In addition to reducing lines of code, this also ensures that the full
allocation is always zeroed avoiding possible bugs with incorrect
lengths passed to explicit_bzero().
Suggested by: cem
Details
Details
- Reviewers
cem delphij jmg - Group Reviewers
csprng O3: Kernel Random Numbers Generator - Commits
- rS362624: Use zfree() instead of explicit_bzero() and free().
- cryptocheck -a all -z for cryptosoft, aesni, and ccr
- IPsec over both IPv4 (AES-CBC + SHA1 and AES-GCM) and IPv6 (AES-GCM)
- KTLS via ktls_ocf
- geli onetime using AES-XTS
Diff Detail
Diff Detail
- Repository
- rS FreeBSD src repository - subversion
- Lint
Lint Not Applicable - Unit
Tests Not Applicable
Event Timeline
Comment Actions
LGTM to me, other than the one question. Approved by: csprng(cem) for the random(4) change.
| sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c | ||
|---|---|---|
| 1437–1438 ↗ | (On Diff #73605) | This changes the logic. Are these pointers definitely initialized to NULL if axf == NULL? |
| sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c | ||
|---|---|---|
| 1437–1438 ↗ | (On Diff #73605) | Yes, the session is implicitly zeroed on creation similar to device softcs and is only set to non-NULL values if we have an auth transform in the session. I think the new version is more concise and a bit more fail-safe. The old version used axf->ctxszize for the length to zero, so had to be conditional on the check. |