Index: stable/12/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/utils.cc
===================================================================
--- stable/12/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/utils.cc	(revision 361125)
+++ stable/12/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/utils.cc	(revision 361126)
@@ -1,623 +1,637 @@
 /*-
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
  *
  * Copyright (c) 2019 The FreeBSD Foundation
  *
  * This software was developed by BFF Storage Systems, LLC under sponsorship
  * from the FreeBSD Foundation.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
  * $FreeBSD$
  */
 
 extern "C" {
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/module.h>
 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 
 #include <dirent.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <grp.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <semaphore.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 }
 
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
 
 #include "mockfs.hh"
 #include "utils.hh"
 
 using namespace testing;
 
 /*
  * The default max_write is set to this formula in libfuse, though
  * individual filesystems can lower it.  The "- 4096" was added in
  * commit 154ffe2, with the commit message "fix".
  */
 const uint32_t libfuse_max_write = 32 * getpagesize() + 0x1000 - 4096;
 
 /* 
  * Set the default max_write to a distinct value from MAXPHYS to catch bugs
  * that confuse the two.
  */
 const uint32_t default_max_write = MIN(libfuse_max_write, MAXPHYS / 2);
 
 
 /* Check that fusefs(4) is accessible and the current user can mount(2) */
 void check_environment()
 {
 	const char *devnode = "/dev/fuse";
+	const char *bsdextended_node = "security.mac.bsdextended.enabled";
+	int bsdextended_val = 0;
+	size_t bsdextended_size = sizeof(bsdextended_val);
+	int bsdextended_found;
 	const char *usermount_node = "vfs.usermount";
 	int usermount_val = 0;
 	size_t usermount_size = sizeof(usermount_val);
 	if (eaccess(devnode, R_OK | W_OK)) {
 		if (errno == ENOENT) {
 			GTEST_SKIP() << devnode << " does not exist";
 		} else if (errno == EACCES) {
 			GTEST_SKIP() << devnode <<
 			    " is not accessible by the current user";
 		} else {
 			GTEST_SKIP() << strerror(errno);
 		}
 	}
+	// mac_bsdextended(4), when enabled, generates many more GETATTR
+	// operations. The fusefs tests' expectations don't account for those,
+	// and adding extra code to handle them obfuscates the real purpose of
+	// the tests.  Better just to skip the fusefs tests if mac_bsdextended
+	// is enabled.
+	bsdextended_found = sysctlbyname(bsdextended_node, &bsdextended_val,
+					 &bsdextended_size, NULL, 0);
+	if (bsdextended_found == 0 && bsdextended_val != 0)
+		GTEST_SKIP() <<
+		    "The fusefs tests are incompatible with mac_bsdextended.";
 	ASSERT_EQ(sysctlbyname(usermount_node, &usermount_val, &usermount_size,
 			       NULL, 0),
-		  0);;
+		  0);
 	if (geteuid() != 0 && !usermount_val)
 		GTEST_SKIP() << "current user is not allowed to mount";
 }
 
 const char *cache_mode_to_s(enum cache_mode cm) {
 	switch (cm) {
 	case Uncached:
 		return "Uncached";
 	case Writethrough:
 		return "Writethrough";
 	case Writeback:
 		return "Writeback";
 	case WritebackAsync:
 		return "WritebackAsync";
 	default:
 		return "Unknown";
 	}
 }
 
 bool is_unsafe_aio_enabled(void) {
 	const char *node = "vfs.aio.enable_unsafe";
 	int val = 0;
 	size_t size = sizeof(val);
 
 	if (sysctlbyname(node, &val, &size, NULL, 0)) {
 		perror("sysctlbyname");
 		return (false);
 	}
 	return (val != 0);
 }
 
 class FuseEnv: public Environment {
 	virtual void SetUp() {
 	}
 };
 
 void FuseTest::SetUp() {
 	const char *maxbcachebuf_node = "vfs.maxbcachebuf";
 	const char *maxphys_node = "kern.maxphys";
 	int val = 0;
 	size_t size = sizeof(val);
 
 	/*
 	 * XXX check_environment should be called from FuseEnv::SetUp, but
 	 * can't due to https://github.com/google/googletest/issues/2189
 	 */
 	check_environment();
 	if (IsSkipped())
 		return;
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sysctlbyname(maxbcachebuf_node, &val, &size, NULL, 0))
 		<< strerror(errno);
 	m_maxbcachebuf = val;
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sysctlbyname(maxphys_node, &val, &size, NULL, 0))
 		<< strerror(errno);
 	m_maxphys = val;
 
 	try {
 		m_mock = new MockFS(m_maxreadahead, m_allow_other,
 			m_default_permissions, m_push_symlinks_in, m_ro,
 			m_pm, m_init_flags, m_kernel_minor_version,
 			m_maxwrite, m_async, m_noclusterr, m_time_gran,
 			m_nointr);
 		/* 
 		 * FUSE_ACCESS is called almost universally.  Expecting it in
 		 * each test case would be super-annoying.  Instead, set a
 		 * default expectation for FUSE_ACCESS and return ENOSYS.
 		 *
 		 * Individual test cases can override this expectation since
 		 * googlemock evaluates expectations in LIFO order.
 		 */
 		EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 			ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 				return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_ACCESS);
 			}, Eq(true)),
 			_)
 		).Times(AnyNumber())
 		.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOSYS)));
 		/*
 		 * FUSE_BMAP is called for most test cases that read data.  Set
 		 * a default expectation and return ENOSYS.
 		 *
 		 * Individual test cases can override this expectation since
 		 * googlemock evaluates expectations in LIFO order.
 		 */
 		EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 			ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 				return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_BMAP);
 			}, Eq(true)),
 			_)
 		).Times(AnyNumber())
 		.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOSYS)));
 	} catch (std::system_error err) {
 		FAIL() << err.what();
 	}
 }
 
 void
 FuseTest::expect_access(uint64_t ino, mode_t access_mode, int error)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_ACCESS &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino &&
 				in.body.access.mask == access_mode);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(error)));
 }
 
 void
 FuseTest::expect_destroy(int error)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_DESTROY);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke( ReturnImmediate([&](auto in, auto& out) {
 		m_mock->m_quit = true;
 		out.header.len = sizeof(out.header);
 		out.header.unique = in.header.unique;
 		out.header.error = -error;
 	})));
 }
 
 void
 FuseTest::expect_flush(uint64_t ino, int times, ProcessMockerT r)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_FLUSH &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).Times(times)
 	.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(r));
 }
 
 void
 FuseTest::expect_forget(uint64_t ino, uint64_t nlookup, sem_t *sem)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_FORGET &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino &&
 				in.body.forget.nlookup == nlookup);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke([=](auto in __unused, auto &out __unused) {
 		if (sem != NULL)
 			sem_post(sem);
 		/* FUSE_FORGET has no response! */
 	}));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_getattr(uint64_t ino, uint64_t size)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_GETATTR &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto i __unused, auto& out) {
 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, attr);
 		out.body.attr.attr.ino = ino;	// Must match nodeid
 		out.body.attr.attr.mode = S_IFREG | 0644;
 		out.body.attr.attr.size = size;
 		out.body.attr.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX;
 	})));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_lookup(const char *relpath, uint64_t ino, mode_t mode,
 	uint64_t size, int times, uint64_t attr_valid, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 {
 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, relpath)
 	.Times(times)
 	.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(
 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry);
 		out.body.entry.attr.mode = mode;
 		out.body.entry.nodeid = ino;
 		out.body.entry.attr.nlink = 1;
 		out.body.entry.attr_valid = attr_valid;
 		out.body.entry.attr.size = size;
 		out.body.entry.attr.uid = uid;
 		out.body.entry.attr.gid = gid;
 	})));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_lookup_7_8(const char *relpath, uint64_t ino, mode_t mode,
 	uint64_t size, int times, uint64_t attr_valid, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 {
 	EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, relpath)
 	.Times(times)
 	.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(
 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry_7_8);
 		out.body.entry.attr.mode = mode;
 		out.body.entry.nodeid = ino;
 		out.body.entry.attr.nlink = 1;
 		out.body.entry.attr_valid = attr_valid;
 		out.body.entry.attr.size = size;
 		out.body.entry.attr.uid = uid;
 		out.body.entry.attr.gid = gid;
 	})));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_open(uint64_t ino, uint32_t flags, int times)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_OPEN &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).Times(times)
 	.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(
 		ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
 		out.header.len = sizeof(out.header);
 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, open);
 		out.body.open.fh = FH;
 		out.body.open.open_flags = flags;
 	})));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_opendir(uint64_t ino)
 {
 	/* opendir(3) calls fstatfs */
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_STATFS);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillRepeatedly(Invoke(
 	ReturnImmediate([=](auto i __unused, auto& out) {
 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, statfs);
 	})));
 
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_OPENDIR &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
 		out.header.len = sizeof(out.header);
 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, open);
 		out.body.open.fh = FH;
 	})));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_read(uint64_t ino, uint64_t offset, uint64_t isize,
 	uint64_t osize, const void *contents, int flags)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_READ &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino &&
 				in.body.read.fh == FH &&
 				in.body.read.offset == offset &&
 				in.body.read.size == isize &&
 				flags == -1 ?
 					(in.body.read.flags == O_RDONLY ||
 					 in.body.read.flags == O_RDWR)
 				: in.body.read.flags == (uint32_t)flags);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
 		out.header.len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header) + osize;
 		memmove(out.body.bytes, contents, osize);
 	}))).RetiresOnSaturation();
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_readdir(uint64_t ino, uint64_t off,
 	std::vector<struct dirent> &ents)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_READDIR &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino &&
 				in.body.readdir.fh == FH &&
 				in.body.readdir.offset == off);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillRepeatedly(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in, auto& out) {
 		struct fuse_dirent *fde = (struct fuse_dirent*)&(out.body);
 		int i = 0;
 
 		out.header.error = 0;
 		out.header.len = 0;
 
 		for (const auto& it: ents) {
 			size_t entlen, entsize;
 
 			fde->ino = it.d_fileno;
 			fde->off = it.d_off;
 			fde->type = it.d_type;
 			fde->namelen = it.d_namlen;
 			strncpy(fde->name, it.d_name, it.d_namlen);
 			entlen = FUSE_NAME_OFFSET + fde->namelen;
 			entsize = FUSE_DIRENT_SIZE(fde);
 			/* 
 			 * The FUSE protocol does not require zeroing out the
 			 * unused portion of the name.  But it's a good
 			 * practice to prevent information disclosure to the
 			 * FUSE client, even though the client is usually the
 			 * kernel
 			 */
 			memset(fde->name + fde->namelen, 0, entsize - entlen);
 			if (out.header.len + entsize > in.body.read.size) {
 				printf("Overflow in readdir expectation: i=%d\n"
 					, i);
 				break;
 			}
 			out.header.len += entsize;
 			fde = (struct fuse_dirent*)
 				((intmax_t*)fde + entsize / sizeof(intmax_t));
 			i++;
 		}
 		out.header.len += sizeof(out.header);
 	})));
 
 }
 void FuseTest::expect_release(uint64_t ino, uint64_t fh)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_RELEASE &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino &&
 				in.body.release.fh == fh);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(0)));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_releasedir(uint64_t ino, ProcessMockerT r)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_RELEASEDIR &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino &&
 				in.body.release.fh == FH);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke(r));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_unlink(uint64_t parent, const char *path, int error)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_UNLINK &&
 				0 == strcmp(path, in.body.unlink) &&
 				in.header.nodeid == parent);
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(error)));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_write(uint64_t ino, uint64_t offset, uint64_t isize,
 	uint64_t osize, uint32_t flags_set, uint32_t flags_unset,
 	const void *contents)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			const char *buf = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
 				sizeof(struct fuse_write_in);
 			bool pid_ok;
 			uint32_t wf = in.body.write.write_flags;
 
 			if (wf & FUSE_WRITE_CACHE)
 				pid_ok = true;
 			else
 				pid_ok = (pid_t)in.header.pid == getpid();
 
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_WRITE &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino &&
 				in.body.write.fh == FH &&
 				in.body.write.offset == offset  &&
 				in.body.write.size == isize &&
 				pid_ok &&
 				(wf & flags_set) == flags_set &&
 				(wf & flags_unset) == 0 &&
 				(in.body.write.flags == O_WRONLY ||
 				 in.body.write.flags == O_RDWR) &&
 				0 == bcmp(buf, contents, isize));
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, write);
 		out.body.write.size = osize;
 	})));
 }
 
 void FuseTest::expect_write_7_8(uint64_t ino, uint64_t offset, uint64_t isize,
 	uint64_t osize, const void *contents)
 {
 	EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process(
 		ResultOf([=](auto in) {
 			const char *buf = (const char*)in.body.bytes +
 				FUSE_COMPAT_WRITE_IN_SIZE;
 			bool pid_ok = (pid_t)in.header.pid == getpid();
 			return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_WRITE &&
 				in.header.nodeid == ino &&
 				in.body.write.fh == FH &&
 				in.body.write.offset == offset  &&
 				in.body.write.size == isize &&
 				pid_ok &&
 				0 == bcmp(buf, contents, isize));
 		}, Eq(true)),
 		_)
 	).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) {
 		SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, write);
 		out.body.write.size = osize;
 	})));
 }
 
 void
 get_unprivileged_id(uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid)
 {
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	struct group *gr;
 
 	/* 
 	 * First try "tests", Kyua's default unprivileged user.  XXX after
 	 * GoogleTest gains a proper Kyua wrapper, get this with the Kyua API
 	 */
 	pw = getpwnam("tests");
 	if (pw == NULL) {
 		/* Fall back to "nobody" */
 		pw = getpwnam("nobody");
 	}
 	if (pw == NULL)
 		GTEST_SKIP() << "Test requires an unprivileged user";
 	/* Use group "nobody", which is Kyua's default unprivileged group */
 	gr = getgrnam("nobody");
 	if (gr == NULL)
 		GTEST_SKIP() << "Test requires an unprivileged group";
 	*uid = pw->pw_uid;
 	*gid = gr->gr_gid;
 }
 
 void
 FuseTest::fork(bool drop_privs, int *child_status,
 	std::function<void()> parent_func,
 	std::function<int()> child_func)
 {
 	sem_t *sem;
 	int mprot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
 	int mflags = MAP_ANON | MAP_SHARED;
 	pid_t child;
 	uid_t uid;
 	gid_t gid;
 	
 	if (drop_privs) {
 		get_unprivileged_id(&uid, &gid);
 		if (IsSkipped())
 			return;
 	}
 
 	sem = (sem_t*)mmap(NULL, sizeof(*sem), mprot, mflags, -1, 0);
 	ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, sem) << strerror(errno);
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, sem_init(sem, 1, 0)) << strerror(errno);
 
 	if ((child = ::fork()) == 0) {
 		/* In child */
 		int err = 0;
 
 		if (sem_wait(sem)) {
 			perror("sem_wait");
 			err = 1;
 			goto out;
 		}
 
 		if (drop_privs && 0 != setegid(gid)) {
 			perror("setegid");
 			err = 1;
 			goto out;
 		}
 		if (drop_privs && 0 != setreuid(-1, uid)) {
 			perror("setreuid");
 			err = 1;
 			goto out;
 		}
 		err = child_func();
 
 out:
 		sem_destroy(sem);
 		_exit(err);
 	} else if (child > 0) {
 		/* 
 		 * In parent.  Cleanup must happen here, because it's still
 		 * privileged.
 		 */
 		m_mock->m_child_pid = child;
 		ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(parent_func());
 
 		/* Signal the child process to go */
 		ASSERT_EQ(0, sem_post(sem)) << strerror(errno);
 
 		ASSERT_LE(0, wait(child_status)) << strerror(errno);
 	} else {
 		FAIL() << strerror(errno);
 	}
 	munmap(sem, sizeof(*sem));
 	return;
 }
 
 static void usage(char* progname) {
 	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-v]\n\t-v increase verbosity\n", progname);
 	exit(2);
 }
 
 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
 	int ch;
 	FuseEnv *fuse_env = new FuseEnv;
 
 	InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
 	AddGlobalTestEnvironment(fuse_env);
 
 	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) {
 		switch (ch) {
 			case 'v':
 				verbosity++;
 				break;
 			default:
 				usage(argv[0]);
 				break;
 		}
 	}
 
 	return (RUN_ALL_TESTS());
 }
Index: stable/12/tests/sys/mac/bsdextended/Makefile
===================================================================
--- stable/12/tests/sys/mac/bsdextended/Makefile	(revision 361125)
+++ stable/12/tests/sys/mac/bsdextended/Makefile	(revision 361126)
@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
 # $FreeBSD$
 
 TESTSDIR=	${TESTSBASE}/sys/mac/bsdextended
 
+ATF_TESTS_SH+=	matches_test
 TAP_TESTS_C+=	ugidfw_test
-TAP_TESTS_SH+=	matches_test
 
 LIBADD.ugidfw_test+=	ugidfw
 
-TEST_METADATA.matches_test+=	required_user="root"
 TEST_METADATA.ugidfw_test+=	required_user="root"
+# Each test case of matches_test reuses the same ruleset number, so they cannot
+# be run simultaneously
+TEST_METADATA.matches_test+=	is_exclusive=true
 
 .include <bsd.test.mk>
Index: stable/12/tests/sys/mac/bsdextended/matches_test.sh
===================================================================
--- stable/12/tests/sys/mac/bsdextended/matches_test.sh	(revision 361125)
+++ stable/12/tests/sys/mac/bsdextended/matches_test.sh	(revision 361126)
@@ -1,365 +1,399 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 #
 # $FreeBSD$
 #
 
 uidrange="60000:100000"
 gidrange="60000:100000"
 uidinrange="nobody"
 uidoutrange="daemon"
 gidinrange="nobody" # We expect $uidinrange in this group
 gidoutrange="daemon" # We expect $uidinrange in this group
 
-test_num=1
-pass()
-{
-	echo "ok $test_num # $@"
-	: $(( test_num += 1 ))
-}
 
-fail()
+check_ko()
 {
-	echo "not ok $test_num # $@"
-	: $(( test_num += 1 ))
+	if ! sysctl -N security.mac.bsdextended >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		atf_skip "mac_bsdextended(4) support isn't available"
+	fi
+	if [ $(sysctl -n security.mac.bsdextended.enabled) = "0" ]; then
+		# The kernel module is loaded but disabled.  Enable it for the
+		# duration of the test.
+		touch enabled_bsdextended
+		sysctl security.mac.bsdextended.enabled=1
+	fi
 }
 
-#
-# Setup
-#
-
-: ${TMPDIR=/tmp}
-if [ $(id -u) -ne 0 ]; then
-	echo "1..0 # SKIP test must be run as root"
-	exit 0
-fi
-if ! sysctl -N security.mac.bsdextended >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-	echo "1..0 # SKIP mac_bsdextended(4) support isn't available"
-	exit 0
-fi
-if [ "$TMPDIR" != "/tmp" ]; then
-	if ! chmod -Rf 0755 $TMPDIR; then
-		echo "1..0 # SKIP failed to chmod $TMPDIR"
-		exit 0
+setup()
+{
+	check_ko
+	mkdir mnt
+	mdmfs -s 25m md mnt \
+		|| atf_fail "failed to mount md device"
+	chmod a+rwx mnt
+	md_device=$(mount -p | grep "$PWD/mnt" | awk '{ gsub(/^\/dev\//, "", $1); print $1 }')
+	if [ -z "$md_device" ]; then
+		atf_fail "md device not properly attached to the system"
 	fi
-fi
-if ! playground=$(mktemp -d $TMPDIR/tmp.XXXXXXX); then
-	echo "1..0 # SKIP failed to create temporary directory"
-	exit 0
-fi
-trap "rmdir $playground" EXIT INT TERM
-if ! mdmfs -s 25m md $playground; then
-	echo "1..0 # SKIP failed to mount md device"
-	exit 0
-fi
-chmod a+rwx $playground
-md_device=$(mount -p | grep "$playground" | awk '{ gsub(/^\/dev\//, "", $1); print $1 }')
-trap "umount -f $playground; mdconfig -d -u $md_device; rmdir $playground" EXIT INT TERM
-if [ -z "$md_device" ]; then
-	mount -p | grep $playground
-	echo "1..0 # SKIP md device not properly attached to the system"
-fi
+	echo $md_device > md_device
 
-ugidfw remove 1
+	ugidfw remove 1
 
-file1=$playground/test-$uidinrange
-file2=$playground/test-$uidoutrange
-cat > $playground/test-script.sh <<'EOF'
+	cat > mnt/test-script.sh <<'EOF'
 #!/bin/sh
 : > $1
 EOF
-if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
-	echo "1..0 # SKIP failed to create test script"
-	exit 0
-fi
-echo "1..30"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		atf_fail "failed to create test script"
+	fi
 
-command1="sh $playground/test-script.sh $file1"
-command2="sh $playground/test-script.sh $file2"
+	file1=mnt/test-$uidinrange
+	file2=mnt/test-$uidoutrange
+	command1="sh mnt/test-script.sh $file1"
+	command2="sh mnt/test-script.sh $file2"
 
-desc="$uidinrange file"
-if su -m $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	# $uidinrange file
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -m $uidinrange -c "$command1"
 
-chown "$uidinrange":"$gidinrange" $file1
-chmod a+w $file1
+	chown "$uidinrange":"$gidinrange" $file1
+	chmod a+w $file1
 
-desc="$uidoutrange file"
-if $command2; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	# $uidoutrange file
+	if ! $command2; then
+		atf_fail $desc
+	fi
 
-chown "$uidoutrange":"$gidoutrange" $file2
-chmod a+w $file2
+	chown "$uidoutrange":"$gidoutrange" $file2
+	chmod a+w $file2
+}
 
-#
-# No rules
-#
-desc="no rules $uidinrange"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+cleanup()
+{
+	ugidfw remove 1
 
-desc="no rules $uidoutrange"
-if su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	umount -f mnt
+	if [ -f md_device ]; then
+		mdconfig -d -u $( cat md_device )
+	fi
+	if [ -f enabled_bsdextended ]; then
+		sysctl security.mac.bsdextended.enabled=0
+	fi
+}
 
-#
-# Subject Match on uid
-#
-ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object mode rasx
-desc="subject uid in range"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+atf_test_case no_rules cleanup
+no_rules_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+no_rules_body()
+{
+	setup
 
-desc="subject uid out range"
-if su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	# no rules $uidinrange
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
 
-#
-# Subject Match on gid
-#
-ugidfw set 1 subject gid $gidrange object mode rasx
+	# no rules $uidoutrange
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"
+}
+no_rules_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
 
-desc="subject gid in range"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+atf_test_case subject_match_on_uid cleanup
+subject_match_on_uid_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+subject_match_on_uid_body()
+{
+	setup
 
-desc="subject gid out range"
-if su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object mode rasx
+	# subject uid in range
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
 
-if which jail >/dev/null; then
-	#
-	# Subject Match on jail
-	#
-	rm -f $playground/test-jail
+	# subject uid out range
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"
 
-	desc="subject matching jailid"
-	jailid=`jail -i / localhost 127.0.0.1 /usr/sbin/daemon -f /bin/sh -c "(sleep 5; touch $playground/test-jail) &"`
-	ugidfw set 1 subject jailid $jailid object mode rasx
+}
+subject_match_on_uid_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
+
+atf_test_case subject_match_on_gid cleanup
+subject_match_on_gid_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+subject_match_on_gid_body()
+{
+	setup
+
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject gid $gidrange object mode rasx
+
+	# subject gid in range
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
+
+	# subject gid out range
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"
+}
+subject_match_on_gid_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
+
+atf_test_case subject_match_on_jail cleanup
+subject_match_on_jail_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.progs" "jail"
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+subject_match_on_jail_body()
+{
+	setup
+
+	atf_expect_fail "this testcase fails (see bug # 205481)"
+	# subject matching jailid
+	jailid=`jail -i / localhost 127.0.0.1 /usr/sbin/daemon -f /bin/sh -c "(sleep 5; touch mnt/test-jail) &"`
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject jailid $jailid object mode rasx
 	sleep 10
 
-	if [ -f $playground/test-jail ]; then
-		fail "TODO $desc: this testcase fails (see bug # 205481)"
-	else
-		pass $desc
+	if [ -f mnt/test-jail ]; then
+		atf_fail "$desc"
 	fi
 
-	rm -f $playground/test-jail
-	desc="subject nonmatching jailid"
-	jailid=`jail -i / localhost 127.0.0.1 /usr/sbin/daemon -f /bin/sh -c "(sleep 5; touch $playground/test-jail) &"`
+	rm -f mnt/test-jail
+	# subject nonmatching jailid
+	jailid=`jail -i / localhost 127.0.0.1 /usr/sbin/daemon -f /bin/sh -c "(sleep 5; touch mnt/test-jail) &"`
 	sleep 10
-	if [ -f $playground/test-jail ]; then
-		pass $desc
-	else
-		fail $desc
+	if ! [ -f mnt/test-jail ]; then
+		atf_fail $desc
 	fi
-else
-	# XXX: kyua is too dumb to parse skip ranges, still..
-	pass "skip jail(8) not installed"
-	pass "skip jail(8) not installed"
-fi
+}
+subject_match_on_jail_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
 
-#
-# Object uid
-#
-ugidfw set 1 subject object uid $uidrange mode rasx
+atf_test_case object_uid cleanup
+object_uid_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+object_uid_body()
+{
+	setup
 
-desc="object uid in range"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject object uid $uidrange mode rasx
 
-desc="object uid out range"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command2"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
-ugidfw set 1 subject object uid $uidrange mode rasx
+	# object uid in range
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
 
-desc="object uid in range (different subject)"
-if su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+	# object uid out range
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command2"
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject object uid $uidrange mode rasx
 
-desc="object uid out range (different subject)"
-if su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command2"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	# object uid in range (different subject)
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"
 
-#
-# Object gid
-#
-ugidfw set 1 subject object gid $uidrange mode rasx
+	# object uid out range (different subject)
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command2"
 
-desc="object gid in range"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+}
+object_uid_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
 
-desc="object gid out range"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command2"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
-desc="object gid in range (different subject)"
-if su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+atf_test_case object_gid cleanup
+object_gid_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+object_gid_body()
+{
+	setup
 
-desc="object gid out range (different subject)"
-if su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command2"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject object gid $uidrange mode rasx
 
-#
-# Object filesys
-#
-ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object filesys / mode rasx
-desc="object out of filesys"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	# object gid in range
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
 
-ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object filesys $playground mode rasx
-desc="object in filesys"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+	# object gid out range
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command2"
+	# object gid in range (different subject)
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command1"
 
-#
-# Object suid
-#
-ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object suid mode rasx
-desc="object notsuid"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	# object gid out range (different subject)
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidoutrange -c "$command2"
+}
+object_gid_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
 
-chmod u+s $file1
-desc="object suid"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
-chmod u-s $file1
+atf_test_case object_filesys cleanup
+object_filesys_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+object_filesys_body()
+{
+	setup
 
-#
-# Object sgid
-#
-ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object sgid mode rasx
-desc="object notsgid"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object filesys / mode rasx
+	# object out of filesys
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
 
-chmod g+s $file1
-desc="object sgid"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
-chmod g-s $file1
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object filesys mnt mode rasx
+	# object in filesys
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
+}
+object_filesys_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
 
-#
-# Object uid matches subject
-#
-ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object uid_of_subject mode rasx
+atf_test_case object_suid cleanup
+object_suid_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+object_suid_body()
+{
+	setup
 
-desc="object uid notmatches subject"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command2"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object suid mode rasx
+	# object notsuid
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
 
-desc="object uid matches subject"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+	chmod u+s $file1
+	# object suid
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
+	chmod u-s $file1
 
-#
-# Object gid matches subject
-#
-ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object gid_of_subject mode rasx
+}
+object_suid_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
 
-desc="object gid notmatches subject"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command2"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+atf_test_case object_sgid cleanup
+object_sgid_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+object_sgid_body()
+{
+	setup
 
-desc="object gid matches subject"
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object sgid mode rasx
+	# object notsgid
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
 
-#
-# Object type
-#
-desc="object not type"
-ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object type dbclsp mode rasx
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	pass $desc
-else
-	fail $desc
-fi
+	chmod g+s $file1
+	# object sgid
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
+	chmod g-s $file1
+}
+object_sgid_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
 
-desc="object type"
-ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object type r mode rasx
-if su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"; then
-	fail $desc
-else
-	pass $desc
-fi
+atf_test_case object_uid_matches_subject cleanup
+object_uid_matches_subject_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+object_uid_matches_subject_body()
+{
+	setup
+
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object uid_of_subject mode rasx
+
+	# object uid notmatches subject
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command2"
+
+	# object uid matches subject
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
+}
+object_uid_matches_subject_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
+
+atf_test_case object_gid_matches_subject cleanup
+object_gid_matches_subject_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+object_gid_matches_subject_body()
+{
+	setup
+
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object gid_of_subject mode rasx
+
+	# object gid notmatches subject
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command2"
+
+	# object gid matches subject
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
+
+}
+object_gid_matches_subject_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
+
+atf_test_case object_type cleanup
+object_type_head()
+{
+	atf_set "require.user" "root"
+}
+object_type_body()
+{
+	setup
+
+	# object not type
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object type dbclsp mode rasx
+	atf_check -s exit:0 su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
+
+	# object type
+	atf_check -s exit:0 ugidfw set 1 subject uid $uidrange object type r mode rasx
+	atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"Permission denied" \
+		su -fm $uidinrange -c "$command1"
+}
+object_type_cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup
+}
+
+atf_init_test_cases()
+{
+	atf_add_test_case no_rules
+	atf_add_test_case subject_match_on_uid
+	atf_add_test_case subject_match_on_gid
+	atf_add_test_case subject_match_on_jail
+	atf_add_test_case object_uid
+	atf_add_test_case object_gid
+	atf_add_test_case object_filesys
+	atf_add_test_case object_suid
+	atf_add_test_case object_sgid
+	atf_add_test_case object_uid_matches_subject
+	atf_add_test_case object_gid_matches_subject
+	atf_add_test_case object_type
+}
Index: stable/12
===================================================================
--- stable/12	(revision 361125)
+++ stable/12	(revision 361126)

Property changes on: stable/12
___________________________________________________________________
Modified: svn:mergeinfo
## -0,0 +0,1 ##
   Merged /head:r360339,360567