Index: head/sys/crypto/chacha20/chacha-sw.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/crypto/chacha20/chacha-sw.c (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/crypto/chacha20/chacha-sw.c (revision 361298) @@ -1,78 +1,56 @@ /* This file is in the public domain. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include static int -chacha20_xform_setkey(u_int8_t **sched, const u_int8_t *key, int len) +chacha20_xform_setkey(void *ctx, const uint8_t *key, int len) { - struct chacha_ctx *ctx; if (len != CHACHA_MINKEYLEN && len != 32) return (EINVAL); - ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx), M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); - *sched = (void *)ctx; - if (ctx == NULL) - return (ENOMEM); - chacha_keysetup(ctx, key, len * 8); return (0); } static void -chacha20_xform_reinit(caddr_t key, const u_int8_t *iv) +chacha20_xform_reinit(void *ctx, const u_int8_t *iv) { - struct chacha_ctx *ctx; - ctx = (void *)key; chacha_ivsetup(ctx, iv + 8, iv); } static void -chacha20_xform_zerokey(u_int8_t **sched) +chacha20_xform_crypt(void *ctx, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out) { - struct chacha_ctx *ctx; - ctx = (void *)*sched; - explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); - free(ctx, M_CRYPTO_DATA); - *sched = NULL; + chacha_encrypt_bytes(ctx, in, out, 1); } static void -chacha20_xform_crypt(caddr_t cctx, u_int8_t *bytes) +chacha20_xform_crypt_multi(void *ctx, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, + size_t len) { - struct chacha_ctx *ctx; - ctx = (void *)cctx; - chacha_encrypt_bytes(ctx, bytes, bytes, 1); + chacha_encrypt_bytes(ctx, in, out, len); } -static void -chacha20_xform_crypt_multi(void *vctx, uint8_t *bytes, size_t len) -{ - struct chacha_ctx *ctx; - - ctx = vctx; - chacha_encrypt_bytes(ctx, bytes, bytes, len); -} - struct enc_xform enc_xform_chacha20 = { .type = CRYPTO_CHACHA20, .name = "chacha20", + .ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), .blocksize = 1, .ivsize = CHACHA_NONCELEN + CHACHA_CTRLEN, .minkey = CHACHA_MINKEYLEN, .maxkey = 32, .encrypt = chacha20_xform_crypt, .decrypt = chacha20_xform_crypt, .setkey = chacha20_xform_setkey, - .zerokey = chacha20_xform_zerokey, .reinit = chacha20_xform_reinit, .encrypt_multi = chacha20_xform_crypt_multi, .decrypt_multi = chacha20_xform_crypt_multi, }; Index: head/sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/dev/cxgbe/crypto/t4_crypto.c (revision 361298) @@ -1,2790 +1,2793 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2017 Chelsio Communications, Inc. * All rights reserved. * Written by: John Baldwin * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cryptodev_if.h" #include "common/common.h" #include "crypto/t4_crypto.h" /* * Requests consist of: * * +-------------------------------+ * | struct fw_crypto_lookaside_wr | * +-------------------------------+ * | struct ulp_txpkt | * +-------------------------------+ * | struct ulptx_idata | * +-------------------------------+ * | struct cpl_tx_sec_pdu | * +-------------------------------+ * | struct cpl_tls_tx_scmd_fmt | * +-------------------------------+ * | key context header | * +-------------------------------+ * | AES key | ----- For requests with AES * +-------------------------------+ * | Hash state | ----- For hash-only requests * +-------------------------------+ - * | IPAD (16-byte aligned) | \ * +-------------------------------+ +---- For requests with HMAC * | OPAD (16-byte aligned) | / * +-------------------------------+ - * | GMAC H | ----- For AES-GCM * +-------------------------------+ - * | struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl | \ * +-------------------------------+ +---- Destination buffer for * | PHYS_DSGL entries | / non-hash-only requests * +-------------------------------+ - * | 16 dummy bytes | ----- Only for HMAC/hash-only requests * +-------------------------------+ * | IV | ----- If immediate IV * +-------------------------------+ * | Payload | ----- If immediate Payload * +-------------------------------+ - * | struct ulptx_sgl | \ * +-------------------------------+ +---- If payload via SGL * | SGL entries | / * +-------------------------------+ - * * Note that the key context must be padded to ensure 16-byte alignment. * For HMAC requests, the key consists of the partial hash of the IPAD * followed by the partial hash of the OPAD. * * Replies consist of: * * +-------------------------------+ * | struct cpl_fw6_pld | * +-------------------------------+ * | hash digest | ----- For HMAC request with * +-------------------------------+ 'hash_size' set in work request * * A 32-bit big-endian error status word is supplied in the last 4 * bytes of data[0] in the CPL_FW6_PLD message. bit 0 indicates a * "MAC" error and bit 1 indicates a "PAD" error. * * The 64-bit 'cookie' field from the fw_crypto_lookaside_wr message * in the request is returned in data[1] of the CPL_FW6_PLD message. * * For block cipher replies, the updated IV is supplied in data[2] and * data[3] of the CPL_FW6_PLD message. * * For hash replies where the work request set 'hash_size' to request * a copy of the hash in the reply, the hash digest is supplied * immediately following the CPL_FW6_PLD message. */ /* * The crypto engine supports a maximum AAD size of 511 bytes. */ #define MAX_AAD_LEN 511 /* * The documentation for CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL claims a maximum of 32 SG * entries. While the CPL includes a 16-bit length field, the T6 can * sometimes hang if an error occurs while processing a request with a * single DSGL entry larger than 2k. */ #define MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE 32 #define DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN 2048 /* * The adapter only supports requests with a total input or output * length of 64k-1 or smaller. Longer requests either result in hung * requests or incorrect results. */ #define MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 65535 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CCR, "ccr", "Chelsio T6 crypto"); struct ccr_session_hmac { struct auth_hash *auth_hash; int hash_len; unsigned int partial_digest_len; unsigned int auth_mode; unsigned int mk_size; char pads[CHCR_HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE_128 * 2]; }; struct ccr_session_gmac { int hash_len; char ghash_h[GMAC_BLOCK_LEN]; }; struct ccr_session_ccm_mac { int hash_len; }; struct ccr_session_blkcipher { unsigned int cipher_mode; unsigned int key_len; unsigned int iv_len; __be32 key_ctx_hdr; char enckey[CHCR_AES_MAX_KEY_LEN]; char deckey[CHCR_AES_MAX_KEY_LEN]; }; struct ccr_port { struct sge_wrq *txq; struct sge_rxq *rxq; int tx_channel_id; u_int active_sessions; }; struct ccr_session { bool active; int pending; enum { HASH, HMAC, BLKCIPHER, ETA, GCM, CCM } mode; struct ccr_port *port; union { struct ccr_session_hmac hmac; struct ccr_session_gmac gmac; struct ccr_session_ccm_mac ccm_mac; }; struct ccr_session_blkcipher blkcipher; }; struct ccr_softc { struct adapter *adapter; device_t dev; uint32_t cid; struct mtx lock; bool detaching; struct ccr_port ports[MAX_NPORTS]; u_int port_mask; /* * Pre-allocate S/G lists used when preparing a work request. * 'sg_crp' contains an sglist describing the entire buffer * for a 'struct cryptop'. 'sg_ulptx' is used to describe * the data the engine should DMA as input via ULPTX_SGL. * 'sg_dsgl' is used to describe the destination that cipher * text and a tag should be written to. */ struct sglist *sg_crp; struct sglist *sg_ulptx; struct sglist *sg_dsgl; /* * Pre-allocate a dummy output buffer for the IV and AAD for * AEAD requests. */ char *iv_aad_buf; struct sglist *sg_iv_aad; /* Statistics. */ uint64_t stats_blkcipher_encrypt; uint64_t stats_blkcipher_decrypt; uint64_t stats_hash; uint64_t stats_hmac; uint64_t stats_eta_encrypt; uint64_t stats_eta_decrypt; uint64_t stats_gcm_encrypt; uint64_t stats_gcm_decrypt; uint64_t stats_ccm_encrypt; uint64_t stats_ccm_decrypt; uint64_t stats_wr_nomem; uint64_t stats_inflight; uint64_t stats_mac_error; uint64_t stats_pad_error; uint64_t stats_bad_session; uint64_t stats_sglist_error; uint64_t stats_process_error; uint64_t stats_sw_fallback; }; /* * Crypto requests involve two kind of scatter/gather lists. * * Non-hash-only requests require a PHYS_DSGL that describes the * location to store the results of the encryption or decryption * operation. This SGL uses a different format (PHYS_DSGL) and should * exclude the skip bytes at the start of the data as well as any AAD * or IV. For authenticated encryption requests it should include the * destination of the hash or tag. * * The input payload may either be supplied inline as immediate data, * or via a standard ULP_TX SGL. This SGL should include AAD, * ciphertext, and the hash or tag for authenticated decryption * requests. * * These scatter/gather lists can describe different subsets of the * buffer described by the crypto operation. ccr_populate_sglist() * generates a scatter/gather list that covers the entire crypto * operation buffer that is then used to construct the other * scatter/gather lists. */ static int ccr_populate_sglist(struct sglist *sg, struct cryptop *crp) { int error; sglist_reset(sg); switch (crp->crp_buf_type) { case CRYPTO_BUF_MBUF: error = sglist_append_mbuf(sg, crp->crp_mbuf); break; case CRYPTO_BUF_UIO: error = sglist_append_uio(sg, crp->crp_uio); break; case CRYPTO_BUF_CONTIG: error = sglist_append(sg, crp->crp_buf, crp->crp_ilen); break; default: error = EINVAL; } return (error); } /* * Segments in 'sg' larger than 'maxsegsize' are counted as multiple * segments. */ static int ccr_count_sgl(struct sglist *sg, int maxsegsize) { int i, nsegs; nsegs = 0; for (i = 0; i < sg->sg_nseg; i++) nsegs += howmany(sg->sg_segs[i].ss_len, maxsegsize); return (nsegs); } /* These functions deal with PHYS_DSGL for the reply buffer. */ static inline int ccr_phys_dsgl_len(int nsegs) { int len; len = (nsegs / 8) * sizeof(struct phys_sge_pairs); if ((nsegs % 8) != 0) { len += sizeof(uint16_t) * 8; len += roundup2(nsegs % 8, 2) * sizeof(uint64_t); } return (len); } static void ccr_write_phys_dsgl(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, void *dst, int nsegs) { struct sglist *sg; struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl *cpl; struct phys_sge_pairs *sgl; vm_paddr_t paddr; size_t seglen; u_int i, j; sg = sc->sg_dsgl; cpl = dst; cpl->op_to_tid = htobe32(V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_OPCODE(CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL) | V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_ISRDMA(0)); cpl->pcirlxorder_to_noofsgentr = htobe32( V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_PCIRLXORDER(0) | V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_PCINOSNOOP(0) | V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_PCITPHNTENB(0) | V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_DCAID(0) | V_CPL_RX_PHYS_DSGL_NOOFSGENTR(nsegs)); cpl->rss_hdr_int.opcode = CPL_RX_PHYS_ADDR; cpl->rss_hdr_int.qid = htobe16(s->port->rxq->iq.abs_id); cpl->rss_hdr_int.hash_val = 0; sgl = (struct phys_sge_pairs *)(cpl + 1); j = 0; for (i = 0; i < sg->sg_nseg; i++) { seglen = sg->sg_segs[i].ss_len; paddr = sg->sg_segs[i].ss_paddr; do { sgl->addr[j] = htobe64(paddr); if (seglen > DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN) { sgl->len[j] = htobe16(DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN); paddr += DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN; seglen -= DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN; } else { sgl->len[j] = htobe16(seglen); seglen = 0; } j++; if (j == 8) { sgl++; j = 0; } } while (seglen != 0); } MPASS(j + 8 * (sgl - (struct phys_sge_pairs *)(cpl + 1)) == nsegs); } /* These functions deal with the ULPTX_SGL for input payload. */ static inline int ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(int nsegs) { u_int n; nsegs--; /* first segment is part of ulptx_sgl */ n = sizeof(struct ulptx_sgl) + 8 * ((3 * nsegs) / 2 + (nsegs & 1)); return (roundup2(n, 16)); } static void ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(struct ccr_softc *sc, void *dst, int nsegs) { struct ulptx_sgl *usgl; struct sglist *sg; struct sglist_seg *ss; int i; sg = sc->sg_ulptx; MPASS(nsegs == sg->sg_nseg); ss = &sg->sg_segs[0]; usgl = dst; usgl->cmd_nsge = htobe32(V_ULPTX_CMD(ULP_TX_SC_DSGL) | V_ULPTX_NSGE(nsegs)); usgl->len0 = htobe32(ss->ss_len); usgl->addr0 = htobe64(ss->ss_paddr); ss++; for (i = 0; i < sg->sg_nseg - 1; i++) { usgl->sge[i / 2].len[i & 1] = htobe32(ss->ss_len); usgl->sge[i / 2].addr[i & 1] = htobe64(ss->ss_paddr); ss++; } } static bool ccr_use_imm_data(u_int transhdr_len, u_int input_len) { if (input_len > CRYPTO_MAX_IMM_TX_PKT_LEN) return (false); if (roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + roundup2(input_len, 16) > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN) return (false); return (true); } static void ccr_populate_wreq(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct chcr_wr *crwr, u_int kctx_len, u_int wr_len, u_int imm_len, u_int sgl_len, u_int hash_size, struct cryptop *crp) { u_int cctx_size, idata_len; cctx_size = sizeof(struct _key_ctx) + kctx_len; crwr->wreq.op_to_cctx_size = htobe32( V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_OPCODE(FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_COMPL(0) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_IMM_LEN(imm_len) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_CCTX_LOC(1) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_CCTX_SIZE(cctx_size >> 4)); crwr->wreq.len16_pkd = htobe32( V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_LEN16(wr_len / 16)); crwr->wreq.session_id = 0; crwr->wreq.rx_chid_to_rx_q_id = htobe32( V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_RX_CHID(s->port->tx_channel_id) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_LCB(0) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_PHASH(0) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_IV(IV_NOP) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_FQIDX(0) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_TX_CH(0) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_RX_Q_ID(s->port->rxq->iq.abs_id)); crwr->wreq.key_addr = 0; crwr->wreq.pld_size_hash_size = htobe32( V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_PLD_SIZE(sgl_len) | V_FW_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE_WR_HASH_SIZE(hash_size)); crwr->wreq.cookie = htobe64((uintptr_t)crp); crwr->ulptx.cmd_dest = htobe32(V_ULPTX_CMD(ULP_TX_PKT) | V_ULP_TXPKT_DATAMODIFY(0) | V_ULP_TXPKT_CHANNELID(s->port->tx_channel_id) | V_ULP_TXPKT_DEST(0) | V_ULP_TXPKT_FID(s->port->rxq->iq.abs_id) | V_ULP_TXPKT_RO(1)); crwr->ulptx.len = htobe32( ((wr_len - sizeof(struct fw_crypto_lookaside_wr)) / 16)); crwr->sc_imm.cmd_more = htobe32(V_ULPTX_CMD(ULP_TX_SC_IMM) | V_ULP_TX_SC_MORE(sgl_len != 0 ? 1 : 0)); idata_len = wr_len - offsetof(struct chcr_wr, sec_cpl) - sgl_len; if (imm_len % 16 != 0) idata_len -= 16 - imm_len % 16; crwr->sc_imm.len = htobe32(idata_len); } static int ccr_hash(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp) { struct chcr_wr *crwr; struct wrqe *wr; struct auth_hash *axf; char *dst; u_int hash_size_in_response, kctx_flits, kctx_len, transhdr_len, wr_len; u_int hmac_ctrl, imm_len, iopad_size; int error, sgl_nsegs, sgl_len, use_opad; /* Reject requests with too large of an input buffer. */ if (crp->crp_payload_length > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); axf = s->hmac.auth_hash; if (s->mode == HMAC) { use_opad = 1; hmac_ctrl = SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_NO_TRUNC; } else { use_opad = 0; hmac_ctrl = SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_NOP; } /* PADs must be 128-bit aligned. */ iopad_size = roundup2(s->hmac.partial_digest_len, 16); /* * The 'key' part of the context includes the aligned IPAD and * OPAD. */ kctx_len = iopad_size; if (use_opad) kctx_len += iopad_size; hash_size_in_response = axf->hashsize; transhdr_len = HASH_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len); if (crp->crp_payload_length == 0) { imm_len = axf->blocksize; sgl_nsegs = 0; sgl_len = 0; } else if (ccr_use_imm_data(transhdr_len, crp->crp_payload_length)) { imm_len = crp->crp_payload_length; sgl_nsegs = 0; sgl_len = 0; } else { imm_len = 0; sglist_reset(sc->sg_ulptx); error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length); if (error) return (error); sgl_nsegs = sc->sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; sgl_len = ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(sgl_nsegs); } wr_len = roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + roundup2(imm_len, 16) + sgl_len; if (wr_len > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN) return (EFBIG); wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, s->port->txq); if (wr == NULL) { sc->stats_wr_nomem++; return (ENOMEM); } crwr = wrtod(wr); memset(crwr, 0, wr_len); ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, hash_size_in_response, crp); crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(s->port->tx_channel_id) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CPLLEN(2) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_PLACEHOLDER(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_IVINSRTOFST(0)); crwr->sec_cpl.pldlen = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length == 0 ? axf->blocksize : crp->crp_payload_length); crwr->sec_cpl.cipherstop_lo_authinsert = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTART(1) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTOP(0)); /* These two flits are actually a CPL_TLS_TX_SCMD_FMT. */ crwr->sec_cpl.seqno_numivs = htobe32( V_SCMD_SEQ_NO_CTRL(0) | V_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION(SCMD_PROTO_VERSION_GENERIC) | V_SCMD_CIPH_MODE(SCMD_CIPH_MODE_NOP) | V_SCMD_AUTH_MODE(s->hmac.auth_mode) | V_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL(hmac_ctrl)); crwr->sec_cpl.ivgen_hdrlen = htobe32( V_SCMD_LAST_FRAG(0) | V_SCMD_MORE_FRAGS(crp->crp_payload_length == 0 ? 1 : 0) | V_SCMD_MAC_ONLY(1)); memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->hmac.pads, kctx_len); /* XXX: F_KEY_CONTEXT_SALT_PRESENT set, but 'salt' not set. */ kctx_flits = (sizeof(struct _key_ctx) + kctx_len) / 16; crwr->key_ctx.ctx_hdr = htobe32(V_KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN(kctx_flits) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_OPAD_PRESENT(use_opad) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_SALT_PRESENT(1) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_CK_SIZE(CHCR_KEYCTX_NO_KEY) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_MK_SIZE(s->hmac.mk_size) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_VALID(1)); dst = (char *)(crwr + 1) + kctx_len + DUMMY_BYTES; if (crp->crp_payload_length == 0) { dst[0] = 0x80; if (s->mode == HMAC) *(uint64_t *)(dst + axf->blocksize - sizeof(uint64_t)) = htobe64(axf->blocksize << 3); } else if (imm_len != 0) crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length, dst); else ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(sc, dst, sgl_nsegs); /* XXX: TODO backpressure */ t4_wrq_tx(sc->adapter, wr); return (0); } static int ccr_hash_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp, const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl, int error) { uint8_t hash[HASH_MAX_LEN]; if (error) return (error); if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) { crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, s->hmac.hash_len, hash); if (timingsafe_bcmp((cpl + 1), hash, s->hmac.hash_len) != 0) return (EBADMSG); } else crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, s->hmac.hash_len, (cpl + 1)); return (0); } static int ccr_blkcipher(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp) { char iv[CHCR_MAX_CRYPTO_IV_LEN]; struct chcr_wr *crwr; struct wrqe *wr; char *dst; u_int kctx_len, key_half, op_type, transhdr_len, wr_len; u_int imm_len, iv_len; int dsgl_nsegs, dsgl_len; int sgl_nsegs, sgl_len; int error; if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0 || crp->crp_payload_length == 0) return (EINVAL); if (s->blkcipher.cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CBC && (crp->crp_payload_length % AES_BLOCK_LEN) != 0) return (EINVAL); /* Reject requests with too large of an input buffer. */ if (crp->crp_payload_length > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) op_type = CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP; else op_type = CHCR_DECRYPT_OP; sglist_reset(sc->sg_dsgl); error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length); if (error) return (error); dsgl_nsegs = ccr_count_sgl(sc->sg_dsgl, DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN); if (dsgl_nsegs > MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE) return (EFBIG); dsgl_len = ccr_phys_dsgl_len(dsgl_nsegs); /* The 'key' must be 128-bit aligned. */ kctx_len = roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16); transhdr_len = CIPHER_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len, dsgl_len); /* For AES-XTS we send a 16-byte IV in the work request. */ if (s->blkcipher.cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_XTS) iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN; else iv_len = s->blkcipher.iv_len; if (ccr_use_imm_data(transhdr_len, crp->crp_payload_length + iv_len)) { imm_len = crp->crp_payload_length; sgl_nsegs = 0; sgl_len = 0; } else { imm_len = 0; sglist_reset(sc->sg_ulptx); error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length); if (error) return (error); sgl_nsegs = sc->sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; sgl_len = ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(sgl_nsegs); } wr_len = roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + iv_len + roundup2(imm_len, 16) + sgl_len; if (wr_len > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN) return (EFBIG); wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, s->port->txq); if (wr == NULL) { sc->stats_wr_nomem++; return (ENOMEM); } crwr = wrtod(wr); memset(crwr, 0, wr_len); crypto_read_iv(crp, iv); /* Zero the remainder of the IV for AES-XTS. */ memset(iv + s->blkcipher.iv_len, 0, iv_len - s->blkcipher.iv_len); ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, 0, crp); crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(s->port->tx_channel_id) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CPLLEN(2) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_PLACEHOLDER(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_IVINSRTOFST(1)); crwr->sec_cpl.pldlen = htobe32(iv_len + crp->crp_payload_length); crwr->sec_cpl.aadstart_cipherstop_hi = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTART(iv_len + 1) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_HI(0)); crwr->sec_cpl.cipherstop_lo_authinsert = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_LO(0)); /* These two flits are actually a CPL_TLS_TX_SCMD_FMT. */ crwr->sec_cpl.seqno_numivs = htobe32( V_SCMD_SEQ_NO_CTRL(0) | V_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION(SCMD_PROTO_VERSION_GENERIC) | V_SCMD_ENC_DEC_CTRL(op_type) | V_SCMD_CIPH_MODE(s->blkcipher.cipher_mode) | V_SCMD_AUTH_MODE(SCMD_AUTH_MODE_NOP) | V_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL(SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_NOP) | V_SCMD_IV_SIZE(iv_len / 2) | V_SCMD_NUM_IVS(0)); crwr->sec_cpl.ivgen_hdrlen = htobe32( V_SCMD_IV_GEN_CTRL(0) | V_SCMD_MORE_FRAGS(0) | V_SCMD_LAST_FRAG(0) | V_SCMD_MAC_ONLY(0) | V_SCMD_AADIVDROP(1) | V_SCMD_HDR_LEN(dsgl_len)); crwr->key_ctx.ctx_hdr = s->blkcipher.key_ctx_hdr; switch (s->blkcipher.cipher_mode) { case SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CBC: if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); else memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.deckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); break; case SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CTR: memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); break; case SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_XTS: key_half = s->blkcipher.key_len / 2; memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey + key_half, key_half); if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + key_half, s->blkcipher.enckey, key_half); else memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + key_half, s->blkcipher.deckey, key_half); break; } dst = (char *)(crwr + 1) + kctx_len; ccr_write_phys_dsgl(sc, s, dst, dsgl_nsegs); dst += sizeof(struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl) + dsgl_len; memcpy(dst, iv, iv_len); dst += iv_len; if (imm_len != 0) crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length, dst); else ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(sc, dst, sgl_nsegs); /* XXX: TODO backpressure */ t4_wrq_tx(sc->adapter, wr); return (0); } static int ccr_blkcipher_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp, const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl, int error) { /* * The updated IV to permit chained requests is at * cpl->data[2], but OCF doesn't permit chained requests. */ return (error); } /* * 'hashsize' is the length of a full digest. 'authsize' is the * requested digest length for this operation which may be less * than 'hashsize'. */ static int ccr_hmac_ctrl(unsigned int hashsize, unsigned int authsize) { if (authsize == 10) return (SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_TRUNC_RFC4366); if (authsize == 12) return (SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_IPSEC_96BIT); if (authsize == hashsize / 2) return (SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_DIV2); return (SCMD_HMAC_CTRL_NO_TRUNC); } static int ccr_eta(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp) { char iv[CHCR_MAX_CRYPTO_IV_LEN]; struct chcr_wr *crwr; struct wrqe *wr; struct auth_hash *axf; char *dst; u_int kctx_len, key_half, op_type, transhdr_len, wr_len; u_int hash_size_in_response, imm_len, iopad_size, iv_len; u_int aad_start, aad_stop; u_int auth_insert; u_int cipher_start, cipher_stop; u_int hmac_ctrl, input_len; int dsgl_nsegs, dsgl_len; int sgl_nsegs, sgl_len; int error; /* * If there is a need in the future, requests with an empty * payload could be supported as HMAC-only requests. */ if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0 || crp->crp_payload_length == 0) return (EINVAL); if (s->blkcipher.cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CBC && (crp->crp_payload_length % AES_BLOCK_LEN) != 0) return (EINVAL); /* For AES-XTS we send a 16-byte IV in the work request. */ if (s->blkcipher.cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_XTS) iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN; else iv_len = s->blkcipher.iv_len; if (crp->crp_aad_length + iv_len > MAX_AAD_LEN) return (EINVAL); axf = s->hmac.auth_hash; hash_size_in_response = s->hmac.hash_len; if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) op_type = CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP; else op_type = CHCR_DECRYPT_OP; /* * The output buffer consists of the cipher text followed by * the hash when encrypting. For decryption it only contains * the plain text. * * Due to a firmware bug, the output buffer must include a * dummy output buffer for the IV and AAD prior to the real * output buffer. */ if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) { if (iv_len + crp->crp_aad_length + crp->crp_payload_length + hash_size_in_response > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); } else { if (iv_len + crp->crp_aad_length + crp->crp_payload_length > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); } sglist_reset(sc->sg_dsgl); error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_iv_aad, 0, iv_len + crp->crp_aad_length); if (error) return (error); error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length); if (error) return (error); if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) { error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_digest_start, hash_size_in_response); if (error) return (error); } dsgl_nsegs = ccr_count_sgl(sc->sg_dsgl, DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN); if (dsgl_nsegs > MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE) return (EFBIG); dsgl_len = ccr_phys_dsgl_len(dsgl_nsegs); /* PADs must be 128-bit aligned. */ iopad_size = roundup2(s->hmac.partial_digest_len, 16); /* * The 'key' part of the key context consists of the key followed * by the IPAD and OPAD. */ kctx_len = roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16) + iopad_size * 2; transhdr_len = CIPHER_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len, dsgl_len); /* * The input buffer consists of the IV, any AAD, and then the * cipher/plain text. For decryption requests the hash is * appended after the cipher text. * * The IV is always stored at the start of the input buffer * even though it may be duplicated in the payload. The * crypto engine doesn't work properly if the IV offset points * inside of the AAD region, so a second copy is always * required. */ input_len = crp->crp_aad_length + crp->crp_payload_length; /* * The firmware hangs if sent a request which is a * bit smaller than MAX_REQUEST_SIZE. In particular, the * firmware appears to require 512 - 16 bytes of spare room * along with the size of the hash even if the hash isn't * included in the input buffer. */ if (input_len + roundup2(axf->hashsize, 16) + (512 - 16) > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) input_len += hash_size_in_response; if (ccr_use_imm_data(transhdr_len, iv_len + input_len)) { imm_len = input_len; sgl_nsegs = 0; sgl_len = 0; } else { imm_len = 0; sglist_reset(sc->sg_ulptx); if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) { error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length); if (error) return (error); } error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length); if (error) return (error); if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) { error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_digest_start, hash_size_in_response); if (error) return (error); } sgl_nsegs = sc->sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; sgl_len = ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(sgl_nsegs); } /* * Any auth-only data before the cipher region is marked as AAD. * Auth-data that overlaps with the cipher region is placed in * the auth section. */ if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) { aad_start = iv_len + 1; aad_stop = aad_start + crp->crp_aad_length - 1; } else { aad_start = 0; aad_stop = 0; } cipher_start = iv_len + crp->crp_aad_length + 1; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) cipher_stop = hash_size_in_response; else cipher_stop = 0; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) auth_insert = hash_size_in_response; else auth_insert = 0; wr_len = roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + iv_len + roundup2(imm_len, 16) + sgl_len; if (wr_len > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN) return (EFBIG); wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, s->port->txq); if (wr == NULL) { sc->stats_wr_nomem++; return (ENOMEM); } crwr = wrtod(wr); memset(crwr, 0, wr_len); crypto_read_iv(crp, iv); /* Zero the remainder of the IV for AES-XTS. */ memset(iv + s->blkcipher.iv_len, 0, iv_len - s->blkcipher.iv_len); ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP ? hash_size_in_response : 0, crp); crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(s->port->tx_channel_id) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CPLLEN(2) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_PLACEHOLDER(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_IVINSRTOFST(1)); crwr->sec_cpl.pldlen = htobe32(iv_len + input_len); crwr->sec_cpl.aadstart_cipherstop_hi = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTART(aad_start) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTOP(aad_stop) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTART(cipher_start) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_HI(cipher_stop >> 4)); crwr->sec_cpl.cipherstop_lo_authinsert = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_LO(cipher_stop & 0xf) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTART(cipher_start) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTOP(cipher_stop) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHINSERT(auth_insert)); /* These two flits are actually a CPL_TLS_TX_SCMD_FMT. */ hmac_ctrl = ccr_hmac_ctrl(axf->hashsize, hash_size_in_response); crwr->sec_cpl.seqno_numivs = htobe32( V_SCMD_SEQ_NO_CTRL(0) | V_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION(SCMD_PROTO_VERSION_GENERIC) | V_SCMD_ENC_DEC_CTRL(op_type) | V_SCMD_CIPH_AUTH_SEQ_CTRL(op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP ? 1 : 0) | V_SCMD_CIPH_MODE(s->blkcipher.cipher_mode) | V_SCMD_AUTH_MODE(s->hmac.auth_mode) | V_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL(hmac_ctrl) | V_SCMD_IV_SIZE(iv_len / 2) | V_SCMD_NUM_IVS(0)); crwr->sec_cpl.ivgen_hdrlen = htobe32( V_SCMD_IV_GEN_CTRL(0) | V_SCMD_MORE_FRAGS(0) | V_SCMD_LAST_FRAG(0) | V_SCMD_MAC_ONLY(0) | V_SCMD_AADIVDROP(0) | V_SCMD_HDR_LEN(dsgl_len)); crwr->key_ctx.ctx_hdr = s->blkcipher.key_ctx_hdr; switch (s->blkcipher.cipher_mode) { case SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CBC: if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); else memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.deckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); break; case SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CTR: memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); break; case SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_XTS: key_half = s->blkcipher.key_len / 2; memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey + key_half, key_half); if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + key_half, s->blkcipher.enckey, key_half); else memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + key_half, s->blkcipher.deckey, key_half); break; } dst = crwr->key_ctx.key + roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16); memcpy(dst, s->hmac.pads, iopad_size * 2); dst = (char *)(crwr + 1) + kctx_len; ccr_write_phys_dsgl(sc, s, dst, dsgl_nsegs); dst += sizeof(struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl) + dsgl_len; memcpy(dst, iv, iv_len); dst += iv_len; if (imm_len != 0) { if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) { crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length, dst); dst += crp->crp_aad_length; } crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length, dst); dst += crp->crp_payload_length; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, hash_size_in_response, dst); } else ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(sc, dst, sgl_nsegs); /* XXX: TODO backpressure */ t4_wrq_tx(sc->adapter, wr); return (0); } static int ccr_eta_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp, const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl, int error) { /* * The updated IV to permit chained requests is at * cpl->data[2], but OCF doesn't permit chained requests. */ return (error); } static int ccr_gcm(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp) { char iv[CHCR_MAX_CRYPTO_IV_LEN]; struct chcr_wr *crwr; struct wrqe *wr; char *dst; u_int iv_len, kctx_len, op_type, transhdr_len, wr_len; u_int hash_size_in_response, imm_len; u_int aad_start, aad_stop, cipher_start, cipher_stop, auth_insert; u_int hmac_ctrl, input_len; int dsgl_nsegs, dsgl_len; int sgl_nsegs, sgl_len; int error; if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0) return (EINVAL); /* * The crypto engine doesn't handle GCM requests with an empty * payload, so handle those in software instead. */ if (crp->crp_payload_length == 0) return (EMSGSIZE); if (crp->crp_aad_length + AES_BLOCK_LEN > MAX_AAD_LEN) return (EMSGSIZE); hash_size_in_response = s->gmac.hash_len; if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) op_type = CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP; else op_type = CHCR_DECRYPT_OP; /* * The IV handling for GCM in OCF is a bit more complicated in * that IPSec provides a full 16-byte IV (including the * counter), whereas the /dev/crypto interface sometimes * provides a full 16-byte IV (if no IV is provided in the * ioctl) and sometimes a 12-byte IV (if the IV was explicit). * * When provided a 12-byte IV, assume the IV is really 16 bytes * with a counter in the last 4 bytes initialized to 1. * * While iv_len is checked below, the value is currently * always set to 12 when creating a GCM session in this driver * due to limitations in OCF (there is no way to know what the * IV length of a given request will be). This means that the * driver always assumes as 12-byte IV for now. */ if (s->blkcipher.iv_len == 12) iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN; else iv_len = s->blkcipher.iv_len; /* * GCM requests should always provide an explicit IV. */ if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) return (EINVAL); /* * The output buffer consists of the cipher text followed by * the tag when encrypting. For decryption it only contains * the plain text. * * Due to a firmware bug, the output buffer must include a * dummy output buffer for the IV and AAD prior to the real * output buffer. */ if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) { if (iv_len + crp->crp_aad_length + crp->crp_payload_length + hash_size_in_response > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); } else { if (iv_len + crp->crp_aad_length + crp->crp_payload_length > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); } sglist_reset(sc->sg_dsgl); error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_iv_aad, 0, iv_len + crp->crp_aad_length); if (error) return (error); error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length); if (error) return (error); if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) { error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_digest_start, hash_size_in_response); if (error) return (error); } dsgl_nsegs = ccr_count_sgl(sc->sg_dsgl, DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN); if (dsgl_nsegs > MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE) return (EFBIG); dsgl_len = ccr_phys_dsgl_len(dsgl_nsegs); /* * The 'key' part of the key context consists of the key followed * by the Galois hash key. */ kctx_len = roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16) + GMAC_BLOCK_LEN; transhdr_len = CIPHER_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len, dsgl_len); /* * The input buffer consists of the IV, any AAD, and then the * cipher/plain text. For decryption requests the hash is * appended after the cipher text. * * The IV is always stored at the start of the input buffer * even though it may be duplicated in the payload. The * crypto engine doesn't work properly if the IV offset points * inside of the AAD region, so a second copy is always * required. */ input_len = crp->crp_aad_length + crp->crp_payload_length; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) input_len += hash_size_in_response; if (input_len > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); if (ccr_use_imm_data(transhdr_len, iv_len + input_len)) { imm_len = input_len; sgl_nsegs = 0; sgl_len = 0; } else { imm_len = 0; sglist_reset(sc->sg_ulptx); if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) { error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length); if (error) return (error); } error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length); if (error) return (error); if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) { error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_digest_start, hash_size_in_response); if (error) return (error); } sgl_nsegs = sc->sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; sgl_len = ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(sgl_nsegs); } if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) { aad_start = iv_len + 1; aad_stop = aad_start + crp->crp_aad_length - 1; } else { aad_start = 0; aad_stop = 0; } cipher_start = iv_len + crp->crp_aad_length + 1; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) cipher_stop = hash_size_in_response; else cipher_stop = 0; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) auth_insert = hash_size_in_response; else auth_insert = 0; wr_len = roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + iv_len + roundup2(imm_len, 16) + sgl_len; if (wr_len > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN) return (EFBIG); wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, s->port->txq); if (wr == NULL) { sc->stats_wr_nomem++; return (ENOMEM); } crwr = wrtod(wr); memset(crwr, 0, wr_len); memcpy(iv, crp->crp_iv, s->blkcipher.iv_len); if (s->blkcipher.iv_len == 12) *(uint32_t *)&iv[12] = htobe32(1); ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, 0, crp); crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(s->port->tx_channel_id) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CPLLEN(2) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_PLACEHOLDER(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_IVINSRTOFST(1)); crwr->sec_cpl.pldlen = htobe32(iv_len + input_len); /* * NB: cipherstop is explicitly set to 0. On encrypt it * should normally be set to 0 anyway. However, for decrypt * the cipher ends before the tag in the ETA case (and * authstop is set to stop before the tag), but for GCM the * cipher still runs to the end of the buffer. Not sure if * this is intentional or a firmware quirk, but it is required * for working tag validation with GCM decryption. */ crwr->sec_cpl.aadstart_cipherstop_hi = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTART(aad_start) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTOP(aad_stop) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTART(cipher_start) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_HI(0)); crwr->sec_cpl.cipherstop_lo_authinsert = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_LO(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTART(cipher_start) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTOP(cipher_stop) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHINSERT(auth_insert)); /* These two flits are actually a CPL_TLS_TX_SCMD_FMT. */ hmac_ctrl = ccr_hmac_ctrl(AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN, hash_size_in_response); crwr->sec_cpl.seqno_numivs = htobe32( V_SCMD_SEQ_NO_CTRL(0) | V_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION(SCMD_PROTO_VERSION_GENERIC) | V_SCMD_ENC_DEC_CTRL(op_type) | V_SCMD_CIPH_AUTH_SEQ_CTRL(op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP ? 1 : 0) | V_SCMD_CIPH_MODE(SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_GCM) | V_SCMD_AUTH_MODE(SCMD_AUTH_MODE_GHASH) | V_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL(hmac_ctrl) | V_SCMD_IV_SIZE(iv_len / 2) | V_SCMD_NUM_IVS(0)); crwr->sec_cpl.ivgen_hdrlen = htobe32( V_SCMD_IV_GEN_CTRL(0) | V_SCMD_MORE_FRAGS(0) | V_SCMD_LAST_FRAG(0) | V_SCMD_MAC_ONLY(0) | V_SCMD_AADIVDROP(0) | V_SCMD_HDR_LEN(dsgl_len)); crwr->key_ctx.ctx_hdr = s->blkcipher.key_ctx_hdr; memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); dst = crwr->key_ctx.key + roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16); memcpy(dst, s->gmac.ghash_h, GMAC_BLOCK_LEN); dst = (char *)(crwr + 1) + kctx_len; ccr_write_phys_dsgl(sc, s, dst, dsgl_nsegs); dst += sizeof(struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl) + dsgl_len; memcpy(dst, iv, iv_len); dst += iv_len; if (imm_len != 0) { if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) { crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length, dst); dst += crp->crp_aad_length; } crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length, dst); dst += crp->crp_payload_length; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, hash_size_in_response, dst); } else ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(sc, dst, sgl_nsegs); /* XXX: TODO backpressure */ t4_wrq_tx(sc->adapter, wr); return (0); } static int ccr_gcm_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp, const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl, int error) { /* * The updated IV to permit chained requests is at * cpl->data[2], but OCF doesn't permit chained requests. * * Note that the hardware should always verify the GMAC hash. */ return (error); } /* * Handle a GCM request that is not supported by the crypto engine by * performing the operation in software. Derived from swcr_authenc(). */ static void ccr_gcm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp) { struct auth_hash *axf; struct enc_xform *exf; - void *auth_ctx; - uint8_t *kschedule; + void *auth_ctx, *kschedule; char block[GMAC_BLOCK_LEN]; char digest[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN]; char iv[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; int error, i, len; auth_ctx = NULL; kschedule = NULL; /* Initialize the MAC. */ switch (s->blkcipher.key_len) { case 16: axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128; break; case 24: axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192; break; case 32: axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256; break; default: error = EINVAL; goto out; } auth_ctx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CCR, M_NOWAIT); if (auth_ctx == NULL) { error = ENOMEM; goto out; } axf->Init(auth_ctx); axf->Setkey(auth_ctx, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); /* Initialize the cipher. */ exf = &enc_xform_aes_nist_gcm; - error = exf->setkey(&kschedule, s->blkcipher.enckey, + kschedule = malloc(exf->ctxsize, M_CCR, M_NOWAIT); + if (kschedule == NULL) { + error = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + error = exf->setkey(kschedule, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); if (error) goto out; /* * This assumes a 12-byte IV from the crp. See longer comment * above in ccr_gcm() for more details. */ if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) { error = EINVAL; goto out; } memcpy(iv, crp->crp_iv, 12); *(uint32_t *)&iv[12] = htobe32(1); axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv)); /* MAC the AAD. */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_aad_length; i += sizeof(block)) { len = imin(crp->crp_aad_length - i, sizeof(block)); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start + i, len, block); bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len); axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, sizeof(block)); } exf->reinit(kschedule, iv); /* Do encryption with MAC */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += sizeof(block)) { len = imin(crp->crp_payload_length - i, sizeof(block)); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, block); bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len); if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) { - exf->encrypt(kschedule, block); + exf->encrypt(kschedule, block, block); axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, len); crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, block); } else { axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, len); } } /* Length block. */ bzero(block, sizeof(block)); ((uint32_t *)block)[1] = htobe32(crp->crp_aad_length * 8); ((uint32_t *)block)[3] = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length * 8); axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, sizeof(block)); /* Finalize MAC. */ axf->Final(digest, auth_ctx); /* Inject or validate tag. */ if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) { crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sizeof(digest), digest); error = 0; } else { char digest2[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN]; crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sizeof(digest2), digest2); if (timingsafe_bcmp(digest, digest2, sizeof(digest)) == 0) { error = 0; /* Tag matches, decrypt data. */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += sizeof(block)) { len = imin(crp->crp_payload_length - i, sizeof(block)); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, block); bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len); - exf->decrypt(kschedule, block); + exf->decrypt(kschedule, block, block); crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, block); } } else error = EBADMSG; } - exf->zerokey(&kschedule); out: - if (auth_ctx != NULL) { - memset(auth_ctx, 0, axf->ctxsize); - free(auth_ctx, M_CCR); - } + zfree(kschedule, M_CCR); + zfree(auth_ctx, M_CCR); crp->crp_etype = error; crypto_done(crp); } static void generate_ccm_b0(struct cryptop *crp, u_int hash_size_in_response, const char *iv, char *b0) { u_int i, payload_len; /* NB: L is already set in the first byte of the IV. */ memcpy(b0, iv, CCM_B0_SIZE); /* Set length of hash in bits 3 - 5. */ b0[0] |= (((hash_size_in_response - 2) / 2) << 3); /* Store the payload length as a big-endian value. */ payload_len = crp->crp_payload_length; for (i = 0; i < iv[0]; i++) { b0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN - 1 - i] = payload_len; payload_len >>= 8; } /* * If there is AAD in the request, set bit 6 in the flags * field and store the AAD length as a big-endian value at the * start of block 1. This only assumes a 16-bit AAD length * since T6 doesn't support large AAD sizes. */ if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) { b0[0] |= (1 << 6); *(uint16_t *)(b0 + CCM_B0_SIZE) = htobe16(crp->crp_aad_length); } } static int ccr_ccm(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp) { char iv[CHCR_MAX_CRYPTO_IV_LEN]; struct ulptx_idata *idata; struct chcr_wr *crwr; struct wrqe *wr; char *dst; u_int iv_len, kctx_len, op_type, transhdr_len, wr_len; u_int aad_len, b0_len, hash_size_in_response, imm_len; u_int aad_start, aad_stop, cipher_start, cipher_stop, auth_insert; u_int hmac_ctrl, input_len; int dsgl_nsegs, dsgl_len; int sgl_nsegs, sgl_len; int error; if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0) return (EINVAL); /* * The crypto engine doesn't handle CCM requests with an empty * payload, so handle those in software instead. */ if (crp->crp_payload_length == 0) return (EMSGSIZE); /* * CCM always includes block 0 in the AAD before AAD from the * request. */ b0_len = CCM_B0_SIZE; if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) b0_len += CCM_AAD_FIELD_SIZE; aad_len = b0_len + crp->crp_aad_length; /* * CCM requests should always provide an explicit IV (really * the nonce). */ if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) return (EINVAL); /* * Always assume a 12 byte input nonce for now since that is * what OCF always generates. The full IV in the work request * is 16 bytes. */ iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN; if (iv_len + aad_len > MAX_AAD_LEN) return (EMSGSIZE); hash_size_in_response = s->ccm_mac.hash_len; if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) op_type = CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP; else op_type = CHCR_DECRYPT_OP; /* * The output buffer consists of the cipher text followed by * the tag when encrypting. For decryption it only contains * the plain text. * * Due to a firmware bug, the output buffer must include a * dummy output buffer for the IV and AAD prior to the real * output buffer. */ if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) { if (iv_len + aad_len + crp->crp_payload_length + hash_size_in_response > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); } else { if (iv_len + aad_len + crp->crp_payload_length > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); } sglist_reset(sc->sg_dsgl); error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_iv_aad, 0, iv_len + aad_len); if (error) return (error); error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length); if (error) return (error); if (op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP) { error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_dsgl, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_digest_start, hash_size_in_response); if (error) return (error); } dsgl_nsegs = ccr_count_sgl(sc->sg_dsgl, DSGL_SGE_MAXLEN); if (dsgl_nsegs > MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE) return (EFBIG); dsgl_len = ccr_phys_dsgl_len(dsgl_nsegs); /* * The 'key' part of the key context consists of two copies of * the AES key. */ kctx_len = roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16) * 2; transhdr_len = CIPHER_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len, dsgl_len); /* * The input buffer consists of the IV, AAD (including block * 0), and then the cipher/plain text. For decryption * requests the hash is appended after the cipher text. * * The IV is always stored at the start of the input buffer * even though it may be duplicated in the payload. The * crypto engine doesn't work properly if the IV offset points * inside of the AAD region, so a second copy is always * required. */ input_len = aad_len + crp->crp_payload_length; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) input_len += hash_size_in_response; if (input_len > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) return (EFBIG); if (ccr_use_imm_data(transhdr_len, iv_len + input_len)) { imm_len = input_len; sgl_nsegs = 0; sgl_len = 0; } else { /* Block 0 is passed as immediate data. */ imm_len = b0_len; sglist_reset(sc->sg_ulptx); if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) { error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length); if (error) return (error); } error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length); if (error) return (error); if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) { error = sglist_append_sglist(sc->sg_ulptx, sc->sg_crp, crp->crp_digest_start, hash_size_in_response); if (error) return (error); } sgl_nsegs = sc->sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; sgl_len = ccr_ulptx_sgl_len(sgl_nsegs); } aad_start = iv_len + 1; aad_stop = aad_start + aad_len - 1; cipher_start = aad_stop + 1; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) cipher_stop = hash_size_in_response; else cipher_stop = 0; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) auth_insert = hash_size_in_response; else auth_insert = 0; wr_len = roundup2(transhdr_len, 16) + iv_len + roundup2(imm_len, 16) + sgl_len; if (wr_len > SGE_MAX_WR_LEN) return (EFBIG); wr = alloc_wrqe(wr_len, s->port->txq); if (wr == NULL) { sc->stats_wr_nomem++; return (ENOMEM); } crwr = wrtod(wr); memset(crwr, 0, wr_len); /* * Read the nonce from the request. Use the nonce to generate * the full IV with the counter set to 0. */ memset(iv, 0, iv_len); iv[0] = (15 - AES_CCM_IV_LEN) - 1; memcpy(iv + 1, crp->crp_iv, AES_CCM_IV_LEN); ccr_populate_wreq(sc, s, crwr, kctx_len, wr_len, imm_len, sgl_len, 0, crp); crwr->sec_cpl.op_ivinsrtofst = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_OPCODE(CPL_TX_SEC_PDU) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_RXCHID(s->port->tx_channel_id) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ACKFOLLOWS(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_ULPTXLPBK(1) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CPLLEN(2) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_PLACEHOLDER(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_IVINSRTOFST(1)); crwr->sec_cpl.pldlen = htobe32(iv_len + input_len); /* * NB: cipherstop is explicitly set to 0. See comments above * in ccr_gcm(). */ crwr->sec_cpl.aadstart_cipherstop_hi = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTART(aad_start) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AADSTOP(aad_stop) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTART(cipher_start) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_HI(0)); crwr->sec_cpl.cipherstop_lo_authinsert = htobe32( V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_CIPHERSTOP_LO(0) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTART(cipher_start) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHSTOP(cipher_stop) | V_CPL_TX_SEC_PDU_AUTHINSERT(auth_insert)); /* These two flits are actually a CPL_TLS_TX_SCMD_FMT. */ hmac_ctrl = ccr_hmac_ctrl(AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN, hash_size_in_response); crwr->sec_cpl.seqno_numivs = htobe32( V_SCMD_SEQ_NO_CTRL(0) | V_SCMD_PROTO_VERSION(SCMD_PROTO_VERSION_GENERIC) | V_SCMD_ENC_DEC_CTRL(op_type) | V_SCMD_CIPH_AUTH_SEQ_CTRL(op_type == CHCR_ENCRYPT_OP ? 0 : 1) | V_SCMD_CIPH_MODE(SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CCM) | V_SCMD_AUTH_MODE(SCMD_AUTH_MODE_CBCMAC) | V_SCMD_HMAC_CTRL(hmac_ctrl) | V_SCMD_IV_SIZE(iv_len / 2) | V_SCMD_NUM_IVS(0)); crwr->sec_cpl.ivgen_hdrlen = htobe32( V_SCMD_IV_GEN_CTRL(0) | V_SCMD_MORE_FRAGS(0) | V_SCMD_LAST_FRAG(0) | V_SCMD_MAC_ONLY(0) | V_SCMD_AADIVDROP(0) | V_SCMD_HDR_LEN(dsgl_len)); crwr->key_ctx.ctx_hdr = s->blkcipher.key_ctx_hdr; memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); memcpy(crwr->key_ctx.key + roundup(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16), s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); dst = (char *)(crwr + 1) + kctx_len; ccr_write_phys_dsgl(sc, s, dst, dsgl_nsegs); dst += sizeof(struct cpl_rx_phys_dsgl) + dsgl_len; memcpy(dst, iv, iv_len); dst += iv_len; generate_ccm_b0(crp, hash_size_in_response, iv, dst); if (sgl_nsegs == 0) { dst += b0_len; if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) { crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length, dst); dst += crp->crp_aad_length; } crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length, dst); dst += crp->crp_payload_length; if (op_type == CHCR_DECRYPT_OP) crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, hash_size_in_response, dst); } else { dst += CCM_B0_SIZE; if (b0_len > CCM_B0_SIZE) { /* * If there is AAD, insert padding including a * ULP_TX_SC_NOOP so that the ULP_TX_SC_DSGL * is 16-byte aligned. */ KASSERT(b0_len - CCM_B0_SIZE == CCM_AAD_FIELD_SIZE, ("b0_len mismatch")); memset(dst + CCM_AAD_FIELD_SIZE, 0, 8 - CCM_AAD_FIELD_SIZE); idata = (void *)(dst + 8); idata->cmd_more = htobe32(V_ULPTX_CMD(ULP_TX_SC_NOOP)); idata->len = htobe32(0); dst = (void *)(idata + 1); } ccr_write_ulptx_sgl(sc, dst, sgl_nsegs); } /* XXX: TODO backpressure */ t4_wrq_tx(sc->adapter, wr); return (0); } static int ccr_ccm_done(struct ccr_softc *sc, struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp, const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl, int error) { /* * The updated IV to permit chained requests is at * cpl->data[2], but OCF doesn't permit chained requests. * * Note that the hardware should always verify the CBC MAC * hash. */ return (error); } /* * Handle a CCM request that is not supported by the crypto engine by * performing the operation in software. Derived from swcr_authenc(). */ static void ccr_ccm_soft(struct ccr_session *s, struct cryptop *crp) { struct auth_hash *axf; struct enc_xform *exf; union authctx *auth_ctx; - uint8_t *kschedule; + void *kschedule; char block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN]; char digest[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN]; char iv[AES_CCM_IV_LEN]; int error, i, len; auth_ctx = NULL; kschedule = NULL; /* Initialize the MAC. */ switch (s->blkcipher.key_len) { case 16: axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_128; break; case 24: axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_192; break; case 32: axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_256; break; default: error = EINVAL; goto out; } auth_ctx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CCR, M_NOWAIT); if (auth_ctx == NULL) { error = ENOMEM; goto out; } axf->Init(auth_ctx); axf->Setkey(auth_ctx, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); /* Initialize the cipher. */ exf = &enc_xform_ccm; - error = exf->setkey(&kschedule, s->blkcipher.enckey, + kschedule = malloc(exf->ctxsize, M_CCR, M_NOWAIT); + if (kschedule == NULL) { + error = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + error = exf->setkey(kschedule, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len); if (error) goto out; if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) { error = EINVAL; goto out; } memcpy(iv, crp->crp_iv, AES_CCM_IV_LEN); auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length; auth_ctx->aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length; axf->Reinit(auth_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv)); /* MAC the AAD. */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_aad_length; i += sizeof(block)) { len = imin(crp->crp_aad_length - i, sizeof(block)); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start + i, len, block); bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len); axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, sizeof(block)); } exf->reinit(kschedule, iv); /* Do encryption/decryption with MAC */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += sizeof(block)) { len = imin(crp->crp_payload_length - i, sizeof(block)); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, block); bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len); if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) { axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, len); - exf->encrypt(kschedule, block); + exf->encrypt(kschedule, block, block); crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, block); } else { - exf->decrypt(kschedule, block); + exf->decrypt(kschedule, block, block); axf->Update(auth_ctx, block, len); } } /* Finalize MAC. */ axf->Final(digest, auth_ctx); /* Inject or validate tag. */ if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) { crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sizeof(digest), digest); error = 0; } else { char digest2[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN]; crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sizeof(digest2), digest2); if (timingsafe_bcmp(digest, digest2, sizeof(digest)) == 0) { error = 0; /* Tag matches, decrypt data. */ exf->reinit(kschedule, iv); for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += sizeof(block)) { len = imin(crp->crp_payload_length - i, sizeof(block)); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, block); bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len); - exf->decrypt(kschedule, block); + exf->decrypt(kschedule, block, block); crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, block); } } else error = EBADMSG; } - exf->zerokey(&kschedule); out: - if (auth_ctx != NULL) { - memset(auth_ctx, 0, axf->ctxsize); - free(auth_ctx, M_CCR); - } + zfree(kschedule, M_CCR); + zfree(auth_ctx, M_CCR); crp->crp_etype = error; crypto_done(crp); } static void ccr_identify(driver_t *driver, device_t parent) { struct adapter *sc; sc = device_get_softc(parent); if (sc->cryptocaps & FW_CAPS_CONFIG_CRYPTO_LOOKASIDE && device_find_child(parent, "ccr", -1) == NULL) device_add_child(parent, "ccr", -1); } static int ccr_probe(device_t dev) { device_set_desc(dev, "Chelsio Crypto Accelerator"); return (BUS_PROBE_DEFAULT); } static void ccr_sysctls(struct ccr_softc *sc) { struct sysctl_ctx_list *ctx; struct sysctl_oid *oid, *port_oid; struct sysctl_oid_list *children; char buf[16]; int i; ctx = device_get_sysctl_ctx(sc->dev); /* * dev.ccr.X. */ oid = device_get_sysctl_tree(sc->dev); children = SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid); SYSCTL_ADD_UINT(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "port_mask", CTLFLAG_RW, &sc->port_mask, 0, "Mask of enabled ports"); /* * dev.ccr.X.stats. */ oid = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "stats", CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, "statistics"); children = SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "hash", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_hash, 0, "Hash requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "hmac", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_hmac, 0, "HMAC requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "cipher_encrypt", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_blkcipher_encrypt, 0, "Cipher encryption requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "cipher_decrypt", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_blkcipher_decrypt, 0, "Cipher decryption requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "eta_encrypt", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_eta_encrypt, 0, "Combined AES+HMAC encryption requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "eta_decrypt", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_eta_decrypt, 0, "Combined AES+HMAC decryption requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "gcm_encrypt", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_gcm_encrypt, 0, "AES-GCM encryption requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "gcm_decrypt", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_gcm_decrypt, 0, "AES-GCM decryption requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "ccm_encrypt", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_ccm_encrypt, 0, "AES-CCM encryption requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "ccm_decrypt", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_ccm_decrypt, 0, "AES-CCM decryption requests submitted"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "wr_nomem", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_wr_nomem, 0, "Work request memory allocation failures"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "inflight", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_inflight, 0, "Requests currently pending"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "mac_error", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_mac_error, 0, "MAC errors"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "pad_error", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_pad_error, 0, "Padding errors"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "bad_session", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_bad_session, 0, "Requests with invalid session ID"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "sglist_error", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_sglist_error, 0, "Requests for which DMA mapping failed"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "process_error", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_process_error, 0, "Requests failed during queueing"); SYSCTL_ADD_U64(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "sw_fallback", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->stats_sw_fallback, 0, "Requests processed by falling back to software"); /* * dev.ccr.X.stats.port */ port_oid = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "port", CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, "Per-port statistics"); for (i = 0; i < nitems(sc->ports); i++) { if (sc->ports[i].rxq == NULL) continue; /* * dev.ccr.X.stats.port.Y */ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", i); oid = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(ctx, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(port_oid), OID_AUTO, buf, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, buf); children = SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid); SYSCTL_ADD_UINT(ctx, children, OID_AUTO, "active_sessions", CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->ports[i].active_sessions, 0, "Count of active sessions"); } } static void ccr_init_port(struct ccr_softc *sc, int port) { sc->ports[port].txq = &sc->adapter->sge.ctrlq[port]; sc->ports[port].rxq = &sc->adapter->sge.rxq[sc->adapter->port[port]->vi->first_rxq]; sc->ports[port].tx_channel_id = port; _Static_assert(sizeof(sc->port_mask) * NBBY >= MAX_NPORTS - 1, "Too many ports to fit in port_mask"); sc->port_mask |= 1u << port; } static int ccr_attach(device_t dev) { struct ccr_softc *sc; int32_t cid; int i; sc = device_get_softc(dev); sc->dev = dev; sc->adapter = device_get_softc(device_get_parent(dev)); for_each_port(sc->adapter, i) { ccr_init_port(sc, i); } cid = crypto_get_driverid(dev, sizeof(struct ccr_session), CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE); if (cid < 0) { device_printf(dev, "could not get crypto driver id\n"); return (ENXIO); } sc->cid = cid; sc->adapter->ccr_softc = sc; mtx_init(&sc->lock, "ccr", NULL, MTX_DEF); sc->sg_crp = sglist_alloc(TX_SGL_SEGS, M_WAITOK); sc->sg_ulptx = sglist_alloc(TX_SGL_SEGS, M_WAITOK); sc->sg_dsgl = sglist_alloc(MAX_RX_PHYS_DSGL_SGE, M_WAITOK); sc->iv_aad_buf = malloc(MAX_AAD_LEN, M_CCR, M_WAITOK); sc->sg_iv_aad = sglist_build(sc->iv_aad_buf, MAX_AAD_LEN, M_WAITOK); ccr_sysctls(sc); return (0); } static int ccr_detach(device_t dev) { struct ccr_softc *sc; sc = device_get_softc(dev); mtx_lock(&sc->lock); sc->detaching = true; mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); crypto_unregister_all(sc->cid); mtx_destroy(&sc->lock); sglist_free(sc->sg_iv_aad); free(sc->iv_aad_buf, M_CCR); sglist_free(sc->sg_dsgl); sglist_free(sc->sg_ulptx); sglist_free(sc->sg_crp); sc->adapter->ccr_softc = NULL; return (0); } static void ccr_init_hash_digest(struct ccr_session *s) { union authctx auth_ctx; struct auth_hash *axf; axf = s->hmac.auth_hash; axf->Init(&auth_ctx); t4_copy_partial_hash(axf->type, &auth_ctx, s->hmac.pads); } static bool ccr_aes_check_keylen(int alg, int klen) { switch (klen * 8) { case 128: case 192: if (alg == CRYPTO_AES_XTS) return (false); break; case 256: break; case 512: if (alg != CRYPTO_AES_XTS) return (false); break; default: return (false); } return (true); } static void ccr_aes_setkey(struct ccr_session *s, const void *key, int klen) { unsigned int ck_size, iopad_size, kctx_flits, kctx_len, kbits, mk_size; unsigned int opad_present; if (s->blkcipher.cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_XTS) kbits = (klen / 2) * 8; else kbits = klen * 8; switch (kbits) { case 128: ck_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_CIPHER_KEY_SIZE_128; break; case 192: ck_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_CIPHER_KEY_SIZE_192; break; case 256: ck_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_CIPHER_KEY_SIZE_256; break; default: panic("should not get here"); } s->blkcipher.key_len = klen; memcpy(s->blkcipher.enckey, key, s->blkcipher.key_len); switch (s->blkcipher.cipher_mode) { case SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CBC: case SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_XTS: t4_aes_getdeckey(s->blkcipher.deckey, key, kbits); break; } kctx_len = roundup2(s->blkcipher.key_len, 16); switch (s->mode) { case ETA: mk_size = s->hmac.mk_size; opad_present = 1; iopad_size = roundup2(s->hmac.partial_digest_len, 16); kctx_len += iopad_size * 2; break; case GCM: mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_128; opad_present = 0; kctx_len += GMAC_BLOCK_LEN; break; case CCM: switch (kbits) { case 128: mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_128; break; case 192: mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_192; break; case 256: mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_256; break; default: panic("should not get here"); } opad_present = 0; kctx_len *= 2; break; default: mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_NO_KEY; opad_present = 0; break; } kctx_flits = (sizeof(struct _key_ctx) + kctx_len) / 16; s->blkcipher.key_ctx_hdr = htobe32(V_KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN(kctx_flits) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_DUAL_CK(s->blkcipher.cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_XTS) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_OPAD_PRESENT(opad_present) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_SALT_PRESENT(1) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_CK_SIZE(ck_size) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_MK_SIZE(mk_size) | V_KEY_CONTEXT_VALID(1)); } static bool ccr_auth_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) { case CRYPTO_SHA1: case CRYPTO_SHA2_224: case CRYPTO_SHA2_256: case CRYPTO_SHA2_384: case CRYPTO_SHA2_512: case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: break; default: return (false); } return (true); } static bool ccr_cipher_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_BLOCK_LEN) return (false); break; case CRYPTO_AES_ICM: if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_BLOCK_LEN) return (false); break; case CRYPTO_AES_XTS: if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_XTS_IV_LEN) return (false); break; default: return (false); } return (ccr_aes_check_keylen(csp->csp_cipher_alg, csp->csp_cipher_klen)); } static int ccr_cipher_mode(const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: return (SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CBC); case CRYPTO_AES_ICM: return (SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CTR); case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: return (SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_GCM); case CRYPTO_AES_XTS: return (SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_XTS); case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16: return (SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CCM); default: return (SCMD_CIPH_MODE_NOP); } } static int ccr_probesession(device_t dev, const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { unsigned int cipher_mode; if (csp->csp_flags != 0) return (EINVAL); switch (csp->csp_mode) { case CSP_MODE_DIGEST: if (!ccr_auth_supported(csp)) return (EINVAL); break; case CSP_MODE_CIPHER: if (!ccr_cipher_supported(csp)) return (EINVAL); break; case CSP_MODE_AEAD: switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_GCM_IV_LEN) return (EINVAL); if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN) return (EINVAL); break; case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16: if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN) return (EINVAL); if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN) return (EINVAL); break; default: return (EINVAL); } break; case CSP_MODE_ETA: if (!ccr_auth_supported(csp) || !ccr_cipher_supported(csp)) return (EINVAL); break; default: return (EINVAL); } if (csp->csp_cipher_klen != 0) { cipher_mode = ccr_cipher_mode(csp); if (cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_NOP) return (EINVAL); } return (CRYPTODEV_PROBE_HARDWARE); } /* * Select an available port with the lowest number of active sessions. */ static struct ccr_port * ccr_choose_port(struct ccr_softc *sc) { struct ccr_port *best, *p; int i; mtx_assert(&sc->lock, MA_OWNED); best = NULL; for (i = 0; i < nitems(sc->ports); i++) { p = &sc->ports[i]; /* Ignore non-existent ports. */ if (p->rxq == NULL) continue; /* * XXX: Ignore ports whose queues aren't initialized. * This is racy as the rxq can be destroyed by the * associated VI detaching. Eventually ccr should use * dedicated queues. */ if (p->rxq->iq.adapter == NULL || p->txq->adapter == NULL) continue; if ((sc->port_mask & (1u << i)) == 0) continue; if (best == NULL || p->active_sessions < best->active_sessions) best = p; } return (best); } static int ccr_newsession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses, const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { struct ccr_softc *sc; struct ccr_session *s; struct auth_hash *auth_hash; unsigned int auth_mode, cipher_mode, mk_size; unsigned int partial_digest_len; switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) { case CRYPTO_SHA1: case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: auth_hash = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1; auth_mode = SCMD_AUTH_MODE_SHA1; mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_160; partial_digest_len = SHA1_HASH_LEN; break; case CRYPTO_SHA2_224: case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC: auth_hash = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_224; auth_mode = SCMD_AUTH_MODE_SHA224; mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_256; partial_digest_len = SHA2_256_HASH_LEN; break; case CRYPTO_SHA2_256: case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: auth_hash = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; auth_mode = SCMD_AUTH_MODE_SHA256; mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_256; partial_digest_len = SHA2_256_HASH_LEN; break; case CRYPTO_SHA2_384: case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: auth_hash = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; auth_mode = SCMD_AUTH_MODE_SHA512_384; mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_512; partial_digest_len = SHA2_512_HASH_LEN; break; case CRYPTO_SHA2_512: case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: auth_hash = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; auth_mode = SCMD_AUTH_MODE_SHA512_512; mk_size = CHCR_KEYCTX_MAC_KEY_SIZE_512; partial_digest_len = SHA2_512_HASH_LEN; break; default: auth_hash = NULL; auth_mode = SCMD_AUTH_MODE_NOP; mk_size = 0; partial_digest_len = 0; break; } cipher_mode = ccr_cipher_mode(csp); #ifdef INVARIANTS switch (csp->csp_mode) { case CSP_MODE_CIPHER: if (cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_NOP || cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_GCM || cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CCM) panic("invalid cipher algo"); break; case CSP_MODE_DIGEST: if (auth_mode == SCMD_AUTH_MODE_NOP) panic("invalid auth algo"); break; case CSP_MODE_AEAD: if (cipher_mode != SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_GCM && cipher_mode != SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CCM) panic("invalid aead cipher algo"); if (auth_mode != SCMD_AUTH_MODE_NOP) panic("invalid aead auth aglo"); break; case CSP_MODE_ETA: if (cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_NOP || cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_GCM || cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CCM) panic("invalid cipher algo"); if (auth_mode == SCMD_AUTH_MODE_NOP) panic("invalid auth algo"); break; default: panic("invalid csp mode"); } #endif sc = device_get_softc(dev); mtx_lock(&sc->lock); if (sc->detaching) { mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); return (ENXIO); } s = crypto_get_driver_session(cses); s->port = ccr_choose_port(sc); if (s->port == NULL) { mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); return (ENXIO); } switch (csp->csp_mode) { case CSP_MODE_AEAD: if (cipher_mode == SCMD_CIPH_MODE_AES_CCM) s->mode = CCM; else s->mode = GCM; break; case CSP_MODE_ETA: s->mode = ETA; break; case CSP_MODE_DIGEST: if (csp->csp_auth_klen != 0) s->mode = HMAC; else s->mode = HASH; break; case CSP_MODE_CIPHER: s->mode = BLKCIPHER; break; } if (s->mode == GCM) { if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0) s->gmac.hash_len = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN; else s->gmac.hash_len = csp->csp_auth_mlen; t4_init_gmac_hash(csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen, s->gmac.ghash_h); } else if (s->mode == CCM) { if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0) s->ccm_mac.hash_len = AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN; else s->ccm_mac.hash_len = csp->csp_auth_mlen; } else if (auth_mode != SCMD_AUTH_MODE_NOP) { s->hmac.auth_hash = auth_hash; s->hmac.auth_mode = auth_mode; s->hmac.mk_size = mk_size; s->hmac.partial_digest_len = partial_digest_len; if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0) s->hmac.hash_len = auth_hash->hashsize; else s->hmac.hash_len = csp->csp_auth_mlen; if (csp->csp_auth_key != NULL) t4_init_hmac_digest(auth_hash, partial_digest_len, csp->csp_auth_key, csp->csp_auth_klen, s->hmac.pads); else ccr_init_hash_digest(s); } if (cipher_mode != SCMD_CIPH_MODE_NOP) { s->blkcipher.cipher_mode = cipher_mode; s->blkcipher.iv_len = csp->csp_ivlen; if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) ccr_aes_setkey(s, csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); } s->active = true; s->port->active_sessions++; mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); return (0); } static void ccr_freesession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses) { struct ccr_softc *sc; struct ccr_session *s; sc = device_get_softc(dev); s = crypto_get_driver_session(cses); mtx_lock(&sc->lock); if (s->pending != 0) device_printf(dev, "session %p freed with %d pending requests\n", s, s->pending); s->active = false; s->port->active_sessions--; mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); } static int ccr_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint) { const struct crypto_session_params *csp; struct ccr_softc *sc; struct ccr_session *s; int error; csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session); s = crypto_get_driver_session(crp->crp_session); sc = device_get_softc(dev); mtx_lock(&sc->lock); error = ccr_populate_sglist(sc->sg_crp, crp); if (error) { sc->stats_sglist_error++; goto out; } switch (s->mode) { case HASH: error = ccr_hash(sc, s, crp); if (error == 0) sc->stats_hash++; break; case HMAC: if (crp->crp_auth_key != NULL) t4_init_hmac_digest(s->hmac.auth_hash, s->hmac.partial_digest_len, crp->crp_auth_key, csp->csp_auth_klen, s->hmac.pads); error = ccr_hash(sc, s, crp); if (error == 0) sc->stats_hmac++; break; case BLKCIPHER: if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) ccr_aes_setkey(s, crp->crp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); error = ccr_blkcipher(sc, s, crp); if (error == 0) { if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) sc->stats_blkcipher_encrypt++; else sc->stats_blkcipher_decrypt++; } break; case ETA: if (crp->crp_auth_key != NULL) t4_init_hmac_digest(s->hmac.auth_hash, s->hmac.partial_digest_len, crp->crp_auth_key, csp->csp_auth_klen, s->hmac.pads); if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) ccr_aes_setkey(s, crp->crp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); error = ccr_eta(sc, s, crp); if (error == 0) { if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) sc->stats_eta_encrypt++; else sc->stats_eta_decrypt++; } break; case GCM: if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) { t4_init_gmac_hash(crp->crp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen, s->gmac.ghash_h); ccr_aes_setkey(s, crp->crp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); } if (crp->crp_payload_length == 0) { mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); ccr_gcm_soft(s, crp); return (0); } error = ccr_gcm(sc, s, crp); if (error == EMSGSIZE) { sc->stats_sw_fallback++; mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); ccr_gcm_soft(s, crp); return (0); } if (error == 0) { if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) sc->stats_gcm_encrypt++; else sc->stats_gcm_decrypt++; } break; case CCM: if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) { ccr_aes_setkey(s, crp->crp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); } error = ccr_ccm(sc, s, crp); if (error == EMSGSIZE) { sc->stats_sw_fallback++; mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); ccr_ccm_soft(s, crp); return (0); } if (error == 0) { if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) sc->stats_ccm_encrypt++; else sc->stats_ccm_decrypt++; } break; } if (error == 0) { s->pending++; sc->stats_inflight++; } else sc->stats_process_error++; out: mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); if (error) { crp->crp_etype = error; crypto_done(crp); } return (0); } static int do_cpl6_fw_pld(struct sge_iq *iq, const struct rss_header *rss, struct mbuf *m) { struct ccr_softc *sc = iq->adapter->ccr_softc; struct ccr_session *s; const struct cpl_fw6_pld *cpl; struct cryptop *crp; uint32_t status; int error; if (m != NULL) cpl = mtod(m, const void *); else cpl = (const void *)(rss + 1); crp = (struct cryptop *)(uintptr_t)be64toh(cpl->data[1]); s = crypto_get_driver_session(crp->crp_session); status = be64toh(cpl->data[0]); if (CHK_MAC_ERR_BIT(status) || CHK_PAD_ERR_BIT(status)) error = EBADMSG; else error = 0; mtx_lock(&sc->lock); s->pending--; sc->stats_inflight--; switch (s->mode) { case HASH: case HMAC: error = ccr_hash_done(sc, s, crp, cpl, error); break; case BLKCIPHER: error = ccr_blkcipher_done(sc, s, crp, cpl, error); break; case ETA: error = ccr_eta_done(sc, s, crp, cpl, error); break; case GCM: error = ccr_gcm_done(sc, s, crp, cpl, error); break; case CCM: error = ccr_ccm_done(sc, s, crp, cpl, error); break; } if (error == EBADMSG) { if (CHK_MAC_ERR_BIT(status)) sc->stats_mac_error++; if (CHK_PAD_ERR_BIT(status)) sc->stats_pad_error++; } mtx_unlock(&sc->lock); crp->crp_etype = error; crypto_done(crp); m_freem(m); return (0); } static int ccr_modevent(module_t mod, int cmd, void *arg) { switch (cmd) { case MOD_LOAD: t4_register_cpl_handler(CPL_FW6_PLD, do_cpl6_fw_pld); return (0); case MOD_UNLOAD: t4_register_cpl_handler(CPL_FW6_PLD, NULL); return (0); default: return (EOPNOTSUPP); } } static device_method_t ccr_methods[] = { DEVMETHOD(device_identify, ccr_identify), DEVMETHOD(device_probe, ccr_probe), DEVMETHOD(device_attach, ccr_attach), DEVMETHOD(device_detach, ccr_detach), DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_probesession, ccr_probesession), DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_newsession, ccr_newsession), DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_freesession, ccr_freesession), DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_process, ccr_process), DEVMETHOD_END }; static driver_t ccr_driver = { "ccr", ccr_methods, sizeof(struct ccr_softc) }; static devclass_t ccr_devclass; DRIVER_MODULE(ccr, t6nex, ccr_driver, ccr_devclass, ccr_modevent, NULL); MODULE_VERSION(ccr, 1); MODULE_DEPEND(ccr, crypto, 1, 1, 1); MODULE_DEPEND(ccr, t6nex, 1, 1, 1); Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_userland.h =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_userland.h (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_userland.h (nonexistent) @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -/*- - * Copyright (c) 2015 Allan Jude - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * $FreeBSD$ - */ - -#ifndef _CRYPTO_XFORM_USERLAND_H_ -#define _CRYPTO_XFORM_USERLAND_H_ - -#ifdef _KERNEL -#include -#define KMALLOC(size, type, flags) malloc(size, type, flags) -#define KFREE(ptr, type) free(ptr, type) -#else /* not _KERNEL */ -#ifdef _STANDALONE -#include -#else /* !_STAND */ -#include -#include -#endif /* _STAND */ -#define KMALLOC(size, type, flags) malloc(size) -#define KFREE(ptr, type) free(ptr) -#endif /* _KERNEL */ - - -#endif /* _CRYPTO_XFORM_USERLAND_H_ */ Property changes on: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_userland.h ___________________________________________________________________ Deleted: svn:eol-style ## -1 +0,0 ## -native \ No newline at end of property Deleted: svn:keywords ## -1 +0,0 ## -FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Deleted: svn:mime-type ## -1 +0,0 ## -text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: head/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c (revision 361298) @@ -1,1430 +1,1402 @@ /* $OpenBSD: cryptosoft.c,v 1.35 2002/04/26 08:43:50 deraadt Exp $ */ /*- * The author of this code is Angelos D. Keromytis (angelos@cis.upenn.edu) * Copyright (c) 2002-2006 Sam Leffler, Errno Consulting * * This code was written by Angelos D. Keromytis in Athens, Greece, in * February 2000. Network Security Technologies Inc. (NSTI) kindly * supported the development of this code. * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all source code copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cryptodev_if.h" struct swcr_auth { void *sw_ictx; void *sw_octx; struct auth_hash *sw_axf; uint16_t sw_mlen; }; struct swcr_encdec { - uint8_t *sw_kschedule; + void *sw_kschedule; struct enc_xform *sw_exf; }; struct swcr_compdec { struct comp_algo *sw_cxf; }; struct swcr_session { struct mtx swcr_lock; int (*swcr_process)(struct swcr_session *, struct cryptop *); struct swcr_auth swcr_auth; struct swcr_encdec swcr_encdec; struct swcr_compdec swcr_compdec; }; static int32_t swcr_id; static void swcr_freesession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses); /* Used for CRYPTO_NULL_CBC. */ static int swcr_null(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp) { return (0); } /* * Apply a symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm. */ static int swcr_encdec(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp) { unsigned char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN], blk[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN]; unsigned char *ivp, *nivp, iv2[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN]; const struct crypto_session_params *csp; struct swcr_encdec *sw; struct enc_xform *exf; int i, j, k, blks, ind, count, ivlen; struct uio *uio, uiolcl; struct iovec iovlcl[4]; struct iovec *iov; int iovcnt, iovalloc; int error; bool encrypting; error = 0; sw = &ses->swcr_encdec; exf = sw->sw_exf; blks = exf->blocksize; ivlen = exf->ivsize; /* Check for non-padded data */ if ((crp->crp_payload_length % blks) != 0) return EINVAL; if (exf == &enc_xform_aes_icm && (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) return (EINVAL); crypto_read_iv(crp, iv); if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) { - if (sw->sw_kschedule) - exf->zerokey(&(sw->sw_kschedule)); - csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session); - error = exf->setkey(&sw->sw_kschedule, + error = exf->setkey(sw->sw_kschedule, crp->crp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); if (error) return (error); } iov = iovlcl; iovcnt = nitems(iovlcl); iovalloc = 0; uio = &uiolcl; switch (crp->crp_buf_type) { case CRYPTO_BUF_MBUF: error = crypto_mbuftoiov(crp->crp_mbuf, &iov, &iovcnt, &iovalloc); if (error) return (error); uio->uio_iov = iov; uio->uio_iovcnt = iovcnt; break; case CRYPTO_BUF_UIO: uio = crp->crp_uio; break; case CRYPTO_BUF_CONTIG: iov[0].iov_base = crp->crp_buf; iov[0].iov_len = crp->crp_ilen; uio->uio_iov = iov; uio->uio_iovcnt = 1; break; } ivp = iv; if (exf->reinit) { /* * xforms that provide a reinit method perform all IV * handling themselves. */ exf->reinit(sw->sw_kschedule, iv); } count = crp->crp_payload_start; ind = cuio_getptr(uio, count, &k); if (ind == -1) { error = EINVAL; goto out; } i = crp->crp_payload_length; encrypting = CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op); while (i > 0) { /* * If there's insufficient data at the end of * an iovec, we have to do some copying. */ if (uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len < k + blks && uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len != k) { cuio_copydata(uio, count, blks, blk); /* Actual encryption/decryption */ if (exf->reinit) { if (encrypting) { - exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, + exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk, blk); } else { - exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, + exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk, blk); } } else if (encrypting) { /* XOR with previous block */ for (j = 0; j < blks; j++) blk[j] ^= ivp[j]; - exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk); + exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk, blk); /* * Keep encrypted block for XOR'ing * with next block */ bcopy(blk, iv, blks); ivp = iv; } else { /* decrypt */ /* * Keep encrypted block for XOR'ing * with next block */ nivp = (ivp == iv) ? iv2 : iv; bcopy(blk, nivp, blks); - exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk); + exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk, blk); /* XOR with previous block */ for (j = 0; j < blks; j++) blk[j] ^= ivp[j]; ivp = nivp; } /* Copy back decrypted block */ cuio_copyback(uio, count, blks, blk); count += blks; /* Advance pointer */ ind = cuio_getptr(uio, count, &k); if (ind == -1) { error = EINVAL; goto out; } i -= blks; /* Could be done... */ if (i == 0) break; } while (uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len >= k + blks && i > 0) { uint8_t *idat; size_t nb, rem; nb = blks; rem = MIN((size_t)i, uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len - (size_t)k); idat = (uint8_t *)uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_base + k; if (exf->reinit) { if (encrypting && exf->encrypt_multi == NULL) exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, - idat); + idat, idat); else if (encrypting) { nb = rounddown(rem, blks); exf->encrypt_multi(sw->sw_kschedule, - idat, nb); + idat, idat, nb); } else if (exf->decrypt_multi == NULL) exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, - idat); + idat, idat); else { nb = rounddown(rem, blks); exf->decrypt_multi(sw->sw_kschedule, - idat, nb); + idat, idat, nb); } } else if (encrypting) { /* XOR with previous block/IV */ for (j = 0; j < blks; j++) idat[j] ^= ivp[j]; - exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, idat); + exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, idat, idat); ivp = idat; } else { /* decrypt */ /* * Keep encrypted block to be used * in next block's processing. */ nivp = (ivp == iv) ? iv2 : iv; bcopy(idat, nivp, blks); - exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, idat); + exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, idat, idat); /* XOR with previous block/IV */ for (j = 0; j < blks; j++) idat[j] ^= ivp[j]; ivp = nivp; } count += nb; k += nb; i -= nb; } /* * Advance to the next iov if the end of the current iov * is aligned with the end of a cipher block. * Note that the code is equivalent to calling: * ind = cuio_getptr(uio, count, &k); */ if (i > 0 && k == uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len) { k = 0; ind++; if (ind >= uio->uio_iovcnt) { error = EINVAL; goto out; } } } out: if (iovalloc) free(iov, M_CRYPTO_DATA); return (error); } static void swcr_authprepare(struct auth_hash *axf, struct swcr_auth *sw, const uint8_t *key, int klen) { switch (axf->type) { case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC: case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC: hmac_init_ipad(axf, key, klen, sw->sw_ictx); hmac_init_opad(axf, key, klen, sw->sw_octx); break; case CRYPTO_POLY1305: case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B: case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S: axf->Setkey(sw->sw_ictx, key, klen); axf->Init(sw->sw_ictx); break; default: panic("%s: algorithm %d doesn't use keys", __func__, axf->type); } } /* * Compute or verify hash. */ static int swcr_authcompute(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp) { u_char aalg[HASH_MAX_LEN]; u_char uaalg[HASH_MAX_LEN]; const struct crypto_session_params *csp; struct swcr_auth *sw; struct auth_hash *axf; union authctx ctx; int err; sw = &ses->swcr_auth; axf = sw->sw_axf; if (crp->crp_auth_key != NULL) { csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session); swcr_authprepare(axf, sw, crp->crp_auth_key, csp->csp_auth_klen); } bcopy(sw->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize); err = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length, (int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, &ctx); if (err) return err; err = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length, (int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, &ctx); if (err) return err; switch (axf->type) { case CRYPTO_SHA1: case CRYPTO_SHA2_224: case CRYPTO_SHA2_256: case CRYPTO_SHA2_384: case CRYPTO_SHA2_512: axf->Final(aalg, &ctx); break; case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC: if (sw->sw_octx == NULL) return EINVAL; axf->Final(aalg, &ctx); bcopy(sw->sw_octx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize); axf->Update(&ctx, aalg, axf->hashsize); axf->Final(aalg, &ctx); break; case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B: case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S: case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC: case CRYPTO_POLY1305: axf->Final(aalg, &ctx); break; } if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) { crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sw->sw_mlen, uaalg); if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, sw->sw_mlen) != 0) return (EBADMSG); } else { /* Inject the authentication data */ crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sw->sw_mlen, aalg); } return (0); } CTASSERT(INT_MAX <= (1ll<<39) - 256); /* GCM: plain text < 2^39-256 */ CTASSERT(INT_MAX <= (uint64_t)-1); /* GCM: associated data <= 2^64-1 */ static int swcr_gmac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp) { uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))]; u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf; u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN]; u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN]; u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN]; union authctx ctx; struct swcr_auth *swa; struct auth_hash *axf; uint32_t *blkp; int blksz, i, ivlen, len; swa = &ses->swcr_auth; axf = swa->sw_axf; bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize); blksz = axf->blocksize; /* Initialize the IV */ ivlen = AES_GCM_IV_LEN; crypto_read_iv(crp, iv); axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen); for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) { len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); bzero(blk + len, blksz - len); axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz); } /* length block */ bzero(blk, blksz); blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 1; *blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length * 8); axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz); /* Finalize MAC */ axf->Final(aalg, &ctx); if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) { crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, uaalg); if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen) != 0) return (EBADMSG); } else { /* Inject the authentication data */ crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, aalg); } return (0); } static int swcr_gcm(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp) { uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))]; u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf; u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN]; u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN]; u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN]; union authctx ctx; struct swcr_auth *swa; struct swcr_encdec *swe; struct auth_hash *axf; struct enc_xform *exf; uint32_t *blkp; int blksz, i, ivlen, len, r; swa = &ses->swcr_auth; axf = swa->sw_axf; bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize); blksz = axf->blocksize; swe = &ses->swcr_encdec; exf = swe->sw_exf; if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) return (EINVAL); /* Initialize the IV */ ivlen = AES_GCM_IV_LEN; bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen); /* Supply MAC with IV */ axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen); /* Supply MAC with AAD */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_aad_length; i += blksz) { len = MIN(crp->crp_aad_length - i, blksz); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start + i, len, blk); bzero(blk + len, blksz - len); axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz); } exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv); /* Do encryption with MAC */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += len) { len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz); if (len < blksz) bzero(blk, blksz); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) { - exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk); + exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk); axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len); crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); } else { axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len); } } /* length block */ bzero(blk, blksz); blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 1; *blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_aad_length * 8); blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 3; *blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length * 8); axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz); /* Finalize MAC */ axf->Final(aalg, &ctx); /* Validate tag */ if (!CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) { crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, uaalg); r = timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen); if (r != 0) return (EBADMSG); /* tag matches, decrypt data */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) { len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz); if (len < blksz) bzero(blk, blksz); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); - exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk); + exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk); crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); } } else { /* Inject the authentication data */ crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, aalg); } return (0); } static int swcr_ccm_cbc_mac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp) { uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))]; u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf; u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN]; u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN]; u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN]; union authctx ctx; struct swcr_auth *swa; struct auth_hash *axf; int blksz, i, ivlen, len; swa = &ses->swcr_auth; axf = swa->sw_axf; bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize); blksz = axf->blocksize; /* Initialize the IV */ ivlen = AES_CCM_IV_LEN; crypto_read_iv(crp, iv); /* * AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth * data and payload data before doing the auth computation. */ ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length; ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = 0; axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen); for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) { len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); bzero(blk + len, blksz - len); axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz); } /* Finalize MAC */ axf->Final(aalg, &ctx); if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) { crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, uaalg); if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen) != 0) return (EBADMSG); } else { /* Inject the authentication data */ crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, aalg); } return (0); } static int swcr_ccm(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp) { uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))]; u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf; u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN]; u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN]; u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN]; union authctx ctx; struct swcr_auth *swa; struct swcr_encdec *swe; struct auth_hash *axf; struct enc_xform *exf; int blksz, i, ivlen, len, r; swa = &ses->swcr_auth; axf = swa->sw_axf; bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize); blksz = axf->blocksize; swe = &ses->swcr_encdec; exf = swe->sw_exf; if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) return (EINVAL); /* Initialize the IV */ ivlen = AES_CCM_IV_LEN; bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen); /* * AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth * data and payload data before doing the auth computation. */ ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length; ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length; /* Supply MAC with IV */ axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen); /* Supply MAC with AAD */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_aad_length; i += blksz) { len = MIN(crp->crp_aad_length - i, blksz); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start + i, len, blk); bzero(blk + len, blksz - len); axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz); } exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv); /* Do encryption/decryption with MAC */ for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += len) { len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz); if (len < blksz) bzero(blk, blksz); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) { axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len); - exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk); + exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk); crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); } else { /* * One of the problems with CCM+CBC is that * the authentication is done on the * unecncrypted data. As a result, we have to * decrypt the data twice: once to generate * the tag and a second time after the tag is * verified. */ - exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk); + exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk); axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len); } } /* Finalize MAC */ axf->Final(aalg, &ctx); /* Validate tag */ if (!CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) { crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, uaalg); r = timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen); if (r != 0) return (EBADMSG); /* tag matches, decrypt data */ exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv); for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) { len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz); if (len < blksz) bzero(blk, blksz); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); - exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk); + exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk); crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk); } } else { /* Inject the authentication data */ crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, aalg); } return (0); } /* * Apply a cipher and a digest to perform EtA. */ static int swcr_eta(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp) { int error; if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) { error = swcr_encdec(ses, crp); if (error == 0) error = swcr_authcompute(ses, crp); } else { error = swcr_authcompute(ses, crp); if (error == 0) error = swcr_encdec(ses, crp); } return (error); } /* * Apply a compression/decompression algorithm */ static int swcr_compdec(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp) { u_int8_t *data, *out; struct comp_algo *cxf; int adj; u_int32_t result; cxf = ses->swcr_compdec.sw_cxf; /* We must handle the whole buffer of data in one time * then if there is not all the data in the mbuf, we must * copy in a buffer. */ data = malloc(crp->crp_payload_length, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT); if (data == NULL) return (EINVAL); crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length, data); if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_COMPRESS(crp->crp_op)) result = cxf->compress(data, crp->crp_payload_length, &out); else result = cxf->decompress(data, crp->crp_payload_length, &out); free(data, M_CRYPTO_DATA); if (result == 0) return (EINVAL); crp->crp_olen = result; /* Check the compressed size when doing compression */ if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_COMPRESS(crp->crp_op)) { if (result >= crp->crp_payload_length) { /* Compression was useless, we lost time */ free(out, M_CRYPTO_DATA); return (0); } } /* Copy back the (de)compressed data. m_copyback is * extending the mbuf as necessary. */ crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, result, out); if (result < crp->crp_payload_length) { switch (crp->crp_buf_type) { case CRYPTO_BUF_MBUF: adj = result - crp->crp_payload_length; m_adj(crp->crp_mbuf, adj); break; case CRYPTO_BUF_UIO: { struct uio *uio = crp->crp_uio; int ind; adj = crp->crp_payload_length - result; ind = uio->uio_iovcnt - 1; while (adj > 0 && ind >= 0) { if (adj < uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len) { uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len -= adj; break; } adj -= uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len; uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len = 0; ind--; uio->uio_iovcnt--; } } break; } } free(out, M_CRYPTO_DATA); return 0; } static int -swcr_setup_encdec(struct swcr_session *ses, +swcr_setup_cipher(struct swcr_session *ses, const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { struct swcr_encdec *swe; struct enc_xform *txf; int error; swe = &ses->swcr_encdec; txf = crypto_cipher(csp); MPASS(txf->ivsize == csp->csp_ivlen); + if (txf->ctxsize != 0) { + swe->sw_kschedule = malloc(txf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, + M_NOWAIT); + if (swe->sw_kschedule == NULL) + return (ENOMEM); + } if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) { - error = txf->setkey(&swe->sw_kschedule, + error = txf->setkey(swe->sw_kschedule, csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); if (error) return (error); } swe->sw_exf = txf; return (0); } static int swcr_setup_auth(struct swcr_session *ses, const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { struct swcr_auth *swa; struct auth_hash *axf; swa = &ses->swcr_auth; axf = crypto_auth_hash(csp); swa->sw_axf = axf; if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize) return (EINVAL); if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0) swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize; else swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen; swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT); if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL) return (ENOBUFS); switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) { case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC: case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC: swa->sw_octx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT); if (swa->sw_octx == NULL) return (ENOBUFS); if (csp->csp_auth_key != NULL) { swcr_authprepare(axf, swa, csp->csp_auth_key, csp->csp_auth_klen); } if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST) ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute; break; case CRYPTO_SHA1: case CRYPTO_SHA2_224: case CRYPTO_SHA2_256: case CRYPTO_SHA2_384: case CRYPTO_SHA2_512: axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx); if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST) ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute; break; case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC: axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx); axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key, csp->csp_auth_klen); if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST) ses->swcr_process = swcr_gmac; break; case CRYPTO_POLY1305: case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B: case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S: /* * Blake2b and Blake2s support an optional key but do * not require one. */ if (csp->csp_auth_klen == 0 || csp->csp_auth_key != NULL) axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key, csp->csp_auth_klen); axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx); if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST) ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute; break; case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC: axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx); axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key, csp->csp_auth_klen); if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST) ses->swcr_process = swcr_ccm_cbc_mac; break; } return (0); } static int swcr_setup_gcm(struct swcr_session *ses, const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { - struct swcr_encdec *swe; struct swcr_auth *swa; - struct enc_xform *txf; struct auth_hash *axf; - int error; if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_GCM_IV_LEN) return (EINVAL); /* First, setup the auth side. */ swa = &ses->swcr_auth; switch (csp->csp_cipher_klen * 8) { case 128: axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128; break; case 192: axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192; break; case 256: axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256; break; default: return (EINVAL); } swa->sw_axf = axf; if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize) return (EINVAL); if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0) swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize; else swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen; swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT); if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL) return (ENOBUFS); axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx); if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); /* Second, setup the cipher side. */ - swe = &ses->swcr_encdec; - txf = &enc_xform_aes_nist_gcm; - if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) { - error = txf->setkey(&swe->sw_kschedule, - csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); - if (error) - return (error); - } - swe->sw_exf = txf; - - return (0); + return (swcr_setup_cipher(ses, csp)); } static int swcr_setup_ccm(struct swcr_session *ses, const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { - struct swcr_encdec *swe; struct swcr_auth *swa; - struct enc_xform *txf; struct auth_hash *axf; - int error; if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN) return (EINVAL); /* First, setup the auth side. */ swa = &ses->swcr_auth; switch (csp->csp_cipher_klen * 8) { case 128: axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_128; break; case 192: axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_192; break; case 256: axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_256; break; default: return (EINVAL); } swa->sw_axf = axf; if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize) return (EINVAL); if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0) swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize; else swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen; swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT); if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL) return (ENOBUFS); axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx); if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); /* Second, setup the cipher side. */ - swe = &ses->swcr_encdec; - txf = &enc_xform_ccm; - if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) { - error = txf->setkey(&swe->sw_kschedule, - csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen); - if (error) - return (error); - } - swe->sw_exf = txf; - - return (0); + return (swcr_setup_cipher(ses, csp)); } static bool swcr_auth_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { struct auth_hash *axf; axf = crypto_auth_hash(csp); if (axf == NULL) return (false); switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) { case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC: case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC: break; case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC: switch (csp->csp_auth_klen * 8) { case 128: case 192: case 256: break; default: return (false); } if (csp->csp_auth_key == NULL) return (false); if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_GCM_IV_LEN) return (false); break; case CRYPTO_POLY1305: if (csp->csp_auth_klen != POLY1305_KEY_LEN) return (false); break; case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC: switch (csp->csp_auth_klen * 8) { case 128: case 192: case 256: break; default: return (false); } if (csp->csp_auth_key == NULL) return (false); if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN) return (false); break; } return (true); } static bool swcr_cipher_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { struct enc_xform *txf; txf = crypto_cipher(csp); if (txf == NULL) return (false); if (csp->csp_cipher_alg != CRYPTO_NULL_CBC && txf->ivsize != csp->csp_ivlen) return (false); return (true); } static int swcr_probesession(device_t dev, const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { if (csp->csp_flags != 0) return (EINVAL); switch (csp->csp_mode) { case CSP_MODE_COMPRESS: switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_DEFLATE_COMP: break; default: return (EINVAL); } break; case CSP_MODE_CIPHER: switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16: return (EINVAL); default: if (!swcr_cipher_supported(csp)) return (EINVAL); break; } break; case CSP_MODE_DIGEST: if (!swcr_auth_supported(csp)) return (EINVAL); break; case CSP_MODE_AEAD: switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16: break; default: return (EINVAL); } break; case CSP_MODE_ETA: /* AEAD algorithms cannot be used for EtA. */ switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16: return (EINVAL); } switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC: case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC: return (EINVAL); } if (!swcr_cipher_supported(csp) || !swcr_auth_supported(csp)) return (EINVAL); break; default: return (EINVAL); } return (CRYPTODEV_PROBE_SOFTWARE); } /* * Generate a new software session. */ static int swcr_newsession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses, const struct crypto_session_params *csp) { struct swcr_session *ses; struct swcr_encdec *swe; struct swcr_auth *swa; struct comp_algo *cxf; int error; ses = crypto_get_driver_session(cses); mtx_init(&ses->swcr_lock, "swcr session lock", NULL, MTX_DEF); error = 0; swe = &ses->swcr_encdec; swa = &ses->swcr_auth; switch (csp->csp_mode) { case CSP_MODE_COMPRESS: switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_DEFLATE_COMP: cxf = &comp_algo_deflate; break; #ifdef INVARIANTS default: panic("bad compression algo"); #endif } ses->swcr_compdec.sw_cxf = cxf; ses->swcr_process = swcr_compdec; break; case CSP_MODE_CIPHER: switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_NULL_CBC: ses->swcr_process = swcr_null; break; #ifdef INVARIANTS case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16: panic("bad cipher algo"); #endif default: - error = swcr_setup_encdec(ses, csp); + error = swcr_setup_cipher(ses, csp); if (error == 0) ses->swcr_process = swcr_encdec; } break; case CSP_MODE_DIGEST: error = swcr_setup_auth(ses, csp); break; case CSP_MODE_AEAD: switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: error = swcr_setup_gcm(ses, csp); if (error == 0) ses->swcr_process = swcr_gcm; break; case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16: error = swcr_setup_ccm(ses, csp); if (error == 0) ses->swcr_process = swcr_ccm; break; #ifdef INVARIANTS default: panic("bad aead algo"); #endif } break; case CSP_MODE_ETA: #ifdef INVARIANTS switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16: panic("bad eta cipher algo"); } switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) { case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC: case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC: panic("bad eta auth algo"); } #endif error = swcr_setup_auth(ses, csp); if (error) break; if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_NULL_CBC) { /* Effectively degrade to digest mode. */ ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute; break; } - error = swcr_setup_encdec(ses, csp); + error = swcr_setup_cipher(ses, csp); if (error == 0) ses->swcr_process = swcr_eta; break; default: error = EINVAL; } if (error) swcr_freesession(dev, cses); return (error); } static void swcr_freesession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses) { struct swcr_session *ses; struct swcr_auth *swa; - struct enc_xform *txf; struct auth_hash *axf; ses = crypto_get_driver_session(cses); mtx_destroy(&ses->swcr_lock); - txf = ses->swcr_encdec.sw_exf; - if (txf != NULL) { - if (ses->swcr_encdec.sw_kschedule != NULL) - txf->zerokey(&(ses->swcr_encdec.sw_kschedule)); - } + zfree(ses->swcr_encdec.sw_kschedule, M_CRYPTO_DATA); axf = ses->swcr_auth.sw_axf; if (axf != NULL) { swa = &ses->swcr_auth; if (swa->sw_ictx != NULL) { explicit_bzero(swa->sw_ictx, axf->ctxsize); free(swa->sw_ictx, M_CRYPTO_DATA); } if (swa->sw_octx != NULL) { explicit_bzero(swa->sw_octx, axf->ctxsize); free(swa->sw_octx, M_CRYPTO_DATA); } } } /* * Process a software request. */ static int swcr_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint) { struct swcr_session *ses; ses = crypto_get_driver_session(crp->crp_session); mtx_lock(&ses->swcr_lock); crp->crp_etype = ses->swcr_process(ses, crp); mtx_unlock(&ses->swcr_lock); crypto_done(crp); return (0); } static void swcr_identify(driver_t *drv, device_t parent) { /* NB: order 10 is so we get attached after h/w devices */ if (device_find_child(parent, "cryptosoft", -1) == NULL && BUS_ADD_CHILD(parent, 10, "cryptosoft", 0) == 0) panic("cryptosoft: could not attach"); } static int swcr_probe(device_t dev) { device_set_desc(dev, "software crypto"); return (BUS_PROBE_NOWILDCARD); } static int swcr_attach(device_t dev) { swcr_id = crypto_get_driverid(dev, sizeof(struct swcr_session), CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC); if (swcr_id < 0) { device_printf(dev, "cannot initialize!"); return (ENXIO); } return (0); } static int swcr_detach(device_t dev) { crypto_unregister_all(swcr_id); return 0; } static device_method_t swcr_methods[] = { DEVMETHOD(device_identify, swcr_identify), DEVMETHOD(device_probe, swcr_probe), DEVMETHOD(device_attach, swcr_attach), DEVMETHOD(device_detach, swcr_detach), DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_probesession, swcr_probesession), DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_newsession, swcr_newsession), DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_freesession,swcr_freesession), DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_process, swcr_process), {0, 0}, }; static driver_t swcr_driver = { "cryptosoft", swcr_methods, 0, /* NB: no softc */ }; static devclass_t swcr_devclass; /* * NB: We explicitly reference the crypto module so we * get the necessary ordering when built as a loadable * module. This is required because we bundle the crypto * module code together with the cryptosoft driver (otherwise * normal module dependencies would handle things). */ extern int crypto_modevent(struct module *, int, void *); /* XXX where to attach */ DRIVER_MODULE(cryptosoft, nexus, swcr_driver, swcr_devclass, crypto_modevent,0); MODULE_VERSION(cryptosoft, 1); MODULE_DEPEND(cryptosoft, crypto, 1, 1, 1); Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_aes_icm.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_aes_icm.c (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_aes_icm.c (revision 361298) @@ -1,180 +1,173 @@ /* $OpenBSD: xform.c,v 1.16 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */ /*- * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr), * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de) and * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org). * * This code was written by John Ioannidis for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, * in November 1995. * * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, * by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis * and Niels Provos. * * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * AES XTS implementation in 2008 by Damien Miller * * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. * * Copyright (C) 2001, Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Copyright (C) 2008, Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to * all. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include -static int aes_icm_setkey(u_int8_t **, const u_int8_t *, int); -static void aes_icm_crypt(caddr_t, u_int8_t *); -static void aes_icm_zerokey(u_int8_t **); -static void aes_icm_reinit(caddr_t, const u_int8_t *); -static void aes_gcm_reinit(caddr_t, const u_int8_t *); -static void aes_ccm_reinit(caddr_t, const u_int8_t *); +static int aes_icm_setkey(void *, const uint8_t *, int); +static void aes_icm_crypt(void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); +static void aes_icm_reinit(void *, const uint8_t *); +static void aes_gcm_reinit(void *, const uint8_t *); +static void aes_ccm_reinit(void *, const uint8_t *); /* Encryption instances */ struct enc_xform enc_xform_aes_icm = { - CRYPTO_AES_ICM, "AES-ICM", - AES_BLOCK_LEN, AES_BLOCK_LEN, AES_MIN_KEY, AES_MAX_KEY, - aes_icm_crypt, - aes_icm_crypt, - aes_icm_setkey, - aes_icm_zerokey, - aes_icm_reinit, + .type = CRYPTO_AES_ICM, + .name = "AES-ICM", + .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_icm_ctx), + .blocksize = AES_BLOCK_LEN, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_LEN, + .minkey = AES_MIN_KEY, + .maxkey = AES_MAX_KEY, + .encrypt = aes_icm_crypt, + .decrypt = aes_icm_crypt, + .setkey = aes_icm_setkey, + .reinit = aes_icm_reinit, }; struct enc_xform enc_xform_aes_nist_gcm = { - CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16, "AES-GCM", - AES_ICM_BLOCK_LEN, AES_GCM_IV_LEN, AES_MIN_KEY, AES_MAX_KEY, - aes_icm_crypt, - aes_icm_crypt, - aes_icm_setkey, - aes_icm_zerokey, - aes_gcm_reinit, + .type = CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16, + .name = "AES-GCM", + .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_icm_ctx), + .blocksize = AES_ICM_BLOCK_LEN, + .ivsize = AES_GCM_IV_LEN, + .minkey = AES_MIN_KEY, + .maxkey = AES_MAX_KEY, + .encrypt = aes_icm_crypt, + .decrypt = aes_icm_crypt, + .setkey = aes_icm_setkey, + .reinit = aes_gcm_reinit, }; struct enc_xform enc_xform_ccm = { .type = CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16, .name = "AES-CCM", + .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_icm_ctx), .blocksize = AES_ICM_BLOCK_LEN, .ivsize = AES_CCM_IV_LEN, .minkey = AES_MIN_KEY, .maxkey = AES_MAX_KEY, .encrypt = aes_icm_crypt, .decrypt = aes_icm_crypt, .setkey = aes_icm_setkey, - .zerokey = aes_icm_zerokey, .reinit = aes_ccm_reinit, }; /* * Encryption wrapper routines. */ static void -aes_icm_reinit(caddr_t key, const u_int8_t *iv) +aes_icm_reinit(void *key, const uint8_t *iv) { struct aes_icm_ctx *ctx; - ctx = (struct aes_icm_ctx *)key; + ctx = key; bcopy(iv, ctx->ac_block, AESICM_BLOCKSIZE); } static void -aes_gcm_reinit(caddr_t key, const u_int8_t *iv) +aes_gcm_reinit(void *key, const uint8_t *iv) { struct aes_icm_ctx *ctx; aes_icm_reinit(key, iv); - ctx = (struct aes_icm_ctx *)key; + ctx = key; /* GCM starts with 2 as counter 1 is used for final xor of tag. */ bzero(&ctx->ac_block[AESICM_BLOCKSIZE - 4], 4); ctx->ac_block[AESICM_BLOCKSIZE - 1] = 2; } static void -aes_ccm_reinit(caddr_t key, const u_int8_t *iv) +aes_ccm_reinit(void *key, const uint8_t *iv) { struct aes_icm_ctx *ctx; - ctx = (struct aes_icm_ctx*)key; + ctx = key; /* CCM has flags, then the IV, then the counter, which starts at 1 */ bzero(ctx->ac_block, sizeof(ctx->ac_block)); /* 3 bytes for length field; this gives a nonce of 12 bytes */ ctx->ac_block[0] = (15 - AES_CCM_IV_LEN) - 1; bcopy(iv, ctx->ac_block+1, AES_CCM_IV_LEN); ctx->ac_block[AESICM_BLOCKSIZE - 1] = 1; } static void -aes_icm_crypt(caddr_t key, u_int8_t *data) +aes_icm_crypt(void *key, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out) { struct aes_icm_ctx *ctx; - u_int8_t keystream[AESICM_BLOCKSIZE]; + uint8_t keystream[AESICM_BLOCKSIZE]; int i; - ctx = (struct aes_icm_ctx *)key; + ctx = key; rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->ac_ek, ctx->ac_nr, ctx->ac_block, keystream); for (i = 0; i < AESICM_BLOCKSIZE; i++) - data[i] ^= keystream[i]; + out[i] = in[i] ^ keystream[i]; explicit_bzero(keystream, sizeof(keystream)); /* increment counter */ for (i = AESICM_BLOCKSIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) if (++ctx->ac_block[i]) /* continue on overflow */ break; } static int -aes_icm_setkey(u_int8_t **sched, const u_int8_t *key, int len) +aes_icm_setkey(void *sched, const uint8_t *key, int len) { struct aes_icm_ctx *ctx; if (len != 16 && len != 24 && len != 32) - return EINVAL; + return (EINVAL); - *sched = KMALLOC(sizeof(struct aes_icm_ctx), M_CRYPTO_DATA, - M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); - if (*sched == NULL) - return ENOMEM; - - ctx = (struct aes_icm_ctx *)*sched; + ctx = sched; ctx->ac_nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->ac_ek, key, len * 8); - return 0; -} - -static void -aes_icm_zerokey(u_int8_t **sched) -{ - - bzero(*sched, sizeof(struct aes_icm_ctx)); - KFREE(*sched, M_CRYPTO_DATA); - *sched = NULL; + return (0); } Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_aes_xts.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_aes_xts.c (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_aes_xts.c (revision 361298) @@ -1,164 +1,156 @@ /* $OpenBSD: xform.c,v 1.16 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */ /*- * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr), * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de) and * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org). * * This code was written by John Ioannidis for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, * in November 1995. * * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, * by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis * and Niels Provos. * * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * AES XTS implementation in 2008 by Damien Miller * * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. * * Copyright (C) 2001, Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Copyright (C) 2008, Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to * all. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include -static int aes_xts_setkey(u_int8_t **, const u_int8_t *, int); -static void aes_xts_encrypt(caddr_t, u_int8_t *); -static void aes_xts_decrypt(caddr_t, u_int8_t *); -static void aes_xts_zerokey(u_int8_t **); -static void aes_xts_reinit(caddr_t, const u_int8_t *); +static int aes_xts_setkey(void *, const uint8_t *, int); +static void aes_xts_encrypt(void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); +static void aes_xts_decrypt(void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); +static void aes_xts_reinit(void *, const uint8_t *); /* Encryption instances */ struct enc_xform enc_xform_aes_xts = { - CRYPTO_AES_XTS, "AES-XTS", - AES_BLOCK_LEN, AES_XTS_IV_LEN, AES_XTS_MIN_KEY, AES_XTS_MAX_KEY, - aes_xts_encrypt, - aes_xts_decrypt, - aes_xts_setkey, - aes_xts_zerokey, - aes_xts_reinit + .type = CRYPTO_AES_XTS, + .name = "AES-XTS", + .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_xts_ctx), + .blocksize = AES_BLOCK_LEN, + .ivsize = AES_XTS_IV_LEN, + .minkey = AES_XTS_MIN_KEY, + .maxkey = AES_XTS_MAX_KEY, + .encrypt = aes_xts_encrypt, + .decrypt = aes_xts_decrypt, + .setkey = aes_xts_setkey, + .reinit = aes_xts_reinit }; /* * Encryption wrapper routines. */ static void -aes_xts_reinit(caddr_t key, const u_int8_t *iv) +aes_xts_reinit(void *key, const uint8_t *iv) { - struct aes_xts_ctx *ctx = (struct aes_xts_ctx *)key; - u_int64_t blocknum; + struct aes_xts_ctx *ctx = key; + uint64_t blocknum; u_int i; /* * Prepare tweak as E_k2(IV). IV is specified as LE representation * of a 64-bit block number which we allow to be passed in directly. */ bcopy(iv, &blocknum, AES_XTS_IVSIZE); for (i = 0; i < AES_XTS_IVSIZE; i++) { ctx->tweak[i] = blocknum & 0xff; blocknum >>= 8; } /* Last 64 bits of IV are always zero */ bzero(ctx->tweak + AES_XTS_IVSIZE, AES_XTS_IVSIZE); rijndael_encrypt(&ctx->key2, ctx->tweak, ctx->tweak); } static void -aes_xts_crypt(struct aes_xts_ctx *ctx, u_int8_t *data, u_int do_encrypt) +aes_xts_crypt(struct aes_xts_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, + u_int do_encrypt) { - u_int8_t block[AES_XTS_BLOCKSIZE]; + uint8_t block[AES_XTS_BLOCKSIZE]; u_int i, carry_in, carry_out; for (i = 0; i < AES_XTS_BLOCKSIZE; i++) - block[i] = data[i] ^ ctx->tweak[i]; + block[i] = in[i] ^ ctx->tweak[i]; if (do_encrypt) - rijndael_encrypt(&ctx->key1, block, data); + rijndael_encrypt(&ctx->key1, block, out); else - rijndael_decrypt(&ctx->key1, block, data); + rijndael_decrypt(&ctx->key1, block, out); for (i = 0; i < AES_XTS_BLOCKSIZE; i++) - data[i] ^= ctx->tweak[i]; + out[i] ^= ctx->tweak[i]; /* Exponentiate tweak */ carry_in = 0; for (i = 0; i < AES_XTS_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { carry_out = ctx->tweak[i] & 0x80; ctx->tweak[i] = (ctx->tweak[i] << 1) | (carry_in ? 1 : 0); carry_in = carry_out; } if (carry_in) ctx->tweak[0] ^= AES_XTS_ALPHA; - bzero(block, sizeof(block)); + explicit_bzero(block, sizeof(block)); } static void -aes_xts_encrypt(caddr_t key, u_int8_t *data) +aes_xts_encrypt(void *key, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out) { - aes_xts_crypt((struct aes_xts_ctx *)key, data, 1); + aes_xts_crypt(key, in, out, 1); } static void -aes_xts_decrypt(caddr_t key, u_int8_t *data) +aes_xts_decrypt(void *key, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out) { - aes_xts_crypt((struct aes_xts_ctx *)key, data, 0); + aes_xts_crypt(key, in, out, 0); } static int -aes_xts_setkey(u_int8_t **sched, const u_int8_t *key, int len) +aes_xts_setkey(void *sched, const uint8_t *key, int len) { struct aes_xts_ctx *ctx; if (len != 32 && len != 64) - return EINVAL; + return (EINVAL); - *sched = KMALLOC(sizeof(struct aes_xts_ctx), M_CRYPTO_DATA, - M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); - if (*sched == NULL) - return ENOMEM; - ctx = (struct aes_xts_ctx *)*sched; + ctx = sched; rijndael_set_key(&ctx->key1, key, len * 4); rijndael_set_key(&ctx->key2, key + (len / 2), len * 4); - return 0; -} - -static void -aes_xts_zerokey(u_int8_t **sched) -{ - bzero(*sched, sizeof(struct aes_xts_ctx)); - KFREE(*sched, M_CRYPTO_DATA); - *sched = NULL; + return (0); } Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_auth.h =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_auth.h (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_auth.h (revision 361298) @@ -1,100 +1,99 @@ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* $OpenBSD: xform.h,v 1.8 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */ /*- * The author of this code is Angelos D. Keromytis (angelos@cis.upenn.edu) * * This code was written by Angelos D. Keromytis in Athens, Greece, in * February 2000. Network Security Technologies Inc. (NSTI) kindly * supported the development of this code. * * Copyright (c) 2000 Angelos D. Keromytis * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all source code copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #ifndef _CRYPTO_XFORM_AUTH_H_ #define _CRYPTO_XFORM_AUTH_H_ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include -#include /* XXX use a define common with other hash stuff ! */ #define AH_ALEN_MAX 64 /* max authenticator hash length */ /* Declarations */ struct auth_hash { int type; char *name; u_int16_t keysize; u_int16_t hashsize; u_int16_t ctxsize; u_int16_t blocksize; void (*Init) (void *); void (*Setkey) (void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); void (*Reinit) (void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); int (*Update) (void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); void (*Final) (u_int8_t *, void *); }; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_null; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_hmac_sha1; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_hmac_sha2_224; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_sha1; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_sha2_224; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_sha2_256; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_sha2_384; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_sha2_512; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_blake2b; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_blake2s; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_poly1305; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_128; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_192; extern struct auth_hash auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_256; union authctx { SHA1_CTX sha1ctx; RMD160_CTX rmd160ctx; SHA224_CTX sha224ctx; SHA256_CTX sha256ctx; SHA384_CTX sha384ctx; SHA512_CTX sha512ctx; struct aes_gmac_ctx aes_gmac_ctx; struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx aes_cbc_mac_ctx; }; #endif /* _CRYPTO_XFORM_AUTH_H_ */ Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_cml.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_cml.c (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_cml.c (revision 361298) @@ -1,113 +1,98 @@ /* $OpenBSD: xform.c,v 1.16 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */ /*- * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr), * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de) and * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org). * * This code was written by John Ioannidis for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, * in November 1995. * * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, * by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis * and Niels Provos. * * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * AES XTS implementation in 2008 by Damien Miller * * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. * * Copyright (C) 2001, Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Copyright (C) 2008, Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to * all. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include -static int cml_setkey(u_int8_t **, const u_int8_t *, int); -static void cml_encrypt(caddr_t, u_int8_t *); -static void cml_decrypt(caddr_t, u_int8_t *); -static void cml_zerokey(u_int8_t **); +static int cml_setkey(void *, const uint8_t *, int); +static void cml_encrypt(void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); +static void cml_decrypt(void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); /* Encryption instances */ struct enc_xform enc_xform_camellia = { - CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_CBC, "Camellia", - CAMELLIA_BLOCK_LEN, CAMELLIA_BLOCK_LEN, CAMELLIA_MIN_KEY, - CAMELLIA_MAX_KEY, - cml_encrypt, - cml_decrypt, - cml_setkey, - cml_zerokey, - NULL, + .type = CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_CBC, + .name = "Camellia-CBC", + .ctxsize = sizeof(camellia_ctx), + .blocksize = CAMELLIA_BLOCK_LEN, + .ivsize = CAMELLIA_BLOCK_LEN, + .minkey = CAMELLIA_MIN_KEY, + .maxkey = CAMELLIA_MAX_KEY, + .encrypt = cml_encrypt, + .decrypt = cml_decrypt, + .setkey = cml_setkey, }; /* * Encryption wrapper routines. */ static void -cml_encrypt(caddr_t key, u_int8_t *blk) +cml_encrypt(void *ctx, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out) { - camellia_encrypt((camellia_ctx *) key, (u_char *) blk, (u_char *) blk); + camellia_encrypt(ctx, in, out); } static void -cml_decrypt(caddr_t key, u_int8_t *blk) +cml_decrypt(void *ctx, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out) { - camellia_decrypt(((camellia_ctx *) key), (u_char *) blk, - (u_char *) blk); + camellia_decrypt(ctx, in, out); } static int -cml_setkey(u_int8_t **sched, const u_int8_t *key, int len) +cml_setkey(void *ctx, const uint8_t *key, int len) { - int err; if (len != 16 && len != 24 && len != 32) return (EINVAL); - *sched = KMALLOC(sizeof(camellia_ctx), M_CRYPTO_DATA, - M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); - if (*sched != NULL) { - camellia_set_key((camellia_ctx *) *sched, key, - len * 8); - err = 0; - } else - err = ENOMEM; - return err; -} -static void -cml_zerokey(u_int8_t **sched) -{ - bzero(*sched, sizeof(camellia_ctx)); - KFREE(*sched, M_CRYPTO_DATA); - *sched = NULL; + camellia_set_key(ctx, key, len * 8); + return (0); } Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_comp.h =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_comp.h (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_comp.h (revision 361298) @@ -1,52 +1,51 @@ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* $OpenBSD: xform.h,v 1.8 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */ /*- * The author of this code is Angelos D. Keromytis (angelos@cis.upenn.edu) * * This code was written by Angelos D. Keromytis in Athens, Greece, in * February 2000. Network Security Technologies Inc. (NSTI) kindly * supported the development of this code. * * Copyright (c) 2000 Angelos D. Keromytis * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all source code copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #ifndef _CRYPTO_XFORM_COMP_H_ #define _CRYPTO_XFORM_COMP_H_ #include #include #include #include -#include /* Declarations */ struct comp_algo { int type; char *name; size_t minlen; u_int32_t (*compress) (u_int8_t *, u_int32_t, u_int8_t **); u_int32_t (*decompress) (u_int8_t *, u_int32_t, u_int8_t **); }; extern struct comp_algo comp_algo_deflate; #endif /* _CRYPTO_XFORM_COMP_H_ */ Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_enc.h =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_enc.h (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_enc.h (revision 361298) @@ -1,92 +1,91 @@ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* $OpenBSD: xform.h,v 1.8 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */ /*- * The author of this code is Angelos D. Keromytis (angelos@cis.upenn.edu) * * This code was written by Angelos D. Keromytis in Athens, Greece, in * February 2000. Network Security Technologies Inc. (NSTI) kindly * supported the development of this code. * * Copyright (c) 2000 Angelos D. Keromytis * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all source code copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #ifndef _CRYPTO_XFORM_ENC_H_ #define _CRYPTO_XFORM_ENC_H_ #include #include #include #include #include -#include #define AESICM_BLOCKSIZE AES_BLOCK_LEN #define AES_XTS_BLOCKSIZE 16 #define AES_XTS_IVSIZE 8 #define AES_XTS_ALPHA 0x87 /* GF(2^128) generator polynomial */ /* Declarations */ struct enc_xform { int type; char *name; + size_t ctxsize; u_int16_t blocksize; /* Required input block size -- 1 for stream ciphers. */ u_int16_t ivsize; u_int16_t minkey, maxkey; - void (*encrypt) (caddr_t, u_int8_t *); - void (*decrypt) (caddr_t, u_int8_t *); - int (*setkey) (u_int8_t **, const u_int8_t *, int len); - void (*zerokey) (u_int8_t **); - void (*reinit) (caddr_t, const u_int8_t *); + void (*encrypt) (void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); + void (*decrypt) (void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); + int (*setkey) (void *, const uint8_t *, int len); + void (*reinit) (void *, const u_int8_t *); /* * Encrypt/decrypt 1+ blocks of input -- total size is 'len' bytes. * Len is guaranteed to be a multiple of the defined 'blocksize'. * Optional interface -- most useful for stream ciphers with a small * blocksize (1). */ - void (*encrypt_multi) (void *, uint8_t *, size_t len); - void (*decrypt_multi) (void *, uint8_t *, size_t len); + void (*encrypt_multi) (void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t len); + void (*decrypt_multi) (void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t len); }; extern struct enc_xform enc_xform_null; extern struct enc_xform enc_xform_rijndael128; extern struct enc_xform enc_xform_aes_icm; extern struct enc_xform enc_xform_aes_nist_gcm; extern struct enc_xform enc_xform_aes_nist_gmac; extern struct enc_xform enc_xform_aes_xts; extern struct enc_xform enc_xform_camellia; extern struct enc_xform enc_xform_chacha20; extern struct enc_xform enc_xform_ccm; struct aes_icm_ctx { u_int32_t ac_ek[4*(RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1)]; /* ac_block is initialized to IV */ u_int8_t ac_block[AESICM_BLOCKSIZE]; int ac_nr; }; struct aes_xts_ctx { rijndael_ctx key1; rijndael_ctx key2; u_int8_t tweak[AES_XTS_BLOCKSIZE]; }; #endif /* _CRYPTO_XFORM_ENC_H_ */ Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_gmac.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_gmac.c (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_gmac.c (revision 361298) @@ -1,99 +1,98 @@ /* $OpenBSD: xform.c,v 1.16 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */ /*- * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr), * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de) and * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org). * * This code was written by John Ioannidis for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, * in November 1995. * * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, * by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis * and Niels Provos. * * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * AES XTS implementation in 2008 by Damien Miller * * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. * * Copyright (C) 2001, Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Copyright (C) 2008, Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to * all. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include /* Encryption instances */ struct enc_xform enc_xform_aes_nist_gmac = { - CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC, "AES-GMAC", - AES_ICM_BLOCK_LEN, AES_GCM_IV_LEN, AES_MIN_KEY, AES_MAX_KEY, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, + .type = CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC, + .name = "AES-GMAC", + .blocksize = AES_ICM_BLOCK_LEN, + .ivsize = AES_GCM_IV_LEN, + .minkey = AES_MIN_KEY, + .maxkey = AES_MAX_KEY, }; /* Authentication instances */ struct auth_hash auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128 = { CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC, "GMAC-AES-128", AES_128_GMAC_KEY_LEN, AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN, sizeof(struct aes_gmac_ctx), GMAC_BLOCK_LEN, (void (*)(void *)) AES_GMAC_Init, (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Setkey, (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Reinit, (int (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Update, (void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_GMAC_Final }; struct auth_hash auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192 = { CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC, "GMAC-AES-192", AES_192_GMAC_KEY_LEN, AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN, sizeof(struct aes_gmac_ctx), GMAC_BLOCK_LEN, (void (*)(void *)) AES_GMAC_Init, (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Setkey, (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Reinit, (int (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Update, (void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_GMAC_Final }; struct auth_hash auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256 = { CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC, "GMAC-AES-256", AES_256_GMAC_KEY_LEN, AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN, sizeof(struct aes_gmac_ctx), GMAC_BLOCK_LEN, (void (*)(void *)) AES_GMAC_Init, (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Setkey, (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Reinit, (int (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Update, (void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_GMAC_Final }; Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_null.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_null.c (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_null.c (revision 361298) @@ -1,144 +1,132 @@ /* $OpenBSD: xform.c,v 1.16 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */ /*- * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr), * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de) and * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org). * * This code was written by John Ioannidis for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, * in November 1995. * * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, * by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis * and Niels Provos. * * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * AES XTS implementation in 2008 by Damien Miller * * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. * * Copyright (C) 2001, Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Copyright (C) 2008, Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to * all. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include -static int null_setkey(u_int8_t **, const u_int8_t *, int); -static void null_encrypt(caddr_t, u_int8_t *); -static void null_decrypt(caddr_t, u_int8_t *); -static void null_zerokey(u_int8_t **); +static int null_setkey(void *, const u_int8_t *, int); +static void null_crypt(void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); static void null_init(void *); static void null_reinit(void *ctx, const u_int8_t *buf, u_int16_t len); static int null_update(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); static void null_final(u_int8_t *, void *); /* Encryption instances */ struct enc_xform enc_xform_null = { - CRYPTO_NULL_CBC, "NULL", + .type = CRYPTO_NULL_CBC, + .name = "NULL", /* NB: blocksize of 4 is to generate a properly aligned ESP header */ - NULL_BLOCK_LEN, 0, NULL_MIN_KEY, NULL_MAX_KEY, - null_encrypt, - null_decrypt, - null_setkey, - null_zerokey, - NULL, + .blocksize = NULL_BLOCK_LEN, + .ivsize = 0, + .minkey = NULL_MIN_KEY, + .maxkey = NULL_MAX_KEY, + .encrypt = null_crypt, + .decrypt = null_crypt, + .setkey = null_setkey, }; /* Authentication instances */ struct auth_hash auth_hash_null = { .type = CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC, .name = "NULL-HMAC", .keysize = 0, .hashsize = NULL_HASH_LEN, .ctxsize = sizeof(int), /* NB: context isn't used */ .blocksize = NULL_HMAC_BLOCK_LEN, .Init = null_init, .Setkey = null_reinit, .Reinit = null_reinit, .Update = null_update, .Final = null_final, }; /* * Encryption wrapper routines. */ static void -null_encrypt(caddr_t key, u_int8_t *blk) +null_crypt(void *key, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out) { } -static void -null_decrypt(caddr_t key, u_int8_t *blk) -{ -} - static int -null_setkey(u_int8_t **sched, const u_int8_t *key, int len) +null_setkey(void *sched, const uint8_t *key, int len) { - *sched = NULL; - return 0; -} - -static void -null_zerokey(u_int8_t **sched) -{ - *sched = NULL; + return (0); } /* * And now for auth. */ static void null_init(void *ctx) { } static void null_reinit(void *ctx, const u_int8_t *buf, u_int16_t len) { } static int null_update(void *ctx, const u_int8_t *buf, u_int16_t len) { return 0; } static void null_final(u_int8_t *buf, void *ctx) { if (buf != (u_int8_t *) 0) bzero(buf, 12); } Index: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_rijndael.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/xform_rijndael.c (revision 361297) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_rijndael.c (revision 361298) @@ -1,113 +1,98 @@ /* $OpenBSD: xform.c,v 1.16 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */ /*- * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr), * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de) and * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org). * * This code was written by John Ioannidis for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, * in November 1995. * * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, * by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis * and Niels Provos. * * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis. * * AES XTS implementation in 2008 by Damien Miller * * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. * * Copyright (C) 2001, Angelos D. Keromytis. * * Copyright (C) 2008, Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation * All rights reserved. * * Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney * under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and * Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate). * * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software. * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to * all. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR * PURPOSE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include -static int rijndael128_setkey(u_int8_t **, const u_int8_t *, int); -static void rijndael128_encrypt(caddr_t, u_int8_t *); -static void rijndael128_decrypt(caddr_t, u_int8_t *); -static void rijndael128_zerokey(u_int8_t **); +static int rijndael128_setkey(void *, const u_int8_t *, int); +static void rijndael128_encrypt(void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); +static void rijndael128_decrypt(void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *); /* Encryption instances */ struct enc_xform enc_xform_rijndael128 = { - CRYPTO_RIJNDAEL128_CBC, "Rijndael-128/AES", - RIJNDAEL128_BLOCK_LEN, RIJNDAEL128_BLOCK_LEN, RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEY, - RIJNDAEL_MAX_KEY, - rijndael128_encrypt, - rijndael128_decrypt, - rijndael128_setkey, - rijndael128_zerokey, - NULL, + .type = CRYPTO_RIJNDAEL128_CBC, + .name = "Rijndael-128/AES", + .ctxsize = sizeof(rijndael_ctx), + .blocksize = RIJNDAEL128_BLOCK_LEN, + .ivsize = RIJNDAEL128_BLOCK_LEN, + .minkey = RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEY, + .maxkey = RIJNDAEL_MAX_KEY, + .encrypt = rijndael128_encrypt, + .decrypt = rijndael128_decrypt, + .setkey = rijndael128_setkey, }; /* * Encryption wrapper routines. */ static void -rijndael128_encrypt(caddr_t key, u_int8_t *blk) +rijndael128_encrypt(void *key, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out) { - rijndael_encrypt((rijndael_ctx *) key, (u_char *) blk, (u_char *) blk); + rijndael_encrypt(key, in, out); } static void -rijndael128_decrypt(caddr_t key, u_int8_t *blk) +rijndael128_decrypt(void *key, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out) { - rijndael_decrypt(((rijndael_ctx *) key), (u_char *) blk, - (u_char *) blk); + rijndael_decrypt(key, in, out); } static int -rijndael128_setkey(u_int8_t **sched, const u_int8_t *key, int len) +rijndael128_setkey(void *sched, const uint8_t *key, int len) { - int err; if (len != 16 && len != 24 && len != 32) return (EINVAL); - *sched = KMALLOC(sizeof(rijndael_ctx), M_CRYPTO_DATA, - M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); - if (*sched != NULL) { - rijndael_set_key((rijndael_ctx *) *sched, key, - len * 8); - err = 0; - } else - err = ENOMEM; - return err; -} -static void -rijndael128_zerokey(u_int8_t **sched) -{ - bzero(*sched, sizeof(rijndael_ctx)); - KFREE(*sched, M_CRYPTO_DATA); - *sched = NULL; + rijndael_set_key(sched, key, len * 8); + return (0); }