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Index: lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.inc
===================================================================
--- lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.inc
+++ lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.inc
@@ -104,11 +104,11 @@
vets.o vets.po vets.pico: ta.h
ta.h: ${.ALLTARGETS:M[tv]*pem:O:u}
@( echo '/* Autogenerated - DO NOT EDIT!!! */'; echo; \
- cat ${.ALLSRC:N*crl*:Mt*.pem} /dev/null | \
+ cat ${.ALLSRC:N*crl*:M*/t*.pem} /dev/null | \
file2c -sx 'static const char ta_PEM[] = {' '};'; \
echo "${.newline}${VE_HASH_LIST:@H@static char vh_$H[] = \"`cat ${.ALLSRC:N*crl*:Mv*.pem} | ${$H:U${H:tl}}`\";${.newline}@}"; ) > ${.TARGET}
.if ${VE_SELF_TESTS} != "no"
- ( cat ${.ALLSRC:N*crl*:Mv*.pem} /dev/null | \
+ ( cat ${.ALLSRC:N*crl*:M*/v*.pem} /dev/null | \
file2c -sx 'static const char vc_PEM[] = {' '};'; echo ) >> ${.TARGET}
.endif
.if !empty(BUILD_UTC_FILE)
Index: lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.libsa.inc
===================================================================
--- lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.libsa.inc
+++ lib/libsecureboot/Makefile.libsa.inc
@@ -16,6 +16,17 @@
vepcr.c \
verify_file.c \
+# Build library with support for the UEFI based authentication
+.if ${MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT} == "yes"
+SRCS+= efi/efi_variables.c \
+ efi/efi_init.c \
+
+# Add includes required by efi part
+CFLAGS+= -I${SRCTOP}/stand/efi/include \
+ -I${SRCTOP}/lib/libsecureboot/efi/include \
+ -I${SRCTOP}/stand/efi/include/${MACHINE}
+.endif
+
# this is the list of paths (relative to a file
# that we need to verify) used to find a signed manifest.
# the signature extensions in VE_SIGNATURE_EXT_LIST
Index: lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_init.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Stormshield.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Semihalf.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
+ * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include "../libsecureboot-priv.h"
+
+void
+ve_efi_init(void)
+{
+ br_x509_certificate *xcs;
+ hash_data *digests;
+ size_t num;
+ int result;
+ static int once = 0;
+
+ if (once)
+ return;
+
+ once = 1;
+
+ result = efi_secure_boot_enabled();
+ if (result <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ xcs = efi_get_trusted_certs(&num);
+ if (num > 0 && xcs != NULL) {
+ num = ve_trust_anchors_add(xcs, num);
+ while(num--)
+ xfree(xcs[num].data);
+
+ xfree(xcs);
+ }
+ xcs = efi_get_forbidden_certs(&num);
+ if (num > 0 && xcs != NULL) {
+ num = ve_forbidden_anchors_add(xcs, num);
+ while(num--)
+ xfree(xcs[num].data);
+
+ xfree(xcs);
+ }
+ digests = efi_get_forbidden_digests(&num);
+ if (num > 0 && digests != NULL) {
+ ve_forbidden_digest_add(digests, num);
+ /*
+ * Don't free the buffors for digests,
+ * since they are shallow copied.
+ */
+ xfree(digests);
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
Index: lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_variables.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ lib/libsecureboot/efi/efi_variables.c
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Stormshield.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Semihalf.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
+ * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <stand.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <efi.h>
+#include <efilib.h>
+#include <Guid/ImageAuthentication.h>
+
+#include "../libsecureboot-priv.h"
+
+static EFI_GUID ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+
+static EFI_GUID efiCertX509GUID = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
+static EFI_GUID efiCertX509Sha256GUID = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
+static EFI_GUID efiCertX509Sha384GUID = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID;
+static EFI_GUID efiCertX509Sha5122UID = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID;
+
+int
+efi_secure_boot_enabled(void)
+{
+ UINT8 SecureBoot;
+ UINT8 SetupMode;
+ size_t length;
+ EFI_STATUS status;
+
+ length = sizeof(SecureBoot);
+ status = efi_global_getenv("SecureBoot", &SecureBoot, &length);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ return (0);
+
+ printf("Failed to read \"SecureBoot\" variable\n");
+ return (-efi_status_to_errno(status));
+ }
+
+ length = sizeof(SetupMode);
+ status = efi_global_getenv("SetupMode", &SetupMode, &length);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ SetupMode = 0;
+
+ printf(" SecureBoot: %d, SetupMode: %d\n", SecureBoot, SetupMode);
+
+ return (SecureBoot == 1 && SetupMode == 0);
+}
+
+static br_x509_certificate*
+efi_get_certs(const char *name, size_t *count)
+{
+ br_x509_certificate *certs;
+ UINT8 *database;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *list;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *entry;
+ size_t length;
+ ssize_t cert_count;
+ EFI_STATUS status;
+
+ database = NULL;
+ certs = NULL;
+ length = 0;
+ cert_count = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Read variable length and allocate proper buffer
+ */
+ status = efi_getenv(&ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID, name, database, &length);
+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ database = malloc(length);
+ if (database == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ status = efi_getenv(&ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID, name, database, &length);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto fail;
+
+
+ for (list = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) database;
+ length >= list->SignatureListSize && length > 0;
+ length -= list->SignatureListSize,
+ list = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*)
+ ((UINT8*)list + list->SignatureListSize)) {
+ if (memcmp(&efiCertX509GUID,
+ &list->SignatureType,
+ sizeof(EFI_GUID)) != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ entry = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)
+ ((UINT8*)list +
+ sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) +
+ list->SignatureHeaderSize);
+
+ certs = realloc(certs,
+ (cert_count + 1) * sizeof(br_x509_certificate));
+ if (certs == NULL) {
+ cert_count = 0;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ certs[cert_count].data_len = list->SignatureSize - sizeof(EFI_GUID);
+ certs[cert_count].data = malloc(certs[cert_count].data_len);
+ if (certs[cert_count].data == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+
+ memcpy(certs[cert_count].data,
+ entry->SignatureData,
+ certs[cert_count].data_len);
+
+ cert_count++;
+ }
+
+ *count = cert_count;
+
+ xfree(database);
+ return (certs);
+
+fail:
+ while (cert_count-- > 0)
+ xfree(certs[cert_count].data);
+
+ xfree(database);
+ xfree(certs);
+ return (NULL);
+
+}
+
+hash_data*
+efi_get_forbidden_digests(size_t *count)
+{
+ UINT8 *database;
+ hash_data *digests;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *list;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *entry;
+ size_t length;
+ size_t header_size;
+ size_t digest_size;
+ size_t digest_count;
+ size_t entry_count;
+ EFI_STATUS status;
+
+ length = 0;
+ digest_count = 0;
+ database = NULL;
+ digests = NULL;
+
+ status = efi_getenv(&ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID, "dbx", database, &length);
+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ database = malloc(length);
+ if (database == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ status = efi_getenv(&ImageSecurityDatabaseGUID, "dbx", database, &length);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto fail;
+
+
+ for(list = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) database;
+ length >= list->SignatureListSize && length > 0;
+ length -= list->SignatureListSize,
+ list = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*)
+ ((UINT8*)list + list->SignatureListSize)) {
+ if (memcmp(&efiCertX509Sha256GUID, &list->SignatureType,
+ sizeof(EFI_GUID)) == 0) {
+ digest_size = br_sha256_SIZE;
+ } else if(memcmp(&efiCertX509Sha384GUID, &list->SignatureType,
+ sizeof(EFI_GUID)) == 0) {
+ digest_size = br_sha384_SIZE;
+ } else if(memcmp(&efiCertX509Sha5122UID, &list->SignatureType,
+ sizeof(EFI_GUID)) == 0) {
+ digest_size = br_sha512_SIZE;
+ } else {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ header_size = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + list->SignatureHeaderSize;
+
+ entry_count = list->SignatureListSize - header_size;
+ entry_count /= list->SignatureSize;
+
+ entry = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)list + header_size);
+ while (entry_count-- > 0) {
+ digests = realloc(digests,
+ (digest_count + 1) * sizeof(hash_data));
+ if (digests == NULL) {
+ digest_count = 0;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ digests[digest_count].data = malloc(digest_size);
+ if (digests[digest_count].data == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+
+ memcpy(digests[digest_count].data,
+ entry->SignatureData,
+ digest_size);
+ digests[digest_count].digest_size = digest_size;
+
+ entry = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)(entry + list->SignatureSize);
+ digest_count++;
+ }
+ }
+ xfree(database);
+ if (count != NULL)
+ *count = digest_count;
+
+ return (digests);
+
+fail:
+ while(digest_count--)
+ xfree(digests[digest_count].data);
+
+ xfree(database);
+ xfree(digests);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* Copy x509 certificates from db */
+br_x509_certificate*
+efi_get_trusted_certs(size_t *count)
+{
+ return (efi_get_certs("db", count));
+}
+
+/* Copy forbidden certificates from dbx */
+br_x509_certificate*
+efi_get_forbidden_certs(size_t *count)
+{
+ return (efi_get_certs("dbx", count));
+}
Index: lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/GlobalVariable.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/GlobalVariable.h
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+/** @file
+ GUID for EFI (NVRAM) Variables.
+ Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ This program and the accompanying materials
+ are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+ which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+ http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+ THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+ @par Revision Reference:
+ GUID defined in UEFI 2.1
+**/
+
+#ifndef __GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID_H__
+#define __GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID_H__
+
+#ifndef EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE
+#define EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE \
+ { \
+ 0x8BE4DF61, 0x93CA, 0x11d2, {0xAA, 0x0D, 0x00, 0xE0, 0x98, 0x03, 0x2B, 0x8C } \
+ }
+#endif /* EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE */
+
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiGlobalVariableGuid;
+
+//
+// Follow UEFI 2.4 spec:
+// To prevent name collisions with possible future globally defined variables,
+// other internal firmware data variables that are not defined here must be
+// saved with a unique VendorGuid other than EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE or
+// any other GUID defined by the UEFI Specification. Implementations must
+// only permit the creation of variables with a UEFI Specification-defined
+// VendorGuid when these variables are documented in the UEFI Specification.
+//
+// Note: except the globally defined variables defined below, the spec also defines
+// L"Boot####" - A boot load option.
+// L"Driver####" - A driver load option.
+// L"SysPrep####" - A System Prep application load option.
+// L"Key####" - Describes hot key relationship with a Boot#### load option.
+// The attribute for them is NV+BS+RT, #### is a printed hex value, and no 0x or h
+// is included in the hex value. They can not be expressed as a #define like other globally
+// defined variables, it is because we can not list the Boot0000, Boot0001, etc one by one.
+//
+
+///
+/// The language codes that the firmware supports. This value is deprecated.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_LANG_CODES_VARIABLE_NAME L"LangCodes"
+///
+/// The language code that the system is configured for. This value is deprecated.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_LANG_VARIABLE_NAME L"Lang"
+///
+/// The firmware's boot managers timeout, in seconds, before initiating the default boot selection.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_TIME_OUT_VARIABLE_NAME L"Timeout"
+///
+/// The language codes that the firmware supports.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_PLATFORM_LANG_CODES_VARIABLE_NAME L"PlatformLangCodes"
+///
+/// The language code that the system is configured for.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_PLATFORM_LANG_VARIABLE_NAME L"PlatformLang"
+///
+/// The device path of the default input/output/error output console.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_CON_IN_VARIABLE_NAME L"ConIn"
+#define EFI_CON_OUT_VARIABLE_NAME L"ConOut"
+#define EFI_ERR_OUT_VARIABLE_NAME L"ErrOut"
+///
+/// The device path of all possible input/output/error output devices.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_CON_IN_DEV_VARIABLE_NAME L"ConInDev"
+#define EFI_CON_OUT_DEV_VARIABLE_NAME L"ConOutDev"
+#define EFI_ERR_OUT_DEV_VARIABLE_NAME L"ErrOutDev"
+///
+/// The ordered boot option load list.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_BOOT_ORDER_VARIABLE_NAME L"BootOrder"
+///
+/// The boot option for the next boot only.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_BOOT_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME L"BootNext"
+///
+/// The boot option that was selected for the current boot.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_BOOT_CURRENT_VARIABLE_NAME L"BootCurrent"
+///
+/// The types of boot options supported by the boot manager. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_BOOT_OPTION_SUPPORT_VARIABLE_NAME L"BootOptionSupport"
+///
+/// The ordered driver load option list.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_DRIVER_ORDER_VARIABLE_NAME L"DriverOrder"
+///
+/// The ordered System Prep Application load option list.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_SYS_PREP_ORDER_VARIABLE_NAME L"SysPrepOrder"
+///
+/// Identifies the level of hardware error record persistence
+/// support implemented by the platform. This variable is
+/// only modified by firmware and is read-only to the OS.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_HW_ERR_REC_SUPPORT_VARIABLE_NAME L"HwErrRecSupport"
+///
+/// Whether the system is operating in setup mode (1) or not (0).
+/// All other values are reserved. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME L"SetupMode"
+///
+/// The Key Exchange Key Signature Database.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT+AT.
+///
+#define EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME L"KEK"
+///
+/// The public Platform Key.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT+AT.
+///
+#define EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME L"PK"
+///
+/// Array of GUIDs representing the type of signatures supported
+/// by the platform firmware. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME L"SignatureSupport"
+///
+/// Whether the platform firmware is operating in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0).
+/// All other values are reserved. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME L"SecureBoot"
+///
+/// The OEM's default Key Exchange Key Signature Database. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_KEK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"KEKDefault"
+///
+/// The OEM's default public Platform Key. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_PK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"PKDefault"
+///
+/// The OEM's default secure boot signature store. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_DB_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"dbDefault"
+///
+/// The OEM's default secure boot blacklist signature store. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_DBX_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"dbxDefault"
+///
+/// The OEM's default secure boot timestamp signature store. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_DBT_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME L"dbtDefault"
+///
+/// Allows the firmware to indicate supported features and actions to the OS.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_OS_INDICATIONS_SUPPORT_VARIABLE_NAME L"OsIndicationsSupported"
+///
+/// Allows the OS to request the firmware to enable certain features and to take certain actions.
+/// Its attribute is NV+BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_OS_INDICATIONS_VARIABLE_NAME L"OsIndications"
+///
+/// Whether the system is configured to use only vendor provided
+/// keys or not. Should be treated as read-only.
+/// Its attribute is BS+RT.
+///
+#define EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME L"VendorKeys"
+
+#endif
Index: lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+/** @file
+ Image signature database are defined for the signed image validation.
+ Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ This program and the accompanying materials
+ are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+ which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+ http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+ THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+ @par Revision Reference:
+ GUIDs defined in UEFI 2.5 spec.
+**/
+
+#ifndef __IMAGE_AUTHTICATION_H__
+#define __IMAGE_AUTHTICATION_H__
+
+#include <Guid/GlobalVariable.h>
+#include <Protocol/Hash.h>
+
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, { 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0xe, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f } \
+ }
+
+///
+/// Varialbe name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID
+/// for the authorized signature database.
+///
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE L"db"
+///
+/// Varialbe name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID
+/// for the forbidden signature database.
+///
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1 L"dbx"
+///
+/// Variable name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID
+/// for the timestamp signature database.
+///
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2 L"dbt"
+
+#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE 1
+#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE 0
+
+#define SETUP_MODE 1
+#define USER_MODE 0
+
+//***********************************************************************
+// Signature Database
+//***********************************************************************
+///
+/// The format of a signature database.
+///
+#pragma pack(1)
+
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// An identifier which identifies the agent which added the signature to the list.
+ ///
+ EFI_GUID SignatureOwner;
+ ///
+ /// The format of the signature is defined by the SignatureType.
+ ///
+ UINT8 SignatureData[1];
+} EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA;
+
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// Type of the signature. GUID signature types are defined in below.
+ ///
+ EFI_GUID SignatureType;
+ ///
+ /// Total size of the signature list, including this header.
+ ///
+ UINT32 SignatureListSize;
+ ///
+ /// Size of the signature header which precedes the array of signatures.
+ ///
+ UINT32 SignatureHeaderSize;
+ ///
+ /// Size of each signature.
+ ///
+ UINT32 SignatureSize;
+ ///
+ /// Header before the array of signatures. The format of this header is specified
+ /// by the SignatureType.
+ /// UINT8 SignatureHeader[SignatureHeaderSize];
+ ///
+ /// An array of signatures. Each signature is SignatureSize bytes in length.
+ /// EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA Signatures[][SignatureSize];
+ ///
+} EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST;
+
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// The SHA256 hash of an X.509 certificate's To-Be-Signed contents.
+ ///
+ EFI_SHA256_HASH ToBeSignedHash;
+ ///
+ /// The time that the certificate shall be considered to be revoked.
+ ///
+ EFI_TIME TimeOfRevocation;
+} EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256;
+
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// The SHA384 hash of an X.509 certificate's To-Be-Signed contents.
+ ///
+ EFI_SHA384_HASH ToBeSignedHash;
+ ///
+ /// The time that the certificate shall be considered to be revoked.
+ ///
+ EFI_TIME TimeOfRevocation;
+} EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384;
+
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// The SHA512 hash of an X.509 certificate's To-Be-Signed contents.
+ ///
+ EFI_SHA512_HASH ToBeSignedHash;
+ ///
+ /// The time that the certificate shall be considered to be revoked.
+ ///
+ EFI_TIME TimeOfRevocation;
+} EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512;
+
+#pragma pack()
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-256 hash. The SignatureHeader size shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) +
+/// 32 bytes.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, {0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28} \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing an RSA-2048 key. The key (only the modulus
+/// since the public key exponent is known to be 0x10001) shall be stored in big-endian
+/// order.
+/// The SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size
+/// of SignatureOwner component) + 256 bytes.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x3c5766e8, 0x269c, 0x4e34, {0xaa, 0x14, 0xed, 0x77, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xb3, 0xb6} \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing a RSA-2048 signature of a SHA-256 hash. The
+/// SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of
+/// SignatureOwner component) + 256 bytes.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xe2b36190, 0x879b, 0x4a3d, {0xad, 0x8d, 0xf2, 0xe7, 0xbb, 0xa3, 0x27, 0x84} \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-1 hash. The SignatureSize shall always
+/// be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) + 20 bytes.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x826ca512, 0xcf10, 0x4ac9, {0xb1, 0x87, 0xbe, 0x1, 0x49, 0x66, 0x31, 0xbd} \
+ }
+
+///
+/// TThis identifies a signature containing a RSA-2048 signature of a SHA-1 hash. The
+/// SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of
+/// SignatureOwner component) + 256 bytes.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x67f8444f, 0x8743, 0x48f1, {0xa3, 0x28, 0x1e, 0xaa, 0xb8, 0x73, 0x60, 0x80} \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature based on an X.509 certificate. If the signature is an X.509
+/// certificate then verification of the signature of an image should validate the public
+/// key certificate in the image using certificate path verification, up to this X.509
+/// certificate as a trusted root. The SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The
+/// SignatureSize may vary but shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner component) +
+/// the size of the certificate itself.
+/// Note: This means that each certificate will normally be in a separate EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, {0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72} \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-224 hash. The SignatureHeader size shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) +
+/// 28 bytes.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xb6e5233, 0xa65c, 0x44c9, {0x94, 0x7, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x83, 0xbf, 0xc8, 0xbd} \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-384 hash. The SignatureHeader size shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) +
+/// 48 bytes.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xff3e5307, 0x9fd0, 0x48c9, {0x85, 0xf1, 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x1e, 0x1} \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-512 hash. The SignatureHeader size shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner component) +
+/// 64 bytes.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x93e0fae, 0xa6c4, 0x4f50, {0x9f, 0x1b, 0xd4, 0x1e, 0x2b, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x9a} \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing the SHA256 hash of an X.509 certificate's
+/// To-Be-Signed contents, and a time of revocation. The SignatureHeader size shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner component)
+/// + 48 bytes for an EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256 structure. If the TimeOfRevocation is non-zero,
+/// the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards, and
+/// otherwise the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x3bd2a492, 0x96c0, 0x4079, {0xb4, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xed } \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing the SHA384 hash of an X.509 certificate's
+/// To-Be-Signed contents, and a time of revocation. The SignatureHeader size shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner component)
+/// + 64 bytes for an EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384 structure. If the TimeOfRevocation is non-zero,
+/// the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards, and
+/// otherwise the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x7076876e, 0x80c2, 0x4ee6, {0xaa, 0xd2, 0x28, 0xb3, 0x49, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x5b } \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing the SHA512 hash of an X.509 certificate's
+/// To-Be-Signed contents, and a time of revocation. The SignatureHeader size shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner component)
+/// + 80 bytes for an EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512 structure. If the TimeOfRevocation is non-zero,
+/// the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards, and
+/// otherwise the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x446dbf63, 0x2502, 0x4cda, {0xbc, 0xfa, 0x24, 0x65, 0xd2, 0xb0, 0xfe, 0x9d } \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing a DER-encoded PKCS #7 version 1.5 [RFC2315]
+/// SignedData value.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x4aafd29d, 0x68df, 0x49ee, {0x8a, 0xa9, 0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65, 0xa7} \
+ }
+
+//***********************************************************************
+// Image Execution Information Table Definition
+//***********************************************************************
+typedef UINT32 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION;
+
+#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000007
+#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED 0x00000000
+#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED 0x00000001
+#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED 0x00000002
+#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_NOT_FOUND 0x00000003
+#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND 0x00000004
+#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_POLICY_FAILED 0x00000005
+#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED 0x00000008
+
+//
+// EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO is added to EFI System Configuration Table
+// and assigned the GUID EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID.
+//
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.
+ ///
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;
+ ///
+ /// Size of all of the entire structure.
+ ///
+ UINT32 InfoSize;
+ ///
+ /// If this image was a UEFI device driver (for option ROM, for example) this is the
+ /// null-terminated, user-friendly name for the device. If the image was for an application,
+ /// then this is the name of the application. If this cannot be determined, then a simple
+ /// NULL character should be put in this position.
+ /// CHAR16 Name[];
+ ///
+
+ ///
+ /// For device drivers, this is the device path of the device for which this device driver
+ /// was intended. In some cases, the driver itself may be stored as part of the system
+ /// firmware, but this field should record the device's path, not the firmware path. For
+ /// applications, this is the device path of the application. If this cannot be determined,
+ /// a simple end-of-path device node should be put in this position.
+ /// EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL DevicePath;
+ ///
+
+ ///
+ /// Zero or more image signatures. If the image contained no signatures,
+ /// then this field is empty.
+ /// EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST Signature;
+ ///
+} EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO;
+
+
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// Number of EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO structures.
+ ///
+ UINTN NumberOfImages;
+ ///
+ /// Number of image instances of EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO structures.
+ ///
+ // EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO InformationInfo[]
+} EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE;
+
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha256Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Sha256Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha1Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Sha1Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha224Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha384Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha512Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertPkcs7Guid;
+
+#endif
Index: lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Protocol/Hash.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ lib/libsecureboot/efi/include/Protocol/Hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/** @file
+ EFI_HASH_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL as defined in UEFI 2.0.
+ EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL as defined in UEFI 2.0.
+ The EFI Hash Service Binding Protocol is used to locate hashing services support
+ provided by a driver and to create and destroy instances of the EFI Hash Protocol
+ so that a multiple drivers can use the underlying hashing services.
+Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under
+the terms and conditions of the BSD License that accompanies this distribution.
+The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php.
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+**/
+
+#ifndef __EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL_H__
+#define __EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL_H__
+
+#define CONST const
+
+#define EFI_HASH_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x42881c98, 0xa4f3, 0x44b0, {0xa3, 0x9d, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0x86, 0x67, 0xd8, 0xcd } \
+ }
+
+#define EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xc5184932, 0xdba5, 0x46db, {0xa5, 0xba, 0xcc, 0x0b, 0xda, 0x9c, 0x14, 0x35 } \
+ }
+
+#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA1_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x2ae9d80f, 0x3fb2, 0x4095, {0xb7, 0xb1, 0xe9, 0x31, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x46, 0xb6 } \
+ }
+
+#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA224_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x8df01a06, 0x9bd5, 0x4bf7, {0xb0, 0x21, 0xdb, 0x4f, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0xf4, 0x5b } \
+ }
+
+#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA256_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x51aa59de, 0xfdf2, 0x4ea3, {0xbc, 0x63, 0x87, 0x5f, 0xb7, 0x84, 0x2e, 0xe9 } \
+ }
+
+#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA384_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xefa96432, 0xde33, 0x4dd2, {0xae, 0xe6, 0x32, 0x8c, 0x33, 0xdf, 0x77, 0x7a } \
+ }
+
+#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA512_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xcaa4381e, 0x750c, 0x4770, {0xb8, 0x70, 0x7a, 0x23, 0xb4, 0xe4, 0x21, 0x30 } \
+ }
+
+#define EFI_HASH_ALGORTIHM_MD5_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0xaf7c79c, 0x65b5, 0x4319, {0xb0, 0xae, 0x44, 0xec, 0x48, 0x4e, 0x4a, 0xd7 } \
+ }
+
+#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA1_NOPAD_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x24c5dc2f, 0x53e2, 0x40ca, {0x9e, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0xa4, 0x9f, 0x46, 0x3b } \
+ }
+
+#define EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA256_NOPAD_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x8628752a, 0x6cb7, 0x4814, {0x96, 0xfc, 0x24, 0xa8, 0x15, 0xac, 0x22, 0x26 } \
+ }
+
+//
+// Note: Use of the following algorithms with EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL is deprecated.
+// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA1_GUID
+// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA224_GUID
+// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA256_GUID
+// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA384_GUID
+// EFI_HASH_ALGORITHM_SHA512_GUID
+// EFI_HASH_ALGORTIHM_MD5_GUID
+//
+
+typedef struct _EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL;
+
+typedef UINT8 EFI_MD5_HASH[16];
+typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA1_HASH[20];
+typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA224_HASH[28];
+typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA256_HASH[32];
+typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA384_HASH[48];
+typedef UINT8 EFI_SHA512_HASH[64];
+
+typedef union {
+ EFI_MD5_HASH *Md5Hash;
+ EFI_SHA1_HASH *Sha1Hash;
+ EFI_SHA224_HASH *Sha224Hash;
+ EFI_SHA256_HASH *Sha256Hash;
+ EFI_SHA384_HASH *Sha384Hash;
+ EFI_SHA512_HASH *Sha512Hash;
+} EFI_HASH_OUTPUT;
+
+/**
+ Returns the size of the hash which results from a specific algorithm.
+ @param[in] This Points to this instance of EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] HashAlgorithm Points to the EFI_GUID which identifies the algorithm to use.
+ @param[out] HashSize Holds the returned size of the algorithm's hash.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash size returned successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER HashSize is NULL or HashAlgorithm is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The algorithm specified by HashAlgorithm is not supported
+ by this driver.
+**/
+typedef
+EFI_STATUS
+(EFIAPI *EFI_HASH_GET_HASH_SIZE)(
+ IN CONST EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN CONST EFI_GUID *HashAlgorithm,
+ OUT UINTN *HashSize
+ );
+
+/**
+ Creates a hash for the specified message text.
+ @param[in] This Points to this instance of EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] HashAlgorithm Points to the EFI_GUID which identifies the algorithm to use.
+ @param[in] Extend Specifies whether to create a new hash (FALSE) or extend the specified
+ existing hash (TRUE).
+ @param[in] Message Points to the start of the message.
+ @param[in] MessageSize The size of Message, in bytes.
+ @param[in,out] Hash On input, if Extend is TRUE, then this parameter holds a pointer
+ to a pointer to an array containing the hash to extend. If Extend
+ is FALSE, then this parameter holds a pointer to a pointer to a
+ caller-allocated array that will receive the result of the hash
+ computation. On output (regardless of the value of Extend), the
+ array will contain the result of the hash computation.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash returned successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Message or Hash, HashAlgorithm is NULL or MessageSize is 0.
+ MessageSize is not an integer multiple of block size.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The algorithm specified by HashAlgorithm is not supported by this
+ driver. Or, Extend is TRUE, and the algorithm doesn't support extending the hash.
+**/
+typedef
+EFI_STATUS
+(EFIAPI *EFI_HASH_HASH)(
+ IN CONST EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN CONST EFI_GUID *HashAlgorithm,
+ IN BOOLEAN Extend,
+ IN CONST UINT8 *Message,
+ IN UINT64 MessageSize,
+ IN OUT EFI_HASH_OUTPUT *Hash
+ );
+
+///
+/// This protocol allows creating a hash of an arbitrary message digest
+/// using one or more hash algorithms.
+///
+struct _EFI_HASH_PROTOCOL {
+ EFI_HASH_GET_HASH_SIZE GetHashSize;
+ EFI_HASH_HASH Hash;
+};
+
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashServiceBindingProtocolGuid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashProtocolGuid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha1Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha224Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha384Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha512Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmMD5Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha1NoPadGuid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256NoPadGuid;
+
+#endif
Index: lib/libsecureboot/h/verify_file.h
===================================================================
--- lib/libsecureboot/h/verify_file.h
+++ lib/libsecureboot/h/verify_file.h
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
#ifndef _VERIFY_FILE_H_
#define _VERIFY_FILE_H_
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
#define VE_GUESS -1 /* let verify_file work it out */
#define VE_TRY 0 /* we don't mind if unverified */
#define VE_WANT 1 /* we want this verified */
@@ -36,6 +38,7 @@
void ve_debug_set(int);
int ve_status_get(int);
+void ve_efi_init(void);
int load_manifest(const char *, const char *, const char *, struct stat *);
int verify_file(int, const char *, off_t, int);
void verify_pcr_export(void);
Index: lib/libsecureboot/libsecureboot-priv.h
===================================================================
--- lib/libsecureboot/libsecureboot-priv.h
+++ lib/libsecureboot/libsecureboot-priv.h
@@ -30,8 +30,16 @@
/* public api */
#include "libsecureboot.h"
+#include <brssl.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char *data;
+ int digest_size;
+} hash_data;
size_t ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *, size_t);
+size_t ve_forbidden_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *, size_t);
+void ve_forbidden_digest_add(hash_data *digest, size_t);
char *fingerprint_info_lookup(int, const char *);
br_x509_certificate * parse_certificates(unsigned char *, size_t, size_t *);
@@ -45,4 +53,9 @@
int openpgp_self_tests(void);
+int efi_secure_boot_enabled(void);
+br_x509_certificate* efi_get_trusted_certs(size_t *count);
+br_x509_certificate* efi_get_forbidden_certs(size_t *count);
+hash_data* efi_get_forbidden_digests(size_t *count);
+
#endif /* _LIBSECUREBOOT_PRIV_H_ */
Index: lib/libsecureboot/local.trust.mk
===================================================================
--- lib/libsecureboot/local.trust.mk
+++ lib/libsecureboot/local.trust.mk
@@ -7,14 +7,16 @@
# for each key will provide the appropriate certificate chain on request
# force these for Junos
-MANIFEST_SKIP_ALWAYS= boot
+#MANIFEST_SKIP_ALWAYS= boot
VE_HASH_LIST= \
SHA1 \
SHA256 \
- SHA384
+ SHA384 \
+ SHA512
VE_SIGNATURE_LIST= \
- ECDSA
+ ECDSA \
+ RSA
VE_SIGNATURE_EXT_LIST= \
esig
@@ -22,9 +24,6 @@
VE_SELF_TESTS= yes
.if ${MACHINE} == "host" && ${.CURDIR:T} == "tests"
-# for testing
-VE_HASH_LIST+= \
- SHA512
VE_SIGNATURE_LIST+= \
RSA \
@@ -88,14 +87,14 @@
.endif
# we take the mtime of this as our baseline time
-BUILD_UTC_FILE= ecerts.pem
+#BUILD_UTC_FILE= ecerts.pem
.else
# you need to provide t*.pem or t*.asc files for each trust anchor
.if empty(TRUST_ANCHORS)
-TRUST_ANCHORS!= cd ${.CURDIR} && 'ls' -1 *.pem t*.asc 2> /dev/null
+TRUST_ANCHORS!= 'ls' -1 ${.CURDIR}/*.pem ${.CURDIR}/t*.asc 2> /dev/null
.endif
-.if empty(TRUST_ANCHORS)
+.if empty(TRUST_ANCHORS) && ${MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT} != "yes"
.error Need TRUST_ANCHORS see ${.CURDIR}/README.rst
.endif
.if ${TRUST_ANCHORS:T:Mt*.pem} != ""
Index: lib/libsecureboot/verify_file.c
===================================================================
--- lib/libsecureboot/verify_file.c
+++ lib/libsecureboot/verify_file.c
@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@
verified_files = vsp;
}
-
/**
* @brief
* load specified manifest if verified
@@ -193,16 +192,19 @@
#ifdef MANIFEST_SKIP_ALWAYS
skip = MANIFEST_SKIP_ALWAYS;
#else
- if (*tp[0] == '.') {
+ if (!strncmp("../", *tp, 3)) {
#ifdef MANIFEST_SKIP
skip = MANIFEST_SKIP;
#else
- if ((skip = strrchr(prefix, '/')))
- skip++;
+ if ((skip = strrchr(prefix, '/'))) {
+ *skip = '\0';
+ skip = NULL;
+ }
#endif
} else
skip = NULL;
#endif
+
rc = load_manifest(buf, prefix, skip, &st);
break;
}
@@ -318,8 +320,9 @@
return (0);
DEBUG_PRINTF(3, ("fd=%d,name='%s',off=%lld,dev=%lld,ino=%lld\n",
- fd, filename, (long long)off, st.st_dev,st.st_ino));
-
+ fd, filename, (long long)off,
+ (long long)st.st_dev, (long long)st.st_ino));
+
rc = is_verified(&st);
if (rc != VE_NOT_CHECKED) {
@@ -334,13 +337,12 @@
if (verbose || severity > VE_WANT) {
#if defined(VE_DEBUG_LEVEL) && VE_DEBUG_LEVEL > 0
printf("Verified %s %llu,%llu\n", filename,
- st.st_dev, st.st_ino);
+ (long long)st.st_dev, (long long)st.st_ino);
#else
printf("Verified %s\n", filename);
#endif
}
if (severity < VE_MUST) { /* not a kernel or module */
-
if ((cp = strrchr(filename, '/'))) {
cp++;
if (strncmp(cp, "loader.ve.", 10) == 0) {
Index: lib/libsecureboot/vets.c
===================================================================
--- lib/libsecureboot/vets.c
+++ lib/libsecureboot/vets.c
@@ -49,8 +49,11 @@
int DebugVe = 0;
typedef VECTOR(br_x509_certificate) cert_list;
+typedef VECTOR(hash_data) digest_list;
static anchor_list trust_anchors = VEC_INIT;
+static anchor_list forbidden_anchors = VEC_INIT;
+static digest_list forbidden_digests = VEC_INIT;
void
ve_debug_set(int n)
@@ -113,12 +116,77 @@
xfree(xc->data);
}
-/**
- * @brief
- * add certs to our trust store
+/* ASN parsing related defines */
+#define ASN1_CONSTRUCTED BIT(5)
+#define ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG 0x1F
+#define ASN1_INF_LENGTH 0x80
+#define ASN1_LENGTH_MASK 0x7F
+
+/*
+ * Get TBS part of certificate.
+ * Since BearSSL doesn't provide any API to do this,
+ * it has to be implemented here.
*/
-size_t
-ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num)
+static void*
+X509_to_tbs(unsigned char* cert, size_t* output_size)
+{
+ unsigned char *result;
+ size_t tbs_size;
+ int size;
+ int i;
+
+ if (cert == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ /* Strip two sequences to get to the TBS section */
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ /*
+ * XXX: We don't need to support extended tags since
+ * they should not be present in certificates.
+ */
+ if ((*cert & ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG) == ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ cert++;
+
+ if (*cert == ASN1_INF_LENGTH)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ size = *cert & ASN1_LENGTH_MASK;
+ tbs_size = 0;
+
+ /* Size can either be stored on a single or multiple bytes */
+ if (*cert & (ASN1_LENGTH_MASK + 1)) {
+ cert++;
+ while (*cert == 0 && size > 0) {
+ cert++;
+ size--;
+ }
+ while(size-- > 0) {
+ tbs_size <<= 8;
+ tbs_size |= *(cert++);
+ }
+ }
+ if (i == 0)
+ result = cert;
+ }
+ tbs_size += (cert - result);
+
+ if (output_size != NULL)
+ *output_size = tbs_size;
+
+ return (result);
+}
+
+void
+ve_forbidden_digest_add(hash_data *digest, size_t num)
+{
+ while (num--)
+ VEC_ADD(forbidden_digests, digest[num]);
+}
+
+static size_t
+ve_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num, anchor_list *anchors)
{
br_x509_trust_anchor ta;
size_t u;
@@ -127,11 +195,27 @@
if (certificate_to_trust_anchor_inner(&ta, &xcs[u]) < 0) {
break;
}
- VEC_ADD(trust_anchors, ta);
+ VEC_ADD(*anchors, ta);
}
return (u);
}
+/**
+ * @brief
+ * add certs to our trust store
+ */
+size_t
+ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num)
+{
+ return (ve_anchors_add(xcs, num, &trust_anchors));
+}
+
+size_t
+ve_forbidden_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num)
+{
+ return (ve_anchors_add(xcs, num, &forbidden_anchors));
+}
+
/**
* @brief
* initialize our trust_anchors from ta_PEM
@@ -139,13 +223,14 @@
int
ve_trust_init(void)
{
+#ifdef TRUST_ANCHOR_STR
br_x509_certificate *xcs;
+#endif
static int once = -1;
size_t num;
if (once >= 0)
return (once);
- once = 0;
ve_utc_set(time(NULL));
#ifdef BUILD_UTC
@@ -159,14 +244,15 @@
#ifdef TRUST_ANCHOR_STR
xcs = parse_certificates(__DECONST(unsigned char *, TRUST_ANCHOR_STR),
sizeof(TRUST_ANCHOR_STR), &num);
- if (xcs == NULL)
- return (0);
+ if (xcs == NULL) {
+ once = (int) VEC_LEN(trust_anchors);
+ return (once);
+ }
num = ve_trust_anchors_add(xcs, num);
- once = (int) num;
-#else
- num = 0;
#endif
- return (num);
+ once = (int) VEC_LEN(trust_anchors);
+
+ return (once);
}
/**
@@ -177,7 +263,8 @@
static br_x509_pkey *
verify_signer_xcs(br_x509_certificate *xcs,
size_t num,
- br_name_element *elts, size_t num_elts)
+ br_name_element *elts, size_t num_elts,
+ anchor_list *anchors)
{
br_x509_minimal_context mc;
br_x509_certificate *xc;
@@ -196,11 +283,11 @@
}
DEBUG_PRINTF(5, ("verify_signer: %zu trust anchors\n",
- VEC_LEN(trust_anchors)));
+ VEC_LEN(*anchors)));
br_x509_minimal_init(&mc, &br_sha256_vtable,
- &VEC_ELT(trust_anchors, 0),
- VEC_LEN(trust_anchors));
+ &VEC_ELT(*anchors, 0),
+ VEC_LEN(*anchors));
#ifdef VE_ECDSA_SUPPORT
br_x509_minimal_set_ecdsa(&mc,
&br_ec_prime_i31, &br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1);
@@ -255,10 +342,72 @@
pk = xpkeydup(tpk);
}
}
- VEC_CLEAREXT(chain, &free_cert_contents);
+ VEC_CLEAR(chain);
return (pk);
}
+static int
+check_forbidden_digests(br_x509_certificate *xcs, size_t num)
+{
+ unsigned char sha256_digest[br_sha256_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sha384_digest[br_sha384_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sha512_digest[br_sha512_SIZE];
+ void *tbs_cert;
+ hash_data *digest;
+ br_hash_compat_context ctx;
+ const br_hash_class *md;
+ size_t tbs_size;
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (VEC_LEN(forbidden_digests) == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ while (num--) {
+ tbs_cert = X509_to_tbs(xcs[num].data, &tbs_size);
+
+ md = &br_sha256_vtable;
+ md->init(&ctx.vtable);
+ md->update(&ctx.vtable, tbs_cert, tbs_size);
+ md->out(&ctx.vtable, sha256_digest);
+
+ md = &br_sha384_vtable;
+ md->init(&ctx.vtable);
+ md->update(&ctx.vtable, tbs_cert, tbs_size);
+ md->out(&ctx.vtable, sha384_digest);
+
+ md = &br_sha512_vtable;
+ md->init(&ctx.vtable);
+ md->update(&ctx.vtable, tbs_cert, tbs_size);
+ md->out(&ctx.vtable, sha512_digest);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < VEC_LEN(forbidden_digests); i++) {
+ digest = &VEC_ELT(forbidden_digests, i);
+ switch (digest->digest_size) {
+ case br_sha256_SIZE:
+ if (!memcmp(sha256_digest,
+ digest->data,
+ br_sha256_SIZE))
+ return (1);
+ break;
+ case br_sha384_SIZE:
+ if (!memcmp(sha384_digest,
+ digest->data,
+ br_sha384_SIZE))
+ return (1);
+ break;
+ case br_sha512_SIZE:
+ if (!memcmp(sha512_digest,
+ digest->data,
+ br_sha512_SIZE))
+ return (1);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
static br_x509_pkey *
verify_signer(const char *certs,
br_name_element *elts, size_t num_elts)
@@ -266,14 +415,44 @@
br_x509_certificate *xcs;
br_x509_pkey *pk;
size_t num;
-
+
+ pk = NULL;
+
ve_trust_init();
xcs = read_certificates(certs, &num);
if (xcs == NULL) {
ve_error_set("cannot read certificates\n");
return (NULL);
}
- pk = verify_signer_xcs(xcs, num, elts, num_elts);
+ /*
+ * Check if hash of tbs part of any certificate in chain
+ * is on the forbidden list.
+ */
+ if (check_forbidden_digests(xcs, num)) {
+ ve_error_set("Certificate hash is on forbidden list\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check if either
+ * 1. There is a direct match between cert from forbidden_anchors
+ * and a cert from chain.
+ * 2. CA that signed the chain is found in forbidden_anchors.
+ */
+ if (VEC_LEN(forbidden_anchors) > 0)
+ pk = verify_signer_xcs(xcs, num, elts, num_elts, &forbidden_anchors);
+ if (pk != NULL) {
+ ve_error_set("Certificate is on forbidden list\n");
+ xfreepkey(pk);
+ pk = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ pk = verify_signer_xcs(xcs, num, elts, num_elts, &trust_anchors);
+
+out:
+ while(num--)
+ free_cert_contents(&xcs[num]);
+
xfree(xcs);
return (pk);
}
@@ -679,7 +858,8 @@
for (u = 0; u < num; u ++) {
cn.len = sizeof(cn_buf);
- if ((pk = verify_signer_xcs(&xcs[u], 1, &cn, 1)) != NULL) {
+ if ((pk = verify_signer_xcs(&xcs[u], 1, &cn, 1, &trust_anchors)) != NULL) {
+ free_cert_contents(&xcs[u]);
once++;
printf("Testing verify certificate: %s\tPassed\n",
cn.status ? cn_buf : "");
Index: share/mk/src.opts.mk
===================================================================
--- share/mk/src.opts.mk
+++ share/mk/src.opts.mk
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@
GNU_GREP_COMPAT \
HESIOD \
LIBSOFT \
+ LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT \
LOADER_FIREWIRE \
LOADER_FORCE_LE \
LOADER_VERBOSE \
@@ -434,6 +435,10 @@
MK_GDB:= no
.endif
+.if ${MK_LOADER_VERIEXEC} == "no"
+MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT:= no
+.endif
+
.if ${MK_CAPSICUM} == "no"
MK_CASPER:= no
.endif
Index: stand/efi/loader/Makefile
===================================================================
--- stand/efi/loader/Makefile
+++ stand/efi/loader/Makefile
@@ -81,6 +81,10 @@
CFLAGS+= -DEFI_STAGING_SIZE=${EFI_STAGING_SIZE}
.endif
+.if ${MK_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT} == "yes"
+CFLAGS+= -DEFI_SECUREBOOT
+.endif
+
NEWVERSWHAT= "EFI loader" ${MACHINE}
VERSION_FILE= ${.CURDIR}/../loader/version
Index: stand/efi/loader/main.c
===================================================================
--- stand/efi/loader/main.c
+++ stand/efi/loader/main.c
@@ -963,6 +963,17 @@
*/
BS->SetWatchdogTimer(0, 0, 0, NULL);
+ /*
+ * Initialize the trusted/forbidden certificates from UEFI.
+ * They will be later used to verify the manifest(s),
+ * which should contain hashes of verified files.
+ * This needs to be initialized before any configuration files
+ * are loaded.
+ */
+#ifdef EFI_SECUREBOOT
+ ve_efi_init();
+#endif
+
/*
* Try and find a good currdev based on the image that was booted.
* It might be desirable here to have a short pause to allow falling
Index: tools/build/options/WITH_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ tools/build/options/WITH_LOADER_EFI_SECUREBOOT
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+Enable building
+.Xr loader 8
+with support for verification based on certificates obtained from UEFI.
+.Pp

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