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Differential D15779

sysutils/storcli: update to 7.5
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Authored by fernape on Jun 12 2018, 5:22 PM.
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tcberner
tz
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rP473045: sysutils/storcli: Update to 7.5
Summary

Sent by maintainer via PR 228777

This version needs to be downloaded manually after accepting the license agreement.

Test Plan
  • portlint -AC OK
  • poudriere builds for {10.4,11.1}{amd64,i386}, 12i386 OK
  • run test in 11.1 OK (light as I don't have a RAID config)

Diff Detail

Repository
rP FreeBSD ports repository
Lint
No Lint Coverage
Unit
No Test Coverage
Build Status
Buildable 17312
Build 17147: arc lint + arc unit

Event Timeline

fernape created this revision.Jun 12 2018, 5:22 PM
Herald added a subscriber: mat. · View Herald TranscriptJun 12 2018, 5:22 PM
Harbormaster completed remote builds in B17203: Diff 43659.Jun 12 2018, 5:22 PM
tcberner added inline comments.Jun 12 2018, 5:41 PM
sysutils/storcli/Makefile
4

oO

fernape updated this revision to Diff 43660.Jun 12 2018, 6:18 PM

Using a sane number terminology.

Note that in the web site, the version is advertised as 7.5.
I would keep the .504 revision number in case there are future revisions.

Harbormaster completed remote builds in B17204: Diff 43660.Jun 12 2018, 6:18 PM
tcberner added a comment.Jun 15 2018, 6:45 PM

Your last change looks broken :)

fernape updated this revision to Diff 43841.Jun 15 2018, 6:57 PM

Trying to fix previuos arc diff update...

Harbormaster completed remote builds in B17312: Diff 43841.Jun 15 2018, 6:57 PM
fernape added a comment.Jun 15 2018, 7:00 PM

I thought I uploaded only the DISTVERSION changes, but I didn't. The new changes are all there (the check for the distfile and so...). I had to expand the whole file to see it in the review.

How is this broken? I'm sure I'm missing something here... :S

fernape added a comment.Jun 15 2018, 7:10 PM
In D15779#334761, @fernape wrote:

I thought I uploaded only the DISTVERSION changes, but I didn't. The new changes are all there (the check for the distfile and so...). I had to expand the whole file to see it in the review.

How is this broken? I'm sure I'm missing something here... :S

Arrrghhh... never mind. I saw the problem.

fernape updated this revision to Diff 43852.Jun 15 2018, 9:32 PM

Unbreak the port by setting the proper DISTNAME

Harbormaster completed remote builds in B17318: Diff 43852.Jun 15 2018, 9:32 PM
tcberner added inline comments.Jun 16 2018, 12:39 PM
sysutils/storcli/Makefile
33

^ it would probably make sense to reuse ${DISTNAME} or ${DISTFILES} here as to not retype the whole 16-digit crazyness .

fernape updated this revision to Diff 43904.Jun 16 2018, 4:07 PM

Use DISTNAME instead of repeating the same horrible version number.

Harbormaster completed remote builds in B17346: Diff 43904.Jun 16 2018, 4:07 PM
fernape marked an inline comment as done.Jun 16 2018, 4:08 PM
fernape added a comment.Jun 19 2018, 8:18 PM

Does the-horrible-version-number port update look good? :-)

tcberner added inline comments.Jun 20 2018, 4:29 AM
sysutils/storcli/Makefile
33

^ ${EXTRACT_SUFX} instead of .zip?

33

^ no <tab> after =

35

^ missing <tab> after =

fernape updated this revision to Diff 44152.Jun 20 2018, 3:53 PM
  • Add missing tabs
  • Use ${EXTRACT_SUFX} where appropriate
Harbormaster completed remote builds in B17482: Diff 44152.Jun 20 2018, 3:53 PM
fernape marked 3 inline comments as done.Jun 20 2018, 3:55 PM
tcberner requested changes to this revision.Jun 21 2018, 5:44 PM
tcberner added inline comments.
sysutils/storcli/Makefile
26

'^ you seem to have lost a \n

This revision now requires changes to proceed.Jun 21 2018, 5:44 PM
fernape updated this revision to Diff 44246.Jun 21 2018, 5:56 PM

Add missing \n !! :S

Harbormaster completed remote builds in B17519: Diff 44246.Jun 21 2018, 5:56 PM
tcberner accepted this revision.Jun 21 2018, 6:29 PM

Looks good now. -- You can commit it, if the maintainer is fine with it too.

This revision is now accepted and ready to land.Jun 21 2018, 6:29 PM
Closed by commit rP473045: sysutils/storcli: Update to 7.5 (authored by fernape). · Explain WhyJun 22 2018, 3:37 PM
This revision was automatically updated to reflect the committed changes.

Revision Contents
Changeset List

PathSize
sysutils/
storcli/
28 lines
6 lines

Diff 43841

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sysutils/storcli/Makefile

Show First 20 Lines • Show All 97 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines
#endif #endif
int old_mlock = 0; int old_mlock = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, old_mlock, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &old_mlock, 0, SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, old_mlock, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &old_mlock, 0,
"Do not apply RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on mlockall"); "Do not apply RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on mlockall");
static int mincore_mapped = 1; static int mincore_mapped = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, mincore_mapped, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &mincore_mapped, 0, SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, mincore_mapped, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &mincore_mapped, 0,
"mincore reports mappings, not residency"); "mincore reports mappings, not residency");
static int imply_prot_max = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, imply_prot_max, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &imply_prot_max, 0,
emasteUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

s/mincore_mapped/imply_prot_max/

emaste: `s/mincore_mapped/imply_prot_max/`
"Imply maximum page permissions in mmap() when none are specified.");
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

sysctl description strings usually don't contain a period.

markj: sysctl description strings usually don't contain a period.
#ifdef MAP_32BIT #ifdef MAP_32BIT
#define MAP_32BIT_MAX_ADDR ((vm_offset_t)1 << 31) #define MAP_32BIT_MAX_ADDR ((vm_offset_t)1 << 31)
#endif #endif
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct sbrk_args { struct sbrk_args {
int incr; int incr;
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 68 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines
kern_mmap(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot, int flags, kern_mmap(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot, int flags,
int fd, off_t pos) int fd, off_t pos)
{ {
struct vmspace *vms; struct vmspace *vms;
struct file *fp; struct file *fp;
vm_offset_t addr; vm_offset_t addr;
vm_size_t pageoff; vm_size_t pageoff;
vm_prot_t cap_maxprot; vm_prot_t cap_maxprot;
int align, error; int align, error, max_prot;
cap_rights_t rights; cap_rights_t rights;
if ((prot & ~(_PROT_ALL | PROT_MAX(_PROT_ALL))) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
emasteUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

This has the effect of masking invalid flags (e.g. PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | 0x100000 or 0xffff in tests/sys/vm/mmap_test.c).

emaste: This has the effect of masking invalid flags (e.g. `PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | 0x100000` or…
max_prot = PROT_MAX_EXTRACT(prot);
prot = PROT_EXTRACT(prot);
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

Don't we also need to verify that prot is a subset of max_prot?

markj: Don't we also need to verify that prot is a subset of max_prot?
/*
* Always honor PROT_MAX if set. If not, default to all
* permissions unless we're implying maximum permissions.
*
* XXX: should be tunable per process and ABI.
*/
if (max_prot == 0)
max_prot = (imply_prot_max && prot != PROT_NONE) ?
prot : _PROT_ALL;
kibUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

I would write this as
`
max_prot = imply_prot_max ? prot : _PROT_ALL
`

kib: I would write this as ` max_prot = imply_prot_max ? prot : _PROT_ALL `
vms = td->td_proc->p_vmspace; vms = td->td_proc->p_vmspace;
fp = NULL; fp = NULL;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd); AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
addr = addr0; addr = addr0;
/* /*
* Ignore old flags that used to be defined but did not do anything. * Ignore old flags that used to be defined but did not do anything.
*/ */
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 126 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines error = vm_mmap_object(&vms->vm_map, &addr, size, VM_PROT_NONE,
VM_PROT_NONE, flags, NULL, pos, FALSE, td); VM_PROT_NONE, flags, NULL, pos, FALSE, td);
} else if ((flags & MAP_ANON) != 0) { } else if ((flags & MAP_ANON) != 0) {
/* /*
* Mapping blank space is trivial. * Mapping blank space is trivial.
* *
* This relies on VM_PROT_* matching PROT_*. * This relies on VM_PROT_* matching PROT_*.
*/ */
error = vm_mmap_object(&vms->vm_map, &addr, size, prot, error = vm_mmap_object(&vms->vm_map, &addr, size, prot,
VM_PROT_ALL, flags, NULL, pos, FALSE, td); max_prot, flags, NULL, pos, FALSE, td);
} else { } else {
/* /*
* Mapping file, get fp for validation and don't let the * Mapping file, get fp for validation and don't let the
* descriptor disappear on us if we block. Check capability * descriptor disappear on us if we block. Check capability
* rights, but also return the maximum rights to be combined * rights, but also return the maximum rights to be combined
* with maxprot later. * with maxprot later.
*/ */
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_MMAP); cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_MMAP);
if (prot & PROT_READ) if (prot & PROT_READ)
cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_R); cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_R);
if ((flags & MAP_SHARED) != 0) { if ((flags & MAP_SHARED) != 0) {
if (prot & PROT_WRITE) if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_W); cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_W);
} }
if (prot & PROT_EXEC) if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_X); cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_X);
error = fget_mmap(td, fd, &rights, &cap_maxprot, &fp); error = fget_mmap(td, fd, &rights, &cap_maxprot, &fp);
if (error != 0) if (error != 0)
goto done; goto done;
if ((flags & (MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE)) == 0 && if ((flags & (MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE)) == 0 &&
markjUnsubmitted
Not Done
Inline Actions

Shouldn't it be (max_prot & cap_maxprot) == max_prot? Otherwise userland can trigger this assertion by requesting a PROT_MAX(PROT_READ) | PROT_READ mapping using a descriptor with read and write rights.

markj: Shouldn't it be `(max_prot & cap_maxprot) == max_prot`? Otherwise userland can trigger this…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

My belief was that this can't happen because of the way fget_mmap is implemented, but rereading, it looks like that's only true when CAPABILITIES is defined (in which case cap_maxprot == prot so this is safe because prot must be a subset of max_prot per the check above). In the non-CAPABILITIES case cap_maxprot is VM_PROT_ALL so this will fail. Dropping the assertion may be the best fix.

brooks: My belief was that this can't happen because of the way fget_mmap is implemented, but rereading…
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

Sorry, I don't see why that assertion worked even with CAPABILITIES defined. fget_mmap() returns the maximum protections permitted by capabilities on the descriptor.

markj: Sorry, I don't see why that assertion worked even with CAPABILITIES defined. fget_mmap()…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

On further reading, you're correct.

brooks: On further reading, you're correct.
td->td_proc->p_osrel >= P_OSREL_MAP_FSTRICT) { td->td_proc->p_osrel >= P_OSREL_MAP_FSTRICT) {
error = EINVAL; error = EINVAL;
goto done; goto done;
} }
/* This relies on VM_PROT_* matching PROT_*. */ /* This relies on VM_PROT_* matching PROT_*. */
error = fo_mmap(fp, &vms->vm_map, &addr, size, prot, error = fo_mmap(fp, &vms->vm_map, &addr, size, prot,
cap_maxprot, flags, pos, td); max_prot & cap_maxprot, flags, pos, td);
kibUnsubmitted
Not Done
Inline Actions

Should we deny the request if (max_prot & cap_maxprot) != max_prot, so that user knows that the call was not really satisfied ?

kib: Should we deny the request if `(max_prot & cap_maxprot) != max_prot`, so that user knows that…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

I'm leaning toward not. I think we'd only want to error when we'd explicitly passed a PROT_MAX(FOO) expression so we'd have to add state for that since we don't want to fail when max_prot defaults to _PROT_ALL or when it's implied. We'd also just add yet another inexplicable EINVAL for a rare case.

brooks: I'm leaning toward not. I think we'd only want to error when we'd explicitly passed a PROT_MAX…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

I've added a KASSERT of this because I'm convinced that with the (prot & max_prot) == prot check above that this will always be safe (cap_maxprot ends up set to something derived directly from prot).

brooks: I've added a KASSERT of this because I'm convinced that with the `(prot & max_prot) == prot`…
} }
if (error == 0) if (error == 0)
td->td_retval[0] = (register_t) (addr + pageoff); td->td_retval[0] = (register_t) (addr + pageoff);
done: done:
if (fp) if (fp)
fdrop(fp, td); fdrop(fp, td);
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 214 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Linessys_mprotect(struct thread *td, struct mprotect_args *uap)
return (kern_mprotect(td, (uintptr_t)uap->addr, uap->len, uap->prot)); return (kern_mprotect(td, (uintptr_t)uap->addr, uap->len, uap->prot));
} }
int int
kern_mprotect(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot) kern_mprotect(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot)
{ {
vm_offset_t addr; vm_offset_t addr;
vm_size_t pageoff; vm_size_t pageoff;
int vm_error, max_prot;
addr = addr0; addr = addr0;
if ((prot & ~(_PROT_ALL | PROT_MAX(_PROT_ALL))) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

This check is interesting. Linux documents this behavior (EINVAL for invalid protections), but POSIX seems to endorse our silent stripping. I'm inclined to think Linux is more correct here.

brooks: This check is interesting. Linux documents this behavior (EINVAL for invalid protections), but…
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

We should probably document this error in the man page too.

markj: We should probably document this error in the man page too.
max_prot = PROT_MAX_EXTRACT(prot);
prot = (prot & VM_PROT_ALL); prot = (prot & VM_PROT_ALL);
alcUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

While not strictly necessary for correctness, I would advocate changing this to

prot = PROT_EXTRACT(prot);
alc: While not strictly necessary for correctness, I would advocate changing this to ``` prot =…
pageoff = (addr & PAGE_MASK); pageoff = (addr & PAGE_MASK);
addr -= pageoff; addr -= pageoff;
size += pageoff; size += pageoff;
size = (vm_size_t) round_page(size); size = (vm_size_t) round_page(size);
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32 #ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) { if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) {
if (((addr + size) & 0xffffffff) < addr) if (((addr + size) & 0xffffffff) < addr)
return (EINVAL); return (EINVAL);
} else } else
#endif #endif
if (addr + size < addr) if (addr + size < addr)
return (EINVAL); return (EINVAL);
switch (vm_map_protect(&td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map, addr, if (max_prot != 0) {
addr + size, prot, FALSE)) { if ((max_prot & prot) != prot)
return (EINVAL);
vm_error = vm_map_protect(&td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map,
kibUnsubmitted
Not Done
Inline Actions

I do not understand this.

Suppose you have a readonly shared mapping of the file, which was created using O_RDONLY file descriptor. Isn't this addition allows to add VM_PROT_WRITE to the corresponding vm_map_entry max_prot ? Then on the next step user can mprotect(2) the mapping to modify the file.

kib: I do not understand this. Suppose you have a readonly shared mapping of the file, which was…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

I think this does the right thing, but I had to read the implementation a couple times to convince myself. In vm_map_protect, when set_max is true, the new max_prot is checked against existing entries max_protection in the first loop over the region:

if ((new_prot & current->max_protection) != new_prot) {
  vm_map_unlock(map);
  return (KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE);
}

This rejects attempts to upgrade max_prot.

brooks: I think this does the right thing, but I had to read the implementation a couple times to…
addr, addr + size, max_prot, TRUE);
if (vm_error != KERN_SUCCESS)
goto error_out;
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

You can avoid a goto by initializing vm_error to KERN_SUCCESS and skipping the final vm_map_protect() if vm_error != KERN_SUCCESS.

markj: You can avoid a goto by initializing `vm_error` to `KERN_SUCCESS` and skipping the final…
}
vm_error = vm_map_protect(&td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map, addr,
addr + size, prot, FALSE);
error_out:
switch (vm_error) {
case KERN_SUCCESS: case KERN_SUCCESS:
return (0); return (0);
case KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE: case KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE:
return (EACCES); return (EACCES);
case KERN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: case KERN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
return (ENOMEM); return (ENOMEM);
} }
return (EINVAL); return (EINVAL);
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 977 Lines • Show Last 20 Lines
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sysutils/storcli/distinfo

Show First 20 Lines • Show All 97 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines
#endif #endif
int old_mlock = 0; int old_mlock = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, old_mlock, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &old_mlock, 0, SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, old_mlock, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &old_mlock, 0,
"Do not apply RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on mlockall"); "Do not apply RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on mlockall");
static int mincore_mapped = 1; static int mincore_mapped = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, mincore_mapped, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &mincore_mapped, 0, SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, mincore_mapped, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &mincore_mapped, 0,
"mincore reports mappings, not residency"); "mincore reports mappings, not residency");
static int imply_prot_max = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, imply_prot_max, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &imply_prot_max, 0,
emasteUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

s/mincore_mapped/imply_prot_max/

emaste: `s/mincore_mapped/imply_prot_max/`
"Imply maximum page permissions in mmap() when none are specified.");
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

sysctl description strings usually don't contain a period.

markj: sysctl description strings usually don't contain a period.
#ifdef MAP_32BIT #ifdef MAP_32BIT
#define MAP_32BIT_MAX_ADDR ((vm_offset_t)1 << 31) #define MAP_32BIT_MAX_ADDR ((vm_offset_t)1 << 31)
#endif #endif
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct sbrk_args { struct sbrk_args {
int incr; int incr;
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 68 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines
kern_mmap(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot, int flags, kern_mmap(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot, int flags,
int fd, off_t pos) int fd, off_t pos)
{ {
struct vmspace *vms; struct vmspace *vms;
struct file *fp; struct file *fp;
vm_offset_t addr; vm_offset_t addr;
vm_size_t pageoff; vm_size_t pageoff;
vm_prot_t cap_maxprot; vm_prot_t cap_maxprot;
int align, error; int align, error, max_prot;
cap_rights_t rights; cap_rights_t rights;
if ((prot & ~(_PROT_ALL | PROT_MAX(_PROT_ALL))) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
emasteUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

This has the effect of masking invalid flags (e.g. PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | 0x100000 or 0xffff in tests/sys/vm/mmap_test.c).

emaste: This has the effect of masking invalid flags (e.g. `PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | 0x100000` or…
max_prot = PROT_MAX_EXTRACT(prot);
prot = PROT_EXTRACT(prot);
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

Don't we also need to verify that prot is a subset of max_prot?

markj: Don't we also need to verify that prot is a subset of max_prot?
/*
* Always honor PROT_MAX if set. If not, default to all
* permissions unless we're implying maximum permissions.
*
* XXX: should be tunable per process and ABI.
*/
if (max_prot == 0)
max_prot = (imply_prot_max && prot != PROT_NONE) ?
prot : _PROT_ALL;
kibUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

I would write this as
`
max_prot = imply_prot_max ? prot : _PROT_ALL
`

kib: I would write this as ` max_prot = imply_prot_max ? prot : _PROT_ALL `
vms = td->td_proc->p_vmspace; vms = td->td_proc->p_vmspace;
fp = NULL; fp = NULL;
AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd); AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd);
addr = addr0; addr = addr0;
/* /*
* Ignore old flags that used to be defined but did not do anything. * Ignore old flags that used to be defined but did not do anything.
*/ */
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 126 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Lines error = vm_mmap_object(&vms->vm_map, &addr, size, VM_PROT_NONE,
VM_PROT_NONE, flags, NULL, pos, FALSE, td); VM_PROT_NONE, flags, NULL, pos, FALSE, td);
} else if ((flags & MAP_ANON) != 0) { } else if ((flags & MAP_ANON) != 0) {
/* /*
* Mapping blank space is trivial. * Mapping blank space is trivial.
* *
* This relies on VM_PROT_* matching PROT_*. * This relies on VM_PROT_* matching PROT_*.
*/ */
error = vm_mmap_object(&vms->vm_map, &addr, size, prot, error = vm_mmap_object(&vms->vm_map, &addr, size, prot,
VM_PROT_ALL, flags, NULL, pos, FALSE, td); max_prot, flags, NULL, pos, FALSE, td);
} else { } else {
/* /*
* Mapping file, get fp for validation and don't let the * Mapping file, get fp for validation and don't let the
* descriptor disappear on us if we block. Check capability * descriptor disappear on us if we block. Check capability
* rights, but also return the maximum rights to be combined * rights, but also return the maximum rights to be combined
* with maxprot later. * with maxprot later.
*/ */
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_MMAP); cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_MMAP);
if (prot & PROT_READ) if (prot & PROT_READ)
cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_R); cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_R);
if ((flags & MAP_SHARED) != 0) { if ((flags & MAP_SHARED) != 0) {
if (prot & PROT_WRITE) if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_W); cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_W);
} }
if (prot & PROT_EXEC) if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_X); cap_rights_set(&rights, CAP_MMAP_X);
error = fget_mmap(td, fd, &rights, &cap_maxprot, &fp); error = fget_mmap(td, fd, &rights, &cap_maxprot, &fp);
if (error != 0) if (error != 0)
goto done; goto done;
if ((flags & (MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE)) == 0 && if ((flags & (MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE)) == 0 &&
markjUnsubmitted
Not Done
Inline Actions

Shouldn't it be (max_prot & cap_maxprot) == max_prot? Otherwise userland can trigger this assertion by requesting a PROT_MAX(PROT_READ) | PROT_READ mapping using a descriptor with read and write rights.

markj: Shouldn't it be `(max_prot & cap_maxprot) == max_prot`? Otherwise userland can trigger this…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

My belief was that this can't happen because of the way fget_mmap is implemented, but rereading, it looks like that's only true when CAPABILITIES is defined (in which case cap_maxprot == prot so this is safe because prot must be a subset of max_prot per the check above). In the non-CAPABILITIES case cap_maxprot is VM_PROT_ALL so this will fail. Dropping the assertion may be the best fix.

brooks: My belief was that this can't happen because of the way fget_mmap is implemented, but rereading…
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

Sorry, I don't see why that assertion worked even with CAPABILITIES defined. fget_mmap() returns the maximum protections permitted by capabilities on the descriptor.

markj: Sorry, I don't see why that assertion worked even with CAPABILITIES defined. fget_mmap()…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

On further reading, you're correct.

brooks: On further reading, you're correct.
td->td_proc->p_osrel >= P_OSREL_MAP_FSTRICT) { td->td_proc->p_osrel >= P_OSREL_MAP_FSTRICT) {
error = EINVAL; error = EINVAL;
goto done; goto done;
} }
/* This relies on VM_PROT_* matching PROT_*. */ /* This relies on VM_PROT_* matching PROT_*. */
error = fo_mmap(fp, &vms->vm_map, &addr, size, prot, error = fo_mmap(fp, &vms->vm_map, &addr, size, prot,
cap_maxprot, flags, pos, td); max_prot & cap_maxprot, flags, pos, td);
kibUnsubmitted
Not Done
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Should we deny the request if (max_prot & cap_maxprot) != max_prot, so that user knows that the call was not really satisfied ?

kib: Should we deny the request if `(max_prot & cap_maxprot) != max_prot`, so that user knows that…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
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I'm leaning toward not. I think we'd only want to error when we'd explicitly passed a PROT_MAX(FOO) expression so we'd have to add state for that since we don't want to fail when max_prot defaults to _PROT_ALL or when it's implied. We'd also just add yet another inexplicable EINVAL for a rare case.

brooks: I'm leaning toward not. I think we'd only want to error when we'd explicitly passed a PROT_MAX…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
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I've added a KASSERT of this because I'm convinced that with the (prot & max_prot) == prot check above that this will always be safe (cap_maxprot ends up set to something derived directly from prot).

brooks: I've added a KASSERT of this because I'm convinced that with the `(prot & max_prot) == prot`…
} }
if (error == 0) if (error == 0)
td->td_retval[0] = (register_t) (addr + pageoff); td->td_retval[0] = (register_t) (addr + pageoff);
done: done:
if (fp) if (fp)
fdrop(fp, td); fdrop(fp, td);
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 214 Lines • ▼ Show 20 Linessys_mprotect(struct thread *td, struct mprotect_args *uap)
return (kern_mprotect(td, (uintptr_t)uap->addr, uap->len, uap->prot)); return (kern_mprotect(td, (uintptr_t)uap->addr, uap->len, uap->prot));
} }
int int
kern_mprotect(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot) kern_mprotect(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot)
{ {
vm_offset_t addr; vm_offset_t addr;
vm_size_t pageoff; vm_size_t pageoff;
int vm_error, max_prot;
addr = addr0; addr = addr0;
if ((prot & ~(_PROT_ALL | PROT_MAX(_PROT_ALL))) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

This check is interesting. Linux documents this behavior (EINVAL for invalid protections), but POSIX seems to endorse our silent stripping. I'm inclined to think Linux is more correct here.

brooks: This check is interesting. Linux documents this behavior (EINVAL for invalid protections), but…
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

We should probably document this error in the man page too.

markj: We should probably document this error in the man page too.
max_prot = PROT_MAX_EXTRACT(prot);
prot = (prot & VM_PROT_ALL); prot = (prot & VM_PROT_ALL);
alcUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

While not strictly necessary for correctness, I would advocate changing this to

prot = PROT_EXTRACT(prot);
alc: While not strictly necessary for correctness, I would advocate changing this to ``` prot =…
pageoff = (addr & PAGE_MASK); pageoff = (addr & PAGE_MASK);
addr -= pageoff; addr -= pageoff;
size += pageoff; size += pageoff;
size = (vm_size_t) round_page(size); size = (vm_size_t) round_page(size);
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32 #ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32
if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) { if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) {
if (((addr + size) & 0xffffffff) < addr) if (((addr + size) & 0xffffffff) < addr)
return (EINVAL); return (EINVAL);
} else } else
#endif #endif
if (addr + size < addr) if (addr + size < addr)
return (EINVAL); return (EINVAL);
switch (vm_map_protect(&td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map, addr, if (max_prot != 0) {
addr + size, prot, FALSE)) { if ((max_prot & prot) != prot)
return (EINVAL);
vm_error = vm_map_protect(&td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map,
kibUnsubmitted
Not Done
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I do not understand this.

Suppose you have a readonly shared mapping of the file, which was created using O_RDONLY file descriptor. Isn't this addition allows to add VM_PROT_WRITE to the corresponding vm_map_entry max_prot ? Then on the next step user can mprotect(2) the mapping to modify the file.

kib: I do not understand this. Suppose you have a readonly shared mapping of the file, which was…
brooksAuthorUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

I think this does the right thing, but I had to read the implementation a couple times to convince myself. In vm_map_protect, when set_max is true, the new max_prot is checked against existing entries max_protection in the first loop over the region:

if ((new_prot & current->max_protection) != new_prot) {
  vm_map_unlock(map);
  return (KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE);
}

This rejects attempts to upgrade max_prot.

brooks: I think this does the right thing, but I had to read the implementation a couple times to…
addr, addr + size, max_prot, TRUE);
if (vm_error != KERN_SUCCESS)
goto error_out;
markjUnsubmitted
Done
Inline Actions

You can avoid a goto by initializing vm_error to KERN_SUCCESS and skipping the final vm_map_protect() if vm_error != KERN_SUCCESS.

markj: You can avoid a goto by initializing `vm_error` to `KERN_SUCCESS` and skipping the final…
}
vm_error = vm_map_protect(&td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map, addr,
addr + size, prot, FALSE);
error_out:
switch (vm_error) {
case KERN_SUCCESS: case KERN_SUCCESS:
return (0); return (0);
case KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE: case KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE:
return (EACCES); return (EACCES);
case KERN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: case KERN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
return (ENOMEM); return (ENOMEM);
} }
return (EINVAL); return (EINVAL);
▲ Show 20 Lines • Show All 977 Lines • Show Last 20 Lines