Change Details

Chacha20 does not require messages to be multiples of block size, so it is valid to use the cipher without the explicit padding AES-CBC would require. (AES-CTR would also be fine without padding. I think it might be reasonable to add AES-CTR mode support, deprecate AES-CBC for panic dumps and only support stream ciphers.) For a PoC, hardcode Chacha in dumpon(8) and disable AES-CBC support in the kernel entirely, so we can allow compress+encrypt unconditionally. A follow-up to r324965.

Chacha20 does not require messages to be multiples of block size, so it is valid to use the cipher without the explicit padding AES-CBC would require.

Chacha20 does not require messages to be multiples of block size, so it is valid to use the cipher without the explicit padding AES-CBC would require. (AES-CTR would also be fine without padding. I think it might be reasonable to add AES-CTR mode support, deprecate AES-CBC for panic dumps and only support stream ciphers.) For a PoC, hardcode Chacha in dumpon(8) and disable AES-CBC support in the kernel entirely, so we can allow compress+encrypt unconditionally. A follow-up to r324965.