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D51645.id160027.diff
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diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_jail.c b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
--- a/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@
{"allow.adjtime", "allow.noadjtime", PR_ALLOW_ADJTIME},
{"allow.settime", "allow.nosettime", PR_ALLOW_SETTIME},
{"allow.routing", "allow.norouting", PR_ALLOW_ROUTING},
+ {"allow.unprivileged_parent_tampering",
+ "allow.nounprivileged_parent_tampering",
+ PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_PARENT_TAMPER},
};
static unsigned pr_allow_all = PR_ALLOW_ALL_STATIC;
const size_t pr_flag_allow_size = sizeof(pr_flag_allow);
@@ -4009,6 +4012,7 @@
case PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED:
case PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID:
case PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV:
+ case PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFJAIL:
/*
* Allow jail to set various resource limits and login
@@ -4046,8 +4050,10 @@
*/
case PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED:
case PRIV_SCHED_CPUSET:
+ case PRIV_SCHED_DIFFJAIL:
case PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED:
case PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID:
+ case PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFJAIL:
/*
* Allow jailed processes to write to sysctls marked as jail
@@ -4691,6 +4697,10 @@
"B", "Jail may read the kernel message buffer");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, unprivileged_proc_debug, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Unprivileged processes may use process debugging facilities");
+SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, unprivileged_parent_tampering,
+ CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B",
+ "Unprivileged parent jail processes may tamper with same-uid processes"
+ " (signal/debug/cpuset)");
SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, suser, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
"B", "Processes in jail with uid 0 have privilege");
#ifdef VIMAGE
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
--- a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
@@ -1913,6 +1913,38 @@
return (ESRCH);
}
+/*
+ * Determine if u1 can tamper with the subject specified by u2, if they are in
+ * different jails and 'unprivileged_parent_tampering' jail policy allows it.
+ *
+ * May be called if u1 and u2 are in the same jail, but it is expected that the
+ * caller has already done a prison_check() prior to calling it.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 for permitted, EPERM otherwise
+ */
+static int
+cr_can_tamper_with_subjail(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2, int priv)
+{
+
+ MPASS(prison_check(u1, u2) == 0);
+ if (u1->cr_prison == u2->cr_prison)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (priv_check_cred(u1, priv) == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ /*
+ * Jails do not maintain a distinct UID space, so process visibility is
+ * all that would control an unprivileged process' ability to tamper
+ * with a process in a subjail by default if we did not have the
+ * allow.unprivileged_parent_tampering knob to restrict it by default.
+ */
+ if (prison_allow(u2, PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_PARENT_TAMPER))
+ return (0);
+
+ return (EPERM);
+}
+
/*
* Helper for cr_cansee*() functions to abide by system-wide security.bsd.see_*
* policies. Determines if u1 "can see" u2 according to these policies.
@@ -2062,6 +2094,19 @@
return (error);
}
+ /*
+ * At this point, the target may be in a different jail than the
+ * subject -- the subject must be in a parent jail to the target,
+ * whether it is prison0 or a subordinate of prison0 that has
+ * children. Additional privileges are required to allow this, as
+ * whether the creds are truly equivalent or not must be determined on
+ * a case-by-case basis.
+ */
+ error = cr_can_tamper_with_subjail(cred, proc->p_ucred,
+ PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFJAIL);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
return (0);
}
@@ -2138,6 +2183,12 @@
if (error)
return (error);
}
+
+ error = cr_can_tamper_with_subjail(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred,
+ PRIV_SCHED_DIFFJAIL);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
return (0);
}
@@ -2258,6 +2309,11 @@
return (error);
}
+ error = cr_can_tamper_with_subjail(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred,
+ PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFJAIL);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
/* Can't trace init when securelevel > 0. */
if (p == initproc) {
error = securelevel_gt(td->td_ucred, 0);
diff --git a/sys/sys/jail.h b/sys/sys/jail.h
--- a/sys/sys/jail.h
+++ b/sys/sys/jail.h
@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@
#define PR_ALLOW_ADJTIME 0x00080000
#define PR_ALLOW_SETTIME 0x00100000
#define PR_ALLOW_ROUTING 0x00200000
+#define PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_PARENT_TAMPER 0x00400000
/*
* PR_ALLOW_PRISON0 are the allow flags that we apply by default to prison0,
@@ -267,14 +268,16 @@
* build time. PR_ALLOW_ALL_STATIC should contain any bit above that we expect
* to be used on the system, while PR_ALLOW_PRISON0 will be some subset of that.
*/
-#define PR_ALLOW_ALL_STATIC 0x003f87ff
-#define PR_ALLOW_PRISON0 (PR_ALLOW_ALL_STATIC)
+#define PR_ALLOW_ALL_STATIC 0x007f87ff
+#define PR_ALLOW_PRISON0 \
+ (PR_ALLOW_ALL_STATIC & ~(PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_PARENT_TAMPERING))
/*
* PR_ALLOW_DIFFERENCES determines which flags are able to be
* different between the parent and child jail upon creation.
*/
-#define PR_ALLOW_DIFFERENCES (PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG)
+#define PR_ALLOW_DIFFERENCES \
+ (PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG | PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_PARENT_TAMPER)
/*
* OSD methods
diff --git a/sys/sys/priv.h b/sys/sys/priv.h
--- a/sys/sys/priv.h
+++ b/sys/sys/priv.h
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@
#define PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID 81 /* Exempt debugging setuid proc. */
#define PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV 82 /* Exempt unprivileged debug limit. */
#define PRIV_DEBUG_DENIED 83 /* Exempt P2_NOTRACE. */
+#define PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFJAIL 84 /* Exempt debugging other jails. */
/*
* Dtrace privileges.
@@ -193,6 +194,7 @@
#define PRIV_SCHED_CPUSET 206 /* Can manipulate cpusets. */
#define PRIV_SCHED_CPUSET_INTR 207 /* Can adjust IRQ to CPU binding. */
#define PRIV_SCHED_IDPRIO 208 /* Can set idle time scheduling. */
+#define PRIV_SCHED_DIFFJAIL 209 /* Exempt scheduling other jails. */
/*
* POSIX semaphore privileges.
@@ -204,6 +206,7 @@
*/
#define PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED 230 /* Exempt signalling other users. */
#define PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID 231 /* Non-conserv signal setuid proc. */
+#define PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFJAIL 232 /* Exempt signalling other jails. */
/*
* Sysctl privileges.
diff --git a/usr.sbin/jail/jail.8 b/usr.sbin/jail/jail.8
--- a/usr.sbin/jail/jail.8
+++ b/usr.sbin/jail/jail.8
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd May 11, 2025
+.Dd August 7, 2025
.Dt JAIL 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -686,6 +686,12 @@
file outside of the jails.
.It Va allow.reserved_ports
The jail root may bind to ports lower than 1024.
+.It Va allow.unprivileged_parent_tampering
+Unprivileged processes in the jail's parent may tamper with processes of the
+same UID in the jail.
+This includes the ability to signal, debug, and
+.Xr cpuset 1
+processes that belong to the jail.
.It Va allow.unprivileged_proc_debug
Unprivileged processes in the jail may use debugging facilities.
.It Va allow.suser
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