Index: head/sys/compat/linux/linux_misc.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/compat/linux/linux_misc.c (revision 355721) +++ head/sys/compat/linux/linux_misc.c (revision 355722) @@ -1,2294 +1,2291 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * * Copyright (c) 2002 Doug Rabson * Copyright (c) 1994-1995 Søren Schmidt * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer * in this position and unchanged. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include "opt_compat.h" #include #include #include #if defined(__i386__) #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef COMPAT_LINUX32 #include #include #else #include #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /** * Special DTrace provider for the linuxulator. * * In this file we define the provider for the entire linuxulator. All * modules (= files of the linuxulator) use it. * * We define a different name depending on the emulated bitsize, see * ../..//linux{,32}/linux.h, e.g.: * native bitsize = linuxulator * amd64, 32bit emulation = linuxulator32 */ LIN_SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(LINUX_DTRACE); int stclohz; /* Statistics clock frequency */ static unsigned int linux_to_bsd_resource[LINUX_RLIM_NLIMITS] = { RLIMIT_CPU, RLIMIT_FSIZE, RLIMIT_DATA, RLIMIT_STACK, RLIMIT_CORE, RLIMIT_RSS, RLIMIT_NPROC, RLIMIT_NOFILE, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, RLIMIT_AS }; struct l_sysinfo { l_long uptime; /* Seconds since boot */ l_ulong loads[3]; /* 1, 5, and 15 minute load averages */ #define LINUX_SYSINFO_LOADS_SCALE 65536 l_ulong totalram; /* Total usable main memory size */ l_ulong freeram; /* Available memory size */ l_ulong sharedram; /* Amount of shared memory */ l_ulong bufferram; /* Memory used by buffers */ l_ulong totalswap; /* Total swap space size */ l_ulong freeswap; /* swap space still available */ l_ushort procs; /* Number of current processes */ l_ushort pads; l_ulong totalbig; l_ulong freebig; l_uint mem_unit; char _f[20-2*sizeof(l_long)-sizeof(l_int)]; /* padding */ }; struct l_pselect6arg { l_uintptr_t ss; l_size_t ss_len; }; static int linux_utimensat_nsec_valid(l_long); int linux_sysinfo(struct thread *td, struct linux_sysinfo_args *args) { struct l_sysinfo sysinfo; vm_object_t object; int i, j; struct timespec ts; bzero(&sysinfo, sizeof(sysinfo)); getnanouptime(&ts); if (ts.tv_nsec != 0) ts.tv_sec++; sysinfo.uptime = ts.tv_sec; /* Use the information from the mib to get our load averages */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) sysinfo.loads[i] = averunnable.ldavg[i] * LINUX_SYSINFO_LOADS_SCALE / averunnable.fscale; sysinfo.totalram = physmem * PAGE_SIZE; sysinfo.freeram = sysinfo.totalram - vm_wire_count() * PAGE_SIZE; sysinfo.sharedram = 0; mtx_lock(&vm_object_list_mtx); TAILQ_FOREACH(object, &vm_object_list, object_list) if (object->shadow_count > 1) sysinfo.sharedram += object->resident_page_count; mtx_unlock(&vm_object_list_mtx); sysinfo.sharedram *= PAGE_SIZE; sysinfo.bufferram = 0; swap_pager_status(&i, &j); sysinfo.totalswap = i * PAGE_SIZE; sysinfo.freeswap = (i - j) * PAGE_SIZE; sysinfo.procs = nprocs; /* The following are only present in newer Linux kernels. */ sysinfo.totalbig = 0; sysinfo.freebig = 0; sysinfo.mem_unit = 1; return (copyout(&sysinfo, args->info, sizeof(sysinfo))); } #ifdef LINUX_LEGACY_SYSCALLS int linux_alarm(struct thread *td, struct linux_alarm_args *args) { struct itimerval it, old_it; u_int secs; int error; secs = args->secs; /* * Linux alarm() is always successful. Limit secs to INT32_MAX / 2 * to match kern_setitimer()'s limit to avoid error from it. * * XXX. Linux limit secs to INT_MAX on 32 and does not limit on 64-bit * platforms. */ if (secs > INT32_MAX / 2) secs = INT32_MAX / 2; it.it_value.tv_sec = secs; it.it_value.tv_usec = 0; timevalclear(&it.it_interval); error = kern_setitimer(td, ITIMER_REAL, &it, &old_it); KASSERT(error == 0, ("kern_setitimer returns %d", error)); if ((old_it.it_value.tv_sec == 0 && old_it.it_value.tv_usec > 0) || old_it.it_value.tv_usec >= 500000) old_it.it_value.tv_sec++; td->td_retval[0] = old_it.it_value.tv_sec; return (0); } #endif int linux_brk(struct thread *td, struct linux_brk_args *args) { struct vmspace *vm = td->td_proc->p_vmspace; uintptr_t new, old; old = (uintptr_t)vm->vm_daddr + ctob(vm->vm_dsize); new = (uintptr_t)args->dsend; if ((caddr_t)new > vm->vm_daddr && !kern_break(td, &new)) td->td_retval[0] = (register_t)new; else td->td_retval[0] = (register_t)old; return (0); } #if defined(__i386__) /* XXX: what about amd64/linux32? */ int linux_uselib(struct thread *td, struct linux_uselib_args *args) { struct nameidata ni; struct vnode *vp; struct exec *a_out; vm_map_t map; vm_map_entry_t entry; struct vattr attr; vm_offset_t vmaddr; unsigned long file_offset; unsigned long bss_size; char *library; ssize_t aresid; int error; bool locked, opened, textset; LCONVPATHEXIST(td, args->library, &library); a_out = NULL; vp = NULL; locked = false; textset = false; opened = false; NDINIT(&ni, LOOKUP, ISOPEN | FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1, UIO_SYSSPACE, library, td); error = namei(&ni); LFREEPATH(library); if (error) goto cleanup; vp = ni.ni_vp; NDFREE(&ni, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF); /* * From here on down, we have a locked vnode that must be unlocked. * XXX: The code below largely duplicates exec_check_permissions(). */ locked = true; /* Executable? */ error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &attr, td->td_ucred); if (error) goto cleanup; if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOEXEC) || ((attr.va_mode & 0111) == 0) || (attr.va_type != VREG)) { /* EACCESS is what exec(2) returns. */ error = ENOEXEC; goto cleanup; } /* Sensible size? */ if (attr.va_size == 0) { error = ENOEXEC; goto cleanup; } /* Can we access it? */ error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VEXEC, td->td_ucred, td); if (error) goto cleanup; /* * XXX: This should use vn_open() so that it is properly authorized, * and to reduce code redundancy all over the place here. * XXX: Not really, it duplicates far more of exec_check_permissions() * than vn_open(). */ #ifdef MAC error = mac_vnode_check_open(td->td_ucred, vp, VREAD); if (error) goto cleanup; #endif error = VOP_OPEN(vp, FREAD, td->td_ucred, td, NULL); if (error) goto cleanup; opened = true; /* Pull in executable header into exec_map */ error = vm_mmap(exec_map, (vm_offset_t *)&a_out, PAGE_SIZE, VM_PROT_READ, VM_PROT_READ, 0, OBJT_VNODE, vp, 0); if (error) goto cleanup; /* Is it a Linux binary ? */ if (((a_out->a_magic >> 16) & 0xff) != 0x64) { error = ENOEXEC; goto cleanup; } /* * While we are here, we should REALLY do some more checks */ /* Set file/virtual offset based on a.out variant. */ switch ((int)(a_out->a_magic & 0xffff)) { case 0413: /* ZMAGIC */ file_offset = 1024; break; case 0314: /* QMAGIC */ file_offset = 0; break; default: error = ENOEXEC; goto cleanup; } bss_size = round_page(a_out->a_bss); /* Check various fields in header for validity/bounds. */ if (a_out->a_text & PAGE_MASK || a_out->a_data & PAGE_MASK) { error = ENOEXEC; goto cleanup; } /* text + data can't exceed file size */ if (a_out->a_data + a_out->a_text > attr.va_size) { error = EFAULT; goto cleanup; } /* * text/data/bss must not exceed limits * XXX - this is not complete. it should check current usage PLUS * the resources needed by this library. */ PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); if (a_out->a_text > maxtsiz || a_out->a_data + bss_size > lim_cur_proc(td->td_proc, RLIMIT_DATA) || racct_set(td->td_proc, RACCT_DATA, a_out->a_data + bss_size) != 0) { PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); error = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); /* * Prevent more writers. */ error = VOP_SET_TEXT(vp); if (error != 0) goto cleanup; textset = true; /* * Lock no longer needed */ locked = false; VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0); /* * Check if file_offset page aligned. Currently we cannot handle * misalinged file offsets, and so we read in the entire image * (what a waste). */ if (file_offset & PAGE_MASK) { /* Map text+data read/write/execute */ /* a_entry is the load address and is page aligned */ vmaddr = trunc_page(a_out->a_entry); /* get anon user mapping, read+write+execute */ error = vm_map_find(&td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map, NULL, 0, &vmaddr, a_out->a_text + a_out->a_data, 0, VMFS_NO_SPACE, VM_PROT_ALL, VM_PROT_ALL, 0); if (error) goto cleanup; error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, vp, (void *)vmaddr, file_offset, a_out->a_text + a_out->a_data, UIO_USERSPACE, 0, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, &aresid, td); if (error != 0) goto cleanup; if (aresid != 0) { error = ENOEXEC; goto cleanup; } } else { /* * for QMAGIC, a_entry is 20 bytes beyond the load address * to skip the executable header */ vmaddr = trunc_page(a_out->a_entry); /* * Map it all into the process's space as a single * copy-on-write "data" segment. */ map = &td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map; error = vm_mmap(map, &vmaddr, a_out->a_text + a_out->a_data, VM_PROT_ALL, VM_PROT_ALL, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, OBJT_VNODE, vp, file_offset); if (error) goto cleanup; vm_map_lock(map); if (!vm_map_lookup_entry(map, vmaddr, &entry)) { vm_map_unlock(map); error = EDOOFUS; goto cleanup; } entry->eflags |= MAP_ENTRY_VN_EXEC; vm_map_unlock(map); textset = false; } if (bss_size != 0) { /* Calculate BSS start address */ vmaddr = trunc_page(a_out->a_entry) + a_out->a_text + a_out->a_data; /* allocate some 'anon' space */ error = vm_map_find(&td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map, NULL, 0, &vmaddr, bss_size, 0, VMFS_NO_SPACE, VM_PROT_ALL, VM_PROT_ALL, 0); if (error) goto cleanup; } cleanup: if (opened) { if (locked) VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0); locked = false; VOP_CLOSE(vp, FREAD, td->td_ucred, td); } if (textset) { if (!locked) { locked = true; VOP_LOCK(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY); } VOP_UNSET_TEXT_CHECKED(vp); } if (locked) VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0); /* Release the temporary mapping. */ if (a_out) kmap_free_wakeup(exec_map, (vm_offset_t)a_out, PAGE_SIZE); return (error); } #endif /* __i386__ */ #ifdef LINUX_LEGACY_SYSCALLS int linux_select(struct thread *td, struct linux_select_args *args) { l_timeval ltv; struct timeval tv0, tv1, utv, *tvp; int error; /* * Store current time for computation of the amount of * time left. */ if (args->timeout) { if ((error = copyin(args->timeout, <v, sizeof(ltv)))) goto select_out; utv.tv_sec = ltv.tv_sec; utv.tv_usec = ltv.tv_usec; if (itimerfix(&utv)) { /* * The timeval was invalid. Convert it to something * valid that will act as it does under Linux. */ utv.tv_sec += utv.tv_usec / 1000000; utv.tv_usec %= 1000000; if (utv.tv_usec < 0) { utv.tv_sec -= 1; utv.tv_usec += 1000000; } if (utv.tv_sec < 0) timevalclear(&utv); } microtime(&tv0); tvp = &utv; } else tvp = NULL; error = kern_select(td, args->nfds, args->readfds, args->writefds, args->exceptfds, tvp, LINUX_NFDBITS); if (error) goto select_out; if (args->timeout) { if (td->td_retval[0]) { /* * Compute how much time was left of the timeout, * by subtracting the current time and the time * before we started the call, and subtracting * that result from the user-supplied value. */ microtime(&tv1); timevalsub(&tv1, &tv0); timevalsub(&utv, &tv1); if (utv.tv_sec < 0) timevalclear(&utv); } else timevalclear(&utv); ltv.tv_sec = utv.tv_sec; ltv.tv_usec = utv.tv_usec; if ((error = copyout(<v, args->timeout, sizeof(ltv)))) goto select_out; } select_out: return (error); } #endif int linux_mremap(struct thread *td, struct linux_mremap_args *args) { uintptr_t addr; size_t len; int error = 0; if (args->flags & ~(LINUX_MREMAP_FIXED | LINUX_MREMAP_MAYMOVE)) { td->td_retval[0] = 0; return (EINVAL); } /* * Check for the page alignment. * Linux defines PAGE_MASK to be FreeBSD ~PAGE_MASK. */ if (args->addr & PAGE_MASK) { td->td_retval[0] = 0; return (EINVAL); } args->new_len = round_page(args->new_len); args->old_len = round_page(args->old_len); if (args->new_len > args->old_len) { td->td_retval[0] = 0; return (ENOMEM); } if (args->new_len < args->old_len) { addr = args->addr + args->new_len; len = args->old_len - args->new_len; error = kern_munmap(td, addr, len); } td->td_retval[0] = error ? 0 : (uintptr_t)args->addr; return (error); } #define LINUX_MS_ASYNC 0x0001 #define LINUX_MS_INVALIDATE 0x0002 #define LINUX_MS_SYNC 0x0004 int linux_msync(struct thread *td, struct linux_msync_args *args) { return (kern_msync(td, args->addr, args->len, args->fl & ~LINUX_MS_SYNC)); } #ifdef LINUX_LEGACY_SYSCALLS int linux_time(struct thread *td, struct linux_time_args *args) { struct timeval tv; l_time_t tm; int error; microtime(&tv); tm = tv.tv_sec; if (args->tm && (error = copyout(&tm, args->tm, sizeof(tm)))) return (error); td->td_retval[0] = tm; return (0); } #endif struct l_times_argv { l_clock_t tms_utime; l_clock_t tms_stime; l_clock_t tms_cutime; l_clock_t tms_cstime; }; /* * Glibc versions prior to 2.2.1 always use hard-coded CLK_TCK value. * Since 2.2.1 Glibc uses value exported from kernel via AT_CLKTCK * auxiliary vector entry. */ #define CLK_TCK 100 #define CONVOTCK(r) (r.tv_sec * CLK_TCK + r.tv_usec / (1000000 / CLK_TCK)) #define CONVNTCK(r) (r.tv_sec * stclohz + r.tv_usec / (1000000 / stclohz)) #define CONVTCK(r) (linux_kernver(td) >= LINUX_KERNVER_2004000 ? \ CONVNTCK(r) : CONVOTCK(r)) int linux_times(struct thread *td, struct linux_times_args *args) { struct timeval tv, utime, stime, cutime, cstime; struct l_times_argv tms; struct proc *p; int error; if (args->buf != NULL) { p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); PROC_STATLOCK(p); calcru(p, &utime, &stime); PROC_STATUNLOCK(p); calccru(p, &cutime, &cstime); PROC_UNLOCK(p); tms.tms_utime = CONVTCK(utime); tms.tms_stime = CONVTCK(stime); tms.tms_cutime = CONVTCK(cutime); tms.tms_cstime = CONVTCK(cstime); if ((error = copyout(&tms, args->buf, sizeof(tms)))) return (error); } microuptime(&tv); td->td_retval[0] = (int)CONVTCK(tv); return (0); } int linux_newuname(struct thread *td, struct linux_newuname_args *args) { struct l_new_utsname utsname; char osname[LINUX_MAX_UTSNAME]; char osrelease[LINUX_MAX_UTSNAME]; char *p; linux_get_osname(td, osname); linux_get_osrelease(td, osrelease); bzero(&utsname, sizeof(utsname)); strlcpy(utsname.sysname, osname, LINUX_MAX_UTSNAME); getcredhostname(td->td_ucred, utsname.nodename, LINUX_MAX_UTSNAME); getcreddomainname(td->td_ucred, utsname.domainname, LINUX_MAX_UTSNAME); strlcpy(utsname.release, osrelease, LINUX_MAX_UTSNAME); strlcpy(utsname.version, version, LINUX_MAX_UTSNAME); for (p = utsname.version; *p != '\0'; ++p) if (*p == '\n') { *p = '\0'; break; } strlcpy(utsname.machine, linux_kplatform, LINUX_MAX_UTSNAME); return (copyout(&utsname, args->buf, sizeof(utsname))); } struct l_utimbuf { l_time_t l_actime; l_time_t l_modtime; }; #ifdef LINUX_LEGACY_SYSCALLS int linux_utime(struct thread *td, struct linux_utime_args *args) { struct timeval tv[2], *tvp; struct l_utimbuf lut; char *fname; int error; LCONVPATHEXIST(td, args->fname, &fname); if (args->times) { if ((error = copyin(args->times, &lut, sizeof lut))) { LFREEPATH(fname); return (error); } tv[0].tv_sec = lut.l_actime; tv[0].tv_usec = 0; tv[1].tv_sec = lut.l_modtime; tv[1].tv_usec = 0; tvp = tv; } else tvp = NULL; error = kern_utimesat(td, AT_FDCWD, fname, UIO_SYSSPACE, tvp, UIO_SYSSPACE); LFREEPATH(fname); return (error); } #endif #ifdef LINUX_LEGACY_SYSCALLS int linux_utimes(struct thread *td, struct linux_utimes_args *args) { l_timeval ltv[2]; struct timeval tv[2], *tvp = NULL; char *fname; int error; LCONVPATHEXIST(td, args->fname, &fname); if (args->tptr != NULL) { if ((error = copyin(args->tptr, ltv, sizeof ltv))) { LFREEPATH(fname); return (error); } tv[0].tv_sec = ltv[0].tv_sec; tv[0].tv_usec = ltv[0].tv_usec; tv[1].tv_sec = ltv[1].tv_sec; tv[1].tv_usec = ltv[1].tv_usec; tvp = tv; } error = kern_utimesat(td, AT_FDCWD, fname, UIO_SYSSPACE, tvp, UIO_SYSSPACE); LFREEPATH(fname); return (error); } #endif static int linux_utimensat_nsec_valid(l_long nsec) { if (nsec == LINUX_UTIME_OMIT || nsec == LINUX_UTIME_NOW) return (0); if (nsec >= 0 && nsec <= 999999999) return (0); return (1); } int linux_utimensat(struct thread *td, struct linux_utimensat_args *args) { struct l_timespec l_times[2]; struct timespec times[2], *timesp = NULL; char *path = NULL; int error, dfd, flags = 0; dfd = (args->dfd == LINUX_AT_FDCWD) ? AT_FDCWD : args->dfd; if (args->flags & ~LINUX_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) return (EINVAL); if (args->times != NULL) { error = copyin(args->times, l_times, sizeof(l_times)); if (error != 0) return (error); if (linux_utimensat_nsec_valid(l_times[0].tv_nsec) != 0 || linux_utimensat_nsec_valid(l_times[1].tv_nsec) != 0) return (EINVAL); times[0].tv_sec = l_times[0].tv_sec; switch (l_times[0].tv_nsec) { case LINUX_UTIME_OMIT: times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT; break; case LINUX_UTIME_NOW: times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW; break; default: times[0].tv_nsec = l_times[0].tv_nsec; } times[1].tv_sec = l_times[1].tv_sec; switch (l_times[1].tv_nsec) { case LINUX_UTIME_OMIT: times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT; break; case LINUX_UTIME_NOW: times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW; break; default: times[1].tv_nsec = l_times[1].tv_nsec; break; } timesp = times; /* This breaks POSIX, but is what the Linux kernel does * _on purpose_ (documented in the man page for utimensat(2)), * so we must follow that behaviour. */ if (times[0].tv_nsec == UTIME_OMIT && times[1].tv_nsec == UTIME_OMIT) return (0); } if (args->pathname != NULL) LCONVPATHEXIST_AT(td, args->pathname, &path, dfd); else if (args->flags != 0) return (EINVAL); if (args->flags & LINUX_AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) flags |= AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW; if (path == NULL) error = kern_futimens(td, dfd, timesp, UIO_SYSSPACE); else { error = kern_utimensat(td, dfd, path, UIO_SYSSPACE, timesp, UIO_SYSSPACE, flags); LFREEPATH(path); } return (error); } #ifdef LINUX_LEGACY_SYSCALLS int linux_futimesat(struct thread *td, struct linux_futimesat_args *args) { l_timeval ltv[2]; struct timeval tv[2], *tvp = NULL; char *fname; int error, dfd; dfd = (args->dfd == LINUX_AT_FDCWD) ? AT_FDCWD : args->dfd; LCONVPATHEXIST_AT(td, args->filename, &fname, dfd); if (args->utimes != NULL) { if ((error = copyin(args->utimes, ltv, sizeof ltv))) { LFREEPATH(fname); return (error); } tv[0].tv_sec = ltv[0].tv_sec; tv[0].tv_usec = ltv[0].tv_usec; tv[1].tv_sec = ltv[1].tv_sec; tv[1].tv_usec = ltv[1].tv_usec; tvp = tv; } error = kern_utimesat(td, dfd, fname, UIO_SYSSPACE, tvp, UIO_SYSSPACE); LFREEPATH(fname); return (error); } #endif static int linux_common_wait(struct thread *td, int pid, int *statusp, int options, struct __wrusage *wrup) { siginfo_t siginfo; idtype_t idtype; id_t id; int error, status, tmpstat; if (pid == WAIT_ANY) { idtype = P_ALL; id = 0; } else if (pid < 0) { idtype = P_PGID; id = (id_t)-pid; } else { idtype = P_PID; id = (id_t)pid; } /* * For backward compatibility we implicitly add flags WEXITED * and WTRAPPED here. */ options |= WEXITED | WTRAPPED; error = kern_wait6(td, idtype, id, &status, options, wrup, &siginfo); if (error) return (error); if (statusp) { tmpstat = status & 0xffff; if (WIFSIGNALED(tmpstat)) { tmpstat = (tmpstat & 0xffffff80) | bsd_to_linux_signal(WTERMSIG(tmpstat)); } else if (WIFSTOPPED(tmpstat)) { tmpstat = (tmpstat & 0xffff00ff) | (bsd_to_linux_signal(WSTOPSIG(tmpstat)) << 8); #if defined(__amd64__) && !defined(COMPAT_LINUX32) if (WSTOPSIG(status) == SIGTRAP) { tmpstat = linux_ptrace_status(td, siginfo.si_pid, tmpstat); } #endif } else if (WIFCONTINUED(tmpstat)) { tmpstat = 0xffff; } error = copyout(&tmpstat, statusp, sizeof(int)); } return (error); } #if defined(__i386__) || (defined(__amd64__) && defined(COMPAT_LINUX32)) int linux_waitpid(struct thread *td, struct linux_waitpid_args *args) { struct linux_wait4_args wait4_args; wait4_args.pid = args->pid; wait4_args.status = args->status; wait4_args.options = args->options; wait4_args.rusage = NULL; return (linux_wait4(td, &wait4_args)); } #endif /* __i386__ || (__amd64__ && COMPAT_LINUX32) */ int linux_wait4(struct thread *td, struct linux_wait4_args *args) { int error, options; struct __wrusage wru, *wrup; if (args->options & ~(LINUX_WUNTRACED | LINUX_WNOHANG | LINUX_WCONTINUED | __WCLONE | __WNOTHREAD | __WALL)) return (EINVAL); options = WEXITED; linux_to_bsd_waitopts(args->options, &options); if (args->rusage != NULL) wrup = &wru; else wrup = NULL; error = linux_common_wait(td, args->pid, args->status, options, wrup); if (error != 0) return (error); if (args->rusage != NULL) error = linux_copyout_rusage(&wru.wru_self, args->rusage); return (error); } int linux_waitid(struct thread *td, struct linux_waitid_args *args) { int status, options, sig; struct __wrusage wru; siginfo_t siginfo; l_siginfo_t lsi; idtype_t idtype; struct proc *p; int error; options = 0; linux_to_bsd_waitopts(args->options, &options); if (options & ~(WNOHANG | WNOWAIT | WEXITED | WUNTRACED | WCONTINUED)) return (EINVAL); if (!(options & (WEXITED | WUNTRACED | WCONTINUED))) return (EINVAL); switch (args->idtype) { case LINUX_P_ALL: idtype = P_ALL; break; case LINUX_P_PID: if (args->id <= 0) return (EINVAL); idtype = P_PID; break; case LINUX_P_PGID: if (args->id <= 0) return (EINVAL); idtype = P_PGID; break; default: return (EINVAL); } error = kern_wait6(td, idtype, args->id, &status, options, &wru, &siginfo); if (error != 0) return (error); if (args->rusage != NULL) { error = linux_copyout_rusage(&wru.wru_children, args->rusage); if (error != 0) return (error); } if (args->info != NULL) { p = td->td_proc; bzero(&lsi, sizeof(lsi)); if (td->td_retval[0] != 0) { sig = bsd_to_linux_signal(siginfo.si_signo); siginfo_to_lsiginfo(&siginfo, &lsi, sig); } error = copyout(&lsi, args->info, sizeof(lsi)); } td->td_retval[0] = 0; return (error); } #ifdef LINUX_LEGACY_SYSCALLS int linux_mknod(struct thread *td, struct linux_mknod_args *args) { char *path; int error; LCONVPATHCREAT(td, args->path, &path); switch (args->mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFIFO: case S_IFSOCK: error = kern_mkfifoat(td, AT_FDCWD, path, UIO_SYSSPACE, args->mode); break; case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK: error = kern_mknodat(td, AT_FDCWD, path, UIO_SYSSPACE, args->mode, args->dev); break; case S_IFDIR: error = EPERM; break; case 0: args->mode |= S_IFREG; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case S_IFREG: error = kern_openat(td, AT_FDCWD, path, UIO_SYSSPACE, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, args->mode); if (error == 0) kern_close(td, td->td_retval[0]); break; default: error = EINVAL; break; } LFREEPATH(path); return (error); } #endif int linux_mknodat(struct thread *td, struct linux_mknodat_args *args) { char *path; int error, dfd; dfd = (args->dfd == LINUX_AT_FDCWD) ? AT_FDCWD : args->dfd; LCONVPATHCREAT_AT(td, args->filename, &path, dfd); switch (args->mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFIFO: case S_IFSOCK: error = kern_mkfifoat(td, dfd, path, UIO_SYSSPACE, args->mode); break; case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK: error = kern_mknodat(td, dfd, path, UIO_SYSSPACE, args->mode, args->dev); break; case S_IFDIR: error = EPERM; break; case 0: args->mode |= S_IFREG; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case S_IFREG: error = kern_openat(td, dfd, path, UIO_SYSSPACE, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, args->mode); if (error == 0) kern_close(td, td->td_retval[0]); break; default: error = EINVAL; break; } LFREEPATH(path); return (error); } /* * UGH! This is just about the dumbest idea I've ever heard!! */ int linux_personality(struct thread *td, struct linux_personality_args *args) { struct linux_pemuldata *pem; struct proc *p = td->td_proc; uint32_t old; PROC_LOCK(p); pem = pem_find(p); old = pem->persona; if (args->per != 0xffffffff) pem->persona = args->per; PROC_UNLOCK(p); td->td_retval[0] = old; return (0); } struct l_itimerval { l_timeval it_interval; l_timeval it_value; }; #define B2L_ITIMERVAL(bip, lip) \ (bip)->it_interval.tv_sec = (lip)->it_interval.tv_sec; \ (bip)->it_interval.tv_usec = (lip)->it_interval.tv_usec; \ (bip)->it_value.tv_sec = (lip)->it_value.tv_sec; \ (bip)->it_value.tv_usec = (lip)->it_value.tv_usec; int linux_setitimer(struct thread *td, struct linux_setitimer_args *uap) { int error; struct l_itimerval ls; struct itimerval aitv, oitv; if (uap->itv == NULL) { uap->itv = uap->oitv; return (linux_getitimer(td, (struct linux_getitimer_args *)uap)); } error = copyin(uap->itv, &ls, sizeof(ls)); if (error != 0) return (error); B2L_ITIMERVAL(&aitv, &ls); error = kern_setitimer(td, uap->which, &aitv, &oitv); if (error != 0 || uap->oitv == NULL) return (error); B2L_ITIMERVAL(&ls, &oitv); return (copyout(&ls, uap->oitv, sizeof(ls))); } int linux_getitimer(struct thread *td, struct linux_getitimer_args *uap) { int error; struct l_itimerval ls; struct itimerval aitv; error = kern_getitimer(td, uap->which, &aitv); if (error != 0) return (error); B2L_ITIMERVAL(&ls, &aitv); return (copyout(&ls, uap->itv, sizeof(ls))); } #if defined(__i386__) || (defined(__amd64__) && defined(COMPAT_LINUX32)) int linux_nice(struct thread *td, struct linux_nice_args *args) { struct setpriority_args bsd_args; bsd_args.which = PRIO_PROCESS; bsd_args.who = 0; /* current process */ bsd_args.prio = args->inc; return (sys_setpriority(td, &bsd_args)); } #endif /* __i386__ || (__amd64__ && COMPAT_LINUX32) */ int linux_setgroups(struct thread *td, struct linux_setgroups_args *args) { struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; l_gid_t *linux_gidset; gid_t *bsd_gidset; int ngrp, error; struct proc *p; ngrp = args->gidsetsize; if (ngrp < 0 || ngrp >= ngroups_max + 1) return (EINVAL); linux_gidset = malloc(ngrp * sizeof(*linux_gidset), M_LINUX, M_WAITOK); error = copyin(args->grouplist, linux_gidset, ngrp * sizeof(l_gid_t)); if (error) goto out; newcred = crget(); crextend(newcred, ngrp + 1); p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = p->p_ucred; crcopy(newcred, oldcred); /* * cr_groups[0] holds egid. Setting the whole set from * the supplied set will cause egid to be changed too. * Keep cr_groups[0] unchanged to prevent that. */ if ((error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS)) != 0) { PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); goto out; } if (ngrp > 0) { newcred->cr_ngroups = ngrp + 1; bsd_gidset = newcred->cr_groups; ngrp--; while (ngrp >= 0) { bsd_gidset[ngrp + 1] = linux_gidset[ngrp]; ngrp--; } } else newcred->cr_ngroups = 1; setsugid(p); proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); error = 0; out: free(linux_gidset, M_LINUX); return (error); } int linux_getgroups(struct thread *td, struct linux_getgroups_args *args) { struct ucred *cred; l_gid_t *linux_gidset; gid_t *bsd_gidset; int bsd_gidsetsz, ngrp, error; cred = td->td_ucred; bsd_gidset = cred->cr_groups; bsd_gidsetsz = cred->cr_ngroups - 1; /* * cr_groups[0] holds egid. Returning the whole set * here will cause a duplicate. Exclude cr_groups[0] * to prevent that. */ if ((ngrp = args->gidsetsize) == 0) { td->td_retval[0] = bsd_gidsetsz; return (0); } if (ngrp < bsd_gidsetsz) return (EINVAL); ngrp = 0; linux_gidset = malloc(bsd_gidsetsz * sizeof(*linux_gidset), M_LINUX, M_WAITOK); while (ngrp < bsd_gidsetsz) { linux_gidset[ngrp] = bsd_gidset[ngrp + 1]; ngrp++; } error = copyout(linux_gidset, args->grouplist, ngrp * sizeof(l_gid_t)); free(linux_gidset, M_LINUX); if (error) return (error); td->td_retval[0] = ngrp; return (0); } int linux_setrlimit(struct thread *td, struct linux_setrlimit_args *args) { struct rlimit bsd_rlim; struct l_rlimit rlim; u_int which; int error; if (args->resource >= LINUX_RLIM_NLIMITS) return (EINVAL); which = linux_to_bsd_resource[args->resource]; if (which == -1) return (EINVAL); error = copyin(args->rlim, &rlim, sizeof(rlim)); if (error) return (error); bsd_rlim.rlim_cur = (rlim_t)rlim.rlim_cur; bsd_rlim.rlim_max = (rlim_t)rlim.rlim_max; return (kern_setrlimit(td, which, &bsd_rlim)); } #if defined(__i386__) || (defined(__amd64__) && defined(COMPAT_LINUX32)) int linux_old_getrlimit(struct thread *td, struct linux_old_getrlimit_args *args) { struct l_rlimit rlim; struct rlimit bsd_rlim; u_int which; if (args->resource >= LINUX_RLIM_NLIMITS) return (EINVAL); which = linux_to_bsd_resource[args->resource]; if (which == -1) return (EINVAL); lim_rlimit(td, which, &bsd_rlim); #ifdef COMPAT_LINUX32 rlim.rlim_cur = (unsigned int)bsd_rlim.rlim_cur; if (rlim.rlim_cur == UINT_MAX) rlim.rlim_cur = INT_MAX; rlim.rlim_max = (unsigned int)bsd_rlim.rlim_max; if (rlim.rlim_max == UINT_MAX) rlim.rlim_max = INT_MAX; #else rlim.rlim_cur = (unsigned long)bsd_rlim.rlim_cur; if (rlim.rlim_cur == ULONG_MAX) rlim.rlim_cur = LONG_MAX; rlim.rlim_max = (unsigned long)bsd_rlim.rlim_max; if (rlim.rlim_max == ULONG_MAX) rlim.rlim_max = LONG_MAX; #endif return (copyout(&rlim, args->rlim, sizeof(rlim))); } #endif /* __i386__ || (__amd64__ && COMPAT_LINUX32) */ int linux_getrlimit(struct thread *td, struct linux_getrlimit_args *args) { struct l_rlimit rlim; struct rlimit bsd_rlim; u_int which; if (args->resource >= LINUX_RLIM_NLIMITS) return (EINVAL); which = linux_to_bsd_resource[args->resource]; if (which == -1) return (EINVAL); lim_rlimit(td, which, &bsd_rlim); rlim.rlim_cur = (l_ulong)bsd_rlim.rlim_cur; rlim.rlim_max = (l_ulong)bsd_rlim.rlim_max; return (copyout(&rlim, args->rlim, sizeof(rlim))); } int linux_sched_setscheduler(struct thread *td, struct linux_sched_setscheduler_args *args) { struct sched_param sched_param; struct thread *tdt; int error, policy; switch (args->policy) { case LINUX_SCHED_OTHER: policy = SCHED_OTHER; break; case LINUX_SCHED_FIFO: policy = SCHED_FIFO; break; case LINUX_SCHED_RR: policy = SCHED_RR; break; default: return (EINVAL); } error = copyin(args->param, &sched_param, sizeof(sched_param)); if (error) return (error); tdt = linux_tdfind(td, args->pid, -1); if (tdt == NULL) return (ESRCH); error = kern_sched_setscheduler(td, tdt, policy, &sched_param); PROC_UNLOCK(tdt->td_proc); return (error); } int linux_sched_getscheduler(struct thread *td, struct linux_sched_getscheduler_args *args) { struct thread *tdt; int error, policy; tdt = linux_tdfind(td, args->pid, -1); if (tdt == NULL) return (ESRCH); error = kern_sched_getscheduler(td, tdt, &policy); PROC_UNLOCK(tdt->td_proc); switch (policy) { case SCHED_OTHER: td->td_retval[0] = LINUX_SCHED_OTHER; break; case SCHED_FIFO: td->td_retval[0] = LINUX_SCHED_FIFO; break; case SCHED_RR: td->td_retval[0] = LINUX_SCHED_RR; break; } return (error); } int linux_sched_get_priority_max(struct thread *td, struct linux_sched_get_priority_max_args *args) { struct sched_get_priority_max_args bsd; switch (args->policy) { case LINUX_SCHED_OTHER: bsd.policy = SCHED_OTHER; break; case LINUX_SCHED_FIFO: bsd.policy = SCHED_FIFO; break; case LINUX_SCHED_RR: bsd.policy = SCHED_RR; break; default: return (EINVAL); } return (sys_sched_get_priority_max(td, &bsd)); } int linux_sched_get_priority_min(struct thread *td, struct linux_sched_get_priority_min_args *args) { struct sched_get_priority_min_args bsd; switch (args->policy) { case LINUX_SCHED_OTHER: bsd.policy = SCHED_OTHER; break; case LINUX_SCHED_FIFO: bsd.policy = SCHED_FIFO; break; case LINUX_SCHED_RR: bsd.policy = SCHED_RR; break; default: return (EINVAL); } return (sys_sched_get_priority_min(td, &bsd)); } #define REBOOT_CAD_ON 0x89abcdef #define REBOOT_CAD_OFF 0 #define REBOOT_HALT 0xcdef0123 #define REBOOT_RESTART 0x01234567 #define REBOOT_RESTART2 0xA1B2C3D4 #define REBOOT_POWEROFF 0x4321FEDC #define REBOOT_MAGIC1 0xfee1dead #define REBOOT_MAGIC2 0x28121969 #define REBOOT_MAGIC2A 0x05121996 #define REBOOT_MAGIC2B 0x16041998 int linux_reboot(struct thread *td, struct linux_reboot_args *args) { struct reboot_args bsd_args; if (args->magic1 != REBOOT_MAGIC1) return (EINVAL); switch (args->magic2) { case REBOOT_MAGIC2: case REBOOT_MAGIC2A: case REBOOT_MAGIC2B: break; default: return (EINVAL); } switch (args->cmd) { case REBOOT_CAD_ON: case REBOOT_CAD_OFF: return (priv_check(td, PRIV_REBOOT)); case REBOOT_HALT: bsd_args.opt = RB_HALT; break; case REBOOT_RESTART: case REBOOT_RESTART2: bsd_args.opt = 0; break; case REBOOT_POWEROFF: bsd_args.opt = RB_POWEROFF; break; default: return (EINVAL); } return (sys_reboot(td, &bsd_args)); } int linux_getpid(struct thread *td, struct linux_getpid_args *args) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_proc->p_pid; return (0); } int linux_gettid(struct thread *td, struct linux_gettid_args *args) { struct linux_emuldata *em; em = em_find(td); KASSERT(em != NULL, ("gettid: emuldata not found.\n")); td->td_retval[0] = em->em_tid; return (0); } int linux_getppid(struct thread *td, struct linux_getppid_args *args) { td->td_retval[0] = kern_getppid(td); return (0); } int linux_getgid(struct thread *td, struct linux_getgid_args *args) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_rgid; return (0); } int linux_getuid(struct thread *td, struct linux_getuid_args *args) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_ruid; return (0); } - int linux_getsid(struct thread *td, struct linux_getsid_args *args) { - struct getsid_args bsd; - bsd.pid = args->pid; - return (sys_getsid(td, &bsd)); + return (kern_getsid(td, args->pid)); } int linux_nosys(struct thread *td, struct nosys_args *ignore) { return (ENOSYS); } int linux_getpriority(struct thread *td, struct linux_getpriority_args *args) { struct getpriority_args bsd_args; int error; bsd_args.which = args->which; bsd_args.who = args->who; error = sys_getpriority(td, &bsd_args); td->td_retval[0] = 20 - td->td_retval[0]; return (error); } int linux_sethostname(struct thread *td, struct linux_sethostname_args *args) { int name[2]; name[0] = CTL_KERN; name[1] = KERN_HOSTNAME; return (userland_sysctl(td, name, 2, 0, 0, 0, args->hostname, args->len, 0, 0)); } int linux_setdomainname(struct thread *td, struct linux_setdomainname_args *args) { int name[2]; name[0] = CTL_KERN; name[1] = KERN_NISDOMAINNAME; return (userland_sysctl(td, name, 2, 0, 0, 0, args->name, args->len, 0, 0)); } int linux_exit_group(struct thread *td, struct linux_exit_group_args *args) { LINUX_CTR2(exit_group, "thread(%d) (%d)", td->td_tid, args->error_code); /* * XXX: we should send a signal to the parent if * SIGNAL_EXIT_GROUP is set. We ignore that (temporarily?) * as it doesnt occur often. */ exit1(td, args->error_code, 0); /* NOTREACHED */ } #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330 #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026 #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 0x20080522 struct l_user_cap_header { l_int version; l_int pid; }; struct l_user_cap_data { l_int effective; l_int permitted; l_int inheritable; }; int linux_capget(struct thread *td, struct linux_capget_args *uap) { struct l_user_cap_header luch; struct l_user_cap_data lucd[2]; int error, u32s; if (uap->hdrp == NULL) return (EFAULT); error = copyin(uap->hdrp, &luch, sizeof(luch)); if (error != 0) return (error); switch (luch.version) { case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1: u32s = 1; break; case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3: u32s = 2; break; default: luch.version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1; error = copyout(&luch, uap->hdrp, sizeof(luch)); if (error) return (error); return (EINVAL); } if (luch.pid) return (EPERM); if (uap->datap) { /* * The current implementation doesn't support setting * a capability (it's essentially a stub) so indicate * that no capabilities are currently set or available * to request. */ memset(&lucd, 0, u32s * sizeof(lucd[0])); error = copyout(&lucd, uap->datap, u32s * sizeof(lucd[0])); } return (error); } int linux_capset(struct thread *td, struct linux_capset_args *uap) { struct l_user_cap_header luch; struct l_user_cap_data lucd[2]; int error, i, u32s; if (uap->hdrp == NULL || uap->datap == NULL) return (EFAULT); error = copyin(uap->hdrp, &luch, sizeof(luch)); if (error != 0) return (error); switch (luch.version) { case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1: u32s = 1; break; case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3: u32s = 2; break; default: luch.version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1; error = copyout(&luch, uap->hdrp, sizeof(luch)); if (error) return (error); return (EINVAL); } if (luch.pid) return (EPERM); error = copyin(uap->datap, &lucd, u32s * sizeof(lucd[0])); if (error != 0) return (error); /* We currently don't support setting any capabilities. */ for (i = 0; i < u32s; i++) { if (lucd[i].effective || lucd[i].permitted || lucd[i].inheritable) { linux_msg(td, "capset[%d] effective=0x%x, permitted=0x%x, " "inheritable=0x%x is not implemented", i, (int)lucd[i].effective, (int)lucd[i].permitted, (int)lucd[i].inheritable); return (EPERM); } } return (0); } int linux_prctl(struct thread *td, struct linux_prctl_args *args) { int error = 0, max_size; struct proc *p = td->td_proc; char comm[LINUX_MAX_COMM_LEN]; int pdeath_signal; switch (args->option) { case LINUX_PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: if (!LINUX_SIG_VALID(args->arg2)) return (EINVAL); pdeath_signal = linux_to_bsd_signal(args->arg2); return (kern_procctl(td, P_PID, 0, PROC_PDEATHSIG_CTL, &pdeath_signal)); case LINUX_PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: error = kern_procctl(td, P_PID, 0, PROC_PDEATHSIG_STATUS, &pdeath_signal); if (error != 0) return (error); pdeath_signal = bsd_to_linux_signal(pdeath_signal); return (copyout(&pdeath_signal, (void *)(register_t)args->arg2, sizeof(pdeath_signal))); break; case LINUX_PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: /* * Indicate that we always clear the effective and * permitted capability sets when the user id becomes * non-zero (actually the capability sets are simply * always zero in the current implementation). */ td->td_retval[0] = 0; break; case LINUX_PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: /* * Ignore requests to keep the effective and permitted * capability sets when the user id becomes non-zero. */ break; case LINUX_PR_SET_NAME: /* * To be on the safe side we need to make sure to not * overflow the size a Linux program expects. We already * do this here in the copyin, so that we don't need to * check on copyout. */ max_size = MIN(sizeof(comm), sizeof(p->p_comm)); error = copyinstr((void *)(register_t)args->arg2, comm, max_size, NULL); /* Linux silently truncates the name if it is too long. */ if (error == ENAMETOOLONG) { /* * XXX: copyinstr() isn't documented to populate the * array completely, so do a copyin() to be on the * safe side. This should be changed in case * copyinstr() is changed to guarantee this. */ error = copyin((void *)(register_t)args->arg2, comm, max_size - 1); comm[max_size - 1] = '\0'; } if (error) return (error); PROC_LOCK(p); strlcpy(p->p_comm, comm, sizeof(p->p_comm)); PROC_UNLOCK(p); break; case LINUX_PR_GET_NAME: PROC_LOCK(p); strlcpy(comm, p->p_comm, sizeof(comm)); PROC_UNLOCK(p); error = copyout(comm, (void *)(register_t)args->arg2, strlen(comm) + 1); break; default: error = EINVAL; break; } return (error); } int linux_sched_setparam(struct thread *td, struct linux_sched_setparam_args *uap) { struct sched_param sched_param; struct thread *tdt; int error; error = copyin(uap->param, &sched_param, sizeof(sched_param)); if (error) return (error); tdt = linux_tdfind(td, uap->pid, -1); if (tdt == NULL) return (ESRCH); error = kern_sched_setparam(td, tdt, &sched_param); PROC_UNLOCK(tdt->td_proc); return (error); } int linux_sched_getparam(struct thread *td, struct linux_sched_getparam_args *uap) { struct sched_param sched_param; struct thread *tdt; int error; tdt = linux_tdfind(td, uap->pid, -1); if (tdt == NULL) return (ESRCH); error = kern_sched_getparam(td, tdt, &sched_param); PROC_UNLOCK(tdt->td_proc); if (error == 0) error = copyout(&sched_param, uap->param, sizeof(sched_param)); return (error); } /* * Get affinity of a process. */ int linux_sched_getaffinity(struct thread *td, struct linux_sched_getaffinity_args *args) { int error; struct thread *tdt; if (args->len < sizeof(cpuset_t)) return (EINVAL); tdt = linux_tdfind(td, args->pid, -1); if (tdt == NULL) return (ESRCH); PROC_UNLOCK(tdt->td_proc); error = kern_cpuset_getaffinity(td, CPU_LEVEL_WHICH, CPU_WHICH_TID, tdt->td_tid, sizeof(cpuset_t), (cpuset_t *)args->user_mask_ptr); if (error == 0) td->td_retval[0] = sizeof(cpuset_t); return (error); } /* * Set affinity of a process. */ int linux_sched_setaffinity(struct thread *td, struct linux_sched_setaffinity_args *args) { struct thread *tdt; if (args->len < sizeof(cpuset_t)) return (EINVAL); tdt = linux_tdfind(td, args->pid, -1); if (tdt == NULL) return (ESRCH); PROC_UNLOCK(tdt->td_proc); return (kern_cpuset_setaffinity(td, CPU_LEVEL_WHICH, CPU_WHICH_TID, tdt->td_tid, sizeof(cpuset_t), (cpuset_t *) args->user_mask_ptr)); } struct linux_rlimit64 { uint64_t rlim_cur; uint64_t rlim_max; }; int linux_prlimit64(struct thread *td, struct linux_prlimit64_args *args) { struct rlimit rlim, nrlim; struct linux_rlimit64 lrlim; struct proc *p; u_int which; int flags; int error; if (args->resource >= LINUX_RLIM_NLIMITS) return (EINVAL); which = linux_to_bsd_resource[args->resource]; if (which == -1) return (EINVAL); if (args->new != NULL) { /* * Note. Unlike FreeBSD where rlim is signed 64-bit Linux * rlim is unsigned 64-bit. FreeBSD treats negative limits * as INFINITY so we do not need a conversion even. */ error = copyin(args->new, &nrlim, sizeof(nrlim)); if (error != 0) return (error); } flags = PGET_HOLD | PGET_NOTWEXIT; if (args->new != NULL) flags |= PGET_CANDEBUG; else flags |= PGET_CANSEE; if (args->pid == 0) { p = td->td_proc; PHOLD(p); } else { error = pget(args->pid, flags, &p); if (error != 0) return (error); } if (args->old != NULL) { PROC_LOCK(p); lim_rlimit_proc(p, which, &rlim); PROC_UNLOCK(p); if (rlim.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) lrlim.rlim_cur = LINUX_RLIM_INFINITY; else lrlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_cur; if (rlim.rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) lrlim.rlim_max = LINUX_RLIM_INFINITY; else lrlim.rlim_max = rlim.rlim_max; error = copyout(&lrlim, args->old, sizeof(lrlim)); if (error != 0) goto out; } if (args->new != NULL) error = kern_proc_setrlimit(td, p, which, &nrlim); out: PRELE(p); return (error); } int linux_pselect6(struct thread *td, struct linux_pselect6_args *args) { struct timeval utv, tv0, tv1, *tvp; struct l_pselect6arg lpse6; struct l_timespec lts; struct timespec uts; l_sigset_t l_ss; sigset_t *ssp; sigset_t ss; int error; ssp = NULL; if (args->sig != NULL) { error = copyin(args->sig, &lpse6, sizeof(lpse6)); if (error != 0) return (error); if (lpse6.ss_len != sizeof(l_ss)) return (EINVAL); if (lpse6.ss != 0) { error = copyin(PTRIN(lpse6.ss), &l_ss, sizeof(l_ss)); if (error != 0) return (error); linux_to_bsd_sigset(&l_ss, &ss); ssp = &ss; } } /* * Currently glibc changes nanosecond number to microsecond. * This mean losing precision but for now it is hardly seen. */ if (args->tsp != NULL) { error = copyin(args->tsp, <s, sizeof(lts)); if (error != 0) return (error); error = linux_to_native_timespec(&uts, <s); if (error != 0) return (error); TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&utv, &uts); if (itimerfix(&utv)) return (EINVAL); microtime(&tv0); tvp = &utv; } else tvp = NULL; error = kern_pselect(td, args->nfds, args->readfds, args->writefds, args->exceptfds, tvp, ssp, LINUX_NFDBITS); if (error == 0 && args->tsp != NULL) { if (td->td_retval[0] != 0) { /* * Compute how much time was left of the timeout, * by subtracting the current time and the time * before we started the call, and subtracting * that result from the user-supplied value. */ microtime(&tv1); timevalsub(&tv1, &tv0); timevalsub(&utv, &tv1); if (utv.tv_sec < 0) timevalclear(&utv); } else timevalclear(&utv); TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&utv, &uts); error = native_to_linux_timespec(<s, &uts); if (error == 0) error = copyout(<s, args->tsp, sizeof(lts)); } return (error); } int linux_ppoll(struct thread *td, struct linux_ppoll_args *args) { struct timespec ts0, ts1; struct l_timespec lts; struct timespec uts, *tsp; l_sigset_t l_ss; sigset_t *ssp; sigset_t ss; int error; if (args->sset != NULL) { if (args->ssize != sizeof(l_ss)) return (EINVAL); error = copyin(args->sset, &l_ss, sizeof(l_ss)); if (error) return (error); linux_to_bsd_sigset(&l_ss, &ss); ssp = &ss; } else ssp = NULL; if (args->tsp != NULL) { error = copyin(args->tsp, <s, sizeof(lts)); if (error) return (error); error = linux_to_native_timespec(&uts, <s); if (error != 0) return (error); nanotime(&ts0); tsp = &uts; } else tsp = NULL; error = kern_poll(td, args->fds, args->nfds, tsp, ssp); if (error == 0 && args->tsp != NULL) { if (td->td_retval[0]) { nanotime(&ts1); timespecsub(&ts1, &ts0, &ts1); timespecsub(&uts, &ts1, &uts); if (uts.tv_sec < 0) timespecclear(&uts); } else timespecclear(&uts); error = native_to_linux_timespec(<s, &uts); if (error == 0) error = copyout(<s, args->tsp, sizeof(lts)); } return (error); } int linux_sched_rr_get_interval(struct thread *td, struct linux_sched_rr_get_interval_args *uap) { struct timespec ts; struct l_timespec lts; struct thread *tdt; int error; /* * According to man in case the invalid pid specified * EINVAL should be returned. */ if (uap->pid < 0) return (EINVAL); tdt = linux_tdfind(td, uap->pid, -1); if (tdt == NULL) return (ESRCH); error = kern_sched_rr_get_interval_td(td, tdt, &ts); PROC_UNLOCK(tdt->td_proc); if (error != 0) return (error); error = native_to_linux_timespec(<s, &ts); if (error != 0) return (error); return (copyout(<s, uap->interval, sizeof(lts))); } /* * In case when the Linux thread is the initial thread in * the thread group thread id is equal to the process id. * Glibc depends on this magic (assert in pthread_getattr_np.c). */ struct thread * linux_tdfind(struct thread *td, lwpid_t tid, pid_t pid) { struct linux_emuldata *em; struct thread *tdt; struct proc *p; tdt = NULL; if (tid == 0 || tid == td->td_tid) { tdt = td; PROC_LOCK(tdt->td_proc); } else if (tid > PID_MAX) tdt = tdfind(tid, pid); else { /* * Initial thread where the tid equal to the pid. */ p = pfind(tid); if (p != NULL) { if (SV_PROC_ABI(p) != SV_ABI_LINUX) { /* * p is not a Linuxulator process. */ PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (NULL); } FOREACH_THREAD_IN_PROC(p, tdt) { em = em_find(tdt); if (tid == em->em_tid) return (tdt); } PROC_UNLOCK(p); } return (NULL); } return (tdt); } void linux_to_bsd_waitopts(int options, int *bsdopts) { if (options & LINUX_WNOHANG) *bsdopts |= WNOHANG; if (options & LINUX_WUNTRACED) *bsdopts |= WUNTRACED; if (options & LINUX_WEXITED) *bsdopts |= WEXITED; if (options & LINUX_WCONTINUED) *bsdopts |= WCONTINUED; if (options & LINUX_WNOWAIT) *bsdopts |= WNOWAIT; if (options & __WCLONE) *bsdopts |= WLINUXCLONE; } int linux_getrandom(struct thread *td, struct linux_getrandom_args *args) { struct uio uio; struct iovec iov; int error; if (args->flags & ~(LINUX_GRND_NONBLOCK|LINUX_GRND_RANDOM)) return (EINVAL); if (args->count > INT_MAX) args->count = INT_MAX; iov.iov_base = args->buf; iov.iov_len = args->count; uio.uio_iov = &iov; uio.uio_iovcnt = 1; uio.uio_resid = iov.iov_len; uio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE; uio.uio_rw = UIO_READ; uio.uio_td = td; error = read_random_uio(&uio, args->flags & LINUX_GRND_NONBLOCK); if (error == 0) td->td_retval[0] = args->count - uio.uio_resid; return (error); } int linux_mincore(struct thread *td, struct linux_mincore_args *args) { /* Needs to be page-aligned */ if (args->start & PAGE_MASK) return (EINVAL); return (kern_mincore(td, args->start, args->len, args->vec)); } Index: head/sys/kern/kern_prot.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/kern/kern_prot.c (revision 355721) +++ head/sys/kern/kern_prot.c (revision 355722) @@ -1,2280 +1,2287 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. * (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 Robert N. M. Watson. * All rights reserved. * * All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed * to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph * Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with * the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)kern_prot.c 8.6 (Berkeley) 1/21/94 */ /* * System calls related to processes and protection */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include "opt_inet.h" #include "opt_inet6.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef REGRESSION FEATURE(regression, "Kernel support for interfaces necessary for regression testing (SECURITY RISK!)"); #endif #include #include static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CRED, "cred", "credentials"); SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, bsd, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "BSD security policy"); static void crsetgroups_locked(struct ucred *cr, int ngrp, gid_t *groups); #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getpid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getpid(struct thread *td, struct getpid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pid; #if defined(COMPAT_43) if (SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_AOUT)) td->td_retval[1] = kern_getppid(td); #endif return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getppid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getppid(struct thread *td, struct getppid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = kern_getppid(td); return (0); } int kern_getppid(struct thread *td) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; return (p->p_oppid); } /* * Get process group ID; note that POSIX getpgrp takes no parameter. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getpgrp_args { int dummy; }; #endif int sys_getpgrp(struct thread *td, struct getpgrp_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pgrp->pg_id; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); } /* Get an arbitrary pid's process group id */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getpgid_args { pid_t pid; }; #endif int sys_getpgid(struct thread *td, struct getpgid_args *uap) { struct proc *p; int error; if (uap->pid == 0) { p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); } else { p = pfind(uap->pid); if (p == NULL) return (ESRCH); error = p_cansee(td, p); if (error) { PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (error); } } td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pgrp->pg_id; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); } /* * Get an arbitrary pid's session id. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getsid_args { pid_t pid; }; #endif int sys_getsid(struct thread *td, struct getsid_args *uap) { + + return (kern_getsid(td, uap->pid)); +} + +int +kern_getsid(struct thread *td, pid_t pid) +{ struct proc *p; int error; - if (uap->pid == 0) { + if (pid == 0) { p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); } else { - p = pfind(uap->pid); + p = pfind(pid); if (p == NULL) return (ESRCH); error = p_cansee(td, p); if (error) { PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (error); } } td->td_retval[0] = p->p_session->s_sid; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getuid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getuid(struct thread *td, struct getuid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_ruid; #if defined(COMPAT_43) td->td_retval[1] = td->td_ucred->cr_uid; #endif return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct geteuid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_geteuid(struct thread *td, struct geteuid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_uid; return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getgid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getgid(struct thread *td, struct getgid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_rgid; #if defined(COMPAT_43) td->td_retval[1] = td->td_ucred->cr_groups[0]; #endif return (0); } /* * Get effective group ID. The "egid" is groups[0], and could be obtained * via getgroups. This syscall exists because it is somewhat painful to do * correctly in a library function. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getegid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getegid(struct thread *td, struct getegid_args *uap) { td->td_retval[0] = td->td_ucred->cr_groups[0]; return (0); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getgroups_args { u_int gidsetsize; gid_t *gidset; }; #endif int sys_getgroups(struct thread *td, struct getgroups_args *uap) { struct ucred *cred; u_int ngrp; int error; cred = td->td_ucred; ngrp = cred->cr_ngroups; if (uap->gidsetsize == 0) { error = 0; goto out; } if (uap->gidsetsize < ngrp) return (EINVAL); error = copyout(cred->cr_groups, uap->gidset, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t)); out: td->td_retval[0] = ngrp; return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setsid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setsid(struct thread *td, struct setsid_args *uap) { struct pgrp *pgrp; int error; struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct pgrp *newpgrp; struct session *newsess; error = 0; pgrp = NULL; newpgrp = malloc(sizeof(struct pgrp), M_PGRP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); newsess = malloc(sizeof(struct session), M_SESSION, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); sx_xlock(&proctree_lock); if (p->p_pgid == p->p_pid || (pgrp = pgfind(p->p_pid)) != NULL) { if (pgrp != NULL) PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp); error = EPERM; } else { (void)enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, newpgrp, newsess); td->td_retval[0] = p->p_pid; newpgrp = NULL; newsess = NULL; } sx_xunlock(&proctree_lock); if (newpgrp != NULL) free(newpgrp, M_PGRP); if (newsess != NULL) free(newsess, M_SESSION); return (error); } /* * set process group (setpgid/old setpgrp) * * caller does setpgid(targpid, targpgid) * * pid must be caller or child of caller (ESRCH) * if a child * pid must be in same session (EPERM) * pid can't have done an exec (EACCES) * if pgid != pid * there must exist some pid in same session having pgid (EPERM) * pid must not be session leader (EPERM) */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setpgid_args { int pid; /* target process id */ int pgid; /* target pgrp id */ }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setpgid(struct thread *td, struct setpgid_args *uap) { struct proc *curp = td->td_proc; struct proc *targp; /* target process */ struct pgrp *pgrp; /* target pgrp */ int error; struct pgrp *newpgrp; if (uap->pgid < 0) return (EINVAL); error = 0; newpgrp = malloc(sizeof(struct pgrp), M_PGRP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); sx_xlock(&proctree_lock); if (uap->pid != 0 && uap->pid != curp->p_pid) { if ((targp = pfind(uap->pid)) == NULL) { error = ESRCH; goto done; } if (!inferior(targp)) { PROC_UNLOCK(targp); error = ESRCH; goto done; } if ((error = p_cansee(td, targp))) { PROC_UNLOCK(targp); goto done; } if (targp->p_pgrp == NULL || targp->p_session != curp->p_session) { PROC_UNLOCK(targp); error = EPERM; goto done; } if (targp->p_flag & P_EXEC) { PROC_UNLOCK(targp); error = EACCES; goto done; } PROC_UNLOCK(targp); } else targp = curp; if (SESS_LEADER(targp)) { error = EPERM; goto done; } if (uap->pgid == 0) uap->pgid = targp->p_pid; if ((pgrp = pgfind(uap->pgid)) == NULL) { if (uap->pgid == targp->p_pid) { error = enterpgrp(targp, uap->pgid, newpgrp, NULL); if (error == 0) newpgrp = NULL; } else error = EPERM; } else { if (pgrp == targp->p_pgrp) { PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp); goto done; } if (pgrp->pg_id != targp->p_pid && pgrp->pg_session != curp->p_session) { PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp); error = EPERM; goto done; } PGRP_UNLOCK(pgrp); error = enterthispgrp(targp, pgrp); } done: sx_xunlock(&proctree_lock); KASSERT((error == 0) || (newpgrp != NULL), ("setpgid failed and newpgrp is NULL")); if (newpgrp != NULL) free(newpgrp, M_PGRP); return (error); } /* * Use the clause in B.4.2.2 that allows setuid/setgid to be 4.2/4.3BSD * compatible. It says that setting the uid/gid to euid/egid is a special * case of "appropriate privilege". Once the rules are expanded out, this * basically means that setuid(nnn) sets all three id's, in all permitted * cases unless _POSIX_SAVED_IDS is enabled. In that case, setuid(getuid()) * does not set the saved id - this is dangerous for traditional BSD * programs. For this reason, we *really* do not want to set * _POSIX_SAVED_IDS and do not want to clear POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2. */ #define POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setuid_args { uid_t uid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setuid(struct thread *td, struct setuid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; uid_t uid; struct uidinfo *uip; int error; uid = uap->uid; AUDIT_ARG_UID(uid); newcred = crget(); uip = uifind(uid); PROC_LOCK(p); /* * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes. */ oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setuid(oldcred, uid); if (error) goto fail; #endif /* * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules. * * Note that setuid(geteuid()) is a special case of * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD * semantics. Basically, it means that "setuid(xx)" sets all * three id's (assuming you have privs). * * Notes on the logic. We do things in three steps. * 1: We determine if the euid is going to change, and do EPERM * right away. We unconditionally change the euid later if this * test is satisfied, simplifying that part of the logic. * 2: We determine if the real and/or saved uids are going to * change. Determined by compile options. * 3: Change euid last. (after tests in #2 for "appropriate privs") */ if (uid != oldcred->cr_ruid && /* allow setuid(getuid()) */ #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS uid != oldcred->cr_svuid && /* allow setuid(saved gid) */ #endif #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */ uid != oldcred->cr_uid && /* allow setuid(geteuid()) */ #endif (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID)) != 0) goto fail; #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS /* * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or uid == euid) * If so, we are changing the real uid and/or saved uid. */ if ( #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use the clause from B.4.2.2 */ uid == oldcred->cr_uid || #endif /* We are using privs. */ priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID) == 0) #endif { /* * Set the real uid and transfer proc count to new user. */ if (uid != oldcred->cr_ruid) { change_ruid(newcred, uip); setsugid(p); } /* * Set saved uid * * XXX always set saved uid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as * the security of seteuid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it * is important that we should do this. */ if (uid != oldcred->cr_svuid) { change_svuid(newcred, uid); setsugid(p); } } /* * In all permitted cases, we are changing the euid. */ if (uid != oldcred->cr_uid) { change_euid(newcred, uip); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); #ifdef RACCT racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred); crhold(newcred); #endif PROC_UNLOCK(p); #ifdef RCTL rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred); crfree(newcred); #endif uifree(uip); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(uip); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct seteuid_args { uid_t euid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_seteuid(struct thread *td, struct seteuid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; uid_t euid; struct uidinfo *euip; int error; euid = uap->euid; AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid); newcred = crget(); euip = uifind(euid); PROC_LOCK(p); /* * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes. */ oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_seteuid(oldcred, euid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && /* allow seteuid(getuid()) */ euid != oldcred->cr_svuid && /* allow seteuid(saved uid) */ (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEUID)) != 0) goto fail; /* * Everything's okay, do it. */ if (oldcred->cr_uid != euid) { change_euid(newcred, euip); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(euip); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(euip); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setgid_args { gid_t gid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setgid(struct thread *td, struct setgid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; gid_t gid; int error; gid = uap->gid; AUDIT_ARG_GID(gid); newcred = crget(); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setgid(oldcred, gid); if (error) goto fail; #endif /* * See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules. * * Note that setgid(getegid()) is a special case of * "appropriate privileges" in appendix B.4.2.2. We need * to use this clause to be compatible with traditional BSD * semantics. Basically, it means that "setgid(xx)" sets all * three id's (assuming you have privs). * * For notes on the logic here, see setuid() above. */ if (gid != oldcred->cr_rgid && /* allow setgid(getgid()) */ #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS gid != oldcred->cr_svgid && /* allow setgid(saved gid) */ #endif #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */ gid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] && /* allow setgid(getegid()) */ #endif (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID)) != 0) goto fail; #ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS /* * Do we have "appropriate privileges" (are we root or gid == egid) * If so, we are changing the real uid and saved gid. */ if ( #ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* use the clause from B.4.2.2 */ gid == oldcred->cr_groups[0] || #endif /* We are using privs. */ priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGID) == 0) #endif { /* * Set real gid */ if (oldcred->cr_rgid != gid) { change_rgid(newcred, gid); setsugid(p); } /* * Set saved gid * * XXX always set saved gid even if not _POSIX_SAVED_IDS, as * the security of setegid() depends on it. B.4.2.2 says it * is important that we should do this. */ if (oldcred->cr_svgid != gid) { change_svgid(newcred, gid); setsugid(p); } } /* * In all cases permitted cases, we are changing the egid. * Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes. */ if (oldcred->cr_groups[0] != gid) { change_egid(newcred, gid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setegid_args { gid_t egid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setegid(struct thread *td, struct setegid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; gid_t egid; int error; egid = uap->egid; AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid); newcred = crget(); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setegid(oldcred, egid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && /* allow setegid(getgid()) */ egid != oldcred->cr_svgid && /* allow setegid(saved gid) */ (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETEGID)) != 0) goto fail; if (oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) { change_egid(newcred, egid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setgroups_args { u_int gidsetsize; gid_t *gidset; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setgroups(struct thread *td, struct setgroups_args *uap) { gid_t smallgroups[XU_NGROUPS]; gid_t *groups; u_int gidsetsize; int error; gidsetsize = uap->gidsetsize; if (gidsetsize > ngroups_max + 1) return (EINVAL); if (gidsetsize > XU_NGROUPS) groups = malloc(gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); else groups = smallgroups; error = copyin(uap->gidset, groups, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t)); if (error == 0) error = kern_setgroups(td, gidsetsize, groups); if (gidsetsize > XU_NGROUPS) free(groups, M_TEMP); return (error); } int kern_setgroups(struct thread *td, u_int ngrp, gid_t *groups) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; int error; MPASS(ngrp <= ngroups_max + 1); AUDIT_ARG_GROUPSET(groups, ngrp); newcred = crget(); crextend(newcred, ngrp); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setgroups(oldcred, ngrp, groups); if (error) goto fail; #endif error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS); if (error) goto fail; if (ngrp == 0) { /* * setgroups(0, NULL) is a legitimate way of clearing the * groups vector on non-BSD systems (which generally do not * have the egid in the groups[0]). We risk security holes * when running non-BSD software if we do not do the same. */ newcred->cr_ngroups = 1; } else { crsetgroups_locked(newcred, ngrp, groups); } setsugid(p); proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setreuid_args { uid_t ruid; uid_t euid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setreuid(struct thread *td, struct setreuid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; uid_t euid, ruid; struct uidinfo *euip, *ruip; int error; euid = uap->euid; ruid = uap->ruid; AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid); AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid); newcred = crget(); euip = uifind(euid); ruip = uifind(ruid); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setreuid(oldcred, ruid, euid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != oldcred->cr_ruid && ruid != oldcred->cr_svuid) || (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != oldcred->cr_uid && euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && euid != oldcred->cr_svuid)) && (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREUID)) != 0) goto fail; if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_uid != euid) { change_euid(newcred, euip); setsugid(p); } if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_ruid != ruid) { change_ruid(newcred, ruip); setsugid(p); } if ((ruid != (uid_t)-1 || newcred->cr_uid != newcred->cr_ruid) && newcred->cr_svuid != newcred->cr_uid) { change_svuid(newcred, newcred->cr_uid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); #ifdef RACCT racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred); crhold(newcred); #endif PROC_UNLOCK(p); #ifdef RCTL rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred); crfree(newcred); #endif uifree(ruip); uifree(euip); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(ruip); uifree(euip); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setregid_args { gid_t rgid; gid_t egid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setregid(struct thread *td, struct setregid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; gid_t egid, rgid; int error; egid = uap->egid; rgid = uap->rgid; AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid); AUDIT_ARG_RGID(rgid); newcred = crget(); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setregid(oldcred, rgid, egid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != oldcred->cr_rgid && rgid != oldcred->cr_svgid) || (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] && egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && egid != oldcred->cr_svgid)) && (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETREGID)) != 0) goto fail; if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) { change_egid(newcred, egid); setsugid(p); } if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_rgid != rgid) { change_rgid(newcred, rgid); setsugid(p); } if ((rgid != (gid_t)-1 || newcred->cr_groups[0] != newcred->cr_rgid) && newcred->cr_svgid != newcred->cr_groups[0]) { change_svgid(newcred, newcred->cr_groups[0]); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } /* * setresuid(ruid, euid, suid) is like setreuid except control over the saved * uid is explicit. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setresuid_args { uid_t ruid; uid_t euid; uid_t suid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setresuid(struct thread *td, struct setresuid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; uid_t euid, ruid, suid; struct uidinfo *euip, *ruip; int error; euid = uap->euid; ruid = uap->ruid; suid = uap->suid; AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid); AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid); AUDIT_ARG_SUID(suid); newcred = crget(); euip = uifind(euid); ruip = uifind(ruid); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setresuid(oldcred, ruid, euid, suid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != oldcred->cr_ruid && ruid != oldcred->cr_svuid && ruid != oldcred->cr_uid) || (euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && euid != oldcred->cr_svuid && euid != oldcred->cr_uid) || (suid != (uid_t)-1 && suid != oldcred->cr_ruid && suid != oldcred->cr_svuid && suid != oldcred->cr_uid)) && (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID)) != 0) goto fail; if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_uid != euid) { change_euid(newcred, euip); setsugid(p); } if (ruid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_ruid != ruid) { change_ruid(newcred, ruip); setsugid(p); } if (suid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_svuid != suid) { change_svuid(newcred, suid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); #ifdef RACCT racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred); crhold(newcred); #endif PROC_UNLOCK(p); #ifdef RCTL rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred); crfree(newcred); #endif uifree(ruip); uifree(euip); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); uifree(ruip); uifree(euip); crfree(newcred); return (error); } /* * setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid) is like setregid except control over the saved * gid is explicit. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setresgid_args { gid_t rgid; gid_t egid; gid_t sgid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setresgid(struct thread *td, struct setresgid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; gid_t egid, rgid, sgid; int error; egid = uap->egid; rgid = uap->rgid; sgid = uap->sgid; AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid); AUDIT_ARG_RGID(rgid); AUDIT_ARG_SGID(sgid); newcred = crget(); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); #ifdef MAC error = mac_cred_check_setresgid(oldcred, rgid, egid, sgid); if (error) goto fail; #endif if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != oldcred->cr_rgid && rgid != oldcred->cr_svgid && rgid != oldcred->cr_groups[0]) || (egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && egid != oldcred->cr_svgid && egid != oldcred->cr_groups[0]) || (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && sgid != oldcred->cr_rgid && sgid != oldcred->cr_svgid && sgid != oldcred->cr_groups[0])) && (error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID)) != 0) goto fail; if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) { change_egid(newcred, egid); setsugid(p); } if (rgid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_rgid != rgid) { change_rgid(newcred, rgid); setsugid(p); } if (sgid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_svgid != sgid) { change_svgid(newcred, sgid); setsugid(p); } proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); fail: PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(newcred); return (error); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getresuid_args { uid_t *ruid; uid_t *euid; uid_t *suid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getresuid(struct thread *td, struct getresuid_args *uap) { struct ucred *cred; int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0; cred = td->td_ucred; if (uap->ruid) error1 = copyout(&cred->cr_ruid, uap->ruid, sizeof(cred->cr_ruid)); if (uap->euid) error2 = copyout(&cred->cr_uid, uap->euid, sizeof(cred->cr_uid)); if (uap->suid) error3 = copyout(&cred->cr_svuid, uap->suid, sizeof(cred->cr_svuid)); return (error1 ? error1 : error2 ? error2 : error3); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getresgid_args { gid_t *rgid; gid_t *egid; gid_t *sgid; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getresgid(struct thread *td, struct getresgid_args *uap) { struct ucred *cred; int error1 = 0, error2 = 0, error3 = 0; cred = td->td_ucred; if (uap->rgid) error1 = copyout(&cred->cr_rgid, uap->rgid, sizeof(cred->cr_rgid)); if (uap->egid) error2 = copyout(&cred->cr_groups[0], uap->egid, sizeof(cred->cr_groups[0])); if (uap->sgid) error3 = copyout(&cred->cr_svgid, uap->sgid, sizeof(cred->cr_svgid)); return (error1 ? error1 : error2 ? error2 : error3); } #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct issetugid_args { int dummy; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_issetugid(struct thread *td, struct issetugid_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; /* * Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time, * we use P_SUGID because we consider changing the owners as * "tainting" as well. * This is significant for procs that start as root and "become" * a user without an exec - programs cannot know *everything* * that libc *might* have put in their data segment. */ td->td_retval[0] = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID) ? 1 : 0; return (0); } int sys___setugid(struct thread *td, struct __setugid_args *uap) { #ifdef REGRESSION struct proc *p; p = td->td_proc; switch (uap->flag) { case 0: PROC_LOCK(p); p->p_flag &= ~P_SUGID; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); case 1: PROC_LOCK(p); p->p_flag |= P_SUGID; PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); default: return (EINVAL); } #else /* !REGRESSION */ return (ENOSYS); #endif /* REGRESSION */ } /* * Check if gid is a member of the group set. */ int groupmember(gid_t gid, struct ucred *cred) { int l; int h; int m; if (cred->cr_groups[0] == gid) return(1); /* * If gid was not our primary group, perform a binary search * of the supplemental groups. This is possible because we * sort the groups in crsetgroups(). */ l = 1; h = cred->cr_ngroups; while (l < h) { m = l + ((h - l) / 2); if (cred->cr_groups[m] < gid) l = m + 1; else h = m; } if ((l < cred->cr_ngroups) && (cred->cr_groups[l] == gid)) return (1); return (0); } /* * Test the active securelevel against a given level. securelevel_gt() * implements (securelevel > level). securelevel_ge() implements * (securelevel >= level). Note that the logic is inverted -- these * functions return EPERM on "success" and 0 on "failure". * * Due to care taken when setting the securelevel, we know that no jail will * be less secure that its parent (or the physical system), so it is sufficient * to test the current jail only. * * XXXRW: Possibly since this has to do with privilege, it should move to * kern_priv.c. */ int securelevel_gt(struct ucred *cr, int level) { return (cr->cr_prison->pr_securelevel > level ? EPERM : 0); } int securelevel_ge(struct ucred *cr, int level) { return (cr->cr_prison->pr_securelevel >= level ? EPERM : 0); } /* * 'see_other_uids' determines whether or not visibility of processes * and sockets with credentials holding different real uids is possible * using a variety of system MIBs. * XXX: data declarations should be together near the beginning of the file. */ static int see_other_uids = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_other_uids, CTLFLAG_RW, &see_other_uids, 0, "Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different real uid"); /*- * Determine if u1 "can see" the subject specified by u2, according to the * 'see_other_uids' policy. * Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise * Locks: none * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required */ int cr_canseeotheruids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) { if (!see_other_uids && u1->cr_ruid != u2->cr_ruid) { if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS) != 0) return (ESRCH); } return (0); } /* * 'see_other_gids' determines whether or not visibility of processes * and sockets with credentials holding different real gids is possible * using a variety of system MIBs. * XXX: data declarations should be together near the beginning of the file. */ static int see_other_gids = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_other_gids, CTLFLAG_RW, &see_other_gids, 0, "Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different real gid"); /* * Determine if u1 can "see" the subject specified by u2, according to the * 'see_other_gids' policy. * Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise * Locks: none * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required */ int cr_canseeothergids(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) { int i, match; if (!see_other_gids) { match = 0; for (i = 0; i < u1->cr_ngroups; i++) { if (groupmember(u1->cr_groups[i], u2)) match = 1; if (match) break; } if (!match) { if (priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS) != 0) return (ESRCH); } } return (0); } /* * 'see_jail_proc' determines whether or not visibility of processes and * sockets with credentials holding different jail ids is possible using a * variety of system MIBs. * * XXX: data declarations should be together near the beginning of the file. */ static int see_jail_proc = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_jail_proc, CTLFLAG_RW, &see_jail_proc, 0, "Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different jail ids"); /*- * Determine if u1 "can see" the subject specified by u2, according to the * 'see_jail_proc' policy. * Returns: 0 for permitted, ESRCH otherwise * Locks: none * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required */ int cr_canseejailproc(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) { if (u1->cr_uid == 0) return (0); return (!see_jail_proc && u1->cr_prison != u2->cr_prison ? ESRCH : 0); } /*- * Determine if u1 "can see" the subject specified by u2. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: none * References: *u1 and *u2 must not change during the call * u1 may equal u2, in which case only one reference is required */ int cr_cansee(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) { int error; if ((error = prison_check(u1, u2))) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_cred_check_visible(u1, u2))) return (error); #endif if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(u1, u2))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(u1, u2))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseejailproc(u1, u2))) return (error); return (0); } /*- * Determine if td "can see" the subject specified by p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect p->p_ucred must be held. td really * should be curthread. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_cansee(struct thread *td, struct proc *p) { /* Wrap cr_cansee() for all functionality. */ KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); return (cr_cansee(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred)); } /* * 'conservative_signals' prevents the delivery of a broad class of * signals by unprivileged processes to processes that have changed their * credentials since the last invocation of execve(). This can prevent * the leakage of cached information or retained privileges as a result * of a common class of signal-related vulnerabilities. However, this * may interfere with some applications that expect to be able to * deliver these signals to peer processes after having given up * privilege. */ static int conservative_signals = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, conservative_signals, CTLFLAG_RW, &conservative_signals, 0, "Unprivileged processes prevented from " "sending certain signals to processes whose credentials have changed"); /*- * Determine whether cred may deliver the specified signal to proc. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise. * Locks: A lock must be held for proc. * References: cred and proc must be valid for the lifetime of the call. */ int cr_cansignal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc, int signum) { int error; PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); /* * Jail semantics limit the scope of signalling to proc in the * same jail as cred, if cred is in jail. */ error = prison_check(cred, proc->p_ucred); if (error) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_proc_check_signal(cred, proc, signum))) return (error); #endif if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(cred, proc->p_ucred))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(cred, proc->p_ucred))) return (error); /* * UNIX signal semantics depend on the status of the P_SUGID * bit on the target process. If the bit is set, then additional * restrictions are placed on the set of available signals. */ if (conservative_signals && (proc->p_flag & P_SUGID)) { switch (signum) { case 0: case SIGKILL: case SIGINT: case SIGTERM: case SIGALRM: case SIGSTOP: case SIGTTIN: case SIGTTOU: case SIGTSTP: case SIGHUP: case SIGUSR1: case SIGUSR2: /* * Generally, permit job and terminal control * signals. */ break; default: /* Not permitted without privilege. */ error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID); if (error) return (error); } } /* * Generally, the target credential's ruid or svuid must match the * subject credential's ruid or euid. */ if (cred->cr_ruid != proc->p_ucred->cr_ruid && cred->cr_ruid != proc->p_ucred->cr_svuid && cred->cr_uid != proc->p_ucred->cr_ruid && cred->cr_uid != proc->p_ucred->cr_svuid) { error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED); if (error) return (error); } return (0); } /*- * Determine whether td may deliver the specified signal to p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must be * held for p. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_cansignal(struct thread *td, struct proc *p, int signum) { KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); if (td->td_proc == p) return (0); /* * UNIX signalling semantics require that processes in the same * session always be able to deliver SIGCONT to one another, * overriding the remaining protections. */ /* XXX: This will require an additional lock of some sort. */ if (signum == SIGCONT && td->td_proc->p_session == p->p_session) return (0); /* * Some compat layers use SIGTHR and higher signals for * communication between different kernel threads of the same * process, so that they expect that it's always possible to * deliver them, even for suid applications where cr_cansignal() can * deny such ability for security consideration. It should be * pretty safe to do since the only way to create two processes * with the same p_leader is via rfork(2). */ if (td->td_proc->p_leader != NULL && signum >= SIGTHR && signum < SIGTHR + 4 && td->td_proc->p_leader == p->p_leader) return (0); return (cr_cansignal(td->td_ucred, p, signum)); } /*- * Determine whether td may reschedule p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must * be held for p. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_cansched(struct thread *td, struct proc *p) { int error; KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); if (td->td_proc == p) return (0); if ((error = prison_check(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_proc_check_sched(td->td_ucred, p))) return (error); #endif if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); if (td->td_ucred->cr_ruid != p->p_ucred->cr_ruid && td->td_ucred->cr_uid != p->p_ucred->cr_ruid) { error = priv_check(td, PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED); if (error) return (error); } return (0); } /* * Handle getting or setting the prison's unprivileged_proc_debug * value. */ static int sysctl_unprivileged_proc_debug(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { struct prison *pr; int error, val; val = prison_allow(req->td->td_ucred, PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG) != 0; error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &val, 0, req); if (error != 0 || req->newptr == NULL) return (error); pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison; mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); switch (val) { case 0: pr->pr_allow &= ~(PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG); break; case 1: pr->pr_allow |= PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG; break; default: error = EINVAL; } mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); return (error); } /* * The 'unprivileged_proc_debug' flag may be used to disable a variety of * unprivileged inter-process debugging services, including some procfs * functionality, ptrace(), and ktrace(). In the past, inter-process * debugging has been involved in a variety of security problems, and sites * not requiring the service might choose to disable it when hardening * systems. */ SYSCTL_PROC(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, unprivileged_proc_debug, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_PRISON | CTLFLAG_SECURE, 0, 0, sysctl_unprivileged_proc_debug, "I", "Unprivileged processes may use process debugging facilities"); /*- * Determine whether td may debug p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must * be held for p. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_candebug(struct thread *td, struct proc *p) { int credentialchanged, error, grpsubset, i, uidsubset; KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); if ((error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV))) return (error); if (td->td_proc == p) return (0); if ((error = prison_check(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_proc_check_debug(td->td_ucred, p))) return (error); #endif if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); if ((error = cr_canseeothergids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); /* * Is p's group set a subset of td's effective group set? This * includes p's egid, group access list, rgid, and svgid. */ grpsubset = 1; for (i = 0; i < p->p_ucred->cr_ngroups; i++) { if (!groupmember(p->p_ucred->cr_groups[i], td->td_ucred)) { grpsubset = 0; break; } } grpsubset = grpsubset && groupmember(p->p_ucred->cr_rgid, td->td_ucred) && groupmember(p->p_ucred->cr_svgid, td->td_ucred); /* * Are the uids present in p's credential equal to td's * effective uid? This includes p's euid, svuid, and ruid. */ uidsubset = (td->td_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_ucred->cr_uid && td->td_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_ucred->cr_svuid && td->td_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_ucred->cr_ruid); /* * Has the credential of the process changed since the last exec()? */ credentialchanged = (p->p_flag & P_SUGID); /* * If p's gids aren't a subset, or the uids aren't a subset, * or the credential has changed, require appropriate privilege * for td to debug p. */ if (!grpsubset || !uidsubset) { error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED); if (error) return (error); } if (credentialchanged) { error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID); if (error) return (error); } /* Can't trace init when securelevel > 0. */ if (p == initproc) { error = securelevel_gt(td->td_ucred, 0); if (error) return (error); } /* * Can't trace a process that's currently exec'ing. * * XXX: Note, this is not a security policy decision, it's a * basic correctness/functionality decision. Therefore, this check * should be moved to the caller's of p_candebug(). */ if ((p->p_flag & P_INEXEC) != 0) return (EBUSY); /* Denied explicitely */ if ((p->p_flag2 & P2_NOTRACE) != 0) { error = priv_check(td, PRIV_DEBUG_DENIED); if (error != 0) return (error); } return (0); } /*- * Determine whether the subject represented by cred can "see" a socket. * Returns: 0 for permitted, ENOENT otherwise. */ int cr_canseesocket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so) { int error; error = prison_check(cred, so->so_cred); if (error) return (ENOENT); #ifdef MAC error = mac_socket_check_visible(cred, so); if (error) return (error); #endif if (cr_canseeotheruids(cred, so->so_cred)) return (ENOENT); if (cr_canseeothergids(cred, so->so_cred)) return (ENOENT); return (0); } /*- * Determine whether td can wait for the exit of p. * Returns: 0 for permitted, an errno value otherwise * Locks: Sufficient locks to protect various components of td and p * must be held. td must be curthread, and a lock must * be held for p. * References: td and p must be valid for the lifetime of the call */ int p_canwait(struct thread *td, struct proc *p) { int error; KASSERT(td == curthread, ("%s: td not curthread", __func__)); PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); if ((error = prison_check(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_proc_check_wait(td->td_ucred, p))) return (error); #endif #if 0 /* XXXMAC: This could have odd effects on some shells. */ if ((error = cr_canseeotheruids(td->td_ucred, p->p_ucred))) return (error); #endif return (0); } /* * Allocate a zeroed cred structure. */ struct ucred * crget(void) { struct ucred *cr; cr = malloc(sizeof(*cr), M_CRED, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); refcount_init(&cr->cr_ref, 1); #ifdef AUDIT audit_cred_init(cr); #endif #ifdef MAC mac_cred_init(cr); #endif cr->cr_groups = cr->cr_smallgroups; cr->cr_agroups = sizeof(cr->cr_smallgroups) / sizeof(cr->cr_smallgroups[0]); return (cr); } /* * Claim another reference to a ucred structure. */ struct ucred * crhold(struct ucred *cr) { refcount_acquire(&cr->cr_ref); return (cr); } /* * Free a cred structure. Throws away space when ref count gets to 0. */ void crfree(struct ucred *cr) { KASSERT(cr->cr_ref > 0, ("bad ucred refcount: %d", cr->cr_ref)); KASSERT(cr->cr_ref != 0xdeadc0de, ("dangling reference to ucred")); if (refcount_release(&cr->cr_ref)) { /* * Some callers of crget(), such as nfs_statfs(), * allocate a temporary credential, but don't * allocate a uidinfo structure. */ if (cr->cr_uidinfo != NULL) uifree(cr->cr_uidinfo); if (cr->cr_ruidinfo != NULL) uifree(cr->cr_ruidinfo); /* * Free a prison, if any. */ if (cr->cr_prison != NULL) prison_free(cr->cr_prison); if (cr->cr_loginclass != NULL) loginclass_free(cr->cr_loginclass); #ifdef AUDIT audit_cred_destroy(cr); #endif #ifdef MAC mac_cred_destroy(cr); #endif if (cr->cr_groups != cr->cr_smallgroups) free(cr->cr_groups, M_CRED); free(cr, M_CRED); } } /* * Copy a ucred's contents from a template. Does not block. */ void crcopy(struct ucred *dest, struct ucred *src) { KASSERT(dest->cr_ref == 1, ("crcopy of shared ucred")); bcopy(&src->cr_startcopy, &dest->cr_startcopy, (unsigned)((caddr_t)&src->cr_endcopy - (caddr_t)&src->cr_startcopy)); crsetgroups(dest, src->cr_ngroups, src->cr_groups); uihold(dest->cr_uidinfo); uihold(dest->cr_ruidinfo); prison_hold(dest->cr_prison); loginclass_hold(dest->cr_loginclass); #ifdef AUDIT audit_cred_copy(src, dest); #endif #ifdef MAC mac_cred_copy(src, dest); #endif } /* * Dup cred struct to a new held one. */ struct ucred * crdup(struct ucred *cr) { struct ucred *newcr; newcr = crget(); crcopy(newcr, cr); return (newcr); } /* * Fill in a struct xucred based on a struct ucred. */ void cru2x(struct ucred *cr, struct xucred *xcr) { int ngroups; bzero(xcr, sizeof(*xcr)); xcr->cr_version = XUCRED_VERSION; xcr->cr_uid = cr->cr_uid; ngroups = MIN(cr->cr_ngroups, XU_NGROUPS); xcr->cr_ngroups = ngroups; bcopy(cr->cr_groups, xcr->cr_groups, ngroups * sizeof(*cr->cr_groups)); } void cru2xt(struct thread *td, struct xucred *xcr) { cru2x(td->td_ucred, xcr); xcr->cr_pid = td->td_proc->p_pid; } /* * Set initial process credentials. * Callers are responsible for providing the reference for provided credentials. */ void proc_set_cred_init(struct proc *p, struct ucred *newcred) { p->p_ucred = newcred; } /* * Change process credentials. * Callers are responsible for providing the reference for passed credentials * and for freeing old ones. * * Process has to be locked except when it does not have credentials (as it * should not be visible just yet) or when newcred is NULL (as this can be * only used when the process is about to be freed, at which point it should * not be visible anymore). */ struct ucred * proc_set_cred(struct proc *p, struct ucred *newcred) { struct ucred *oldcred; MPASS(p->p_ucred != NULL); if (newcred == NULL) MPASS(p->p_state == PRS_ZOMBIE); else PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); oldcred = p->p_ucred; p->p_ucred = newcred; if (newcred != NULL) PROC_UPDATE_COW(p); return (oldcred); } struct ucred * crcopysafe(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cr) { struct ucred *oldcred; int groups; PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); oldcred = p->p_ucred; while (cr->cr_agroups < oldcred->cr_agroups) { groups = oldcred->cr_agroups; PROC_UNLOCK(p); crextend(cr, groups); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = p->p_ucred; } crcopy(cr, oldcred); return (oldcred); } /* * Extend the passed in credential to hold n items. */ void crextend(struct ucred *cr, int n) { int cnt; /* Truncate? */ if (n <= cr->cr_agroups) return; /* * We extend by 2 each time since we're using a power of two * allocator until we need enough groups to fill a page. * Once we're allocating multiple pages, only allocate as many * as we actually need. The case of processes needing a * non-power of two number of pages seems more likely than * a real world process that adds thousands of groups one at a * time. */ if ( n < PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(gid_t) ) { if (cr->cr_agroups == 0) cnt = MINALLOCSIZE / sizeof(gid_t); else cnt = cr->cr_agroups * 2; while (cnt < n) cnt *= 2; } else cnt = roundup2(n, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(gid_t)); /* Free the old array. */ if (cr->cr_groups != cr->cr_smallgroups) free(cr->cr_groups, M_CRED); cr->cr_groups = malloc(cnt * sizeof(gid_t), M_CRED, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); cr->cr_agroups = cnt; } /* * Copy groups in to a credential, preserving any necessary invariants. * Currently this includes the sorting of all supplemental gids. * crextend() must have been called before hand to ensure sufficient * space is available. */ static void crsetgroups_locked(struct ucred *cr, int ngrp, gid_t *groups) { int i; int j; gid_t g; KASSERT(cr->cr_agroups >= ngrp, ("cr_ngroups is too small")); bcopy(groups, cr->cr_groups, ngrp * sizeof(gid_t)); cr->cr_ngroups = ngrp; /* * Sort all groups except cr_groups[0] to allow groupmember to * perform a binary search. * * XXX: If large numbers of groups become common this should * be replaced with shell sort like linux uses or possibly * heap sort. */ for (i = 2; i < ngrp; i++) { g = cr->cr_groups[i]; for (j = i-1; j >= 1 && g < cr->cr_groups[j]; j--) cr->cr_groups[j + 1] = cr->cr_groups[j]; cr->cr_groups[j + 1] = g; } } /* * Copy groups in to a credential after expanding it if required. * Truncate the list to (ngroups_max + 1) if it is too large. */ void crsetgroups(struct ucred *cr, int ngrp, gid_t *groups) { if (ngrp > ngroups_max + 1) ngrp = ngroups_max + 1; crextend(cr, ngrp); crsetgroups_locked(cr, ngrp, groups); } /* * Get login name, if available. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct getlogin_args { char *namebuf; u_int namelen; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getlogin(struct thread *td, struct getlogin_args *uap) { char login[MAXLOGNAME]; struct proc *p = td->td_proc; size_t len; if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME) uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME; PROC_LOCK(p); SESS_LOCK(p->p_session); len = strlcpy(login, p->p_session->s_login, uap->namelen) + 1; SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session); PROC_UNLOCK(p); if (len > uap->namelen) return (ERANGE); return (copyout(login, uap->namebuf, len)); } /* * Set login name. */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_ struct setlogin_args { char *namebuf; }; #endif /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setlogin(struct thread *td, struct setlogin_args *uap) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; int error; char logintmp[MAXLOGNAME]; CTASSERT(sizeof(p->p_session->s_login) >= sizeof(logintmp)); error = priv_check(td, PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN); if (error) return (error); error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf, logintmp, sizeof(logintmp), NULL); if (error != 0) { if (error == ENAMETOOLONG) error = EINVAL; return (error); } AUDIT_ARG_LOGIN(logintmp); PROC_LOCK(p); SESS_LOCK(p->p_session); strcpy(p->p_session->s_login, logintmp); SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session); PROC_UNLOCK(p); return (0); } void setsugid(struct proc *p) { PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); p->p_flag |= P_SUGID; if (!(p->p_pfsflags & PF_ISUGID)) p->p_stops = 0; } /*- * Change a process's effective uid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_uid and newcred->cr_uidinfo will be modified. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_euid(struct ucred *newcred, struct uidinfo *euip) { newcred->cr_uid = euip->ui_uid; uihold(euip); uifree(newcred->cr_uidinfo); newcred->cr_uidinfo = euip; } /*- * Change a process's effective gid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_gid will be modified. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_egid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t egid) { newcred->cr_groups[0] = egid; } /*- * Change a process's real uid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_ruid will be updated, newcred->cr_ruidinfo * will be updated, and the old and new cr_ruidinfo proc * counts will be updated. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_ruid(struct ucred *newcred, struct uidinfo *ruip) { (void)chgproccnt(newcred->cr_ruidinfo, -1, 0); newcred->cr_ruid = ruip->ui_uid; uihold(ruip); uifree(newcred->cr_ruidinfo); newcred->cr_ruidinfo = ruip; (void)chgproccnt(newcred->cr_ruidinfo, 1, 0); } /*- * Change a process's real gid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_rgid will be updated. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_rgid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t rgid) { newcred->cr_rgid = rgid; } /*- * Change a process's saved uid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_svuid will be updated. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_svuid(struct ucred *newcred, uid_t svuid) { newcred->cr_svuid = svuid; } /*- * Change a process's saved gid. * Side effects: newcred->cr_svgid will be updated. * References: newcred must be an exclusive credential reference for the * duration of the call. */ void change_svgid(struct ucred *newcred, gid_t svgid) { newcred->cr_svgid = svgid; } Index: head/sys/sys/syscallsubr.h =================================================================== --- head/sys/sys/syscallsubr.h (revision 355721) +++ head/sys/sys/syscallsubr.h (revision 355722) @@ -1,318 +1,319 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD * * Copyright (c) 2002 Ian Dowse. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef _SYS_SYSCALLSUBR_H_ #define _SYS_SYSCALLSUBR_H_ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include struct __wrusage; struct file; struct filecaps; enum idtype; struct itimerval; struct image_args; struct jail; struct kevent; struct kevent_copyops; struct kld_file_stat; struct ksiginfo; struct mbuf; struct msghdr; struct msqid_ds; struct pollfd; struct ogetdirentries_args; struct rlimit; struct rusage; struct sched_param; union semun; struct sockaddr; struct stat; struct thr_param; struct uio; int kern___getcwd(struct thread *td, char *buf, enum uio_seg bufseg, size_t buflen, size_t path_max); int kern_accept(struct thread *td, int s, struct sockaddr **name, socklen_t *namelen, struct file **fp); int kern_accept4(struct thread *td, int s, struct sockaddr **name, socklen_t *namelen, int flags, struct file **fp); int kern_accessat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, int flags, int mode); int kern_adjtime(struct thread *td, struct timeval *delta, struct timeval *olddelta); int kern_alternate_path(struct thread *td, const char *prefix, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, char **pathbuf, int create, int dirfd); int kern_bindat(struct thread *td, int dirfd, int fd, struct sockaddr *sa); int kern_break(struct thread *td, uintptr_t *addr); int kern_cap_ioctls_limit(struct thread *td, int fd, u_long *cmds, size_t ncmds); int kern_cap_rights_limit(struct thread *td, int fd, cap_rights_t *rights); int kern_chdir(struct thread *td, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg); int kern_clock_getcpuclockid2(struct thread *td, id_t id, int which, clockid_t *clk_id); int kern_clock_getres(struct thread *td, clockid_t clock_id, struct timespec *ts); int kern_clock_gettime(struct thread *td, clockid_t clock_id, struct timespec *ats); int kern_clock_nanosleep(struct thread *td, clockid_t clock_id, int flags, const struct timespec *rqtp, struct timespec *rmtp); int kern_clock_settime(struct thread *td, clockid_t clock_id, struct timespec *ats); int kern_close(struct thread *td, int fd); int kern_connectat(struct thread *td, int dirfd, int fd, struct sockaddr *sa); int kern_copy_file_range(struct thread *td, int infd, off_t *inoffp, int outfd, off_t *outoffp, size_t len, unsigned int flags); int kern_cpuset_getaffinity(struct thread *td, cpulevel_t level, cpuwhich_t which, id_t id, size_t cpusetsize, cpuset_t *maskp); int kern_cpuset_setaffinity(struct thread *td, cpulevel_t level, cpuwhich_t which, id_t id, size_t cpusetsize, const cpuset_t *maskp); int kern_cpuset_getdomain(struct thread *td, cpulevel_t level, cpuwhich_t which, id_t id, size_t domainsetsize, domainset_t *maskp, int *policyp); int kern_cpuset_setdomain(struct thread *td, cpulevel_t level, cpuwhich_t which, id_t id, size_t domainsetsize, const domainset_t *maskp, int policy); int kern_cpuset_getid(struct thread *td, cpulevel_t level, cpuwhich_t which, id_t id, cpusetid_t *setid); int kern_cpuset_setid(struct thread *td, cpuwhich_t which, id_t id, cpusetid_t setid); int kern_dup(struct thread *td, u_int mode, int flags, int old, int new); int kern_execve(struct thread *td, struct image_args *args, struct mac *mac_p); int kern_fchmodat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, mode_t mode, int flag); int kern_fchownat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, int uid, int gid, int flag); int kern_fcntl(struct thread *td, int fd, int cmd, intptr_t arg); int kern_fcntl_freebsd(struct thread *td, int fd, int cmd, long arg); int kern_fhstat(struct thread *td, fhandle_t fh, struct stat *buf); int kern_fhstatfs(struct thread *td, fhandle_t fh, struct statfs *buf); int kern_fpathconf(struct thread *td, int fd, int name, long *valuep); int kern_fstat(struct thread *td, int fd, struct stat *sbp); int kern_fstatfs(struct thread *td, int fd, struct statfs *buf); int kern_fsync(struct thread *td, int fd, bool fullsync); int kern_ftruncate(struct thread *td, int fd, off_t length); int kern_futimes(struct thread *td, int fd, struct timeval *tptr, enum uio_seg tptrseg); int kern_futimens(struct thread *td, int fd, struct timespec *tptr, enum uio_seg tptrseg); int kern_getdirentries(struct thread *td, int fd, char *buf, size_t count, off_t *basep, ssize_t *residp, enum uio_seg bufseg); int kern_getfsstat(struct thread *td, struct statfs **buf, size_t bufsize, size_t *countp, enum uio_seg bufseg, int mode); int kern_getitimer(struct thread *, u_int, struct itimerval *); int kern_getppid(struct thread *); int kern_getpeername(struct thread *td, int fd, struct sockaddr **sa, socklen_t *alen); int kern_getrusage(struct thread *td, int who, struct rusage *rup); +int kern_getsid(struct thread *td, pid_t pid); int kern_getsockname(struct thread *td, int fd, struct sockaddr **sa, socklen_t *alen); int kern_getsockopt(struct thread *td, int s, int level, int name, void *optval, enum uio_seg valseg, socklen_t *valsize); int kern_ioctl(struct thread *td, int fd, u_long com, caddr_t data); int kern_jail(struct thread *td, struct jail *j); int kern_jail_get(struct thread *td, struct uio *options, int flags); int kern_jail_set(struct thread *td, struct uio *options, int flags); int kern_kevent(struct thread *td, int fd, int nchanges, int nevents, struct kevent_copyops *k_ops, const struct timespec *timeout); int kern_kevent_anonymous(struct thread *td, int nevents, struct kevent_copyops *k_ops); int kern_kevent_fp(struct thread *td, struct file *fp, int nchanges, int nevents, struct kevent_copyops *k_ops, const struct timespec *timeout); int kern_kqueue(struct thread *td, int flags, struct filecaps *fcaps); int kern_kldload(struct thread *td, const char *file, int *fileid); int kern_kldstat(struct thread *td, int fileid, struct kld_file_stat *stat); int kern_kldunload(struct thread *td, int fileid, int flags); int kern_linkat(struct thread *td, int fd1, int fd2, const char *path1, const char *path2, enum uio_seg segflg, int follow); int kern_listen(struct thread *td, int s, int backlog); int kern_lseek(struct thread *td, int fd, off_t offset, int whence); int kern_lutimes(struct thread *td, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, struct timeval *tptr, enum uio_seg tptrseg); int kern_madvise(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t len, int behav); int kern_mincore(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t len, char *vec); int kern_mkdirat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg segflg, int mode); int kern_mkfifoat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, int mode); int kern_mknodat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, int mode, dev_t dev); int kern_mlock(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, uintptr_t addr, size_t len); int kern_mmap(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t len, int prot, int flags, int fd, off_t pos); int kern_mmap_maxprot(struct proc *p, int prot); int kern_mprotect(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t size, int prot); int kern_msgctl(struct thread *, int, int, struct msqid_ds *); int kern_msgrcv(struct thread *, int, void *, size_t, long, int, long *); int kern_msgsnd(struct thread *, int, const void *, size_t, int, long); int kern_msync(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t size, int flags); int kern_munlock(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t size); int kern_munmap(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t size); int kern_nanosleep(struct thread *td, struct timespec *rqt, struct timespec *rmt); int kern_ogetdirentries(struct thread *td, struct ogetdirentries_args *uap, long *ploff); int kern_openat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, int flags, int mode); int kern_pathconf(struct thread *td, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, int name, u_long flags, long *valuep); int kern_pipe(struct thread *td, int fildes[2], int flags, struct filecaps *fcaps1, struct filecaps *fcaps2); int kern_poll(struct thread *td, struct pollfd *fds, u_int nfds, struct timespec *tsp, sigset_t *uset); int kern_posix_error(struct thread *td, int error); int kern_posix_fadvise(struct thread *td, int fd, off_t offset, off_t len, int advice); int kern_posix_fallocate(struct thread *td, int fd, off_t offset, off_t len); int kern_procctl(struct thread *td, enum idtype idtype, id_t id, int com, void *data); int kern_pread(struct thread *td, int fd, void *buf, size_t nbyte, off_t offset); int kern_preadv(struct thread *td, int fd, struct uio *auio, off_t offset); int kern_pselect(struct thread *td, int nd, fd_set *in, fd_set *ou, fd_set *ex, struct timeval *tvp, sigset_t *uset, int abi_nfdbits); int kern_ptrace(struct thread *td, int req, pid_t pid, void *addr, int data); int kern_pwrite(struct thread *td, int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbyte, off_t offset); int kern_pwritev(struct thread *td, int fd, struct uio *auio, off_t offset); int kern_readlinkat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, char *buf, enum uio_seg bufseg, size_t count); int kern_readv(struct thread *td, int fd, struct uio *auio); int kern_recvit(struct thread *td, int s, struct msghdr *mp, enum uio_seg fromseg, struct mbuf **controlp); int kern_renameat(struct thread *td, int oldfd, const char *old, int newfd, const char *new, enum uio_seg pathseg); int kern_frmdirat(struct thread *td, int dfd, const char *path, int fd, enum uio_seg pathseg, int flag); int kern_sched_getparam(struct thread *td, struct thread *targettd, struct sched_param *param); int kern_sched_getscheduler(struct thread *td, struct thread *targettd, int *policy); int kern_sched_setparam(struct thread *td, struct thread *targettd, struct sched_param *param); int kern_sched_setscheduler(struct thread *td, struct thread *targettd, int policy, struct sched_param *param); int kern_sched_rr_get_interval(struct thread *td, pid_t pid, struct timespec *ts); int kern_sched_rr_get_interval_td(struct thread *td, struct thread *targettd, struct timespec *ts); int kern_semctl(struct thread *td, int semid, int semnum, int cmd, union semun *arg, register_t *rval); int kern_select(struct thread *td, int nd, fd_set *fd_in, fd_set *fd_ou, fd_set *fd_ex, struct timeval *tvp, int abi_nfdbits); int kern_sendit(struct thread *td, int s, struct msghdr *mp, int flags, struct mbuf *control, enum uio_seg segflg); int kern_setgroups(struct thread *td, u_int ngrp, gid_t *groups); int kern_setitimer(struct thread *, u_int, struct itimerval *, struct itimerval *); int kern_setrlimit(struct thread *, u_int, struct rlimit *); int kern_setsockopt(struct thread *td, int s, int level, int name, const void *optval, enum uio_seg valseg, socklen_t valsize); int kern_settimeofday(struct thread *td, struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tzp); int kern_shm_open(struct thread *td, const char *userpath, int flags, mode_t mode, struct filecaps *fcaps, int initial_seals); int kern_shm_open2(struct thread *td, const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode, int shmflags, const char *name); int kern_shmat(struct thread *td, int shmid, const void *shmaddr, int shmflg); int kern_shmctl(struct thread *td, int shmid, int cmd, void *buf, size_t *bufsz); int kern_shutdown(struct thread *td, int s, int how); int kern_sigaction(struct thread *td, int sig, const struct sigaction *act, struct sigaction *oact, int flags); int kern_sigaltstack(struct thread *td, stack_t *ss, stack_t *oss); int kern_sigprocmask(struct thread *td, int how, sigset_t *set, sigset_t *oset, int flags); int kern_sigsuspend(struct thread *td, sigset_t mask); int kern_sigtimedwait(struct thread *td, sigset_t waitset, struct ksiginfo *ksi, struct timespec *timeout); int kern_sigqueue(struct thread *td, pid_t pid, int signum, union sigval *value); int kern_socket(struct thread *td, int domain, int type, int protocol); int kern_statat(struct thread *td, int flag, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, struct stat *sbp, void (*hook)(struct vnode *vp, struct stat *sbp)); int kern_statfs(struct thread *td, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, struct statfs *buf); int kern_symlinkat(struct thread *td, const char *path1, int fd, const char *path2, enum uio_seg segflg); int kern_sync(struct thread *td); int kern_ktimer_create(struct thread *td, clockid_t clock_id, struct sigevent *evp, int *timerid, int preset_id); int kern_ktimer_delete(struct thread *, int); int kern_ktimer_settime(struct thread *td, int timer_id, int flags, struct itimerspec *val, struct itimerspec *oval); int kern_ktimer_gettime(struct thread *td, int timer_id, struct itimerspec *val); int kern_ktimer_getoverrun(struct thread *td, int timer_id); int kern_thr_alloc(struct proc *, int pages, struct thread **); int kern_thr_exit(struct thread *td); int kern_thr_new(struct thread *td, struct thr_param *param); int kern_thr_suspend(struct thread *td, struct timespec *tsp); int kern_truncate(struct thread *td, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, off_t length); int kern_funlinkat(struct thread *td, int dfd, const char *path, int fd, enum uio_seg pathseg, int flag, ino_t oldinum); int kern_utimesat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, struct timeval *tptr, enum uio_seg tptrseg); int kern_utimensat(struct thread *td, int fd, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg, struct timespec *tptr, enum uio_seg tptrseg, int follow); int kern_wait(struct thread *td, pid_t pid, int *status, int options, struct rusage *rup); int kern_wait6(struct thread *td, enum idtype idtype, id_t id, int *status, int options, struct __wrusage *wrup, siginfo_t *sip); int kern_writev(struct thread *td, int fd, struct uio *auio); int kern_socketpair(struct thread *td, int domain, int type, int protocol, int *rsv); /* flags for kern_sigaction */ #define KSA_OSIGSET 0x0001 /* uses osigact_t */ #define KSA_FREEBSD4 0x0002 /* uses ucontext4 */ struct freebsd11_dirent; int freebsd11_kern_getdirentries(struct thread *td, int fd, char *ubuf, u_int count, long *basep, void (*func)(struct freebsd11_dirent *)); #endif /* !_SYS_SYSCALLSUBR_H_ */