These messages serve little purpose and break some scripts:
PR: 199855
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
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| Differential D2440 Authored by brooks on May 4 2015, 3:55 PM.
Details Summary These messages serve little purpose and break some scripts: PR: 199855
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Event Timelinebrooks updated this object. Herald added a subscriber: imp. · View Herald TranscriptMay 4 2015, 3:55 PM2015-05-04 15:55:46 (UTC+0) rwatson edited edge metadata. Comment ActionsSeems reasonable to me. I'd rather take sandboxing for granted and not have output. An interesting question, of course, is whether we want a more mature policy than "Is Capsicum compiled into the kernel?" to control whether to fail stop if sandboxing fails. My intuition is that the status quo is fine there -- i.e., that if Capsicum is present we expect to be in a sandbox, and if not, we don't. You could imagine some sort of assert_cap_sandboxed() but I'm also not convinced that adds anything over the current check on the cap_enter() return value. This revision is now accepted and ready to land.May 4 2015, 4:08 PM2015-05-04 16:08:15 (UTC+0) Closed by commit rS282436: Remove "capability mode sandbox enabled" messages. (authored by brooks). · Explain WhyMay 4 2015, 9:45 PM2015-05-04 21:45:07 (UTC+0) This revision was automatically updated to reflect the committed changes.
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Diff 5177 contrib/tcpdump/tcpdump.c
sbin/ping/ping.c
usr.bin/kdump/kdump.c
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