Index: stable/12/contrib/sendmail/src/tls.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/sendmail/src/tls.c (revision 359080) +++ stable/12/contrib/sendmail/src/tls.c (revision 359081) @@ -1,2038 +1,2045 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013 Proofpoint, Inc. and its suppliers. * All rights reserved. * * By using this file, you agree to the terms and conditions set * forth in the LICENSE file which can be found at the top level of * the sendmail distribution. * */ #include SM_RCSID("@(#)$Id: tls.c,v 8.127 2013-11-27 02:51:11 gshapiro Exp $") #if STARTTLS # include # include # include # if !NO_DH # include # endif /* !NO_DH */ # ifndef HASURANDOMDEV # include # endif /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */ # if !TLS_NO_RSA static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL; /* temporary RSA key */ static RSA *tmp_rsa_key __P((SSL *, int, int)); # endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L static int tls_verify_cb __P((X509_STORE_CTX *)); # else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ static int tls_verify_cb __P((X509_STORE_CTX *, void *)); # endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L static int x509_verify_cb __P((int, X509_STORE_CTX *)); # endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L # define CONST097 # else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ # define CONST097 const # endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ static void apps_ssl_info_cb __P((CONST097 SSL *, int , int)); static bool tls_ok_f __P((char *, char *, int)); static bool tls_safe_f __P((char *, long, bool)); static int tls_verify_log __P((int, X509_STORE_CTX *, const char *)); # if !NO_DH # if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100001L || \ (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L) static int DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, q, g) DH *dh; BIGNUM *p; BIGNUM *q; BIGNUM *g; { - dh->p=p; + dh->p = p; if (q != NULL) - dh->q=q; - dh->g=g; + dh->q = q; + dh->g = g; return 1; /* success */ } # endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ static DH *get_dh512 __P((void)); static unsigned char dh512_p[] = { 0xDA,0x58,0x3C,0x16,0xD9,0x85,0x22,0x89,0xD0,0xE4,0xAF,0x75, 0x6F,0x4C,0xCA,0x92,0xDD,0x4B,0xE5,0x33,0xB8,0x04,0xFB,0x0F, 0xED,0x94,0xEF,0x9C,0x8A,0x44,0x03,0xED,0x57,0x46,0x50,0xD3, 0x69,0x99,0xDB,0x29,0xD7,0x76,0x27,0x6B,0xA2,0xD3,0xD4,0x12, 0xE2,0x18,0xF4,0xDD,0x1E,0x08,0x4C,0xF6,0xD8,0x00,0x3E,0x7C, 0x47,0x74,0xE8,0x33 }; static unsigned char dh512_g[] = { 0x02 }; static DH * get_dh512() { - DH *dh = NULL; + DH *dh; BIGNUM *dhp_bn, *dhg_bn; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; dhp_bn = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL); dhg_bn = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL); - if ((dhp_bn == NULL) || (dhg_bn == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, dhp_bn, NULL, dhg_bn)) + if ((dhp_bn == NULL) || (dhg_bn == NULL)) { DH_free(dh); BN_free(dhp_bn); BN_free(dhg_bn); - return(NULL); + return NULL; } + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dhp_bn, NULL, dhg_bn)) + { + DH_free(dh); + return NULL; + } return dh; } # if 0 This is the data from which the C code has been generated: -----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIIBCAKCAQEArDcgcLpxEksQHPlolRKCUJ2szKRziseWV9cUSQNZGxoGw7KkROz4 HF9QSbg5axyNIG+QbZYtx0jp3l6/GWq1dLOj27yZkgYgaYgFrvKPiZ2jJ5xETQVH UpZwbjRcyjyWkWYJVsx1aF4F/iY4kT0n/+iGEoimI3C9V3KXTJ2S6jIkyJ6M/CrN EtrDynMlUMGlc7S1ouXVOTrtKeqy3S2L9eBLxVI+sChEijGIfELupdVeXihK006p MgnABPDbkTx6OOtYmSZaGQX+OLW2FPmwvcrzgCz9t9cAsuUcBZv1LeHEqZZttyLU oK0jjSXgFyeU4/NfyA+zuNeWzUL6bHmigwIBAg== -----END DH PARAMETERS----- # endif /* 0 */ static DH * get_dh2048() { - static unsigned char dh2048_p[]={ + static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = { 0xAC,0x37,0x20,0x70,0xBA,0x71,0x12,0x4B,0x10,0x1C,0xF9,0x68, 0x95,0x12,0x82,0x50,0x9D,0xAC,0xCC,0xA4,0x73,0x8A,0xC7,0x96, 0x57,0xD7,0x14,0x49,0x03,0x59,0x1B,0x1A,0x06,0xC3,0xB2,0xA4, 0x44,0xEC,0xF8,0x1C,0x5F,0x50,0x49,0xB8,0x39,0x6B,0x1C,0x8D, 0x20,0x6F,0x90,0x6D,0x96,0x2D,0xC7,0x48,0xE9,0xDE,0x5E,0xBF, 0x19,0x6A,0xB5,0x74,0xB3,0xA3,0xDB,0xBC,0x99,0x92,0x06,0x20, 0x69,0x88,0x05,0xAE,0xF2,0x8F,0x89,0x9D,0xA3,0x27,0x9C,0x44, 0x4D,0x05,0x47,0x52,0x96,0x70,0x6E,0x34,0x5C,0xCA,0x3C,0x96, 0x91,0x66,0x09,0x56,0xCC,0x75,0x68,0x5E,0x05,0xFE,0x26,0x38, 0x91,0x3D,0x27,0xFF,0xE8,0x86,0x12,0x88,0xA6,0x23,0x70,0xBD, 0x57,0x72,0x97,0x4C,0x9D,0x92,0xEA,0x32,0x24,0xC8,0x9E,0x8C, 0xFC,0x2A,0xCD,0x12,0xDA,0xC3,0xCA,0x73,0x25,0x50,0xC1,0xA5, 0x73,0xB4,0xB5,0xA2,0xE5,0xD5,0x39,0x3A,0xED,0x29,0xEA,0xB2, 0xDD,0x2D,0x8B,0xF5,0xE0,0x4B,0xC5,0x52,0x3E,0xB0,0x28,0x44, 0x8A,0x31,0x88,0x7C,0x42,0xEE,0xA5,0xD5,0x5E,0x5E,0x28,0x4A, 0xD3,0x4E,0xA9,0x32,0x09,0xC0,0x04,0xF0,0xDB,0x91,0x3C,0x7A, 0x38,0xEB,0x58,0x99,0x26,0x5A,0x19,0x05,0xFE,0x38,0xB5,0xB6, 0x14,0xF9,0xB0,0xBD,0xCA,0xF3,0x80,0x2C,0xFD,0xB7,0xD7,0x00, 0xB2,0xE5,0x1C,0x05,0x9B,0xF5,0x2D,0xE1,0xC4,0xA9,0x96,0x6D, 0xB7,0x22,0xD4,0xA0,0xAD,0x23,0x8D,0x25,0xE0,0x17,0x27,0x94, 0xE3,0xF3,0x5F,0xC8,0x0F,0xB3,0xB8,0xD7,0x96,0xCD,0x42,0xFA, 0x6C,0x79,0xA2,0x83, }; - static unsigned char dh2048_g[]={ 0x02, }; + static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = { 0x02, }; DH *dh; BIGNUM *dhp_bn, *dhg_bn; - if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) - return(NULL); - dhp_bn = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p,sizeof(dh2048_p),NULL); - dhg_bn = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g,sizeof(dh2048_g),NULL); - if ((dhp_bn == NULL) || (dhg_bn == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, dhp_bn, NULL, dhg_bn)) + if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + dhp_bn = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL); + dhg_bn = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL); + if ((dhp_bn == NULL) || (dhg_bn == NULL)) { DH_free(dh); BN_free(dhp_bn); BN_free(dhg_bn); - return(NULL); + return NULL; } - return(dh); + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dhp_bn, NULL, dhg_bn)) + { + DH_free(dh); + return NULL; + } + return dh; } # endif /* !NO_DH */ /* ** TLS_RAND_INIT -- initialize STARTTLS random generator ** ** Parameters: ** randfile -- name of file with random data ** logl -- loglevel ** ** Returns: ** success/failure ** ** Side Effects: ** initializes PRNG for tls library. */ # define MIN_RAND_BYTES 128 /* 1024 bits */ # define RF_OK 0 /* randfile OK */ # define RF_MISS 1 /* randfile == NULL || *randfile == '\0' */ # define RF_UNKNOWN 2 /* unknown prefix for randfile */ # define RI_NONE 0 /* no init yet */ # define RI_SUCCESS 1 /* init was successful */ # define RI_FAIL 2 /* init failed */ static bool tls_rand_init __P((char *, int)); static bool tls_rand_init(randfile, logl) char *randfile; int logl; { # ifndef HASURANDOMDEV /* not required if /dev/urandom exists, OpenSSL does it internally */ bool ok; int randdef; static int done = RI_NONE; /* ** initialize PRNG */ /* did we try this before? if yes: return old value */ if (done != RI_NONE) return done == RI_SUCCESS; /* set default values */ ok = false; done = RI_FAIL; randdef = (randfile == NULL || *randfile == '\0') ? RF_MISS : RF_OK; # if EGD if (randdef == RF_OK && sm_strncasecmp(randfile, "egd:", 4) == 0) { randfile += 4; if (RAND_egd(randfile) < 0) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: RAND_egd(%s) failed: random number generator not seeded", randfile); } else ok = true; } else # endif /* EGD */ if (randdef == RF_OK && sm_strncasecmp(randfile, "file:", 5) == 0) { int fd; long sff; struct stat st; randfile += 5; sff = SFF_SAFEDIRPATH | SFF_NOWLINK | SFF_NOGWFILES | SFF_NOWWFILES | SFF_NOGRFILES | SFF_NOWRFILES | SFF_MUSTOWN | SFF_ROOTOK | SFF_OPENASROOT; if (DontLockReadFiles) sff |= SFF_NOLOCK; if ((fd = safeopen(randfile, O_RDONLY, 0, sff)) >= 0) { if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { if (LogLevel > logl) sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, "STARTTLS: can't fstat(%s)", randfile); } else { bool use, problem; use = true; problem = false; /* max. age of file: 10 minutes */ if (st.st_mtime + 600 < curtime()) { use = bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY, DontBlameSendmail); problem = true; if (LogLevel > logl) sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, "STARTTLS: RandFile %s too old: %s", randfile, use ? "unsafe" : "unusable"); } if (use && st.st_size < MIN_RAND_BYTES) { use = bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY, DontBlameSendmail); problem = true; if (LogLevel > logl) sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, "STARTTLS: size(%s) < %d: %s", randfile, MIN_RAND_BYTES, use ? "unsafe" : "unusable"); } if (use) ok = RAND_load_file(randfile, -1) >= MIN_RAND_BYTES; if (use && !ok) { if (LogLevel > logl) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: RAND_load_file(%s) failed: random number generator not seeded", randfile); } if (problem) ok = false; } if (ok || bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY, DontBlameSendmail)) { /* add this even if fstat() failed */ RAND_seed((void *) &st, sizeof(st)); } (void) close(fd); } else { if (LogLevel > logl) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: Warning: safeopen(%s) failed", randfile); } } else if (randdef == RF_OK) { if (LogLevel > logl) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: Error: no proper random file definition %s", randfile); randdef = RF_UNKNOWN; } if (randdef == RF_MISS) { if (LogLevel > logl) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: Error: missing random file definition"); } if (!ok && bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY, DontBlameSendmail)) { int i; long r; unsigned char buf[MIN_RAND_BYTES]; /* assert((MIN_RAND_BYTES % sizeof(long)) == 0); */ for (i = 0; i <= sizeof(buf) - sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) { r = get_random(); (void) memcpy(buf + i, (void *) &r, sizeof(long)); } RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf)); if (LogLevel > logl) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: Warning: random number generator not properly seeded"); ok = true; } done = ok ? RI_SUCCESS : RI_FAIL; return ok; # else /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */ return true; # endif /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */ } /* ** INIT_TLS_LIBRARY -- Calls functions which setup TLS library for global use. ** ** Parameters: ** fipsmode -- use FIPS? ** ** Returns: ** succeeded? */ bool init_tls_library(fipsmode) bool fipsmode; { bool bv; /* basic TLS initialization, ignore result for now */ SSL_library_init(); SSL_load_error_strings(); OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); # if 0 /* this is currently a macro for SSL_library_init */ SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms(); # endif /* 0 */ bv = tls_rand_init(RandFile, 7); # if _FFR_FIPSMODE if (bv && fipsmode) { if (!FIPS_mode_set(1)) { unsigned long err; err = ERR_get_error(); if (LogLevel > 0) sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, "STARTTLS=init, FIPSMode=%s", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); return false; } else { if (LogLevel > 9) sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS=init, FIPSMode=ok"); } } #endif /* _FFR_FIPSMODE */ if (bv && CertFingerprintAlgorithm != NULL) { const EVP_MD *md; md = EVP_get_digestbyname(CertFingerprintAlgorithm); if (NULL == md) { bv = false; if (LogLevel > 0) sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, "STARTTLS=init, CertFingerprintAlgorithm=%s, status=invalid" , CertFingerprintAlgorithm); } else EVP_digest = md; } return bv; } /* ** TLS_SET_VERIFY -- request client certificate? ** ** Parameters: ** ctx -- TLS context ** ssl -- TLS structure ** vrfy -- request certificate? ** ** Returns: ** none. ** ** Side Effects: ** Sets verification state for TLS ** # if TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX ** Notice: ** This is per TLS context, not per TLS structure; ** the former is global, the latter per connection. ** It would be nice to do this per connection, but this ** doesn't work in the current TLS libraries :-( # endif * TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX * */ void tls_set_verify(ctx, ssl, vrfy) SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *ssl; bool vrfy; { # if !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX SSL_set_verify(ssl, vrfy ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); # else /* !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX */ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, vrfy ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); # endif /* !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX */ } /* ** status in initialization ** these flags keep track of the status of the initialization ** i.e., whether a file exists (_EX) and whether it can be used (_OK) ** [due to permissions] */ # define TLS_S_NONE 0x00000000 /* none yet */ # define TLS_S_CERT_EX 0x00000001 /* cert file exists */ # define TLS_S_CERT_OK 0x00000002 /* cert file is ok */ # define TLS_S_KEY_EX 0x00000004 /* key file exists */ # define TLS_S_KEY_OK 0x00000008 /* key file is ok */ # define TLS_S_CERTP_EX 0x00000010 /* CA cert path exists */ # define TLS_S_CERTP_OK 0x00000020 /* CA cert path is ok */ # define TLS_S_CERTF_EX 0x00000040 /* CA cert file exists */ # define TLS_S_CERTF_OK 0x00000080 /* CA cert file is ok */ # define TLS_S_CRLF_EX 0x00000100 /* CRL file exists */ # define TLS_S_CRLF_OK 0x00000200 /* CRL file is ok */ # define TLS_S_CERT2_EX 0x00001000 /* 2nd cert file exists */ # define TLS_S_CERT2_OK 0x00002000 /* 2nd cert file is ok */ # define TLS_S_KEY2_EX 0x00004000 /* 2nd key file exists */ # define TLS_S_KEY2_OK 0x00008000 /* 2nd key file is ok */ # define TLS_S_DH_OK 0x00200000 /* DH cert is ok */ # define TLS_S_DHPAR_EX 0x00400000 /* DH param file exists */ # define TLS_S_DHPAR_OK 0x00800000 /* DH param file is ok to use */ /* Type of variable */ # define TLS_T_OTHER 0 # define TLS_T_SRV 1 # define TLS_T_CLT 2 /* ** TLS_OK_F -- can var be an absolute filename? ** ** Parameters: ** var -- filename ** fn -- what is the filename used for? ** type -- type of variable ** ** Returns: ** ok? */ static bool tls_ok_f(var, fn, type) char *var; char *fn; int type; { /* must be absolute pathname */ if (var != NULL && *var == '/') return true; if (LogLevel > 12) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: %s%s missing", type == TLS_T_SRV ? "Server" : (type == TLS_T_CLT ? "Client" : ""), fn); return false; } /* ** TLS_SAFE_F -- is a file safe to use? ** ** Parameters: ** var -- filename ** sff -- flags for safefile() ** srv -- server side? ** ** Returns: ** ok? */ static bool tls_safe_f(var, sff, srv) char *var; long sff; bool srv; { int ret; if ((ret = safefile(var, RunAsUid, RunAsGid, RunAsUserName, sff, S_IRUSR, NULL)) == 0) return true; if (LogLevel > 7) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s: file %s unsafe: %s", srv ? "server" : "client", var, sm_errstring(ret)); return false; } /* ** TLS_OK_F -- macro to simplify calls to tls_ok_f ** ** Parameters: ** var -- filename ** fn -- what is the filename used for? ** req -- is the file required? ** st -- status bit to set if ok ** type -- type of variable ** ** Side Effects: ** uses r, ok; may change ok and status. ** */ # define TLS_OK_F(var, fn, req, st, type) if (ok) \ { \ r = tls_ok_f(var, fn, type); \ if (r) \ status |= st; \ else if (req) \ ok = false; \ } /* ** TLS_UNR -- macro to return whether a file should be unreadable ** ** Parameters: ** bit -- flag to test ** req -- flags ** ** Returns: ** 0/SFF_NORFILES */ # define TLS_UNR(bit, req) (bitset(bit, req) ? SFF_NORFILES : 0) # define TLS_OUNR(bit, req) (bitset(bit, req) ? SFF_NOWRFILES : 0) # define TLS_KEYSFF(req) \ (bitnset(DBS_GROUPREADABLEKEYFILE, DontBlameSendmail) ? \ TLS_OUNR(TLS_I_KEY_OUNR, req) : \ TLS_UNR(TLS_I_KEY_UNR, req)) /* ** TLS_SAFE_F -- macro to simplify calls to tls_safe_f ** ** Parameters: ** var -- filename ** sff -- flags for safefile() ** req -- is the file required? ** ex -- does the file exist? ** st -- status bit to set if ok ** srv -- server side? ** ** Side Effects: ** uses r, ok, ex; may change ok and status. ** */ # define TLS_SAFE_F(var, sff, req, ex, st, srv) if (ex && ok) \ { \ r = tls_safe_f(var, sff, srv); \ if (r) \ status |= st; \ else if (req) \ ok = false; \ } # if _FFR_TLS_SE_OPTS /* ** LOAD_CERTKEY -- load cert/key for TLS session ** ** Parameters: ** ssl -- TLS session context ** certfile -- filename of certificate ** keyfile -- filename of private key ** ** Returns: ** succeeded? */ bool load_certkey(ssl, srv, certfile, keyfile) SSL *ssl; bool srv; char *certfile; char *keyfile; { bool ok; int r; long sff, status; unsigned long req; char *who; ok = true; who = srv ? "server" : "client"; status = TLS_S_NONE; req = TLS_I_CERT_EX|TLS_I_KEY_EX; TLS_OK_F(certfile, "CertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), TLS_S_CERT_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); TLS_OK_F(keyfile, "KeyFile", bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), TLS_S_KEY_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); /* certfile etc. must be "safe". */ sff = SFF_REGONLY | SFF_SAFEDIRPATH | SFF_NOWLINK | SFF_NOGWFILES | SFF_NOWWFILES | SFF_MUSTOWN | SFF_ROOTOK | SFF_OPENASROOT; if (DontLockReadFiles) sff |= SFF_NOLOCK; TLS_SAFE_F(certfile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERT_UNR, req), bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), bitset(TLS_S_CERT_EX, status), TLS_S_CERT_OK, srv); TLS_SAFE_F(keyfile, sff | TLS_KEYSFF(req), bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), bitset(TLS_S_KEY_EX, status), TLS_S_KEY_OK, srv); # define SSL_use_cert(ssl, certfile) \ SSL_use_certificate_file(ssl, certfile, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) # define SSL_USE_CERT "SSL_use_certificate_file" if (bitset(TLS_S_CERT_OK, status) && SSL_use_cert(ssl, certfile) <= 0) { if (LogLevel > 7) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: %s(%s) failed", who, SSL_USE_CERT, certfile); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_CERT, req)) return false; } if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY_OK, status) && SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(ssl, keyfile, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { if (LogLevel > 7) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(%s) failed", who, keyfile); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_KEY, req)) return false; } /* check the private key */ if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY_OK, status) && (r = SSL_check_private_key(ssl)) <= 0) { /* Private key does not match the certificate public key */ if (LogLevel > 5) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_check_private_key failed(%s): %d", who, keyfile, r); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_KEY, req)) return false; } return true; } # endif /* _FFR_TLS_SE_OPTS */ /* ** INITTLS -- initialize TLS ** ** Parameters: ** ctx -- pointer to context ** req -- requirements for initialization (see sendmail.h) ** options -- options ** srv -- server side? ** certfile -- filename of certificate ** keyfile -- filename of private key ** cacertpath -- path to CAs ** cacertfile -- file with CA(s) ** dhparam -- parameters for DH ** ** Returns: ** succeeded? */ /* ** The session_id_context identifies the service that created a session. ** This information is used to distinguish between multiple TLS-based ** servers running on the same server. We use the name of the mail system. ** Note: the session cache is not persistent. */ static char server_session_id_context[] = "sendmail8"; # if !TLS_NO_RSA static RSA * sm_RSA_generate_key(num, e) int num; unsigned long e; { RSA *rsa = NULL; - BIGNUM *bn_rsa_r4; - int rc; + BIGNUM *bn_rsa_r4; bn_rsa_r4 = BN_new(); - rc = BN_set_word(bn_rsa_r4, RSA_F4); - if ((bn_rsa_r4 != NULL) && BN_set_word(bn_rsa_r4, RSA_F4) && (rsa = RSA_new()) != NULL) + if ((bn_rsa_r4 != NULL) && BN_set_word(bn_rsa_r4, e) && (rsa = RSA_new()) != NULL) { - if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, RSA_KEYLENGTH, bn_rsa_r4, NULL)) + if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, num, bn_rsa_r4, NULL)) { RSA_free(rsa); rsa = NULL; } - return NULL; } BN_free(bn_rsa_r4); return rsa; } # endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */ /* 0.9.8a and b have a problem with SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG */ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) # define SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 1 #else # define SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0 #endif bool inittls(ctx, req, options, srv, certfile, keyfile, cacertpath, cacertfile, dhparam) SSL_CTX **ctx; unsigned long req; unsigned long options; bool srv; char *certfile, *keyfile, *cacertpath, *cacertfile, *dhparam; { # if !NO_DH static DH *dh = NULL; # endif /* !NO_DH */ int r; bool ok; long sff, status; char *who; char *cf2, *kf2; # if SM_CONF_SHM extern int ShmId; # endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */ # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L BIO *crl_file; X509_CRL *crl; X509_STORE *store; # endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ #if SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG long rt_version; STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; #endif status = TLS_S_NONE; who = srv ? "server" : "client"; if (ctx == NULL) { syserr("STARTTLS=%s, inittls: ctx == NULL", who); /* NOTREACHED */ SM_ASSERT(ctx != NULL); } /* already initialized? (we could re-init...) */ if (*ctx != NULL) return true; ok = true; /* ** look for a second filename: it must be separated by a ',' ** no blanks allowed (they won't be skipped). ** we change a global variable here! this change will be undone ** before return from the function but only if it returns true. ** this isn't a problem since in a failure case this function ** won't be called again with the same (overwritten) values. ** otherwise each return must be replaced with a goto endinittls. */ cf2 = NULL; kf2 = NULL; if (certfile != NULL && (cf2 = strchr(certfile, ',')) != NULL) { *cf2++ = '\0'; if (keyfile != NULL && (kf2 = strchr(keyfile, ',')) != NULL) *kf2++ = '\0'; } /* ** Check whether files/paths are defined */ TLS_OK_F(certfile, "CertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), TLS_S_CERT_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); TLS_OK_F(keyfile, "KeyFile", bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), TLS_S_KEY_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); TLS_OK_F(cacertpath, "CACertPath", bitset(TLS_I_CERTP_EX, req), TLS_S_CERTP_EX, TLS_T_OTHER); TLS_OK_F(cacertfile, "CACertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERTF_EX, req), TLS_S_CERTF_EX, TLS_T_OTHER); # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L TLS_OK_F(CRLFile, "CRLFile", bitset(TLS_I_CRLF_EX, req), TLS_S_CRLF_EX, TLS_T_OTHER); # endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ /* ** if the second file is specified it must exist ** XXX: it is possible here to define only one of those files */ if (cf2 != NULL) { TLS_OK_F(cf2, "CertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), TLS_S_CERT2_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); } if (kf2 != NULL) { TLS_OK_F(kf2, "KeyFile", bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), TLS_S_KEY2_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT); } /* ** valid values for dhparam are (only the first char is checked) ** none no parameters: don't use DH ** i use precomputed 2048 bit parameters ** 512 use precomputed 512 bit parameters ** 1024 generate 1024 bit parameters ** 2048 generate 2048 bit parameters ** /file/name read parameters from /file/name */ #define SET_DH_DFL \ do { \ dhparam = "I"; \ req |= TLS_I_DHFIXED; \ } while (0) if (bitset(TLS_I_TRY_DH, req)) { if (dhparam != NULL) { char c = *dhparam; if (c == '1') req |= TLS_I_DH1024; else if (c == 'I' || c == 'i') req |= TLS_I_DHFIXED; else if (c == '2') req |= TLS_I_DH2048; else if (c == '5') req |= TLS_I_DH512; else if (c == 'n' || c == 'N') req &= ~TLS_I_TRY_DH; else if (c != '/') { if (LogLevel > 12) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: illegal value '%s' for DHParameters", who, dhparam); dhparam = NULL; } } if (dhparam == NULL) SET_DH_DFL; else if (*dhparam == '/') { TLS_OK_F(dhparam, "DHParameters", bitset(TLS_I_DHPAR_EX, req), TLS_S_DHPAR_EX, TLS_T_OTHER); } } if (!ok) return ok; /* certfile etc. must be "safe". */ sff = SFF_REGONLY | SFF_SAFEDIRPATH | SFF_NOWLINK | SFF_NOGWFILES | SFF_NOWWFILES | SFF_MUSTOWN | SFF_ROOTOK | SFF_OPENASROOT; if (DontLockReadFiles) sff |= SFF_NOLOCK; TLS_SAFE_F(certfile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERT_UNR, req), bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), bitset(TLS_S_CERT_EX, status), TLS_S_CERT_OK, srv); TLS_SAFE_F(keyfile, sff | TLS_KEYSFF(req), bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), bitset(TLS_S_KEY_EX, status), TLS_S_KEY_OK, srv); TLS_SAFE_F(cacertfile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERTF_UNR, req), bitset(TLS_I_CERTF_EX, req), bitset(TLS_S_CERTF_EX, status), TLS_S_CERTF_OK, srv); if (dhparam != NULL && *dhparam == '/') { TLS_SAFE_F(dhparam, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_DHPAR_UNR, req), bitset(TLS_I_DHPAR_EX, req), bitset(TLS_S_DHPAR_EX, status), TLS_S_DHPAR_OK, srv); if (!bitset(TLS_S_DHPAR_OK, status)) SET_DH_DFL; } # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L TLS_SAFE_F(CRLFile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CRLF_UNR, req), bitset(TLS_I_CRLF_EX, req), bitset(TLS_S_CRLF_EX, status), TLS_S_CRLF_OK, srv); # endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ if (!ok) return ok; if (cf2 != NULL) { TLS_SAFE_F(cf2, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERT_UNR, req), bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req), bitset(TLS_S_CERT2_EX, status), TLS_S_CERT2_OK, srv); } if (kf2 != NULL) { TLS_SAFE_F(kf2, sff | TLS_KEYSFF(req), bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req), bitset(TLS_S_KEY2_EX, status), TLS_S_KEY2_OK, srv); } /* create a method and a new context */ if ((*ctx = SSL_CTX_new(srv ? SSLv23_server_method() : SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL) { if (LogLevel > 7) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_%s_method()) failed", who, who); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); return false; } # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L if (CRLFile != NULL) { /* get a pointer to the current certificate validation store */ store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(*ctx); /* does not fail */ crl_file = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (crl_file != NULL) { if (BIO_read_filename(crl_file, CRLFile) >= 0) { crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(crl_file, NULL, NULL, NULL); BIO_free(crl_file); X509_STORE_add_crl(store, crl); X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, x509_verify_cb); } else { if (LogLevel > 9) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(%s)=failed", who, CRLFile); } /* avoid memory leaks */ BIO_free(crl_file); return false; } } else if (LogLevel > 9) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: BIO_new=failed", who); } else store = NULL; # if _FFR_CRLPATH if (CRLPath != NULL && store != NULL) { X509_LOOKUP *lookup; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) { if (LogLevel > 9) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: X509_STORE_add_lookup(hash)=failed", who, CRLFile); } return false; } X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CRLPath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); } # endif /* _FFR_CRLPATH */ # endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ # if TLS_NO_RSA /* turn off backward compatibility, required for no-rsa */ SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); # endif /* TLS_NO_RSA */ # if !TLS_NO_RSA /* ** Create a temporary RSA key ** XXX Maybe we shouldn't create this always (even though it ** is only at startup). ** It is a time-consuming operation and it is not always necessary. ** maybe we should do it only on demand... */ if (bitset(TLS_I_RSA_TMP, req) # if SM_CONF_SHM && ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID && (rsa_tmp = sm_RSA_generate_key(RSA_KEYLENGTH, RSA_F4)) == NULL # else /* SM_CONF_SHM */ && 0 /* no shared memory: no need to generate key now */ # endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */ ) { if (LogLevel > 7) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: RSA_generate_key failed", who); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } return false; } # endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */ /* ** load private key ** XXX change this for DSA-only version */ if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY_OK, status) && SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(*ctx, keyfile, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { if (LogLevel > 7) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(%s) failed", who, keyfile); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_KEY, req)) return false; } #if _FFR_TLS_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE # define SSL_CTX_use_cert(ssl_ctx, certfile) \ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ssl_ctx, certfile) # define SSL_CTX_USE_CERT "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file" #else # define SSL_CTX_use_cert(ssl_ctx, certfile) \ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ssl_ctx, certfile, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) # define SSL_CTX_USE_CERT "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file" #endif /* get the certificate file */ if (bitset(TLS_S_CERT_OK, status) && SSL_CTX_use_cert(*ctx, certfile) <= 0) { if (LogLevel > 7) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: %s(%s) failed", who, SSL_CTX_USE_CERT, certfile); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_CERT, req)) return false; } /* check the private key */ if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY_OK, status) && (r = SSL_CTX_check_private_key(*ctx)) <= 0) { /* Private key does not match the certificate public key */ if (LogLevel > 5) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_check_private_key failed(%s): %d", who, keyfile, r); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_KEY, req)) return false; } /* XXX this code is pretty much duplicated from above! */ /* load private key */ if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY2_OK, status) && SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(*ctx, kf2, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { if (LogLevel > 7) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(%s) failed", who, kf2); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } } /* get the certificate file */ if (bitset(TLS_S_CERT2_OK, status) && SSL_CTX_use_cert(*ctx, cf2) <= 0) { if (LogLevel > 7) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: %s(%s) failed", who, SSL_CTX_USE_CERT, cf2); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } } /* also check the private key */ if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY2_OK, status) && (r = SSL_CTX_check_private_key(*ctx)) <= 0) { /* Private key does not match the certificate public key */ if (LogLevel > 5) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_check_private_key 2 failed: %d", who, r); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } } /* SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(*ctx, 1); violation of standard? */ #if SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG /* ** In OpenSSL 0.9.8[ab], enabling zlib compression breaks the ** padding bug work-around, leading to false positives and ** failed connections. We may not interoperate with systems ** with the bug, but this is better than breaking on all 0.9.8[ab] ** systems that have zlib support enabled. ** Note: this checks the runtime version of the library, not ** just the compile time version. */ rt_version = SSLeay(); if (rt_version >= 0x00908000L && rt_version <= 0x0090802fL) { comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); if (comp_methods != NULL && sk_SSL_COMP_num(comp_methods) > 0) options &= ~SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG; } #endif SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, (long) options); # if !NO_DH /* Diffie-Hellman initialization */ if (bitset(TLS_I_TRY_DH, req)) { #if _FFR_TLS_EC EC_KEY *ecdh; #endif /* _FFR_TLS_EC */ if (tTd(96, 8)) sm_dprintf("inittls: req=%#lx, status=%#lx\n", req, status); if (bitset(TLS_S_DHPAR_OK, status)) { BIO *bio; if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhparam, "r")) != NULL) { dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); BIO_free(bio); if (dh == NULL && LogLevel > 7) { unsigned long err; err = ERR_get_error(); sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: cannot read DH parameters(%s): %s", who, dhparam, ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); SET_DH_DFL; } } else { if (LogLevel > 5) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: BIO_new_file(%s) failed", who, dhparam); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } } } if (dh == NULL && bitset(TLS_I_DH1024|TLS_I_DH2048, req)) { int bits; DSA *dsa; bits = bitset(TLS_I_DH2048, req) ? 2048 : 1024; if (tTd(96, 2)) sm_dprintf("inittls: Generating %d bit DH parameters\n", bits); - dsa=DSA_new(); + dsa = DSA_new(); /* this takes a while! */ (void)DSA_generate_parameters_ex(dsa, bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL); dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa); DSA_free(dsa); } else if (dh == NULL && bitset(TLS_I_DHFIXED, req)) { if (tTd(96, 2)) sm_dprintf("inittls: Using precomputed 2048 bit DH parameters\n"); dh = get_dh2048(); } else if (dh == NULL && bitset(TLS_I_DH512, req)) { if (tTd(96, 2)) sm_dprintf("inittls: Using precomputed 512 bit DH parameters\n"); dh = get_dh512(); } if (dh == NULL) { if (LogLevel > 9) { unsigned long err; err = ERR_get_error(); sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: cannot read or set DH parameters(%s): %s", who, dhparam, ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); } if (bitset(TLS_I_REQ_DH, req)) return false; } else { /* important to avoid small subgroup attacks */ SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(*ctx, dh); if (LogLevel > 13) sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, Diffie-Hellman init, key=%d bit (%c)", who, 8 * DH_size(dh), *dhparam); DH_free(dh); } #if _FFR_TLS_EC ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); if (ecdh != NULL) { SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE); SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(*ctx, ecdh); EC_KEY_free(ecdh); } #endif /* _FFR_TLS_EC */ } # endif /* !NO_DH */ /* XXX do we need this cache here? */ if (bitset(TLS_I_CACHE, req)) { SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(*ctx, 1); SSL_CTX_set_timeout(*ctx, 1); SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(*ctx, (void *) &server_session_id_context, sizeof(server_session_id_context)); (void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(*ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); } else { (void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(*ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); } /* load certificate locations and default CA paths */ if (bitset(TLS_S_CERTP_EX, status) && bitset(TLS_S_CERTF_EX, status)) { if ((r = SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(*ctx, cacertfile, cacertpath)) == 1) { # if !TLS_NO_RSA if (bitset(TLS_I_RSA_TMP, req)) SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(*ctx, tmp_rsa_key); # endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */ /* ** We have to install our own verify callback: ** SSL_VERIFY_PEER requests a client cert but even ** though *FAIL_IF* isn't set, the connection ** will be aborted if the client presents a cert ** that is not "liked" (can't be verified?) by ** the TLS library :-( */ /* ** XXX currently we could call tls_set_verify() ** but we hope that that function will later on ** only set the mode per connection. */ SSL_CTX_set_verify(*ctx, bitset(TLS_I_NO_VRFY, req) ? SSL_VERIFY_NONE : SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL); /* install verify callback */ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(*ctx, tls_verify_cb, NULL); SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(*ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(cacertfile)); } else { /* ** can't load CA data; do we care? ** the data is necessary to authenticate the client, ** which in turn would be necessary ** if we want to allow relaying based on it. */ if (LogLevel > 5) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: load verify locs %s, %s failed: %d", who, cacertpath, cacertfile, r); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } if (bitset(TLS_I_VRFY_LOC, req)) return false; } } /* XXX: make this dependent on an option? */ if (tTd(96, 9)) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctx, apps_ssl_info_cb); /* install our own cipher list */ if (CipherList != NULL && *CipherList != '\0') { if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(*ctx, CipherList) <= 0) { if (LogLevel > 7) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed, list ignored", who, CipherList); if (LogLevel > 9) tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, who); } /* failure if setting to this list is required? */ } } if (LogLevel > 12) sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, init=%d", who, ok); # if 0 /* ** this label is required if we want to have a "clean" exit ** see the comments above at the initialization of cf2 */ endinittls: # endif /* 0 */ /* undo damage to global variables */ if (cf2 != NULL) *--cf2 = ','; if (kf2 != NULL) *--kf2 = ','; return ok; } /* ** CERT_FP -- get cert fingerprint ** ** Parameters: ** cert -- TLS cert ** mac -- macro storage ** macro -- where to store cert fp ** ** Returns: ** <=0: cert fp calculation failed ** >0: cert fp calculation ok */ static int cert_fp(cert, evp_digest, mac, macro) X509 *cert; const EVP_MD *evp_digest; MACROS_T *mac; char *macro; { unsigned int n; int r; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; char md5h[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3]; static const char hexcodes[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; n = 0; if (X509_digest(cert, EVP_digest, md, &n) == 0 || n <= 0) { macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid(macro), ""); return 0; } SM_ASSERT((n * 3) + 2 < sizeof(md5h)); for (r = 0; r < (int) n; r++) { md5h[r * 3] = hexcodes[(md[r] & 0xf0) >> 4]; md5h[(r * 3) + 1] = hexcodes[(md[r] & 0x0f)]; md5h[(r * 3) + 2] = ':'; } md5h[(n * 3) - 1] = '\0'; macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid(macro), md5h); return 1; } /* ** TLS_GET_INFO -- get information about TLS connection ** ** Parameters: ** ssl -- TLS connection structure ** srv -- server or client ** host -- hostname of other side ** mac -- macro storage ** certreq -- did we ask for a cert? ** ** Returns: ** result of authentication. ** ** Side Effects: ** sets various TLS related macros. */ int tls_get_info(ssl, srv, host, mac, certreq) SSL *ssl; bool srv; char *host; MACROS_T *mac; bool certreq; { const SSL_CIPHER *c; int b, r; long verifyok; char *s, *who; char bitstr[16]; X509 *cert; c = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl); /* cast is just workaround for compiler warning */ macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cipher}"), (char *) SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); b = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, &r); (void) sm_snprintf(bitstr, sizeof(bitstr), "%d", b); macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cipher_bits}"), bitstr); (void) sm_snprintf(bitstr, sizeof(bitstr), "%d", r); macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{alg_bits}"), bitstr); s = (char *) SSL_get_version(ssl); if (s == NULL) s = "UNKNOWN"; macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{tls_version}"), s); who = srv ? "server" : "client"; cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); verifyok = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl); if (LogLevel > 14) sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, get_verify: %ld get_peer: 0x%lx", who, verifyok, (unsigned long) cert); if (cert != NULL) { X509_NAME *subj, *issuer; char buf[MAXNAME]; subj = X509_get_subject_name(cert); issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert); X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf)); macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_subject}"), xtextify(buf, "<>\")")); X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf)); macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_issuer}"), xtextify(buf, "<>\")")); # define LL_BADCERT 8 #define CERTFPMACRO (CertFingerprintAlgorithm != NULL ? "{cert_fp}" : "{cert_md5}") #define CHECK_X509_NAME(which) \ do { \ if (r == -1) \ { \ sm_strlcpy(buf, "BadCertificateUnknown", sizeof(buf)); \ if (LogLevel > LL_BADCERT) \ sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, \ "STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, field=%s, status=failed to extract CN", \ who, \ host == NULL ? "local" : host, \ which); \ } \ else if ((size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) - 1) \ { \ sm_strlcpy(buf, "BadCertificateTooLong", sizeof(buf)); \ if (LogLevel > 7) \ sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, \ "STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, field=%s, status=CN too long", \ who, \ host == NULL ? "local" : host, \ which); \ } \ else if ((size_t)r > strlen(buf)) \ { \ sm_strlcpy(buf, "BadCertificateContainsNUL", \ sizeof(buf)); \ if (LogLevel > 7) \ sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, \ "STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, field=%s, status=CN contains NUL", \ who, \ host == NULL ? "local" : host, \ which); \ } \ } while (0) r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof buf); CHECK_X509_NAME("cn_subject"); macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cn_subject}"), xtextify(buf, "<>\")")); r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof buf); CHECK_X509_NAME("cn_issuer"); macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cn_issuer}"), xtextify(buf, "<>\")")); (void) cert_fp(cert, EVP_digest, mac, CERTFPMACRO); } else { macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cert_subject}"), ""); macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cert_issuer}"), ""); macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cn_subject}"), ""); macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cn_issuer}"), ""); macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid(CERTFPMACRO), ""); } switch (verifyok) { case X509_V_OK: if (cert != NULL) { s = "OK"; r = TLS_AUTH_OK; } else { s = certreq ? "NO" : "NOT", r = TLS_AUTH_NO; } break; default: s = "FAIL"; r = TLS_AUTH_FAIL; break; } macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{verify}"), s); if (cert != NULL) X509_free(cert); /* do some logging */ if (LogLevel > 8) { char *vers, *s1, *s2, *cbits, *algbits; vers = macget(mac, macid("{tls_version}")); cbits = macget(mac, macid("{cipher_bits}")); algbits = macget(mac, macid("{alg_bits}")); s1 = macget(mac, macid("{verify}")); s2 = macget(mac, macid("{cipher}")); /* XXX: maybe cut off ident info? */ sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, version=%.16s, verify=%.16s, cipher=%.64s, bits=%.6s/%.6s", who, host == NULL ? "local" : host, vers, s1, s2, /* sm_snprintf() can deal with NULL */ algbits == NULL ? "0" : algbits, cbits == NULL ? "0" : cbits); if (LogLevel > 11) { /* ** Maybe run xuntextify on the strings? ** That is easier to read but makes it maybe a bit ** more complicated to figure out the right values ** for the access map... */ s1 = macget(mac, macid("{cert_subject}")); s2 = macget(mac, macid("{cert_issuer}")); sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, cert-subject=%.256s, cert-issuer=%.256s, verifymsg=%s", who, s1, s2, X509_verify_cert_error_string(verifyok)); } } return r; } /* ** ENDTLS -- shutdown secure connection ** ** Parameters: ** ssl -- SSL connection information. ** side -- server/client (for logging). ** ** Returns: ** success? (EX_* code) */ int endtls(ssl, side) SSL *ssl; char *side; { int ret = EX_OK; if (ssl != NULL) { int r; if ((r = SSL_shutdown(ssl)) < 0) { if (LogLevel > 11) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, SSL_shutdown failed: %d", side, r); tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, side); } ret = EX_SOFTWARE; } # if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090602fL /* ** Bug in OpenSSL (at least up to 0.9.6b): ** From: Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE ** Message-ID: <20010723152244.A13122@serv01.aet.tu-cottbus.de> ** To: openssl-users@openssl.org ** Subject: Re: SSL_shutdown() woes (fwd) ** ** The side sending the shutdown alert first will ** not care about the answer of the peer but will ** immediately return with a return value of "0" ** (ssl/s3_lib.c:ssl3_shutdown()). SSL_get_error will evaluate ** the value of "0" and as the shutdown alert of the peer was ** not received (actually, the program did not even wait for ** the answer), an SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL is flagged, because this ** is the default rule in case everything else does not apply. ** ** For your server the problem is different, because it ** receives the shutdown first (setting SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN), ** then sends its response (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN), so for the ** server the shutdown was successfull. ** ** As is by know, you would have to call SSL_shutdown() once ** and ignore an SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL returned. Then call ** SSL_shutdown() again to actually get the server's response. ** ** In the last discussion, Bodo Moeller concluded that a ** rewrite of the shutdown code would be necessary, but ** probably with another API, as the change would not be ** compatible to the way it is now. Things do not become ** easier as other programs do not follow the shutdown ** guidelines anyway, so that a lot error conditions and ** compitibility issues would have to be caught. ** ** For now the recommondation is to ignore the error message. */ else if (r == 0) { if (LogLevel > 15) { sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, SSL_shutdown not done", side); tlslogerr(LOG_WARNING, side); } ret = EX_SOFTWARE; } # endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090602fL */ SSL_free(ssl); ssl = NULL; } return ret; } # if !TLS_NO_RSA /* ** TMP_RSA_KEY -- return temporary RSA key ** ** Parameters: ** s -- TLS connection structure ** export -- ** keylength -- ** ** Returns: ** temporary RSA key. */ # ifndef MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT # define MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT 1000 /* XXX better value? */ # endif /* ! MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT */ /* ARGUSED0 */ static RSA * tmp_rsa_key(s, export, keylength) SSL *s; int export; int keylength; { # if SM_CONF_SHM extern int ShmId; extern int *PRSATmpCnt; if (ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID && rsa_tmp != NULL && ++(*PRSATmpCnt) < MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT) return rsa_tmp; # endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */ if (rsa_tmp != NULL) RSA_free(rsa_tmp); rsa_tmp = sm_RSA_generate_key(RSA_KEYLENGTH, RSA_F4); if (rsa_tmp == NULL) { if (LogLevel > 0) sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, "STARTTLS=server, tmp_rsa_key: RSA_generate_key failed!"); } else { # if SM_CONF_SHM # if 0 /* ** XXX we can't (yet) share the new key... ** The RSA structure contains pointers hence it can't be ** easily kept in shared memory. It must be transformed ** into a continous memory region first, then stored, ** and later read out again (each time re-transformed). */ if (ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID) *PRSATmpCnt = 0; # endif /* 0 */ # endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */ if (LogLevel > 9) sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID, "STARTTLS=server, tmp_rsa_key: new temp RSA key"); } return rsa_tmp; } # endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */ /* ** APPS_SSL_INFO_CB -- info callback for TLS connections ** ** Parameters: ** s -- TLS connection structure ** where -- state in handshake ** ret -- return code of last operation ** ** Returns: ** none. */ static void apps_ssl_info_cb(s, where, ret) CONST097 SSL *s; int where; int ret; { int w; char *str; BIO *bio_err = NULL; if (LogLevel > 14) sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS: info_callback where=0x%x, ret=%d", where, ret); w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK; if (bio_err == NULL) bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (bitset(SSL_ST_CONNECT, w)) str = "SSL_connect"; else if (bitset(SSL_ST_ACCEPT, w)) str = "SSL_accept"; else str = "undefined"; if (bitset(SSL_CB_LOOP, where)) { if (LogLevel > 12) sm_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, NOQID, "STARTTLS: %s:%s", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); } else if (bitset(SSL_CB_ALERT, where)) { str = bitset(SSL_CB_READ, where) ? "read" : "write"; if (LogLevel > 12) sm_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, NOQID, "STARTTLS: SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s", str, SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret)); } else if (bitset(SSL_CB_EXIT, where)) { if (ret == 0) { if (LogLevel > 7) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: %s:failed in %s", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); } else if (ret < 0) { if (LogLevel > 7) sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: %s:error in %s", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); } } } /* ** TLS_VERIFY_LOG -- log verify error for TLS certificates ** ** Parameters: ** ok -- verify ok? ** ctx -- x509 context ** name -- from where is this called? ** ** Returns: ** 1 -- ok */ static int tls_verify_log(ok, ctx, name) int ok; X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; const char *name; { X509 *cert; int reason, depth; char buf[512]; cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); reason = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS: %s cert verify: depth=%d %s, state=%d, reason=%s", name, depth, buf, ok, X509_verify_cert_error_string(reason)); return 1; } /* ** TLS_VERIFY_CB -- verify callback for TLS certificates ** ** Parameters: ** ctx -- x509 context ** ** Returns: ** accept connection? ** currently: always yes. */ static int # if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L tls_verify_cb(ctx) X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; # else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ tls_verify_cb(ctx, unused) X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; void *unused; # endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */ { int ok; /* ** man SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(): ** callback should return 1 to indicate verification success ** and 0 to indicate verification failure. */ ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx); if (ok <= 0) { if (LogLevel > 13) return tls_verify_log(ok, ctx, "TLS"); } return 1; } /* ** TLSLOGERR -- log the errors from the TLS error stack ** ** Parameters: ** level -- syslog level ** who -- server/client (for logging). ** ** Returns: ** none. */ void tlslogerr(level, who) int level; const char *who; { unsigned long l; int line, flags; unsigned long es; char *file, *data; char buf[256]; es = CRYPTO_thread_id(); while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data((const char **) &file, &line, (const char **) &data, &flags)) != 0) { sm_syslog(level, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s: %lu:%s:%s:%d:%s", who, es, ERR_error_string(l, buf), file, line, bitset(ERR_TXT_STRING, flags) ? data : ""); } } # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L /* ** X509_VERIFY_CB -- verify callback ** ** Parameters: ** ctx -- x509 context ** ** Returns: ** accept connection? ** currently: always yes. */ static int x509_verify_cb(ok, ctx) int ok; X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; { if (ok == 0) { if (LogLevel > 13) tls_verify_log(ok, ctx, "x509"); if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL) { X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, 0); return 1; /* override it */ } } return ok; } # endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */ #endif /* STARTTLS */ Index: stable/12 =================================================================== --- stable/12 (revision 359080) +++ stable/12 (revision 359081) Property changes on: stable/12 ___________________________________________________________________ Modified: svn:mergeinfo ## -0,0 +0,1 ## Merged /head:r358404,358410-358413