At a basic level, remove assumptions about the underlying algorithm (such as
output block size and reseeding requirements) from the algorithm-independent
logic in randomdev.c. Chacha20 does not have many of the restrictions that
AES-ICM does as a PRF (Pseudo-Random Function), because it has a cipher
block size of 256 bits. The motivation is that by generalizing the API,
Chacha is not penalized by the limitations of AES.
In READ_RANDOM_UIO, first attempt to NOWAIT allocate a large enough buffer
for the entire user request, or the maximal input we'll accept between
signal checking, whichever is smaller. The idea is that the implementation
of any randomdev algorithm is then free to divide up large requests in
whatever fashion it sees fit.
As part of this, two responsibilities from the "algorithm-generic" randomdev
code are pushed down into the Fortuna ra_read implementation (and any other
future or out-of-tree ra_read implementations):
- If an algorithm needs to rekey every N bytes, it is responsible for handling that in ra_read(). (I.e., Fortuna's 1MB rekey interval for AES block generation.)
- If an algorithm uses a block cipher that doesn't tolerate partial-block requests (again, e.g., AES), it is also responsible for handling that in ra_read().
Several APIs are changed from u_int buffer length to the more canonical
size_t. Several APIs are changed from taking a blockcount to a bytecount,
to permit PRFs like Chacha20 to directly generate quantities of output that
are not multiples of RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE (AES block size).
The Fortuna algorithm is changed to NOT rekey every 1MiB when in Chacha20
mode (kern.random.use_chacha20_cipher="1"). This is explicitly supported by
the math in FS&K §9.4 (Ferguson, Schneier, and Kohno; "Cryptography
Engineering"), as well as by their conclusion: "If we had a block cipher
with a 256-bit block size, then the collisions would not have been an issue