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Index: head/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
===================================================================
--- head/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
+++ head/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
PORTNAME= xen
PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel
PORTVERSION= 4.5.2
-PORTREVISION= 1
+PORTREVISION= 2
CATEGORIES= emulators
MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PORTVERSION}/
@@ -31,10 +31,15 @@
${FILESDIR}/0005-x86-rework-paging_log_dirty_op-to-work-with-hvm-gues.patch:-p2 \
${FILESDIR}/0006-xen-pvh-enable-mmu_update-hypercall.patch:-p2 \
${FILESDIR}/0007-iommu-fix-usage-of-shared-EPT-IOMMU-page-tables-on-P.patch:-p2 \
+ ${FILESDIR}/0001-x86-pvh-use-a-custom-IO-bitmap-for-PVH-hardware-doma.patch:-p2 \
+ ${FILESDIR}/0002-x86-pvh-trap-access-to-sensitive-IO-ports.patch:-p2 \
${FILESDIR}/xsa156-4.5.patch:-p2 \
${FILESDIR}/xsa159.patch:-p2 \
${FILESDIR}/xsa165-4.5.patch:-p2 \
- ${FILESDIR}/xsa166-4.5.patch:-p2
+ ${FILESDIR}/xsa166-4.5.patch:-p2 \
+ ${FILESDIR}/xsa167-4.6.patch:-p2 \
+ ${FILESDIR}/xsa168.patch:-p2 \
+ ${FILESDIR}/xsa170-4.5.patch:-p2
.include <bsd.port.options.mk>
Index: head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-pvh-use-a-custom-IO-bitmap-for-PVH-hardware-doma.patch
===================================================================
--- head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-pvh-use-a-custom-IO-bitmap-for-PVH-hardware-doma.patch
+++ head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0001-x86-pvh-use-a-custom-IO-bitmap-for-PVH-hardware-doma.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+From 8ddb99287cd18da99a95a9f70904a97b52893599 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 May 2015 13:26:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86/pvh: use a custom IO bitmap for PVH hardware domains
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Since a PVH hardware domain has access to the physical hardware create a
+custom more permissive IO bitmap. The permissions set on the bitmap are
+populated based on the contents of the ioports rangeset.
+
+Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c | 2 +-
+ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 4 ++--
+ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ xen/common/domain.c | 3 +++
+ xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h | 2 ++
+ xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h | 1 +
+ 7 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+index 689e402..89423fa 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+@@ -77,9 +77,13 @@ integer_param("hvm_debug", opt_hvm_debug_level);
+
+ struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs __read_mostly;
+
+-/* I/O permission bitmap is globally shared by all HVM guests. */
++/*
++ * The I/O permission bitmap is globally shared by all HVM guests except
++ * the hardware domain which needs a more permissive one.
++ */
++#define HVM_IOBITMAP_SIZE (3 * PAGE_SIZE)
+ unsigned long __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned")))
+- hvm_io_bitmap[3*PAGE_SIZE/BYTES_PER_LONG];
++ hvm_io_bitmap[HVM_IOBITMAP_SIZE / BYTES_PER_LONG];
+
+ /* Xen command-line option to enable HAP */
+ static bool_t __initdata opt_hap_enabled = 1;
+@@ -1461,6 +1465,20 @@ int hvm_domain_initialise(struct domain *d)
+ goto fail1;
+ d->arch.hvm_domain.io_handler->num_slot = 0;
+
++ /* Set the default IO Bitmap. */
++ if ( is_hardware_domain(d) )
++ {
++ d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap = _xmalloc(HVM_IOBITMAP_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
++ if ( d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap == NULL )
++ {
++ rc = -ENOMEM;
++ goto fail1;
++ }
++ memset(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap, ~0, HVM_IOBITMAP_SIZE);
++ }
++ else
++ d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap = hvm_io_bitmap;
++
+ if ( is_pvh_domain(d) )
+ {
+ register_portio_handler(d, 0, 0x10003, handle_pvh_io);
+@@ -1496,6 +1514,8 @@ int hvm_domain_initialise(struct domain *d)
+ stdvga_deinit(d);
+ vioapic_deinit(d);
+ fail1:
++ if ( is_hardware_domain(d) )
++ xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap);
+ xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_handler);
+ xfree(d->arch.hvm_domain.params);
+ fail0:
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
+index 21292bb..6339d2a 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
+@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static int construct_vmcb(struct vcpu *v)
+ svm_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_LWP_CBADDR);
+
+ vmcb->_msrpm_base_pa = (u64)virt_to_maddr(arch_svm->msrpm);
+- vmcb->_iopm_base_pa = (u64)virt_to_maddr(hvm_io_bitmap);
++ vmcb->_iopm_base_pa = __pa(v->domain->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap);
+
+ /* Virtualise EFLAGS.IF and LAPIC TPR (CR8). */
+ vmcb->_vintr.fields.intr_masking = 1;
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+index 3123706..355d1b5 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+@@ -1032,8 +1032,8 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
+ }
+
+ /* I/O access bitmap. */
+- __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_A, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + 0));
+- __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + PAGE_SIZE));
++ __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_A, __pa(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap));
++ __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, __pa(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap) + PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
+ {
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+index 2b9787a..cd333f9 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+@@ -1446,6 +1446,8 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
+
+ dmi_end_boot();
+
++ setup_io_bitmap(dom0);
++
+ system_state = SYS_STATE_active;
+
+ domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(dom0);
+@@ -1509,6 +1511,32 @@ int __hwdom_init xen_in_range(unsigned long mfn)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++static int __hwdom_init io_bitmap_cb(unsigned long s, unsigned long e,
++ void *ctx)
++{
++ struct domain *d = ctx;
++ unsigned int i;
++
++ ASSERT(e <= INT_MAX);
++ for ( i = s; i <= e; i++ )
++ __clear_bit(i, d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void __hwdom_init setup_io_bitmap(struct domain *d)
++{
++ int rc;
++
++ if ( has_hvm_container_domain(d) )
++ {
++ bitmap_fill(d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap, 0x10000);
++ rc = rangeset_report_ranges(d->arch.ioport_caps, 0, 0x10000,
++ io_bitmap_cb, d);
++ BUG_ON(rc);
++ }
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
+index 6803c4d..b0e83f5 100644
+--- a/xen/common/domain.c
++++ b/xen/common/domain.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
+ #include <xsm/xsm.h>
+ #include <xen/trace.h>
+ #include <xen/tmem.h>
++#include <asm/setup.h>
+
+ /* Linux config option: propageted to domain0 */
+ /* xen_processor_pmbits: xen control Cx, Px, ... */
+@@ -219,6 +220,8 @@ static int late_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
+ rangeset_swap(d->iomem_caps, dom0->iomem_caps);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ rangeset_swap(d->arch.ioport_caps, dom0->arch.ioport_caps);
++ setup_io_bitmap(d);
++ setup_io_bitmap(dom0);
+ #endif
+
+ rcu_unlock_domain(dom0);
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
+index 0f8b19a..bdab45d 100644
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
+@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ struct hvm_domain {
+ */
+ uint64_t sync_tsc;
+
++ unsigned long *io_bitmap;
++
+ union {
+ struct vmx_domain vmx;
+ struct svm_domain svm;
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
+index 08bc23a..381d9f8 100644
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ int construct_dom0(
+ module_t *initrd,
+ void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *),
+ char *cmdline);
++void setup_io_bitmap(struct domain *d);
+
+ unsigned long initial_images_nrpages(nodeid_t node);
+ void discard_initial_images(void);
+--
+2.5.4 (Apple Git-61)
+
Index: head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0002-x86-pvh-trap-access-to-sensitive-IO-ports.patch
===================================================================
--- head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0002-x86-pvh-trap-access-to-sensitive-IO-ports.patch
+++ head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/0002-x86-pvh-trap-access-to-sensitive-IO-ports.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 72d5acdc1d5b83107066e25054f9119e7771cf70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 May 2015 13:27:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/pvh: trap access to sensitive IO ports
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This is needed so Xen can properly trap 4 byte accesses to 0xcf8 in order to
+keep consistency with accesses to 0xcfc.
+
+The access to RTC ports also needs to be trapped in order to keep
+consistency, this includes RTC_PORT(0) and RTC_PORT(1) (0x70 and 0x71
+respectively).
+
+Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+index cd333f9..2cc9185 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
+ #include <xen/cpu.h>
+ #include <asm/nmi.h>
+ #include <asm/alternative.h>
++#include <asm/mc146818rtc.h>
+
+ /* opt_nosmp: If true, secondary processors are ignored. */
+ static bool_t __initdata opt_nosmp;
+@@ -1534,6 +1535,16 @@ void __hwdom_init setup_io_bitmap(struct domain *d)
+ rc = rangeset_report_ranges(d->arch.ioport_caps, 0, 0x10000,
+ io_bitmap_cb, d);
+ BUG_ON(rc);
++ /*
++ * NB: we need to trap accesses to 0xcf8 in order to intercept
++ * 4 byte accesses, that need to be handled by Xen in order to
++ * keep consistency.
++ * Access to 1 byte RTC ports also needs to be trapped in order
++ * to keep consistency with PV.
++ */
++ __set_bit(0xcf8, d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap);
++ __set_bit(RTC_PORT(0), d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap);
++ __set_bit(RTC_PORT(1), d->arch.hvm_domain.io_bitmap);
+ }
+ }
+
+--
+2.5.4 (Apple Git-61)
+
Index: head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa167-4.6.patch
===================================================================
--- head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa167-4.6.patch
+++ head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa167-4.6.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+x86/mm: PV superpage handling lacks sanity checks
+
+MMUEXT_{,UN}MARK_SUPER fail to check the input MFN for validity before
+dereferencing pointers into the superpage frame table.
+
+get_superpage() has a similar issue.
+
+This is XSA-167.
+
+Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -2624,6 +2624,9 @@ int get_superpage(unsigned long mfn, str
+
+ ASSERT(opt_allow_superpage);
+
++ if ( !mfn_valid(mfn | (L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1)) )
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ spage = mfn_to_spage(mfn);
+ y = spage->type_info;
+ do {
+@@ -3401,42 +3404,26 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
+ }
+
+ case MMUEXT_MARK_SUPER:
++ case MMUEXT_UNMARK_SUPER:
+ {
+ unsigned long mfn = op.arg1.mfn;
+
+- if ( unlikely(d != pg_owner) )
+- rc = -EPERM;
+- else if ( mfn & (L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES-1) )
+- {
+- MEM_LOG("Unaligned superpage reference mfn %lx", mfn);
+- okay = 0;
+- }
+- else if ( !opt_allow_superpage )
++ if ( !opt_allow_superpage )
+ {
+ MEM_LOG("Superpages disallowed");
+ rc = -ENOSYS;
+ }
+- else
+- rc = mark_superpage(mfn_to_spage(mfn), d);
+- break;
+- }
+-
+- case MMUEXT_UNMARK_SUPER:
+- {
+- unsigned long mfn = op.arg1.mfn;
+-
+- if ( unlikely(d != pg_owner) )
++ else if ( unlikely(d != pg_owner) )
+ rc = -EPERM;
+- else if ( mfn & (L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES-1) )
++ else if ( mfn & (L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1) )
+ {
+ MEM_LOG("Unaligned superpage reference mfn %lx", mfn);
+- okay = 0;
+- }
+- else if ( !opt_allow_superpage )
+- {
+- MEM_LOG("Superpages disallowed");
+- rc = -ENOSYS;
++ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
++ else if ( !mfn_valid(mfn | (L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1)) )
++ rc = -EINVAL;
++ else if ( op.cmd == MMUEXT_MARK_SUPER )
++ rc = mark_superpage(mfn_to_spage(mfn), d);
+ else
+ rc = unmark_superpage(mfn_to_spage(mfn));
+ break;
Index: head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa168.patch
===================================================================
--- head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa168.patch
+++ head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa168.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+x86/VMX: prevent INVVPID failure due to non-canonical guest address
+
+While INVLPG (and on SVM INVLPGA) don't fault on non-canonical
+addresses, INVVPID fails (in the "individual address" case) when passed
+such an address.
+
+Since such intercepted INVLPG are effectively no-ops anyway, don't fix
+this in vmx_invlpg_intercept(), but instead have paging_invlpg() never
+return true in such a case.
+
+This is XSA-168.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
+@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ paging_fault(unsigned long va, struct cp
+ * or 0 if it's safe not to do so. */
+ static inline int paging_invlpg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long va)
+ {
+- return paging_get_hostmode(v)->invlpg(v, va);
++ return is_canonical_address(va) && paging_get_hostmode(v)->invlpg(v, va);
+ }
+
+ /* Translate a guest virtual address to the frame number that the
Index: head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa170-4.5.patch
===================================================================
--- head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa170-4.5.patch
+++ head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa170-4.5.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest
+
+... to prevent guest user mode arranging for a guest crash (due to
+failed VM entry). (On the AMD system I checked, hardware is doing
+exactly the canonicalization being added here.)
+
+Note that fixing this in an architecturally correct way would be quite
+a bit more involved: Making the x86 instruction emulator check all
+branch targets for validity, plus dealing with invalid rIP resulting
+from update_guest_eip() or incoming directly during a VM exit. The only
+way to get the latter right would be by not having hardware do the
+injection.
+
+Note further that there are a two early returns from
+vmx_vmexit_handler(): One (through vmx_failed_vmentry()) leads to
+domain_crash() anyway, and the other covers real mode only and can
+neither occur with a non-canonical rIP nor result in an altered rIP,
+so we don't need to force those paths through the checking logic.
+
+This is XSA-170.
+
+Reported-by: 刘令 <liuling-it@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+@@ -2675,7 +2675,7 @@ void vmx_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct
+ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+ {
+ unsigned long exit_qualification, exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0;
+- unsigned int vector = 0;
++ unsigned int vector = 0, mode;
+ struct vcpu *v = current;
+
+ __vmread(GUEST_RIP, &regs->rip);
+@@ -3219,6 +3219,41 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
+ out:
+ if ( nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) )
+ nvmx_idtv_handling();
++
++ /*
++ * VM entry will fail (causing the guest to get crashed) if rIP (and
++ * rFLAGS, but we don't have an issue there) doesn't meet certain
++ * criteria. As we must not allow less than fully privileged mode to have
++ * such an effect on the domain, we correct rIP in that case (accepting
++ * this not being architecturally correct behavior, as the injected #GP
++ * fault will then not see the correct [invalid] return address).
++ * And since we know the guest will crash, we crash it right away if it
++ * already is in most privileged mode.
++ */
++ mode = vmx_guest_x86_mode(v);
++ if ( mode == 8 ? !is_canonical_address(regs->rip)
++ : regs->rip != regs->_eip )
++ {
++ struct segment_register ss;
++
++ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Bad rIP %lx for mode %u\n", regs->rip, mode);
++
++ vmx_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &ss);
++ if ( ss.attr.fields.dpl )
++ {
++ __vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, &intr_info);
++ if ( !(intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) )
++ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
++ /* Need to fix rIP nevertheless. */
++ if ( mode == 8 )
++ regs->rip = (long)(regs->rip << (64 - VADDR_BITS)) >>
++ (64 - VADDR_BITS);
++ else
++ regs->rip = regs->_eip;
++ }
++ else
++ domain_crash(v->domain);
++ }
+ }
+
+ void vmx_vmenter_helper(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
Index: head/emulators/xen/Makefile
===================================================================
--- head/emulators/xen/Makefile
+++ head/emulators/xen/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
PORTNAME= xen
PORTVERSION= 4.5.2
-PORTREVISION= 1
+PORTREVISION= 2
CATEGORIES= emulators
MAINTAINER= royger@FreeBSD.org
Index: head/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
===================================================================
--- head/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
+++ head/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
PORTNAME= xen
PORTVERSION= 4.5.2
-PORTREVISION= 1
+PORTREVISION= 2
CATEGORIES= sysutils emulators
MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PORTVERSION}/ \
http://code.coreboot.org/p/seabios/downloads/get/:seabios
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
ONLY_FOR_ARCHS= amd64
ONLY_FOR_ARCHS_REASON= "not yet ported to anything other than amd64"
-SEABIOSVERSION= 1.8.1
+SEABIOSVERSION= 1.8.2
DISTFILES+= ${DISTNAME}.tar.gz \
seabios-${SEABIOSVERSION}.tar.gz:seabios
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
--cxx=c++
EXTRA_PATCHES= ${FILESDIR}/0002-libxc-fix-xc_dom_load_elf_symtab.patch:-p1 \
+ ${FILESDIR}/0001-build-fix-.text-section-address-alignment.patch:-p1 \
${FILESDIR}/xsa160-4.6.patch:-p1
CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --with-extra-qemuu-configure-args="${QEMU_ARGS}"
@@ -77,9 +78,9 @@
${WRKSRC}/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/i386-dm/helper2.c \
${WRKSRC}/docs/man/*
@for p in ${FILESDIR}/*qemuu*.patch; do \
- ${ECHO_CMD} "====> Applying $${p##*/}" ; \
- ${PATCH} -s -p1 -i $${p} -d ${WRKSRC}/tools/qemu-xen ; \
- done
+ ${ECHO_CMD} "====> Applying $${p##*/}" ; \
+ ${PATCH} -s -p1 -i $${p} -d ${WRKSRC}/tools/qemu-xen ; \
+ done
post-install:
${MKDIR} ${STAGEDIR}/var/run/xen
Index: head/sysutils/xen-tools/distinfo
===================================================================
--- head/sysutils/xen-tools/distinfo
+++ head/sysutils/xen-tools/distinfo
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
SHA256 (xen-4.5.2.tar.gz) = 4c9e5dac4eea484974e9f76da2756c8e0973b4e884d28d37e955df9ebf00e7e8
SIZE (xen-4.5.2.tar.gz) = 18416220
-SHA256 (seabios-1.8.1.tar.gz) = 283bd848f5ce9d4bc52add973a856347e02c9ce89a9e6bc92c99359b87c9871d
-SIZE (seabios-1.8.1.tar.gz) = 537712
+SHA256 (seabios-1.8.2.tar.gz) = f59479307fdae840de398b75aacb2333c8eba24a5964d68c77e32ca6c987ee61
+SIZE (seabios-1.8.2.tar.gz) = 538497
Index: head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-build-fix-.text-section-address-alignment.patch
===================================================================
--- head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-build-fix-.text-section-address-alignment.patch
+++ head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-build-fix-.text-section-address-alignment.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 70a912f04dec2b556f37a60d1f596fcedb13f8a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kevin O'Connor <kevin@koconnor.net>
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 11:45:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] build: fix .text section address alignment
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Some linkers verify that sections have a start address that is aligned
+with the minimum alignment of that section. Add extra padding to the
+".text" section to ensure it is always aligned with the maximum
+alignment of any section placed in ".text".
+
+Signed-off-by: Kevin O'Connor <kevin@koconnor.net>
+Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Reported by: Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org>
+---
+ scripts/layoutrom.py | 14 ++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/firmware/seabios-dir/scripts/layoutrom.py b/tools/firmware/seabios-dir/scripts/layoutrom.py
+index dd770fe..c7e406c 100755
+--- a/tools/firmware/seabios-dir/scripts/layoutrom.py
++++ b/tools/firmware/seabios-dir/scripts/layoutrom.py
+@@ -34,18 +34,22 @@ COMMONTRAILER = """
+ # Determine section locations
+ ######################################################################
+
+-# Align 'pos' to 'alignbytes' offset
++# Align 'pos' up to 'alignbytes' offset
+ def alignpos(pos, alignbytes):
+ mask = alignbytes - 1
+ return (pos + mask) & ~mask
+
++# Align 'pos' down to 'alignbytes' offset
++def aligndown(pos, alignbytes):
++ mask = alignbytes - 1
++ return pos & ~mask
++
+ # Determine the final addresses for a list of sections that end at an
+ # address.
+ def setSectionsStart(sections, endaddr, minalign=1, segoffset=0):
+ totspace = 0
+ for section in sections:
+- if section.align > minalign:
+- minalign = section.align
++ minalign = max(minalign, section.align)
+ totspace = alignpos(totspace, section.align) + section.size
+ startaddr = int((endaddr - totspace) / minalign) * minalign
+ curaddr = startaddr
+@@ -267,7 +271,7 @@ def doLayout(sections, config, genreloc):
+ final_sec32low_end = BUILD_LOWRAM_END
+ zonelow_base = final_sec32low_end - 64*1024
+ relocdelta = final_sec32low_end - sec32low_end
+- li.sec32low_start, li.sec32low_align = setSectionsStart(
++ li.sec32low_start, sec32low_align = setSectionsStart(
+ sections32low, sec32low_end, 16
+ , segoffset=zonelow_base - relocdelta)
+ li.sec32low_end = sec32low_end
+@@ -399,6 +403,8 @@ def writeLinkerScripts(li, out16, out32seg, out32flat):
+ filesections32flat = getSectionsFileid(li.sections, '32flat')
+ out = outXRefs([], exportsyms=li.varlowsyms
+ , forcedelta=li.final_sec32low_start-li.sec32low_start)
++ sec32all_align = max([section.align for section in li.sections])
++ sec32all_start = aligndown(sec32all_start, sec32all_align)
+ out += outXRefs(filesections32flat, exportsyms=[li.entrysym]) + """
+ _reloc_min_align = 0x%x ;
+ zonefseg_start = 0x%x ;
+--
+2.5.4 (Apple Git-61)
+
Index: head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/patch-tools_firmware_seabios-dir_scripts_buildversion.sh
===================================================================
--- head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/patch-tools_firmware_seabios-dir_scripts_buildversion.sh
+++ head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/patch-tools_firmware_seabios-dir_scripts_buildversion.sh
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
--- tools/firmware/seabios-dir/scripts/buildversion.sh.orig 2015-03-13 09:02:17 UTC
+++ tools/firmware/seabios-dir/scripts/buildversion.sh
-@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ elif [ -f .version ]; then
+@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ if [ -z "$BUILD_VERSION" ]; then
+ else
+ VERSION="?"
+ fi
+- VERSION="${VERSION}-`date +"%Y%m%d_%H%M%S"`-`hostname`"
++ VERSION="${VERSION}"
else
- VERSION="?"
+ VERSION="$BUILD_VERSION"
fi
--VERSION="${VERSION}-`date +"%Y%m%d_%H%M%S"`-`hostname`"
-+VERSION="${VERSION}"
- echo "Version: ${VERSION}"
-
- # Build header file

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