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- Jul 4 2018, 7:23 PM (423 w, 1 d)
Fri, Aug 7
Thu, Aug 6
Fri, Jul 31
Thu, Jul 30
But LGTM aside from that
Thanks
Looks like phab mangled my tabs so the updated lines are all using spaces :(
I just used their email address for Reported by because given (a) the lack of history with the project (b) no trace of them existing anywhere else online (c) the low-quality suspicious nature of the patches (d) the name being one of *the* quintessential placeholders, I am suspicious as to whether it's their real name.
There's also lib/libc/gen/tls.c for PT_TLS
Wed, Jul 29
Fixed properly in 1e39a314d870e312f623199e146eda6bdbc293a3.
I don't think you tested this.
Tue, Jul 28
Mon, Jul 27
Sun, Jul 19
D58301 seems a better alternative to this?
bus_read_8 has been replace to bus_space_read series in sys/bus.h.
Huh, I hadn't thought of doing it this way. This does seem like a better approach than D58318 and, assuming there's no concern about other code accidentally using these (which is no different to the intent of the existing bus_read_8/bus_write_8 stubbing), reintroducing the READ8/WRITE8 macros (whether called that or something else).
Sat, Jul 18
Fri, Jul 17
Jul 13 2026
(But also happy with the current diff if you'd rather go with that)
Jul 11 2026
Ok, so long as everyone's in agreement that this ultimately needs to land in FreeBSD as a vendor import of a new upstream release, I'm happy
Jul 10 2026
I don't see any of this upstream at https://gitlab.com/alfix/bsddialog, nor even as a merge request there?
Jul 8 2026
Jul 7 2026
Maybe for now it should just be "if ${_tool} is ld and a relative symlink to the same directory then wrap that too"?
You can't unconditionally add it though. For XLD it's probably ok to just check whether it's "ld" or not, but for LD I don't know what the right thing to do is.
Hm. If the link is absolute, we definitely don't need to do anything to it, and if the link is relative, well, who knows? We might already be linking it, copying it, adding our own wrapper, etc.
Jul 6 2026
The untested https://termbin.com/tmhd is what my mental model is from reading the manpage and thinking about what sensible semantics would be. Maybe it should follow the existing locking discipline as in this patch, though I don't obviously see why that complexity is important for slightly shrinking the lock duration.
Jul 5 2026
Jul 1 2026
We may still end up with local diffs to include it in places that upstream doesn't, though
Linux lets you mprotect(PROT_MTE) to enable it. I don't know about disabling.
Would inverting it to PV_MTE_DIRTY not make more sense, as then the default state (and pages that aren't even mapped with tags enabled) is 0?
Jun 29 2026
Implementation-wise it seems reasonable, but every time bsdinstall hardening gains an option the security world cries out in pain over having sensible defaults and good UX :')
Fixes: 7a58744fd0f1 ("Split out the attachment from the generic-ehci driver")
Jun 27 2026
Jun 25 2026
Jun 22 2026
The change itself looks fine but I think the commit message needs rewriting. It is quite verbose on irrelevant details (like how bus_(space_)* foo work under the hood), and talks about data on the PCI bus (which is implementation, not architecture). Also the bug reference should follow the proper format (see tools/tools/git/hooks/prepare-commit-msg). Honestly the commit message would be better if it was entirely replaced with something like:
Jun 8 2026
Jun 4 2026
Hm, this'll break if building on Linux... don't know if GCE is one of the ones for which that's now supported, probably not, but a bit sad to have this
Jun 3 2026
Hm, seems the current version is the same as the arm file, and now it's the same as the aarch64 one? I'm guessing copying from arm is how this came to be...
Jun 2 2026
Jun 1 2026
Having said that, what is the use case you have for these? Generally speaking you shouldn't be using sub-word atomics unless absolutely needed, since performance will be worse.
Surely these belong in atomic_subword.h or similar? They're not at all specific to RISC-V, and other architectures lack various of these.
May 28 2026
I mean, sure, I guess, but what's the threat model here? I sure hope you trust the tarballs you're unpacking to install a system not to be malicious, otherwise what's the point?