D20967.id59909.diff
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	Index: sys/modules/mac_ipacl/Makefile
	===================================================================
	--- /dev/null
	+++ sys/modules/mac_ipacl/Makefile
	@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
	+# $FreeBSD$
	+
	+.PATH: ${SRCTOP}/sys/security/mac_ipacl
	+
	+KMOD=mac_ipacl
	+SRCS=mac_ipacl.c
	+
	+.include <bsd.kmod.mk>
	Index: sys/netinet/in.c
	===================================================================
	--- sys/netinet/in.c
	+++ sys/netinet/in.c
	@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@
	#include <netinet/udp.h>
	#include <netinet/udp_var.h>

	+#ifdef MAC
	+#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
	+#endif
	+
	static int in_aifaddr_ioctl(u_long, caddr_t, struct ifnet , struct thread );
	static int in_difaddr_ioctl(u_long, caddr_t, struct ifnet , struct thread );

	@@ -372,6 +376,15 @@
	/*
	* See whether address already exist.
	*/
	+
	+#ifdef MAC
	+ /Check if a MAC policy disallows setting the IPv4 address./
	+ error = mac_inet_check_SIOCAIFADDR(td->td_ucred,
	+ &addr->sin_addr, ifp);
	+ if (error)
	+ return (error);
	+#endif
	+
	iaIsFirst = true;
	ia = NULL;
	NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et);
	Index: sys/netinet6/in6.c
	===================================================================
	--- sys/netinet6/in6.c
	+++ sys/netinet6/in6.c
	@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@
	#include <netinet6/in6_fib.h>
	#include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>

	+#ifdef MAC
	+#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
	+#endif

	/*
	* struct in6_ifreq and struct ifreq must be type punnable for common members
	@@ -556,7 +559,14 @@
	{
	struct nd_prefixctl pr0;
	struct nd_prefix *pr;
	-
	+
	+#ifdef MAC
	+ /Check if a MAC policy disallows setting the IPv6 address./
	+ error = mac_inet6_check_SIOCAIFADDR(td->td_ucred,
	+ &sa6->sin6_addr, ifp);
	+ if (error)
	+ goto out;
	+#endif
	/*
	* first, make or update the interface address structure,
	* and link it to the list.
	Index: sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
	===================================================================
	--- sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
	+++ sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
	@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@
	struct vnode;
	struct vop_setlabel_args;

	+struct in_addr;
	+struct in6_addr;
	+
	#include <sys/acl.h> /* XXX acl_type_t */
	#include <sys/types.h> /* accmode_t */

	@@ -153,6 +156,12 @@
	int mac_ifnet_ioctl_set(struct ucred cred, struct ifreq ifr,
	struct ifnet *ifp);

	+/Checks if the IP address is allowed for the interface./
	+int mac_inet_check_SIOCAIFADDR(struct ucred *cred,
	+ const struct in_addr ia, struct ifnet ifp);
	+int mac_inet6_check_SIOCAIFADDR(struct ucred *cred,
	+ const struct in6_addr ia6, struct ifnet ifp);
	+
	int mac_inpcb_check_deliver(struct inpcb inp, struct mbuf m);
	int mac_inpcb_check_visible(struct ucred cred, struct inpcb inp);
	void mac_inpcb_create(struct socket so, struct inpcb inp);
	Index: sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c
	===================================================================
	--- sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c
	+++ sys/security/mac/mac_inet.c
	@@ -108,6 +108,18 @@
	return (0);
	}

	+
	+/* Check with rules in module if the IPv4 address is allowed.*/
	+int
	+mac_inet_check_SIOCAIFADDR(struct ucred cred, const struct in_addr ia,
	+ struct ifnet *ifp)
	+{
	+ int error;
	+
	+ MAC_POLICY_CHECK(ip4_check_jail, cred, ia, ifp);
	+ return (error);
	+}
	+
	static struct label *
	mac_ipq_label_alloc(int flag)
	{
	Index: sys/security/mac/mac_inet6.c
	===================================================================
	--- sys/security/mac/mac_inet6.c
	+++ sys/security/mac/mac_inet6.c
	@@ -173,6 +173,16 @@
	q6->ip6q_label);
	}

	+/* Check with rules in module if the IPv4 address is allowed.*/
	+int
	+mac_inet6_check_SIOCAIFADDR(struct ucred cred, const struct in6_addr ia6,
	+ struct ifnet *ifp)
	+{
	+ int error;
	+
	+ MAC_POLICY_CHECK(ip6_check_jail, cred, ia6, ifp);
	+ return (error);
	+}
	void
	mac_netinet6_nd6_send(struct ifnet ifp, struct mbuf m)
	{
	Index: sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h
	===================================================================
	--- sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h
	+++ sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h
	@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@
	struct vattr;
	struct vnode;

	+struct in_addr;
	+struct in6_addr;
	+
	/*
	* Policy module operations.
	*/
	@@ -238,6 +241,12 @@
	typedef void (mpo_ip6q_update_t)(struct mbuf m, struct label *mlabel,
	struct ip6q q6, struct label q6label);

	+/* Policy ops checking IPv4 and IPv6 address for ipacl.*/
	+typedef int (mpo_ip4_check_jail_t)(struct ucred cred,
	+ const struct in_addr ia, struct ifnet ifp);
	+typedef int (mpo_ip6_check_jail_t)(struct ucred cred,
	+ const struct in6_addr ia6, struct ifnet ifp);
	+
	typedef void (mpo_ipq_create_t)(struct mbuf m, struct label *mlabel,
	struct ipq q, struct label qlabel);
	typedef void (mpo_ipq_destroy_label_t)(struct label label);
	@@ -746,6 +755,9 @@
	mpo_inpcb_destroy_label_t mpo_inpcb_destroy_label;
	mpo_inpcb_init_label_t mpo_inpcb_init_label;
	mpo_inpcb_sosetlabel_t mpo_inpcb_sosetlabel;
	+
	+ mpo_ip4_check_jail_t mpo_ip4_check_jail;
	+ mpo_ip6_check_jail_t mpo_ip6_check_jail;

	mpo_ip6q_create_t mpo_ip6q_create;
	mpo_ip6q_destroy_label_t mpo_ip6q_destroy_label;
	Index: sys/security/mac_ipacl/Makefile
	===================================================================
	--- /dev/null
	+++ sys/security/mac_ipacl/Makefile
	@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
	+KMOD=mac_ipacl
	+SRCS=mac_ipacl.c
	+
	+.include <bsd.kmod.mk>
	Index: sys/security/mac_ipacl/design_notes.txt
	===================================================================
	--- /dev/null
	+++ sys/security/mac_ipacl/design_notes.txt
	@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
	+"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication"
	+------------------------
	+\|mac_ipacl Design Notes\|
	+------------------------
	+
	+Design Goals -
	+------------
	+1. Do we need to check the addresses per interface per vnet-jail or addresses per
	+ vnet-jail?
	+
	+ The first one gives more flexibilty but increases complexity of policy table.
	+ The first is more prefered over the second since it gives ability to restrict
	+ the particular interface of a jail.
	+
	+2. Another question which increses complexity here is- Should jails be allowed to
	+ create new interface(intefaces created after the policy has been loaded? and,
	+ if yes, then how our module will react to the new interface?
	+
	+ I am not sure about this one. But the new interfaces shall not affect the host
	+ until and unless they are connected to the host or other jail. So, they don't
	+ have any effect but this issue should be dealt to prevent any design flaw/bugs.
	+
	+ New interfaces, by default, should not have any rights to set the IP address,
	+ new rules(about the new interface) have to be applied by the host to provide
	+ those rights.
	+
	+3. Another important step is to decide whether to allow all IP addresses or reject
	+ all IP address when the MAC module is loaded?
	+
	+ I'm thinking to allow all address when the module is loaded and then tune it with
	+ a sysctl variable to disallow all. The host can then specify IP address to allow
	+ according to the Policy Table.
	+
	+4. The "Policy Table" may take-
	+ a.) JID(or name of the jail) - the jail id/name for the jail for which the
	+ restriction are to be applied, This identifies that jail.
	+ b.) Network Interface - The network interface which are allowed to set the IP
	+ address and/or which are not?
	+ OR we can say, name of the interfaces that are allowed for setting their IP
	+ c.) IP address/list of IP address which are allowed for particular interface.
	+ d.) Network Prefix(A range of IP address) that is allowed to the jail.
	+ e.) label to allow/reject? But depend on whether we started with all IP or NO IP.
	+ f.) ?
	+
	+5. In policy, we may check the jail by passing the credential and where the thread is
	+ and also if the thread's vnet and intefaces matches.
	+
	+6. How to name the jail in the policy?
	+
	+ I am thinking of using jid to name the jail in the policy. But another question
	+ arises is how to find that jail with that jid. Search for the function that find
	+ your prison with given jid. check prison_find(int jid), this will solve this problem
	+
	+7. should we also check for subnet the jail is choosing? If yes, then we also have to pass
	+ the prefix to the framework.
	+
	+Points
	+(To be kept in mind) -
	+--------------------
	+1. ioctl check calls should be kept generic. Although, currently we are only interested
	+ in VIMAGE JAILS, but in future might need to extend the MAC module to host system,
	+ et cetera.
	+ So, the MAC calls should run for all cases, and checks related to jails and VNET
	+ should be handled later in the Policy Module
	+
	+3. vnet should be checked from socket or interface and not from the thread. This means
	+ we'd probably have to pass one of those in the policy as well.
	+
	+ Passing the interface ifnet to the policy will be more easy/appropriate, since only
	+ it is available as arguement in in.c(in_aifaddr_ioctl) for our MAC checks. Alternatively
	+ we could have moved our check to in_control() for ipv4 case like we have in IPv6 case,
	+ for checking the vnet from socket.
	Index: sys/security/mac_ipacl/mac_ipacl.c
	===================================================================
	--- /dev/null
	+++ sys/security/mac_ipacl/mac_ipacl.c
	@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
	+/* MAC policy module for limiting IP address to a VNET enabled jail. */
	+
	+#include <sys/param.h>
	+#include <sys/module.h>
	+#include <sys/errno.h>
	+#include <sys/kernel.h>
	+#include <sys/mutex.h>
	+#include <sys/priv.h>
	+#include <sys/queue.h>
	+#include <sys/socket.h>
	+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
	+#include <sys/systm.h>
	+#include <sys/types.h>
	+#include <sys/ucred.h>
	+#include <sys/jail.h>
	+
	+#include <net/if.h>
	+#include <net/if_var.h>
	+
	+#include <netinet/in.h>
	+#include <netinet6/scope6_var.h>
	+
	+#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
	+
	+SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
	+
	+static SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, ipacl, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
	+ "TrustedBSD mac_ipacl policy controls");
	+
	+//#ifdef INET
	+static int ipacl_ipv4 = 1;
	+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_ipacl, OID_AUTO, ipv4, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
	+ &ipacl_ipv4, 0, "Enforce mac_ipacl for IPv4 addresses");
	+//#endif
	+
	+//#ifdef INET6
	+static int ipacl_ipv6 = 1;
	+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_ipacl, OID_AUTO, ipv6, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
	+ &ipacl_ipv6, 0, "Enforce mac_ipacl for IPv6 addresses");
	+//#endif
	+
	+static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_IPACL, "ipacl_rule", "Rules for mac_ipacl");
	+
	+#define MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN 1024
	+
	+struct ipacl_addr {
	+ union {
	+ struct in_addr ipv4;
	+ struct in6_addr ipv6;
	+ u_int8_t addr8[16];
	+ u_int16_t addr16[8];
	+ u_int32_t addr32[4];
	+ } ipa; /* 128 bit address*/
	+#define v4 ipa.ipv4
	+#define v6 ipa.ipv6
	+#define addr8 ipa.addr8
	+#define addr16 ipa.addr16
	+#define addr32 ipa.addr32
	+};
	+
	+struct ip_rule {
	+ int jid;
	+ bool allow;
	+ bool subnet_apply; /rule applied on whole subnet/
	+ char if_name[IFNAMSIZ]; /network interface name/
	+ int af; /address family/
	+ struct ipacl_addr addr;
	+ struct ipacl_addr mask;
	+ TAILQ_ENTRY(ip_rule) r_entries;
	+};
	+
	+static struct mtx rule_mtx;
	+static TAILQ_HEAD(rulehead, ip_rule) rule_head;
	+static char rule_string[MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN];
	+
	+static void
	+destroy_rules(struct rulehead *head)
	+{
	+ struct ip_rule *rule;
	+
	+ while ((rule = TAILQ_FIRST(head)) != NULL) {
	+ TAILQ_REMOVE(head, rule, r_entries);
	+ free(rule, M_IPACL);
	+ }
	+}
	+
	+static void
	+ipacl_init(struct mac_policy_conf *conf)
	+{
	+
	+ mtx_init(&rule_mtx, "rule_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
	+ TAILQ_INIT(&rule_head);
	+}
	+
	+static void
	+ipacl_destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *conf)
	+{
	+
	+ mtx_destroy(&rule_mtx);
	+ destroy_rules(&rule_head);
	+}
	+
	+/*
	+ * Note: parsing routines are destructive on the passed string.
	+ */
	+static int
	+parse_rule_element(char element, struct ip_rule *rule)
	+{
	+ char jid, allow, if_name, fam, ip_addr, mask, *p;
	+ struct ip_rule *new;
	+ int error, prefix, i;
	+
	+ error = 0;
	+ new = malloc(sizeof(*new), M_IPACL, M_ZERO \| M_WAITOK);
	+ /* Should we support a jail wildcard? */
	+ jid = strsep(&element, "@");
	+ if (jid == NULL) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ new->jid = strtol(jid, &p, 10);
	+ if (*p != '\0') {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ allow = strsep(&element, "@");
	+ if (allow == NULL) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ new->allow = strtol(allow, &p, 10);
	+ if (*p != '\0') {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ if_name = strsep(&element, "@");
	+ if (sizeof(if_name) > IFNAMSIZ) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ /* Empty interface name is wildcard to all interfaces.*/
	+ bzero(new->if_name, IFNAMSIZ);
	+ bcopy(if_name, new->if_name, strlen(if_name));
	+ fam = strsep(&element, "@");
	+ if (fam == NULL) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ new->af = (strcmp(fam, "AF_INET") == 0) ? AF_INET :
	+ (strcmp(fam, "AF_INET6") == 0) ? AF_INET6 : -1;
	+ if (new->af == -1) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ ip_addr = strsep(&element, "@");
	+ if (ip_addr == NULL) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ if (inet_pton(new->af, ip_addr, new->addr.addr32) != 1) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ mask = element;
	+ if (mask == NULL) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ prefix = strtol(mask, &p, 10);
	+ if (*p != '\0') {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ /Value -1 for prefix make policy applicable to individual IP only./
	+ if (prefix == -1)
	+ new->subnet_apply = false;
	+ else {
	+ new->subnet_apply = true;
	+ if (new->af == AF_INET) {
	+ if (prefix < 0 \|\| prefix > 32) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ if (prefix == 0)
	+ new->mask.addr32[0] = htonl(0);
	+ else
	+ new->mask.addr32[0] =
	+ htonl(~((1 << (32 - prefix)) - 1));
	+ new->addr.addr32[0] &= new->mask.addr32[0];
	+ }
	+ else {
	+ if (prefix < 0 \|\| prefix > 128) {
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ for (i = 0; prefix > 0; prefix -= 8, i++)
	+ new->mask.addr8[i] =
	+ prefix >= 8 ? 0xFF :
	+ (u_int8_t)((0xFFU << (8 - prefix)) & 0xFFU);
	+ for (i=0; i<16; i++)
	+ new->addr.addr8[i] &= new->mask.addr8[i];
	+ }
	+ }
	+out:
	+ if (error != 0) {
	+ free(new, M_IPACL);
	+ *rule = NULL;
	+ } else
	+ *rule = new;
	+ return (error);
	+}
	+
	+/*
	+ * Format of Rule- jid@allow@interface_name@addr_family@ip_addr@subnet_mask
	+ * Example: sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=1@1@epair0b@AF_INET@192.0.2.2@24
	+ */
	+static int
	+parse_rules(char string, struct rulehead head)
	+{
	+ struct ip_rule *new;
	+ char *element;
	+ int error;
	+
	+ error = 0;
	+ while ((element = strsep(&string, ",")) != NULL) {
	+ if (strlen(element) == 0)
	+ continue;
	+ error = parse_rule_element(element, &new);
	+ if (error)
	+ goto out;
	+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, new, r_entries);
	+ }
	+out:
	+ if (error != 0)
	+ destroy_rules(head);
	+ return (error);
	+}
	+
	+static int
	+sysctl_rules(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
	+{
	+ char string, copy_string, *new_string;
	+ struct rulehead head, save_head;
	+ int error;
	+
	+ new_string = NULL;
	+ if (req->newptr != NULL) {
	+ new_string = malloc(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, M_IPACL,
	+ M_WAITOK \| M_ZERO);
	+ mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
	+ strcpy(new_string, rule_string);
	+ mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
	+ string = new_string;
	+ } else
	+ string = rule_string;
	+
	+ error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, req);
	+ if (error)
	+ goto out;
	+
	+ if (req->newptr != NULL) {
	+ copy_string = strdup(string, M_IPACL);
	+ TAILQ_INIT(&head);
	+ error = parse_rules(copy_string, &head);
	+ free(copy_string, M_IPACL);
	+ if (error)
	+ goto out;
	+
	+ TAILQ_INIT(&save_head);
	+ mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
	+ TAILQ_CONCAT(&save_head, &rule_head, r_entries);
	+ TAILQ_CONCAT(&rule_head, &head, r_entries);
	+ strcpy(rule_string, string);
	+ mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
	+ destroy_rules(&save_head);
	+ }
	+out:
	+ if (new_string != NULL)
	+ free(new_string, M_IPACL);
	+ return (error);
	+}
	+SYSCTL_PROC(_security_mac_ipacl, OID_AUTO, rules,
	+ CTLTYPE_STRING\|CTLFLAG_RW, 0, 0, sysctl_rules, "A", "IP ACL Rules");
	+
	+static int
	+rules_check(struct ucred *cred,
	+ struct ipacl_addr ip_addr, struct ifnet ifp)
	+{
	+ struct ip_rule *rule;
	+ int error, i;
	+ bool same_subnet;
	+ error = EPERM;
	+
	+ mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
	+
	+ for (rule = TAILQ_FIRST(&rule_head);
	+ rule != NULL;
	+ rule = TAILQ_NEXT(rule, r_entries)) {
	+
	+ /Skip if current rule applies to different jail./
	+ if (cred->cr_prison->pr_id != rule->jid)
	+ continue;
	+
	+ if (strcmp(rule->if_name, "\0") &&
	+ strcmp(rule->if_name, ifp->if_xname))
	+ continue;
	+
	+ switch (rule->af) {
	+ case AF_INET:
	+ if (rule->subnet_apply) {
	+ if (rule->addr.v4.s_addr !=
	+ (ip_addr->v4.s_addr &
	+ rule->mask.v4.s_addr))
	+ continue;
	+ }
	+ else
	+ if (ip_addr->v4.s_addr !=
	+ rule->addr.v4.s_addr)
	+ continue;
	+ break;
	+ case AF_INET6:
	+ if (rule->subnet_apply) {
	+ same_subnet=true;
	+ for ( i=0 ; i<16 ; i++ )
	+ if (rule->addr.v6.s6_addr[i] !=
	+ (ip_addr->v6.s6_addr[i] &
	+ rule->mask.v6.s6_addr[i])) {
	+ same_subnet=false;
	+ break;
	+ }
	+ if (!same_subnet)
	+ continue;
	+ }
	+ else
	+ if (bcmp(&rule->addr, ip_addr,
	+ sizeof(*ip_addr)))
	+ continue;
	+ break;
	+ default:
	+ error = EINVAL;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (rule->allow)
	+ error = 0;
	+ else
	+ error = EPERM;
	+ }
	+
	+ mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
	+
	+ return (error);
	+}
	+
	+/* Feature request: Can we make this a sysctl policy as well defaulting
	+ * to jails only, but if changed also applying to the base system?
	+ */
	+static int
	+ipacl_ip4_check_jail(struct ucred *cred,
	+ const struct in_addr ia, struct ifnet ifp)
	+{
	+ struct ipacl_addr ip4_addr;
	+
	+ ip4_addr.v4 = *ia;
	+
	+ /function only when requested by a jail/
	+ if (!jailed(cred))
	+ return 0;
	+
	+ /check with the policy only when it is enforced for ipv4/
	+ if (ipacl_ipv4)
	+ return rules_check(cred, &ip4_addr, ifp);
	+
	+ return 0;
	+}
	+
	+static int
	+ipacl_ip6_check_jail(struct ucred *cred,
	+ const struct in6_addr ia6, struct ifnet ifp)
	+{
	+ struct ipacl_addr ip6_addr;
	+
	+ ip6_addr.v6 = ia6; /make copy to not alter the original*/
	+ in6_clearscope(&ip6_addr.v6);/* clear scope id*/
	+
	+ /function only when requested by a jail/
	+ if (!jailed(cred))
	+ return 0;
	+
	+ /check with the policy when it is enforced for ipv6/
	+ if (ipacl_ipv6)
	+ return rules_check(cred, &ip6_addr, ifp);
	+
	+ return 0;
	+}
	+
	+static struct mac_policy_ops ipacl_ops =
	+{
	+ .mpo_init = ipacl_init,
	+ .mpo_destroy = ipacl_destroy,
	+//#ifdef INET
	+ .mpo_ip4_check_jail = ipacl_ip4_check_jail,
	+//#endif
	+//#ifdef INET6
	+ .mpo_ip6_check_jail = ipacl_ip6_check_jail,
	+//#endif
	+};
	+
	+MAC_POLICY_SET(&ipacl_ops, mac_ipacl, "TrustedBSD MAC/ipacl",
	+ MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL);
	Index: sys/security/mac_ipacl/notes.txt
	===================================================================
	--- /dev/null
	+++ sys/security/mac_ipacl/notes.txt
	@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
	+-----------------------------------
	+Documentation Notes-
	+IP Address access control policy
	+
	+1. mac_ipacl allows the root of the host to limit the VNET jail's privileges
	+ of setting IPv4 and IPv6 addresses via sysctl(8) interface. So, the host
	+ can define rules for jails and their interfaces about IP addresses.
	+
	+2. Its default behaviour is to deny all IP addresses if policy is enforced and allow/deny
	+ IP(or subnets) according to rules specified with sysctl
	+
	+ Runtime Configuration-sysctl(8) MIB
	+
	+ security.mac.ipacl.ipv4: enforce the mac_ipacl for ipv4 addresses (default:1)
	+
	+ security.mac.ipacl.ipv6: enforce the mac_ipacl for ipv6 addresses (default:1)
	+
	+ security.mac.ipacl.rules:
	+ jail_id@allow@interface@address_family@IP_addr@prefix_length[,jail_id@...]
	+
	+ jail_id: Describe the jail id of the jail for which the rule is written
	+
	+ allow: 1 for allow and 0 for deny. action to perform for the rule
	+
	+ interface: name of the interface the rule is enforced for. Interface is
	+ left empty(ie, NULL) then it is a wildcard to enforce rule
	+ for all interfaces.
	+
	+ address_family: Address family of the IP_addr. give input as AF_INET
	+ or AF_INET6 string only
	+
	+ IP_addr: IP address(or subnet) to be allowed/deny. Action depend on the
	+ prefix length
	+
	+ prefix_length: Prefix length of the subnet to be enforced by the policy.
	+ -1 implies the policy is enforced for individual IP address.
	+ For non-negative value, a range of IP address(present in subnet)
	+ which calculated as subnet = IP_addr & mask
	+3. Example-
	+ a.)
	+ sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv4=1
	+ sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv6=0
	+ sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=1@1@@AF_INET@169.254.123.123@-1
	+ It allows only 169.254.123.123 IPv4 address for all interfaces(wildcard) of jail 1.
	+ It allows all IPv6 address since policy is not enforced for IPv6.
	+
	+ b.)
	+ sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv4=1
	+ sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv6=1
	+ sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=1@1@epair0b@AF_INET6@fe80::@32,1@0@epair0b@AF_INET6@fe80::abcd@-1
	+ It deny all IPv4 address as policy is enforced but no rules are specified about it.
	+ It allow all IPv6 address in the subnet- fe80::/32 except fe80::abcd for interface epair0b only
	+ c.)
	+ sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv4=1
	+ sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv6=1
	+ sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=2@1@@AF_INET6@fc00::@7,2@0@@AF_INET6@fc00::1111:2200@120,2@1@@AF_INET6@fc00::1111:2299@-1,1@1@@AF_INET@198.51.100.0@24
	+ It allow IPv4 in the subnet 198.51.100.0/24 for jail 2 and all interfaces.
	+ It allow IPv6 address in the subnet fc00::/7 but deny the subnet fc00::1111:2200/120, and allow
	+ individual IP fc00::1111:2299 from the denied subnet for all interfaces in the jail 2
	+
	+4. Using the test scripts:
	+ a.)
	+ Test scripts are not completely automatic :( So, the user has to create
	+ edit the scripts to enter the jid of the test jails and interface.
	+ After editing the scripts run make && make install, which then install
	+ the scripts in /usr/tests/sys/mac/ipacl.
	+ you may also need to create that directory if it gives error.
	+
	+6. To discuss the limitation of the module and point to be kept in mind while
	+ using it.
	+ a.)
	+ rules are checked in the same sequence they are given. If many rules are
	+ there for a IP(or a set of IP), result depend on final rule.
	+ b.)
	+
	+7. Future Works
	+ a.)
	+ rules are given with sysctl interface which gets very complex to give them all in
	+ command line. It has to be simplified with a better way to input those rules.
	+
	+
	+-------------------------------------
	+Commands-
	+1. kld
	+ * kldstat
	+ * kldload /usr/obj/usr/home/shivank/freebsd/amd64.amd64/sys/security/mac_ipacl/mac_ipacl.ko
	+ * kldunload mac_ipacl
	+2. make
	+ * make obj depend all install #create obj in /boot/modules, can be loaded and unloaded by just name
	+ * make -j 4 KERNCONF=VIMAGE kernel -DKERNFAST
	Index: sys/security/mac_ipacl/tests/Makefile
	===================================================================
	--- /dev/null
	+++ sys/security/mac_ipacl/tests/Makefile
	@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
	+# $FreeBSD$
	+
	+PACKAGE= tests
	+
	+TESTSDIR= ${TESTSBASE}/sys/mac/ipacl
	+
	+${PACKAGE}FILES+= ipacl_script.sh
	+
	+TAP_TESTS_SH+= ip4_test
	+TAP_TESTS_SH+= ip6_test
	+.for t in ${TAP_TESTS_SH}
	+TEST_METADATA.$t+= required_user="root"
	+TEST_METADATA.$t+= timeout="450"
	+.endfor
	+
	+.include <bsd.test.mk>
	Index: sys/security/mac_ipacl/tests/ip4_test.sh
	===================================================================
	--- /dev/null
	+++ sys/security/mac_ipacl/tests/ip4_test.sh
	@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
	+#!/bin/sh
	+# $FreeBSD$
	+
	+dir=`dirname $0`
	+. ${dir}/ipacl_script.sh
	+
	+echo "1..32"
	+jid1=1
	+jid2=3
	+#run this script for epair0a and epair0b as of now
	+#use ifconfig epair create to generate epair
	+#epair0a = host #epair0b = jail 1
	+# make sure to create second jail(jid=2) with epair1b
	+
	+#this script also tests that host remain unaffected in all cases
	+if1_host="epair0a"
	+if1_jail1="epair0b"
	+if2_jail1="lo0"
	+if1_jail2="epair1b"
	+if2_jail2="lo0"
	+
	+# Verify effect of changing security.mac.ipacl.ipv4
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv4=0 >/dev/null
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_host} '192.168.43.26' 16 0
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '192.168.43.26' 16 1
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_host} '127.1.32.31' 24 0
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '198.18.0.12' 15 1
	+
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv4=1 >/dev/null
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules= >/dev/null
	+
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_host} '192.168.43.26' 16 0
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '192.168.43.26' 16 1
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_host} '127.1.32.31' 24 0
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '198.18.0.12' 15 1
	+
	+# rule: jid@allow@interface_name@addr_family@ip_addr@subnet_mask
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=${jid1}@1@${if1_jail1}@AF_INET@192.168.42.2@-1,${jid2}@1@${if1_jail2}@AF_INET@127.1.32.1@-1,${jid2}@1@@AF_INET@198.18.0.1@15,${jid2}@0@@AF_INET@198.18.0.12@-1 >/dev/null
	+
	+# Verify if security.mac.ipacl.rules allow jail to set certain IPv4 address
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '192.168.42.2' 16 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '192.168.42.3' 16 ${jid1}
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_jail2} '127.1.32.1' 24 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if2_jail2} '127.1.32.1' 24 ${jid2}
	+
	+# Verify if scurity.mac.ipacl.rules allow jail to set any address in subnet
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_jail2} '198.18.0.192' 15 ${jid2}
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_jail2} '198.18.132.121' 15 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if1_jail2} '197.1.123.123' 15 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if1_jail2} '198.18.0.12' 15 ${jid2} #last rule disllow the ip in that subnet
	+
	+# Verify if security.mac.ipacl.rules (interface wildcard) allow jail to set certain IPv4 address
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if2_jail2} '198.18.0.192' 15 ${jid2}
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if2_jail2} '198.18.132.121' 15 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if2_jail2} '197.1.123.123' 15 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if2_jail2} '198.18.0.12' 15 ${jid2} #last rule disllow the ip in that subnet
	+
	+# Add more checks on subnet
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=${jid2}@1@@AF_INET@10.0.0.0@16,${jid2}@1@@AF_INET@10.12.0.0@16
	+
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if2_jail2} '10.1.0.0' 16 ${jid2}
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if2_jail2} '10.0.10.10' 16 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if2_jail2} '10.13.0.0' 24 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if2_jail2} '10.11.0.10' 24 ${jid2} #last rule disllow the ip in that subnet
	+
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=${jid1}@1@@AF_INET@169.254.0.0@16,${jid1}@0@@AF_INET@169.254.123.0@24,${jid1}@1@@AF_INET@169.254.123.123@-1,${jid1}@1@@AF_INET@198.51.100.0@24,${jid1}@0@@AF_INET@198.51.100.100@-1 >/dev/null
	+# Add more tests from Link-Local space and Documentation(TEST-NET-3)
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '169.254.121.121' 16 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '169.254.123.121' 16 ${jid1}
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '169.254.123.123' 16 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '169.253.121.121' 16 ${jid1}
	+
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if2_jail1} '198.51.100.001' 24 ${jid1}
	+exec_test ok ipv4 ${if2_jail1} '198.51.100.254' 24 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '198.51.100.100' 24 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv4 ${if1_jail1} '198.151.100.100' 24 ${jid1}
	+
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules= >/dev/null
	Index: sys/security/mac_ipacl/tests/ip6_test.sh
	===================================================================
	--- /dev/null
	+++ sys/security/mac_ipacl/tests/ip6_test.sh
	@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
	+#!/bin/sh
	+# $FreeBSD$
	+
	+dir=`dirname $0`
	+. ${dir}/ipacl_script.sh
	+
	+echo "1..36"
	+jid1=1
	+jid2=3
	+
	+if1_host="epair0a"
	+if1_jail1="epair0b"
	+if2_jail1="lo0"
	+if1_jail2="epair1b"
	+if2_jail2="lo0"
	+
	+#run this script for epair0a and epair0b as of now
	+#use ifconfig epair create to generate epair
	+#epair0a = host #epair0b = jail 1
	+# make sure to create second jail(jid=2) with epair1b
	+
	+#this script also tests that host remain unaffected in all cases
	+
	+# Verify effect of changing security.mac.ipacl.ipv4
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv6=0 >/dev/null
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_host} '2001:db8::1111' 32 0
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '2001:db8::1112' 64 1
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_host} '2001:2::abcd' 24 0
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '001:470:1e01:5ea::11' 48 1
	+
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.ipv6=1 >/dev/null
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules= >/dev/null
	+
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_host} '2001:db8::1111' 32 0
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '2001:db8::1112' 64 1
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_host} '2001:2::abcd' 24 0
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '001:470:1e01:5ea::11' 48 1
	+
	+# rule: jid@allow@interface_name@addr_family@ip_addr@subnet_mask
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=${jid1}@1@epair0b@AF_INET6@2001:db8::1111@-1,${jid2}@1@epair1b@AF_INET6@2001:2::1234:1234@-1,${jid2}@1@@AF_INET6@fe80::@32,${jid2}@0@@AF_INET6@fe80::abcd@-1 >/dev/null
	+
	+# Verify if security.mac.ipacl.rules allow jail to set certain IPv4 address
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '2001:db8::1111' 16 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '2001:db8::1112' 16 ${jid1}
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail2} '2001:2::1234:1234' 48 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '2001:2::1234:1234' 48 ${jid1}
	+
	+# Verify if scurity.mac.ipacl.rules allow jail to set any address in subnet
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail2} 'FE80::1101:1221' 15 ${jid2}
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail2} 'FE80::abab' 15 ${jid2}
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail2} 'FE80::1' 64 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail2} 'FE80::abcd' 15 ${jid2} #last rule disllow the ip in that subnet
	+
	+# Verify if security.mac.ipacl.rules (interface wildcard) allow jail to set certain IPv4 address
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if2_jail2} 'FE80::1101:1221' 15 ${jid2}
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if2_jail2} 'FE80::abab' 32 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if2_jail2} 'FE81::1' 64 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if2_jail2} 'FE80::abcd' 32 ${jid2} #last rule disllow the ip in that subnet
	+
	+
	+# add more tests for subnet
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=${jid2}@1@@AF_INET6@2001:2::@48,${jid2}@1@@AF_INET6@2001:3::@32 >/dev/null
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if2_jail2} '2001:2:0001::1' 64 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if2_jail2} '2001:2:1000::1' 32 ${jid2}
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if2_jail2} '2001:3:0001::1' 64 ${jid2}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if2_jail2} '2001:4::1' 64 ${jid2}
	+
	+
	+#add more tests of ULA address space
	+#allow subnet fc00::/7 except subnet fc00::1111:22xx but allow fc00::1111:2281
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules=${jid1}@1@@AF_INET6@fc00::@7,${jid1}@0@@AF_INET6@fc00::1111:2200@120,${jid1}@1@@AF_INET6@fc00::1111:2299@-1,${jid1}@1@@AF_INET6@2001:db8::@32,${jid1}@0@@AF_INET6@2001:db8::abcd@-1 >/dev/null
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail1} 'fc00::0000:1234' 48 ${jid1}
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail1} 'fc00::1112:1234' 48 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail1} 'f800::2222:2200' 48 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail1} 'f800::2222:22ff' 48 ${jid1}
	+
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail1} 'fc00::1111:2111' 64 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail1} 'fc00::1111:2211' 64 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail1} 'fc00::1111:22aa' 48 ${jid1}
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail1} 'fc00::1111:2299' 48 ${jid1}
	+
	+#add more tests of documentation range IPV6
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '2001:db8:abcd:bcde:cdef:def1:ef12:f123' 32 ${jid1}
	+exec_test ok ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '2001:db8:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:6666' 32 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if1_jail1} '2000:db9:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:6666' 32 ${jid1}
	+exec_test fl ipv6 ${if2_jail1} '2001:db8::abcd' 32 ${jid1}
	+
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl.rules= >/dev/null
	Index: sys/security/mac_ipacl/tests/ipacl_script.sh
	===================================================================
	--- /dev/null
	+++ sys/security/mac_ipacl/tests/ipacl_script.sh
	@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
	+#!/bin/sh
	+# $FreeBSD$
	+
	+sysctl security.mac.ipacl >/dev/null 2>&1
	+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
	+ echo "1..0 # SKIP MAC_IPACL is unavailable."
	+ exit 0
	+fi
	+
	+if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
	+ echo "1..0 # SKIP testcases must be run as root"
	+ exit 0
	+fi
	+
	+ntest=1
	+
	+test_ip() {
	+ local proto interface address prefix jid
	+
	+ proto=${1}
	+ interface=${2}
	+ address=${3}
	+ prefix=${4}
	+ jid=${5} #if jid = 0 then assume host
	+
	+ if [ "${proto}" = "ipv4" ]; then
	+ if [ "${jid}" -eq 0 ]; then
	+ echo \| ifconfig ${interface} ${address}/${prefix} up
	+ RetVal=$?
	+ else
	+ echo \| jexec ${jid} ifconfig ${interface} ${address}/${prefix} up
	+ RetVal=$?
	+ fi
	+ elif [ "${proto}" = "ipv6" ]; then
	+ if [ "${jid}" -eq 0 ]; then
	+ echo \| ifconfig ${interface} inet6 ${address} prefixlen ${prefix}
	+ RetVal=$?
	+ else
	+ echo \| jexec ${jid} ifconfig ${interface} inet6 ${address} prefixlen ${prefix}
	+ RetVal=$?
	+ fi
	+ fi
	+ if [ ${RetVal} -eq 0 ]; then
	+ echo ok
	+ else
	+ echo fl
	+ fi
	+
	+}
	+
	+exec_test() {
	+ local expect_with_rule proto interface address prefix jid
	+ expect_with_rule=${1}
	+ proto=${2}
	+ interface=${3}
	+ address=${4}
	+ prefix=${5}
	+ jid=${6}
	+
	+ out=$(test_ip "${proto}" "${interface}" "${address}" "${prefix}" "${jid}")
	+ if [ "${out}" = "${expect_with_rule}" ]; then
	+ echo "ok : PASS ${ntest}"
	+ elif [ "${out}" = "ok" ] \|\| [ "${out}" = "fl" ]; then
	+ echo "not ok : FAIL ${ntest} # '${out}' != '${expect_with_rule}'"
	+ else
	+ echo "not ok : FAIL ${ntest} # unexpected output: '${out}'"
	+ fi
	+ : $(( ntest += 1 ))
	+}

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