In D30795#692443, @hselasky wrote:

The commit message has some spelling errors - can you fix?

In D30767#691741, @manu wrote:

Where is that used ? Can't find anything in the 5.5-wip branch.

Could you test https://reviews.freebsd.org/D30542 ?
It should fix

Cannot gain exklusive access to the input device
Occurs when using legacy drivers for FreeBSD

While here use bitwise operations for UMS_EVDEV_OPENED flag.

In D30020#673848, @greg_unrelenting.technology wrote:

Cannot gain exklusive access to the input device

You are doing EVIOCGRAB, so it would be exclusive against other evdev clients.
But yes, that currently won't exclude keyboards from the vt console, or mouses from various legacy interfaces (that moused uses, etc.).
Shouldn't be an issue if you do have a GUI running, but of course not every VM host is a desktop.
Pinging @wulf — would be nice to make evdev_grab_client tell the driver to pause vt kbd events etc.

In D29111#654477, @trasz wrote:

Seems to work perfectly for at least fstatat(2) and fchownat(2). Thanks for working on it!

In D29323#665100, @kib wrote:

Fix propagating FKQALLOWED

Could you please give me the min example?

Move FKQALLOWED to the final f_flag value.

Check access on open and allow kevent vnode filter for O_PATH files if VOP_ACCESS(VREAD) passed.

Why VWRITE?

It depends on orthogonality of O_PATH
If we consider O_PATH flag to be orthogonal to other access mode flags like O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY and O_RDWR, we should pass VWRITE to VOP_ACCESS if O_WRONLY or O_RDWR is specified in open() flag list.
If O_PATH is just a next access mode in the list and it can not be combined with other aforementioned O_* flags, then only VREAD should be passed to VOP_ACCESS unconditionally.

You mean, with O_PATH we should check the snapshot of current access rights when fd is passed to kqueue for vnode filter?

Can you elaborate more?

Do we still consider it wrong?

In D29323#663265, @kib wrote:

Can you formulate exactly what should we deny? I do not see how to limit this usefully, unless you can provide a criteria, I will roll back enablement of the kqueue' vnode filter.

I am able to open 600 root:wheel files as ordinary user with O_PATH flag added. Is it intended behavior?
If yes, we should deny kevent() for such a fds as it is a security hole.

In D28746#643683, @manu wrote:

I agree with Warner here, having a table would be nicer.

In D28543#638978, @imp wrote:

In D28543#638950, @wulf wrote:

Could you share the HID report descriptor of your device?

How do I do that?

In D28521#638841, @james.wright_digital-chaos.com wrote:

Thanks! Would you be able to commit it for me?

Could you share the HID report descriptor of your device?