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Index: MOVED
===================================================================
--- MOVED
+++ MOVED
@@ -10323,8 +10323,6 @@
graphics/projectm-libvisual|graphics/libprojectm|2018-07-17|Code of projectm-libvisual was merged into graphics/libprojectm
graphics/yafray|graphics/yafaray|2018-07-20|Project renamed
lang/spec.alpha||2018-07-21|Unused in the ports tree
-sysutils/xen-tools|sysutils/xen-tools47|2018-07-23|Renamed to support multiple versions
-emulators/xen-kernel|emulators/xen-kernel47|2018-07-23|Renamed to support multiple versions
emulators/xen||2018-07-23|Removed to support multiple versions
devel/py-levenshtein|devel/py-python-Levenshtein|2018-07-28|Remove the duplicate
comms/xwota||2018-07-28|Has expired: No server message and no upstream releases
@@ -11629,3 +11627,5 @@
net-im/emesene||2019-02-20|Abandoned non function MSN client
net-im/pebrot||2019-02-20|Abandoned non function MSN client
games/plutocracy||2019-02-21|Has expired: broken, upstream gone
+sysutils/xen-tools411|sysutils/xen-tools|2019-02-21|Rename in preparation for having a single Xen port
+emulators/xen-kernel411|emulators/xen-kernel|2019-02-21|Rename in preparation for having a single Xen port
Index: emulators/Makefile
===================================================================
--- emulators/Makefile
+++ emulators/Makefile
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@
SUBDIR += x49gp
SUBDIR += xbraitenberg
SUBDIR += xcpc
- SUBDIR += xen-kernel411
+ SUBDIR += xen-kernel
SUBDIR += xen-kernel47
SUBDIR += xhomer
SUBDIR += xsystem35
Index: emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
===================================================================
--- emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
+++ emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
PORTREVISION= 4
CATEGORIES= emulators
MASTER_SITES= http://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/${PORTVERSION}/
-PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel411
+PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel
MAINTAINER= royger@FreeBSD.org
COMMENT= Hypervisor using a microkernel design
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/distinfo
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/distinfo
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-TIMESTAMP = 1532345202
-SHA256 (xen-4.11.0.tar.gz) = 826e3a9f6d0eac94a825d272cc2c1294e22640ae75af906eb13920f9ad667643
-SIZE (xen-4.11.0.tar.gz) = 25131533
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-pci-treat-class-0-devices-as-endpoints.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-pci-treat-class-0-devices-as-endpoints.patch
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 7495a5b6aa1c741964baf18a1cbdb8b8d71cce98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 8 May 2018 11:33:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pci: treat class 0 devices as endpoints
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Class 0 devices are legacy pre PCI 2.0 devices that didn't have a
-class code. Treat them as endpoints, so that they can be handled by
-the IOMMU and properly passed-through to the hardware domain.
-
-Such device has been seen on a Super Micro server, lspci -vv reports:
-
-00:13.0 Non-VGA unclassified device: Intel Corporation Device a135 (rev 31)
- Subsystem: Super Micro Computer Inc Device 0931
- Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, IRQ 11
- Memory at df222000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=4K]
- Capabilities: [80] Power Management version 3
-
-Arguably this is not a legacy device (since this is a new server), but
-in any case Xen needs to deal with it.
-
-Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-index 1db69d5b99..c4890a4295 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-@@ -927,10 +927,11 @@ enum pdev_type pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
- case PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_HOST:
- return DEV_TYPE_PCI_HOST_BRIDGE;
-
-- case 0x0000: case 0xffff:
-+ case 0xffff:
- return DEV_TYPE_PCI_UNKNOWN;
- }
-
-+ /* NB: treat legacy pre PCI 2.0 devices (class_device == 0) as endpoints. */
- return pos ? DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT : DEV_TYPE_PCI;
- }
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-vpci-msi-split-code-to-bind-pirq.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-vpci-msi-split-code-to-bind-pirq.patch
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-From 9109e5afb99012244e9fbe7f44e7010950051443 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2018 13:07:26 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] vpci/msi: split code to bind pirq
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-And put it in a separate update function. This is required in order to
-improve binding of MSI PIRQs when using vPCI.
-
-No functional change.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
-index 5ab7387d78..acadc23f8d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
-@@ -663,6 +663,42 @@ void vpci_msi_arch_mask(struct vpci_msi *msi, const struct pci_dev *pdev,
- vpci_mask_pirq(pdev->domain, msi->arch.pirq + entry, mask);
- }
-
-+static int vpci_msi_update(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint32_t data,
-+ uint64_t address, unsigned int vectors,
-+ unsigned int pirq, uint32_t mask)
-+{
-+ unsigned int i;
-+
-+ ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
-+
-+ for ( i = 0; i < vectors; i++ )
-+ {
-+ uint8_t vector = MASK_EXTR(data, MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK);
-+ uint8_t vector_mask = 0xff >> (8 - fls(vectors) + 1);
-+ struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq bind = {
-+ .machine_irq = pirq + i,
-+ .irq_type = PT_IRQ_TYPE_MSI,
-+ .u.msi.gvec = (vector & ~vector_mask) |
-+ ((vector + i) & vector_mask),
-+ .u.msi.gflags = msi_gflags(data, address, (mask >> i) & 1),
-+ };
-+ int rc = pt_irq_create_bind(pdev->domain, &bind);
-+
-+ if ( rc )
-+ {
-+ gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
-+ "%04x:%02x:%02x.%u: failed to bind PIRQ %u: %d\n",
-+ pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn),
-+ PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn), pirq + i, rc);
-+ while ( bind.machine_irq-- > pirq )
-+ pt_irq_destroy_bind(pdev->domain, &bind);
-+ return rc;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- static int vpci_msi_enable(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint32_t data,
- uint64_t address, unsigned int nr,
- paddr_t table_base, uint32_t mask)
-@@ -674,7 +710,7 @@ static int vpci_msi_enable(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint32_t data,
- .table_base = table_base,
- .entry_nr = nr,
- };
-- unsigned int i, vectors = table_base ? 1 : nr;
-+ unsigned vectors = table_base ? 1 : nr;
- int rc, pirq = INVALID_PIRQ;
-
- /* Get a PIRQ. */
-@@ -690,36 +726,17 @@ static int vpci_msi_enable(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint32_t data,
- return rc;
- }
-
-- for ( i = 0; i < vectors; i++ )
-+ pcidevs_lock();
-+ rc = vpci_msi_update(pdev, data, address, vectors, pirq, mask);
-+ if ( rc )
- {
-- uint8_t vector = MASK_EXTR(data, MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK);
-- uint8_t vector_mask = 0xff >> (8 - fls(vectors) + 1);
-- struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq bind = {
-- .machine_irq = pirq + i,
-- .irq_type = PT_IRQ_TYPE_MSI,
-- .u.msi.gvec = (vector & ~vector_mask) |
-- ((vector + i) & vector_mask),
-- .u.msi.gflags = msi_gflags(data, address, (mask >> i) & 1),
-- };
--
-- pcidevs_lock();
-- rc = pt_irq_create_bind(pdev->domain, &bind);
-- if ( rc )
-- {
-- gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
-- "%04x:%02x:%02x.%u: failed to bind PIRQ %u: %d\n",
-- pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn),
-- PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn), pirq + i, rc);
-- while ( bind.machine_irq-- > pirq )
-- pt_irq_destroy_bind(pdev->domain, &bind);
-- spin_lock(&pdev->domain->event_lock);
-- unmap_domain_pirq(pdev->domain, pirq);
-- spin_unlock(&pdev->domain->event_lock);
-- pcidevs_unlock();
-- return rc;
-- }
-+ spin_lock(&pdev->domain->event_lock);
-+ unmap_domain_pirq(pdev->domain, pirq);
-+ spin_unlock(&pdev->domain->event_lock);
- pcidevs_unlock();
-+ return rc;
- }
-+ pcidevs_unlock();
-
- return pirq;
- }
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-HVM-improve-MTRR-load-checks.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-HVM-improve-MTRR-load-checks.patch
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-From 76159f10b174d8a5cd4c50213a9d21fcc0e9441d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 15:08:02 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/7] x86/HVM: improve MTRR load checks
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-We should not assume that the incoming set of values contains exactly
-MTRR_VCNT variable range MSRs. Permit a smaller amount and reject a
-bigger one. As a result the save path then also needs to no longer use
-a fixed upper bound, in turn requiring unused space in the save record
-to be zeroed up front.
-
-Also slightly refine types where appropriate.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-[switch to use MASK_EXTR to get VCNT]
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-index c2927fb437..a636012388 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-@@ -673,22 +673,22 @@ int hvm_set_mem_pinned_cacheattr(struct domain *d, uint64_t gfn_start,
-
- static int hvm_save_mtrr_msr(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
- {
-- int i;
- struct vcpu *v;
-- struct hvm_hw_mtrr hw_mtrr;
-- struct mtrr_state *mtrr_state;
-+
- /* save mtrr&pat */
- for_each_vcpu(d, v)
- {
-- mtrr_state = &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr;
-+ const struct mtrr_state *mtrr_state = &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr;
-+ struct hvm_hw_mtrr hw_mtrr = {
-+ .msr_mtrr_def_type = mtrr_state->def_type |
-+ (mtrr_state->enabled << 10),
-+ .msr_mtrr_cap = mtrr_state->mtrr_cap,
-+ };
-+ unsigned int i;
-
- hvm_get_guest_pat(v, &hw_mtrr.msr_pat_cr);
-
-- hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_def_type = mtrr_state->def_type
-- | (mtrr_state->enabled << 10);
-- hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_cap = mtrr_state->mtrr_cap;
--
-- for ( i = 0; i < MTRR_VCNT; i++ )
-+ for ( i = 0; i < MASK_EXTR(hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT); i++ )
- {
- /* save physbase */
- hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_var[i*2] =
-@@ -726,6 +726,14 @@ static int hvm_load_mtrr_msr(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
- if ( hvm_load_entry(MTRR, h, &hw_mtrr) != 0 )
- return -EINVAL;
-
-+ if ( MASK_EXTR(hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT) > MTRR_VCNT )
-+ {
-+ dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR,
-+ "HVM restore: %pv: too many (%lu) variable range MTRRs\n",
-+ v, MASK_EXTR(hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT));
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+ }
-+
- mtrr_state = &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr;
-
- hvm_set_guest_pat(v, hw_mtrr.msr_pat_cr);
-@@ -735,7 +743,7 @@ static int hvm_load_mtrr_msr(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
- for ( i = 0; i < NUM_FIXED_MSR; i++ )
- mtrr_fix_range_msr_set(d, mtrr_state, i, hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_fixed[i]);
-
-- for ( i = 0; i < MTRR_VCNT; i++ )
-+ for ( i = 0; i < MASK_EXTR(hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT); i++ )
- {
- mtrr_var_range_msr_set(d, mtrr_state,
- MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(i),
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-dom0-add-extra-RAM-regions-as-UNUSABLE-for-PVH-m.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-dom0-add-extra-RAM-regions-as-UNUSABLE-for-PVH-m.patch
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-From e8e58be2b77708fd4d6ba6bca3f70bc507fde4be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 08:48:14 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/dom0: add extra RAM regions as UNUSABLE for PVH memory
- map
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-When running as PVH Dom0 the native memory map is used in order to
-craft a tailored memory map for Dom0 taking into account it's memory
-limit.
-
-Dom0 memory is always going to be smaller than the total amount
-of memory present on the host, so in order to prevent Dom0 from
-relocating PCI BARs over RAM regions mark all the RAM regions not
-available to Dom0 as UNUSABLE in the memory map.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c
-index b237508072..e2b5d48e03 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c
-@@ -314,8 +314,10 @@ static __init void pvh_setup_e820(struct domain *d, unsigned long nr_pages)
-
- /*
- * Craft the e820 memory map for Dom0 based on the hardware e820 map.
-+ * Add an extra entry in case we have to split a RAM entry into a RAM and a
-+ * UNUSABLE one in order to truncate it.
- */
-- d->arch.e820 = xzalloc_array(struct e820entry, e820.nr_map);
-+ d->arch.e820 = xzalloc_array(struct e820entry, e820.nr_map + 1);
- if ( !d->arch.e820 )
- panic("Unable to allocate memory for Dom0 e820 map");
- entry_guest = d->arch.e820;
-@@ -323,19 +325,20 @@ static __init void pvh_setup_e820(struct domain *d, unsigned long nr_pages)
- /* Clamp e820 memory map to match the memory assigned to Dom0 */
- for ( i = 0, entry = e820.map; i < e820.nr_map; i++, entry++ )
- {
-+ *entry_guest = *entry;
-+
- if ( entry->type != E820_RAM )
-- {
-- *entry_guest = *entry;
- goto next;
-- }
-
- if ( nr_pages == cur_pages )
- {
- /*
-- * We already have all the assigned memory,
-- * skip this entry
-+ * We already have all the requested memory, turn this RAM region
-+ * into a UNUSABLE region in order to prevent Dom0 from placing
-+ * BARs in this area.
- */
-- continue;
-+ entry_guest->type = E820_UNUSABLE;
-+ goto next;
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -358,6 +361,12 @@ static __init void pvh_setup_e820(struct domain *d, unsigned long nr_pages)
- {
- /* Truncate region */
- entry_guest->size = (nr_pages - cur_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT;
-+ /* Add the remaining of the RAM region as UNUSABLE. */
-+ entry_guest++;
-+ d->arch.nr_e820++;
-+ entry_guest->type = E820_UNUSABLE;
-+ entry_guest->addr = start + ((nr_pages - cur_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT);
-+ entry_guest->size = end - entry_guest->addr;
- cur_pages = nr_pages;
- }
- else
-@@ -367,9 +376,9 @@ static __init void pvh_setup_e820(struct domain *d, unsigned long nr_pages)
- next:
- d->arch.nr_e820++;
- entry_guest++;
-+ ASSERT(d->arch.nr_e820 <= e820.nr_map + 1);
- }
- ASSERT(cur_pages == nr_pages);
-- ASSERT(d->arch.nr_e820 <= e820.nr_map);
- }
-
- static int __init pvh_setup_p2m(struct domain *d)
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-efi-move-the-logic-to-detect-PE-build-support.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-efi-move-the-logic-to-detect-PE-build-support.patch
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-From 9bd8e5d5cf128f5f19d8b8e74bd693c2711ce4d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 10:58:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: move the logic to detect PE build support
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-So that it can be used by other components apart from the efi specific
-code. By moving the detection code creating a dummy efi/disabled file
-can be avoided.
-
-This is required so that the conditional used to define the efi symbol
-in the linker script can be removed and instead the definition of the
-efi symbol can be guarded using the preprocessor.
-
-The motivation behind this change is to be able to build Xen using lld
-(the LLVM linker), that at least on version 6.0.0 doesn't work
-properly with a DEFINED being used in a conditional expression:
-
-ld -melf_x86_64_fbsd -T xen.lds -N prelink.o --build-id=sha1 \
- /root/src/xen/xen/common/symbols-dummy.o -o /root/src/xen/xen/.xen-syms.0
-ld: error: xen.lds:233: symbol not found: efi
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
-Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Cc: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
-Changes since v2:
- - Use CFLAGS-y to append the XEN_BUILD_PE define.
- - Check that XEN_BUILD_PE is set to 'y' in order to build the PE
- binary.
-
-Changes since v1:
- - Rename variable.
- - Remove usage of the efi/disabled file.
----
- .gitignore | 1 -
- xen/arch/x86/Makefile | 9 +++++++--
- xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile | 11 +++--------
- xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 4 +++-
- 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
-index 55b78008c0..1625a8f0e7 100644
---- a/.gitignore
-+++ b/.gitignore
-@@ -302,7 +302,6 @@ xen/arch/x86/boot/*.bin
- xen/arch/x86/boot/*.lnk
- xen/arch/x86/efi.lds
- xen/arch/x86/efi/check.efi
--xen/arch/x86/efi/disabled
- xen/arch/x86/efi/mkreloc
- xen/arch/*/efi/boot.c
- xen/arch/*/efi/compat.c
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-index 5563c813dd..172685fb41 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-@@ -163,10 +163,15 @@ EFI_LDFLAGS += --minor-image-version=$(XEN_SUBVERSION)
- EFI_LDFLAGS += --major-os-version=2 --minor-os-version=0
- EFI_LDFLAGS += --major-subsystem-version=2 --minor-subsystem-version=0
-
-+# Check if the build system supports PE.
-+XEN_BUILD_PE := $(shell $(CC) $(filter-out $(CFLAGS-y) .%.d,$(CFLAGS)) -c efi/check.c -o efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y)
-+export XEN_BUILD_PE := $(if $(XEN_BUILD_PE),$(shell $(LD) -mi386pep --subsystem=10 -o efi/check.efi efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y))
-+CFLAGS-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += -DXEN_BUILD_PE
-+
- $(TARGET).efi: VIRT_BASE = 0x$(shell $(NM) efi/relocs-dummy.o | sed -n 's, A VIRT_START$$,,p')
- $(TARGET).efi: ALT_BASE = 0x$(shell $(NM) efi/relocs-dummy.o | sed -n 's, A ALT_START$$,,p')
- # Don't use $(wildcard ...) here - at least make 3.80 expands this too early!
--$(TARGET).efi: guard = $(if $(shell echo efi/dis* | grep disabled),:)
-+$(TARGET).efi: guard = $(if $(filter y,$(XEN_BUILD_PE)),,:)
-
- ifneq ($(build_id_linker),)
- ifeq ($(call ld-ver-build-id,$(LD) $(filter -m%,$(EFI_LDFLAGS))),y)
-@@ -232,6 +237,6 @@ efi/mkreloc: efi/mkreloc.c
- clean::
- rm -f asm-offsets.s *.lds boot/*.o boot/*~ boot/core boot/mkelf32
- rm -f $(BASEDIR)/.xen-syms.[0-9]* boot/.*.d
-- rm -f $(BASEDIR)/.xen.efi.[0-9]* efi/*.efi efi/disabled efi/mkreloc
-+ rm -f $(BASEDIR)/.xen.efi.[0-9]* efi/*.efi efi/mkreloc
- rm -f boot/cmdline.S boot/reloc.S boot/*.lnk boot/*.bin
- rm -f note.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-index 3be9661108..918383b325 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-@@ -1,16 +1,11 @@
- CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
-
--efi := y$(shell rm -f disabled)
--efi := $(if $(efi),$(shell $(CC) $(filter-out $(CFLAGS-y) .%.d,$(CFLAGS)) -c check.c 2>disabled && echo y))
--efi := $(if $(efi),$(shell $(LD) -mi386pep --subsystem=10 -o check.efi check.o 2>disabled && echo y))
--efi := $(if $(efi),$(shell rm disabled)y)
--
- %.o: %.ihex
- $(OBJCOPY) -I ihex -O binary $< $@
-
- boot.init.o: buildid.o
-
- obj-y := stub.o
--obj-$(efi) := boot.init.o compat.o relocs-dummy.o runtime.o
--extra-$(efi) += buildid.o
--nocov-$(efi) += stub.o
-+obj-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) := boot.init.o compat.o relocs-dummy.o runtime.o
-+extra-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += buildid.o
-+nocov-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += stub.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-index 326e885402..4a59467986 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-@@ -304,7 +304,9 @@ SECTIONS
- } :text
- #endif
-
-- efi = DEFINED(efi) ? efi : .;
-+#ifndef XEN_BUILD_PE
-+ efi = .;
-+#endif
-
- /* Sections to be discarded */
- /DISCARD/ : {
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-hvm-ioreq-fix-page-referencing.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-hvm-ioreq-fix-page-referencing.patch
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-From bcc115ba39d2985dcf356ba8a9ac291e314f1f0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2018 04:00:26 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86/hvm/ioreq: fix page referencing
-
-The code does not take a page reference in hvm_alloc_ioreq_mfn(), only a
-type reference. This can lead to a situation where a malicious domain with
-XSM_DM_PRIV can engineer a sequence as follows:
-
-- create IOREQ server: no pages as yet.
-- acquire resource: page allocated, total 0.
-- decrease reservation: -1 ref, total -1.
-
-This will cause Xen to hit a BUG_ON() in free_domheap_pages().
-
-This patch fixes the issue by changing the call to get_page_type() in
-hvm_alloc_ioreq_mfn() to a call to get_page_and_type(). This change
-in turn requires an extra put_page() in hvm_free_ioreq_mfn() in the case
-that _PGC_allocated is still set (i.e. a decrease reservation has not
-occurred) to avoid the page being leaked.
-
-This is part of XSA-276.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-index f39f391929..bdc2687014 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static int hvm_map_ioreq_gfn(struct hvm_ioreq_server *s, bool buf)
- static int hvm_alloc_ioreq_mfn(struct hvm_ioreq_server *s, bool buf)
- {
- struct hvm_ioreq_page *iorp = buf ? &s->bufioreq : &s->ioreq;
-+ struct page_info *page;
-
- if ( iorp->page )
- {
-@@ -349,27 +350,33 @@ static int hvm_alloc_ioreq_mfn(struct hvm_ioreq_server *s, bool buf)
- * could fail if the emulating domain has already reached its
- * maximum allocation.
- */
-- iorp->page = alloc_domheap_page(s->emulator, MEMF_no_refcount);
-+ page = alloc_domheap_page(s->emulator, MEMF_no_refcount);
-
-- if ( !iorp->page )
-+ if ( !page )
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-- if ( !get_page_type(iorp->page, PGT_writable_page) )
-- goto fail1;
-+ if ( !get_page_and_type(page, s->emulator, PGT_writable_page) )
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The domain can't possibly know about this page yet, so failure
-+ * here is a clear indication of something fishy going on.
-+ */
-+ domain_crash(s->emulator);
-+ return -ENODATA;
-+ }
-
-- iorp->va = __map_domain_page_global(iorp->page);
-+ iorp->va = __map_domain_page_global(page);
- if ( !iorp->va )
-- goto fail2;
-+ goto fail;
-
-+ iorp->page = page;
- clear_page(iorp->va);
- return 0;
-
-- fail2:
-- put_page_type(iorp->page);
--
-- fail1:
-- put_page(iorp->page);
-- iorp->page = NULL;
-+ fail:
-+ if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &page->count_info) )
-+ put_page(page);
-+ put_page_and_type(page);
-
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-@@ -377,15 +384,24 @@ static int hvm_alloc_ioreq_mfn(struct hvm_ioreq_server *s, bool buf)
- static void hvm_free_ioreq_mfn(struct hvm_ioreq_server *s, bool buf)
- {
- struct hvm_ioreq_page *iorp = buf ? &s->bufioreq : &s->ioreq;
-+ struct page_info *page = iorp->page;
-
-- if ( !iorp->page )
-+ if ( !page )
- return;
-
-+ iorp->page = NULL;
-+
- unmap_domain_page_global(iorp->va);
- iorp->va = NULL;
-
-- put_page_and_type(iorp->page);
-- iorp->page = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we need to clear the allocation reference before
-+ * dropping the explicit references taken by get_page_and_type().
-+ */
-+ if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &page->count_info) )
-+ put_page(page);
-+
-+ put_page_and_type(page);
- }
-
- bool is_ioreq_server_page(struct domain *d, const struct page_info *page)
---
-2.19.1
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-mtrr-introduce-mask-to-get-VCNT-from-MTRRcap-MSR.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-mtrr-introduce-mask-to-get-VCNT-from-MTRRcap-MSR.patch
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-From f7c587fa1341b59f4ff654bd7e55e162f3513130 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 5 Jul 2018 15:28:56 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/mtrr: introduce mask to get VCNT from MTRRcap MSR
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-No functional change.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/main.c | 2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c | 8 ++++----
- xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 2 ++
- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/main.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/main.c
-index 56f71a6e1f..e9df53f00d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/main.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/main.c
-@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void __init set_num_var_ranges(void)
- config = 2;
- else if (is_cpu(CENTAUR))
- config = 8;
-- num_var_ranges = config & 0xff;
-+ num_var_ranges = MASK_EXTR(config, MTRRcap_VCNT);
- }
-
- static void __init init_table(void)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-index c78e5c17ad..c2927fb437 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static uint8_t __read_mostly pat_entry_tbl[PAT_TYPE_NUMS] =
- bool_t is_var_mtrr_overlapped(const struct mtrr_state *m)
- {
- unsigned int seg, i;
-- unsigned int num_var_ranges = (uint8_t)m->mtrr_cap;
-+ unsigned int num_var_ranges = MASK_EXTR(m->mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT);
-
- for ( i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++ )
- {
-@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static int get_mtrr_type(const struct mtrr_state *m,
- uint8_t overlap_mtrr = 0;
- uint8_t overlap_mtrr_pos = 0;
- uint64_t mask = -(uint64_t)PAGE_SIZE << order;
-- unsigned int seg, num_var_ranges = m->mtrr_cap & 0xff;
-+ unsigned int seg, num_var_ranges = MASK_EXTR(m->mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT);
-
- if ( unlikely(!(m->enabled & 0x2)) )
- return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
-@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ bool mtrr_pat_not_equal(const struct vcpu *vd, const struct vcpu *vs)
-
- if ( md->enabled & 2 )
- {
-- unsigned int num_var_ranges = (uint8_t)md->mtrr_cap;
-+ unsigned int num_var_ranges = MASK_EXTR(md->mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT);
-
- /* Test default type MSR. */
- if ( md->def_type != ms->def_type )
-@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ bool mtrr_pat_not_equal(const struct vcpu *vd, const struct vcpu *vs)
- return true;
-
- /* Test variable ranges. */
-- if ( num_var_ranges != (uint8_t)ms->mtrr_cap ||
-+ if ( num_var_ranges != MASK_EXTR(ms->mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT) ||
- memcmp(md->var_ranges, ms->var_ranges,
- num_var_ranges * sizeof(*md->var_ranges)) )
- return true;
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index 8fbccc88a7..95bb66916c 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@
- #define ATM_LNC_C6_AUTO_DEMOTE (1UL << 25)
-
- #define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe
-+#define MTRRcap_VCNT 0x000000ff
-+
- #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
-
- #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-pvh-change-the-order-of-the-iommu-initialization.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-pvh-change-the-order-of-the-iommu-initialization.patch
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From ec3d58041829e0747d94efa11a44467c3e083b60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 13:12:18 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/pvh: change the order of the iommu initialization for
- Dom0
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The iommu initialization will also create MMIO mappings in the Dom0
-p2m, so the paging memory pool needs to be allocated or else iommu
-initialization will fail.
-
-Move the call to init the iommu after the Dom0 p2m has been setup in
-order to solve this.
-
-Note that issues caused by this wrong ordering have only been seen
-when using shadow paging.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
-Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c
-index 9a833fa4b9..f0cd63b1ec 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c
-@@ -1093,8 +1093,6 @@ int __init dom0_construct_pvh(struct domain *d, const module_t *image,
-
- printk(XENLOG_INFO "*** Building a PVH Dom%d ***\n", d->domain_id);
-
-- iommu_hwdom_init(d);
--
- rc = pvh_setup_p2m(d);
- if ( rc )
- {
-@@ -1102,6 +1100,8 @@ int __init dom0_construct_pvh(struct domain *d, const module_t *image,
- return rc;
- }
-
-+ iommu_hwdom_init(d);
-+
- rc = pvh_load_kernel(d, image, image_headroom, initrd, bootstrap_map(image),
- cmdline, &entry, &start_info);
- if ( rc )
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-replace-usage-in-the-linker-script.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-x86-replace-usage-in-the-linker-script.patch
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From e21ba44f771226a5f6f0ce269aabcfb019eae539 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2018 10:48:18 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] x86: replace '||' usage in the linker script
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-With '|'. The result is the same, and the later works with lld. Fixes
-the following error when building Xen with lld:
-
-ld -melf_x86_64_fbsd -T xen.lds -N prelink.o --build-id=sha1 \
- /root/src/xen/xen/common/symbols-dummy.o -o /root/src/xen/xen/.xen-syms.0
-ld: error: xen.lds:260: malformed number: |
->>> ASSERT(__image_base__ > (((((((((261 >> 8) * 0xffff000000000000) | (261 << 39))) + ((1 << 39) / 2)) + (64 << 30)) + (1 << 30)) + (1 << 30))) ||
->>> ^
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-index 70afedd31d..326e885402 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ SECTIONS
- .comment 0 : { *(.comment) }
- }
-
--ASSERT(__image_base__ > XEN_VIRT_START ||
-+ASSERT(__image_base__ > XEN_VIRT_START |
- __2M_rwdata_end <= XEN_VIRT_END - NR_CPUS * PAGE_SIZE,
- "Xen image overlaps stubs area")
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-xen-Port-the-array_index_nospec-infrastructure-from-.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0001-xen-Port-the-array_index_nospec-infrastructure-from-.patch
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-From e932371d6ae0f69b89abb2dce725483c75356de2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:17:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 01/42] xen: Port the array_index_nospec() infrastructure from
- Linux
-
-This is as the infrastructure appeared in Linux 4.17, adapted slightly for
-Xen.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 2ddfae51d8b1d7b8cd33a4f6ad4d16d27cb869ae
-master date: 2018-07-06 16:49:57 +0100
----
- xen/include/asm-arm/arm32/system.h | 18 ++++++++
- xen/include/asm-arm/arm64/system.h | 22 ++++++++++
- xen/include/asm-x86/system.h | 24 ++++++++++
- xen/include/xen/compiler.h | 3 ++
- xen/include/xen/nospec.h | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 5 files changed, 137 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 xen/include/xen/nospec.h
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/arm32/system.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/arm32/system.h
-index c617b40438..ab57abfbc5 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/arm32/system.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/arm32/system.h
-@@ -48,6 +48,24 @@ static inline int local_fiq_is_enabled(void)
- return !(flags & PSR_FIQ_MASK);
- }
-
-+#define CSDB ".inst 0xe320f014"
-+
-+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long idx,
-+ unsigned long sz)
-+{
-+ unsigned long mask;
-+
-+ asm volatile( "cmp %1, %2\n"
-+ "sbc %0, %1, %1\n"
-+ CSDB
-+ : "=r" (mask)
-+ : "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz)
-+ : "cc" );
-+
-+ return mask;
-+}
-+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
-+
- #endif
- /*
- * Local variables:
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/arm64/system.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/arm64/system.h
-index 2e2ee212a1..2e36573ac6 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/arm64/system.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/arm64/system.h
-@@ -58,6 +58,28 @@ static inline int local_fiq_is_enabled(void)
- return !(flags & PSR_FIQ_MASK);
- }
-
-+#define csdb() asm volatile ( "hint #20" : : : "memory" )
-+
-+/*
-+ * Generate a mask for array_index__nospec() that is ~0UL when 0 <= idx < sz
-+ * and 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long idx,
-+ unsigned long sz)
-+{
-+ unsigned long mask;
-+
-+ asm volatile ( "cmp %1, %2\n"
-+ "sbc %0, xzr, xzr\n"
-+ : "=r" (mask)
-+ : "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz)
-+ : "cc" );
-+ csdb();
-+
-+ return mask;
-+}
-+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
-+
- #endif
- /*
- * Local variables:
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/system.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/system.h
-index 43fb6fe489..483cd20afd 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/system.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/system.h
-@@ -221,6 +221,30 @@ static always_inline unsigned long __xadd(
- #define set_mb(var, value) do { xchg(&var, value); } while (0)
- #define set_wmb(var, value) do { var = value; smp_wmb(); } while (0)
-
-+/**
-+ * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the
-+ * bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise
-+ * @index: array element index
-+ * @size: number of elements in array
-+ *
-+ * Returns:
-+ * 0 - (index < size)
-+ */
-+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
-+ unsigned long size)
-+{
-+ unsigned long mask;
-+
-+ asm volatile ( "cmp %[size], %[index]; sbb %[mask], %[mask];"
-+ : [mask] "=r" (mask)
-+ : [size] "g" (size), [index] "r" (index) );
-+
-+ return mask;
-+}
-+
-+/* Override default implementation in nospec.h. */
-+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
-+
- #define local_irq_disable() asm volatile ( "cli" : : : "memory" )
- #define local_irq_enable() asm volatile ( "sti" : : : "memory" )
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/compiler.h b/xen/include/xen/compiler.h
-index 533a8ea0f3..a7e05681c9 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/compiler.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/compiler.h
-@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@
- #pragma GCC visibility push(hidden)
- #endif
-
-+/* Make the optimizer believe the variable can be manipulated arbitrarily. */
-+#define OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(var) __asm__ ( "" : "+g" (var) )
-+
- /* This macro obfuscates arithmetic on a variable address so that gcc
- shouldn't recognize the original var, and make assumptions about it */
- /*
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/nospec.h b/xen/include/xen/nospec.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..48793996e8
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/nospec.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
-+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-+/* Copyright(c) 2018 Linus Torvalds. All rights reserved. */
-+/* Copyright(c) 2018 Alexei Starovoitov. All rights reserved. */
-+/* Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */
-+/* Copyright(c) 2018 Citrix Systems R&D Ltd. All rights reserved. */
-+
-+#ifndef XEN_NOSPEC_H
-+#define XEN_NOSPEC_H
-+
-+#include <asm/system.h>
-+
-+/**
-+ * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
-+ * @index: array element index
-+ * @size: number of elements in array
-+ *
-+ * When @index is out of bounds (@index >= @size), the sign bit will be
-+ * set. Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of
-+ * zero for an out of bounds index, or ~0 if within bounds [0, @size).
-+ */
-+#ifndef array_index_mask_nospec
-+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
-+ unsigned long size)
-+{
-+ /*
-+ * Always calculate and emit the mask even if the compiler
-+ * thinks the mask is not needed. The compiler does not take
-+ * into account the value of @index under speculation.
-+ */
-+ OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(index);
-+ return ~(long)(index | (size - 1UL - index)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check
-+ *
-+ * For a code sequence like:
-+ *
-+ * if (index < size) {
-+ * index = array_index_nospec(index, size);
-+ * val = array[index];
-+ * }
-+ *
-+ * ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then
-+ * array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0,
-+ * size).
-+ */
-+#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \
-+({ \
-+ typeof(index) _i = (index); \
-+ typeof(size) _s = (size); \
-+ unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \
-+ \
-+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \
-+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \
-+ \
-+ (typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask); \
-+})
-+
-+#endif /* XEN_NOSPEC_H */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local variables:
-+ * mode: C
-+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
-+ * c-basic-offset: 4
-+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
-+ * End:
-+ */
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-vpci-msi-fix-update-of-bound-MSI-interrupts.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-vpci-msi-fix-update-of-bound-MSI-interrupts.patch
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-From 1e34ed7174cce6ab37e420dda9452267301fb7d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2018 13:07:55 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] vpci/msi: fix update of bound MSI interrupts
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Current update process of already bound MSI interrupts is wrong
-because unmap_domain_pirq calls pci_disable_msi, which disables MSI
-interrupts on the device. On the other hand map_domain_pirq doesn't
-enable MSI, so the current update process of already enabled MSI
-entries is wrong because MSI control bit will be disabled by
-unmap_domain_pirq and not re-enabled by map_domain_pirq.
-
-In order to fix this avoid unmapping the PIRQs and just update the
-binding of the PIRQ. A new arch helper to do that is introduced.
-
-Note that MSI-X is not affected because unmap_domain_pirq only
-disables the MSI enable control bit for the MSI case, for MSI-X the
-bit is left untouched by unmap_domain_pirq.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c | 3 +--
- xen/include/xen/vpci.h | 2 ++
- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
-index acadc23f8d..3001d5c488 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
-@@ -699,6 +699,29 @@ static int vpci_msi_update(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint32_t data,
- return 0;
- }
-
-+int vpci_msi_arch_update(struct vpci_msi *msi, const struct pci_dev *pdev)
-+{
-+ int rc;
-+
-+ ASSERT(msi->arch.pirq != INVALID_PIRQ);
-+
-+ pcidevs_lock();
-+ rc = vpci_msi_update(pdev, msi->data, msi->address, msi->vectors,
-+ msi->arch.pirq, msi->mask);
-+ if ( rc )
-+ {
-+ spin_lock(&pdev->domain->event_lock);
-+ unmap_domain_pirq(pdev->domain, msi->arch.pirq);
-+ spin_unlock(&pdev->domain->event_lock);
-+ pcidevs_unlock();
-+ msi->arch.pirq = INVALID_PIRQ;
-+ return rc;
-+ }
-+ pcidevs_unlock();
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- static int vpci_msi_enable(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint32_t data,
- uint64_t address, unsigned int nr,
- paddr_t table_base, uint32_t mask)
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c
-index ad26c38a92..8f15ad7bf2 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c
-@@ -87,8 +87,7 @@ static void update_msi(const struct pci_dev *pdev, struct vpci_msi *msi)
- if ( !msi->enabled )
- return;
-
-- vpci_msi_arch_disable(msi, pdev);
-- if ( vpci_msi_arch_enable(msi, pdev, msi->vectors) )
-+ if ( vpci_msi_arch_update(msi, pdev) )
- msi->enabled = false;
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h
-index 72d2225a97..af2b8580ee 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h
-@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ int __must_check vpci_msi_arch_enable(struct vpci_msi *msi,
- const struct pci_dev *pdev,
- unsigned int vectors);
- void vpci_msi_arch_disable(struct vpci_msi *msi, const struct pci_dev *pdev);
-+int __must_check vpci_msi_arch_update(struct vpci_msi *msi,
-+ const struct pci_dev *pdev);
- void vpci_msi_arch_init(struct vpci_msi *msi);
- void vpci_msi_arch_print(const struct vpci_msi *msi);
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-x86-correctly-set-nonlazy_xstate_used-when-loading-f.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-x86-correctly-set-nonlazy_xstate_used-when-loading-f.patch
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From da33530ab393dcc04d3e35424956277669b8d8ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:18:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 02/42] x86: correctly set nonlazy_xstate_used when loading
- full state
-
-In this case, just like xcr0_accum, nonlazy_xstate_used should always be
-set to the intended new value, rather than possibly leaving the flag set
-from a prior state load.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: f46bf0e101ca63118b9db2616e8f51e972d7f563
-master date: 2018-07-09 10:51:02 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 3 +--
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 3 +--
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-index 8fbbf3aeb3..b04388d663 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -1187,8 +1187,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
- vcpu_pause(v);
- v->arch.xcr0 = _xcr0;
- v->arch.xcr0_accum = _xcr0_accum;
-- if ( _xcr0_accum & XSTATE_NONLAZY )
-- v->arch.nonlazy_xstate_used = 1;
-+ v->arch.nonlazy_xstate_used = _xcr0_accum & XSTATE_NONLAZY;
- compress_xsave_states(v, _xsave_area,
- evc->size - PV_XSAVE_HDR_SIZE);
- vcpu_unpause(v);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-index c23983cdff..279cb88e45 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -1324,8 +1324,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
-
- v->arch.xcr0 = ctxt->xcr0;
- v->arch.xcr0_accum = ctxt->xcr0_accum;
-- if ( ctxt->xcr0_accum & XSTATE_NONLAZY )
-- v->arch.nonlazy_xstate_used = 1;
-+ v->arch.nonlazy_xstate_used = ctxt->xcr0_accum & XSTATE_NONLAZY;
- compress_xsave_states(v, &ctxt->save_area,
- size - offsetof(struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave, save_area));
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-x86-efi-split-compiler-vs-linker-support.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-x86-efi-split-compiler-vs-linker-support.patch
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From fe810e9bcbca982a2f6980d119695c7e933c39bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 10:58:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/efi: split compiler vs linker support
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-So that an ELF binary with support for EFI services will be built when
-the compiler supports the MS ABI, regardless of the linker support for
-PE.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
-Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Cc: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
-Changes since v1:
- - New in this version.
----
- xen/arch/x86/Makefile | 9 +++++----
- xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile | 6 +++---
- xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 2 +-
- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-index 172685fb41..17e7d3fa34 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-@@ -163,10 +163,11 @@ EFI_LDFLAGS += --minor-image-version=$(XEN_SUBVERSION)
- EFI_LDFLAGS += --major-os-version=2 --minor-os-version=0
- EFI_LDFLAGS += --major-subsystem-version=2 --minor-subsystem-version=0
-
--# Check if the build system supports PE.
--XEN_BUILD_PE := $(shell $(CC) $(filter-out $(CFLAGS-y) .%.d,$(CFLAGS)) -c efi/check.c -o efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y)
--export XEN_BUILD_PE := $(if $(XEN_BUILD_PE),$(shell $(LD) -mi386pep --subsystem=10 -o efi/check.efi efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y))
--CFLAGS-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += -DXEN_BUILD_PE
-+# Check if the compiler supports the MS ABI.
-+export XEN_BUILD_EFI := $(shell $(CC) $(filter-out $(CFLAGS-y) .%.d,$(CFLAGS)) -c efi/check.c -o efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y)
-+# Check if the linker supports PE.
-+XEN_BUILD_PE := $(if $(XEN_BUILD_EFI),$(shell $(LD) -mi386pep --subsystem=10 -o efi/check.efi efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y))
-+CFLAGS-$(XEN_BUILD_EFI) += -DXEN_BUILD_EFI
-
- $(TARGET).efi: VIRT_BASE = 0x$(shell $(NM) efi/relocs-dummy.o | sed -n 's, A VIRT_START$$,,p')
- $(TARGET).efi: ALT_BASE = 0x$(shell $(NM) efi/relocs-dummy.o | sed -n 's, A ALT_START$$,,p')
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-index 918383b325..3816de2738 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-@@ -6,6 +6,6 @@ CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
- boot.init.o: buildid.o
-
- obj-y := stub.o
--obj-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) := boot.init.o compat.o relocs-dummy.o runtime.o
--extra-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += buildid.o
--nocov-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += stub.o
-+obj-$(XEN_BUILD_EFI) := boot.init.o compat.o relocs-dummy.o runtime.o
-+extra-$(XEN_BUILD_EFI) += buildid.o
-+nocov-$(XEN_BUILD_EFI) += stub.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-index 4a59467986..6e9bda5109 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ SECTIONS
- } :text
- #endif
-
--#ifndef XEN_BUILD_PE
-+#ifndef XEN_BUILD_EFI
- efi = .;
- #endif
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-x86-hvm-ioreq-use-ref-counted-target-assigned-shared.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-x86-hvm-ioreq-use-ref-counted-target-assigned-shared.patch
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-From 0bb2969630fbc92a0510bf120578b58efb74cdab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2018 17:30:20 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/hvm/ioreq: use ref-counted target-assigned shared
- pages
-
-Passing MEMF_no_refcount to alloc_domheap_pages() will allocate, as
-expected, a page that is assigned to the specified domain but is not
-accounted for in tot_pages. Unfortunately there is no logic for tracking
-such allocations and avoiding any adjustment to tot_pages when the page
-is freed.
-
-The only caller of alloc_domheap_pages() that passes MEMF_no_refcount is
-hvm_alloc_ioreq_mfn() so this patch removes use of the flag from that
-call-site to avoid the possibility of a domain using an ioreq server as
-a means to adjust its tot_pages and hence allocate more memory than it
-should be able to.
-
-However, the reason for using the flag in the first place was to avoid
-the allocation failing if the emulator domain is already at its maximum
-memory limit. Hence this patch switches to allocating memory from the
-target domain instead of the emulator domain. There is already an extra
-memory allowance of 2MB (LIBXL_HVM_EXTRA_MEMORY) applied to HVM guests,
-which is sufficient to cover the pages required by the supported
-configuration of a single IOREQ server for QEMU. (Stub-domains do not,
-so far, use resource mapping). It also also the case the QEMU will have
-mapped the IOREQ server pages before the guest boots, hence it is not
-possible for the guest to inflate its balloon to consume these pages.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c | 12 ++----------
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 6 ------
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-index bdc2687014..fd10ee6146 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/ioreq.c
-@@ -342,20 +342,12 @@ static int hvm_alloc_ioreq_mfn(struct hvm_ioreq_server *s, bool buf)
- return 0;
- }
-
-- /*
-- * Allocated IOREQ server pages are assigned to the emulating
-- * domain, not the target domain. This is safe because the emulating
-- * domain cannot be destroyed until the ioreq server is destroyed.
-- * Also we must use MEMF_no_refcount otherwise page allocation
-- * could fail if the emulating domain has already reached its
-- * maximum allocation.
-- */
-- page = alloc_domheap_page(s->emulator, MEMF_no_refcount);
-+ page = alloc_domheap_page(s->target, 0);
-
- if ( !page )
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-- if ( !get_page_and_type(page, s->emulator, PGT_writable_page) )
-+ if ( !get_page_and_type(page, s->target, PGT_writable_page) )
- {
- /*
- * The domain can't possibly know about this page yet, so failure
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 7d4871b791..24b215d785 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -4396,12 +4396,6 @@ int arch_acquire_resource(struct domain *d, unsigned int type,
-
- mfn_list[i] = mfn_x(mfn);
- }
--
-- /*
-- * The frames will have been assigned to the domain that created
-- * the ioreq server.
-- */
-- *flags |= XENMEM_rsrc_acq_caller_owned;
- break;
- }
-
---
-2.19.1
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-x86-mtrr-split-enabled-field-into-two-boolean-flags.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0002-x86-mtrr-split-enabled-field-into-two-boolean-flags.patch
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
-From 8ebc60e0274b770743e59256f665789d4308b188 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 15:09:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/7] x86/mtrr: split "enabled" field into two boolean flags
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The code hopefully is more readable this way.
-
-Also switch have_fixed to bool, seeing that it already is used as a
-boolean.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-[switched to use MASK_*]
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/generic.c | 14 +++++++++-----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 6 ++++--
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
- xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 2 ++
- xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h | 5 +++--
- 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
-index 7ba0c3f0fe..09763654be 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
-@@ -80,7 +80,8 @@ void __init get_mtrr_state(void)
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_MTRRdefType, msr_content);
- mtrr_state.def_type = (msr_content & 0xff);
-- mtrr_state.enabled = (msr_content & 0xc00) >> 10;
-+ mtrr_state.enabled = MASK_EXTR(msr_content, MTRRdefType_E);
-+ mtrr_state.fixed_enabled = MASK_EXTR(msr_content, MTRRdefType_FE);
-
- /* Store mtrr_cap for HVM MTRR virtualisation. */
- rdmsrl(MSR_MTRRcap, mtrr_state.mtrr_cap);
-@@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ static void __init print_mtrr_state(const char *level)
- unsigned int base = 0, step = 0x10000;
-
- printk("%sMTRR fixed ranges %sabled:\n", level,
-- mtrr_state.enabled & 1 ? "en" : "dis");
-+ mtrr_state.fixed_enabled ? "en" : "dis");
- for (; block->ranges; ++block, step >>= 2) {
- for (i = 0; i < block->ranges; ++i, fr += 8) {
- print_fixed(base, step, fr, level);
-@@ -169,7 +170,7 @@ static void __init print_mtrr_state(const char *level)
- print_fixed_last(level);
- }
- printk("%sMTRR variable ranges %sabled:\n", level,
-- mtrr_state.enabled & 2 ? "en" : "dis");
-+ mtrr_state.enabled ? "en" : "dis");
- width = (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT + 3) / 4;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; ++i) {
-@@ -383,8 +384,11 @@ static unsigned long set_mtrr_state(void)
- /* Set_mtrr_restore restores the old value of MTRRdefType,
- so to set it we fiddle with the saved value */
- if ((deftype & 0xff) != mtrr_state.def_type
-- || ((deftype & 0xc00) >> 10) != mtrr_state.enabled) {
-- deftype = (deftype & ~0xcff) | mtrr_state.def_type | (mtrr_state.enabled << 10);
-+ || MASK_EXTR(deftype, MTRRdefType_E) != mtrr_state.enabled
-+ || MASK_EXTR(deftype, MTRRdefType_FE) != mtrr_state.fixed_enabled) {
-+ deftype = (deftype & ~0xcff) | mtrr_state.def_type |
-+ MASK_INSR(mtrr_state.enabled, MTRRdefType_E) |
-+ MASK_INSR(mtrr_state.fixed_enabled, MTRRdefType_FE);
- change_mask |= MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_DEFTYPE;
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-index e022f5ab0e..3e2abeb274 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -3453,8 +3453,10 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content)
- case MSR_MTRRdefType:
- if ( !d->arch.cpuid->basic.mtrr )
- goto gp_fault;
-- *msr_content = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.def_type
-- | (v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.enabled << 10);
-+ *msr_content = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.def_type |
-+ MASK_INSR(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.enabled, MTRRdefType_E) |
-+ MASK_INSR(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.fixed_enabled,
-+ MTRRdefType_FE);
- break;
- case MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000:
- if ( !d->arch.cpuid->basic.mtrr )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-index a636012388..d74b363851 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-@@ -195,11 +195,11 @@ static int get_mtrr_type(const struct mtrr_state *m,
- uint64_t mask = -(uint64_t)PAGE_SIZE << order;
- unsigned int seg, num_var_ranges = MASK_EXTR(m->mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT);
-
-- if ( unlikely(!(m->enabled & 0x2)) )
-+ if ( unlikely(!m->enabled) )
- return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
-
- pa &= mask;
-- if ( (pa < 0x100000) && (m->enabled & 1) )
-+ if ( (pa < 0x100000) && m->fixed_enabled )
- {
- /* Fixed range MTRR takes effect. */
- uint32_t addr = (uint32_t)pa, index;
-@@ -391,7 +391,8 @@ bool_t mtrr_def_type_msr_set(struct domain *d, struct mtrr_state *m,
- uint64_t msr_content)
- {
- uint8_t def_type = msr_content & 0xff;
-- uint8_t enabled = (msr_content >> 10) & 0x3;
-+ bool fixed_enabled = MASK_EXTR(msr_content, MTRRdefType_FE);
-+ bool enabled = MASK_EXTR(msr_content, MTRRdefType_E);
-
- if ( unlikely(!valid_mtrr_type(def_type)) )
- {
-@@ -406,10 +407,12 @@ bool_t mtrr_def_type_msr_set(struct domain *d, struct mtrr_state *m,
- return 0;
- }
-
-- if ( m->enabled != enabled || m->def_type != def_type )
-+ if ( m->enabled != enabled || m->fixed_enabled != fixed_enabled ||
-+ m->def_type != def_type )
- {
- m->enabled = enabled;
- m->def_type = def_type;
-+ m->fixed_enabled = fixed_enabled;
- memory_type_changed(d);
- }
-
-@@ -478,10 +481,10 @@ bool mtrr_pat_not_equal(const struct vcpu *vd, const struct vcpu *vs)
- const struct mtrr_state *md = &vd->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr;
- const struct mtrr_state *ms = &vs->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr;
-
-- if ( (md->enabled ^ ms->enabled) & 2 )
-+ if ( md->enabled != ms->enabled )
- return true;
-
-- if ( md->enabled & 2 )
-+ if ( md->enabled )
- {
- unsigned int num_var_ranges = MASK_EXTR(md->mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT);
-
-@@ -490,10 +493,10 @@ bool mtrr_pat_not_equal(const struct vcpu *vd, const struct vcpu *vs)
- return true;
-
- /* Test fixed ranges. */
-- if ( (md->enabled ^ ms->enabled) & 1 )
-+ if ( md->fixed_enabled != ms->fixed_enabled )
- return true;
-
-- if ( (md->enabled & 1) &&
-+ if ( md->fixed_enabled &&
- memcmp(md->fixed_ranges, ms->fixed_ranges,
- sizeof(md->fixed_ranges)) )
- return true;
-@@ -681,7 +684,9 @@ static int hvm_save_mtrr_msr(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
- const struct mtrr_state *mtrr_state = &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr;
- struct hvm_hw_mtrr hw_mtrr = {
- .msr_mtrr_def_type = mtrr_state->def_type |
-- (mtrr_state->enabled << 10),
-+ MASK_INSR(mtrr_state->fixed_enabled,
-+ MTRRdefType_FE) |
-+ MASK_INSR(mtrr_state->enabled, MTRRdefType_E),
- .msr_mtrr_cap = mtrr_state->mtrr_cap,
- };
- unsigned int i;
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index 95bb66916c..94bccf73a1 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@
- #define MSR_MTRRfix4K_F0000 0x0000026e
- #define MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000 0x0000026f
- #define MSR_MTRRdefType 0x000002ff
-+#define MTRRdefType_FE (1u << 10)
-+#define MTRRdefType_E (1u << 11)
-
- #define MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x000001d9
- #define IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR (1<<0) /* Last Branch Record */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h
-index 5cdc5d4fe3..b1f7af6396 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h
-@@ -50,8 +50,9 @@ struct mtrr_var_range {
- struct mtrr_state {
- struct mtrr_var_range *var_ranges;
- mtrr_type fixed_ranges[NUM_FIXED_RANGES];
-- unsigned char enabled;
-- unsigned char have_fixed;
-+ bool enabled;
-+ bool fixed_enabled;
-+ bool have_fixed;
- mtrr_type def_type;
-
- u64 mtrr_cap;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0003-hvm-mtrr-add-emacs-local-variables-block-with-format.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0003-hvm-mtrr-add-emacs-local-variables-block-with-format.patch
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From de3b31312248646394a78b837b8a02f2483cad02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 15:09:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/7] hvm/mtrr: add emacs local variables block with formatting
- info
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-index d74b363851..7db0d473e8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-@@ -871,3 +871,13 @@ int epte_get_entry_emt(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn,
-
- return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local variables:
-+ * mode: C
-+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
-+ * c-basic-offset: 4
-+ * tab-width: 4
-+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
-+ * End:
-+ */
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0003-x86-spec-ctrl-command-line-handling-adjustments.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0003-x86-spec-ctrl-command-line-handling-adjustments.patch
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From 4bdeedbd611c59f07878eb22955f655a81452835 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:19:41 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 03/42] x86/spec-ctrl: command line handling adjustments
-
-For one, "no-xen" should not imply "no-eager-fpu", as "eager FPU" mode
-is to guard guests, not Xen itself, which is also expressed so by
-print_details().
-
-And then opt_ssbd, despite being off by default, should also be cleared
-by the "no" and "no-xen" sub-options.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: ac3f9a72141a48d40fabfff561d5a7dc0e1b810d
-master date: 2018-07-10 12:22:31 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 08e6784c4c..73dc7170c7 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
- opt_msr_sc_pv = false;
- opt_msr_sc_hvm = false;
-
-+ opt_eager_fpu = 0;
-+
- disable_common:
- opt_rsb_pv = false;
- opt_rsb_hvm = false;
-@@ -131,7 +133,7 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
- opt_thunk = THUNK_JMP;
- opt_ibrs = 0;
- opt_ibpb = false;
-- opt_eager_fpu = 0;
-+ opt_ssbd = false;
- }
- else if ( val > 0 )
- rc = -EINVAL;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0004-hvm-mtrr-use-the-hardware-number-of-variable-ranges-.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0004-hvm-mtrr-use-the-hardware-number-of-variable-ranges-.patch
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-From e520d9e144ac4766aaa7ce55f1c49191a5ddefc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 15:10:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 4/7] hvm/mtrr: use the hardware number of variable ranges for
- Dom0
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Expand the size of the variable ranges array to match the size of the
-underlying hardware, this is a preparatory change for copying the
-hardware MTRR state for Dom0.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 12 +++++++++---
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h | 3 +++
- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-index 3e2abeb274..c7eb943ed3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -3476,10 +3476,13 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content)
- index = msr - MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000;
- *msr_content = fixed_range_base[index + 3];
- break;
-- case MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0)...MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSMASK(MTRR_VCNT-1):
-+ case MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0)...MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSMASK(MTRR_VCNT_MAX - 1):
- if ( !d->arch.cpuid->basic.mtrr )
- goto gp_fault;
- index = msr - MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0);
-+ if ( (index / 2) >=
-+ MASK_EXTR(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT) )
-+ goto gp_fault;
- *msr_content = var_range_base[index];
- break;
-
-@@ -3637,10 +3640,13 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content,
- index, msr_content) )
- goto gp_fault;
- break;
-- case MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0)...MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSMASK(MTRR_VCNT-1):
-+ case MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0)...MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSMASK(MTRR_VCNT_MAX - 1):
- if ( !d->arch.cpuid->basic.mtrr )
- goto gp_fault;
-- if ( !mtrr_var_range_msr_set(v->domain, &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr,
-+ index = msr - MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0);
-+ if ( ((index / 2) >=
-+ MASK_EXTR(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT)) ||
-+ !mtrr_var_range_msr_set(v->domain, &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr,
- msr, msr_content) )
- goto gp_fault;
- break;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-index 7db0d473e8..4021d972fe 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-@@ -154,14 +154,26 @@ uint8_t pat_type_2_pte_flags(uint8_t pat_type)
- int hvm_vcpu_cacheattr_init(struct vcpu *v)
- {
- struct mtrr_state *m = &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr;
-+ unsigned int num_var_ranges =
-+ is_hardware_domain(v->domain) ? MASK_EXTR(mtrr_state.mtrr_cap,
-+ MTRRcap_VCNT)
-+ : MTRR_VCNT;
-+
-+ if ( num_var_ranges > MTRR_VCNT_MAX )
-+ {
-+ ASSERT(is_hardware_domain(v->domain));
-+ printk("WARNING: limited Dom%u variable range MTRRs from %u to %u\n",
-+ v->domain->domain_id, num_var_ranges, MTRR_VCNT_MAX);
-+ num_var_ranges = MTRR_VCNT_MAX;
-+ }
-
- memset(m, 0, sizeof(*m));
-
-- m->var_ranges = xzalloc_array(struct mtrr_var_range, MTRR_VCNT);
-+ m->var_ranges = xzalloc_array(struct mtrr_var_range, num_var_ranges);
- if ( m->var_ranges == NULL )
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-- m->mtrr_cap = (1u << 10) | (1u << 8) | MTRR_VCNT;
-+ m->mtrr_cap = (1u << 10) | (1u << 8) | num_var_ranges;
-
- v->arch.hvm_vcpu.pat_cr =
- ((uint64_t)PAT_TYPE_WRBACK) | /* PAT0: WB */
-@@ -448,6 +460,12 @@ bool_t mtrr_var_range_msr_set(
- uint64_t *var_range_base = (uint64_t*)m->var_ranges;
-
- index = msr - MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0);
-+ if ( (index / 2) >= MASK_EXTR(m->mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT) )
-+ {
-+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- if ( var_range_base[index] == msr_content )
- return 1;
-
-@@ -691,6 +709,15 @@ static int hvm_save_mtrr_msr(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
- };
- unsigned int i;
-
-+ if ( MASK_EXTR(hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT) >
-+ (ARRAY_SIZE(hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_var) / 2) )
-+ {
-+ dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR,
-+ "HVM save: %pv: too many (%lu) variable range MTRRs\n",
-+ v, MASK_EXTR(hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT));
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+ }
-+
- hvm_get_guest_pat(v, &hw_mtrr.msr_pat_cr);
-
- for ( i = 0; i < MASK_EXTR(hw_mtrr.msr_mtrr_cap, MTRRcap_VCNT); i++ )
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h
-index b1f7af6396..72d0690e28 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mtrr.h
-@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef u8 mtrr_type;
- #define MTRR_PHYSBASE_SHIFT 12
- /* Number of variable range MSR pairs we emulate for HVM guests: */
- #define MTRR_VCNT 8
-+/* Maximum number of variable range MSR pairs if FE is supported. */
-+#define MTRR_VCNT_MAX ((MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 - \
-+ MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0)) / 2)
-
- struct mtrr_var_range {
- uint64_t base;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0005-hvm-mtrr-copy-hardware-state-for-Dom0.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0005-hvm-mtrr-copy-hardware-state-for-Dom0.patch
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From d8b0840bb90711e93b6994e50c728bbbf0f012a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 15:10:49 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 5/7] hvm/mtrr: copy hardware state for Dom0
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Copy the state found on the hardware when creating a PVH Dom0. Since
-the memory map provided to a PVH Dom0 is based on the native one using
-the same set of MTRR ranges should provide Dom0 with a sane MTRR state
-without having to manually build it in Xen.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-index 4021d972fe..2b00993a7b 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
-@@ -185,6 +185,32 @@ int hvm_vcpu_cacheattr_init(struct vcpu *v)
- ((uint64_t)PAT_TYPE_UC_MINUS << 48) | /* PAT6: UC- */
- ((uint64_t)PAT_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << 56); /* PAT7: UC */
-
-+ if ( is_hardware_domain(v->domain) )
-+ {
-+ /* Copy values from the host. */
-+ struct domain *d = v->domain;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+
-+ if ( mtrr_state.have_fixed )
-+ for ( i = 0; i < NUM_FIXED_MSR; i++ )
-+ mtrr_fix_range_msr_set(d, m, i,
-+ ((uint64_t *)mtrr_state.fixed_ranges)[i]);
-+
-+ for ( i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++ )
-+ {
-+ mtrr_var_range_msr_set(d, m, MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(i),
-+ mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].base);
-+ mtrr_var_range_msr_set(d, m, MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSMASK(i),
-+ mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].mask);
-+ }
-+
-+ mtrr_def_type_msr_set(d, m,
-+ mtrr_state.def_type |
-+ MASK_INSR(mtrr_state.fixed_enabled,
-+ MTRRdefType_FE) |
-+ MASK_INSR(mtrr_state.enabled, MTRRdefType_E));
-+ }
-+
- return 0;
- }
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0005-mm-page_alloc-correct-first_dirty-calculations-durin.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0005-mm-page_alloc-correct-first_dirty-calculations-durin.patch
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From ac35e050b64a565fe234dd42e8dac163e946e58d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:21:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 05/42] mm/page_alloc: correct first_dirty calculations during
- block merging
-
-Currently it's possible to hit an assertion in alloc_heap_pages():
-
-Assertion 'first_dirty != INVALID_DIRTY_IDX || !(pg[i].count_info & PGC_need_scrub)' failed at page_alloc.c:988
-
-This can happen because a piece of logic to calculate first_dirty
-during block merging in free_heap_pages() is missing for the following
-scenario:
-
-1. Current block's first_dirty equals to INVALID_DIRTY_IDX
-2. Successor block is free but its first_dirty != INVALID_DIRTY_IDX
-3. The successor is merged into current block
-4. Current block's first_dirty still equals to INVALID_DIRTY_IDX
-
-This will trigger the assertion during allocation of such block in
-alloc_heap_pages() because there will be pages with PGC_need_scrub
-bit set despite the claim of first_dirty that the block is scrubbed.
-
-Add the missing piece of logic and slightly update the comment for
-the predecessor case to better capture the code's intent.
-
-Fixes 1a37f33ea613 ("mm: Place unscrubbed pages at the end of pagelist")
-
-Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
-master commit: 1e2df9608857b5355f2ec3b1a34b87a2007dcd16
-master date: 2018-07-12 10:45:11 +0200
----
- xen/common/page_alloc.c | 8 +++++++-
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/page_alloc.c b/xen/common/page_alloc.c
-index 20ee1e4897..02aeed7c47 100644
---- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c
-+++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c
-@@ -1426,7 +1426,7 @@ static void free_heap_pages(
-
- page_list_del(predecessor, &heap(node, zone, order));
-
-- /* Keep predecessor's first_dirty if it is already set. */
-+ /* Update predecessor's first_dirty if necessary. */
- if ( predecessor->u.free.first_dirty == INVALID_DIRTY_IDX &&
- pg->u.free.first_dirty != INVALID_DIRTY_IDX )
- predecessor->u.free.first_dirty = (1U << order) +
-@@ -1447,6 +1447,12 @@ static void free_heap_pages(
-
- check_and_stop_scrub(successor);
-
-+ /* Update pg's first_dirty if necessary. */
-+ if ( pg->u.free.first_dirty == INVALID_DIRTY_IDX &&
-+ successor->u.free.first_dirty != INVALID_DIRTY_IDX )
-+ pg->u.free.first_dirty = (1U << order) +
-+ successor->u.free.first_dirty;
-+
- page_list_del(successor, &heap(node, zone, order));
- }
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0006-allow-cpu_down-to-be-called-earlier.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0006-allow-cpu_down-to-be-called-earlier.patch
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From a44cf0c8728e08858638170a057675ca5479fdc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:22:06 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 06/42] allow cpu_down() to be called earlier
-
-The function's use of the stop-machine logic has so far prevented its
-use ahead of the processing of the "ordinary" initcalls. Since at this
-early time we're in a controlled environment anyway, there's no need for
-such a heavy tool. Additionally this ought to have less of a performance
-impact especially on large systems, compared to the alternative of
-making stop-machine functionality available earlier.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 5894c0a2da66243a89088d309c7e1ea212ab28d6
-master date: 2018-07-16 15:15:12 +0200
----
- xen/common/cpu.c | 11 +++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/cpu.c b/xen/common/cpu.c
-index 6350f150bd..653a56b840 100644
---- a/xen/common/cpu.c
-+++ b/xen/common/cpu.c
-@@ -67,12 +67,17 @@ void __init register_cpu_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
- spin_unlock(&cpu_add_remove_lock);
- }
-
--static int take_cpu_down(void *unused)
-+static void _take_cpu_down(void *unused)
- {
- void *hcpu = (void *)(long)smp_processor_id();
- int notifier_rc = notifier_call_chain(&cpu_chain, CPU_DYING, hcpu, NULL);
- BUG_ON(notifier_rc != NOTIFY_DONE);
- __cpu_disable();
-+}
-+
-+static int take_cpu_down(void *arg)
-+{
-+ _take_cpu_down(arg);
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -98,7 +103,9 @@ int cpu_down(unsigned int cpu)
- goto fail;
- }
-
-- if ( (err = stop_machine_run(take_cpu_down, NULL, cpu)) < 0 )
-+ if ( unlikely(system_state < SYS_STATE_active) )
-+ on_selected_cpus(cpumask_of(cpu), _take_cpu_down, NULL, true);
-+ else if ( (err = stop_machine_run(take_cpu_down, NULL, cpu)) < 0 )
- goto fail;
-
- __cpu_die(cpu);
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0006-libxc-pvh-set-default-MTRR-type-to-write-back.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0006-libxc-pvh-set-default-MTRR-type-to-write-back.patch
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-From a1c1ae0b0f5b30b5b928e45349086ec00930bccf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 15:11:22 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 6/7] libxc/pvh: set default MTRR type to write-back
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-And enable MTRR. This allows to provide a sane initial MTRR state for
-PVH DomUs. This will have to be expanded when pci-passthrough support
-is added to PVH guests, so that MMIO regions of devices are set as
-UC.
-
-Note that initial MTRR setup is done by hvmloader for HVM guests,
-that's not used by PVH guests.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
----
- tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
-index e33a28847d..d28ff4d7e9 100644
---- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
-+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c
-@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@
- #define X86_CR0_PE 0x01
- #define X86_CR0_ET 0x10
-
-+#define MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK 6
-+#define MTRR_DEF_TYPE_ENABLE (1u << 11)
-+
- #define SPECIALPAGE_PAGING 0
- #define SPECIALPAGE_ACCESS 1
- #define SPECIALPAGE_SHARING 2
-@@ -931,6 +934,20 @@ static int vcpu_x86_64(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
- return rc;
- }
-
-+const static void *hvm_get_save_record(const void *ctx, unsigned int type,
-+ unsigned int instance)
-+{
-+ const struct hvm_save_descriptor *header;
-+
-+ for ( header = ctx;
-+ header->typecode != HVM_SAVE_CODE(END);
-+ ctx += sizeof(*header) + header->length, header = ctx )
-+ if ( header->typecode == type && header->instance == instance )
-+ return ctx + sizeof(*header);
-+
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+
- static int vcpu_hvm(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
- {
- struct {
-@@ -938,9 +955,12 @@ static int vcpu_hvm(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
- HVM_SAVE_TYPE(HEADER) header;
- struct hvm_save_descriptor cpu_d;
- HVM_SAVE_TYPE(CPU) cpu;
-+ struct hvm_save_descriptor mtrr_d;
-+ HVM_SAVE_TYPE(MTRR) mtrr;
- struct hvm_save_descriptor end_d;
- HVM_SAVE_TYPE(END) end;
- } bsp_ctx;
-+ const HVM_SAVE_TYPE(MTRR) *mtrr_record;
- uint8_t *full_ctx = NULL;
- int rc;
-
-@@ -1014,6 +1034,30 @@ static int vcpu_hvm(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
- if ( dom->start_info_seg.pfn )
- bsp_ctx.cpu.rbx = dom->start_info_seg.pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
-
-+ /* Set the MTRR. */
-+ bsp_ctx.mtrr_d.typecode = HVM_SAVE_CODE(MTRR);
-+ bsp_ctx.mtrr_d.instance = 0;
-+ bsp_ctx.mtrr_d.length = HVM_SAVE_LENGTH(MTRR);
-+
-+ mtrr_record = hvm_get_save_record(full_ctx, HVM_SAVE_CODE(MTRR), 0);
-+ if ( !mtrr_record )
-+ {
-+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-+ "%s: unable to get MTRR save record", __func__);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ memcpy(&bsp_ctx.mtrr, mtrr_record, sizeof(bsp_ctx.mtrr));
-+
-+ /* TODO: maybe this should be a firmware option instead? */
-+ if ( !dom->device_model )
-+ /*
-+ * Enable MTRR, set default type to WB.
-+ * TODO: add MMIO areas as UC when passthrough is supported.
-+ */
-+ bsp_ctx.mtrr.msr_mtrr_def_type = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK |
-+ MTRR_DEF_TYPE_ENABLE;
-+
- /* Set the end descriptor. */
- bsp_ctx.end_d.typecode = HVM_SAVE_CODE(END);
- bsp_ctx.end_d.instance = 0;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0007-docs-pvh-document-initial-MTRR-state.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0007-docs-pvh-document-initial-MTRR-state.patch
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 565efbc8a7145c47379543edfcc84fc4f4dd6d83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 15:11:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 7/7] docs/pvh: document initial MTRR state
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Provided to both Dom0 and DomUs.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
----
- docs/misc/pvh.markdown | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/pvh.markdown b/docs/misc/pvh.markdown
-index e85fb15374..1c9a00b48a 100644
---- a/docs/misc/pvh.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/pvh.markdown
-@@ -92,3 +92,21 @@ event channels. Delivery of those interrupts can be configured in the same way
- as HVM guests, check xen/include/public/hvm/params.h and
- xen/include/public/hvm/hvm\_op.h for more information about available delivery
- methods.
-+
-+## MTRR ##
-+
-+### Unprivileged guests ###
-+
-+PVH guests are currently booted with the default MTRR type set to write-back
-+and MTRR enabled. This allows DomUs to start with a sane MTRR state. Note that
-+this will have to be revisited when pci-passthrough is added to PVH in order to
-+set MMIO regions as UC.
-+
-+Xen guarantees that RAM regions will always have the WB cache type set in the
-+initial MTRR state, either set by the default MTRR type or by other means.
-+
-+### Hardware domain ###
-+
-+A PVH hardware domain is booted with the same MTRR state as the one found on
-+the host. This is done because the hardware domain memory map is already a
-+modified copy of the host memory map, so the same MTRR setup should work.
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0007-x86-svm-Fixes-and-cleanup-to-svm_inject_event.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0007-x86-svm-Fixes-and-cleanup-to-svm_inject_event.patch
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-From b53e0defcea1400c03f83d1d5cc30a3b237c8cfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:22:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 07/42] x86/svm Fixes and cleanup to svm_inject_event()
-
- * State adjustments (and debug tracing) for #DB/#BP/#PF should not be done
- for `int $n` instructions. Updates to %cr2 occur even if the exception
- combines to #DF.
- * Don't opencode DR_STEP when updating %dr6.
- * Simplify the logic for calling svm_emul_swint_injection() as in the common
- case, every condition needs checking.
- * Fix comments which have become stale as code has moved between components.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
-master commit: 8dab867c81ede455009028a9a88edc4ff3b9da88
-master date: 2018-07-17 10:12:40 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++----------------------
- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-index 165500e3f2..b964c59dad 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
-@@ -1432,24 +1432,18 @@ static void svm_inject_event(const struct x86_event *event)
- * Xen must emulate enough of the event injection to be sure that a
- * further fault shouldn't occur during delivery. This covers the fact
- * that hardware doesn't perform DPL checking on injection.
-- *
-- * Also, it accounts for proper positioning of %rip for an event with trap
-- * semantics (where %rip should point after the instruction) which suffers
-- * a fault during injection (at which point %rip should point at the
-- * instruction).
- */
- if ( event->type == X86_EVENTTYPE_PRI_SW_EXCEPTION ||
-- (!cpu_has_svm_nrips && (event->type == X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT ||
-- event->type == X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_EXCEPTION)) )
-+ (!cpu_has_svm_nrips && (event->type >= X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT)) )
- svm_emul_swint_injection(&_event);
-
-- switch ( _event.vector )
-+ switch ( _event.vector | -(_event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT) )
- {
- case TRAP_debug:
- if ( regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF )
- {
- __restore_debug_registers(vmcb, curr);
-- vmcb_set_dr6(vmcb, vmcb_get_dr6(vmcb) | 0x4000);
-+ vmcb_set_dr6(vmcb, vmcb_get_dr6(vmcb) | DR_STEP);
- }
- /* fall through */
- case TRAP_int3:
-@@ -1459,6 +1453,13 @@ static void svm_inject_event(const struct x86_event *event)
- domain_pause_for_debugger();
- return;
- }
-+ break;
-+
-+ case TRAP_page_fault:
-+ ASSERT(_event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION);
-+ curr->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[2] = _event.cr2;
-+ vmcb_set_cr2(vmcb, _event.cr2);
-+ break;
- }
-
- if ( unlikely(eventinj.fields.v) &&
-@@ -1481,13 +1482,9 @@ static void svm_inject_event(const struct x86_event *event)
- * icebp, software events with trap semantics need emulating, so %rip in
- * the trap frame points after the instruction.
- *
-- * The x86 emulator (if requested by the x86_swint_emulate_* choice) will
-- * have performed checks such as presence/dpl/etc and believes that the
-- * event injection will succeed without faulting.
-- *
-- * The x86 emulator will always provide fault semantics for software
-- * events, with _trap.insn_len set appropriately. If the injection
-- * requires emulation, move %rip forwards at this point.
-+ * svm_emul_swint_injection() has already confirmed that events with trap
-+ * semantics won't fault on injection. Position %rip/NextRIP suitably,
-+ * and restrict the event type to what hardware will tolerate.
- */
- switch ( _event.type )
- {
-@@ -1544,16 +1541,12 @@ static void svm_inject_event(const struct x86_event *event)
- eventinj.fields.errorcode == (uint16_t)eventinj.fields.errorcode);
- vmcb->eventinj = eventinj;
-
-- if ( _event.vector == TRAP_page_fault )
-- {
-- curr->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[2] = _event.cr2;
-- vmcb_set_cr2(vmcb, _event.cr2);
-- HVMTRACE_LONG_2D(PF_INJECT, _event.error_code, TRC_PAR_LONG(_event.cr2));
-- }
-+ if ( _event.vector == TRAP_page_fault &&
-+ _event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION )
-+ HVMTRACE_LONG_2D(PF_INJECT, _event.error_code,
-+ TRC_PAR_LONG(_event.cr2));
- else
-- {
- HVMTRACE_2D(INJ_EXC, _event.vector, _event.error_code);
-- }
- }
-
- static int svm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v)
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0008-cpupools-fix-state-when-downing-a-CPU-failed.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0008-cpupools-fix-state-when-downing-a-CPU-failed.patch
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From 0a2016ca2fabfe674c311dcfd8e15fec0ba3f7b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:23:22 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 08/42] cpupools: fix state when downing a CPU failed
-
-While I've run into the issue with further patches in place which no
-longer guarantee the per-CPU area to start out as all zeros, the
-CPU_DOWN_FAILED processing looks to have the same issue: By not zapping
-the per-CPU cpupool pointer, cpupool_cpu_add()'s (indirect) invocation
-of schedule_cpu_switch() will trigger the "c != old_pool" assertion
-there.
-
-Clearing the field during CPU_DOWN_PREPARE is too early (afaict this
-should not happen before cpu_disable_scheduler()). Clearing it in
-CPU_DEAD and CPU_DOWN_FAILED would be an option, but would take the same
-piece of code twice. Since the field's value shouldn't matter while the
-CPU is offline, simply clear it (implicitly) for CPU_ONLINE and
-CPU_DOWN_FAILED, but only for other than the suspend/resume case (which
-gets specially handled in cpupool_cpu_remove()).
-
-By adjusting the conditional in cpupool_cpu_add() CPU_DOWN_FAILED
-handling in the suspend case should now also be handled better.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-master commit: cb1ae9a27819cea0c5008773c68a7be6f37eb0e5
-master date: 2018-07-19 09:41:55 +0200
----
- xen/common/cpupool.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/cpupool.c b/xen/common/cpupool.c
-index 999839444e..1e8edcbd57 100644
---- a/xen/common/cpupool.c
-+++ b/xen/common/cpupool.c
-@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static int cpupool_cpu_add(unsigned int cpu)
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_locked_cpus);
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_free_cpus);
-
-- if ( system_state == SYS_STATE_resume )
-+ if ( system_state == SYS_STATE_suspend || system_state == SYS_STATE_resume )
- {
- struct cpupool **c;
-
-@@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ static int cpupool_cpu_add(unsigned int cpu)
- * (or unplugging would have failed) and that is the default behavior
- * anyway.
- */
-+ per_cpu(cpupool, cpu) = NULL;
- ret = cpupool_assign_cpu_locked(cpupool0, cpu);
- }
- out:
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0009-x86-AMD-distinguish-compute-units-from-hyper-threads.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0009-x86-AMD-distinguish-compute-units-from-hyper-threads.patch
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-From bd51a6424202a5f1cd13dee6614bcb69ecbd2458 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:24:01 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 09/42] x86/AMD: distinguish compute units from hyper-threads
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Fam17 replaces CUs by HTs, which we should reflect accordingly, even if
-the difference is not very big. The most relevant change (requiring some
-code restructuring) is that the topoext feature no longer means there is
-a valid CU ID.
-
-Take the opportunity and convert wrongly plain int variables in
-set_cpu_sibling_map() to unsigned int.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@amd.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 9429b07a0af7f92a5f25e4068e11db881e157495
-master date: 2018-07-19 09:42:42 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-index 458a3fe60c..76078b55b2 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-@@ -505,17 +505,23 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
- u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
-
- cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-- c->compute_unit_id = ebx & 0xFF;
- c->x86_num_siblings = ((ebx >> 8) & 0x3) + 1;
-+
-+ if (c->x86 < 0x17)
-+ c->compute_unit_id = ebx & 0xFF;
-+ else {
-+ c->cpu_core_id = ebx & 0xFF;
-+ c->x86_max_cores /= c->x86_num_siblings;
-+ }
- }
-
- if (opt_cpu_info)
- printk("CPU %d(%d) -> Processor %d, %s %d\n",
- cpu, c->x86_max_cores, c->phys_proc_id,
-- cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT) ? "Compute Unit" :
-- "Core",
-- cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT) ? c->compute_unit_id :
-- c->cpu_core_id);
-+ c->compute_unit_id != INVALID_CUID ? "Compute Unit"
-+ : "Core",
-+ c->compute_unit_id != INVALID_CUID ? c->compute_unit_id
-+ : c->cpu_core_id);
- }
-
- static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-index d4478e6132..78ba73578a 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -234,33 +234,41 @@ static void link_thread_siblings(int cpu1, int cpu2)
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu2, per_cpu(cpu_core_mask, cpu1));
- }
-
--static void set_cpu_sibling_map(int cpu)
-+static void set_cpu_sibling_map(unsigned int cpu)
- {
-- int i;
-+ unsigned int i;
- struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = cpu_data;
-
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &cpu_sibling_setup_map);
-
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, socket_cpumask[cpu_to_socket(cpu)]);
-+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, per_cpu(cpu_core_mask, cpu));
-+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, cpu));
-
- if ( c[cpu].x86_num_siblings > 1 )
- {
- for_each_cpu ( i, &cpu_sibling_setup_map )
- {
-- if ( cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT) ) {
-- if ( (c[cpu].phys_proc_id == c[i].phys_proc_id) &&
-- (c[cpu].compute_unit_id == c[i].compute_unit_id) )
-+ if ( cpu == i || c[cpu].phys_proc_id != c[i].phys_proc_id )
-+ continue;
-+ if ( c[cpu].compute_unit_id != INVALID_CUID &&
-+ c[i].compute_unit_id != INVALID_CUID )
-+ {
-+ if ( c[cpu].compute_unit_id == c[i].compute_unit_id )
-+ link_thread_siblings(cpu, i);
-+ }
-+ else if ( c[cpu].cpu_core_id != XEN_INVALID_CORE_ID &&
-+ c[i].cpu_core_id != XEN_INVALID_CORE_ID )
-+ {
-+ if ( c[cpu].cpu_core_id == c[i].cpu_core_id )
- link_thread_siblings(cpu, i);
-- } else if ( (c[cpu].phys_proc_id == c[i].phys_proc_id) &&
-- (c[cpu].cpu_core_id == c[i].cpu_core_id) ) {
-- link_thread_siblings(cpu, i);
- }
-+ else
-+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING
-+ "CPU%u: unclear relationship with CPU%u\n",
-+ cpu, i);
- }
- }
-- else
-- {
-- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, cpu));
-- }
-
- if ( c[cpu].x86_max_cores == 1 )
- {
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0010-x86-distinguish-CPU-offlining-from-CPU-removal.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0010-x86-distinguish-CPU-offlining-from-CPU-removal.patch
@@ -1,423 +0,0 @@
-From 5908b4866b682d9189c36eddf7c898fd95b27ec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:24:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 10/42] x86: distinguish CPU offlining from CPU removal
-
-In order to be able to service #MC on offlined CPUs, the GDT, IDT,
-stack, and per-CPU data (which includes the TSS) need to be kept
-allocated. They should only be freed upon CPU removal (which we
-currently don't support, so some code is becoming effectively dead for
-the moment).
-
-Note that for now park_offline_cpus doesn't get set to true anywhere -
-this is going to be the subject of a subsequent patch.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 2e6c8f182c9c50129b1c7a620242861e6ad6a9fb
-master date: 2018-07-19 13:43:33 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 15 ++++++--
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 9 +++--
- xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c | 9 +++--
- xen/arch/x86/percpu.c | 9 +++--
- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
- xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h | 2 +
- xen/include/xen/cpu.h | 2 +
- xen/include/xen/cpumask.h | 23 ++++++++++++
- xen/include/xen/mm.h | 8 ++++
- xen/include/xen/xmalloc.h | 6 +++
- 10 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
-index a8c287d124..32273d9208 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
-@@ -692,12 +692,15 @@ static void cpu_bank_free(unsigned int cpu)
-
- mcabanks_free(poll);
- mcabanks_free(clr);
-+
-+ per_cpu(poll_bankmask, cpu) = NULL;
-+ per_cpu(mce_clear_banks, cpu) = NULL;
- }
-
- static int cpu_bank_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
- {
-- struct mca_banks *poll = mcabanks_alloc();
-- struct mca_banks *clr = mcabanks_alloc();
-+ struct mca_banks *poll = per_cpu(poll_bankmask, cpu) ?: mcabanks_alloc();
-+ struct mca_banks *clr = per_cpu(mce_clear_banks, cpu) ?: mcabanks_alloc();
-
- if ( !poll || !clr )
- {
-@@ -725,7 +728,13 @@ static int cpu_callback(
-
- case CPU_UP_CANCELED:
- case CPU_DEAD:
-- cpu_bank_free(cpu);
-+ if ( !park_offline_cpus )
-+ cpu_bank_free(cpu);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case CPU_REMOVE:
-+ if ( park_offline_cpus )
-+ cpu_bank_free(cpu);
- break;
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 9850a782ec..c39cf2c6e5 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -107,10 +107,11 @@ static void play_dead(void)
- local_irq_disable();
-
- /*
-- * NOTE: After cpu_exit_clear, per-cpu variables are no longer accessible,
-- * as they may be freed at any time. In this case, heap corruption or
-- * #PF can occur (when heap debugging is enabled). For example, even
-- * printk() can involve tasklet scheduling, which touches per-cpu vars.
-+ * NOTE: After cpu_exit_clear, per-cpu variables may no longer accessible,
-+ * as they may be freed at any time if offline CPUs don't get parked. In
-+ * this case, heap corruption or #PF can occur (when heap debugging is
-+ * enabled). For example, even printk() can involve tasklet scheduling,
-+ * which touches per-cpu vars.
- *
- * Consider very carefully when adding code to *dead_idle. Most hypervisor
- * subsystems are unsafe to call.
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
-index 4779b0d0d5..d997806272 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
-@@ -201,18 +201,21 @@ static int update_clusterinfo(
- if ( !cluster_cpus_spare )
- cluster_cpus_spare = xzalloc(cpumask_t);
- if ( !cluster_cpus_spare ||
-- !alloc_cpumask_var(&per_cpu(scratch_mask, cpu)) )
-+ !cond_alloc_cpumask_var(&per_cpu(scratch_mask, cpu)) )
- err = -ENOMEM;
- break;
- case CPU_UP_CANCELED:
- case CPU_DEAD:
-+ case CPU_REMOVE:
-+ if ( park_offline_cpus == (action != CPU_REMOVE) )
-+ break;
- if ( per_cpu(cluster_cpus, cpu) )
- {
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, per_cpu(cluster_cpus, cpu));
- if ( cpumask_empty(per_cpu(cluster_cpus, cpu)) )
-- xfree(per_cpu(cluster_cpus, cpu));
-+ XFREE(per_cpu(cluster_cpus, cpu));
- }
-- free_cpumask_var(per_cpu(scratch_mask, cpu));
-+ FREE_CPUMASK_VAR(per_cpu(scratch_mask, cpu));
- break;
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/percpu.c b/xen/arch/x86/percpu.c
-index c9997b7937..8be4ebddf4 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/percpu.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/percpu.c
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static int init_percpu_area(unsigned int cpu)
- char *p;
-
- if ( __per_cpu_offset[cpu] != INVALID_PERCPU_AREA )
-- return -EBUSY;
-+ return 0;
-
- if ( (p = alloc_xenheap_pages(PERCPU_ORDER, 0)) == NULL )
- return -ENOMEM;
-@@ -76,9 +76,12 @@ static int cpu_percpu_callback(
- break;
- case CPU_UP_CANCELED:
- case CPU_DEAD:
-- free_percpu_area(cpu);
-+ if ( !park_offline_cpus )
-+ free_percpu_area(cpu);
- break;
-- default:
-+ case CPU_REMOVE:
-+ if ( park_offline_cpus )
-+ free_percpu_area(cpu);
- break;
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-index 78ba73578a..7e76cc3d68 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ static cpumask_t scratch_cpu0mask;
- cpumask_t cpu_online_map __read_mostly;
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_online_map);
-
-+bool __read_mostly park_offline_cpus;
-+
- unsigned int __read_mostly nr_sockets;
- cpumask_t **__read_mostly socket_cpumask;
- static cpumask_t *secondary_socket_cpumask;
-@@ -895,7 +897,14 @@ static void cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned int cpu)
- }
- }
-
--static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu)
-+/*
-+ * The 'remove' boolean controls whether a CPU is just getting offlined (and
-+ * parked), or outright removed / offlined without parking. Parked CPUs need
-+ * things like their stack, GDT, IDT, TSS, and per-CPU data still available.
-+ * A few other items, in particular CPU masks, are also retained, as it's
-+ * difficult to prove that they're entirely unreferenced from parked CPUs.
-+ */
-+static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu, bool remove)
- {
- unsigned int order, socket = cpu_to_socket(cpu);
- struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = cpu_data;
-@@ -906,15 +915,19 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu)
- socket_cpumask[socket] = NULL;
- }
-
-- c[cpu].phys_proc_id = XEN_INVALID_SOCKET_ID;
-- c[cpu].cpu_core_id = XEN_INVALID_CORE_ID;
-- c[cpu].compute_unit_id = INVALID_CUID;
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &cpu_sibling_setup_map);
-
-- free_cpumask_var(per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, cpu));
-- free_cpumask_var(per_cpu(cpu_core_mask, cpu));
-- if ( per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu) != &scratch_cpu0mask )
-- free_cpumask_var(per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu));
-+ if ( remove )
-+ {
-+ c[cpu].phys_proc_id = XEN_INVALID_SOCKET_ID;
-+ c[cpu].cpu_core_id = XEN_INVALID_CORE_ID;
-+ c[cpu].compute_unit_id = INVALID_CUID;
-+
-+ FREE_CPUMASK_VAR(per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, cpu));
-+ FREE_CPUMASK_VAR(per_cpu(cpu_core_mask, cpu));
-+ if ( per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu) != &scratch_cpu0mask )
-+ FREE_CPUMASK_VAR(per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu));
-+ }
-
- cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(cpu);
-
-@@ -936,19 +949,21 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned int cpu)
- }
-
- order = get_order_from_pages(NR_RESERVED_GDT_PAGES);
-- free_xenheap_pages(per_cpu(gdt_table, cpu), order);
-+ if ( remove )
-+ FREE_XENHEAP_PAGES(per_cpu(gdt_table, cpu), order);
-
- free_xenheap_pages(per_cpu(compat_gdt_table, cpu), order);
-
-- order = get_order_from_bytes(IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(idt_entry_t));
-- free_xenheap_pages(idt_tables[cpu], order);
-- idt_tables[cpu] = NULL;
--
-- if ( stack_base[cpu] != NULL )
-+ if ( remove )
- {
-- memguard_unguard_stack(stack_base[cpu]);
-- free_xenheap_pages(stack_base[cpu], STACK_ORDER);
-- stack_base[cpu] = NULL;
-+ order = get_order_from_bytes(IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(idt_entry_t));
-+ FREE_XENHEAP_PAGES(idt_tables[cpu], order);
-+
-+ if ( stack_base[cpu] )
-+ {
-+ memguard_unguard_stack(stack_base[cpu]);
-+ FREE_XENHEAP_PAGES(stack_base[cpu], STACK_ORDER);
-+ }
- }
- }
-
-@@ -963,15 +978,17 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
- if ( node != NUMA_NO_NODE )
- memflags = MEMF_node(node);
-
-- stack_base[cpu] = alloc_xenheap_pages(STACK_ORDER, memflags);
-+ if ( stack_base[cpu] == NULL )
-+ stack_base[cpu] = alloc_xenheap_pages(STACK_ORDER, memflags);
- if ( stack_base[cpu] == NULL )
- goto out;
- memguard_guard_stack(stack_base[cpu]);
-
- order = get_order_from_pages(NR_RESERVED_GDT_PAGES);
-- per_cpu(gdt_table, cpu) = gdt = alloc_xenheap_pages(order, memflags);
-+ gdt = per_cpu(gdt_table, cpu) ?: alloc_xenheap_pages(order, memflags);
- if ( gdt == NULL )
- goto out;
-+ per_cpu(gdt_table, cpu) = gdt;
- memcpy(gdt, boot_cpu_gdt_table, NR_RESERVED_GDT_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(NR_CPUS > 0x10000);
- gdt[PER_CPU_GDT_ENTRY - FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY].a = cpu;
-@@ -983,7 +1000,8 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
- gdt[PER_CPU_GDT_ENTRY - FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY].a = cpu;
-
- order = get_order_from_bytes(IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(idt_entry_t));
-- idt_tables[cpu] = alloc_xenheap_pages(order, memflags);
-+ if ( idt_tables[cpu] == NULL )
-+ idt_tables[cpu] = alloc_xenheap_pages(order, memflags);
- if ( idt_tables[cpu] == NULL )
- goto out;
- memcpy(idt_tables[cpu], idt_table, IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(idt_entry_t));
-@@ -1011,16 +1029,16 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
- (secondary_socket_cpumask = xzalloc(cpumask_t)) == NULL )
- goto out;
-
-- if ( !(zalloc_cpumask_var(&per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, cpu)) &&
-- zalloc_cpumask_var(&per_cpu(cpu_core_mask, cpu)) &&
-- alloc_cpumask_var(&per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu))) )
-+ if ( !(cond_zalloc_cpumask_var(&per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, cpu)) &&
-+ cond_zalloc_cpumask_var(&per_cpu(cpu_core_mask, cpu)) &&
-+ cond_alloc_cpumask_var(&per_cpu(scratch_cpumask, cpu))) )
- goto out;
-
- rc = 0;
-
- out:
- if ( rc )
-- cpu_smpboot_free(cpu);
-+ cpu_smpboot_free(cpu, true);
-
- return rc;
- }
-@@ -1038,9 +1056,10 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_callback(
- break;
- case CPU_UP_CANCELED:
- case CPU_DEAD:
-- cpu_smpboot_free(cpu);
-+ cpu_smpboot_free(cpu, !park_offline_cpus);
- break;
-- default:
-+ case CPU_REMOVE:
-+ cpu_smpboot_free(cpu, true);
- break;
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
-index 4e5f673fec..09c55458df 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/smp.h
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(cpumask_var_t, cpu_sibling_mask);
- DECLARE_PER_CPU(cpumask_var_t, cpu_core_mask);
- DECLARE_PER_CPU(cpumask_var_t, scratch_cpumask);
-
-+extern bool park_offline_cpus;
-+
- void smp_send_nmi_allbutself(void);
-
- void send_IPI_mask(const cpumask_t *, int vector);
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/cpu.h b/xen/include/xen/cpu.h
-index ffefc09f8e..2fe3ec05d8 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/cpu.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/cpu.h
-@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ void register_cpu_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
- #define CPU_DYING (0x0007 | NOTIFY_REVERSE)
- /* CPU_DEAD: CPU is dead. */
- #define CPU_DEAD (0x0008 | NOTIFY_REVERSE)
-+/* CPU_REMOVE: CPU was removed. */
-+#define CPU_REMOVE (0x0009 | NOTIFY_REVERSE)
-
- /* Perform CPU hotplug. May return -EAGAIN. */
- int cpu_down(unsigned int cpu);
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/cpumask.h b/xen/include/xen/cpumask.h
-index 42340a098e..4a11bcc3f3 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/cpumask.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/cpumask.h
-@@ -351,16 +351,35 @@ static inline bool_t alloc_cpumask_var(cpumask_var_t *mask)
- return *mask != NULL;
- }
-
-+static inline bool cond_alloc_cpumask_var(cpumask_var_t *mask)
-+{
-+ if (*mask == NULL)
-+ *mask = _xmalloc(nr_cpumask_bits / 8, sizeof(long));
-+ return *mask != NULL;
-+}
-+
- static inline bool_t zalloc_cpumask_var(cpumask_var_t *mask)
- {
- *(void **)mask = _xzalloc(nr_cpumask_bits / 8, sizeof(long));
- return *mask != NULL;
- }
-
-+static inline bool cond_zalloc_cpumask_var(cpumask_var_t *mask)
-+{
-+ if (*mask == NULL)
-+ *mask = _xzalloc(nr_cpumask_bits / 8, sizeof(long));
-+ else
-+ cpumask_clear(*mask);
-+ return *mask != NULL;
-+}
-+
- static inline void free_cpumask_var(cpumask_var_t mask)
- {
- xfree(mask);
- }
-+
-+/* Free an allocated mask, and zero the pointer to it. */
-+#define FREE_CPUMASK_VAR(m) XFREE(m)
- #else
- typedef cpumask_t cpumask_var_t[1];
-
-@@ -368,16 +387,20 @@ static inline bool_t alloc_cpumask_var(cpumask_var_t *mask)
- {
- return 1;
- }
-+#define cond_alloc_cpumask_var alloc_cpumask_var
-
- static inline bool_t zalloc_cpumask_var(cpumask_var_t *mask)
- {
- cpumask_clear(*mask);
- return 1;
- }
-+#define cond_zalloc_cpumask_var zalloc_cpumask_var
-
- static inline void free_cpumask_var(cpumask_var_t mask)
- {
- }
-+
-+#define FREE_CPUMASK_VAR(m) free_cpumask_var(m)
- #endif
-
- #if NR_CPUS > 1
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/mm.h b/xen/include/xen/mm.h
-index e928551c91..24654e8e22 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/mm.h
-@@ -162,6 +162,14 @@ void free_xenheap_pages(void *v, unsigned int order);
- bool scrub_free_pages(void);
- #define alloc_xenheap_page() (alloc_xenheap_pages(0,0))
- #define free_xenheap_page(v) (free_xenheap_pages(v,0))
-+
-+/* Free an allocation, and zero the pointer to it. */
-+#define FREE_XENHEAP_PAGES(p, o) do { \
-+ free_xenheap_pages(p, o); \
-+ (p) = NULL; \
-+} while ( false )
-+#define FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(p) FREE_XENHEAP_PAGES(p, 0)
-+
- /* Map machine page range in Xen virtual address space. */
- int map_pages_to_xen(
- unsigned long virt,
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/xmalloc.h b/xen/include/xen/xmalloc.h
-index cc2673d8ae..9aa5edf593 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/xmalloc.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/xmalloc.h
-@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
- /* Free any of the above. */
- extern void xfree(void *);
-
-+/* Free an allocation, and zero the pointer to it. */
-+#define XFREE(p) do { \
-+ xfree(p); \
-+ (p) = NULL; \
-+} while ( false )
-+
- /* Underlying functions */
- extern void *_xmalloc(unsigned long size, unsigned long align);
- extern void *_xzalloc(unsigned long size, unsigned long align);
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0011-x86-possibly-bring-up-all-CPUs-even-if-not-all-are-s.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0011-x86-possibly-bring-up-all-CPUs-even-if-not-all-are-s.patch
@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
-From 75313e478e894176056e1fc5852136b344a0dc70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:25:38 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 11/42] x86: possibly bring up all CPUs even if not all are
- supposed to be used
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Reportedly Intel CPUs which can't broadcast #MC to all targeted
-cores/threads because some have CR4.MCE clear will shut down. Therefore
-we want to keep CR4.MCE enabled when offlining a CPU, and we need to
-bring up all CPUs in order to be able to set CR4.MCE in the first place.
-
-The use of clear_in_cr4() in cpu_mcheck_disable() was ill advised
-anyway, and to avoid future similar mistakes I'm removing clear_in_cr4()
-altogether right here.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-master commit: 8797d20a6ec2dd75195585a107ce345c51c0a59a
-master date: 2018-07-19 13:43:33 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c | 2 --
- xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c | 15 +++++++++++----
- xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
- xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h | 6 ------
- 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
-index 528aff1811..fdb022875a 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
-@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
- #include <public/sysctl.h> /* for XEN_INVALID_{SOCKET,CORE}_ID */
-
- #include "cpu.h"
-+#include "mcheck/x86_mca.h"
-
- bool_t opt_arat = 1;
- boolean_param("arat", opt_arat);
-@@ -355,6 +356,9 @@ static void __init early_cpu_detect(void)
- hap_paddr_bits = PADDR_BITS;
- }
-
-+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
-+ park_offline_cpus = opt_mce;
-+
- initialize_cpu_data(0);
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
-index e5dd956a24..4474a34e34 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
-@@ -636,8 +636,6 @@ static void clear_cmci(void)
-
- static void cpu_mcheck_disable(void)
- {
-- clear_in_cr4(X86_CR4_MCE);
--
- if ( cmci_support && opt_mce )
- clear_cmci();
- }
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
-index 49140e46f0..f3f6d48668 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
-@@ -68,19 +68,26 @@ physid_mask_t phys_cpu_present_map;
-
- void __init set_nr_cpu_ids(unsigned int max_cpus)
- {
-+ unsigned int tot_cpus = num_processors + disabled_cpus;
-+
- if (!max_cpus)
-- max_cpus = num_processors + disabled_cpus;
-+ max_cpus = tot_cpus;
- if (max_cpus > NR_CPUS)
- max_cpus = NR_CPUS;
- else if (!max_cpus)
- max_cpus = 1;
- printk(XENLOG_INFO "SMP: Allowing %u CPUs (%d hotplug CPUs)\n",
- max_cpus, max_t(int, max_cpus - num_processors, 0));
-- nr_cpu_ids = max_cpus;
-+
-+ if (!park_offline_cpus)
-+ tot_cpus = max_cpus;
-+ nr_cpu_ids = min(tot_cpus, NR_CPUS + 0u);
-+ if (park_offline_cpus && nr_cpu_ids < num_processors)
-+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING "SMP: Cannot bring up %u further CPUs\n",
-+ num_processors - nr_cpu_ids);
-
- #ifndef nr_cpumask_bits
-- nr_cpumask_bits = (max_cpus + (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)) &
-- ~(BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
-+ nr_cpumask_bits = ROUNDUP(nr_cpu_ids, BITS_PER_LONG);
- printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "NR_CPUS:%u nr_cpumask_bits:%u\n",
- NR_CPUS, nr_cpumask_bits);
- #endif
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-index a3172ca92c..984c948216 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
- {
- char *memmap_type = NULL;
- char *cmdline, *kextra, *loader;
-- unsigned int initrdidx;
-+ unsigned int initrdidx, num_parked = 0;
- multiboot_info_t *mbi;
- module_t *mod;
- unsigned long nr_pages, raw_max_page, modules_headroom, *module_map;
-@@ -1494,7 +1494,8 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
- else
- {
- set_nr_cpu_ids(max_cpus);
-- max_cpus = nr_cpu_ids;
-+ if ( !max_cpus )
-+ max_cpus = nr_cpu_ids;
- }
-
- if ( xen_guest )
-@@ -1617,16 +1618,27 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
- /* Set up node_to_cpumask based on cpu_to_node[]. */
- numa_add_cpu(i);
-
-- if ( (num_online_cpus() < max_cpus) && !cpu_online(i) )
-+ if ( (park_offline_cpus || num_online_cpus() < max_cpus) &&
-+ !cpu_online(i) )
- {
- int ret = cpu_up(i);
- if ( ret != 0 )
- printk("Failed to bring up CPU %u (error %d)\n", i, ret);
-+ else if ( num_online_cpus() > max_cpus )
-+ {
-+ ret = cpu_down(i);
-+ if ( !ret )
-+ ++num_parked;
-+ else
-+ printk("Could not re-offline CPU%u (%d)\n", i, ret);
-+ }
- }
- }
- }
-
- printk("Brought up %ld CPUs\n", (long)num_online_cpus());
-+ if ( num_parked )
-+ printk(XENLOG_INFO "Parked %u CPUs\n", num_parked);
- smp_cpus_done();
-
- do_initcalls();
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-index 9924cdf1f3..2bd9e69684 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
-@@ -337,12 +337,6 @@ static always_inline void set_in_cr4 (unsigned long mask)
- write_cr4(read_cr4() | mask);
- }
-
--static always_inline void clear_in_cr4 (unsigned long mask)
--{
-- mmu_cr4_features &= ~mask;
-- write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~mask);
--}
--
- static inline unsigned int read_pkru(void)
- {
- unsigned int pkru;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0012-x86-command-line-option-to-avoid-use-of-secondary-hy.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0012-x86-command-line-option-to-avoid-use-of-secondary-hy.patch
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-From 353edf12c865d2a1e24173aac841452b90614915 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:26:16 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 12/42] x86: command line option to avoid use of secondary
- hyper-threads
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Shared resources (L1 cache and TLB in particular) present a risk of
-information leak via side channels. Provide a means to avoid use of
-hyperthreads in such cases.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: d8f974f1a646c0200b97ebcabb808324b288fadb
-master date: 2018-07-19 13:43:33 +0100
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 7 +++++++
- xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 8 +++++++-
- xen/arch/x86/sysctl.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
- xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h | 2 ++
- 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index 075e5ea159..3b710b71fb 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -1748,6 +1748,13 @@ Use `smap=hvm` to allow SMAP use by HVM guests only.
- Flag to enable Supervisor Mode Execution Protection
- Use `smep=hvm` to allow SMEP use by HVM guests only.
-
-+### smt (x86)
-+> `= <boolean>`
-+
-+Default: `true`
-+
-+Control bring up of multiple hyper-threads per CPU core.
-+
- ### snb\_igd\_quirk
- > `= <boolean> | cap | <integer>`
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-index 984c948216..66fd13f93a 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ boolean_param("nosmp", opt_nosmp);
- static unsigned int __initdata max_cpus;
- integer_param("maxcpus", max_cpus);
-
-+int8_t __read_mostly opt_smt = -1;
-+boolean_param("smt", opt_smt);
-+
- /* opt_invpcid: If false, don't use INVPCID instruction even if available. */
- static bool __initdata opt_invpcid = true;
- boolean_param("invpcid", opt_invpcid);
-@@ -1624,7 +1627,10 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
- int ret = cpu_up(i);
- if ( ret != 0 )
- printk("Failed to bring up CPU %u (error %d)\n", i, ret);
-- else if ( num_online_cpus() > max_cpus )
-+ else if ( num_online_cpus() > max_cpus ||
-+ (!opt_smt &&
-+ cpu_data[i].compute_unit_id == INVALID_CUID &&
-+ cpumask_weight(per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, i)) > 1) )
- {
- ret = cpu_down(i);
- if ( !ret )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/sysctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/sysctl.c
-index 4d372db12b..e704ed7f1c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/sysctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/sysctl.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- #include <asm/hvm/hvm.h>
- #include <asm/hvm/support.h>
- #include <asm/processor.h>
-+#include <asm/setup.h>
- #include <asm/smp.h>
- #include <asm/numa.h>
- #include <xen/nodemask.h>
-@@ -48,14 +49,27 @@ static void l3_cache_get(void *arg)
-
- long cpu_up_helper(void *data)
- {
-- int cpu = (unsigned long)data;
-+ unsigned int cpu = (unsigned long)data;
- int ret = cpu_up(cpu);
-+
- if ( ret == -EBUSY )
- {
- /* On EBUSY, flush RCU work and have one more go. */
- rcu_barrier();
- ret = cpu_up(cpu);
- }
-+
-+ if ( !ret && !opt_smt &&
-+ cpu_data[cpu].compute_unit_id == INVALID_CUID &&
-+ cpumask_weight(per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, cpu)) > 1 )
-+ {
-+ ret = cpu_down_helper(data);
-+ if ( ret )
-+ printk("Could not re-offline CPU%u (%d)\n", cpu, ret);
-+ else
-+ ret = -EPERM;
-+ }
-+
- return ret;
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
-index 19232afa01..c09a5ff381 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
-@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ extern uint8_t kbd_shift_flags;
- extern unsigned long highmem_start;
- #endif
-
-+extern int8_t opt_smt;
-+
- #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING
- extern bool opt_dom0_shadow;
- #else
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0013-x86-vmx-Don-t-clobber-dr6-while-debugging-state-is-l.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0013-x86-vmx-Don-t-clobber-dr6-while-debugging-state-is-l.patch
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 037fe82cf5fadf0f74c3da70560ee7592a8f2083 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:26:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 13/42] x86/vmx: Don't clobber %dr6 while debugging state is
- lazy
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-c/s 4f36452b63 introduced a write to %dr6 in the #DB intercept case, but the
-guests debug registers may be lazy at this point, at which point the guests
-later attempt to read %dr6 will discard this value and use the older stale
-value.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-master commit: 3cdac2805692c7accde2f405d81cc0be799aee48
-master date: 2018-07-19 14:06:48 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 610c8d6eb9..7189820bfc 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -3701,6 +3701,7 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- */
- __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, &exit_qualification);
- HVMTRACE_1D(TRAP_DEBUG, exit_qualification);
-+ __restore_debug_registers(v);
- write_debugreg(6, exit_qualification | DR_STATUS_RESERVED_ONE);
- if ( !v->domain->debugger_attached )
- {
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0014-x86-xstate-Use-a-guests-CPUID-policy-rather-than-all.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0014-x86-xstate-Use-a-guests-CPUID-policy-rather-than-all.patch
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-From 543027c9842d8416047ef38846d2de1295052e92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:27:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 14/42] x86/xstate: Use a guests CPUID policy, rather than
- allowing all features
-
-It turns out that Xen has never enforced that a domain remain within the
-xstate features advertised in CPUID.
-
-The check of new_bv against xfeature_mask ensures that a domain stays within
-the set of features that Xen has enabled in hardware (and therefore isn't a
-security problem), but this does means that attempts to level a guest for
-migration safety might not be effective if the guest ignores CPUID.
-
-Check the CPUID policy in validate_xstate() (for incoming migration) and in
-handle_xsetbv() (for guest XSETBV instructions). This subsumes the PKRU check
-for PV guests in handle_xsetbv() (and also demonstrates that I should have
-spotted this problem while reviewing c/s fbf9971241f).
-
-For migration, this is correct despite the current (mis)ordering of data
-because d->arch.cpuid is the applicable max policy.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 361b835fa00d9f45167c50a60e054ccf22c065d7
-master date: 2018-07-19 19:57:26 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/xstate.c | 17 +++++++++++------
- xen/include/asm-x86/xstate.h | 5 +++--
- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-index b04388d663..fa82b6744e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
- if ( _xcr0_accum )
- {
- if ( evc->size >= PV_XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSTATE_AREA_MIN_SIZE )
-- ret = validate_xstate(_xcr0, _xcr0_accum,
-+ ret = validate_xstate(d, _xcr0, _xcr0_accum,
- &_xsave_area->xsave_hdr);
- }
- else if ( !_xcr0 )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-index 279cb88e45..d544720876 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
- ctxt = (struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave *)&h->data[h->cur];
- h->cur += desc->length;
-
-- err = validate_xstate(ctxt->xcr0, ctxt->xcr0_accum,
-+ err = validate_xstate(d, ctxt->xcr0, ctxt->xcr0_accum,
- (const void *)&ctxt->save_area.xsave_hdr);
- if ( err )
- {
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
-index b4aea4b50a..1fbb0871d0 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
-@@ -670,12 +670,17 @@ static bool valid_xcr0(u64 xcr0)
- return !(xcr0 & X86_XCR0_BNDREGS) == !(xcr0 & X86_XCR0_BNDCSR);
- }
-
--int validate_xstate(u64 xcr0, u64 xcr0_accum, const struct xsave_hdr *hdr)
-+int validate_xstate(const struct domain *d, uint64_t xcr0, uint64_t xcr0_accum,
-+ const struct xsave_hdr *hdr)
- {
-+ const struct cpuid_policy *cp = d->arch.cpuid;
-+ uint64_t xcr0_max =
-+ ((uint64_t)cp->xstate.xcr0_high << 32) | cp->xstate.xcr0_low;
- unsigned int i;
-
- if ( (hdr->xstate_bv & ~xcr0_accum) ||
- (xcr0 & ~xcr0_accum) ||
-+ (xcr0_accum & ~xcr0_max) ||
- !valid_xcr0(xcr0) ||
- !valid_xcr0(xcr0_accum) )
- return -EINVAL;
-@@ -694,18 +699,18 @@ int validate_xstate(u64 xcr0, u64 xcr0_accum, const struct xsave_hdr *hdr)
- int handle_xsetbv(u32 index, u64 new_bv)
- {
- struct vcpu *curr = current;
-+ const struct cpuid_policy *cp = curr->domain->arch.cpuid;
-+ uint64_t xcr0_max =
-+ ((uint64_t)cp->xstate.xcr0_high << 32) | cp->xstate.xcr0_low;
- u64 mask;
-
- if ( index != XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK )
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
-- if ( (new_bv & ~xfeature_mask) || !valid_xcr0(new_bv) )
-+ if ( (new_bv & ~xcr0_max) ||
-+ (new_bv & ~xfeature_mask) || !valid_xcr0(new_bv) )
- return -EINVAL;
-
-- /* XCR0.PKRU is disabled on PV mode. */
-- if ( is_pv_vcpu(curr) && (new_bv & X86_XCR0_PKRU) )
-- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
--
- if ( !set_xcr0(new_bv) )
- return -EFAULT;
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/xstate.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/xstate.h
-index 86a4a1f75c..47f602b855 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/xstate.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/xstate.h
-@@ -97,8 +97,9 @@ void xsave(struct vcpu *v, uint64_t mask);
- void xrstor(struct vcpu *v, uint64_t mask);
- void xstate_set_init(uint64_t mask);
- bool xsave_enabled(const struct vcpu *v);
--int __must_check validate_xstate(u64 xcr0, u64 xcr0_accum,
-- const struct xsave_hdr *);
-+int __must_check validate_xstate(const struct domain *d,
-+ uint64_t xcr0, uint64_t xcr0_accum,
-+ const struct xsave_hdr *hdr);
- int __must_check handle_xsetbv(u32 index, u64 new_bv);
- void expand_xsave_states(struct vcpu *v, void *dest, unsigned int size);
- void compress_xsave_states(struct vcpu *v, const void *src, unsigned int size);
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0015-x86-xstate-Make-errors-in-xstate-calculations-more-o.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0015-x86-xstate-Make-errors-in-xstate-calculations-more-o.patch
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From 06d2a763d07d53a4ccc7bd1255ffc9ea01ec1609 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:29:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 15/42] x86/xstate: Make errors in xstate calculations more
- obvious by crashing the domain
-
-If xcr0_max exceeds xfeature_mask, then something is broken with the CPUID
-policy derivation or auditing logic. If hardware rejects new_bv, then
-something is broken with Xen's xstate logic.
-
-In both cases, crash the domain with an obvious error message, to help
-highlight the issues.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: d6371ccb93012db4ad6615fe666205b86308cb4e
-master date: 2018-07-19 19:57:26 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/xstate.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
-index 1fbb0871d0..15edd5df96 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
-@@ -707,12 +707,32 @@ int handle_xsetbv(u32 index, u64 new_bv)
- if ( index != XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK )
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
-- if ( (new_bv & ~xcr0_max) ||
-- (new_bv & ~xfeature_mask) || !valid_xcr0(new_bv) )
-+ /*
-+ * The CPUID logic shouldn't be able to hand out an XCR0 exceeding Xen's
-+ * maximum features, but keep the check for robustness.
-+ */
-+ if ( unlikely(xcr0_max & ~xfeature_mask) )
-+ {
-+ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
-+ "xcr0_max %016" PRIx64 " exceeds hardware max %016" PRIx64 "\n",
-+ xcr0_max, xfeature_mask);
-+ domain_crash(curr->domain);
-+
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ( (new_bv & ~xcr0_max) || !valid_xcr0(new_bv) )
- return -EINVAL;
-
-- if ( !set_xcr0(new_bv) )
-+ /* By this point, new_bv really should be accepted by hardware. */
-+ if ( unlikely(!set_xcr0(new_bv)) )
-+ {
-+ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "new_bv %016" PRIx64 " rejected by hardware\n",
-+ new_bv);
-+ domain_crash(curr->domain);
-+
- return -EFAULT;
-+ }
-
- mask = new_bv & ~curr->arch.xcr0_accum;
- curr->arch.xcr0 = new_bv;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0016-x86-hvm-Disallow-unknown-MSR_EFER-bits.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0016-x86-hvm-Disallow-unknown-MSR_EFER-bits.patch
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From 7de21555730367497eb01edf6e9e9530224105e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:29:39 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 16/42] x86/hvm: Disallow unknown MSR_EFER bits
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-It turns out that nothing ever prevented HVM guests from trying to set unknown
-EFER bits. Generally, this results in a vmentry failure.
-
-For Intel hardware, all implemented bits are covered by the checks.
-
-For AMD hardware, the only EFER bit which isn't covered by the checks is TCE
-(which AFAICT is specific to AMD Fam15/16 hardware). We never advertise TCE
-in CPUID, but it isn't a security problem to have TCE unexpected enabled in
-guest context.
-
-Disallow the setting of bits outside of the EFER_KNOWN_MASK, which prevents
-any vmentry failures for guests, yielding #GP instead.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: ef0269c6215d642a709866f04ba1a1f9f13f3614
-master date: 2018-07-24 11:25:53 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-index d544720876..4cbb688c05 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -907,6 +907,9 @@ const char *hvm_efer_valid(const struct vcpu *v, uint64_t value,
- else
- p = &host_cpuid_policy;
-
-+ if ( value & ~EFER_KNOWN_MASK )
-+ return "Unknown bits set";
-+
- if ( (value & EFER_SCE) && !p->extd.syscall )
- return "SCE without feature";
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0017-x86-spec-ctrl-Fix-the-parsing-of-xpti-on-fixed-Intel.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0017-x86-spec-ctrl-Fix-the-parsing-of-xpti-on-fixed-Intel.patch
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-From 33ced725e11af4eabd3334d12f53ed807e9e2586 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 11:30:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 17/42] x86/spec-ctrl: Fix the parsing of xpti= on fixed Intel
- hardware
-
-The calls to xpti_init_default() in parse_xpti() are buggy. The CPUID data
-hasn't been fetched that early, and boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) will
-always evaluate false.
-
-As a result, the default case won't disable XPTI on Intel hardware which
-advertises ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO.
-
-Simplify parse_xpti() to solely the setting of opt_xpti according to the
-passed string, and have init_speculation_mitigations() call
-xpti_init_default() if appropiate. Drop the force parameter, and pass caps
-instead, to avoid redundant re-reading of MSR_ARCH_CAPS.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: be5e2ff6f54e0245331ed360b8786760f82fd673
-master date: 2018-07-24 11:25:54 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 17 +++++------------
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 73dc7170c7..32a4ea6e99 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -423,17 +423,10 @@ static bool __init should_use_eager_fpu(void)
- #define OPT_XPTI_DEFAULT 0xff
- uint8_t __read_mostly opt_xpti = OPT_XPTI_DEFAULT;
-
--static __init void xpti_init_default(bool force)
-+static __init void xpti_init_default(uint64_t caps)
- {
-- uint64_t caps = 0;
--
-- if ( !force && (opt_xpti != OPT_XPTI_DEFAULT) )
-- return;
--
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD )
- caps = ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO;
-- else if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) )
-- rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, caps);
-
- if ( caps & ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO )
- opt_xpti = 0;
-@@ -446,8 +439,6 @@ static __init int parse_xpti(const char *s)
- const char *ss;
- int val, rc = 0;
-
-- xpti_init_default(false);
--
- do {
- ss = strchr(s, ',');
- if ( !ss )
-@@ -465,7 +456,7 @@ static __init int parse_xpti(const char *s)
-
- default:
- if ( !strcmp(s, "default") )
-- xpti_init_default(true);
-+ opt_xpti = OPT_XPTI_DEFAULT;
- else if ( (val = parse_boolean("dom0", s, ss)) >= 0 )
- opt_xpti = (opt_xpti & ~OPT_XPTI_DOM0) |
- (val ? OPT_XPTI_DOM0 : 0);
-@@ -627,7 +618,9 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
- if ( default_xen_spec_ctrl )
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_IDLE);
-
-- xpti_init_default(false);
-+ if ( opt_xpti == OPT_XPTI_DEFAULT )
-+ xpti_init_default(caps);
-+
- if ( opt_xpti == 0 )
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_NO_XPTI);
- else
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0018-x86-spec-ctrl-Yet-more-fixes-for-xpti-parsing.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0018-x86-spec-ctrl-Yet-more-fixes-for-xpti-parsing.patch
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-From 6fe9726aebc11433083b9810402501f1a71d02fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2018 17:22:17 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 18/42] x86/spec-ctrl: Yet more fixes for xpti= parsing
-
-As it currently stands, 'xpti=dom0' is indistinguishable from the default
-value, which means it will be overridden by ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO on fixed
-hardware.
-
-Switch opt_xpti to use -1 as a default like all our other related options, and
-clobber it as soon as we have a string to parse.
-
-In addition, 'xpti' alone should be interpreted in its positive boolean form,
-rather than resulting in a parse error.
-
- (XEN) parameter "xpti" has invalid value "", rc=-22!
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 2a3b34ec47817048ab59586855cf0709fc77487e)
----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 15 +++++++++++----
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 32a4ea6e99..32213ace86 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -420,8 +420,7 @@ static bool __init should_use_eager_fpu(void)
- }
- }
-
--#define OPT_XPTI_DEFAULT 0xff
--uint8_t __read_mostly opt_xpti = OPT_XPTI_DEFAULT;
-+int8_t __read_mostly opt_xpti = -1;
-
- static __init void xpti_init_default(uint64_t caps)
- {
-@@ -439,6 +438,14 @@ static __init int parse_xpti(const char *s)
- const char *ss;
- int val, rc = 0;
-
-+ /* Inhibit the defaults as an explicit choice has been given. */
-+ if ( opt_xpti == -1 )
-+ opt_xpti = 0;
-+
-+ /* Interpret 'xpti' alone in its positive boolean form. */
-+ if ( *s == '\0' )
-+ opt_xpti = OPT_XPTI_DOM0 | OPT_XPTI_DOMU;
-+
- do {
- ss = strchr(s, ',');
- if ( !ss )
-@@ -456,7 +463,7 @@ static __init int parse_xpti(const char *s)
-
- default:
- if ( !strcmp(s, "default") )
-- opt_xpti = OPT_XPTI_DEFAULT;
-+ opt_xpti = -1;
- else if ( (val = parse_boolean("dom0", s, ss)) >= 0 )
- opt_xpti = (opt_xpti & ~OPT_XPTI_DOM0) |
- (val ? OPT_XPTI_DOM0 : 0);
-@@ -618,7 +625,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
- if ( default_xen_spec_ctrl )
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_IDLE);
-
-- if ( opt_xpti == OPT_XPTI_DEFAULT )
-+ if ( opt_xpti == -1 )
- xpti_init_default(caps);
-
- if ( opt_xpti == 0 )
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index 5b40afbab0..fea82603ca 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ extern bool bsp_delay_spec_ctrl;
- extern uint8_t default_xen_spec_ctrl;
- extern uint8_t default_spec_ctrl_flags;
-
--extern uint8_t opt_xpti;
-+extern int8_t opt_xpti;
- #define OPT_XPTI_DOM0 0x01
- #define OPT_XPTI_DOMU 0x02
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0019-x86-vmx-Fix-handing-of-MSR_DEBUGCTL-on-VMExit.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0019-x86-vmx-Fix-handing-of-MSR_DEBUGCTL-on-VMExit.patch
@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-From 4254e9874006cc2641b67d0531a3a65374f34c35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 24 May 2018 17:20:09 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 19/42] x86/vmx: Fix handing of MSR_DEBUGCTL on VMExit
-
-Currently, whenever the guest writes a nonzero value to MSR_DEBUGCTL, Xen
-updates a host MSR load list entry with the current hardware value of
-MSR_DEBUGCTL.
-
-On VMExit, hardware automatically resets MSR_DEBUGCTL to 0. Later, when the
-guest writes to MSR_DEBUGCTL, the current value in hardware (0) is fed back
-into guest load list. As a practical result, `ler` debugging gets lost on any
-PCPU which has ever scheduled an HVM vcpu, and the common case when `ler`
-debugging isn't active, guest actions result in an unnecessary load list entry
-repeating the MSR_DEBUGCTL reset.
-
-Restoration of Xen's debugging setting needs to happen from the very first
-vmexit. Due to the automatic reset, Xen need take no action in the general
-case, and only needs to load a value when debugging is active.
-
-This could be fixed by using a host MSR load list entry set up during
-construct_vmcs(). However, a more efficient option is to use an alternative
-block in the VMExit path, keyed on whether hypervisor debugging has been
-enabled.
-
-In order to set this up, drop the per cpu ler_msr variable (as there is no
-point having it per cpu when it will be the same everywhere), and use a single
-read_mostly variable instead. Split calc_ler_msr() out of percpu_traps_init()
-for clarity.
-
-Finally, clean up do_debug(). Reinstate LBR early to help catch cascade
-errors, which allows for the removal of the out label.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 730dc8d2c9e1b6402e66973cf99a7c56bc78be4c)
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S | 9 +++++
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +-
- xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 64 +++++++++++++++----------------
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c | 7 ++--
- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 1 +
- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
- xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h | 2 +-
- 7 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
-index aa2f103895..afd552f2b9 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
-@@ -41,6 +41,15 @@ ENTRY(vmx_asm_vmexit_handler)
- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_HVM /* Req: b=curr %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
- /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
-
-+ /* Hardware clears MSR_DEBUGCTL on VMExit. Reinstate it if debugging Xen. */
-+ .macro restore_lbr
-+ mov $IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR, %eax
-+ mov $MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, %ecx
-+ xor %edx, %edx
-+ wrmsr
-+ .endm
-+ ALTERNATIVE "", restore_lbr, X86_FEATURE_XEN_LBR
-+
- mov %rsp,%rdi
- call vmx_vmexit_handler
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 7189820bfc..bb164359bb 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -3124,8 +3124,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
- }
- }
-
-- if ( (rc < 0) ||
-- (msr_content && (vmx_add_host_load_msr(msr) < 0)) )
-+ if ( rc < 0 )
- hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_machine_check, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
- else
- __vmwrite(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, msr_content);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-index 9f045a2045..789d7ff8cd 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-@@ -96,8 +96,6 @@ string_param("nmi", opt_nmi);
- DEFINE_PER_CPU(uint64_t, efer);
- static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, last_extable_addr);
-
--DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u32, ler_msr);
--
- DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct desc_struct *, gdt_table);
- DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct desc_struct *, compat_gdt_table);
-
-@@ -117,6 +115,9 @@ integer_param("debug_stack_lines", debug_stack_lines);
- static bool opt_ler;
- boolean_param("ler", opt_ler);
-
-+/* LastExceptionFromIP on this hardware. Zero if LER is not in use. */
-+unsigned int __read_mostly ler_msr;
-+
- #define stack_words_per_line 4
- #define ESP_BEFORE_EXCEPTION(regs) ((unsigned long *)regs->rsp)
-
-@@ -1778,17 +1779,6 @@ void do_device_not_available(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return;
- }
-
--static void ler_enable(void)
--{
-- u64 debugctl;
--
-- if ( !this_cpu(ler_msr) )
-- return;
--
-- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl);
-- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl | IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR);
--}
--
- void do_debug(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- unsigned long dr6;
-@@ -1821,6 +1811,10 @@ void do_debug(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- */
- write_debugreg(6, X86_DR6_DEFAULT);
-
-+ /* #DB automatically disabled LBR. Reinstate it if debugging Xen. */
-+ if ( cpu_has_xen_lbr )
-+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR);
-+
- if ( !guest_mode(regs) )
- {
- /*
-@@ -1838,7 +1832,7 @@ void do_debug(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- if ( regs->rip == (unsigned long)sysenter_eflags_saved )
- regs->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
-- goto out;
-+ return;
- }
- if ( !debugger_trap_fatal(TRAP_debug, regs) )
- {
-@@ -1895,20 +1889,14 @@ void do_debug(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- regs->cs, _p(regs->rip), _p(regs->rip),
- regs->ss, _p(regs->rsp), dr6);
-
-- goto out;
-+ return;
- }
-
- /* Save debug status register where guest OS can peek at it */
- v->arch.debugreg[6] |= (dr6 & ~X86_DR6_DEFAULT);
- v->arch.debugreg[6] &= (dr6 | ~X86_DR6_DEFAULT);
-
-- ler_enable();
- pv_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_debug, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
-- return;
--
-- out:
-- ler_enable();
-- return;
- }
-
- static void __init noinline __set_intr_gate(unsigned int n,
-@@ -1952,38 +1940,46 @@ void load_TR(void)
- : "=m" (old_gdt) : "rm" (TSS_ENTRY << 3), "m" (tss_gdt) : "memory" );
- }
-
--void percpu_traps_init(void)
-+static unsigned int calc_ler_msr(void)
- {
-- subarch_percpu_traps_init();
--
-- if ( !opt_ler )
-- return;
--
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor )
- {
- case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86 )
- {
- case 6:
-- this_cpu(ler_msr) = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP;
-- break;
-+ return MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP;
-+
- case 15:
-- this_cpu(ler_msr) = MSR_P4_LER_FROM_LIP;
-- break;
-+ return MSR_P4_LER_FROM_LIP;
- }
- break;
-+
- case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86 )
- {
- case 6:
- case 0xf ... 0x17:
-- this_cpu(ler_msr) = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP;
-- break;
-+ return MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP;
- }
- break;
- }
-
-- ler_enable();
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void percpu_traps_init(void)
-+{
-+ subarch_percpu_traps_init();
-+
-+ if ( !opt_ler )
-+ return;
-+
-+ if ( !ler_msr && (ler_msr = calc_ler_msr()) )
-+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XEN_LBR);
-+
-+ if ( cpu_has_xen_lbr )
-+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR);
- }
-
- void __init init_idt_traps(void)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
-index f7f6928d70..b0401850ef 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c
-@@ -144,11 +144,12 @@ void show_registers(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- printk("CPU: %d\n", smp_processor_id());
- _show_registers(&fault_regs, fault_crs, context, v);
-
-- if ( this_cpu(ler_msr) && !guest_mode(regs) )
-+ if ( ler_msr && !guest_mode(regs) )
- {
- u64 from, to;
-- rdmsrl(this_cpu(ler_msr), from);
-- rdmsrl(this_cpu(ler_msr) + 1, to);
-+
-+ rdmsrl(ler_msr, from);
-+ rdmsrl(ler_msr + 1, to);
- printk("ler: %016lx -> %016lx\n", from, to);
- }
- }
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
-index 2cf8f7ea2a..b237da165c 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
-@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@
- #define cpu_has_aperfmperf boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF)
- #define cpu_has_lfence_dispatch boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH)
- #define cpu_has_no_xpti boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NO_XPTI)
-+#define cpu_has_xen_lbr boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_LBR)
-
- enum _cache_type {
- CACHE_TYPE_NULL = 0,
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-index b90aa2d046..8e5cc53dde 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-@@ -32,3 +32,4 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_PV, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+18) /* RSB overwrite needed for
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_HVM, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+19) /* RSB overwrite needed for HVM */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(NO_XPTI, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+20) /* XPTI mitigation not in use */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_IDLE, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+21) /* (SC_MSR_PV || SC_MSR_HVM) && default_xen_spec_ctrl */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_LBR, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+22) /* Xen uses MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
-index f14f265aa5..afbeb7f155 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
-@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static inline void write_efer(uint64_t val)
- wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, val);
- }
-
--DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, ler_msr);
-+extern unsigned int ler_msr;
-
- DECLARE_PER_CPU(uint32_t, tsc_aux);
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0020-x86-vmx-Defer-vmx_vmcs_exit-as-long-as-possible-in-c.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0020-x86-vmx-Defer-vmx_vmcs_exit-as-long-as-possible-in-c.patch
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From 61cc8769a917c646b9bc99ee8adbea602f8d50d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 May 2018 15:02:34 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 20/42] x86/vmx: Defer vmx_vmcs_exit() as long as possible in
- construct_vmcs()
-
-paging_update_paging_modes() and vmx_vlapic_msr_changed() both operate on the
-VMCS being constructed. Avoid dropping and re-acquiring the reference
-multiple times.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-(cherry picked from commit f30e3cf34042846e391e3f8361fc6a76d181a7ee)
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 12 +++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index 258fc08f72..15d63663e5 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -996,6 +996,7 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
- struct domain *d = v->domain;
- u32 vmexit_ctl = vmx_vmexit_control;
- u32 vmentry_ctl = vmx_vmentry_control;
-+ int rc = 0;
-
- vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
-
-@@ -1083,8 +1084,8 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
-
- if ( msr_bitmap == NULL )
- {
-- vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
-- return -ENOMEM;
-+ rc = -ENOMEM;
-+ goto out;
- }
-
- memset(msr_bitmap, ~0, PAGE_SIZE);
-@@ -1268,14 +1269,15 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
- if ( cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling )
- __vmwrite(TSC_MULTIPLIER, d->arch.hvm_domain.tsc_scaling_ratio);
-
-- vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
--
- /* will update HOST & GUEST_CR3 as reqd */
- paging_update_paging_modes(v);
-
- vmx_vlapic_msr_changed(v);
-
-- return 0;
-+ out:
-+ vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
-+
-+ return rc;
- }
-
- static int vmx_msr_entry_key_cmp(const void *key, const void *elt)
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0021-x86-vmx-API-improvements-for-MSR-load-save-infrastru.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0021-x86-vmx-API-improvements-for-MSR-load-save-infrastru.patch
@@ -1,309 +0,0 @@
-From 935e9c404714f5fa6d31890034a7e2cc11c6e0b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 11:57:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 21/42] x86/vmx: API improvements for MSR load/save
- infrastructure
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Collect together related infrastructure in vmcs.h, rather than having it
-spread out. Turn vmx_{read,write}_guest_msr() into static inlines, as they
-are simple enough.
-
-Replace 'int type' with 'enum vmx_msr_list_type', and use switch statements
-internally. Later changes are going to introduce a new type.
-
-Rename the type identifiers for consistency with the other VMX_MSR_*
-constants.
-
-No functional change.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-(cherry picked from commit f54b63e8617ada823be43d60467a43c8224b7909)
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 93 +++++++++++++-----------------
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8 +--
- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 62 +++++++++++++++-----
- 3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index 15d63663e5..6bc6597242 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -1293,22 +1293,26 @@ static int vmx_msr_entry_key_cmp(const void *key, const void *elt)
- return 0;
- }
-
--struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(u32 msr, int type)
-+struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- {
- struct vcpu *curr = current;
- unsigned int msr_count;
-- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr_area;
-+ struct vmx_msr_entry *msr_area = NULL;
-
-- if ( type == VMX_GUEST_MSR )
-+ switch ( type )
- {
-- msr_count = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_count;
-- msr_area = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_area;
-- }
-- else
-- {
-- ASSERT(type == VMX_HOST_MSR);
-+ case VMX_MSR_HOST:
- msr_count = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.host_msr_count;
- msr_area = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.host_msr_area;
-+ break;
-+
-+ case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
-+ msr_count = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_count;
-+ msr_area = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_area;
-+ break;
-+
-+ default:
-+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
- }
-
- if ( msr_area == NULL )
-@@ -1318,48 +1322,27 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(u32 msr, int type)
- vmx_msr_entry_key_cmp);
- }
-
--int vmx_read_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 *val)
--{
-- struct vmx_msr_entry *ent;
--
-- if ( (ent = vmx_find_msr(msr, VMX_GUEST_MSR)) != NULL )
-- {
-- *val = ent->data;
-- return 0;
-- }
--
-- return -ESRCH;
--}
--
--int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val)
--{
-- struct vmx_msr_entry *ent;
--
-- if ( (ent = vmx_find_msr(msr, VMX_GUEST_MSR)) != NULL )
-- {
-- ent->data = val;
-- return 0;
-- }
--
-- return -ESRCH;
--}
--
--int vmx_add_msr(u32 msr, int type)
-+int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- {
- struct vcpu *curr = current;
- unsigned int idx, *msr_count;
- struct vmx_msr_entry **msr_area, *msr_area_elem;
-
-- if ( type == VMX_GUEST_MSR )
-+ switch ( type )
- {
-- msr_count = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_count;
-- msr_area = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_area;
-- }
-- else
-- {
-- ASSERT(type == VMX_HOST_MSR);
-+ case VMX_MSR_HOST:
- msr_count = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.host_msr_count;
- msr_area = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.host_msr_area;
-+ break;
-+
-+ case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
-+ msr_count = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_count;
-+ msr_area = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_area;
-+ break;
-+
-+ default:
-+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+ return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if ( *msr_area == NULL )
-@@ -1367,13 +1350,17 @@ int vmx_add_msr(u32 msr, int type)
- if ( (*msr_area = alloc_xenheap_page()) == NULL )
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-- if ( type == VMX_GUEST_MSR )
-+ switch ( type )
- {
-+ case VMX_MSR_HOST:
-+ __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(*msr_area));
-+ break;
-+
-+ case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(*msr_area));
- __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(*msr_area));
-+ break;
- }
-- else
-- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(*msr_area));
- }
-
- for ( idx = 0; idx < *msr_count && (*msr_area)[idx].index <= msr; idx++ )
-@@ -1392,16 +1379,18 @@ int vmx_add_msr(u32 msr, int type)
-
- ++*msr_count;
-
-- if ( type == VMX_GUEST_MSR )
-+ switch ( type )
- {
-+ case VMX_MSR_HOST:
-+ rdmsrl(msr, msr_area_elem->data);
-+ __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, *msr_count);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
- msr_area_elem->data = 0;
- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, *msr_count);
- __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, *msr_count);
-- }
-- else
-- {
-- rdmsrl(msr, msr_area_elem->data);
-- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, *msr_count);
-+ break;
- }
-
- return 0;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index bb164359bb..d4ebae8945 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -4169,7 +4169,7 @@ static void lbr_tsx_fixup(void)
- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr_area = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_area;
- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr;
-
-- if ( (msr = vmx_find_msr(lbr_from_start, VMX_GUEST_MSR)) != NULL )
-+ if ( (msr = vmx_find_msr(lbr_from_start, VMX_MSR_GUEST)) != NULL )
- {
- /*
- * Sign extend into bits 61:62 while preserving bit 63
-@@ -4179,7 +4179,7 @@ static void lbr_tsx_fixup(void)
- msr->data |= ((LBR_FROM_SIGNEXT_2MSB & msr->data) << 2);
- }
-
-- if ( (msr = vmx_find_msr(lbr_lastint_from, VMX_GUEST_MSR)) != NULL )
-+ if ( (msr = vmx_find_msr(lbr_lastint_from, VMX_MSR_GUEST)) != NULL )
- msr->data |= ((LBR_FROM_SIGNEXT_2MSB & msr->data) << 2);
- }
-
-@@ -4207,8 +4207,8 @@ static void bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup(void)
- * erratum BDF14. Fix up MSR_IA32_LASTINT{FROM,TO}IP by
- * sign-extending into bits 48:63.
- */
-- sign_extend_msr(MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, VMX_GUEST_MSR);
-- sign_extend_msr(MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, VMX_GUEST_MSR);
-+ sign_extend_msr(MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+ sign_extend_msr(MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
- }
-
- static void lbr_fixup(void)
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-index 06c3179cec..20882d13e0 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-@@ -514,9 +514,6 @@ enum vmcs_field {
-
- #define VMCS_VPID_WIDTH 16
-
--#define VMX_GUEST_MSR 0
--#define VMX_HOST_MSR 1
--
- /* VM Instruction error numbers */
- enum vmx_insn_errno
- {
-@@ -534,6 +531,52 @@ enum vmx_insn_errno
- VMX_INSN_FAIL_INVALID = ~0,
- };
-
-+/* MSR load/save list infrastructure. */
-+enum vmx_msr_list_type {
-+ VMX_MSR_HOST, /* MSRs loaded on VMExit. */
-+ VMX_MSR_GUEST, /* MSRs saved on VMExit, loaded on VMEntry. */
-+};
-+
-+int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type);
-+
-+static inline int vmx_add_host_load_msr(uint32_t msr)
-+{
-+ return vmx_add_msr(msr, VMX_MSR_HOST);
-+}
-+
-+static inline int vmx_add_guest_msr(uint32_t msr)
-+{
-+ return vmx_add_msr(msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+}
-+
-+struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type);
-+
-+static inline int vmx_read_guest_msr(uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
-+{
-+ const struct vmx_msr_entry *ent = vmx_find_msr(msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+
-+ if ( !ent )
-+ return -ESRCH;
-+
-+ *val = ent->data;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static inline int vmx_write_guest_msr(uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
-+{
-+ struct vmx_msr_entry *ent = vmx_find_msr(msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+
-+ if ( !ent )
-+ return -ESRCH;
-+
-+ ent->data = val;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/* MSR intercept bitmap infrastructure. */
- enum vmx_msr_intercept_type {
- VMX_MSR_R = 1,
- VMX_MSR_W = 2,
-@@ -544,10 +587,6 @@ void vmx_clear_msr_intercept(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int msr,
- enum vmx_msr_intercept_type type);
- void vmx_set_msr_intercept(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int msr,
- enum vmx_msr_intercept_type type);
--int vmx_read_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 *val);
--int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val);
--struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(u32 msr, int type);
--int vmx_add_msr(u32 msr, int type);
- void vmx_vmcs_switch(paddr_t from, paddr_t to);
- void vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector);
- void vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector);
-@@ -562,15 +601,6 @@ void virtual_vmcs_vmwrite(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding, u64 val);
- enum vmx_insn_errno virtual_vmcs_vmwrite_safe(const struct vcpu *v,
- u32 vmcs_encoding, u64 val);
-
--static inline int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr)
--{
-- return vmx_add_msr(msr, VMX_GUEST_MSR);
--}
--static inline int vmx_add_host_load_msr(u32 msr)
--{
-- return vmx_add_msr(msr, VMX_HOST_MSR);
--}
--
- DECLARE_PER_CPU(bool_t, vmxon);
-
- bool_t vmx_vcpu_pml_enabled(const struct vcpu *v);
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0022-x86-vmx-Internal-cleanup-for-MSR-load-save-infrastru.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0022-x86-vmx-Internal-cleanup-for-MSR-load-save-infrastru.patch
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
-From 52b8f9ae22a5daa1f2cad0aa5065b72b48c33ce4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 11:57:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 22/42] x86/vmx: Internal cleanup for MSR load/save
- infrastructure
-
- * Use an arch_vmx_struct local variable to reduce later code volume.
- * Use start/total instead of msr_area/msr_count. This is in preparation for
- more finegrained handling with later changes.
- * Use ent/end pointers (again for preparation), and to make the vmx_add_msr()
- logic easier to follow.
- * Make the memory allocation block of vmx_add_msr() unlikely, and calculate
- virt_to_maddr() just once.
-
-No practical change to functionality.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 94fda356fcdcc847662a4c9f6cc63511f25c1247)
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index 6bc6597242..a6ddba3132 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -1296,48 +1296,49 @@ static int vmx_msr_entry_key_cmp(const void *key, const void *elt)
- struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- {
- struct vcpu *curr = current;
-- unsigned int msr_count;
-- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr_area = NULL;
-+ struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx;
-+ struct vmx_msr_entry *start = NULL;
-+ unsigned int total;
-
- switch ( type )
- {
- case VMX_MSR_HOST:
-- msr_count = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.host_msr_count;
-- msr_area = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.host_msr_area;
-+ start = vmx->host_msr_area;
-+ total = vmx->host_msr_count;
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
-- msr_count = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_count;
-- msr_area = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_area;
-+ start = vmx->msr_area;
-+ total = vmx->msr_count;
- break;
-
- default:
- ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
- }
-
-- if ( msr_area == NULL )
-+ if ( !start )
- return NULL;
-
-- return bsearch(&msr, msr_area, msr_count, sizeof(struct vmx_msr_entry),
-- vmx_msr_entry_key_cmp);
-+ return bsearch(&msr, start, total, sizeof(*start), vmx_msr_entry_key_cmp);
- }
-
- int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- {
- struct vcpu *curr = current;
-- unsigned int idx, *msr_count;
-- struct vmx_msr_entry **msr_area, *msr_area_elem;
-+ struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx;
-+ struct vmx_msr_entry **ptr, *start = NULL, *ent, *end;
-+ unsigned int total;
-
- switch ( type )
- {
- case VMX_MSR_HOST:
-- msr_count = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.host_msr_count;
-- msr_area = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.host_msr_area;
-+ ptr = &vmx->host_msr_area;
-+ total = vmx->host_msr_count;
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
-- msr_count = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_count;
-- msr_area = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_area;
-+ ptr = &vmx->msr_area;
-+ total = vmx->msr_count;
- break;
-
- default:
-@@ -1345,51 +1346,55 @@ int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
-- if ( *msr_area == NULL )
-+ /* Allocate memory on first use. */
-+ if ( unlikely(!*ptr) )
- {
-- if ( (*msr_area = alloc_xenheap_page()) == NULL )
-+ paddr_t addr;
-+
-+ if ( (*ptr = alloc_xenheap_page()) == NULL )
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-+ addr = virt_to_maddr(*ptr);
-+
- switch ( type )
- {
- case VMX_MSR_HOST:
-- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(*msr_area));
-+ __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, addr);
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
-- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(*msr_area));
-- __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(*msr_area));
-+ __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_ADDR, addr);
-+ __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, addr);
- break;
- }
- }
-
-- for ( idx = 0; idx < *msr_count && (*msr_area)[idx].index <= msr; idx++ )
-- if ( (*msr_area)[idx].index == msr )
-+ start = *ptr;
-+ end = start + total;
-+
-+ for ( ent = start; ent < end && ent->index <= msr; ++ent )
-+ if ( ent->index == msr )
- return 0;
-
-- if ( *msr_count == (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct vmx_msr_entry)) )
-+ if ( total == (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*ent)) )
- return -ENOSPC;
-
-- memmove(*msr_area + idx + 1, *msr_area + idx,
-- sizeof(*msr_area_elem) * (*msr_count - idx));
--
-- msr_area_elem = *msr_area + idx;
-- msr_area_elem->index = msr;
-- msr_area_elem->mbz = 0;
-+ memmove(ent + 1, ent, sizeof(*ent) * (end - ent));
-
-- ++*msr_count;
-+ ent->index = msr;
-+ ent->mbz = 0;
-
- switch ( type )
- {
- case VMX_MSR_HOST:
-- rdmsrl(msr, msr_area_elem->data);
-- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, *msr_count);
-+ rdmsrl(msr, ent->data);
-+ __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, ++vmx->host_msr_count);
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
-- msr_area_elem->data = 0;
-- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, *msr_count);
-- __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, *msr_count);
-+ ent->data = 0;
-+ __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, ++vmx->msr_count);
-+ __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_count);
- break;
- }
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0023-x86-vmx-Factor-locate_msr_entry-out-of-vmx_find_msr-.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0023-x86-vmx-Factor-locate_msr_entry-out-of-vmx_find_msr-.patch
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-From b52017c904ae770ab86a62bf3219ee21d23bb55b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 11:57:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 23/42] x86/vmx: Factor locate_msr_entry() out of
- vmx_find_msr() and vmx_add_msr()
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Instead of having multiple algorithms searching the MSR lists, implement a
-single one. It has the semantics required by vmx_add_msr(), to identify the
-position in which an MSR should live, if it isn't already present.
-
-There will be a marginal improvement for vmx_find_msr() by avoiding the
-function pointer calls to vmx_msr_entry_key_cmp(), and a major improvement for
-vmx_add_msr() by using a binary search instead of a linear search.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 4d94828cf11104256dccea1fa7762f00575dfaa0)
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index a6ddba3132..c75b0ee5c3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -1280,24 +1280,36 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
- return rc;
- }
-
--static int vmx_msr_entry_key_cmp(const void *key, const void *elt)
-+/*
-+ * Search an MSR list looking for an MSR entry, or the slot in which it should
-+ * live (to keep the data sorted) if an entry is not found.
-+ *
-+ * The return pointer is guaranteed to be bounded by start and end. However,
-+ * it may point at end, and may be invalid for the caller to dereference.
-+ */
-+static struct vmx_msr_entry *locate_msr_entry(
-+ struct vmx_msr_entry *start, struct vmx_msr_entry *end, uint32_t msr)
- {
-- const u32 *msr = key;
-- const struct vmx_msr_entry *entry = elt;
-+ while ( start < end )
-+ {
-+ struct vmx_msr_entry *mid = start + (end - start) / 2;
-
-- if ( *msr > entry->index )
-- return 1;
-- if ( *msr < entry->index )
-- return -1;
-+ if ( msr < mid->index )
-+ end = mid;
-+ else if ( msr > mid->index )
-+ start = mid + 1;
-+ else
-+ return mid;
-+ }
-
-- return 0;
-+ return start;
- }
-
- struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- {
- struct vcpu *curr = current;
- struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx;
-- struct vmx_msr_entry *start = NULL;
-+ struct vmx_msr_entry *start = NULL, *ent, *end;
- unsigned int total;
-
- switch ( type )
-@@ -1319,7 +1331,10 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- if ( !start )
- return NULL;
-
-- return bsearch(&msr, start, total, sizeof(*start), vmx_msr_entry_key_cmp);
-+ end = start + total;
-+ ent = locate_msr_entry(start, end, msr);
-+
-+ return ((ent < end) && (ent->index == msr)) ? ent : NULL;
- }
-
- int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
-@@ -1371,10 +1386,10 @@ int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
-
- start = *ptr;
- end = start + total;
-+ ent = locate_msr_entry(start, end, msr);
-
-- for ( ent = start; ent < end && ent->index <= msr; ++ent )
-- if ( ent->index == msr )
-- return 0;
-+ if ( (ent < end) && (ent->index == msr) )
-+ return 0;
-
- if ( total == (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*ent)) )
- return -ENOSPC;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0024-x86-vmx-Support-remote-access-to-the-MSR-lists.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0024-x86-vmx-Support-remote-access-to-the-MSR-lists.patch
@@ -1,354 +0,0 @@
-From 218d403ad944f47548752d4a60e8f77e5f8e1950 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 11:57:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 24/42] x86/vmx: Support remote access to the MSR lists
-
-At the moment, all modifications of the MSR lists are in current context.
-However, future changes may need to put MSR_EFER into the lists from domctl
-hypercall context.
-
-Plumb a struct vcpu parameter down through the infrastructure, and use
-vmx_vmcs_{enter,exit}() for safe access to the VMCS in vmx_add_msr(). Use
-assertions to ensure that access is either in current context, or while the
-vcpu is paused.
-
-Note these expectations beside the fields in arch_vmx_struct, and reorder the
-fields to avoid unnecessary padding.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 80599f0b770199116aa753bfdfac9bfe2e8ea86a)
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c | 14 +++++------
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 22 ++++++++--------
- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++---------
- xen/include/xen/sched.h | 2 +-
- 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c
-index 207e2e712c..c499e69f2f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c
-@@ -455,12 +455,12 @@ static int core2_vpmu_alloc_resource(struct vcpu *v)
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
- {
- wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0);
-- if ( vmx_add_host_load_msr(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) )
-+ if ( vmx_add_host_load_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) )
- goto out_err;
-
-- if ( vmx_add_guest_msr(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) )
-+ if ( vmx_add_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) )
- goto out_err;
-- vmx_write_guest_msr(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0);
-+ vmx_write_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0);
- }
-
- core2_vpmu_cxt = xzalloc_bytes(sizeof(*core2_vpmu_cxt) +
-@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static int core2_vpmu_do_wrmsr(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content,
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
-- vmx_read_guest_msr(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
-+ vmx_read_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
- &core2_vpmu_cxt->global_ctrl);
- else
- rdmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, core2_vpmu_cxt->global_ctrl);
-@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static int core2_vpmu_do_wrmsr(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content,
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
-- vmx_read_guest_msr(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
-+ vmx_read_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
- &core2_vpmu_cxt->global_ctrl);
- else
- rdmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, core2_vpmu_cxt->global_ctrl);
-@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ static int core2_vpmu_do_wrmsr(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content,
- else
- {
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
-- vmx_write_guest_msr(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, msr_content);
-+ vmx_write_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, msr_content);
- else
- wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, msr_content);
- }
-@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ static int core2_vpmu_do_rdmsr(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content)
- break;
- case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
-- vmx_read_guest_msr(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, msr_content);
-+ vmx_read_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, msr_content);
- else
- rdmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, *msr_content);
- break;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index c75b0ee5c3..e86f292fbc 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -1305,13 +1305,15 @@ static struct vmx_msr_entry *locate_msr_entry(
- return start;
- }
-
--struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
-+struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
-+ enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- {
-- struct vcpu *curr = current;
-- struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx;
-+ const struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx;
- struct vmx_msr_entry *start = NULL, *ent, *end;
- unsigned int total;
-
-+ ASSERT(v == current || !vcpu_runnable(v));
-+
- switch ( type )
- {
- case VMX_MSR_HOST:
-@@ -1337,12 +1339,14 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- return ((ent < end) && (ent->index == msr)) ? ent : NULL;
- }
-
--int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
-+int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- {
-- struct vcpu *curr = current;
-- struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &curr->arch.hvm_vmx;
-+ struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx;
- struct vmx_msr_entry **ptr, *start = NULL, *ent, *end;
- unsigned int total;
-+ int rc;
-+
-+ ASSERT(v == current || !vcpu_runnable(v));
-
- switch ( type )
- {
-@@ -1361,13 +1365,18 @@ int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
-+ vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
-+
- /* Allocate memory on first use. */
- if ( unlikely(!*ptr) )
- {
- paddr_t addr;
-
- if ( (*ptr = alloc_xenheap_page()) == NULL )
-- return -ENOMEM;
-+ {
-+ rc = -ENOMEM;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-
- addr = virt_to_maddr(*ptr);
-
-@@ -1389,10 +1398,16 @@ int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- ent = locate_msr_entry(start, end, msr);
-
- if ( (ent < end) && (ent->index == msr) )
-- return 0;
-+ {
-+ rc = 0;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-
- if ( total == (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*ent)) )
-- return -ENOSPC;
-+ {
-+ rc = -ENOSPC;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-
- memmove(ent + 1, ent, sizeof(*ent) * (end - ent));
-
-@@ -1413,7 +1428,12 @@ int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- break;
- }
-
-- return 0;
-+ rc = 0;
-+
-+ out:
-+ vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
-+
-+ return rc;
- }
-
- void vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index d4ebae8945..95162bf187 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -2822,7 +2822,7 @@ static int is_last_branch_msr(u32 ecx)
-
- static int vmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content)
- {
-- const struct vcpu *curr = current;
-+ struct vcpu *curr = current;
-
- HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_MSR, "ecx=%#x", msr);
-
-@@ -2901,7 +2901,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content)
- if ( passive_domain_do_rdmsr(msr, msr_content) )
- goto done;
-
-- if ( vmx_read_guest_msr(msr, msr_content) == 0 )
-+ if ( vmx_read_guest_msr(curr, msr, msr_content) == 0 )
- break;
-
- if ( is_last_branch_msr(msr) )
-@@ -3113,7 +3113,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
-
- for ( ; (rc == 0) && lbr->count; lbr++ )
- for ( i = 0; (rc == 0) && (i < lbr->count); i++ )
-- if ( (rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(lbr->base + i)) == 0 )
-+ if ( (rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(v, lbr->base + i)) == 0 )
- {
- vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, lbr->base + i, VMX_MSR_RW);
- if ( lbr_tsx_fixup_needed )
-@@ -3153,7 +3153,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
- if ( wrmsr_viridian_regs(msr, msr_content) )
- break;
-
-- if ( vmx_write_guest_msr(msr, msr_content) == 0 ||
-+ if ( vmx_write_guest_msr(v, msr, msr_content) == 0 ||
- is_last_branch_msr(msr) )
- break;
-
-@@ -4169,7 +4169,7 @@ static void lbr_tsx_fixup(void)
- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr_area = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_area;
- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr;
-
-- if ( (msr = vmx_find_msr(lbr_from_start, VMX_MSR_GUEST)) != NULL )
-+ if ( (msr = vmx_find_msr(curr, lbr_from_start, VMX_MSR_GUEST)) != NULL )
- {
- /*
- * Sign extend into bits 61:62 while preserving bit 63
-@@ -4179,15 +4179,15 @@ static void lbr_tsx_fixup(void)
- msr->data |= ((LBR_FROM_SIGNEXT_2MSB & msr->data) << 2);
- }
-
-- if ( (msr = vmx_find_msr(lbr_lastint_from, VMX_MSR_GUEST)) != NULL )
-+ if ( (msr = vmx_find_msr(curr, lbr_lastint_from, VMX_MSR_GUEST)) != NULL )
- msr->data |= ((LBR_FROM_SIGNEXT_2MSB & msr->data) << 2);
- }
-
--static void sign_extend_msr(u32 msr, int type)
-+static void sign_extend_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type)
- {
- struct vmx_msr_entry *entry;
-
-- if ( (entry = vmx_find_msr(msr, type)) != NULL )
-+ if ( (entry = vmx_find_msr(v, msr, type)) != NULL )
- {
- if ( entry->data & VADDR_TOP_BIT )
- entry->data |= CANONICAL_MASK;
-@@ -4198,6 +4198,8 @@ static void sign_extend_msr(u32 msr, int type)
-
- static void bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup(void)
- {
-+ struct vcpu *curr = current;
-+
- /*
- * Occasionally, on certain Broadwell CPUs MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP has
- * been observed to have the top three bits corrupted as though the
-@@ -4207,8 +4209,8 @@ static void bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup(void)
- * erratum BDF14. Fix up MSR_IA32_LASTINT{FROM,TO}IP by
- * sign-extending into bits 48:63.
- */
-- sign_extend_msr(MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-- sign_extend_msr(MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+ sign_extend_msr(curr, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+ sign_extend_msr(curr, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
- }
-
- static void lbr_fixup(void)
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-index 20882d13e0..62afebec11 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-@@ -130,10 +130,17 @@ struct arch_vmx_struct {
- uint64_t sfmask;
-
- struct vmx_msr_bitmap *msr_bitmap;
-- unsigned int msr_count;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Most accesses to the MSR host/guest load/save lists are in current
-+ * context. However, the data can be modified by toolstack/migration
-+ * actions. Remote access is only permitted for paused vcpus, and is
-+ * protected under the domctl lock.
-+ */
- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr_area;
-- unsigned int host_msr_count;
- struct vmx_msr_entry *host_msr_area;
-+ unsigned int msr_count;
-+ unsigned int host_msr_count;
-
- unsigned long eoi_exitmap_changed;
- DECLARE_BITMAP(eoi_exit_bitmap, NR_VECTORS);
-@@ -537,23 +544,25 @@ enum vmx_msr_list_type {
- VMX_MSR_GUEST, /* MSRs saved on VMExit, loaded on VMEntry. */
- };
-
--int vmx_add_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type);
-+int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type);
-
--static inline int vmx_add_host_load_msr(uint32_t msr)
-+static inline int vmx_add_guest_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr)
- {
-- return vmx_add_msr(msr, VMX_MSR_HOST);
-+ return vmx_add_msr(v, msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
- }
-
--static inline int vmx_add_guest_msr(uint32_t msr)
-+static inline int vmx_add_host_load_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr)
- {
-- return vmx_add_msr(msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+ return vmx_add_msr(v, msr, VMX_MSR_HOST);
- }
-
--struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type);
-+struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
-+ enum vmx_msr_list_type type);
-
--static inline int vmx_read_guest_msr(uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
-+static inline int vmx_read_guest_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
-+ uint64_t *val)
- {
-- const struct vmx_msr_entry *ent = vmx_find_msr(msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+ const struct vmx_msr_entry *ent = vmx_find_msr(v, msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-
- if ( !ent )
- return -ESRCH;
-@@ -563,9 +572,10 @@ static inline int vmx_read_guest_msr(uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
- return 0;
- }
-
--static inline int vmx_write_guest_msr(uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
-+static inline int vmx_write_guest_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
-+ uint64_t val)
- {
-- struct vmx_msr_entry *ent = vmx_find_msr(msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+ struct vmx_msr_entry *ent = vmx_find_msr(v, msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-
- if ( !ent )
- return -ESRCH;
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-index 99d2af2e1f..e79d5a36ca 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static inline struct domain *next_domain_in_cpupool(
- #define _VPF_parked 8
- #define VPF_parked (1UL<<_VPF_parked)
-
--static inline int vcpu_runnable(struct vcpu *v)
-+static inline bool vcpu_runnable(const struct vcpu *v)
- {
- return !(v->pause_flags |
- atomic_read(&v->pause_count) |
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0025-x86-vmx-Improvements-to-LBR-MSR-handling.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0025-x86-vmx-Improvements-to-LBR-MSR-handling.patch
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-From cfdd4e846a77ca5510b6c35adeec55014a73efb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 11:57:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 25/42] x86/vmx: Improvements to LBR MSR handling
-
-The main purpose of this patch is to only ever insert the LBR MSRs into the
-guest load/save list once, as a future patch wants to change the behaviour of
-vmx_add_guest_msr().
-
-The repeated processing of lbr_info and the guests MSR load/save list is
-redundant, and a guest using LBR itself will have to re-enable
-MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR in its #DB handler, meaning that Xen will repeat this
-redundant processing every time the guest gets a debug exception.
-
-Rename lbr_fixup_enabled to lbr_flags to be a little more generic, and use one
-bit to indicate that the MSRs have been inserted into the load/save list.
-Shorten the existing FIXUP* identifiers to reduce code volume.
-
-Furthermore, handing the guest #MC on an error isn't a legitimate action. Two
-of the three failure cases are definitely hypervisor bugs, and the third is a
-boundary case which shouldn't occur in practice. The guest also won't execute
-correctly, so handle errors by cleanly crashing the guest.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit be73a842e642772d7372004c9c105de35b771020)
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 95162bf187..5f01652d48 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -2758,8 +2758,10 @@ enum
-
- #define LBR_FROM_SIGNEXT_2MSB ((1ULL << 59) | (1ULL << 60))
-
--#define FIXUP_LBR_TSX (1u << 0)
--#define FIXUP_BDW_ERRATUM_BDF14 (1u << 1)
-+#define LBR_MSRS_INSERTED (1u << 0)
-+#define LBR_FIXUP_TSX (1u << 1)
-+#define LBR_FIXUP_BDF14 (1u << 2)
-+#define LBR_FIXUP_MASK (LBR_FIXUP_TSX | LBR_FIXUP_BDF14)
-
- static bool __read_mostly lbr_tsx_fixup_needed;
- static bool __read_mostly bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup_needed;
-@@ -3094,7 +3096,6 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
- break;
-
- case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR: {
-- int i, rc = 0;
- uint64_t supported = IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
-
- if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) )
-@@ -3105,30 +3106,64 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
- if ( vpmu_do_wrmsr(msr, msr_content, supported) )
- break;
- }
-- if ( msr_content & IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR )
-+
-+ /*
-+ * When a guest first enables LBR, arrange to save and restore the LBR
-+ * MSRs and allow the guest direct access.
-+ *
-+ * MSR_DEBUGCTL and LBR has existed almost as long as MSRs have
-+ * existed, and there is no architectural way to hide the feature, or
-+ * fail the attempt to enable LBR.
-+ *
-+ * Unknown host LBR MSRs or hitting -ENOSPC with the guest load/save
-+ * list are definitely hypervisor bugs, whereas -ENOMEM for allocating
-+ * the load/save list is simply unlucky (and shouldn't occur with
-+ * sensible management by the toolstack).
-+ *
-+ * Either way, there is nothing we can do right now to recover, and
-+ * the guest won't execute correctly either. Simply crash the domain
-+ * to make the failure obvious.
-+ */
-+ if ( !(v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags & LBR_MSRS_INSERTED) &&
-+ (msr_content & IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) )
- {
- const struct lbr_info *lbr = last_branch_msr_get();
-- if ( lbr == NULL )
-- break;
-
-- for ( ; (rc == 0) && lbr->count; lbr++ )
-- for ( i = 0; (rc == 0) && (i < lbr->count); i++ )
-- if ( (rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(v, lbr->base + i)) == 0 )
-+ if ( unlikely(!lbr) )
-+ {
-+ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Unknown Host LBR MSRs\n");
-+ domain_crash(v->domain);
-+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
-+ }
-+
-+ for ( ; lbr->count; lbr++ )
-+ {
-+ unsigned int i;
-+
-+ for ( i = 0; i < lbr->count; i++ )
-+ {
-+ int rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(v, lbr->base + i);
-+
-+ if ( unlikely(rc) )
- {
-- vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, lbr->base + i, VMX_MSR_RW);
-- if ( lbr_tsx_fixup_needed )
-- v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_fixup_enabled |= FIXUP_LBR_TSX;
-- if ( bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup_needed )
-- v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_fixup_enabled |=
-- FIXUP_BDW_ERRATUM_BDF14;
-+ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
-+ "Guest load/save list error %d\n", rc);
-+ domain_crash(v->domain);
-+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-- }
-
-- if ( rc < 0 )
-- hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_machine_check, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
-- else
-- __vmwrite(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, msr_content);
-+ vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, lbr->base + i, VMX_MSR_RW);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags |= LBR_MSRS_INSERTED;
-+ if ( lbr_tsx_fixup_needed )
-+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags |= LBR_FIXUP_TSX;
-+ if ( bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup_needed )
-+ v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags |= LBR_FIXUP_BDF14;
-+ }
-
-+ __vmwrite(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, msr_content);
- break;
- }
- case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
-@@ -4217,9 +4252,9 @@ static void lbr_fixup(void)
- {
- struct vcpu *curr = current;
-
-- if ( curr->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_fixup_enabled & FIXUP_LBR_TSX )
-+ if ( curr->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags & LBR_FIXUP_TSX )
- lbr_tsx_fixup();
-- if ( curr->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_fixup_enabled & FIXUP_BDW_ERRATUM_BDF14 )
-+ if ( curr->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags & LBR_FIXUP_BDF14 )
- bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup();
- }
-
-@@ -4287,7 +4322,7 @@ bool vmx_vmenter_helper(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- }
-
- out:
-- if ( unlikely(curr->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_fixup_enabled) )
-+ if ( unlikely(curr->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags & LBR_FIXUP_MASK) )
- lbr_fixup();
-
- HVMTRACE_ND(VMENTRY, 0, 1/*cycles*/, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-index 62afebec11..2c9e291bee 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ struct arch_vmx_struct {
- /* Are we emulating rather than VMENTERing? */
- uint8_t vmx_emulate;
-
-- uint8_t lbr_fixup_enabled;
-+ uint8_t lbr_flags;
-
- /* Bitmask of segments that we can't safely use in virtual 8086 mode */
- uint16_t vm86_segment_mask;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0026-x86-vmx-Pass-an-MSR-value-into-vmx_msr_add.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0026-x86-vmx-Pass-an-MSR-value-into-vmx_msr_add.patch
@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
-From 8b35b978a273a153ceadccd9c02d433f8be1c9bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 11:57:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 26/42] x86/vmx: Pass an MSR value into vmx_msr_add()
-
-The main purpose of this change is to allow us to set a specific MSR value,
-without needing to know whether there is already a load/save list slot for it.
-
-Previously, callers wanting this property needed to call both vmx_add_*_msr()
-and vmx_write_*_msr() to cover both cases, and there are no callers which want
-the old behaviour of being a no-op if an entry already existed for the MSR.
-
-As a result of this API improvement, the default value for guest MSRs need not
-be 0, and the default for host MSRs need not be passed via hardware register.
-In practice, this cleans up the VPMU allocation logic, and avoids an MSR read
-as part of vcpu construction.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit ee7689b94ac7094b975ab4a023cfeae209da0a36)
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c | 6 ++----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 14 +++++++-------
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 20 ++++++++++++++------
- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c
-index c499e69f2f..1fc79c9ff4 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c
-@@ -454,13 +454,11 @@ static int core2_vpmu_alloc_resource(struct vcpu *v)
-
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
- {
-- wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0);
-- if ( vmx_add_host_load_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) )
-+ if ( vmx_add_host_load_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0) )
- goto out_err;
-
-- if ( vmx_add_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) )
-+ if ( vmx_add_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0) )
- goto out_err;
-- vmx_write_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0);
- }
-
- core2_vpmu_cxt = xzalloc_bytes(sizeof(*core2_vpmu_cxt) +
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index e86f292fbc..af422b3f92 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -1339,7 +1339,8 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
- return ((ent < end) && (ent->index == msr)) ? ent : NULL;
- }
-
--int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
-+int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val,
-+ enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- {
- struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx;
- struct vmx_msr_entry **ptr, *start = NULL, *ent, *end;
-@@ -1398,11 +1399,9 @@ int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- ent = locate_msr_entry(start, end, msr);
-
- if ( (ent < end) && (ent->index == msr) )
-- {
-- rc = 0;
-- goto out;
-- }
-+ goto found;
-
-+ /* If there isn't an existing entry for msr, insert room for one. */
- if ( total == (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*ent)) )
- {
- rc = -ENOSPC;
-@@ -1417,17 +1416,18 @@ int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type)
- switch ( type )
- {
- case VMX_MSR_HOST:
-- rdmsrl(msr, ent->data);
- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, ++vmx->host_msr_count);
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
-- ent->data = 0;
- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, ++vmx->msr_count);
- __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_count);
- break;
- }
-
-+ /* Set the msr's value. */
-+ found:
-+ ent->data = val;
- rc = 0;
-
- out:
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 5f01652d48..5745543e49 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -3142,7 +3142,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
-
- for ( i = 0; i < lbr->count; i++ )
- {
-- int rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(v, lbr->base + i);
-+ int rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(v, lbr->base + i, 0);
-
- if ( unlikely(rc) )
- {
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-index 2c9e291bee..f94a108ea5 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-@@ -544,16 +544,24 @@ enum vmx_msr_list_type {
- VMX_MSR_GUEST, /* MSRs saved on VMExit, loaded on VMEntry. */
- };
-
--int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, enum vmx_msr_list_type type);
-+/**
-+ * Add an MSR to an MSR list (inserting space for the entry if necessary), and
-+ * set the MSRs value.
-+ *
-+ * May fail if unable to allocate memory for the list, or the total number of
-+ * entries exceeds the memory allocated.
-+ */
-+int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val,
-+ enum vmx_msr_list_type type);
-
--static inline int vmx_add_guest_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr)
-+static inline int vmx_add_guest_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
- {
-- return vmx_add_msr(v, msr, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
-+ return vmx_add_msr(v, msr, val, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
- }
--
--static inline int vmx_add_host_load_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr)
-+static inline int vmx_add_host_load_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
-+ uint64_t val)
- {
-- return vmx_add_msr(v, msr, VMX_MSR_HOST);
-+ return vmx_add_msr(v, msr, val, VMX_MSR_HOST);
- }
-
- struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0027-x86-vmx-Support-load-only-guest-MSR-list-entries.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0027-x86-vmx-Support-load-only-guest-MSR-list-entries.patch
@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-From 7b420e8a82cc8664e086ed31ec5e80615bd6225f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 11:57:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 27/42] x86/vmx: Support load-only guest MSR list entries
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Currently, the VMX_MSR_GUEST type maintains completely symmetric guest load
-and save lists, by pointing VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_ADDR and VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR
-at the same page, and setting VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT and
-VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT to the same value.
-
-However, for MSRs which we won't let the guest have direct access to, having
-hardware save the current value on VMExit is unnecessary overhead.
-
-To avoid this overhead, we must make the load and save lists asymmetric. By
-making the entry load count greater than the exit store count, we can maintain
-two adjacent lists of MSRs, the first of which is saved and restored, and the
-second of which is only restored on VMEntry.
-
-For simplicity:
- * Both adjacent lists are still sorted by MSR index.
- * It undefined behaviour to insert the same MSR into both lists.
- * The total size of both lists is still limited at 256 entries (one 4k page).
-
-Split the current msr_count field into msr_{load,save}_count, and introduce a
-new VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY type, and update vmx_{add,find}_msr() to calculate
-which sublist to search, based on type. VMX_MSR_HOST has no logical sublist,
-whereas VMX_MSR_GUEST has a sublist between 0 and the save count, while
-VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY has a sublist between the save count and the load
-count.
-
-One subtle point is that inserting an MSR into the load-save list involves
-moving the entire load-only list, and updating both counts.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 1ac46b55632626aeb935726e1b0a71605ef6763a)
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 7 ++++-
- 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index af422b3f92..ca652c49cb 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
- {
- const struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx;
- struct vmx_msr_entry *start = NULL, *ent, *end;
-- unsigned int total;
-+ unsigned int substart, subend, total;
-
- ASSERT(v == current || !vcpu_runnable(v));
-
-@@ -1318,12 +1318,23 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
- {
- case VMX_MSR_HOST:
- start = vmx->host_msr_area;
-- total = vmx->host_msr_count;
-+ substart = 0;
-+ subend = vmx->host_msr_count;
-+ total = subend;
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
- start = vmx->msr_area;
-- total = vmx->msr_count;
-+ substart = 0;
-+ subend = vmx->msr_save_count;
-+ total = vmx->msr_load_count;
-+ break;
-+
-+ case VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY:
-+ start = vmx->msr_area;
-+ substart = vmx->msr_save_count;
-+ subend = vmx->msr_load_count;
-+ total = subend;
- break;
-
- default:
-@@ -1334,7 +1345,7 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
- return NULL;
-
- end = start + total;
-- ent = locate_msr_entry(start, end, msr);
-+ ent = locate_msr_entry(start + substart, start + subend, msr);
-
- return ((ent < end) && (ent->index == msr)) ? ent : NULL;
- }
-@@ -1344,7 +1355,7 @@ int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val,
- {
- struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx;
- struct vmx_msr_entry **ptr, *start = NULL, *ent, *end;
-- unsigned int total;
-+ unsigned int substart, subend, total;
- int rc;
-
- ASSERT(v == current || !vcpu_runnable(v));
-@@ -1353,12 +1364,23 @@ int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val,
- {
- case VMX_MSR_HOST:
- ptr = &vmx->host_msr_area;
-- total = vmx->host_msr_count;
-+ substart = 0;
-+ subend = vmx->host_msr_count;
-+ total = subend;
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
- ptr = &vmx->msr_area;
-- total = vmx->msr_count;
-+ substart = 0;
-+ subend = vmx->msr_save_count;
-+ total = vmx->msr_load_count;
-+ break;
-+
-+ case VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY:
-+ ptr = &vmx->msr_area;
-+ substart = vmx->msr_save_count;
-+ subend = vmx->msr_load_count;
-+ total = subend;
- break;
-
- default:
-@@ -1388,6 +1410,7 @@ int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val,
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
-+ case VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY:
- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_ADDR, addr);
- __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, addr);
- break;
-@@ -1396,7 +1419,7 @@ int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val,
-
- start = *ptr;
- end = start + total;
-- ent = locate_msr_entry(start, end, msr);
-+ ent = locate_msr_entry(start + substart, start + subend, msr);
-
- if ( (ent < end) && (ent->index == msr) )
- goto found;
-@@ -1420,8 +1443,11 @@ int vmx_add_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val,
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
-- __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, ++vmx->msr_count);
-- __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_count);
-+ __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, ++vmx->msr_save_count);
-+
-+ /* Fallthrough */
-+ case VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY:
-+ __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, ++vmx->msr_load_count);
- break;
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 5745543e49..1e32f61225 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -4200,7 +4200,7 @@ out:
- static void lbr_tsx_fixup(void)
- {
- struct vcpu *curr = current;
-- unsigned int msr_count = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_count;
-+ unsigned int msr_count = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_save_count;
- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr_area = curr->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_area;
- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr;
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-index f94a108ea5..57e5098b99 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
-@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ struct arch_vmx_struct {
- */
- struct vmx_msr_entry *msr_area;
- struct vmx_msr_entry *host_msr_area;
-- unsigned int msr_count;
-+ unsigned int msr_load_count;
-+ unsigned int msr_save_count;
- unsigned int host_msr_count;
-
- unsigned long eoi_exitmap_changed;
-@@ -542,12 +543,16 @@ enum vmx_insn_errno
- enum vmx_msr_list_type {
- VMX_MSR_HOST, /* MSRs loaded on VMExit. */
- VMX_MSR_GUEST, /* MSRs saved on VMExit, loaded on VMEntry. */
-+ VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY, /* MSRs loaded on VMEntry only. */
- };
-
- /**
- * Add an MSR to an MSR list (inserting space for the entry if necessary), and
- * set the MSRs value.
- *
-+ * It is undefined behaviour to try and insert the same MSR into both the
-+ * GUEST and GUEST_LOADONLY list.
-+ *
- * May fail if unable to allocate memory for the list, or the total number of
- * entries exceeds the memory allocated.
- */
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0028-VMX-fix-vmx_-find-del-_msr-build.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0028-VMX-fix-vmx_-find-del-_msr-build.patch
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 1d32c21975097e64a7ecf0932680a3b6d53d00a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 11:54:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 28/42] VMX: fix vmx_{find,del}_msr() build
-
-Older gcc at -O2 (and perhaps higher) does not recognize that apparently
-uninitialized variables aren't really uninitialized. Pull out the
-assignments used by two of the three case blocks and make them
-initializers of the variables, as I think I had suggested during review.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 97cb0516a322ecdf0032fa9d8aa1525c03d7772f)
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 12 ++++--------
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index ca652c49cb..30a33dd0bd 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -1310,7 +1310,8 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
- {
- const struct arch_vmx_struct *vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx;
- struct vmx_msr_entry *start = NULL, *ent, *end;
-- unsigned int substart, subend, total;
-+ unsigned int substart = 0, subend = vmx->msr_save_count;
-+ unsigned int total = vmx->msr_load_count;
-
- ASSERT(v == current || !vcpu_runnable(v));
-
-@@ -1318,23 +1319,18 @@ struct vmx_msr_entry *vmx_find_msr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
- {
- case VMX_MSR_HOST:
- start = vmx->host_msr_area;
-- substart = 0;
- subend = vmx->host_msr_count;
- total = subend;
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST:
- start = vmx->msr_area;
-- substart = 0;
-- subend = vmx->msr_save_count;
-- total = vmx->msr_load_count;
- break;
-
- case VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY:
- start = vmx->msr_area;
-- substart = vmx->msr_save_count;
-- subend = vmx->msr_load_count;
-- total = subend;
-+ substart = subend;
-+ subend = total;
- break;
-
- default:
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0029-ARM-disable-grant-table-v2.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0029-ARM-disable-grant-table-v2.patch
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From fa79f9e762be390b56218437ed317a695a03a5e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 17:25:51 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 29/42] ARM: disable grant table v2
-
-It was never expected to work, the implementation is incomplete.
-
-As a side effect, it also prevents guests from triggering a
-"BUG_ON(page_get_owner(pg) != d)" in gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames().
-
-This is XSA-268.
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 9a5c16a3e75778c8a094ca87784d93b74676f46c)
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 2 ++
- xen/common/grant_table.c | 6 +++++-
- xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h | 1 +
- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index 3b710b71fb..e5e7fdc405 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -936,6 +936,8 @@ version are 1 and 2.
- use of grant table v2 without transitive grants is an ABI breakage from the
- guests point of view.
-
-+The usage of gnttab v2 is not security supported on ARM platforms.
-+
- ### gnttab\_max\_frames
- > `= <integer>`
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-index c757b7f6f5..231ecf509a 100644
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -97,7 +97,11 @@ static unsigned int __read_mostly max_maptrack_frames =
- DEFAULT_MAX_MAPTRACK_FRAMES;
- integer_runtime_param("gnttab_max_maptrack_frames", max_maptrack_frames);
-
--static unsigned int __read_mostly opt_gnttab_max_version = 2;
-+#ifndef GNTTAB_MAX_VERSION
-+#define GNTTAB_MAX_VERSION 2
-+#endif
-+
-+static unsigned int __read_mostly opt_gnttab_max_version = GNTTAB_MAX_VERSION;
- static bool __read_mostly opt_transitive_grants = true;
-
- static int __init parse_gnttab(const char *s)
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-index e52936c79f..24958e4670 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
-@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
- #include <xen/sched.h>
-
- #define INITIAL_NR_GRANT_FRAMES 1U
-+#define GNTTAB_MAX_VERSION 1
-
- struct grant_table_arch {
- gfn_t *shared_gfn;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0030-x86-vtx-Fix-the-checking-for-unknown-invalid-MSR_DEB.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0030-x86-vtx-Fix-the-checking-for-unknown-invalid-MSR_DEB.patch
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-From 48fb482ef695c6b193ccfca665e6dd302eb230e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 17:26:21 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 30/42] x86/vtx: Fix the checking for unknown/invalid
- MSR_DEBUGCTL bits
-
-The VPMU_MODE_OFF early-exit in vpmu_do_wrmsr() introduced by c/s
-11fe998e56 bypasses all reserved bit checking in the general case. As a
-result, a guest can enable BTS when it shouldn't be permitted to, and
-lock up the entire host.
-
-With vPMU active (not a security supported configuration, but useful for
-debugging), the reserved bit checking in broken, caused by the original
-BTS changeset 1a8aa75ed.
-
-From a correctness standpoint, it is not possible to have two different
-pieces of code responsible for different parts of value checking, if
-there isn't an accumulation of bits which have been checked. A
-practical upshot of this is that a guest can set any value it
-wishes (usually resulting in a vmentry failure for bad guest state).
-
-Therefore, fix this by implementing all the reserved bit checking in the
-main MSR_DEBUGCTL block, and removing all handling of DEBUGCTL from the
-vPMU MSR logic.
-
-This is XSA-269.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 2a8a8e99feb950504559196521bc9fd63ed3a962)
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c | 20 --------------------
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c
-index 1fc79c9ff4..6e27f6ec8e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_intel.c
-@@ -533,27 +533,7 @@ static int core2_vpmu_do_wrmsr(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content,
- uint64_t *enabled_cntrs;
-
- if ( !core2_vpmu_msr_common_check(msr, &type, &index) )
-- {
-- /* Special handling for BTS */
-- if ( msr == MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR )
-- {
-- supported |= IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_TR | IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS |
-- IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTINT;
--
-- if ( cpu_has(&current_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_DSCPL) )
-- supported |= IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS_OFF_OS |
-- IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS_OFF_USR;
-- if ( !(msr_content & ~supported) &&
-- vpmu_is_set(vpmu, VPMU_CPU_HAS_BTS) )
-- return 0;
-- if ( (msr_content & supported) &&
-- !vpmu_is_set(vpmu, VPMU_CPU_HAS_BTS) )
-- printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
-- "%pv: Debug Store unsupported on this CPU\n",
-- current);
-- }
- return -EINVAL;
-- }
-
- ASSERT(!supported);
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 1e32f61225..c7cf3a8fbc 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -3038,11 +3038,14 @@ void vmx_vlapic_msr_changed(struct vcpu *v)
- static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
- {
- struct vcpu *v = current;
-+ const struct cpuid_policy *cp = v->domain->arch.cpuid;
-
- HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_MSR, "ecx=%#x, msr_value=%#"PRIx64, msr, msr_content);
-
- switch ( msr )
- {
-+ uint64_t rsvd;
-+
- case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
- __vmwrite(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, msr_content);
- break;
-@@ -3095,18 +3098,26 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
- wrmsrl(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, msr_content);
- break;
-
-- case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR: {
-- uint64_t supported = IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
-+ case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
-+ rsvd = ~(IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF);
-
-- if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) )
-- supported |= IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_RTM;
-- if ( msr_content & ~supported )
-+ /* TODO: Wire vPMU settings properly through the CPUID policy */
-+ if ( vpmu_is_set(vcpu_vpmu(v), VPMU_CPU_HAS_BTS) )
- {
-- /* Perhaps some other bits are supported in vpmu. */
-- if ( vpmu_do_wrmsr(msr, msr_content, supported) )
-- break;
-+ rsvd &= ~(IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_TR | IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS |
-+ IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTINT);
-+
-+ if ( cpu_has(&current_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_DSCPL) )
-+ rsvd &= ~(IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS_OFF_OS |
-+ IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS_OFF_USR);
- }
-
-+ if ( cp->feat.rtm )
-+ rsvd &= ~IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR_RTM;
-+
-+ if ( msr_content & rsvd )
-+ goto gp_fault;
-+
- /*
- * When a guest first enables LBR, arrange to save and restore the LBR
- * MSRs and allow the guest direct access.
-@@ -3165,7 +3176,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content)
-
- __vmwrite(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, msr_content);
- break;
-- }
-+
- case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
- case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
- /* None of these MSRs are writeable. */
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0032-x86-spec-ctrl-Calculate-safe-PTE-addresses-for-L1TF-.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0032-x86-spec-ctrl-Calculate-safe-PTE-addresses-for-L1TF-.patch
@@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
-From d044f6cc590c58178d87ad78f1859d1c7905ee0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:10:19 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 32/42] x86/spec-ctrl: Calculate safe PTE addresses for L1TF
- mitigations
-
-Safe PTE addresses for L1TF mitigations are ones which are within the L1D
-address width (may be wider than reported in CPUID), and above the highest
-cacheable RAM/NVDIMM/BAR/etc.
-
-All logic here is best-effort heuristics, which should in practice be fine for
-most hardware. Future work will see about disentangling the SRAT handling
-further, as well as having L0 pass this information down to lower levels when
-virtualised.
-
-This is part of XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3620.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit b03a57c9383b32181e60add6b6de12b473652aa4)
----
- xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 12 +++
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/srat.c | 8 +-
- xen/common/efi/boot.c | 12 +++
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h | 7 ++
- 5 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-index 66fd13f93a..3cd3e81b30 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-@@ -912,6 +912,18 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
- /* Sanitise the raw E820 map to produce a final clean version. */
- max_page = raw_max_page = init_e820(memmap_type, &e820_raw);
-
-+ if ( !efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) )
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Supplement the heuristics in l1tf_calculations() by assuming that
-+ * anything referenced in the E820 may be cacheable.
-+ */
-+ l1tf_safe_maddr =
-+ max(l1tf_safe_maddr,
-+ ROUNDUP(e820_raw.map[e820_raw.nr_map - 1].addr +
-+ e820_raw.map[e820_raw.nr_map - 1].size, PAGE_SIZE));
-+ }
-+
- /* Create a temporary copy of the E820 map. */
- memcpy(&boot_e820, &e820, sizeof(e820));
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 32213ace86..fe15a58de0 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ bool __initdata bsp_delay_spec_ctrl;
- uint8_t __read_mostly default_xen_spec_ctrl;
- uint8_t __read_mostly default_spec_ctrl_flags;
-
-+paddr_t __read_mostly l1tf_addr_mask, __read_mostly l1tf_safe_maddr;
-+static bool __initdata cpu_has_bug_l1tf;
-+static unsigned int __initdata l1d_maxphysaddr;
-+
- static int __init parse_bti(const char *s)
- {
- const char *ss;
-@@ -420,6 +424,153 @@ static bool __init should_use_eager_fpu(void)
- }
- }
-
-+/* Calculate whether this CPU is vulnerable to L1TF. */
-+static __init void l1tf_calculations(uint64_t caps)
-+{
-+ bool hit_default = false;
-+
-+ l1d_maxphysaddr = paddr_bits;
-+
-+ /* L1TF is only known to affect Intel Family 6 processors at this time. */
-+ if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
-+ boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 )
-+ {
-+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Core processors since at least Penryn are vulnerable.
-+ */
-+ case 0x17: /* Penryn */
-+ case 0x1d: /* Dunnington */
-+ cpu_has_bug_l1tf = true;
-+ break;
-+
-+ case 0x1f: /* Auburndale / Havendale */
-+ case 0x1e: /* Nehalem */
-+ case 0x1a: /* Nehalem EP */
-+ case 0x2e: /* Nehalem EX */
-+ case 0x25: /* Westmere */
-+ case 0x2c: /* Westmere EP */
-+ case 0x2f: /* Westmere EX */
-+ cpu_has_bug_l1tf = true;
-+ l1d_maxphysaddr = 44;
-+ break;
-+
-+ case 0x2a: /* SandyBridge */
-+ case 0x2d: /* SandyBridge EP/EX */
-+ case 0x3a: /* IvyBridge */
-+ case 0x3e: /* IvyBridge EP/EX */
-+ case 0x3c: /* Haswell */
-+ case 0x3f: /* Haswell EX/EP */
-+ case 0x45: /* Haswell D */
-+ case 0x46: /* Haswell H */
-+ case 0x3d: /* Broadwell */
-+ case 0x47: /* Broadwell H */
-+ case 0x4f: /* Broadwell EP/EX */
-+ case 0x56: /* Broadwell D */
-+ case 0x4e: /* Skylake M */
-+ case 0x55: /* Skylake X */
-+ case 0x5e: /* Skylake D */
-+ case 0x66: /* Cannonlake */
-+ case 0x67: /* Cannonlake? */
-+ case 0x8e: /* Kabylake M */
-+ case 0x9e: /* Kabylake D */
-+ cpu_has_bug_l1tf = true;
-+ l1d_maxphysaddr = 46;
-+ break;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Atom processors are not vulnerable.
-+ */
-+ case 0x1c: /* Pineview */
-+ case 0x26: /* Lincroft */
-+ case 0x27: /* Penwell */
-+ case 0x35: /* Cloverview */
-+ case 0x36: /* Cedarview */
-+ case 0x37: /* Baytrail / Valleyview (Silvermont) */
-+ case 0x4d: /* Avaton / Rangely (Silvermont) */
-+ case 0x4c: /* Cherrytrail / Brasswell */
-+ case 0x4a: /* Merrifield */
-+ case 0x5a: /* Moorefield */
-+ case 0x5c: /* Goldmont */
-+ case 0x5f: /* Denverton */
-+ case 0x7a: /* Gemini Lake */
-+ break;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Knights processors are not vulnerable.
-+ */
-+ case 0x57: /* Knights Landing */
-+ case 0x85: /* Knights Mill */
-+ break;
-+
-+ default:
-+ /* Defer printk() until we've accounted for RDCL_NO. */
-+ hit_default = true;
-+ cpu_has_bug_l1tf = true;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Any processor advertising RDCL_NO should be not vulnerable to L1TF. */
-+ if ( caps & ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO )
-+ cpu_has_bug_l1tf = false;
-+
-+ if ( cpu_has_bug_l1tf && hit_default )
-+ printk("Unrecognised CPU model %#x - assuming vulnerable to L1TF\n",
-+ boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * L1TF safe address heuristics. These apply to the real hardware we are
-+ * running on, and are best-effort-only if Xen is virtualised.
-+ *
-+ * The address mask which the L1D cache uses, which might be wider than
-+ * the CPUID-reported maxphysaddr.
-+ */
-+ l1tf_addr_mask = ((1ul << l1d_maxphysaddr) - 1) & PAGE_MASK;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * To be safe, l1tf_safe_maddr must be above the highest cacheable entity
-+ * in system physical address space. However, to preserve space for
-+ * paged-out metadata, it should be as low as possible above the highest
-+ * cacheable address, so as to require fewer high-order bits being set.
-+ *
-+ * These heuristics are based on some guesswork to improve the likelihood
-+ * of safety in the common case, including Linux's L1TF mitigation of
-+ * inverting all address bits in a non-present PTE.
-+ *
-+ * - If L1D is wider than CPUID (Nehalem and later mobile/desktop/low end
-+ * server), setting any address bit beyond CPUID maxphysaddr guarantees
-+ * to make the PTE safe. This case doesn't require all the high-order
-+ * bits being set, and doesn't require any other source of information
-+ * for safety.
-+ *
-+ * - If L1D is the same as CPUID (Pre-Nehalem, or high end server), we
-+ * must sacrifice high order bits from the real address space for
-+ * safety. Therefore, make a blind guess that there is nothing
-+ * cacheable in the top quarter of physical address space.
-+ *
-+ * It is exceedingly unlikely for machines to be populated with this
-+ * much RAM (likely 512G on pre-Nehalem, 16T on Nehalem/Westmere, 64T on
-+ * Sandybridge and later) due to the sheer volume of DIMMs this would
-+ * actually take.
-+ *
-+ * However, it is possible to find machines this large, so the "top
-+ * quarter" guess is supplemented to push the limit higher if references
-+ * to cacheable mappings (E820/SRAT/EFI/etc) are found above the top
-+ * quarter boundary.
-+ *
-+ * Finally, this top quarter guess gives us a good chance of being safe
-+ * when running virtualised (and the CPUID maxphysaddr hasn't been
-+ * levelled for heterogeneous migration safety), where the safety
-+ * consideration is still in terms of host details, but all E820/etc
-+ * information is in terms of guest physical layout.
-+ */
-+ l1tf_safe_maddr = max(l1tf_safe_maddr, ((l1d_maxphysaddr > paddr_bits)
-+ ? (1ul << paddr_bits)
-+ : (3ul << (paddr_bits - 2))));
-+}
-+
- int8_t __read_mostly opt_xpti = -1;
-
- static __init void xpti_init_default(uint64_t caps)
-@@ -633,6 +784,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
- else
- setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_NO_XPTI);
-
-+ l1tf_calculations(caps);
-+
- print_details(thunk, caps);
-
- /*
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/srat.c b/xen/arch/x86/srat.c
-index 166eb44fe2..2d70b45909 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/srat.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/srat.c
-@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
- #include <xen/pfn.h>
- #include <asm/e820.h>
- #include <asm/page.h>
-+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
-
- static struct acpi_table_slit *__read_mostly acpi_slit;
-
-@@ -284,6 +285,11 @@ acpi_numa_memory_affinity_init(const struct acpi_srat_mem_affinity *ma)
- if (!(ma->flags & ACPI_SRAT_MEM_ENABLED))
- return;
-
-+ start = ma->base_address;
-+ end = start + ma->length;
-+ /* Supplement the heuristics in l1tf_calculations(). */
-+ l1tf_safe_maddr = max(l1tf_safe_maddr, ROUNDUP(end, PAGE_SIZE));
-+
- if (num_node_memblks >= NR_NODE_MEMBLKS)
- {
- dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
-@@ -292,8 +298,6 @@ acpi_numa_memory_affinity_init(const struct acpi_srat_mem_affinity *ma)
- return;
- }
-
-- start = ma->base_address;
-- end = start + ma->length;
- pxm = ma->proximity_domain;
- if (srat_rev < 2)
- pxm &= 0xff;
-diff --git a/xen/common/efi/boot.c b/xen/common/efi/boot.c
-index 64d12685d3..6be0b3986f 100644
---- a/xen/common/efi/boot.c
-+++ b/xen/common/efi/boot.c
-@@ -1304,6 +1304,8 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable)
-
- #ifndef CONFIG_ARM /* TODO - runtime service support */
-
-+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
-+
- static bool __initdata efi_map_uc;
-
- static int __init parse_efi_param(const char *s)
-@@ -1419,6 +1421,16 @@ void __init efi_init_memory(void)
- desc->PhysicalStart, desc->PhysicalStart + len - 1,
- desc->Type, desc->Attribute);
-
-+ if ( (desc->Attribute & (EFI_MEMORY_WB | EFI_MEMORY_WT)) ||
-+ (efi_bs_revision >= EFI_REVISION(2, 5) &&
-+ (desc->Attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WP)) )
-+ {
-+ /* Supplement the heuristics in l1tf_calculations(). */
-+ l1tf_safe_maddr =
-+ max(l1tf_safe_maddr,
-+ ROUNDUP(desc->PhysicalStart + len, PAGE_SIZE));
-+ }
-+
- if ( !efi_enabled(EFI_RS) ||
- (!(desc->Attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) &&
- (!map_bs ||
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index fea82603ca..d7e8ed0f5f 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ extern int8_t opt_xpti;
- #define OPT_XPTI_DOM0 0x01
- #define OPT_XPTI_DOMU 0x02
-
-+/*
-+ * The L1D address mask, which might be wider than reported in CPUID, and the
-+ * system physical address above which there are believed to be no cacheable
-+ * memory regions, thus unable to leak data via the L1TF vulnerability.
-+ */
-+extern paddr_t l1tf_addr_mask, l1tf_safe_maddr;
-+
- static inline void init_shadow_spec_ctrl_state(void)
- {
- struct cpu_info *info = get_cpu_info();
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0033-x86-spec-ctrl-Introduce-an-option-to-control-L1TF-mi.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0033-x86-spec-ctrl-Introduce-an-option-to-control-L1TF-mi.patch
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-From 57483c09ef4fe9489ec4214989a97949916fecc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 13:46:10 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 33/42] x86/spec-ctrl: Introduce an option to control L1TF
- mitigation for PV guests
-
-Shadowing a PV guest is only available when shadow paging is compiled in.
-When shadow paging isn't available, guests can be crashed instead as
-mitigation from Xen's point of view.
-
-Ideally, dom0 would also be potentially-shadowed-by-default, but dom0 has
-never been shadowed before, and there are some stability issues under
-investigation.
-
-This is part of XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3620.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 66a4e986819a86ba66ca2fe9d925e62a4fd30114)
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 24 ++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h | 4 ++
- 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index e5e7fdc405..763cc1d878 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -1546,6 +1546,30 @@ do; there may be other custom operating systems which do. If you're
- certain you don't plan on having PV guests which use this feature,
- turning it off can reduce the attack surface.
-
-+### pv-l1tf (x86)
-+> `= List of [ <bool>, dom0=<bool>, domu=<bool> ]`
-+
-+> Default: `false` on believed-unaffected hardware, or in pv-shim mode.
-+> `domu` on believed-affected hardware.
-+
-+Mitigations for L1TF / XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3620 for PV guests.
-+
-+For backwards compatibility, we may not alter an architecturally-legitimate
-+pagetable entry a PV guest chooses to write. We can however force such a
-+guest into shadow mode so that Xen controls the PTEs which are reachable by
-+the CPU pagewalk.
-+
-+Shadowing is performed at the point where a PV guest first tries to write an
-+L1TF-vulnerable PTE. Therefore, a PV guest kernel which has been updated with
-+its own L1TF mitigations will not trigger shadow mode if it is well behaved.
-+
-+If CONFIG\_SHADOW\_PAGING is not compiled in, this mitigation instead crashes
-+the guest when an L1TF-vulnerable PTE is written, which still allows updated,
-+well-behaved PV guests to run, despite Shadow being compiled out.
-+
-+In the pv-shim case, Shadow is expected to be compiled out, and a malicious
-+guest kernel can only leak data from the shim Xen, rather than the host Xen.
-+
- ### pv-shim (x86)
- > `= <boolean>`
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
-index f64fc56739..cfba4a708c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
-@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ config SHADOW_PAGING
- * Running HVM guests on hardware lacking hardware paging support
- (First-generation Intel VT-x or AMD SVM).
- * Live migration of PV guests.
-+ * L1TF sidechannel mitigation for PV guests.
-
- Under a small number of specific workloads, shadow paging may be
- deliberately used as a performance optimisation.
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index fe15a58de0..7995e27218 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- #include <asm/microcode.h>
- #include <asm/msr.h>
- #include <asm/processor.h>
-+#include <asm/pv/shim.h>
- #include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
- #include <asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h>
-
-@@ -203,6 +204,55 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
- }
- custom_param("spec-ctrl", parse_spec_ctrl);
-
-+int8_t __read_mostly opt_pv_l1tf = -1;
-+
-+static __init int parse_pv_l1tf(const char *s)
-+{
-+ const char *ss;
-+ int val, rc = 0;
-+
-+ /* Inhibit the defaults as an explicit choice has been given. */
-+ if ( opt_pv_l1tf == -1 )
-+ opt_pv_l1tf = 0;
-+
-+ /* Interpret 'pv-l1tf' alone in its positive boolean form. */
-+ if ( *s == '\0' )
-+ opt_xpti = OPT_PV_L1TF_DOM0 | OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU;
-+
-+ do {
-+ ss = strchr(s, ',');
-+ if ( !ss )
-+ ss = strchr(s, '\0');
-+
-+ switch ( parse_bool(s, ss) )
-+ {
-+ case 0:
-+ opt_pv_l1tf = 0;
-+ break;
-+
-+ case 1:
-+ opt_pv_l1tf = OPT_PV_L1TF_DOM0 | OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU;
-+ break;
-+
-+ default:
-+ if ( (val = parse_boolean("dom0", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+ opt_pv_l1tf = ((opt_pv_l1tf & ~OPT_PV_L1TF_DOM0) |
-+ (val ? OPT_PV_L1TF_DOM0 : 0));
-+ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("domu", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+ opt_pv_l1tf = ((opt_pv_l1tf & ~OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU) |
-+ (val ? OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU : 0));
-+ else
-+ rc = -EINVAL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ s = ss + 1;
-+ } while ( *ss );
-+
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+custom_param("pv-l1tf", parse_pv_l1tf);
-+
- static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
- {
- unsigned int _7d0 = 0, e8b = 0, tmp;
-@@ -226,9 +276,16 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
- (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "",
- (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO) ? " SSB_NO" : "");
-
-- /* Compiled-in support which pertains to BTI mitigations. */
-- if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) )
-- printk(" Compiled-in support: INDIRECT_THUNK\n");
-+ /* Compiled-in support which pertains to mitigations. */
-+ if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING) )
-+ printk(" Compiled-in support:"
-+#ifdef CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK
-+ " INDIRECT_THUNK"
-+#endif
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING
-+ " SHADOW_PAGING"
-+#endif
-+ "\n");
-
- /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */
- printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s, Other:%s\n",
-@@ -242,6 +299,13 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
- (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ? " SSBD+" : " SSBD-",
- opt_ibpb ? " IBPB" : "");
-
-+ /* L1TF diagnostics, printed if vulnerable or PV shadowing is in use. */
-+ if ( cpu_has_bug_l1tf || opt_pv_l1tf )
-+ printk(" L1TF: believed%s vulnerable, maxphysaddr L1D %u, CPUID %u"
-+ ", Safe address %"PRIx64"\n",
-+ cpu_has_bug_l1tf ? "" : " not",
-+ l1d_maxphysaddr, paddr_bits, l1tf_safe_maddr);
-+
- /*
- * Alternatives blocks for protecting against and/or virtualising
- * mitigation support for guests.
-@@ -263,6 +327,10 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
- printk(" XPTI (64-bit PV only): Dom0 %s, DomU %s\n",
- opt_xpti & OPT_XPTI_DOM0 ? "enabled" : "disabled",
- opt_xpti & OPT_XPTI_DOMU ? "enabled" : "disabled");
-+
-+ printk(" PV L1TF shadowing: Dom0 %s, DomU %s\n",
-+ opt_pv_l1tf & OPT_PV_L1TF_DOM0 ? "enabled" : "disabled",
-+ opt_pv_l1tf & OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU ? "enabled" : "disabled");
- }
-
- /* Calculate whether Retpoline is known-safe on this CPU. */
-@@ -786,6 +854,21 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-
- l1tf_calculations(caps);
-
-+ /*
-+ * By default, enable PV domU L1TF mitigations on all L1TF-vulnerable
-+ * hardware, except when running in shim mode.
-+ *
-+ * In shim mode, SHADOW is expected to be compiled out, and a malicious
-+ * guest kernel can only attack the shim Xen, not the host Xen.
-+ */
-+ if ( opt_pv_l1tf == -1 )
-+ {
-+ if ( pv_shim || !cpu_has_bug_l1tf )
-+ opt_pv_l1tf = 0;
-+ else
-+ opt_pv_l1tf = OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU;
-+ }
-+
- print_details(thunk, caps);
-
- /*
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index d7e8ed0f5f..cdf5737dc2 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ extern int8_t opt_xpti;
- #define OPT_XPTI_DOM0 0x01
- #define OPT_XPTI_DOMU 0x02
-
-+extern int8_t opt_pv_l1tf;
-+#define OPT_PV_L1TF_DOM0 0x01
-+#define OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU 0x02
-+
- /*
- * The L1D address mask, which might be wider than reported in CPUID, and the
- * system physical address above which there are believed to be no cacheable
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0034-x86-shadow-Infrastructure-to-force-a-PV-guest-into-s.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0034-x86-shadow-Infrastructure-to-force-a-PV-guest-into-s.patch
@@ -1,277 +0,0 @@
-From 02d2c660935cfd6ff2438afb3892776dfc7db711 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 07:11:40 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 34/42] x86/shadow: Infrastructure to force a PV guest into
- shadow mode
-
-To mitigate L1TF, we cannot alter an architecturally-legitimate PTE a PV guest
-chooses to write, but we can force the PV domain into shadow mode so Xen
-controls the PTEs which are reachable by the CPU pagewalk.
-
-Introduce new shadow mode, PG_SH_forced, and a tasklet to perform the
-transition. Later patches will introduce the logic to enable this mode at the
-appropriate time.
-
-To simplify vcpu cleanup, make tasklet_kill() idempotent with respect to
-tasklet_init(), which involves adding a helper to check for an uninitialised
-list head.
-
-This is part of XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3620.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit b76ec3946bf6caca2c3950b857c008bc8db6723f)
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c | 2 ++
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c | 5 +++++
- xen/common/tasklet.c | 5 +++++
- xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 7 +++++++
- xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h | 4 ++++
- xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/include/xen/list.h | 5 +++++
- 8 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
-index 2b0445ffe9..dcee496eb0 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
-@@ -873,6 +873,8 @@ void paging_dump_domain_info(struct domain *d)
- printk(" paging assistance: ");
- if ( paging_mode_shadow(d) )
- printk("shadow ");
-+ if ( paging_mode_sh_forced(d) )
-+ printk("forced ");
- if ( paging_mode_hap(d) )
- printk("hap ");
- if ( paging_mode_refcounts(d) )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-index dd61b50eb7..fd42d734e7 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -3177,6 +3177,15 @@ static void sh_new_mode(struct domain *d, u32 new_mode)
- ASSERT(paging_locked_by_me(d));
- ASSERT(d != current->domain);
-
-+ /*
-+ * If PG_SH_forced has previously been activated because of writing an
-+ * L1TF-vulnerable PTE, it must remain active for the remaining lifetime
-+ * of the domain, even if the logdirty mode needs to be controlled for
-+ * migration purposes.
-+ */
-+ if ( paging_mode_sh_forced(d) )
-+ new_mode |= PG_SH_forced | PG_SH_enable;
-+
- d->arch.paging.mode = new_mode;
- for_each_vcpu(d, v)
- sh_update_paging_modes(v);
-@@ -4057,6 +4066,33 @@ void shadow_audit_tables(struct vcpu *v)
-
- #endif /* Shadow audit */
-
-+#ifdef CONFIG_PV
-+
-+void pv_l1tf_tasklet(unsigned long data)
-+{
-+ struct domain *d = (void *)data;
-+
-+ domain_pause(d);
-+ paging_lock(d);
-+
-+ if ( !paging_mode_sh_forced(d) && !d->is_dying )
-+ {
-+ int ret = shadow_one_bit_enable(d, PG_SH_forced);
-+
-+ if ( ret )
-+ {
-+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "d%d Failed to enable PG_SH_forced: %d\n",
-+ d->domain_id, ret);
-+ domain_crash(d);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ paging_unlock(d);
-+ domain_unpause(d);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* CONFIG_PV */
-+
- /*
- * Local variables:
- * mode: C
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
-index a4f0bd239d..3230ac6a22 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
-@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
- #include <asm/invpcid.h>
- #include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
- #include <asm/pv/domain.h>
-+#include <asm/shadow.h>
-
- static __read_mostly enum {
- PCID_OFF,
-@@ -209,6 +210,8 @@ int pv_vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
-
- void pv_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
- {
-+ pv_l1tf_domain_destroy(d);
-+
- destroy_perdomain_mapping(d, GDT_LDT_VIRT_START,
- GDT_LDT_MBYTES << (20 - PAGE_SHIFT));
-
-@@ -229,6 +232,8 @@ int pv_domain_initialise(struct domain *d)
- };
- int rc = -ENOMEM;
-
-+ pv_l1tf_domain_init(d);
-+
- d->arch.pv_domain.gdt_ldt_l1tab =
- alloc_xenheap_pages(0, MEMF_node(domain_to_node(d)));
- if ( !d->arch.pv_domain.gdt_ldt_l1tab )
-diff --git a/xen/common/tasklet.c b/xen/common/tasklet.c
-index 0f0a6f8365..d4fea3151c 100644
---- a/xen/common/tasklet.c
-+++ b/xen/common/tasklet.c
-@@ -156,6 +156,10 @@ void tasklet_kill(struct tasklet *t)
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&tasklet_lock, flags);
-
-+ /* Cope with uninitialised tasklets. */
-+ if ( list_head_is_null(&t->list) )
-+ goto unlock;
-+
- if ( !list_empty(&t->list) )
- {
- BUG_ON(t->is_dead || t->is_running || (t->scheduled_on < 0));
-@@ -172,6 +176,7 @@ void tasklet_kill(struct tasklet *t)
- spin_lock_irqsave(&tasklet_lock, flags);
- }
-
-+ unlock:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklet_lock, flags);
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-index e0d413c7de..61e6900465 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-@@ -121,6 +121,11 @@ struct shadow_domain {
-
- /* Has this domain ever used HVMOP_pagetable_dying? */
- bool_t pagetable_dying_op;
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_PV
-+ /* PV L1 Terminal Fault mitigation. */
-+ struct tasklet pv_l1tf_tasklet;
-+#endif /* CONFIG_PV */
- #endif
- };
-
-@@ -257,6 +262,8 @@ struct pv_domain
- bool xpti;
- /* Use PCID feature? */
- bool pcid;
-+ /* Mitigate L1TF with shadow/crashing? */
-+ bool check_l1tf;
-
- /* map_domain_page() mapping cache. */
- struct mapcache_domain mapcache;
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
-index f0085511c7..f440e3e53c 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
-@@ -37,11 +37,14 @@
-
- #define PG_SH_shift 20
- #define PG_HAP_shift 21
-+#define PG_SHF_shift 22
- /* We're in one of the shadow modes */
- #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING
- #define PG_SH_enable (1U << PG_SH_shift)
-+#define PG_SH_forced (1U << PG_SHF_shift)
- #else
- #define PG_SH_enable 0
-+#define PG_SH_forced 0
- #endif
- #define PG_HAP_enable (1U << PG_HAP_shift)
-
-@@ -62,6 +65,7 @@
-
- #define paging_mode_enabled(_d) (!!(_d)->arch.paging.mode)
- #define paging_mode_shadow(_d) (!!((_d)->arch.paging.mode & PG_SH_enable))
-+#define paging_mode_sh_forced(_d) (!!((_d)->arch.paging.mode & PG_SH_forced))
- #define paging_mode_hap(_d) (!!((_d)->arch.paging.mode & PG_HAP_enable))
-
- #define paging_mode_refcounts(_d) (!!((_d)->arch.paging.mode & PG_refcounts))
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
-index 94a34fd16a..14afb7db52 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
- #include <asm/flushtlb.h>
- #include <asm/paging.h>
- #include <asm/p2m.h>
-+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
-
- /*****************************************************************************
- * Macros to tell which shadow paging mode a domain is in*/
-@@ -115,6 +116,37 @@ static inline int shadow_domctl(struct domain *d,
-
- #endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING */
-
-+/*
-+ * Mitigations for L1TF / CVE-2018-3620 for PV guests.
-+ *
-+ * We cannot alter an architecturally-legitimate PTE which a PV guest has
-+ * chosen to write, as traditional paged-out metadata is L1TF-vulnerable.
-+ * What we can do is force a PV guest which writes a vulnerable PTE into
-+ * shadow mode, so Xen controls the pagetables which are reachable by the CPU
-+ * pagewalk.
-+ */
-+
-+void pv_l1tf_tasklet(unsigned long data);
-+
-+static inline void pv_l1tf_domain_init(struct domain *d)
-+{
-+ d->arch.pv_domain.check_l1tf =
-+ opt_pv_l1tf & (is_hardware_domain(d)
-+ ? OPT_PV_L1TF_DOM0 : OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU);
-+
-+#if defined(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING) && defined(CONFIG_PV)
-+ tasklet_init(&d->arch.paging.shadow.pv_l1tf_tasklet,
-+ pv_l1tf_tasklet, (unsigned long)d);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+static inline void pv_l1tf_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
-+{
-+#if defined(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING) && defined(CONFIG_PV)
-+ tasklet_kill(&d->arch.paging.shadow.pv_l1tf_tasklet);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- /* Remove all shadows of the guest mfn. */
- static inline void shadow_remove_all_shadows(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn)
- {
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/list.h b/xen/include/xen/list.h
-index fa07d720ee..1387abb211 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/list.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/list.h
-@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@ static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list)
- list->prev = list;
- }
-
-+static inline bool list_head_is_null(const struct list_head *list)
-+{
-+ return !list->next && !list->prev;
-+}
-+
- /*
- * Insert a new entry between two known consecutive entries.
- *
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0035-x86-mm-Plumbing-to-allow-any-PTE-update-to-fail-with.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0035-x86-mm-Plumbing-to-allow-any-PTE-update-to-fail-with.patch
@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-From f4a049ede7ee9e1fafad6248cffc5e6deac1bc39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 08:11:40 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 35/42] x86/mm: Plumbing to allow any PTE update to fail with
- -ERESTART
-
-Switching to shadow mode is performed in tasklet context. To facilitate this,
-we schedule the tasklet, then create a hypercall continuation to allow the
-switch to take place.
-
-As a consequence, the x86 mm code needs to cope with an L1e operation being
-continuable. do_mmu{,ext}_op() may no longer assert that a continuation
-doesn't happen on the final iteration.
-
-To handle the arguments correctly on continuation, compat_update_va_mapping*()
-may no longer call into their non-compat counterparts. Move the compat
-functions into mm.c rather than exporting __do_update_va_mapping() and
-{get,put}_pg_owner(), and fix an unsigned long/int inconsistency with
-compat_update_va_mapping_otherdomain().
-
-This is part of XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3620.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit c612481d1c9232c6abf91b03ec655e92f808805f)
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c | 13 ------
- xen/include/asm-x86/hypercall.h | 2 +-
- 3 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index bcf46c0743..657af50c4c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -613,6 +613,9 @@ static int alloc_segdesc_page(struct page_info *page)
- return i == 512 ? 0 : -EINVAL;
- }
-
-+static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-+ bool preemptible);
-+
- static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
- mfn_t mfn, unsigned long type, struct domain *d,
- int partial, int preemptible)
-@@ -624,9 +627,7 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
- unlikely(!get_page_from_mfn(mfn, d)) )
- return -EINVAL;
-
-- rc = (preemptible ?
-- get_page_type_preemptible(page, type) :
-- (get_page_type(page, type) ? 0 : -EINVAL));
-+ rc = _get_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
-
- if ( unlikely(rc) && partial >= 0 &&
- (!preemptible || page != current->arch.old_guest_table) )
-@@ -1456,8 +1457,7 @@ static int create_pae_xen_mappings(struct domain *d, l3_pgentry_t *pl3e)
- return 1;
- }
-
--static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-- int preemptible)
-+static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
- {
- struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
- unsigned long pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-@@ -1469,8 +1469,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-
- for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; i++ )
- {
-- if ( preemptible && i > page->nr_validated_ptes
-- && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-+ if ( i > page->nr_validated_ptes && hypercall_preempt_check() )
- {
- page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
- rc = -ERESTART;
-@@ -1481,6 +1480,12 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- (rc = get_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn, d)) > 0 )
- continue;
-
-+ if ( unlikely(rc == -ERESTART) )
-+ {
-+ page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
- if ( rc < 0 )
- {
- gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Failure in alloc_l2_table: slot %#x\n", i);
-@@ -1763,7 +1768,7 @@ static void free_l1_table(struct page_info *page)
- }
-
-
--static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page, int preemptible)
-+static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page)
- {
- struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
- unsigned long pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-@@ -1777,7 +1782,7 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page, int preemptible)
- do {
- if ( is_guest_l2_slot(d, page->u.inuse.type_info, i) &&
- put_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn) == 0 &&
-- preemptible && i && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-+ i && hypercall_preempt_check() )
- {
- page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
- err = -ERESTART;
-@@ -2373,7 +2378,8 @@ static int alloc_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- rc = alloc_l1_table(page);
- break;
- case PGT_l2_page_table:
-- rc = alloc_l2_table(page, type, preemptible);
-+ ASSERT(preemptible);
-+ rc = alloc_l2_table(page, type);
- break;
- case PGT_l3_page_table:
- ASSERT(preemptible);
-@@ -2463,7 +2469,8 @@ int free_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- rc = 0;
- break;
- case PGT_l2_page_table:
-- rc = free_l2_table(page, preemptible);
-+ ASSERT(preemptible);
-+ rc = free_l2_table(page);
- break;
- case PGT_l3_page_table:
- ASSERT(preemptible);
-@@ -3550,12 +3557,9 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
- }
-
- if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-- {
-- ASSERT(i < count);
- rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
- __HYPERVISOR_mmuext_op, "hihi",
- uops, (count - i) | MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, pdone, foreigndom);
-- }
- else if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table )
- {
- XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) null;
-@@ -3861,12 +3865,9 @@ long do_mmu_update(
- }
-
- if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-- {
-- ASSERT(i < count);
- rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
- __HYPERVISOR_mmu_update, "hihi",
- ureqs, (count - i) | MMU_UPDATE_PREEMPTED, pdone, foreigndom);
-- }
- else if ( curr->arch.old_guest_table )
- {
- XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) null;
-@@ -4121,7 +4122,13 @@ static int __do_update_va_mapping(
- long do_update_va_mapping(unsigned long va, u64 val64,
- unsigned long flags)
- {
-- return __do_update_va_mapping(va, val64, flags, current->domain);
-+ int rc = __do_update_va_mapping(va, val64, flags, current->domain);
-+
-+ if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
-+ __HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping, "lll", va, val64, flags);
-+
-+ return rc;
- }
-
- long do_update_va_mapping_otherdomain(unsigned long va, u64 val64,
-@@ -4138,6 +4145,46 @@ long do_update_va_mapping_otherdomain(unsigned long va, u64 val64,
-
- put_pg_owner(pg_owner);
-
-+ if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
-+ __HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping_otherdomain,
-+ "llli", va, val64, flags, domid);
-+
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+
-+int compat_update_va_mapping(unsigned int va, uint32_t lo, uint32_t hi,
-+ unsigned int flags)
-+{
-+ int rc = __do_update_va_mapping(va, ((uint64_t)hi << 32) | lo,
-+ flags, current->domain);
-+
-+ if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
-+ __HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping, "iiii", va, lo, hi, flags);
-+
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+
-+int compat_update_va_mapping_otherdomain(unsigned int va,
-+ uint32_t lo, uint32_t hi,
-+ unsigned int flags, domid_t domid)
-+{
-+ struct domain *pg_owner;
-+ int rc;
-+
-+ if ( (pg_owner = get_pg_owner(domid)) == NULL )
-+ return -ESRCH;
-+
-+ rc = __do_update_va_mapping(va, ((uint64_t)hi << 32) | lo, flags, pg_owner);
-+
-+ put_pg_owner(pg_owner);
-+
-+ if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-+ rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
-+ __HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping_otherdomain,
-+ "iiiii", va, lo, hi, flags, domid);
-+
- return rc;
- }
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
-index c2aa6f2fdb..02bc75b91e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
-@@ -163,19 +163,6 @@ int compat_arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
- return rc;
- }
-
--int compat_update_va_mapping(unsigned int va, u32 lo, u32 hi,
-- unsigned int flags)
--{
-- return do_update_va_mapping(va, lo | ((u64)hi << 32), flags);
--}
--
--int compat_update_va_mapping_otherdomain(unsigned long va, u32 lo, u32 hi,
-- unsigned long flags,
-- domid_t domid)
--{
-- return do_update_va_mapping_otherdomain(va, lo | ((u64)hi << 32), flags, domid);
--}
--
- DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mmuext_op_compat_t);
-
- int compat_mmuext_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg,
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hypercall.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hypercall.h
-index 1cc2e37d5c..da38b7991c 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hypercall.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hypercall.h
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ extern int compat_update_va_mapping(
- unsigned int va, u32 lo, u32 hi, unsigned int flags);
-
- extern int compat_update_va_mapping_otherdomain(
-- unsigned long va, u32 lo, u32 hi, unsigned long flags, domid_t domid);
-+ unsigned int va, u32 lo, u32 hi, unsigned int flags, domid_t domid);
-
- DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(trap_info_compat_t);
- extern int compat_set_trap_table(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(trap_info_compat_t) traps);
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0036-x86-pv-Force-a-guest-into-shadow-mode-when-it-writes.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0036-x86-pv-Force-a-guest-into-shadow-mode-when-it-writes.patch
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
-From 665e7685b4f5a683101ef833c45415e2548d873f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 08:11:40 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 36/42] x86/pv: Force a guest into shadow mode when it writes
- an L1TF-vulnerable PTE
-
-See the comment in shadow.h for an explanation of L1TF and the safety
-consideration of the PTEs.
-
-In the case that CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING isn't compiled in, crash the domain
-instead. This allows well-behaved PV guests to function, while preventing
-L1TF from being exploited. (Note: PV guest kernels which haven't been updated
-with L1TF mitigations will likely be crashed as soon as they try paging a
-piece of userspace out to disk.)
-
-This is part of XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3620.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 06e8b622d3f3c0fa5075e91b041c6f45549ad70a)
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 22 ++++++--
- xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c | 5 ++
- xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/include/xen/tasklet.h | 5 ++
- 4 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 657af50c4c..7d4871b791 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ get_page_from_l2e(
- int rc;
-
- if ( !(l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-- return 1;
-+ return pv_l1tf_check_l2e(d, l2e) ? -ERESTART : 1;
-
- if ( unlikely((l2e_get_flags(l2e) & L2_DISALLOW_MASK)) )
- {
-@@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ get_page_from_l3e(
- int rc;
-
- if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-- return 1;
-+ return pv_l1tf_check_l3e(d, l3e) ? -ERESTART : 1;
-
- if ( unlikely((l3e_get_flags(l3e) & l3_disallow_mask(d))) )
- {
-@@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
- int rc;
-
- if ( !(l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-- return 1;
-+ return pv_l1tf_check_l4e(d, l4e) ? -ERESTART : 1;
-
- if ( unlikely((l4e_get_flags(l4e) & L4_DISALLOW_MASK)) )
- {
-@@ -1390,6 +1390,13 @@ static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_info *page)
-
- for ( i = 0; i < L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; i++ )
- {
-+ if ( !(l1e_get_flags(pl1e[i]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+ {
-+ ret = pv_l1tf_check_l1e(d, pl1e[i]) ? -ERESTART : 0;
-+ if ( ret )
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
- switch ( ret = get_page_from_l1e(pl1e[i], d, d) )
- {
- default:
-@@ -1410,6 +1417,7 @@ static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_info *page)
-
- fail:
- gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Failure in alloc_l1_table: slot %#x\n", i);
-+ out:
- while ( i-- > 0 )
- put_page_from_l1e(pl1e[i], d);
-
-@@ -2060,6 +2068,8 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e,
- rc = -EBUSY;
- }
- }
-+ else if ( pv_l1tf_check_l1e(pt_dom, nl1e) )
-+ return -ERESTART;
- else if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu,
- preserve_ad)) )
- {
-@@ -2123,6 +2133,8 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e,
- rc = -EBUSY;
- }
- }
-+ else if ( pv_l1tf_check_l2e(d, nl2e) )
-+ return -ERESTART;
- else if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu,
- preserve_ad)) )
- {
-@@ -2184,6 +2196,8 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e,
- rc = -EFAULT;
- }
- }
-+ else if ( pv_l1tf_check_l3e(d, nl3e) )
-+ return -ERESTART;
- else if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l3, pl3e, ol3e, nl3e, pfn, vcpu,
- preserve_ad)) )
- {
-@@ -2249,6 +2263,8 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e,
- rc = -EFAULT;
- }
- }
-+ else if ( pv_l1tf_check_l4e(d, nl4e) )
-+ return -ERESTART;
- else if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l4, pl4e, ol4e, nl4e, pfn, vcpu,
- preserve_ad)) )
- {
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c
-index aa8d5a7556..a3c0c2dd19 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
- #include <asm/mm.h>
- #include <asm/pci.h>
- #include <asm/pv/mm.h>
-+#include <asm/shadow.h>
-
- #include "emulate.h"
- #include "mm.h"
-@@ -129,6 +130,10 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update(unsigned long addr, intpte_t *p_old,
-
- /* Check the new PTE. */
- nl1e = l1e_from_intpte(val);
-+
-+ if ( !(l1e_get_flags(nl1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) && pv_l1tf_check_l1e(d, nl1e) )
-+ return X86EMUL_RETRY;
-+
- switch ( ret = get_page_from_l1e(nl1e, d, d) )
- {
- default:
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
-index 14afb7db52..f40f411871 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
-@@ -124,8 +124,102 @@ static inline int shadow_domctl(struct domain *d,
- * What we can do is force a PV guest which writes a vulnerable PTE into
- * shadow mode, so Xen controls the pagetables which are reachable by the CPU
- * pagewalk.
-+ *
-+ * The core of the L1TF vulnerability is that the address bits of the PTE
-+ * (accounting for PSE and factoring in the level-relevant part of the linear
-+ * access) are sent for an L1D lookup (to retrieve the next-level PTE, or
-+ * eventual memory address) before the Present or reserved bits (which would
-+ * cause a terminal fault) are accounted for. If an L1D hit occurs, the
-+ * resulting data is available for potentially dependent instructions.
-+ *
-+ * For Present PTEs, the PV type-count safety logic ensures that the address
-+ * bits always point at a guest-accessible frame, which is safe WRT L1TF from
-+ * Xen's point of view. In practice, a PV guest should be unable to set any
-+ * reserved bits, so should be unable to create any present L1TF-vulnerable
-+ * PTEs at all.
-+ *
-+ * Therefore, these safety checks apply to Not-Present PTEs only, where
-+ * traditionally, Xen would have let the guest write any value it chose.
-+ *
-+ * The all-zero PTE potentially leaks mfn 0. All software on the system is
-+ * expected to cooperate and not put any secrets there. In a Xen system,
-+ * neither Xen nor dom0 are expected to touch mfn 0, as it typically contains
-+ * the real mode IVT and Bios Data Area. Therefore, mfn 0 is considered safe.
-+ *
-+ * Any PTE whose address is higher than the maximum cacheable address is safe,
-+ * as it won't get an L1D hit.
-+ *
-+ * Speculative superpages also need accounting for, as PSE is considered
-+ * irrespective of Present. We disallow PSE being set, as it allows an
-+ * attacker to leak 2M or 1G of data starting from mfn 0. Also, because of
-+ * recursive/linear pagetables, we must consider PSE even at L4, as hardware
-+ * will interpret an L4e as an L3e during a recursive walk.
- */
-
-+static inline bool is_l1tf_safe_maddr(intpte_t pte)
-+{
-+ paddr_t maddr = pte & l1tf_addr_mask;
-+
-+ return maddr == 0 || maddr >= l1tf_safe_maddr;
-+}
-+
-+static inline bool pv_l1tf_check_pte(struct domain *d, unsigned int level,
-+ intpte_t pte)
-+{
-+ ASSERT(is_pv_domain(d));
-+ ASSERT(!(pte & _PAGE_PRESENT));
-+
-+ if ( d->arch.pv_domain.check_l1tf && !paging_mode_sh_forced(d) &&
-+ (((level > 1) && (pte & _PAGE_PSE)) || !is_l1tf_safe_maddr(pte)) )
-+ {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING
-+ struct tasklet *t = &d->arch.paging.shadow.pv_l1tf_tasklet;
-+
-+ printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
-+ "d%d L1TF-vulnerable L%ue %016"PRIx64" - Shadowing\n",
-+ d->domain_id, level, pte);
-+ /*
-+ * Safety consideration for accessing tasklet.scheduled_on without the
-+ * tasklet lock. This is a singleshot tasklet with the side effect of
-+ * setting PG_SH_forced (checked just above). Multiple vcpus can race
-+ * to schedule the tasklet, but if we observe it scheduled anywhere,
-+ * that is good enough.
-+ */
-+ smp_rmb();
-+ if ( !tasklet_is_scheduled(t) )
-+ tasklet_schedule(t);
-+#else
-+ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
-+ "d%d L1TF-vulnerable L%ue %016"PRIx64" - Crashing\n",
-+ d->domain_id, level, pte);
-+ domain_crash(d);
-+#endif
-+ return true;
-+ }
-+
-+ return false;
-+}
-+
-+static inline bool pv_l1tf_check_l1e(struct domain *d, l1_pgentry_t l1e)
-+{
-+ return pv_l1tf_check_pte(d, 1, l1e.l1);
-+}
-+
-+static inline bool pv_l1tf_check_l2e(struct domain *d, l2_pgentry_t l2e)
-+{
-+ return pv_l1tf_check_pte(d, 2, l2e.l2);
-+}
-+
-+static inline bool pv_l1tf_check_l3e(struct domain *d, l3_pgentry_t l3e)
-+{
-+ return pv_l1tf_check_pte(d, 3, l3e.l3);
-+}
-+
-+static inline bool pv_l1tf_check_l4e(struct domain *d, l4_pgentry_t l4e)
-+{
-+ return pv_l1tf_check_pte(d, 4, l4e.l4);
-+}
-+
- void pv_l1tf_tasklet(unsigned long data);
-
- static inline void pv_l1tf_domain_init(struct domain *d)
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/tasklet.h b/xen/include/xen/tasklet.h
-index 23d69c738e..bc9ddace6d 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/tasklet.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/tasklet.h
-@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ static inline bool tasklet_work_to_do(unsigned int cpu)
- TASKLET_scheduled);
- }
-
-+static inline bool tasklet_is_scheduled(const struct tasklet *t)
-+{
-+ return t->scheduled_on != -1;
-+}
-+
- void tasklet_schedule_on_cpu(struct tasklet *t, unsigned int cpu);
- void tasklet_schedule(struct tasklet *t);
- void do_tasklet(void);
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0037-x86-spec-ctrl-CPUID-MSR-definitions-for-L1D_FLUSH.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0037-x86-spec-ctrl-CPUID-MSR-definitions-for-L1D_FLUSH.patch
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-From fb78137bb82d3d8bcac36430b8bc331008ee3826 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 15:21:39 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 37/42] x86/spec-ctrl: CPUID/MSR definitions for L1D_FLUSH
-
-This is part of XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3646.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 3563fc2b2731a63fd7e8372ab0f5cef205bf8477)
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 8 ++++----
- tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c | 1 +
- tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c | 2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 5 +++++
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 4 +++-
- xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 4 ++++
- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 1 +
- 7 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index 763cc1d878..158b5bb919 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -489,10 +489,10 @@ accounting for hardware capabilities as enumerated via CPUID.
-
- Currently accepted:
-
--The Speculation Control hardware features `ibrsb`, `stibp`, `ibpb`, `ssbd` are
--used by default if available and applicable. They can be ignored,
--e.g. `no-ibrsb`, at which point Xen won't use them itself, and won't offer
--them to guests.
-+The Speculation Control hardware features `ibrsb`, `stibp`, `ibpb`,
-+`l1d-flush` and `ssbd` are used by default if available and applicable. They can
-+be ignored, e.g. `no-ibrsb`, at which point Xen won't use them itself, and
-+won't offer them to guests.
-
- ### cpuid\_mask\_cpu (AMD only)
- > `= fam_0f_rev_c | fam_0f_rev_d | fam_0f_rev_e | fam_0f_rev_f | fam_0f_rev_g | fam_10_rev_b | fam_10_rev_c | fam_11_rev_b`
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c
-index 7b0f594c3d..52e16c20ed 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c
-@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ int libxl_cpuid_parse_config(libxl_cpuid_policy_list *cpuid, const char* str)
- {"avx512-4fmaps",0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 3, 1},
- {"ibrsb", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 26, 1},
- {"stibp", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 27, 1},
-+ {"l1d-flush", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 28, 1},
- {"arch-caps", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 29, 1},
- {"ssbd", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 31, 1},
-
-diff --git a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
-index e116339733..3888b4e158 100644
---- a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
-+++ b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
-@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static const char *str_7d0[32] =
- [ 2] = "avx512_4vnniw", [ 3] = "avx512_4fmaps",
-
- [26] = "ibrsb", [27] = "stibp",
-- /* 28 */ [29] = "arch_caps",
-+ [28] = "l1d_flush", [29] = "arch_caps",
- /* 30 */ [31] = "ssbd",
- };
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
-index beee47d0ed..5cc89e2b34 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
-@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ static int __init parse_xen_cpuid(const char *s)
- if ( !val )
- setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
- }
-+ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("l1d-flush", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+ {
-+ if ( !val )
-+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH);
-+ }
- else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ssbd", s, ss)) >= 0 )
- {
- if ( !val )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 7995e27218..9bcc2b6adc 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -266,14 +266,16 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
- printk("Speculative mitigation facilities:\n");
-
- /* Hardware features which pertain to speculative mitigations. */
-- printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-+ printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
- (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBRS/IBPB" : "",
- (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) ? " STIBP" : "",
-+ (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH)) ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "",
- (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)) ? " SSBD" : "",
- (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) ? " IBPB" : "",
- (caps & ARCH_CAPABILITIES_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL" : "",
- (caps & ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO) ? " RDCL_NO" : "",
- (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "",
-+ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) ? " SKIP_L1DFL": "",
- (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO) ? " SSB_NO" : "");
-
- /* Compiled-in support which pertains to mitigations. */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index 8fbccc88a7..7235623c86 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -47,8 +47,12 @@
- #define ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
- #define ARCH_CAPABILITIES_IBRS_ALL (_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
- #define ARCH_CAPS_RSBA (_AC(1, ULL) << 2)
-+#define ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL (_AC(1, ULL) << 3)
- #define ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 4)
-
-+#define MSR_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
-+#define FLUSH_CMD_L1D (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
-+
- /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
- #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
- #define MSR_IA32_A_PERFCTR0 0x000004c1
-diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-index f1a5ed93e0..9f4c8246a9 100644
---- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4VNNIW, 9*32+ 2) /*A AVX512 Neural Network Instructions *
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4FMAPS, 9*32+ 3) /*A AVX512 Multiply Accumulation Single Precision */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBRSB, 9*32+26) /*A IBRS and IBPB support (used by Intel) */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(STIBP, 9*32+27) /*A STIBP */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(L1D_FLUSH, 9*32+28) /* MSR_FLUSH_CMD and L1D flush. */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(ARCH_CAPS, 9*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSBD, 9*32+31) /*A MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0038-x86-msr-Virtualise-MSR_FLUSH_CMD-for-guests.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0038-x86-msr-Virtualise-MSR_FLUSH_CMD-for-guests.patch
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-From 007752fb9b85b9235fe2820677988c6408c583da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 15:34:01 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 38/42] x86/msr: Virtualise MSR_FLUSH_CMD for guests
-
-Guests (outside of the nested virt case, which isn't supported yet) don't need
-L1D_FLUSH for their L1TF mitigations, but offering/emulating MSR_FLUSH_CMD is
-easy and doesn't pose an issue for Xen.
-
-The MSR is offered to HVM guests only. PV guests attempting to use it would
-trap for emulation, and the L1D cache would fill long before the return to
-guest context. As such, PV guests can't make any use of the L1D_FLUSH
-functionality.
-
-This is part of XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3646.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit fd9823faf9df057a69a9a53c2e100691d3f4267c)
----
- xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 3 ++-
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 ++++++
- xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 2 +-
- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-index fa82b6744e..dd91038a67 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ static int update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
- */
- call_policy_changed = (is_hvm_domain(d) &&
- ((old_7d0 ^ p->feat.raw[0].d) &
-- cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)));
-+ (cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) |
-+ cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH))));
- break;
-
- case 0xa:
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index c7cf3a8fbc..b0fababede 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ static void vmx_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)
- vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_PRED_CMD, VMX_MSR_RW);
- else
- vmx_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_PRED_CMD, VMX_MSR_RW);
-+
-+ /* MSR_FLUSH_CMD is safe to pass through if the guest knows about it. */
-+ if ( cp->feat.l1d_flush )
-+ vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_FLUSH_CMD, VMX_MSR_RW);
-+ else
-+ vmx_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_FLUSH_CMD, VMX_MSR_RW);
- }
-
- int vmx_guest_x86_mode(struct vcpu *v)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-index 1e12ccb729..1a591dd2b5 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
- case MSR_AMD_PATCHLOADER:
- case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
- case MSR_PRED_CMD:
-+ case MSR_FLUSH_CMD:
- /* Write-only */
- goto gp_fault;
-
-@@ -254,6 +255,17 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
- wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, val);
- break;
-
-+ case MSR_FLUSH_CMD:
-+ if ( !cp->feat.l1d_flush )
-+ goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
-+
-+ if ( val & ~FLUSH_CMD_L1D )
-+ goto gp_fault; /* Rsvd bit set? */
-+
-+ if ( v == curr )
-+ wrmsrl(MSR_FLUSH_CMD, val);
-+ break;
-+
- case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
- {
- bool old_cpuid_faulting = vp->misc_features_enables.cpuid_faulting;
-diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-index 9f4c8246a9..6c82816fd3 100644
---- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4VNNIW, 9*32+ 2) /*A AVX512 Neural Network Instructions *
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4FMAPS, 9*32+ 3) /*A AVX512 Multiply Accumulation Single Precision */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBRSB, 9*32+26) /*A IBRS and IBPB support (used by Intel) */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(STIBP, 9*32+27) /*A STIBP */
--XEN_CPUFEATURE(L1D_FLUSH, 9*32+28) /* MSR_FLUSH_CMD and L1D flush. */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(L1D_FLUSH, 9*32+28) /*S MSR_FLUSH_CMD and L1D flush. */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(ARCH_CAPS, 9*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSBD, 9*32+31) /*A MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0039-x86-spec-ctrl-Introduce-an-option-to-control-L1D_FLU.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0039-x86-spec-ctrl-Introduce-an-option-to-control-L1D_FLU.patch
@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-From 2a47c7550910f5d591ca0de369234f8c18daa2d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 18:44:16 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 39/42] x86/spec-ctrl: Introduce an option to control L1D_FLUSH
- for HVM HAP guests
-
-This mitigation requires up-to-date microcode, and is enabled by default on
-affected hardware if available, and is used for HVM guests
-
-The default for SMT/Hyperthreading is far more complicated to reason about,
-not least because we don't know if the user is going to want to run any HVM
-guests to begin with. If a explicit default isn't given, nag the user to
-perform a risk assessment and choose an explicit default, and leave other
-configuration to the toolstack.
-
-This is part of XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3620.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 3bd36952dab60290f33d6791070b57920e10754b)
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 9 ++++++-
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 5 ++++
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h | 1 +
- 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index 158b5bb919..57ef18194a 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -1791,7 +1791,8 @@ false disable the quirk workaround, which is also the default.
-
- ### spec-ctrl (x86)
- > `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb}=<bool>,
--> bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,eager-fpu}=<bool> ]`
-+> bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,eager-fpu,
-+> l1d-flush}=<bool> ]`
-
- Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations. By default, Xen
- will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support,
-@@ -1846,6 +1847,12 @@ from using fully eager FPU context switches. This is currently implemented as
- a global control. By default, Xen will choose to use fully eager context
- switches on hardware believed to speculate past #NM exceptions.
-
-+On hardware supporting L1D_FLUSH, the `l1d-flush=` option can be used to force
-+or prevent Xen from issuing an L1 data cache flush on each VMEntry.
-+Irrespective of Xen's setting, the feature is virtualised for HVM guests to
-+use. By default, Xen will enable this mitigation on hardware believed to be
-+vulnerable to L1TF.
-+
- ### sync\_console
- > `= <boolean>`
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index 30a33dd0bd..2ba0c40808 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- #include <asm/flushtlb.h>
- #include <asm/monitor.h>
- #include <asm/shadow.h>
-+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
- #include <asm/tboot.h>
- #include <asm/apic.h>
-
-@@ -1274,6 +1275,10 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
-
- vmx_vlapic_msr_changed(v);
-
-+ if ( opt_l1d_flush && paging_mode_hap(d) )
-+ rc = vmx_add_msr(v, MSR_FLUSH_CMD, FLUSH_CMD_L1D,
-+ VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY);
-+
- out:
- vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 9bcc2b6adc..59baebb959 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -19,11 +19,13 @@
- #include <xen/errno.h>
- #include <xen/init.h>
- #include <xen/lib.h>
-+#include <xen/warning.h>
-
- #include <asm/microcode.h>
- #include <asm/msr.h>
- #include <asm/processor.h>
- #include <asm/pv/shim.h>
-+#include <asm/setup.h>
- #include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
- #include <asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h>
-
-@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ static int8_t __initdata opt_ibrs = -1;
- bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb = true;
- bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd = false;
- int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1;
-+int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1;
-
- bool __initdata bsp_delay_spec_ctrl;
- uint8_t __read_mostly default_xen_spec_ctrl;
-@@ -139,6 +142,7 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
- opt_ibrs = 0;
- opt_ibpb = false;
- opt_ssbd = false;
-+ opt_l1d_flush = 0;
- }
- else if ( val > 0 )
- rc = -EINVAL;
-@@ -194,6 +198,8 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
- opt_ssbd = val;
- else if ( (val = parse_boolean("eager-fpu", s, ss)) >= 0 )
- opt_eager_fpu = val;
-+ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("l1d-flush", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+ opt_l1d_flush = val;
- else
- rc = -EINVAL;
-
-@@ -290,7 +296,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
- "\n");
-
- /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */
-- printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s, Other:%s\n",
-+ printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s, Other:%s%s\n",
- thunk == THUNK_NONE ? "N/A" :
- thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" :
- thunk == THUNK_LFENCE ? "LFENCE" :
-@@ -299,7 +305,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
- (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS) ? "IBRS+" : "IBRS-",
- !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) ? "" :
- (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ? " SSBD+" : " SSBD-",
-- opt_ibpb ? " IBPB" : "");
-+ opt_ibpb ? " IBPB" : "",
-+ opt_l1d_flush ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "");
-
- /* L1TF diagnostics, printed if vulnerable or PV shadowing is in use. */
- if ( cpu_has_bug_l1tf || opt_pv_l1tf )
-@@ -871,6 +878,33 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
- opt_pv_l1tf = OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU;
- }
-
-+ /*
-+ * By default, enable L1D_FLUSH on L1TF-vulnerable hardware, unless
-+ * instructed to skip the flush on vmentry by our outer hypervisor.
-+ */
-+ if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH) )
-+ opt_l1d_flush = 0;
-+ else if ( opt_l1d_flush == -1 )
-+ opt_l1d_flush = cpu_has_bug_l1tf && !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We do not disable HT by default on affected hardware.
-+ *
-+ * Firstly, if the user intends to use exclusively PV, or HVM shadow
-+ * guests, HT isn't a concern and should remain fully enabled. Secondly,
-+ * safety for HVM HAP guests can be arranged by the toolstack with core
-+ * parking, pinning or cpupool configurations, including mixed setups.
-+ *
-+ * However, if we are on affected hardware, with HT enabled, and the user
-+ * hasn't explicitly chosen whether to use HT or not, nag them to do so.
-+ */
-+ if ( opt_smt == -1 && cpu_has_bug_l1tf && !pv_shim &&
-+ boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings > 1 )
-+ warning_add(
-+ "Booted on L1TF-vulnerable hardware with SMT/Hyperthreading\n"
-+ "enabled. Please assess your configuration and choose an\n"
-+ "explicit 'smt=<bool>' setting. See XSA-273.\n");
-+
- print_details(thunk, caps);
-
- /*
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index cdf5737dc2..8f8aad40bb 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ void init_speculation_mitigations(void);
- extern bool opt_ibpb;
- extern bool opt_ssbd;
- extern int8_t opt_eager_fpu;
-+extern int8_t opt_l1d_flush;
-
- extern bool bsp_delay_spec_ctrl;
- extern uint8_t default_xen_spec_ctrl;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0040-x86-Make-spec-ctrl-no-a-global-disable-of-all-mitiga.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0040-x86-Make-spec-ctrl-no-a-global-disable-of-all-mitiga.patch
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-From 6c7d074a4b5c8e69e21e505a04e7bb3f43658bea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 05:07:23 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH 40/42] x86: Make "spec-ctrl=no" a global disable of all
- mitigations
-
-In order to have a simple and easy to remember means to suppress all the
-more or less recent workarounds for hardware vulnerabilities, force
-settings not controlled by "spec-ctrl=" also to their original defaults,
-unless they've been forced to specific values already by earlier command
-line options.
-
-This is part of XSA-273.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit d8800a82c3840b06b17672eddee4878bbfdacc6d)
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 13 +++++++++----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 9 +++++++++
- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-index 57ef18194a..0886706368 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
-@@ -1804,10 +1804,15 @@ extreme care.**
-
- An overall boolean value, `spec-ctrl=no`, can be specified to turn off all
- mitigations, including pieces of infrastructure used to virtualise certain
--mitigation features for guests. Alternatively, a slightly more restricted
--`spec-ctrl=no-xen` can be used to turn off all of Xen's mitigations, while
--leaving the virtualisation support in place for guests to use. Use of a
--positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid.
-+mitigation features for guests. This also includes settings which `xpti`,
-+`smt`, `pv-l1tf` control, unless the respective option(s) have been
-+specified earlier on the command line.
-+
-+Alternatively, a slightly more restricted `spec-ctrl=no-xen` can be used to
-+turn off all of Xen's mitigations, while leaving the virtualisation support
-+in place for guests to use.
-+
-+Use of a positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid.
-
- The booleans `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=` and `rsb=` offer fine grained control
- over the alternative blocks used by Xen. These impact Xen's ability to
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 59baebb959..f0c50d6703 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -134,6 +134,15 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
-
- opt_eager_fpu = 0;
-
-+ if ( opt_xpti < 0 )
-+ opt_xpti = 0;
-+
-+ if ( opt_smt < 0 )
-+ opt_smt = 1;
-+
-+ if ( opt_pv_l1tf < 0 )
-+ opt_pv_l1tf = 0;
-+
- disable_common:
- opt_rsb_pv = false;
- opt_rsb_hvm = false;
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0042-x86-write-to-correct-variable-in-parse_pv_l1tf.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/0042-x86-write-to-correct-variable-in-parse_pv_l1tf.patch
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 733450b39b83d7891ddd931399beef93e1edbf33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 14:20:24 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 42/42] x86: write to correct variable in parse_pv_l1tf()
-
-Apparently a copy-and-paste mistake.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 57c554f8a6e06894f601d977d18b3017d2a60f40
-master date: 2018-08-15 14:15:30 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index f0c50d6703..c430b25b84 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static __init int parse_pv_l1tf(const char *s)
-
- /* Interpret 'pv-l1tf' alone in its positive boolean form. */
- if ( *s == '\0' )
-- opt_xpti = OPT_PV_L1TF_DOM0 | OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU;
-+ opt_pv_l1tf = OPT_PV_L1TF_DOM0 | OPT_PV_L1TF_DOMU;
-
- do {
- ss = strchr(s, ',');
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xen.4th
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xen.4th
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-\ Copyright (c) 2015 Devin Teske <dteske@FreeBSD.org>
-\ All rights reserved.
-\
-\ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-\ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-\ are met:
-\ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-\ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-\ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-\ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-\ documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-\
-\ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
-\ ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-\ IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
-\ ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
-\ FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
-\ DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
-\ OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-\ HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-\ LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-\ OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-\ SUCH DAMAGE.
-\
-\ $FreeBSD$
-
-create xenkerndefault 64 allot
-0 xenkerndefault c!
-
-also menu-command-helpers
-also menu-namespace
-
-: init_xen_active ( N -- N )
- s" [X]en Kernel.. off" 2 pick menu_caption[x] setenv
- s" [X]en Kernel.. On" 2 pick toggled_text[x] setenv
- s" toggle_xen" 2 pick menu_command[x] setenv
- s" 120" 2 pick menu_keycode[x] setenv
- s" ^[1mX^[men Kernel.. ^[34;1mOff^[m" 2 pick ansi_caption[x] setenv
- s" ^[1mX^[men Kernel.. ^[32;7mOn^[m" 2 pick toggled_ansi[x] setenv
-;
-
-: init_xen_inactive ( N -- N )
- s" Xen Kernel.. N/A" 2dup
- 4 pick menu_caption[x] setenv
- 2 pick ansi_caption[x] setenv
- s" true" 2 pick menu_command[x] setenv
-;
-
-: init_xen ( -- )
- s" optionsmenu_options" getenv 0> if
- c@ dup [char] 0 > over [char] 9 < and false = if
- drop [char] 0
- then
- 1+
- else
- [char] 1
- then
- begin
- dup [char] 8 > if
- false ( break )
- else
- dup s" optionsmenu_caption[x]" 20 +c! getenv -1 = if
- false ( break )
- else
- drop true
- then
- then
- while
- 1+
- repeat
-
- s" xen_kernel" getenv dup -1 <> over 0> and if
- xenkerndefault 1+ 0 2swap strcat swap 1- c!
- init_xen_active ( n -- n )
- toggle_menuitem ( n -- n )
- else
- drop
- xenkerndefault c@ 0<> if
- init_xen_active ( n -- n )
- else
- init_xen_inactive ( n -- n )
- then
- then
-;
-
-: toggle_xen ( N -- N TRUE )
- toggle_menuitem ( n -- n )
- menu-redraw
-
- dup toggle_stateN @ 0= if
- s" xen_kernel" unsetenv
- else
- xenkerndefault count s" xen_kernel" setenv
- then
-
- TRUE \ loop menu again
-;
-
-set optionsmenu_init="$optionsmenu_init init_xen"
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa275-4.11-1.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa275-4.11-1.patch
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Subject: amd/iommu: fix flush checks
-
-Flush checking for AMD IOMMU didn't check whether the previous entry
-was present, or whether the flags (writable/readable) changed in order
-to decide whether a flush should be executed.
-
-Fix this by taking the writable/readable/next-level fields into account,
-together with the present bit.
-
-Along these lines the flushing in amd_iommu_map_page() must not be
-omitted for PV domains. The comment there was simply wrong: Mappings may
-very well change, both their addresses and their permissions. Ultimately
-this should honor iommu_dont_flush_iotlb, but to achieve this
-amd_iommu_ops first needs to gain an .iotlb_flush hook.
-
-Also make clear_iommu_pte_present() static, to demonstrate there's no
-caller omitting the (subsequent) flush.
-
-This is part of XSA-275.
-
-Reported-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c
-@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static unsigned int pfn_to_pde_idx(unsig
- return idx;
- }
-
--void clear_iommu_pte_present(unsigned long l1_mfn, unsigned long gfn)
-+static void clear_iommu_pte_present(unsigned long l1_mfn, unsigned long gfn)
- {
- u64 *table, *pte;
-
-@@ -49,23 +49,42 @@ static bool_t set_iommu_pde_present(u32
- unsigned int next_level,
- bool_t iw, bool_t ir)
- {
-- u64 addr_lo, addr_hi, maddr_old, maddr_next;
-+ uint64_t addr_lo, addr_hi, maddr_next;
- u32 entry;
-- bool_t need_flush = 0;
-+ bool need_flush = false, old_present;
-
- maddr_next = (u64)next_mfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
-
-- addr_hi = get_field_from_reg_u32(pde[1],
-- IOMMU_PTE_ADDR_HIGH_MASK,
-- IOMMU_PTE_ADDR_HIGH_SHIFT);
-- addr_lo = get_field_from_reg_u32(pde[0],
-- IOMMU_PTE_ADDR_LOW_MASK,
-- IOMMU_PTE_ADDR_LOW_SHIFT);
--
-- maddr_old = (addr_hi << 32) | (addr_lo << PAGE_SHIFT);
--
-- if ( maddr_old != maddr_next )
-- need_flush = 1;
-+ old_present = get_field_from_reg_u32(pde[0], IOMMU_PTE_PRESENT_MASK,
-+ IOMMU_PTE_PRESENT_SHIFT);
-+ if ( old_present )
-+ {
-+ bool old_r, old_w;
-+ unsigned int old_level;
-+ uint64_t maddr_old;
-+
-+ addr_hi = get_field_from_reg_u32(pde[1],
-+ IOMMU_PTE_ADDR_HIGH_MASK,
-+ IOMMU_PTE_ADDR_HIGH_SHIFT);
-+ addr_lo = get_field_from_reg_u32(pde[0],
-+ IOMMU_PTE_ADDR_LOW_MASK,
-+ IOMMU_PTE_ADDR_LOW_SHIFT);
-+ old_level = get_field_from_reg_u32(pde[0],
-+ IOMMU_PDE_NEXT_LEVEL_MASK,
-+ IOMMU_PDE_NEXT_LEVEL_SHIFT);
-+ old_w = get_field_from_reg_u32(pde[1],
-+ IOMMU_PTE_IO_WRITE_PERMISSION_MASK,
-+ IOMMU_PTE_IO_WRITE_PERMISSION_SHIFT);
-+ old_r = get_field_from_reg_u32(pde[1],
-+ IOMMU_PTE_IO_READ_PERMISSION_MASK,
-+ IOMMU_PTE_IO_READ_PERMISSION_SHIFT);
-+
-+ maddr_old = (addr_hi << 32) | (addr_lo << PAGE_SHIFT);
-+
-+ if ( maddr_old != maddr_next || iw != old_w || ir != old_r ||
-+ old_level != next_level )
-+ need_flush = true;
-+ }
-
- addr_lo = maddr_next & DMA_32BIT_MASK;
- addr_hi = maddr_next >> 32;
-@@ -687,10 +706,7 @@ int amd_iommu_map_page(struct domain *d,
- if ( !need_flush )
- goto out;
-
-- /* 4K mapping for PV guests never changes,
-- * no need to flush if we trust non-present bits */
-- if ( is_hvm_domain(d) )
-- amd_iommu_flush_pages(d, gfn, 0);
-+ amd_iommu_flush_pages(d, gfn, 0);
-
- for ( merge_level = IOMMU_PAGING_MODE_LEVEL_2;
- merge_level <= hd->arch.paging_mode; merge_level++ )
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa275-4.11-2.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa275-4.11-2.patch
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: AMD/IOMMU: suppress PTE merging after initial table creation
-
-The logic is not fit for this purpose, so simply disable its use until
-it can be fixed / replaced. Note that this re-enables merging for the
-table creation case, which was disabled as a (perhaps unintended) side
-effect of the earlier "amd/iommu: fix flush checks". It relies on no
-page getting mapped more than once (with different properties) in this
-process, as that would still be beyond what the merging logic can cope
-with. But arch_iommu_populate_page_table() guarantees this afaict.
-
-This is part of XSA-275.
-
-Reported-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c
-@@ -702,11 +702,24 @@ int amd_iommu_map_page(struct domain *d,
- !!(flags & IOMMUF_writable),
- !!(flags & IOMMUF_readable));
-
-- /* Do not increase pde count if io mapping has not been changed */
-- if ( !need_flush )
-- goto out;
-+ if ( need_flush )
-+ {
-+ amd_iommu_flush_pages(d, gfn, 0);
-+ /* No further merging, as the logic doesn't cope. */
-+ hd->arch.no_merge = true;
-+ }
-
-- amd_iommu_flush_pages(d, gfn, 0);
-+ /*
-+ * Suppress merging of non-R/W mappings or after initial table creation,
-+ * as the merge logic does not cope with this.
-+ */
-+ if ( hd->arch.no_merge || flags != (IOMMUF_writable | IOMMUF_readable) )
-+ goto out;
-+ if ( d->creation_finished )
-+ {
-+ hd->arch.no_merge = true;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-
- for ( merge_level = IOMMU_PAGING_MODE_LEVEL_2;
- merge_level <= hd->arch.paging_mode; merge_level++ )
-@@ -780,6 +793,10 @@ int amd_iommu_unmap_page(struct domain *
-
- /* mark PTE as 'page not present' */
- clear_iommu_pte_present(pt_mfn[1], gfn);
-+
-+ /* No further merging in amd_iommu_map_page(), as the logic doesn't cope. */
-+ hd->arch.no_merge = true;
-+
- spin_unlock(&hd->arch.mapping_lock);
-
- amd_iommu_flush_pages(d, gfn, 0);
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/iommu.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/iommu.h
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct arch_iommu
-
- /* amd iommu support */
- int paging_mode;
-+ bool no_merge;
- struct page_info *root_table;
- struct guest_iommu *g_iommu;
- };
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa277.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa277.patch
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/mm: Put the gfn on all paths after get_gfn_query()
-
-c/s 7867181b2 "x86/PoD: correctly handle non-order-0 decrease-reservation
-requests" introduced an early exit in guest_remove_page() for unexpected p2m
-types. However, get_gfn_query() internally takes the p2m lock, and must be
-matched with a put_gfn() call later.
-
-Fix the erroneous comment beside the declaration of get_gfn_query().
-
-This is XSA-277.
-
-Reported-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
-index 987395f..26b7123 100644
---- a/xen/common/memory.c
-+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
-@@ -305,7 +305,11 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d, unsigned long gmfn)
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
- mfn = get_gfn_query(d, gmfn, &p2mt);
- if ( unlikely(p2mt == p2m_invalid) || unlikely(p2mt == p2m_mmio_dm) )
-+ {
-+ put_gfn(d, gmfn);
-+
- return -ENOENT;
-+ }
-
- if ( unlikely(p2m_is_paging(p2mt)) )
- {
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-index ac33f50..6d849a5 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-@@ -448,10 +448,7 @@ static inline mfn_t __nonnull(3) get_gfn_type(
- return get_gfn_type_access(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), gfn, t, &a, q, NULL);
- }
-
--/* Syntactic sugar: most callers will use one of these.
-- * N.B. get_gfn_query() is the _only_ one guaranteed not to take the
-- * p2m lock; none of the others can be called with the p2m or paging
-- * lock held. */
-+/* Syntactic sugar: most callers will use one of these. */
- #define get_gfn(d, g, t) get_gfn_type((d), (g), (t), P2M_ALLOC)
- #define get_gfn_query(d, g, t) get_gfn_type((d), (g), (t), 0)
- #define get_gfn_unshare(d, g, t) get_gfn_type((d), (g), (t), \
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa278-4.11.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa278-4.11.patch
@@ -1,326 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/vvmx: Disallow the use of VT-x instructions when nested virt is disabled
-
-c/s ac6a4500b "vvmx: set vmxon_region_pa of vcpu out of VMX operation to an
-invalid address" was a real bugfix as described, but has a very subtle bug
-which results in all VT-x instructions being usable by a guest.
-
-The toolstack constructs a guest by issuing:
-
- XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain
- XEN_DOMCTL_max_vcpus
-
-and optionally later, HVMOP_set_param to enable nested virt.
-
-As a result, the call to nvmx_vcpu_initialise() in hvm_vcpu_initialise()
-(which is what makes the above patch look correct during review) is actually
-dead code. In practice, nvmx_vcpu_initialise() first gets called when nested
-virt is enabled, which is typically never.
-
-As a result, the zeroed memory of struct vcpu causes nvmx_vcpu_in_vmx() to
-return true before nested virt is enabled for the guest.
-
-Fixing the order of initialisation is a work in progress for other reasons,
-but not viable for security backports.
-
-A compounding factor is that the vmexit handlers for all instructions, other
-than VMXON, pass 0 into vmx_inst_check_privilege()'s vmxop_check parameter,
-which skips the CR4.VMXE check. (This is one of many reasons why nested virt
-isn't a supported feature yet.)
-
-However, the overall result is that when nested virt is not enabled by the
-toolstack (i.e. the default configuration for all production guests), the VT-x
-instructions (other than VMXON) are actually usable, and Xen very quickly
-falls over the fact that the nvmx structure is uninitialised.
-
-In order to fail safe in the supported case, re-implement all the VT-x
-instruction handling using a single function with a common prologue, covering
-all the checks which should cause #UD or #GP faults. This deliberately
-doesn't use any state from the nvmx structure, in case there are other lurking
-issues.
-
-This is XSA-278
-
-Reported-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index a6415f0..a4d2829 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -3982,57 +3982,17 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- break;
-
- case EXIT_REASON_VMXOFF:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_vmxoff(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_VMXON:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_vmxon(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_vmclear(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_vmptrld(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_vmptrst(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_vmread(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_vmwrite(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_vmresume(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_invept(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- update_guest_eip();
-- break;
--
- case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
-- if ( nvmx_handle_invvpid(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
-+ if ( nvmx_handle_vmx_insn(regs, exit_reason) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
- update_guest_eip();
- break;
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
-index e97db33..88cb58c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
-@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ void nvmx_switch_guest(void)
- * VMX instructions handling
- */
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmxon(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_vmxon(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct vcpu *v=current;
- struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
-@@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmxon(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmxoff(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_vmxoff(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct vcpu *v=current;
- struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
-@@ -1611,7 +1611,7 @@ static int nvmx_vmresume(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- bool_t launched;
- struct vcpu *v = current;
-@@ -1645,7 +1645,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return nvmx_vmresume(v,regs);
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- bool_t launched;
- struct vcpu *v = current;
-@@ -1688,7 +1688,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return rc;
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmptrld(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_vmptrld(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct vcpu *v = current;
- struct vmx_inst_decoded decode;
-@@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmptrld(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmptrst(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_vmptrst(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct vcpu *v = current;
- struct vmx_inst_decoded decode;
-@@ -1784,7 +1784,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmptrst(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmclear(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_vmclear(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct vcpu *v = current;
- struct vmx_inst_decoded decode;
-@@ -1836,7 +1836,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmclear(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmread(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_vmread(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct vcpu *v = current;
- struct vmx_inst_decoded decode;
-@@ -1878,7 +1878,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmread(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct vcpu *v = current;
- struct vmx_inst_decoded decode;
-@@ -1926,7 +1926,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_invept(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_invept(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct vmx_inst_decoded decode;
- unsigned long eptp;
-@@ -1954,7 +1954,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_invept(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-
--int nvmx_handle_invvpid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_handle_invvpid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct vmx_inst_decoded decode;
- unsigned long vpid;
-@@ -1980,6 +1980,81 @@ int nvmx_handle_invvpid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
-
-+int nvmx_handle_vmx_insn(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, unsigned int exit_reason)
-+{
-+ struct vcpu *curr = current;
-+ int ret;
-+
-+ if ( !(curr->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_VMXE) ||
-+ !nestedhvm_enabled(curr->domain) ||
-+ (vmx_guest_x86_mode(curr) < (hvm_long_mode_active(curr) ? 8 : 2)) )
-+ {
-+ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_invalid_op, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
-+ return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ( vmx_get_cpl() > 0 )
-+ {
-+ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
-+ return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
-+ }
-+
-+ switch ( exit_reason )
-+ {
-+ case EXIT_REASON_VMXOFF:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_vmxoff(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_VMXON:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_vmxon(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_vmclear(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_vmptrld(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_vmptrst(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_vmread(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_vmwrite(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_vmresume(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_invept(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
-+ ret = nvmx_handle_invvpid(regs);
-+ break;
-+
-+ default:
-+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+ domain_crash(curr->domain);
-+ ret = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ return ret;
-+}
-+
- #define __emul_value(enable1, default1) \
- ((enable1 | default1) << 32 | (default1))
-
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
-index 9ea35eb..fc4a8d1 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
-@@ -94,9 +94,6 @@ void nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d);
-
- bool_t nvmx_ept_enabled(struct vcpu *v);
-
--int nvmx_handle_vmxon(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--int nvmx_handle_vmxoff(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--
- #define EPT_TRANSLATE_SUCCEED 0
- #define EPT_TRANSLATE_VIOLATION 1
- #define EPT_TRANSLATE_MISCONFIG 2
-@@ -191,15 +188,7 @@ enum vmx_insn_errno set_vvmcs_real_safe(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding,
- uint64_t get_shadow_eptp(struct vcpu *v);
-
- void nvmx_destroy_vmcs(struct vcpu *v);
--int nvmx_handle_vmptrld(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--int nvmx_handle_vmptrst(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--int nvmx_handle_vmclear(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--int nvmx_handle_vmread(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--int nvmx_handle_invept(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
--int nvmx_handle_invvpid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
-+int nvmx_handle_vmx_insn(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, unsigned int exit_reason);
- int nvmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr,
- u64 *msr_content);
-
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa279.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa279.patch
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/mm: Don't perform flush after failing to update a guests L1e
-
-If the L1e update hasn't occured, the flush cannot do anything useful. This
-skips the potentially expensive vcpumask_to_pcpumask() conversion, and
-broadcast TLB shootdown.
-
-More importantly however, we might be in the error path due to a bad va
-parameter from the guest, and this should not propagate into the TLB flushing
-logic. The INVPCID instruction for example raises #GP for a non-canonical
-address.
-
-This is XSA-279.
-
-Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 703f330..75663c6 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -4155,6 +4155,14 @@ static int __do_update_va_mapping(
- if ( pl1e )
- unmap_domain_page(pl1e);
-
-+ /*
-+ * Any error at this point means that we haven't change the L1e. Skip the
-+ * flush, as it won't do anything useful. Furthermore, va is guest
-+ * controlled and not necesserily audited by this point.
-+ */
-+ if ( rc )
-+ return rc;
-+
- switch ( flags & UVMF_FLUSHTYPE_MASK )
- {
- case UVMF_TLB_FLUSH:
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa280-1.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa280-1.patch
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/shadow: move OOS flag bit positions
-
-In preparation of reducing struct page_info's shadow_flags field to 16
-bits, lower the bit positions used for SHF_out_of_sync and
-SHF_oos_may_write.
-
-Instead of also adjusting the open coded use in _get_page_type(),
-introduce shadow_prepare_page_type_change() to contain knowledge of the
-bit positions to shadow code.
-
-This is part of XSA-280.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
----
-v2: Rename function and pass full type.
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -2712,17 +2712,8 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_in
- {
- struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
-
-- /*
-- * Normally we should never let a page go from type count 0
-- * to type count 1 when it is shadowed. One exception:
-- * out-of-sync shadowed pages are allowed to become
-- * writeable.
-- */
-- if ( d && shadow_mode_enabled(d)
-- && (page->count_info & PGC_page_table)
-- && !((page->shadow_flags & (1u<<29))
-- && type == PGT_writable_page) )
-- shadow_remove_all_shadows(d, page_to_mfn(page));
-+ if ( d && shadow_mode_enabled(d) )
-+ shadow_prepare_page_type_change(d, page, type);
-
- ASSERT(!(x & PGT_pae_xen_l2));
- if ( (x & PGT_type_mask) != type )
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -749,6 +749,9 @@ int sh_unsync(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gmfn
- || !v->domain->arch.paging.shadow.oos_active )
- return 0;
-
-+ BUILD_BUG_ON(!(typeof(pg->shadow_flags))SHF_out_of_sync);
-+ BUILD_BUG_ON(!(typeof(pg->shadow_flags))SHF_oos_may_write);
-+
- pg->shadow_flags |= SHF_out_of_sync|SHF_oos_may_write;
- oos_hash_add(v, gmfn);
- perfc_incr(shadow_unsync);
-@@ -2413,6 +2416,26 @@ void sh_remove_shadows(struct domain *d,
- paging_unlock(d);
- }
-
-+void shadow_prepare_page_type_change(struct domain *d, struct page_info *page,
-+ unsigned long new_type)
-+{
-+ if ( !(page->count_info & PGC_page_table) )
-+ return;
-+
-+#if (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC)
-+ /*
-+ * Normally we should never let a page go from type count 0 to type
-+ * count 1 when it is shadowed. One exception: out-of-sync shadowed
-+ * pages are allowed to become writeable.
-+ */
-+ if ( (page->shadow_flags & SHF_oos_may_write) &&
-+ new_type == PGT_writable_page )
-+ return;
-+#endif
-+
-+ shadow_remove_all_shadows(d, page_to_mfn(page));
-+}
-+
- static void
- sh_remove_all_shadows_and_parents(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn)
- /* Even harsher: this is a HVM page that we thing is no longer a pagetable.
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-@@ -285,8 +285,8 @@ static inline void sh_terminate_list(str
- * codepath is called during that time and is sensitive to oos issues, it may
- * need to use the second flag.
- */
--#define SHF_out_of_sync (1u<<30)
--#define SHF_oos_may_write (1u<<29)
-+#define SHF_out_of_sync (1u << (SH_type_max_shadow + 1))
-+#define SHF_oos_may_write (1u << (SH_type_max_shadow + 2))
-
- #endif /* (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC) */
-
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
-@@ -81,6 +81,10 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain
-
- void sh_remove_shadows(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, int fast, int all);
-
-+/* Adjust shadows ready for a guest page to change its type. */
-+void shadow_prepare_page_type_change(struct domain *d, struct page_info *page,
-+ unsigned long new_type);
-+
- /* Discard _all_ mappings from the domain's shadows. */
- void shadow_blow_tables_per_domain(struct domain *d);
-
-@@ -105,6 +109,10 @@ int shadow_set_allocation(struct domain
- static inline void sh_remove_shadows(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn,
- int fast, int all) {}
-
-+static inline void shadow_prepare_page_type_change(struct domain *d,
-+ struct page_info *page,
-+ unsigned long new_type) {}
-+
- static inline void shadow_blow_tables_per_domain(struct domain *d) {}
-
- static inline int shadow_domctl(struct domain *d,
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa280-4.11-2.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa280-4.11-2.patch
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/shadow: shrink struct page_info's shadow_flags to 16 bits
-
-This is to avoid it overlapping the linear_pt_count field needed for PV
-domains. Introduce a separate, HVM-only pagetable_dying field to replace
-the sole one left in the upper 16 bits.
-
-Note that the accesses to ->shadow_flags in shadow_{pro,de}mote() get
-switched to non-atomic, non-bitops operations, as {test,set,clear}_bit()
-are not allowed on uint16_t fields and hence their use would have
-required ugly casts. This is fine because all updates of the field ought
-to occur with the paging lock held, and other updates of it use |= and
-&= as well (i.e. using atomic operations here didn't really guard
-against potentially racing updates elsewhere).
-
-This is part of XSA-280.
-
-Reported-by: Prgmr.com Security <security@prgmr.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -1028,10 +1028,14 @@ void shadow_promote(struct domain *d, mf
-
- /* Is the page already shadowed? */
- if ( !test_and_set_bit(_PGC_page_table, &page->count_info) )
-+ {
- page->shadow_flags = 0;
-+ if ( is_hvm_domain(d) )
-+ page->pagetable_dying = false;
-+ }
-
-- ASSERT(!test_bit(type, &page->shadow_flags));
-- set_bit(type, &page->shadow_flags);
-+ ASSERT(!(page->shadow_flags & (1u << type)));
-+ page->shadow_flags |= 1u << type;
- TRACE_SHADOW_PATH_FLAG(TRCE_SFLAG_PROMOTE);
- }
-
-@@ -1040,9 +1044,9 @@ void shadow_demote(struct domain *d, mfn
- struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(gmfn);
-
- ASSERT(test_bit(_PGC_page_table, &page->count_info));
-- ASSERT(test_bit(type, &page->shadow_flags));
-+ ASSERT(page->shadow_flags & (1u << type));
-
-- clear_bit(type, &page->shadow_flags);
-+ page->shadow_flags &= ~(1u << type);
-
- if ( (page->shadow_flags & SHF_page_type_mask) == 0 )
- {
-@@ -2921,7 +2925,7 @@ void sh_remove_shadows(struct domain *d,
- if ( !fast && all && (pg->count_info & PGC_page_table) )
- {
- SHADOW_ERROR("can't find all shadows of mfn %"PRI_mfn" "
-- "(shadow_flags=%08x)\n",
-+ "(shadow_flags=%04x)\n",
- mfn_x(gmfn), pg->shadow_flags);
- domain_crash(d);
- }
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-@@ -3299,8 +3299,8 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
-
- /* Unshadow if we are writing to a toplevel pagetable that is
- * flagged as a dying process, and that is not currently used. */
-- if ( sh_mfn_is_a_page_table(gmfn)
-- && (mfn_to_page(gmfn)->shadow_flags & SHF_pagetable_dying) )
-+ if ( sh_mfn_is_a_page_table(gmfn) && is_hvm_domain(d) &&
-+ mfn_to_page(gmfn)->pagetable_dying )
- {
- int used = 0;
- struct vcpu *tmp;
-@@ -4254,9 +4254,9 @@ int sh_rm_write_access_from_sl1p(struct
- ASSERT(mfn_valid(smfn));
-
- /* Remember if we've been told that this process is being torn down */
-- if ( curr->domain == d )
-+ if ( curr->domain == d && is_hvm_domain(d) )
- curr->arch.paging.shadow.pagetable_dying
-- = !!(mfn_to_page(gmfn)->shadow_flags & SHF_pagetable_dying);
-+ = mfn_to_page(gmfn)->pagetable_dying;
-
- sp = mfn_to_page(smfn);
-
-@@ -4572,10 +4572,10 @@ static void sh_pagetable_dying(struct vc
- : shadow_hash_lookup(d, mfn_x(gmfn), SH_type_l2_pae_shadow);
- }
-
-- if ( mfn_valid(smfn) )
-+ if ( mfn_valid(smfn) && is_hvm_domain(d) )
- {
- gmfn = _mfn(mfn_to_page(smfn)->v.sh.back);
-- mfn_to_page(gmfn)->shadow_flags |= SHF_pagetable_dying;
-+ mfn_to_page(gmfn)->pagetable_dying = true;
- shadow_unhook_mappings(d, smfn, 1/* user pages only */);
- flush = 1;
- }
-@@ -4612,9 +4612,9 @@ static void sh_pagetable_dying(struct vc
- smfn = shadow_hash_lookup(d, mfn_x(gmfn), SH_type_l4_64_shadow);
- #endif
-
-- if ( mfn_valid(smfn) )
-+ if ( mfn_valid(smfn) && is_hvm_domain(d) )
- {
-- mfn_to_page(gmfn)->shadow_flags |= SHF_pagetable_dying;
-+ mfn_to_page(gmfn)->pagetable_dying = true;
- shadow_unhook_mappings(d, smfn, 1/* user pages only */);
- /* Now flush the TLB: we removed toplevel mappings. */
- flush_tlb_mask(d->dirty_cpumask);
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-@@ -292,8 +292,6 @@ static inline void sh_terminate_list(str
-
- #endif /* (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC) */
-
--#define SHF_pagetable_dying (1u<<31)
--
- static inline int sh_page_has_multiple_shadows(struct page_info *pg)
- {
- u32 shadows;
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -259,8 +259,15 @@ struct page_info
- * Guest pages with a shadow. This does not conflict with
- * tlbflush_timestamp since page table pages are explicitly not
- * tracked for TLB-flush avoidance when a guest runs in shadow mode.
-+ *
-+ * pagetable_dying is used for HVM domains only. The layout here has
-+ * to avoid re-use of the space used by linear_pt_count, which (only)
-+ * PV guests use.
- */
-- u32 shadow_flags;
-+ struct {
-+ uint16_t shadow_flags;
-+ bool pagetable_dying;
-+ };
-
- /* When in use as a shadow, next shadow in this hash chain. */
- __pdx_t next_shadow;
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa282-2.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa282-2.patch
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86: work around HLE host lockup erratum
-
-XACQUIRE prefixed accesses to the 4Mb range of memory starting at 1Gb
-are liable to lock up the processor. Disallow use of this memory range.
-
-Unfortunately the available Core Gen7 and Gen8 spec updates are pretty
-old, so I can only guess that they're similarly affected when Core Gen6
-is and the Xeon counterparts are, too.
-
-This is part of XSA-282.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
----
-v2: Don't apply the workaround when running ourselves virtualized.
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -5853,6 +5853,22 @@ const struct platform_bad_page *__init g
- { .mfn = 0x20138000 >> PAGE_SHIFT },
- { .mfn = 0x40004000 >> PAGE_SHIFT },
- };
-+ static const struct platform_bad_page __initconst hle_bad_page = {
-+ .mfn = 0x40000000 >> PAGE_SHIFT, .order = 10
-+ };
-+
-+ switch ( cpuid_eax(1) & 0x000f3ff0 )
-+ {
-+ case 0x000406e0: /* erratum SKL167 */
-+ case 0x00050650: /* erratum SKZ63 */
-+ case 0x000506e0: /* errata SKL167 / SKW159 */
-+ case 0x000806e0: /* erratum KBL??? */
-+ case 0x000906e0: /* errata KBL??? / KBW114 / CFW103 */
-+ *array_size = (cpuid_eax(0) >= 7 &&
-+ !(cpuid_ecx(1) & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) &&
-+ (cpuid_count_ebx(7, 0) & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_HLE)));
-+ return &hle_bad_page;
-+ }
-
- *array_size = ARRAY_SIZE(snb_bad_pages);
- igd_id = pci_conf_read32(0, 0, 2, 0, 0);
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa282-4.11-1.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/files/xsa282-4.11-1.patch
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86: extend get_platform_badpages() interface
-
-Use a structure so along with an address (now frame number) an order can
-also be specified.
-
-This is part of XSA-282.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen.c
-@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ bool __read_mostly xen_guest;
- static __read_mostly uint32_t xen_cpuid_base;
- extern char hypercall_page[];
- static struct rangeset *mem;
--static unsigned long __initdata reserved_pages[2];
-+static struct platform_bad_page __initdata reserved_pages[2];
-
- DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, vcpu_id);
-
-@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ void __init hypervisor_fixup_e820(struct
- panic("Unable to get " #p); \
- mark_pfn_as_ram(e820, pfn); \
- ASSERT(i < ARRAY_SIZE(reserved_pages)); \
-- reserved_pages[i++] = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; \
-+ reserved_pages[i++].mfn = pfn; \
- })
- MARK_PARAM_RAM(HVM_PARAM_STORE_PFN);
- if ( !pv_console )
-@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ void __init hypervisor_fixup_e820(struct
- #undef MARK_PARAM_RAM
- }
-
--const unsigned long *__init hypervisor_reserved_pages(unsigned int *size)
-+const struct platform_bad_page *__init hypervisor_reserved_pages(unsigned int *size)
- {
- ASSERT(xen_guest);
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -5768,23 +5768,23 @@ void arch_dump_shared_mem_info(void)
- mem_sharing_get_nr_saved_mfns());
- }
-
--const unsigned long *__init get_platform_badpages(unsigned int *array_size)
-+const struct platform_bad_page *__init get_platform_badpages(unsigned int *array_size)
- {
- u32 igd_id;
-- static unsigned long __initdata bad_pages[] = {
-- 0x20050000,
-- 0x20110000,
-- 0x20130000,
-- 0x20138000,
-- 0x40004000,
-+ static const struct platform_bad_page __initconst snb_bad_pages[] = {
-+ { .mfn = 0x20050000 >> PAGE_SHIFT },
-+ { .mfn = 0x20110000 >> PAGE_SHIFT },
-+ { .mfn = 0x20130000 >> PAGE_SHIFT },
-+ { .mfn = 0x20138000 >> PAGE_SHIFT },
-+ { .mfn = 0x40004000 >> PAGE_SHIFT },
- };
-
-- *array_size = ARRAY_SIZE(bad_pages);
-+ *array_size = ARRAY_SIZE(snb_bad_pages);
- igd_id = pci_conf_read32(0, 0, 2, 0, 0);
-- if ( !IS_SNB_GFX(igd_id) )
-- return NULL;
-+ if ( IS_SNB_GFX(igd_id) )
-+ return snb_bad_pages;
-
-- return bad_pages;
-+ return NULL;
- }
-
- void paging_invlpg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long va)
---- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c
-+++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c
-@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ void __init init_boot_pages(paddr_t ps,
- unsigned long bad_spfn, bad_epfn;
- const char *p;
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-- const unsigned long *badpage = NULL;
-+ const struct platform_bad_page *badpage;
- unsigned int i, array_size;
-
- BUILD_BUG_ON(8 * sizeof(frame_table->u.free.first_dirty) <
-@@ -299,8 +299,8 @@ void __init init_boot_pages(paddr_t ps,
- {
- for ( i = 0; i < array_size; i++ )
- {
-- bootmem_region_zap(*badpage >> PAGE_SHIFT,
-- (*badpage >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1);
-+ bootmem_region_zap(badpage->mfn,
-+ badpage->mfn + (1U << badpage->order));
- badpage++;
- }
- }
-@@ -312,8 +312,8 @@ void __init init_boot_pages(paddr_t ps,
- {
- for ( i = 0; i < array_size; i++ )
- {
-- bootmem_region_zap(*badpage >> PAGE_SHIFT,
-- (*badpage >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1);
-+ bootmem_region_zap(badpage->mfn,
-+ badpage->mfn + (1U << badpage->order));
- badpage++;
- }
- }
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/guest/xen.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/guest/xen.h
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ void hypervisor_ap_setup(void);
- int hypervisor_alloc_unused_page(mfn_t *mfn);
- int hypervisor_free_unused_page(mfn_t mfn);
- void hypervisor_fixup_e820(struct e820map *e820);
--const unsigned long *hypervisor_reserved_pages(unsigned int *size);
-+const struct platform_bad_page *hypervisor_reserved_pages(unsigned int *size);
- uint32_t hypervisor_cpuid_base(void);
- void hypervisor_resume(void);
-
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static inline void hypervisor_fixup_e820
- ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
- }
-
--static inline const unsigned long *hypervisor_reserved_pages(unsigned int *size)
-+static inline const struct platform_bad_page *hypervisor_reserved_pages(unsigned int *size)
- {
- ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
- return NULL;
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -348,7 +348,13 @@ void zap_ro_mpt(mfn_t mfn);
-
- bool is_iomem_page(mfn_t mfn);
-
--const unsigned long *get_platform_badpages(unsigned int *array_size);
-+struct platform_bad_page {
-+ unsigned long mfn;
-+ unsigned int order;
-+};
-+
-+const struct platform_bad_page *get_platform_badpages(unsigned int *array_size);
-+
- /* Per page locks:
- * page_lock() is used for two purposes: pte serialization, and memory sharing.
- *
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/pkg-descr
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/pkg-descr
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-The Xen Project hypervisor is an open-source type-1 or baremetal hypervisor,
-which makes it possible to run many instances of an operating system or indeed
-different operating systems in parallel on a single machine (or host). The Xen
-Project hypervisor is the only type-1 hypervisor that is available as open
-source. It is used as the basis for a number of different commercial and open
-source applications, such as: server virtualization, Infrastructure as a Service
-(IaaS), desktop virtualization, security applications, embedded and hardware
-appliances
-
-WWW: http://www.xenproject.org/
Index: emulators/xen-kernel411/pkg-message
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ emulators/xen-kernel411/pkg-message
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-Please add the following entries in order to boot the xen kernel
-
-In /etc/sysctl.conf:
- vm.max_wired=-1
-
-In /etc/ttys:
- xc0 "/usr/libexec/getty Pc" xterm on secure
-
-In /boot/loader.conf for a dom0 with 2G memory and 4 vcpus:
- hw.pci.mcfg=0
- xen_kernel="/boot/xen"
- xen_cmdline="dom0_mem=2048M dom0_max_vcpus=4 dom0=pvh com1=115200,8n1 guest_loglvl=all loglvl=all"
-
-Add to the above xen_cmdline in order to activate the serial console:
- console=com1
-
-In /boot/menu.rc.local:
- try-include /boot/xen.4th
Index: sysutils/Makefile
===================================================================
--- sysutils/Makefile
+++ sysutils/Makefile
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@
SUBDIR += xe
SUBDIR += xe-guest-utilities
SUBDIR += xen-guest-tools
- SUBDIR += xen-tools411
+ SUBDIR += xen-tools
SUBDIR += xen-tools47
SUBDIR += xfburn
SUBDIR += xfce4-battery-plugin
Index: sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
===================================================================
--- sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
+++ sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# $FreeBSD$
PORTNAME= xen
-PKGNAMESUFFIX= -tools411
+PKGNAMESUFFIX= -tools
PORTVERSION= 4.11.0
PORTREVISION= 7
CATEGORIES= sysutils emulators
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/distinfo
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/distinfo
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-TIMESTAMP = 1532353889
-SHA256 (xen-4.11.0.tar.gz) = 826e3a9f6d0eac94a825d272cc2c1294e22640ae75af906eb13920f9ad667643
-SIZE (xen-4.11.0.tar.gz) = 25131533
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-build-fix-include-paths-in-FreeBSD.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-build-fix-include-paths-in-FreeBSD.patch
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From fe9b60476a548de1c62d6fc985e9741b04479d36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2018 10:28:26 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] build: fix include paths in FreeBSD
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-FreeBSD package manager uses /usr/local/ as the default install path,
-but that's not part of the compiler search path, so add it using the
-APPEND_{LIB/INCLUDES} variables.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
----
- config/FreeBSD.mk | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/config/FreeBSD.mk b/config/FreeBSD.mk
-index afeaefbde2..98a5117e60 100644
---- a/config/FreeBSD.mk
-+++ b/config/FreeBSD.mk
-@@ -3,3 +3,7 @@ include $(XEN_ROOT)/config/StdGNU.mk
- # No wget on FreeBSD base system
- WGET = ftp
- PKG_INSTALLDIR = ${prefix}/libdata/pkgconfig
-+
-+# Add the default pkg install path
-+APPEND_LIB += /usr/local/lib
-+APPEND_INCLUDES += /usr/local/include
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-docs-use-the-make-wildcard-function-instead-of-find.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-docs-use-the-make-wildcard-function-instead-of-find.patch
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 76c9776e63305c23bca03eba933e7ce2ecbb749c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 17:58:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] docs: use the make wildcard function instead of find
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The regexp used with find in order to list the man pages doesn't work
-with FreeBSD find, so use a wildcard instead. No functional change.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
----
-Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
----
- docs/Makefile | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/Makefile b/docs/Makefile
-index b300bb6be1..fba6673db6 100644
---- a/docs/Makefile
-+++ b/docs/Makefile
-@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ DATE := $(shell date +%Y-%m-%d)
- DOC_ARCHES := arm x86_32 x86_64
-
- # Documentation sources to build
--MAN1SRC-y := $(sort $(shell find man/ -regex '.*\.\(pod\|markdown\)\.1' -print))
--MAN5SRC-y := $(sort $(shell find man/ -regex '.*\.\(pod\|markdown\)\.5' -print))
--MAN7SRC-y := $(sort $(shell find man/ -regex '.*\.\(pod\|markdown\)\.7' -print))
--MAN8SRC-y := $(sort $(shell find man/ -regex '.*\.\(pod\|markdown\)\.8' -print))
-+MAN1SRC-y := $(sort $(wildcard man/*.pod.1 man/*.markdown.1))
-+MAN5SRC-y := $(sort $(wildcard man/*.pod.5 man/*.markdown.5))
-+MAN7SRC-y := $(sort $(wildcard man/*.pod.7 man/*.markdown.7))
-+MAN8SRC-y := $(sort $(wildcard man/*.pod.8 man/*.markdown.8))
-
- MARKDOWNSRC-y := $(sort $(shell find misc -name '*.markdown' -print))
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-hvmloader-fix-build-with-LLVM-Linker.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-hvmloader-fix-build-with-LLVM-Linker.patch
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-From 9aa8c031ce844ada6832a56d3b25341bed2825db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2018 10:14:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] hvmloader: fix build with LLVM Linker
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The hvmloader binary generated when using LLVM LD doesn't work
-properly and seems to get stuck while trying to generate and load the
-ACPI tables. This is caused by the layout of the binary when linked
-with LLVM LD.
-
-LLVM LD has a different default linker script that GNU LD, and the
-resulting hvmloader binary is slightly different:
-
-LLVM LD:
-Program Headers:
- Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align
- PHDR 0x000034 0x000ff034 0x000ff034 0x00060 0x00060 R 0x4
- LOAD 0x000000 0x000ff000 0x000ff000 0x38000 0x38000 RWE 0x1000
- GNU_STACK 0x000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000 0x00000 RW 0
-
-GNU LD:
-Program Headers:
- Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align
- LOAD 0x000080 0x00100000 0x00100000 0x36308 0x3fd74 RWE 0x10
- GNU_STACK 0x000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000 0x00000 RW 0x4
-
-Note that in the LLVM LD case (as with GNU LD) the .text section does
-indeed have the address set to 0x100000 as requested on the command
-line:
-
-[ 1] .text PROGBITS 00100000 001000 00dd10 00 AX 0 0 16
-
-There's however the PHDR which is not present when using GNU LD.
-
-Fix this by using a very simple linker script that generates the same
-binary regardless of whether LLVM or GNU LD is used. By using a linker
-script the usage of -Ttext can also be avoided by placing the desired
-.text load address directly in the linker script.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
----
-Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- tools/firmware/hvmloader/Makefile | 7 ++-----
- tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.lds | 13 +++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.lds
-
-diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/Makefile b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/Makefile
-index 496ac72b77..e980ce7c5f 100644
---- a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/Makefile
-+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/Makefile
-@@ -20,9 +20,6 @@
- XEN_ROOT = $(CURDIR)/../../..
- include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/firmware/Rules.mk
-
--
--LOADADDR = 0x100000
--
- # SMBIOS spec requires format mm/dd/yyyy
- SMBIOS_REL_DATE ?= $(shell date +%m/%d/%Y)
-
-@@ -82,8 +79,8 @@ vpath build.c $(ACPI_PATH)
- vpath static_tables.c $(ACPI_PATH)
- OBJS += $(ACPI_OBJS)
-
--hvmloader: $(OBJS)
-- $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_DIRECT) -N -Ttext $(LOADADDR) -o $@ $^
-+hvmloader: $(OBJS) hvmloader.lds
-+ $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_DIRECT) -N -T hvmloader.lds -o $@ $(OBJS)
-
- roms.inc: $(ROMS)
- echo "/* Autogenerated file. DO NOT EDIT */" > $@.new
-diff --git a/tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.lds b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.lds
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..15d8f38fff
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tools/firmware/hvmloader/hvmloader.lds
-@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
-+SECTIONS
-+{
-+ . = 0x100000;
-+ /*
-+ * NB: there's no need to use the AT keyword in order to set the LMA, by
-+ * default the linker will use VMA = LMA unless specified otherwise.
-+ */
-+ .text : { *(.text) }
-+ .rodata : { *(.rodata) }
-+ .data : { *(.data) }
-+ .bss : { *(.bss) }
-+ _end = .;
-+}
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-x86-efi-move-the-logic-to-detect-PE-build-support.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-x86-efi-move-the-logic-to-detect-PE-build-support.patch
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-From 9bd8e5d5cf128f5f19d8b8e74bd693c2711ce4d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 10:58:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: move the logic to detect PE build support
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-So that it can be used by other components apart from the efi specific
-code. By moving the detection code creating a dummy efi/disabled file
-can be avoided.
-
-This is required so that the conditional used to define the efi symbol
-in the linker script can be removed and instead the definition of the
-efi symbol can be guarded using the preprocessor.
-
-The motivation behind this change is to be able to build Xen using lld
-(the LLVM linker), that at least on version 6.0.0 doesn't work
-properly with a DEFINED being used in a conditional expression:
-
-ld -melf_x86_64_fbsd -T xen.lds -N prelink.o --build-id=sha1 \
- /root/src/xen/xen/common/symbols-dummy.o -o /root/src/xen/xen/.xen-syms.0
-ld: error: xen.lds:233: symbol not found: efi
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
-Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Cc: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
-Changes since v2:
- - Use CFLAGS-y to append the XEN_BUILD_PE define.
- - Check that XEN_BUILD_PE is set to 'y' in order to build the PE
- binary.
-
-Changes since v1:
- - Rename variable.
- - Remove usage of the efi/disabled file.
----
- .gitignore | 1 -
- xen/arch/x86/Makefile | 9 +++++++--
- xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile | 11 +++--------
- xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 4 +++-
- 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
-index 55b78008c0..1625a8f0e7 100644
---- a/.gitignore
-+++ b/.gitignore
-@@ -302,7 +302,6 @@ xen/arch/x86/boot/*.bin
- xen/arch/x86/boot/*.lnk
- xen/arch/x86/efi.lds
- xen/arch/x86/efi/check.efi
--xen/arch/x86/efi/disabled
- xen/arch/x86/efi/mkreloc
- xen/arch/*/efi/boot.c
- xen/arch/*/efi/compat.c
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-index 5563c813dd..172685fb41 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-@@ -163,10 +163,15 @@ EFI_LDFLAGS += --minor-image-version=$(XEN_SUBVERSION)
- EFI_LDFLAGS += --major-os-version=2 --minor-os-version=0
- EFI_LDFLAGS += --major-subsystem-version=2 --minor-subsystem-version=0
-
-+# Check if the build system supports PE.
-+XEN_BUILD_PE := $(shell $(CC) $(filter-out $(CFLAGS-y) .%.d,$(CFLAGS)) -c efi/check.c -o efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y)
-+export XEN_BUILD_PE := $(if $(XEN_BUILD_PE),$(shell $(LD) -mi386pep --subsystem=10 -o efi/check.efi efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y))
-+CFLAGS-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += -DXEN_BUILD_PE
-+
- $(TARGET).efi: VIRT_BASE = 0x$(shell $(NM) efi/relocs-dummy.o | sed -n 's, A VIRT_START$$,,p')
- $(TARGET).efi: ALT_BASE = 0x$(shell $(NM) efi/relocs-dummy.o | sed -n 's, A ALT_START$$,,p')
- # Don't use $(wildcard ...) here - at least make 3.80 expands this too early!
--$(TARGET).efi: guard = $(if $(shell echo efi/dis* | grep disabled),:)
-+$(TARGET).efi: guard = $(if $(filter y,$(XEN_BUILD_PE)),,:)
-
- ifneq ($(build_id_linker),)
- ifeq ($(call ld-ver-build-id,$(LD) $(filter -m%,$(EFI_LDFLAGS))),y)
-@@ -232,6 +237,6 @@ efi/mkreloc: efi/mkreloc.c
- clean::
- rm -f asm-offsets.s *.lds boot/*.o boot/*~ boot/core boot/mkelf32
- rm -f $(BASEDIR)/.xen-syms.[0-9]* boot/.*.d
-- rm -f $(BASEDIR)/.xen.efi.[0-9]* efi/*.efi efi/disabled efi/mkreloc
-+ rm -f $(BASEDIR)/.xen.efi.[0-9]* efi/*.efi efi/mkreloc
- rm -f boot/cmdline.S boot/reloc.S boot/*.lnk boot/*.bin
- rm -f note.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-index 3be9661108..918383b325 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-@@ -1,16 +1,11 @@
- CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
-
--efi := y$(shell rm -f disabled)
--efi := $(if $(efi),$(shell $(CC) $(filter-out $(CFLAGS-y) .%.d,$(CFLAGS)) -c check.c 2>disabled && echo y))
--efi := $(if $(efi),$(shell $(LD) -mi386pep --subsystem=10 -o check.efi check.o 2>disabled && echo y))
--efi := $(if $(efi),$(shell rm disabled)y)
--
- %.o: %.ihex
- $(OBJCOPY) -I ihex -O binary $< $@
-
- boot.init.o: buildid.o
-
- obj-y := stub.o
--obj-$(efi) := boot.init.o compat.o relocs-dummy.o runtime.o
--extra-$(efi) += buildid.o
--nocov-$(efi) += stub.o
-+obj-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) := boot.init.o compat.o relocs-dummy.o runtime.o
-+extra-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += buildid.o
-+nocov-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += stub.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-index 326e885402..4a59467986 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-@@ -304,7 +304,9 @@ SECTIONS
- } :text
- #endif
-
-- efi = DEFINED(efi) ? efi : .;
-+#ifndef XEN_BUILD_PE
-+ efi = .;
-+#endif
-
- /* Sections to be discarded */
- /DISCARD/ : {
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-x86-replace-usage-in-the-linker-script.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0001-x86-replace-usage-in-the-linker-script.patch
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From e21ba44f771226a5f6f0ce269aabcfb019eae539 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2018 10:48:18 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] x86: replace '||' usage in the linker script
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-With '|'. The result is the same, and the later works with lld. Fixes
-the following error when building Xen with lld:
-
-ld -melf_x86_64_fbsd -T xen.lds -N prelink.o --build-id=sha1 \
- /root/src/xen/xen/common/symbols-dummy.o -o /root/src/xen/xen/.xen-syms.0
-ld: error: xen.lds:260: malformed number: |
->>> ASSERT(__image_base__ > (((((((((261 >> 8) * 0xffff000000000000) | (261 << 39))) + ((1 << 39) / 2)) + (64 << 30)) + (1 << 30)) + (1 << 30))) ||
->>> ^
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-index 70afedd31d..326e885402 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ SECTIONS
- .comment 0 : { *(.comment) }
- }
-
--ASSERT(__image_base__ > XEN_VIRT_START ||
-+ASSERT(__image_base__ > XEN_VIRT_START |
- __2M_rwdata_end <= XEN_VIRT_END - NR_CPUS * PAGE_SIZE,
- "Xen image overlaps stubs area")
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0002-x86-efi-split-compiler-vs-linker-support.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0002-x86-efi-split-compiler-vs-linker-support.patch
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From fe810e9bcbca982a2f6980d119695c7e933c39bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 10:58:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/efi: split compiler vs linker support
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-So that an ELF binary with support for EFI services will be built when
-the compiler supports the MS ABI, regardless of the linker support for
-PE.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
-Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Cc: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
----
-Changes since v1:
- - New in this version.
----
- xen/arch/x86/Makefile | 9 +++++----
- xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile | 6 +++---
- xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 2 +-
- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-index 172685fb41..17e7d3fa34 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-@@ -163,10 +163,11 @@ EFI_LDFLAGS += --minor-image-version=$(XEN_SUBVERSION)
- EFI_LDFLAGS += --major-os-version=2 --minor-os-version=0
- EFI_LDFLAGS += --major-subsystem-version=2 --minor-subsystem-version=0
-
--# Check if the build system supports PE.
--XEN_BUILD_PE := $(shell $(CC) $(filter-out $(CFLAGS-y) .%.d,$(CFLAGS)) -c efi/check.c -o efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y)
--export XEN_BUILD_PE := $(if $(XEN_BUILD_PE),$(shell $(LD) -mi386pep --subsystem=10 -o efi/check.efi efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y))
--CFLAGS-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += -DXEN_BUILD_PE
-+# Check if the compiler supports the MS ABI.
-+export XEN_BUILD_EFI := $(shell $(CC) $(filter-out $(CFLAGS-y) .%.d,$(CFLAGS)) -c efi/check.c -o efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y)
-+# Check if the linker supports PE.
-+XEN_BUILD_PE := $(if $(XEN_BUILD_EFI),$(shell $(LD) -mi386pep --subsystem=10 -o efi/check.efi efi/check.o 2>/dev/null && echo y))
-+CFLAGS-$(XEN_BUILD_EFI) += -DXEN_BUILD_EFI
-
- $(TARGET).efi: VIRT_BASE = 0x$(shell $(NM) efi/relocs-dummy.o | sed -n 's, A VIRT_START$$,,p')
- $(TARGET).efi: ALT_BASE = 0x$(shell $(NM) efi/relocs-dummy.o | sed -n 's, A ALT_START$$,,p')
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-index 918383b325..3816de2738 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-@@ -6,6 +6,6 @@ CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
- boot.init.o: buildid.o
-
- obj-y := stub.o
--obj-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) := boot.init.o compat.o relocs-dummy.o runtime.o
--extra-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += buildid.o
--nocov-$(XEN_BUILD_PE) += stub.o
-+obj-$(XEN_BUILD_EFI) := boot.init.o compat.o relocs-dummy.o runtime.o
-+extra-$(XEN_BUILD_EFI) += buildid.o
-+nocov-$(XEN_BUILD_EFI) += stub.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-index 4a59467986..6e9bda5109 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ SECTIONS
- } :text
- #endif
-
--#ifndef XEN_BUILD_PE
-+#ifndef XEN_BUILD_EFI
- efi = .;
- #endif
-
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0031-tools-oxenstored-Make-evaluation-order-explicit.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0031-tools-oxenstored-Make-evaluation-order-explicit.patch
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From e6441a804b76797c6ebac81b7d70ff19e5df9188 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 17:26:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 31/42] tools/oxenstored: Make evaluation order explicit
-
-In Store.path_write(), Path.apply_modify() updates the node_created
-reference and both the value of apply_modify() and node_created are
-returned by path_write().
-
-At least with OCaml 4.06.1 this leads to the value of node_created being
-returned *before* it is updated by apply_modify(). This in turn leads
-to the quota for a domain not being updated in Store.write(). Hence, a
-guest can create an unlimited number of entries in xenstore.
-
-The fix is to make evaluation order explicit.
-
-This is XSA-272.
-
-Signed-off-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 73392c7fd14c59f8c96e0b2eeeb329e4ae9086b6)
----
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
-index 13cf3b5bf4..5a8c377603 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
-@@ -262,7 +262,8 @@ let path_write store perm path value =
- Node.check_perm store.root perm Perms.WRITE;
- Node.set_value store.root value, false
- ) else
-- Path.apply_modify store.root path do_write, !node_created
-+ let root = Path.apply_modify store.root path do_write in
-+ root, !node_created
-
- let path_rm store perm path =
- let do_rm node name =
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0041-xl.conf-Add-global-affinity-masks.patch
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/files/0041-xl.conf-Add-global-affinity-masks.patch
@@ -1,431 +0,0 @@
-From d757c29ffe2e31b15397e43cd58da88b6318b654 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2018 15:35:34 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 41/42] xl.conf: Add global affinity masks
-
-XSA-273 involves one hyperthread being able to use Spectre-like
-techniques to "spy" on another thread. The details are somewhat
-complicated, but the upshot is that after all Xen-based mitigations
-have been applied:
-
-* PV guests cannot spy on sibling threads
-* HVM guests can spy on sibling threads
-
-(NB that for purposes of this vulnerability, PVH and HVM guests are
-identical. Whenever this comment refers to 'HVM', this includes PVH.)
-
-There are many possible mitigations to this, including disabling
-hyperthreading entirely. But another solution would be:
-
-* Specify some cores as PV-only, others as PV or HVM
-* Allow HVM guests to only run on thread 0 of the "HVM-or-PV" cores
-* Allow PV guests to run on the above cores, as well as any thread of the PV-only cores.
-
-For example, suppose you had 16 threads across 8 cores (0-7). You
-could specify 0-3 as PV-only, and 4-7 as HVM-or-PV. Then you'd set
-the affinity of the HVM guests as follows (binary representation):
-
-0000000010101010
-
-And the affinity of the PV guests as follows:
-
-1111111110101010
-
-In order to make this easy, this patches introduces three "global affinity
-masks", placed in xl.conf:
-
- vm.cpumask
- vm.hvm.cpumask
- vm.pv.cpumask
-
-These are parsed just like the 'cpus' and 'cpus_soft' options in the
-per-domain xl configuration files. The resulting mask is AND-ed with
-whatever mask results at the end of the xl configuration file.
-`vm.cpumask` would be applied to all guest types, `vm.hvm.cpumask`
-would be applied to HVM and PVH guest types, and `vm.pv.cpumask`
-would be applied to PV guest types.
-
-The idea would be that to implement the above mask across all your
-VMs, you'd simply add the following two lines to the configuration
-file:
-
- vm.hvm.cpumask=8,10,12,14
- vm.pv.cpumask=0-8,10,12,14
-
-See xl.conf manpage for details.
-
-This is part of XSA-273 / CVE-2018-3646.
-
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit aa67b97ed34279c43a43d9ca46727b5746caa92e)
----
- docs/man/xl.conf.pod.5 | 22 ++++++++++++
- tools/examples/xl.conf | 5 +++
- tools/xl/xl.c | 26 ++++++++++++++
- tools/xl/xl.h | 7 ++++
- tools/xl/xl_cmdtable.c | 6 ++--
- tools/xl/xl_vcpu.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++--
- 7 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/man/xl.conf.pod.5 b/docs/man/xl.conf.pod.5
-index da91b8626c..37262a7ef8 100644
---- a/docs/man/xl.conf.pod.5
-+++ b/docs/man/xl.conf.pod.5
-@@ -185,6 +185,28 @@ massively huge guests).
-
- =back
-
-+=item B<vm.cpumask>="CPULIST"
-+
-+=item B<vm.hvm.cpumask>="CPULIST"
-+
-+=item B<vm.pv.cpumask>="CPULIST"
-+
-+Global masks that are applied when creating guests and pinning vcpus
-+to indicate which cpus they are allowed to run on. Specifically,
-+C<vm.cpumask> applies to all guest types, C<vm.hvm.cpumask> applies to
-+both HVM and PVH guests and C<vm.pv.cpumask> applies to PV guests.
-+
-+The hard affinity of guest's vcpus are logical-AND'ed with respective
-+masks. If the resulting affinity mask is empty, operation will fail.
-+
-+Use --ignore-global-affinity-masks to skip applying global masks.
-+
-+The default value for these masks are all 1's, i.e. all cpus are allowed.
-+
-+Due to bug(s), these options may not interact well with other options
-+concerning CPU affinity. One example is CPU pools. Users should always double
-+check that the required affinity has taken effect.
-+
- =back
-
- =head1 SEE ALSO
-diff --git a/tools/examples/xl.conf b/tools/examples/xl.conf
-index 374b6bbc2e..0446deb304 100644
---- a/tools/examples/xl.conf
-+++ b/tools/examples/xl.conf
-@@ -37,3 +37,8 @@
- # (which can take a long time to find out if launching huge guests).
- # see xl.conf(5) for details.
- #claim_mode=1
-+
-+# Specify global vcpu hard affinity masks. See xl.conf(5) for details.
-+#vm.cpumask="0-7"
-+#vm.pv.cpumask="0-3"
-+#vm.hvm.cpumask="3-7"
-diff --git a/tools/xl/xl.c b/tools/xl/xl.c
-index 179908b4f6..7d2142f16f 100644
---- a/tools/xl/xl.c
-+++ b/tools/xl/xl.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
- #include <libxl_utils.h>
- #include <libxlutil.h>
- #include "xl.h"
-+#include "xl_parse.h"
-+
-+#include "xl_utils.h"
-
- xentoollog_logger_stdiostream *logger;
- int dryrun_only;
-@@ -42,6 +45,9 @@ char *default_gatewaydev = NULL;
- char *default_vifbackend = NULL;
- char *default_remus_netbufscript = NULL;
- char *default_colo_proxy_script = NULL;
-+libxl_bitmap global_vm_affinity_mask;
-+libxl_bitmap global_hvm_affinity_mask;
-+libxl_bitmap global_pv_affinity_mask;
- enum output_format default_output_format = OUTPUT_FORMAT_JSON;
- int claim_mode = 1;
- bool progress_use_cr = 0;
-@@ -203,6 +209,26 @@ static void parse_global_config(const char *configfile,
- if (!xlu_cfg_get_long (config, "max_maptrack_frames", &l, 0))
- max_maptrack_frames = l;
-
-+ libxl_bitmap_init(&global_vm_affinity_mask);
-+ libxl_cpu_bitmap_alloc(ctx, &global_vm_affinity_mask, 0);
-+ libxl_bitmap_init(&global_hvm_affinity_mask);
-+ libxl_cpu_bitmap_alloc(ctx, &global_hvm_affinity_mask, 0);
-+ libxl_bitmap_init(&global_pv_affinity_mask);
-+ libxl_cpu_bitmap_alloc(ctx, &global_pv_affinity_mask, 0);
-+
-+ if (!xlu_cfg_get_string (config, "vm.cpumask", &buf, 0))
-+ parse_cpurange(buf, &global_vm_affinity_mask);
-+ else
-+ libxl_bitmap_set_any(&global_vm_affinity_mask);
-+ if (!xlu_cfg_get_string (config, "vm.hvm.cpumask", &buf, 0))
-+ parse_cpurange(buf, &global_hvm_affinity_mask);
-+ else
-+ libxl_bitmap_set_any(&global_hvm_affinity_mask);
-+ if (!xlu_cfg_get_string (config, "vm.pv.cpumask", &buf, 0))
-+ parse_cpurange(buf, &global_pv_affinity_mask);
-+ else
-+ libxl_bitmap_set_any(&global_pv_affinity_mask);
-+
- xlu_cfg_destroy(config);
- }
-
-diff --git a/tools/xl/xl.h b/tools/xl/xl.h
-index 4e784ff402..7e97144b50 100644
---- a/tools/xl/xl.h
-+++ b/tools/xl/xl.h
-@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct domain_create {
- int vncautopass;
- int console_autoconnect;
- int checkpointed_stream;
-+ int ignore_global_affinity_masks;
- const char *config_file;
- char *extra_config; /* extra config string */
- const char *restore_file;
-@@ -279,6 +280,9 @@ extern char *default_colo_proxy_script;
- extern char *blkdev_start;
- extern int max_grant_frames;
- extern int max_maptrack_frames;
-+extern libxl_bitmap global_vm_affinity_mask;
-+extern libxl_bitmap global_hvm_affinity_mask;
-+extern libxl_bitmap global_pv_affinity_mask;
-
- enum output_format {
- OUTPUT_FORMAT_JSON,
-@@ -294,6 +298,9 @@ typedef enum {
- } domain_restart_type;
-
- extern void printf_info_sexp(int domid, libxl_domain_config *d_config, FILE *fh);
-+extern void apply_global_affinity_masks(libxl_domain_type type,
-+ libxl_bitmap *vcpu_affinity_array,
-+ unsigned int size);
-
- #define XL_GLOBAL_CONFIG XEN_CONFIG_DIR "/xl.conf"
- #define XL_LOCK_FILE XEN_LOCK_DIR "/xl"
-diff --git a/tools/xl/xl_cmdtable.c b/tools/xl/xl_cmdtable.c
-index bf2ced8140..54c2db6022 100644
---- a/tools/xl/xl_cmdtable.c
-+++ b/tools/xl/xl_cmdtable.c
-@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ struct cmd_spec cmd_table[] = {
- "-e Do not wait in the background for the death of the domain.\n"
- "-V, --vncviewer Connect to the VNC display after the domain is created.\n"
- "-A, --vncviewer-autopass\n"
-- " Pass VNC password to viewer via stdin."
-+ " Pass VNC password to viewer via stdin.\n"
-+ "--ignore-global-affinity-masks Ignore global masks in xl.conf."
- },
- { "config-update",
- &main_config_update, 1, 1,
-@@ -224,7 +225,8 @@ struct cmd_spec cmd_table[] = {
- &main_vcpupin, 1, 1,
- "Set which CPUs a VCPU can use",
- "[option] <Domain> <VCPU|all> <Hard affinity|-|all> <Soft affinity|-|all>",
-- "-f, --force undo an override pinning done by the kernel",
-+ "-f, --force undo an override pinning done by the kernel\n"
-+ "--ignore-global-affinity-masks Ignore global masks in xl.conf",
- },
- { "vcpu-set",
- &main_vcpuset, 0, 1,
-diff --git a/tools/xl/xl_vcpu.c b/tools/xl/xl_vcpu.c
-index 8e735b38c1..3384eeed06 100644
---- a/tools/xl/xl_vcpu.c
-+++ b/tools/xl/xl_vcpu.c
-@@ -68,6 +68,61 @@ static void print_domain_vcpuinfo(uint32_t domid, uint32_t nr_cpus)
- libxl_vcpuinfo_list_free(vcpuinfo, nb_vcpu);
- }
-
-+void apply_global_affinity_masks(libxl_domain_type type,
-+ libxl_bitmap *vcpu_affinity_array,
-+ unsigned int size)
-+{
-+ libxl_bitmap *mask = &global_vm_affinity_mask;
-+ libxl_bitmap *type_mask;
-+ unsigned int i;
-+
-+ switch (type) {
-+ case LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM:
-+ case LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_PVH:
-+ type_mask = &global_hvm_affinity_mask;
-+ break;
-+ case LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_PV:
-+ type_mask = &global_pv_affinity_mask;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown guest type\n");
-+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+ }
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-+ int rc;
-+ libxl_bitmap *t = &vcpu_affinity_array[i];
-+ libxl_bitmap b1, b2;
-+
-+ libxl_bitmap_init(&b1);
-+ libxl_bitmap_init(&b2);
-+
-+ rc = libxl_bitmap_and(ctx, &b1, t, mask);
-+ if (rc) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "libxl_bitmap_and errored\n");
-+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+ }
-+ rc = libxl_bitmap_and(ctx, &b2, &b1, type_mask);
-+ if (rc) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "libxl_bitmap_and errored\n");
-+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (libxl_bitmap_is_empty(&b2)) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "vcpu hard affinity map is empty\n");
-+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Replace target bitmap with the result */
-+ libxl_bitmap_dispose(t);
-+ libxl_bitmap_init(t);
-+ libxl_bitmap_copy_alloc(ctx, t, &b2);
-+
-+ libxl_bitmap_dispose(&b1);
-+ libxl_bitmap_dispose(&b2);
-+ }
-+}
-+
- static void vcpulist(int argc, char **argv)
- {
- libxl_dominfo *dominfo;
-@@ -118,6 +173,7 @@ int main_vcpupin(int argc, char **argv)
- {
- static struct option opts[] = {
- {"force", 0, 0, 'f'},
-+ {"ignore-global-affinity-masks", 0, 0, 'i'},
- COMMON_LONG_OPTS
- };
- libxl_vcpuinfo *vcpuinfo;
-@@ -132,15 +188,18 @@ int main_vcpupin(int argc, char **argv)
- const char *vcpu, *hard_str, *soft_str;
- char *endptr;
- int opt, nb_cpu, nb_vcpu, rc = EXIT_FAILURE;
-- bool force = false;
-+ bool force = false, ignore_masks = false;
-
- libxl_bitmap_init(&cpumap_hard);
- libxl_bitmap_init(&cpumap_soft);
-
-- SWITCH_FOREACH_OPT(opt, "f", opts, "vcpu-pin", 3) {
-+ SWITCH_FOREACH_OPT(opt, "fi", opts, "vcpu-pin", 3) {
- case 'f':
- force = true;
- break;
-+ case 'i':
-+ ignore_masks = true;
-+ break;
- default:
- break;
- }
-@@ -222,6 +281,23 @@ int main_vcpupin(int argc, char **argv)
- goto out;
- }
-
-+ /* Only hard affinity matters here */
-+ if (!ignore_masks) {
-+ libxl_domain_config d_config;
-+
-+ libxl_domain_config_init(&d_config);
-+ rc = libxl_retrieve_domain_configuration(ctx, domid, &d_config);
-+ if (rc) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not retrieve domain configuration\n");
-+ libxl_domain_config_dispose(&d_config);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ apply_global_affinity_masks(d_config.b_info.type, hard, 1);
-+
-+ libxl_domain_config_dispose(&d_config);
-+ }
-+
- if (force) {
- if (libxl_set_vcpuaffinity_force(ctx, domid, vcpuid, hard, soft)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not set affinity for vcpu `%ld'.\n",
-diff --git a/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c b/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c
-index 89c2b25ded..a1d633795c 100644
---- a/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c
-+++ b/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c
-@@ -804,6 +804,36 @@ int create_domain(struct domain_create *dom_info)
- parse_config_data(config_source, config_data, config_len, &d_config);
- }
-
-+ if (!dom_info->ignore_global_affinity_masks) {
-+ libxl_domain_build_info *b_info = &d_config.b_info;
-+
-+ /* It is possible that no hard affinity is specified in config file.
-+ * Generate hard affinity maps now if we care about those.
-+ */
-+ if (b_info->num_vcpu_hard_affinity == 0 &&
-+ (!libxl_bitmap_is_full(&global_vm_affinity_mask) ||
-+ (b_info->type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_PV &&
-+ !libxl_bitmap_is_full(&global_pv_affinity_mask)) ||
-+ (b_info->type != LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_PV &&
-+ !libxl_bitmap_is_full(&global_hvm_affinity_mask))
-+ )) {
-+ b_info->num_vcpu_hard_affinity = b_info->max_vcpus;
-+ b_info->vcpu_hard_affinity =
-+ xmalloc(b_info->max_vcpus * sizeof(libxl_bitmap));
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < b_info->num_vcpu_hard_affinity; i++) {
-+ libxl_bitmap *m = &b_info->vcpu_hard_affinity[i];
-+ libxl_bitmap_init(m);
-+ libxl_cpu_bitmap_alloc(ctx, m, 0);
-+ libxl_bitmap_set_any(m);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ apply_global_affinity_masks(b_info->type,
-+ b_info->vcpu_hard_affinity,
-+ b_info->num_vcpu_hard_affinity);
-+ }
-+
- if (migrate_fd >= 0) {
- if (d_config.c_info.name) {
- /* when we receive a domain we get its name from the config
-@@ -1124,7 +1154,7 @@ int main_create(int argc, char **argv)
- const char *filename = NULL;
- struct domain_create dom_info;
- int paused = 0, debug = 0, daemonize = 1, console_autoconnect = 0,
-- quiet = 0, monitor = 1, vnc = 0, vncautopass = 0;
-+ quiet = 0, monitor = 1, vnc = 0, vncautopass = 0, ignore_masks = 0;
- int opt, rc;
- static struct option opts[] = {
- {"dryrun", 0, 0, 'n'},
-@@ -1132,6 +1162,7 @@ int main_create(int argc, char **argv)
- {"defconfig", 1, 0, 'f'},
- {"vncviewer", 0, 0, 'V'},
- {"vncviewer-autopass", 0, 0, 'A'},
-+ {"ignore-global-affinity-masks", 0, 0, 'i'},
- COMMON_LONG_OPTS
- };
-
-@@ -1142,7 +1173,7 @@ int main_create(int argc, char **argv)
- argc--; argv++;
- }
-
-- SWITCH_FOREACH_OPT(opt, "Fnqf:pcdeVA", opts, "create", 0) {
-+ SWITCH_FOREACH_OPT(opt, "Fnqf:pcdeVAi", opts, "create", 0) {
- case 'f':
- filename = optarg;
- break;
-@@ -1174,6 +1205,9 @@ int main_create(int argc, char **argv)
- case 'A':
- vnc = vncautopass = 1;
- break;
-+ case 'i':
-+ ignore_masks = 1;
-+ break;
- }
-
- memset(&dom_info, 0, sizeof(dom_info));
-@@ -1203,6 +1237,7 @@ int main_create(int argc, char **argv)
- dom_info.vnc = vnc;
- dom_info.vncautopass = vncautopass;
- dom_info.console_autoconnect = console_autoconnect;
-+ dom_info.ignore_global_affinity_masks = ignore_masks;
-
- rc = create_domain(&dom_info);
- if (rc < 0) {
---
-2.18.0
-
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/pkg-descr
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/pkg-descr
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-The xl program is the new tool for managing Xen guest domains. The program can
-be used to create, pause, and shutdown domains. It can also be used to list
-current domains, enable or pin VCPUs, and attach or detach virtual block devices
-
-WWW: https://wiki.xen.org/wiki/XL
Index: sysutils/xen-tools411/pkg-plist
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ sysutils/xen-tools411/pkg-plist
@@ -1,669 +0,0 @@
-bin/pygrub
-bin/xen-cpuid
-bin/xen-detect
-bin/xenalyze
-bin/xencons
-bin/xencov_split
-bin/xenstore
-bin/xenstore-chmod
-bin/xenstore-control
-bin/xenstore-exists
-bin/xenstore-list
-bin/xenstore-ls
-bin/xenstore-read
-bin/xenstore-rm
-bin/xenstore-watch
-bin/xenstore-write
-bin/xentrace_format
-etc/bash_completion.d/xl.sh
-etc/rc.d/xencommons
-etc/rc.d/xendriverdomain
-%%ETCDIR%%/README
-%%ETCDIR%%/README.incompatibilities
-%%ETCDIR%%/cpupool
-%%ETCDIR%%/scripts/block
-%%ETCDIR%%/scripts/hotplugpath.sh
-%%ETCDIR%%/scripts/vif-bridge
-%%ETCDIR%%/xl.conf
-%%ETCDIR%%/xlexample.hvm
-%%ETCDIR%%/xlexample.pvlinux
-include/_libxl_list.h
-include/_libxl_types.h
-include/_libxl_types_json.h
-include/fsimage.h
-include/fsimage_grub.h
-include/fsimage_plugin.h
-include/libxl.h
-include/libxl_event.h
-include/libxl_json.h
-include/libxl_utils.h
-include/libxl_uuid.h
-include/libxlutil.h
-include/xen/COPYING
-include/xen/arch-arm.h
-include/xen/arch-arm/hvm/save.h
-include/xen/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-include/xen/arch-x86/cpuid.h
-include/xen/arch-x86/hvm/save.h
-include/xen/arch-x86/hvm/start_info.h
-include/xen/arch-x86/pmu.h
-include/xen/arch-x86/xen-mca.h
-include/xen/arch-x86/xen-x86_32.h
-include/xen/arch-x86/xen-x86_64.h
-include/xen/arch-x86/xen.h
-include/xen/arch-x86_32.h
-include/xen/arch-x86_64.h
-include/xen/callback.h
-include/xen/dom0_ops.h
-include/xen/domctl.h
-include/xen/elfnote.h
-include/xen/errno.h
-include/xen/event_channel.h
-include/xen/features.h
-include/xen/foreign/arm32.h
-include/xen/foreign/arm64.h
-include/xen/foreign/x86_32.h
-include/xen/foreign/x86_64.h
-include/xen/grant_table.h
-include/xen/hvm/dm_op.h
-include/xen/hvm/e820.h
-include/xen/hvm/hvm_info_table.h
-include/xen/hvm/hvm_op.h
-include/xen/hvm/hvm_vcpu.h
-include/xen/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h
-include/xen/hvm/ioreq.h
-include/xen/hvm/params.h
-include/xen/hvm/pvdrivers.h
-include/xen/hvm/save.h
-include/xen/io/9pfs.h
-include/xen/io/blkif.h
-include/xen/io/console.h
-include/xen/io/displif.h
-include/xen/io/fbif.h
-include/xen/io/fsif.h
-include/xen/io/kbdif.h
-include/xen/io/libxenvchan.h
-include/xen/io/netif.h
-include/xen/io/pciif.h
-include/xen/io/protocols.h
-include/xen/io/pvcalls.h
-include/xen/io/ring.h
-include/xen/io/sndif.h
-include/xen/io/tpmif.h
-include/xen/io/usbif.h
-include/xen/io/vscsiif.h
-include/xen/io/xenbus.h
-include/xen/io/xs_wire.h
-include/xen/kexec.h
-include/xen/memory.h
-include/xen/nmi.h
-include/xen/physdev.h
-include/xen/platform.h
-include/xen/pmu.h
-include/xen/sched.h
-include/xen/sys/evtchn.h
-include/xen/sys/gntdev.h
-include/xen/sys/privcmd.h
-include/xen/sysctl.h
-include/xen/tmem.h
-include/xen/trace.h
-include/xen/vcpu.h
-include/xen/version.h
-include/xen/vm_event.h
-include/xen/xen-compat.h
-include/xen/xen.h
-include/xen/xencomm.h
-include/xen/xenoprof.h
-include/xen/xsm/flask_op.h
-include/xencall.h
-include/xenctrl.h
-include/xenctrl_compat.h
-include/xendevicemodel.h
-include/xenevtchn.h
-include/xenforeignmemory.h
-include/xengnttab.h
-include/xenguest.h
-include/xenstat.h
-include/xenstore-compat/xs.h
-include/xenstore-compat/xs_lib.h
-include/xenstore.h
-include/xenstore_lib.h
-include/xentoolcore.h
-include/xentoollog.h
-include/xs.h
-include/xs_lib.h
-lib/debug/usr/local/lib/xen/boot/xen-shim-syms
-lib/fs/ext2fs/fsimage.so
-lib/fs/fat/fsimage.so
-lib/fs/iso9660/fsimage.so
-lib/fs/reiserfs/fsimage.so
-lib/fs/ufs/fsimage.so
-lib/fs/xfs/fsimage.so
-lib/fs/zfs/fsimage.so
-lib/libfsimage.so
-lib/libfsimage.so.1.0
-lib/libfsimage.so.1.0.0
-lib/libxencall.a
-lib/libxencall.so
-lib/libxencall.so.1
-lib/libxencall.so.1.1
-lib/libxenctrl.a
-lib/libxenctrl.so
-lib/libxenctrl.so.4.11
-lib/libxenctrl.so.4.11.0
-lib/libxendevicemodel.a
-lib/libxendevicemodel.so
-lib/libxendevicemodel.so.1
-lib/libxendevicemodel.so.1.2
-lib/libxenevtchn.a
-lib/libxenevtchn.so
-lib/libxenevtchn.so.1
-lib/libxenevtchn.so.1.1
-lib/libxenforeignmemory.a
-lib/libxenforeignmemory.so
-lib/libxenforeignmemory.so.1
-lib/libxenforeignmemory.so.1.3
-lib/libxengnttab.a
-lib/libxengnttab.so
-lib/libxengnttab.so.1
-lib/libxengnttab.so.1.1
-lib/libxenguest.a
-lib/libxenguest.so
-lib/libxenguest.so.4.11
-lib/libxenguest.so.4.11.0
-lib/libxenlight.a
-lib/libxenlight.so
-lib/libxenlight.so.4.11
-lib/libxenlight.so.4.11.0
-lib/libxenstat.a
-lib/libxenstat.so
-lib/libxenstat.so.0
-lib/libxenstat.so.0.0
-lib/libxenstore.a
-lib/libxenstore.so
-lib/libxenstore.so.3.0
-lib/libxenstore.so.3.0.3
-lib/libxentoolcore.a
-lib/libxentoolcore.so
-lib/libxentoolcore.so.1
-lib/libxentoolcore.so.1.0
-lib/libxentoollog.a
-lib/libxentoollog.so
-lib/libxentoollog.so.1
-lib/libxentoollog.so.1.0
-lib/libxlutil.a
-lib/libxlutil.so
-lib/libxlutil.so.4.11
-lib/libxlutil.so.4.11.0
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/fsimage.so
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/grub/ExtLinuxConf.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/grub/ExtLinuxConf.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/grub/GrubConf.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/grub/GrubConf.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/grub/LiloConf.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/grub/LiloConf.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/grub/__init__.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/grub/__init__.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/pygrub-0.3-py%%PYTHON_VER%%.egg-info
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen-3.0-py%%PYTHON_VER%%.egg-info
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/__init__.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/__init__.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/lowlevel/__init__.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/lowlevel/__init__.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/lowlevel/xc.so
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/lowlevel/xs.so
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/__init__.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/__init__.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/legacy.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/legacy.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/libxc.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/libxc.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/libxl.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/libxl.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/public.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/public.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/tests.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/tests.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/verify.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/verify.pyc
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/xl.py
-%%PYTHON_SITELIBDIR%%/xen/migration/xl.pyc
-lib/xen/bin/convert-legacy-stream
-lib/xen/bin/libxl-save-helper
-lib/xen/bin/lsevtchn
-lib/xen/bin/pygrub
-lib/xen/bin/qemu-img
-lib/xen/bin/qemu-io
-lib/xen/bin/qemu-nbd
-lib/xen/bin/qemu-system-i386
-lib/xen/bin/readnotes
-lib/xen/bin/verify-stream-v2
-lib/xen/bin/xen-init-dom0
-lib/xen/bin/xenconsole
-lib/xen/bin/xenctx
-lib/xen/bin/xenpaging
-lib/xen/bin/xenpvnetboot
-lib/xen/boot/hvmloader
-lib/xen/boot/xen-shim
-libdata/pkgconfig/xencall.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xencontrol.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xendevicemodel.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xenevtchn.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xenforeignmemory.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xengnttab.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xenguest.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xenlight.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xenstat.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xenstore.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xentoolcore.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xentoollog.pc
-libdata/pkgconfig/xlutil.pc
-sbin/flask-get-bool
-sbin/flask-getenforce
-sbin/flask-label-pci
-sbin/flask-loadpolicy
-sbin/flask-set-bool
-sbin/flask-setenforce
-sbin/gdbsx
-sbin/kdd
-sbin/xen-bugtool
-sbin/xen-diag
-sbin/xen-hptool
-sbin/xen-hvmcrash
-sbin/xen-hvmctx
-sbin/xen-livepatch
-sbin/xen-lowmemd
-sbin/xen-mfndump
-sbin/xen-ringwatch
-sbin/xen-tmem-list-parse
-sbin/xenbaked
-sbin/xenconsoled
-sbin/xencov
-sbin/xenlockprof
-sbin/xenmon.py
-sbin/xenperf
-sbin/xenpm
-sbin/xenpmd
-sbin/xenstored
-sbin/xentop
-sbin/xentrace
-sbin/xentrace_setmask
-sbin/xentrace_setsize
-sbin/xenwatchdogd
-sbin/xl
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/.deps
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,arch-arm,hvm,save.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,arch-arm,smccc.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,arch-arm.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,callback.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,dom0_ops.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,domctl.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,elfnote.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,errno.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,event_channel.h.html
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-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,grant_table.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,hvm,dm_op.h.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/include,public,hvm,e820.h.html
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-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/arm/index.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/index.html
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/x86_32/.deps
-%%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/hypercall/x86_32/include,public,arch-x86,cpufeatureset.h.html
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