Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c (revision 78128) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c (revision 78129) @@ -1,249 +1,250 @@ /* * Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #include "includes.h" #include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh1.h" #include "packet.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #ifdef KRB5 krb5_context ssh_context = NULL; krb5_auth_context auth_context; krb5_ccache mem_ccache = NULL; /* Credential cache for acquired ticket */ /* Try krb5 authentication. server_user is passed for logging purposes only, in auth is received ticket, in client is returned principal from the ticket */ int auth_krb5(const char* server_user, krb5_data *auth, krb5_principal *client) { krb5_error_code problem; krb5_principal server = NULL; krb5_principal tkt_client = NULL; krb5_data reply; krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL; int fd; int ret; reply.length = 0; problem = krb5_init(); if (problem) return 0; problem = krb5_auth_con_init(ssh_context, &auth_context); if (problem) { log("Kerberos v5 authentication failed: %.100s", krb5_get_err_text(ssh_context, problem)); return 0; } fd = packet_get_connection_in(); problem = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd(ssh_context, auth_context, &fd); if (problem) { ret = 0; goto err; } problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(ssh_context, NULL, NULL , KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); if (problem) { ret = 0; goto err; } problem = krb5_rd_req(ssh_context, &auth_context, auth, server, NULL, NULL, &ticket); if (problem) { ret = 0; goto err; } problem = krb5_copy_principal(ssh_context, ticket->client, &tkt_client); if (problem) { ret = 0; goto err; } /* if client wants mutual auth */ problem = krb5_mk_rep(ssh_context, auth_context, &reply); if (problem) { ret = 0; goto err; } *client = tkt_client; packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE); packet_put_string((char *) reply.data, reply.length); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); ret = 1; err: if (server) krb5_free_principal(ssh_context, server); if (ticket) krb5_free_ticket(ssh_context, ticket); if (reply.length) xfree(reply.data); return ret; } int auth_krb5_tgt(char *server_user, krb5_data *tgt, krb5_principal tkt_client) { krb5_error_code problem; krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; if (ssh_context == NULL) { goto fail; } problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(ssh_context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); if (problem) { goto fail; } problem = krb5_cc_initialize(ssh_context, ccache, tkt_client); if (problem) { goto fail; } problem = krb5_rd_cred2(ssh_context, auth_context, ccache, tgt); if (problem) { goto fail; } mem_ccache = ccache; ccache = NULL; /* problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(ssh_context, ccache, mem_ccache); if (problem) { mem_ccache = NULL; goto fail; } problem = krb5_cc_destroy(ssh_context, ccache); if (problem) goto fail; */ #if 0 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif return 1; fail: if (ccache) krb5_cc_destroy(ssh_context, ccache); #if 0 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif return 0; } int auth_krb5_password(struct passwd *pw, const char *password) { krb5_error_code problem; krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; krb5_principal client = NULL; int ret; problem = krb5_init(); if (problem) return 0; problem = krb5_parse_name(ssh_context, pw->pw_name, &client); if (problem) { ret = 0; goto out; } problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(ssh_context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); if (problem) { ret = 0; goto out; } problem = krb5_cc_initialize(ssh_context, ccache, client); if (problem) { ret = 0; goto out; } problem = krb5_verify_user(ssh_context, client, ccache, password, 1, NULL); if (problem) { ret = 0; goto out; } /* problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(ssh_context, ccache, mem_ccache); if (problem) { ret = 0; mem_ccache = NULL; goto out; } */ mem_ccache = ccache; ccache = NULL; ret = 1; out: if (client != NULL) krb5_free_principal(ssh_context, client); if (ccache != NULL) krb5_cc_destroy(ssh_context, ccache); return ret; } void krb5_cleanup_proc(void *ignore) { extern krb5_principal tkt_client; debug("krb5_cleanup_proc() called"); if (mem_ccache) krb5_cc_destroy(ssh_context, mem_ccache); if (tkt_client) krb5_free_principal(ssh_context, tkt_client); if (auth_context) krb5_auth_con_free(ssh_context, auth_context); if (ssh_context) krb5_free_context(ssh_context); } int krb5_init(void) { krb5_error_code problem; static cleanup_registered = 0; if (ssh_context == NULL) { problem = krb5_init_context(&ssh_context); if (problem) return problem; krb5_init_ets(ssh_context); } if (!cleanup_registered) { fatal_add_cleanup(krb5_cleanup_proc, NULL); cleanup_registered = 1; } return 0; } #endif /* KRB5 */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth.h (revision 78128) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth.h (revision 78129) @@ -1,152 +1,153 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.15 2001/04/12 19:15:24 markus Exp $ * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef AUTH_H #define AUTH_H #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP #include #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH #include #endif typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; struct Authctxt { int success; int postponed; int valid; int attempt; int failures; char *user; char *service; struct passwd *pw; char *style; #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif }; /* * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file. Returns true if * authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is non-zero, this will not * consider .rhosts and .shosts (/etc/hosts.equiv will still be used). */ int auth_rhosts(struct passwd * pw, const char *client_user); /* extended interface similar to auth_rhosts() */ int auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname, const char *ipaddr); /* * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using * its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds. */ int auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd * pw, const char *client_user, RSA* client_host_key); /* * Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if * authentication succeeds. */ int auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password); /* * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns 0 if * the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation. */ int auth_rsa(struct passwd * pw, BIGNUM * client_n); /* * Parses an RSA key (number of bits, e, n) from a string. Moves the pointer * over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end. */ int auth_rsa_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n); /* * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client, * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to our * challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer. */ int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *pk); #ifdef KRB5 #include +#include int auth_krb5(); /* XXX Doplnit prototypy */ int auth_krb5_tgt(); int krb5_init(); void krb5_cleanup_proc(void *ignore); int auth_krb5_password(struct passwd *pw, const char *password); #endif /* KRB5 */ #ifdef KRB4 #include /* * Performs Kerberos v4 mutual authentication with the client. This returns 0 * if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation. */ int auth_krb4(const char *server_user, KTEXT auth, char **client); int krb4_init(uid_t uid); void krb4_cleanup_proc(void *ignore); int auth_krb4_password(struct passwd * pw, const char *password); #ifdef AFS #include /* Accept passed Kerberos v4 ticket-granting ticket and AFS tokens. */ int auth_kerberos_tgt(struct passwd * pw, const char *string); int auth_afs_token(struct passwd * pw, const char *token_string); #endif /* AFS */ #endif /* KRB4 */ void do_authentication(void); void do_authentication2(void); Authctxt *authctxt_new(void); void auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info); void userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method); int auth_root_allowed(char *method); int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs); int allowed_user(struct passwd * pw); char *get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs); int verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, char *response); struct passwd * auth_get_user(void); #define AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 #define AUTH_FAIL_LOG (AUTH_FAIL_MAX/2) #define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s" #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth1.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth1.c (revision 78128) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth1.c (revision 78129) @@ -1,571 +1,571 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.22 2001/03/23 12:02:49 markus Exp $"); RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "mpaux.h" #include "log.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "session.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" #include #include #ifdef KRB5 extern krb5_context ssh_context; krb5_principal tkt_client = NULL; /* Principal from the received ticket. Also is used as an indication of succesful krb5 authentization. */ #endif /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; /* * convert ssh auth msg type into description */ char * get_authname(int type) { static char buf[1024]; switch (type) { case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD: return "password"; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA: return "rsa"; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA: return "rhosts-rsa"; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS: return "rhosts"; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS: case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE: return "challenge-response"; #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS: return "kerberos"; #endif } snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type); return buf; } /* * read packets, try to authenticate the user and * return only if authentication is successful */ void do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt) { int authenticated = 0; u_int bits; RSA *client_host_key; BIGNUM *n; char *client_user, *password; char info[1024]; u_int dlen; int plen, nlen, elen; u_int ulen; int type = 0; struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP login_cap_t *lc; #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ #ifdef USE_PAM struct inverted_pam_cookie *pam_cookie; #endif /* USE_PAM */ #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) || defined(LOGIN_ACCESS) const char *from_host, *from_ip; from_host = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check); from_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP || LOGIN_ACCESS */ #if 0 #ifdef KRB5 { krb5_error_code ret; ret = krb5_init_context(&ssh_context); if (ret) verbose("Error while initializing Kerberos V5."); krb5_init_ets(ssh_context); } #endif /* KRB5 */ #endif debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.", authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", authctxt->user); /* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */ if (options.password_authentication && #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) (!options.kerberos_authentication #if defined(KRB4) || options.krb4_or_local_passwd #endif ) && #endif #ifdef USE_PAM auth_pam_password(authctxt, "") #else auth_password(authctxt, "") #endif ) { auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", ""); return; } /* Indicate that authentication is needed. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); client_user = NULL; for (;;) { /* default to fail */ authenticated = 0; info[0] = '\0'; /* Get a packet from the client. */ type = packet_read(&plen); /* Process the packet. */ switch (type) { #ifdef AFS #ifndef KRB5 case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KRB4_TGT: if (!options.krb4_tgt_passing) { /* packet_get_all(); */ verbose("Kerberos v4 tgt passing disabled."); break; } else { /* Accept Kerberos v4 tgt. */ char *tgt = packet_get_string(&dlen); packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); if (!auth_krb4_tgt(pw, tgt)) verbose("Kerberos v4 tgt REFUSED for %.100ss", authctxt->user); xfree(tgt); } continue; #endif /* !KRB5 */ case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN: if (!options.afs_token_passing || !k_hasafs()) { verbose("AFS token passing disabled."); break; } else { /* Accept AFS token. */ char *token_string = packet_get_string(&dlen); packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); if (!auth_afs_token(pw, token_string)) verbose("AFS token REFUSED for %.100s", authctxt->user); xfree(token_string); } continue; #endif /* AFS */ #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS: if (!options.kerberos_authentication) { verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled."); break; } else { /* Try Kerberos authentication. */ KTEXT_ST auth; char *tkt_user = NULL; char *kdata = packet_get_string((u_int *) &auth.length); packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type); if (!authctxt->valid) { /* Do nothing. */ } else if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* 4 == KRB_PROT_VERSION */ #ifdef KRB4 if (auth.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN) memcpy(auth.dat, kdata, auth.length); authenticated = auth_krb4(pw->pw_name, &auth, &tkt_user); if (authenticated) { snprintf(info, sizeof info, " tktuser %.100s", tkt_user); xfree(tkt_user); } #else verbose("Kerberos v4 authentication disabled."); #endif /* KRB4 */ } else { #ifndef KRB5 verbose("Kerberos v5 authentication disabled."); #else krb5_data k5data; k5data.length = auth.length; k5data.data = kdata; #if 0 if (krb5_init_context(&ssh_context)) { verbose("Error while initializing Kerberos V5."); break; } krb5_init_ets(ssh_context); #endif /* pw->name is passed just for logging purposes */ if (auth_krb5(pw->pw_name, &k5data, &tkt_client)) { /* authorize client against .k5login */ if (krb5_kuserok(ssh_context, tkt_client, pw->pw_name)) authenticated = 1; } #endif /* KRB5 */ } xfree(kdata); } break; #endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS: if (!options.rhosts_authentication) { verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled."); break; } /* * Get client user name. Note that we just have to * trust the client; this is one reason why rhosts * authentication is insecure. (Another is * IP-spoofing on a local network.) */ client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen); packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + ulen, type); /* Try to authenticate using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts. */ authenticated = auth_rhosts(pw, client_user); snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user); break; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA: if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) { verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled."); break; } /* * Get client user name. Note that we just have to * trust the client; root on the client machine can * claim to be any user. */ client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen); /* Get the client host key. */ client_host_key = RSA_new(); if (client_host_key == NULL) fatal("RSA_new failed"); client_host_key->e = BN_new(); client_host_key->n = BN_new(); if (client_host_key->e == NULL || client_host_key->n == NULL) fatal("BN_new failed"); bits = packet_get_int(); packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->e, &elen); packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->n, &nlen); if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n)) verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: " "actual %d, announced %d", BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n), bits); packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen) + 4 + elen + nlen, type); authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(pw, client_user, client_host_key); RSA_free(client_host_key); snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user); break; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA: if (!options.rsa_authentication) { verbose("RSA authentication disabled."); break; } /* RSA authentication requested. */ n = BN_new(); packet_get_bignum(n, &nlen); packet_integrity_check(plen, nlen, type); authenticated = auth_rsa(pw, n); BN_clear_free(n); break; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD: if (!options.password_authentication) { verbose("Password authentication disabled."); break; } /* * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is * not visible to an outside observer. */ password = packet_get_string(&dlen); packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); #ifdef USE_PAM /* Do PAM auth with password */ authenticated = auth_pam_password(authctxt, password); #else /* !USE_PAM */ /* Try authentication with the password. */ authenticated = auth_password(authctxt, password); #endif /* USE_PAM */ memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); xfree(password); break; #ifdef USE_PAM case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS: debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS: Trying PAM"); pam_cookie = ipam_start_auth("csshd", pw->pw_name); /* We now have data available to send as a challenge */ if (pam_cookie->num_msg != 1 || (pam_cookie->msg[0]->msg_style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF && pam_cookie->msg[0]->msg_style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON)) { /* We got several challenges or an unknown challenge type */ ipam_free_cookie(pam_cookie); pam_cookie = NULL; break; } packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE); packet_put_string(pam_cookie->msg[0]->msg, strlen(pam_cookie->msg[0]->msg)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); continue; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE: debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE"); if (pam_cookie == NULL) break; { char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen); packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); pam_cookie->resp[0]->resp = strdup(response); xfree(response); authenticated = ipam_complete_auth(pam_cookie); ipam_free_cookie(pam_cookie); pam_cookie = NULL; } break; #elif defined(SKEY) case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS: debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS"); if (options.challenge_reponse_authentication == 1) { char *challenge = get_challenge(authctxt, authctxt->style); if (challenge != NULL) { debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge); packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE); packet_put_cstring(challenge); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); continue; } } break; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE: debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE"); if (options.challenge_reponse_authentication == 1) { char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen); debug("got response '%s'", response); packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type); authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response); memset(response, 'r', dlen); xfree(response); } break; #else case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS: /* TIS Authentication is unsupported */ log("TIS authentication unsupported."); break; #endif #ifdef KRB5 case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT: /* Passing krb5 ticket */ if (!options.krb5_tgt_passing /*|| !options.krb5_authentication */) { } if (tkt_client == NULL) { /* passing tgt without krb5 authentication */ } { krb5_data tgt; u_int tgtlen; tgt.data = packet_get_string(&tgtlen); tgt.length = tgtlen; - if (!auth_krb5_tgt(luser, &tgt, tkt_client)) - verbose ("Kerberos V5 TGT refused for %.100s", luser); + if (!auth_krb5_tgt(pw->pw_name, &tgt, tkt_client)) + verbose ("Kerberos V5 TGT refused for %.100s", pw->pw_name); xfree(tgt.data); break; } #endif /* KRB5 */ default: /* * Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure * returned) during authentication. */ log("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type); break; } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (pw != NULL) { lc = login_getpwclass(pw); if (lc == NULL) lc = login_getclassbyname(NULL, pw); if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) { log("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].", pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip); packet_disconnect("Sorry, you are not allowed to connect."); } if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) { log("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME) FROM %.200s", pw->pw_name, from_host); packet_disconnect("Logins not available right now."); } login_close(lc); lc = NULL; } #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ #ifdef LOGIN_ACCESS if (pw != NULL && !login_access(pw->pw_name, from_host)) { log("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].", pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip); packet_disconnect("Sorry, you are not allowed to connect."); } #endif /* LOGIN_ACCESS */ #ifdef BSD_AUTH if (authctxt->as) { auth_close(authctxt->as); authctxt->as = NULL; } #endif if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated) fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s", authctxt->user); /* Special handling for root */ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) authenticated = 0; if (pw != NULL && pw->pw_uid == 0) log("ROOT LOGIN as '%.100s' from %.100s", pw->pw_name, get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check)); /* Log before sending the reply */ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info); #ifdef USE_PAM if (authenticated && !do_pam_account(pw->pw_name, client_user)) authenticated = 0; #endif if (client_user != NULL) { xfree(client_user); client_user = NULL; } if (authenticated) return; if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user); packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } } /* * Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already * been exchanged and encryption is enabled. */ void do_authentication() { Authctxt *authctxt; struct passwd *pw; int plen; u_int ulen; char *user, *style = NULL; /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_USER); /* Get the user name. */ user = packet_get_string(&ulen); packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen), SSH_CMSG_USER); if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) *style++ = 0; authctxt = authctxt_new(); authctxt->user = user; authctxt->style = style; /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */ pw = getpwnam(user); if (pw && allowed_user(pw)) { authctxt->valid = 1; pw = pwcopy(pw); } else { debug("do_authentication: illegal user %s", user); pw = NULL; } authctxt->pw = pw; #ifdef USE_PAM if (pw != NULL) start_pam(pw); #endif setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown"); /* * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as * the server. */ if (getuid() != 0 && pw && pw->pw_uid != getuid()) packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root."); /* * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful */ do_authloop(authctxt); /* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Perform session preparation. */ do_authenticated(authctxt); } Index: head/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile =================================================================== --- head/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile (revision 78128) +++ head/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile (revision 78129) @@ -1,48 +1,46 @@ # $FreeBSD$ # LOGINSRC= ${.CURDIR}/../../../usr.bin/login PROG= sshd SRCS= sshd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-passwd.c auth-rsa.c auth-rh-rsa.c \ sshpty.c sshlogin.c servconf.c serverloop.c \ auth.c auth1.c auth2.c auth-options.c session.c \ auth-chall.c auth2-chall.c auth-pam.c login_access.c groupaccess.c MAN= sshd.8 CFLAGS+= -DLIBWRAP -DHAVE_LOGIN_CAP -DLOGIN_ACCESS -I${LOGINSRC} -DUSE_PAM -DHAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST .if defined(MAKE_KERBEROS4) && \ ((${MAKE_KERBEROS4} == "yes") || (${MAKE_KERBEROS4} == "YES")) DISTRIBUTION=krb4 CFLAGS+= -DKRB4 SRCS+= auth-krb4.c LDADD+= -lkrb -lcom_err DPADD+= ${LIBKRB} ${LIBCOM_ERR} .endif # MAKE_KERBEROS4 -.if 0 .if defined(MAKE_KERBEROS5) && \ ((${MAKE_KERBEROS5} == "yes") || (${MAKE_KERBEROS5} == "YES")) DISTRIBUTION=krb5 CFLAGS+= -DKRB5 SRCS+= auth-krb5.c LDADD+= -lkrb5 -lasn1 -lcom_err -lmd -L${.OBJDIR}/../../../kerberos5/lib/libroken -lroken DPADD+= ${LIBKRB5} ${LIBCOM_ERR} ${LIBASN1} ${LIBMD} .endif # MAKE_KERBEROS5 -.endif # 0 CFLAGS+= -DSKEY LDADD+= -lopie -lmd DPADD+= ${LIBOPIE} ${LIBMD} .if defined(X11BASE) CFLAGS+= -DXAUTH_PATH=\"${X11BASE}/bin/xauth\" .endif LDADD+= ${LIBSSH} -lcrypt -lcrypto -lutil -lz -lwrap -lpam DPADD+= ${LIBSSH} ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBUTIL} ${LIBZ} ${LIBWRAP} ${LIBPAM} .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} ${LOGINSRC}