Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,505 +1,504 @@ /* * This module implements a simple access control language that is based on * host (or domain) names, NIS (host) netgroup names, IP addresses (or * network numbers) and daemon process names. When a match is found the * search is terminated, and depending on whether PROCESS_OPTIONS is defined, * a list of options is executed or an optional shell command is executed. * * Host and user names are looked up on demand, provided that suitable endpoint * information is available as sockaddr_in structures or TLI netbufs. As a * side effect, the pattern matching process may change the contents of * request structure fields. * * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). * * Compile with -DNETGROUP if your library provides support for netgroups. * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) hosts_access.c 1.21 97/02/12 02:13:22"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include #ifdef INT32_T typedef uint32_t u_int32_t; #endif #include #ifdef INET6 #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef INET6 #include #endif #include extern char *fgets(); extern int errno; #ifndef INADDR_NONE #define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ #endif /* Local stuff. */ #include "tcpd.h" /* Error handling. */ extern jmp_buf tcpd_buf; /* Delimiters for lists of daemons or clients. */ static char sep[] = ", \t\r\n"; /* Constants to be used in assignments only, not in comparisons... */ #define YES 1 #define NO 0 /* * These variables are globally visible so that they can be redirected in * verification mode. */ char *hosts_allow_table = HOSTS_ALLOW; char *hosts_deny_table = HOSTS_DENY; int hosts_access_verbose = 0; /* * In a long-running process, we are not at liberty to just go away. */ int resident = (-1); /* -1, 0: unknown; +1: yes */ /* Forward declarations. */ -static int table_match(); -static int list_match(); -static int server_match(); -static int client_match(); -static int host_match(); -static int string_match(); -static int masked_match(); +static int table_match(char *table, struct request_info *request); +static int list_match(char *list, struct request_info *request, + int (*match_fn)(char *, struct request_info *)); +static int server_match(char *tok, struct request_info *request); +static int client_match(char *tok, struct request_info *request); +static int host_match(char *tok, struct host_info *host); +static int string_match(char *tok, char *string); +static int masked_match(char *net_tok, char *mask_tok, char *string); #ifdef INET6 -static int masked_match4(); -static int masked_match6(); +static int masked_match4(char *net_tok, char *mask_tok, char *string); +static int masked_match6(char *net_tok, char *mask_tok, char *string); #endif /* Size of logical line buffer. */ #define BUFLEN 2048 /* definition to be used from workarounds.c */ #ifdef NETGROUP int yp_get_default_domain(char **); #endif /* hosts_access - host access control facility */ int hosts_access(request) struct request_info *request; { int verdict; /* * If the (daemon, client) pair is matched by an entry in the file * /etc/hosts.allow, access is granted. Otherwise, if the (daemon, * client) pair is matched by an entry in the file /etc/hosts.deny, * access is denied. Otherwise, access is granted. A non-existent * access-control file is treated as an empty file. * * After a rule has been matched, the optional language extensions may * decide to grant or refuse service anyway. Or, while a rule is being * processed, a serious error is found, and it seems better to play safe * and deny service. All this is done by jumping back into the * hosts_access() routine, bypassing the regular return from the * table_match() function calls below. */ if (resident <= 0) resident++; verdict = setjmp(tcpd_buf); if (verdict != 0) return (verdict == AC_PERMIT); if (table_match(hosts_allow_table, request)) return (YES); if (table_match(hosts_deny_table, request)) return (NO); return (YES); } /* table_match - match table entries with (daemon, client) pair */ static int table_match(table, request) char *table; struct request_info *request; { FILE *fp; char sv_list[BUFLEN]; /* becomes list of daemons */ char *cl_list; /* becomes list of clients */ char *sh_cmd; /* becomes optional shell command */ int match = NO; struct tcpd_context saved_context; char *cp; saved_context = tcpd_context; /* stupid compilers */ /* * Between the fopen() and fclose() calls, avoid jumps that may cause * file descriptor leaks. */ if ((fp = fopen(table, "r")) != 0) { tcpd_context.file = table; tcpd_context.line = 0; while (match == NO && xgets(sv_list, sizeof(sv_list), fp) != 0) { if (sv_list[strlen(sv_list) - 1] != '\n') { tcpd_warn("missing newline or line too long"); continue; } /* Ignore anything after unescaped # character */ for (cp = strchr(sv_list, '#'); cp != NULL;) { if (cp > sv_list && cp[-1] == '\\') { cp = strchr(cp + 1, '#'); continue; } *cp = '\0'; break; } if (sv_list[strspn(sv_list, " \t\r\n")] == 0) continue; if ((cl_list = split_at(sv_list, ':')) == 0) { tcpd_warn("missing \":\" separator"); continue; } sh_cmd = split_at(cl_list, ':'); match = list_match(sv_list, request, server_match) && list_match(cl_list, request, client_match); } (void) fclose(fp); } else if (errno != ENOENT) { tcpd_warn("cannot open %s: %m", table); } if (match) { if (hosts_access_verbose > 1) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "matched: %s line %d", tcpd_context.file, tcpd_context.line); if (sh_cmd) { #ifdef PROCESS_OPTIONS process_options(sh_cmd, request); #else char cmd[BUFSIZ]; shell_cmd(percent_x(cmd, sizeof(cmd), sh_cmd, request)); #endif } } tcpd_context = saved_context; return (match); } /* list_match - match a request against a list of patterns with exceptions */ -static int list_match(list, request, match_fn) -char *list; -struct request_info *request; -int (*match_fn) (); +static int list_match(char *list, struct request_info *request, + int (*match_fn)(char *, struct request_info *)) { char *tok; /* * Process tokens one at a time. We have exhausted all possible matches * when we reach an "EXCEPT" token or the end of the list. If we do find * a match, look for an "EXCEPT" list and recurse to determine whether * the match is affected by any exceptions. */ for (tok = strtok(list, sep); tok != 0; tok = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) { if (STR_EQ(tok, "EXCEPT")) /* EXCEPT: give up */ return (NO); if (match_fn(tok, request)) { /* YES: look for exceptions */ while ((tok = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) && STR_NE(tok, "EXCEPT")) /* VOID */ ; return (tok == 0 || list_match((char *) 0, request, match_fn) == 0); } } return (NO); } /* server_match - match server information */ static int server_match(tok, request) char *tok; struct request_info *request; { char *host; if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) { /* plain daemon */ return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request))); } else { /* daemon@host */ return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request)) && host_match(host, request->server)); } } /* client_match - match client information */ static int client_match(tok, request) char *tok; struct request_info *request; { char *host; if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) { /* plain host */ return (host_match(tok, request->client)); } else { /* user@host */ return (host_match(host, request->client) && string_match(tok, eval_user(request))); } } /* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */ static int hostfile_match(path, host) char *path; struct host_info *host; { char tok[BUFSIZ]; int match = NO; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host))) /* void */ ; fclose(fp); } else if (errno != ENOENT) { tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path); } return (match); } /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */ static int host_match(tok, host) char *tok; struct host_info *host; { char *mask; /* * This code looks a little hairy because we want to avoid unnecessary * hostname lookups. * * The KNOWN pattern requires that both address AND name be known; some * patterns are specific to host names or to host addresses; all other * patterns are satisfied when either the address OR the name match. */ if (tok[0] == '@') { /* netgroup: look it up */ #ifdef NETGROUP static char *mydomain = 0; if (mydomain == 0) yp_get_default_domain(&mydomain); return (innetgr(tok + 1, eval_hostname(host), (char *) 0, mydomain)); #else tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */ return (NO); #endif } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */ return (hostfile_match(tok, host)); } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */ char *name = eval_hostname(host); return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "LOCAL")) { /* local: no dots in name */ char *name = eval_hostname(host); return (strchr(name, '.') == 0 && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); } else if ((mask = split_at(tok, '/')) != 0) { /* net/mask */ return (masked_match(tok, mask, eval_hostaddr(host))); } else { /* anything else */ return (string_match(tok, eval_hostaddr(host)) || (NOT_INADDR(tok) && string_match(tok, eval_hostname(host)))); } } /* string_match - match string against pattern */ static int string_match(tok, string) char *tok; char *string; { int n; #ifdef INET6 /* convert IPv4 mapped IPv6 address to IPv4 address */ if (STRN_EQ(string, "::ffff:", 7) && dot_quad_addr(string + 7) != INADDR_NONE) { string += 7; } #endif if (tok[0] == '.') { /* suffix */ n = strlen(string) - strlen(tok); return (n > 0 && STR_EQ(tok, string + n)); } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "ALL")) { /* all: match any */ return (YES); } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* not unknown */ return (STR_NE(string, unknown)); } else if (tok[(n = strlen(tok)) - 1] == '.') { /* prefix */ return (STRN_EQ(tok, string, n)); } else { /* exact match */ #ifdef INET6 struct addrinfo hints, *res; struct sockaddr_in6 pat, addr; int len, ret; char ch; len = strlen(tok); if (*tok == '[' && tok[len - 1] == ']') { ch = tok[len - 1]; tok[len - 1] = '\0'; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = AF_INET6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; if ((ret = getaddrinfo(tok + 1, NULL, &hints, &res)) == 0) { memcpy(&pat, res->ai_addr, sizeof(pat)); freeaddrinfo(res); } tok[len - 1] = ch; if (ret != 0 || getaddrinfo(string, NULL, &hints, &res) != 0) return NO; memcpy(&addr, res->ai_addr, sizeof(addr)); freeaddrinfo(res); if (pat.sin6_scope_id != 0 && addr.sin6_scope_id != pat.sin6_scope_id) return NO; return (!memcmp(&pat.sin6_addr, &addr.sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr))); return (ret); } #endif return (STR_EQ(tok, string)); } } /* masked_match - match address against netnumber/netmask */ #ifdef INET6 static int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string) char *net_tok; char *mask_tok; char *string; { return (masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string) || masked_match6(net_tok, mask_tok, string)); } static int masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string) #else static int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string) #endif char *net_tok; char *mask_tok; char *string; { #ifdef INET6 u_int32_t net; u_int32_t mask; u_int32_t addr; #else unsigned long net; unsigned long mask; unsigned long addr; #endif /* * Disallow forms other than dotted quad: the treatment that inet_addr() * gives to forms with less than four components is inconsistent with the * access control language. John P. Rouillard . */ if ((addr = dot_quad_addr(string)) == INADDR_NONE) return (NO); if ((net = dot_quad_addr(net_tok)) == INADDR_NONE || (mask = dot_quad_addr(mask_tok)) == INADDR_NONE) { #ifndef INET6 tcpd_warn("bad net/mask expression: %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok); #endif return (NO); /* not tcpd_jump() */ } return ((addr & mask) == net); } #ifdef INET6 static int masked_match6(net_tok, mask_tok, string) char *net_tok; char *mask_tok; char *string; { struct addrinfo hints, *res; struct sockaddr_in6 net, addr; u_int32_t mask; int len, mask_len, i = 0; char ch; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = AF_INET6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; if (getaddrinfo(string, NULL, &hints, &res) != 0) return NO; memcpy(&addr, res->ai_addr, sizeof(addr)); freeaddrinfo(res); if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&addr.sin6_addr)) { if ((*(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[12] = dot_quad_addr(net_tok)) == INADDR_NONE || (mask = dot_quad_addr(mask_tok)) == INADDR_NONE) return (NO); return ((*(u_int32_t *)&addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr[12] & mask) == *(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[12]); } /* match IPv6 address against netnumber/prefixlen */ len = strlen(net_tok); if (*net_tok != '[' || net_tok[len - 1] != ']') return NO; ch = net_tok[len - 1]; net_tok[len - 1] = '\0'; if (getaddrinfo(net_tok + 1, NULL, &hints, &res) != 0) { net_tok[len - 1] = ch; return NO; } memcpy(&net, res->ai_addr, sizeof(net)); freeaddrinfo(res); net_tok[len - 1] = ch; if ((mask_len = atoi(mask_tok)) < 0 || mask_len > 128) return NO; if (net.sin6_scope_id != 0 && addr.sin6_scope_id != net.sin6_scope_id) return NO; while (mask_len > 0) { if (mask_len < 32) { mask = htonl(~(0xffffffff >> mask_len)); if ((*(u_int32_t *)&addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] & mask) != (*(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] & mask)) return NO; break; } if (*(u_int32_t *)&addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] != *(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i]) return NO; i += 4; mask_len -= 32; } return YES; } #endif /* INET6 */ Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,324 +1,321 @@ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* * Routines to parse an inetd.conf or tlid.conf file. This would be a great * job for a PERL script. * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) inetcf.c 1.7 97/02/12 02:13:23"; #endif #include #include #include #include -#include #include +#include -extern int errno; -extern void exit(); - #include "tcpd.h" #include "inetcf.h" #include "scaffold.h" /* * Network configuration files may live in unusual places. Here are some * guesses. Shorter names follow longer ones. */ char *inet_files[] = { "/private/etc/inetd.conf", /* NEXT */ "/etc/inet/inetd.conf", /* SYSV4 */ "/usr/etc/inetd.conf", /* IRIX?? */ "/etc/inetd.conf", /* BSD */ "/etc/net/tlid.conf", /* SYSV4?? */ "/etc/saf/tlid.conf", /* SYSV4?? */ "/etc/tlid.conf", /* SYSV4?? */ 0, }; -static void inet_chk(); -static char *base_name(); +static void inet_chk(char *protocol, char *path, char *arg0, char *arg1); +static char *base_name(char *path); +extern char *percent_m(char *obuf, char *ibuf); /* * Structure with everything we know about a service. */ struct inet_ent { struct inet_ent *next; int type; char name[1]; }; static struct inet_ent *inet_list = 0; static char whitespace[] = " \t\r\n"; /* inet_conf - read in and examine inetd.conf (or tlid.conf) entries */ char *inet_cfg(conf) char *conf; { char buf[BUFSIZ]; FILE *fp; char *service; char *protocol; char *user; char *path; char *arg0; char *arg1; struct tcpd_context saved_context; - char *percent_m(); int i; struct stat st; saved_context = tcpd_context; /* * The inetd.conf (or tlid.conf) information is so useful that we insist * on its availability. When no file is given run a series of educated * guesses. */ if (conf != 0) { if ((fp = fopen(conf, "r")) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, percent_m(buf, "open %s: %m\n"), conf); exit(1); } } else { for (i = 0; inet_files[i] && (fp = fopen(inet_files[i], "r")) == 0; i++) /* void */ ; if (fp == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find your inetd.conf or tlid.conf file.\n"); fprintf(stderr, "Please specify its location.\n"); exit(1); } conf = inet_files[i]; check_path(conf, &st); } /* * Process the file. After the 7.0 wrapper release it became clear that * there are many more inetd.conf formats than the 8 systems that I had * studied. EP/IX uses a two-line specification for rpc services; HP-UX * permits long lines to be broken with backslash-newline. */ tcpd_context.file = conf; tcpd_context.line = 0; while (xgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { service = strtok(buf, whitespace); /* service */ if (service == 0 || *service == '#') continue; if (STR_NE(service, "stream") && STR_NE(service, "dgram")) strtok((char *) 0, whitespace); /* endpoint */ protocol = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace); (void) strtok((char *) 0, whitespace); /* wait */ if ((user = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) continue; if (user[0] == '/') { /* user */ path = user; } else { /* path */ if ((path = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) continue; } if (path[0] == '?') /* IRIX optional service */ path++; if (STR_EQ(path, "internal")) continue; if (path[strspn(path, "-0123456789")] == 0) { /* * ConvexOS puts RPC version numbers before path names. Jukka * Ukkonen . */ if ((path = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) continue; } if ((arg0 = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) { tcpd_warn("incomplete line"); continue; } if (arg0[strspn(arg0, "0123456789")] == 0) { /* * We're reading a tlid.conf file, the format is: * * ...stuff... path arg_count arguments mod_count modules */ if ((arg0 = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) { tcpd_warn("incomplete line"); continue; } } if ((arg1 = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) arg1 = ""; inet_chk(protocol, path, arg0, arg1); } fclose(fp); tcpd_context = saved_context; return (conf); } /* inet_chk - examine one inetd.conf (tlid.conf?) entry */ static void inet_chk(protocol, path, arg0, arg1) char *protocol; char *path; char *arg0; char *arg1; { char daemon[BUFSIZ]; struct stat st; int wrap_status = WR_MAYBE; char *base_name_path = base_name(path); char *tcpd_proc_name = (arg0[0] == '/' ? base_name(arg0) : arg0); /* * Always warn when the executable does not exist or when it is not * executable. */ if (check_path(path, &st) < 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: not found: %m", path); } else if ((st.st_mode & 0100) == 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: not executable", path); } /* * Cheat on the miscd tests, nobody uses it anymore. */ if (STR_EQ(base_name_path, "miscd")) { inet_set(arg0, WR_YES); return; } /* * While we are here... */ if (STR_EQ(tcpd_proc_name, "rexd") || STR_EQ(tcpd_proc_name, "rpc.rexd")) tcpd_warn("%s may be an insecure service", tcpd_proc_name); /* * The tcpd program gets most of the attention. */ if (STR_EQ(base_name_path, "tcpd")) { if (STR_EQ(tcpd_proc_name, "tcpd")) tcpd_warn("%s is recursively calling itself", tcpd_proc_name); wrap_status = WR_YES; /* * Check: some sites install the wrapper set-uid. */ if ((st.st_mode & 06000) != 0) tcpd_warn("%s: file is set-uid or set-gid", path); /* * Check: some sites insert tcpd in inetd.conf, instead of replacing * the daemon pathname. */ if (arg0[0] == '/' && STR_EQ(tcpd_proc_name, base_name(arg1))) tcpd_warn("%s inserted before %s", path, arg0); /* * Check: make sure files exist and are executable. On some systems * the network daemons are set-uid so we cannot complain. Note that * tcpd takes the basename only in case of absolute pathnames. */ if (arg0[0] == '/') { /* absolute path */ if (check_path(arg0, &st) < 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: not found: %m", arg0); } else if ((st.st_mode & 0100) == 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: not executable", arg0); } } else { /* look in REAL_DAEMON_DIR */ sprintf(daemon, "%s/%s", REAL_DAEMON_DIR, arg0); if (check_path(daemon, &st) < 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: not found in %s: %m", arg0, REAL_DAEMON_DIR); } else if ((st.st_mode & 0100) == 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: not executable", daemon); } } } else { /* * No tcpd program found. Perhaps they used the "simple installation" * recipe. Look for a file with the same basename in REAL_DAEMON_DIR. * Draw some conservative conclusions when a distinct file is found. */ sprintf(daemon, "%s/%s", REAL_DAEMON_DIR, arg0); if (STR_EQ(path, daemon)) { #ifdef __FreeBSD__ wrap_status = WR_MAYBE; #else wrap_status = WR_NOT; #endif } else if (check_path(daemon, &st) >= 0) { wrap_status = WR_MAYBE; } else if (errno == ENOENT) { wrap_status = WR_NOT; } else { tcpd_warn("%s: file lookup: %m", daemon); wrap_status = WR_MAYBE; } } /* * Alas, we cannot wrap rpc/tcp services. */ if (wrap_status == WR_YES && STR_EQ(protocol, "rpc/tcp")) tcpd_warn("%s: cannot wrap rpc/tcp services", tcpd_proc_name); inet_set(tcpd_proc_name, wrap_status); } /* inet_set - remember service status */ void inet_set(name, type) char *name; int type; { struct inet_ent *ip = (struct inet_ent *) malloc(sizeof(struct inet_ent) + strlen(name)); if (ip == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "out of memory\n"); exit(1); } ip->next = inet_list; strcpy(ip->name, name); ip->type = type; inet_list = ip; } /* inet_get - look up service status */ int inet_get(name) char *name; { struct inet_ent *ip; if (inet_list == 0) return (WR_MAYBE); for (ip = inet_list; ip; ip = ip->next) if (STR_EQ(ip->name, name)) return (ip->type); return (-1); } /* base_name - compute last pathname component */ static char *base_name(path) char *path; { char *cp; if ((cp = strrchr(path, '/')) != 0) path = cp + 1; return (path); } Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.h =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.h (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.h (revision 350296) @@ -1,14 +1,14 @@ /* * @(#) inetcf.h 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:30 * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. */ -extern char *inet_cfg(); /* read inetd.conf file */ -extern void inet_set(); /* remember internet service */ -extern int inet_get(); /* look up internet service */ +extern char *inet_cfg(char *conf); /* read inetd.conf file */ +extern void inet_set(char *name, int type); /* remember internet service */ +extern int inet_get(char *name); /* look up internet service */ #define WR_UNKNOWN (-1) /* service unknown */ #define WR_NOT 1 /* may not be wrapped */ #define WR_MAYBE 2 /* may be wrapped */ #define WR_YES 3 /* service is wrapped */ Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/mystdarg.h =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/mystdarg.h (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/mystdarg.h (revision 350296) @@ -1,19 +1,19 @@ /* * What follows is an attempt to unify varargs.h and stdarg.h. I'd rather * have this than #ifdefs all over the code. */ #ifdef __STDC__ #include #define VARARGS(func,type,arg) func(type arg, ...) #define VASTART(ap,type,name) va_start(ap,name) #define VAEND(ap) va_end(ap) #else #include #define VARARGS(func,type,arg) func(va_alist) va_dcl #define VASTART(ap,type,name) {type name; va_start(ap); name = va_arg(ap, type) #define VAEND(ap) va_end(ap);} #endif -extern char *percent_m(); +extern char *percent_m(char *obuf, char *ibuf); Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/options.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/options.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/options.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,538 +1,538 @@ /* * General skeleton for adding options to the access control language. The * features offered by this module are documented in the hosts_options(5) * manual page (source file: hosts_options.5, "nroff -man" format). * * Notes and warnings for those who want to add features: * * In case of errors, abort options processing and deny access. There are too * many irreversible side effects to make error recovery feasible. For * example, it makes no sense to continue after we have already changed the * userid. * * In case of errors, do not terminate the process: the routines might be * called from a long-running daemon that should run forever. Instead, call * tcpd_jump() which does a non-local goto back into the hosts_access() * routine. * * In case of severe errors, use clean_exit() instead of directly calling * exit(), or the inetd may loop on an UDP request. * * In verification mode (for example, with the "tcpdmatch" command) the * "dry_run" flag is set. In this mode, an option function should just "say" * what it is going to do instead of really doing it. * * Some option functions do not return (for example, the twist option passes * control to another program). In verification mode (dry_run flag is set) * such options should clear the "dry_run" flag to inform the caller of this * course of action. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) options.c 1.17 96/02/11 17:01:31"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define SYSLOG_NAMES #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef MAXPATHNAMELEN #define MAXPATHNAMELEN BUFSIZ #endif /* Local stuff. */ #include "tcpd.h" /* Options runtime support. */ int dry_run = 0; /* flag set in verification mode */ extern jmp_buf tcpd_buf; /* tcpd_jump() support */ /* Options parser support. */ static char whitespace_eq[] = "= \t\r\n"; #define whitespace (whitespace_eq + 1) -static char *get_field(); /* chew :-delimited field off string */ -static char *chop_string(); /* strip leading and trailing blanks */ +static char *get_field(char *string); /* chew :-delimited field off string */ +static char *chop_string(char *string); /* strip leading and trailing blanks */ /* List of functions that implement the options. Add yours here. */ static void user_option(); /* execute "user name.group" option */ static void group_option(); /* execute "group name" option */ static void umask_option(); /* execute "umask mask" option */ static void linger_option(); /* execute "linger time" option */ static void keepalive_option(); /* execute "keepalive" option */ static void spawn_option(); /* execute "spawn command" option */ static void twist_option(); /* execute "twist command" option */ static void rfc931_option(); /* execute "rfc931" option */ static void setenv_option(); /* execute "setenv name value" */ static void nice_option(); /* execute "nice" option */ static void severity_option(); /* execute "severity value" */ static void allow_option(); /* execute "allow" option */ static void deny_option(); /* execute "deny" option */ static void banners_option(); /* execute "banners path" option */ /* Structure of the options table. */ struct option { char *name; /* keyword name, case is ignored */ void (*func) (); /* function that does the real work */ int flags; /* see below... */ }; #define NEED_ARG (1<<1) /* option requires argument */ #define USE_LAST (1<<2) /* option must be last */ #define OPT_ARG (1<<3) /* option has optional argument */ #define EXPAND_ARG (1<<4) /* do %x expansion on argument */ #define need_arg(o) ((o)->flags & NEED_ARG) #define opt_arg(o) ((o)->flags & OPT_ARG) #define permit_arg(o) ((o)->flags & (NEED_ARG | OPT_ARG)) #define use_last(o) ((o)->flags & USE_LAST) #define expand_arg(o) ((o)->flags & EXPAND_ARG) /* List of known keywords. Add yours here. */ static struct option option_table[] = { "user", user_option, NEED_ARG, "group", group_option, NEED_ARG, "umask", umask_option, NEED_ARG, "linger", linger_option, NEED_ARG, "keepalive", keepalive_option, 0, "spawn", spawn_option, NEED_ARG | EXPAND_ARG, "twist", twist_option, NEED_ARG | EXPAND_ARG | USE_LAST, "rfc931", rfc931_option, OPT_ARG, "setenv", setenv_option, NEED_ARG | EXPAND_ARG, "nice", nice_option, OPT_ARG, "severity", severity_option, NEED_ARG, "allow", allow_option, USE_LAST, "deny", deny_option, USE_LAST, "banners", banners_option, NEED_ARG, 0, }; /* process_options - process access control options */ void process_options(options, request) char *options; struct request_info *request; { char *key; char *value; char *curr_opt; char *next_opt; struct option *op; char bf[BUFSIZ]; for (curr_opt = get_field(options); curr_opt; curr_opt = next_opt) { next_opt = get_field((char *) 0); /* * Separate the option into name and value parts. For backwards * compatibility we ignore exactly one '=' between name and value. */ curr_opt = chop_string(curr_opt); if (*(value = curr_opt + strcspn(curr_opt, whitespace_eq))) { if (*value != '=') { *value++ = 0; value += strspn(value, whitespace); } if (*value == '=') { *value++ = 0; value += strspn(value, whitespace); } } if (*value == 0) value = 0; key = curr_opt; /* * Disallow missing option names (and empty option fields). */ if (*key == 0) tcpd_jump("missing option name"); /* * Lookup the option-specific info and do some common error checks. * Delegate option-specific processing to the specific functions. */ for (op = option_table; op->name && STR_NE(op->name, key); op++) /* VOID */ ; if (op->name == 0) tcpd_jump("bad option name: \"%s\"", key); if (!value && need_arg(op)) tcpd_jump("option \"%s\" requires value", key); if (value && !permit_arg(op)) tcpd_jump("option \"%s\" requires no value", key); if (next_opt && use_last(op)) tcpd_jump("option \"%s\" must be at end", key); if (value && expand_arg(op)) value = chop_string(percent_x(bf, sizeof(bf), value, request)); if (hosts_access_verbose) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "option: %s %s", key, value ? value : ""); (*(op->func)) (value, request); } } /* allow_option - grant access */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void allow_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { longjmp(tcpd_buf, AC_PERMIT); } /* deny_option - deny access */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void deny_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { longjmp(tcpd_buf, AC_DENY); } /* banners_option - expand %, terminate each line with CRLF */ static void banners_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { char path[MAXPATHNAMELEN]; char ibuf[BUFSIZ]; char obuf[2 * BUFSIZ]; struct stat st; int ch; FILE *fp; sprintf(path, "%s/%s", value, eval_daemon(request)); if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { while ((ch = fgetc(fp)) == 0) write(request->fd, "", 1); ungetc(ch, fp); while (fgets(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf) - 1, fp)) { if (split_at(ibuf, '\n')) strcat(ibuf, "\r\n"); percent_x(obuf, sizeof(obuf), ibuf, request); write(request->fd, obuf, strlen(obuf)); } fclose(fp); } else if (stat(value, &st) < 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: %m", value); } } /* group_option - switch group id */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void group_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { struct group *grp; struct group *getgrnam(); if ((grp = getgrnam(value)) == 0) tcpd_jump("unknown group: \"%s\"", value); endgrent(); if (dry_run == 0 && setgid(grp->gr_gid)) tcpd_jump("setgid(%s): %m", value); } /* user_option - switch user id */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void user_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { struct passwd *pwd; struct passwd *getpwnam(); char *group; if ((group = split_at(value, '.')) != 0) group_option(group, request); if ((pwd = getpwnam(value)) == 0) tcpd_jump("unknown user: \"%s\"", value); endpwent(); if (dry_run == 0 && setuid(pwd->pw_uid)) tcpd_jump("setuid(%s): %m", value); } /* umask_option - set file creation mask */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void umask_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { unsigned mask; char junk; if (sscanf(value, "%o%c", &mask, &junk) != 1 || (mask & 0777) != mask) tcpd_jump("bad umask value: \"%s\"", value); (void) umask(mask); } /* spawn_option - spawn a shell command and wait */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void spawn_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { if (dry_run == 0) shell_cmd(value); } /* linger_option - set the socket linger time (Marc Boucher ) */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void linger_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { struct linger linger; char junk; if (sscanf(value, "%d%c", &linger.l_linger, &junk) != 1 || linger.l_linger < 0) tcpd_jump("bad linger value: \"%s\"", value); if (dry_run == 0) { linger.l_onoff = (linger.l_linger != 0); if (setsockopt(request->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (char *) &linger, sizeof(linger)) < 0) tcpd_warn("setsockopt SO_LINGER %d: %m", linger.l_linger); } } /* keepalive_option - set the socket keepalive option */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void keepalive_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { static int on = 1; if (dry_run == 0 && setsockopt(request->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (char *) &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) tcpd_warn("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %m"); } /* nice_option - set nice value */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void nice_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { int niceval = 10; char junk; if (value != 0 && sscanf(value, "%d%c", &niceval, &junk) != 1) tcpd_jump("bad nice value: \"%s\"", value); if (dry_run == 0 && nice(niceval) < 0) tcpd_warn("nice(%d): %m", niceval); } /* twist_option - replace process by shell command */ static void twist_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { char *error; if (dry_run != 0) { dry_run = 0; } else { if (resident > 0) tcpd_jump("twist option in resident process"); syslog(deny_severity, "twist %s to %s", eval_client(request), value); /* Before switching to the shell, set up stdin, stdout and stderr. */ #define maybe_dup2(from, to) ((from == to) ? to : (close(to), dup(from))) if (maybe_dup2(request->fd, 0) != 0 || maybe_dup2(request->fd, 1) != 1 || maybe_dup2(request->fd, 2) != 2) { error = "twist_option: dup: %m"; } else { if (request->fd > 2) close(request->fd); (void) execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", value, (char *) 0); error = "twist_option: /bin/sh: %m"; } /* Something went wrong: we MUST terminate the process. */ tcpd_warn(error); clean_exit(request); } } /* rfc931_option - look up remote user name */ static void rfc931_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { int timeout; char junk; if (value != 0) { if (sscanf(value, "%d%c", &timeout, &junk) != 1 || timeout <= 0) tcpd_jump("bad rfc931 timeout: \"%s\"", value); rfc931_timeout = timeout; } (void) eval_user(request); } /* setenv_option - set environment variable */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void setenv_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { char *var_value; if (*(var_value = value + strcspn(value, whitespace))) *var_value++ = 0; if (setenv(chop_string(value), chop_string(var_value), 1)) tcpd_jump("memory allocation failure"); } /* severity_map - lookup facility or severity value */ static int severity_map(table, name) const CODE *table; char *name; { const CODE *t; int ret = -1; for (t = table; t->c_name; t++) if (STR_EQ(t->c_name, name)) { ret = t->c_val; break; } if (ret == -1) tcpd_jump("bad syslog facility or severity: \"%s\"", name); return (ret); } /* severity_option - change logging severity for this event (Dave Mitchell) */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void severity_option(value, request) char *value; struct request_info *request; { char *level = split_at(value, '.'); allow_severity = deny_severity = level ? severity_map(facilitynames, value) | severity_map(prioritynames, level) : severity_map(prioritynames, value); } /* get_field - return pointer to next field in string */ static char *get_field(string) char *string; { static char *last = ""; char *src; char *dst; char *ret; int ch; /* * This function returns pointers to successive fields within a given * string. ":" is the field separator; warn if the rule ends in one. It * replaces a "\:" sequence by ":", without treating the result of * substitution as field terminator. A null argument means resume search * where the previous call terminated. This function destroys its * argument. * * Work from explicit source or from memory. While processing \: we * overwrite the input. This way we do not have to maintain buffers for * copies of input fields. */ src = dst = ret = (string ? string : last); if (src[0] == 0) return (0); while (ch = *src) { if (ch == ':') { if (*++src == 0) tcpd_warn("rule ends in \":\""); break; } if (ch == '\\' && src[1] == ':') src++; *dst++ = *src++; } last = src; *dst = 0; return (ret); } /* chop_string - strip leading and trailing blanks from string */ static char *chop_string(string) register char *string; { char *start = 0; char *end; char *cp; for (cp = string; *cp; cp++) { if (!isspace(*cp)) { if (start == 0) start = cp; end = cp; } } return (start ? (end[1] = 0, start) : cp); } Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/rfc931.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/rfc931.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/rfc931.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,233 +1,232 @@ /* * rfc931() speaks a common subset of the RFC 931, AUTH, TAP, IDENT and RFC * 1413 protocols. It queries an RFC 931 etc. compatible daemon on a remote * host to look up the owner of a connection. The information should not be * used for authentication purposes. This routine intercepts alarm signals. * * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) rfc931.c 1.10 95/01/02 16:11:34"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef SEEK_SET #define SEEK_SET 0 #endif /* Local stuff. */ #include "tcpd.h" #define RFC931_PORT 113 /* Semi-well-known port */ #define ANY_PORT 0 /* Any old port will do */ int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */ static jmp_buf timebuf; /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */ static FILE *fsocket(domain, type, protocol) int domain; int type; int protocol; { int s; FILE *fp; if ((s = socket(domain, type, protocol)) < 0) { tcpd_warn("socket: %m"); return (0); } else { if ((fp = fdopen(s, "r+")) == 0) { tcpd_warn("fdopen: %m"); close(s); } return (fp); } } /* timeout - handle timeouts */ -static void timeout(sig) -int sig; +static void timeout(int sig) { longjmp(timebuf, sig); } /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */ void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) #ifdef INET6 struct sockaddr *rmt_sin; struct sockaddr *our_sin; #else struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; #endif char *dest; { unsigned rmt_port; unsigned our_port; #ifdef INET6 struct sockaddr_storage rmt_query_sin; struct sockaddr_storage our_query_sin; int alen; #else struct sockaddr_in rmt_query_sin; struct sockaddr_in our_query_sin; #endif char user[256]; /* XXX */ char buffer[512]; /* XXX */ char *cp; char *result = unknown; FILE *fp; #ifdef INET6 /* address family must be the same */ if (rmt_sin->sa_family != our_sin->sa_family) { STRN_CPY(dest, result, STRING_LENGTH); return; } switch (our_sin->sa_family) { case AF_INET: alen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: alen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: STRN_CPY(dest, result, STRING_LENGTH); return; } #endif /* * If we use a single, buffered, bidirectional stdio stream ("r+" or * "w+" mode) we may read our own output. Such behaviour would make sense * with resources that support random-access operations, but not with * sockets. ANSI C suggests several functions which can be called when * you want to change IO direction, fseek seems the most portable. */ #ifdef INET6 if ((fp = fsocket(our_sin->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) != 0) { #else if ((fp = fsocket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) != 0) { #endif /* * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server. */ if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { signal(SIGALRM, timeout); alarm(rfc931_timeout); /* * Bind the local and remote ends of the query socket to the same * IP addresses as the connection under investigation. We go * through all this trouble because the local or remote system * might have more than one network address. The RFC931 etc. * client sends only port numbers; the server takes the IP * addresses from the query socket. */ #ifdef INET6 memcpy(&our_query_sin, our_sin, alen); memcpy(&rmt_query_sin, rmt_sin, alen); switch (our_sin->sa_family) { case AF_INET: ((struct sockaddr_in *)&our_query_sin)->sin_port = htons(ANY_PORT); ((struct sockaddr_in *)&rmt_query_sin)->sin_port = htons(RFC931_PORT); break; case AF_INET6: ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&our_query_sin)->sin6_port = htons(ANY_PORT); ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&rmt_query_sin)->sin6_port = htons(RFC931_PORT); break; } if (bind(fileno(fp), (struct sockaddr *) & our_query_sin, alen) >= 0 && connect(fileno(fp), (struct sockaddr *) & rmt_query_sin, alen) >= 0) { #else our_query_sin = *our_sin; our_query_sin.sin_port = htons(ANY_PORT); rmt_query_sin = *rmt_sin; rmt_query_sin.sin_port = htons(RFC931_PORT); if (bind(fileno(fp), (struct sockaddr *) & our_query_sin, sizeof(our_query_sin)) >= 0 && connect(fileno(fp), (struct sockaddr *) & rmt_query_sin, sizeof(rmt_query_sin)) >= 0) { #endif /* * Send query to server. Neglect the risk that a 13-byte * write would have to be fragmented by the local system and * cause trouble with buggy System V stdio libraries. */ fprintf(fp, "%u,%u\r\n", #ifdef INET6 ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)rmt_sin)->sin_port), ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)our_sin)->sin_port)); #else ntohs(rmt_sin->sin_port), ntohs(our_sin->sin_port)); #endif fflush(fp); fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET); /* * Read response from server. Use fgets()/sscanf() so we can * work around System V stdio libraries that incorrectly * assume EOF when a read from a socket returns less than * requested. */ if (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fp) != 0 && ferror(fp) == 0 && feof(fp) == 0 && sscanf(buffer, "%u , %u : USERID :%*[^:]:%255s", &rmt_port, &our_port, user) == 3 #ifdef INET6 && ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)rmt_sin)->sin_port) == rmt_port && ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)our_sin)->sin_port) == our_port) { #else && ntohs(rmt_sin->sin_port) == rmt_port && ntohs(our_sin->sin_port) == our_port) { #endif /* * Strip trailing carriage return. It is part of the * protocol, not part of the data. */ if (cp = strchr(user, '\r')) *cp = 0; result = user; } } alarm(0); } fclose(fp); } STRN_CPY(dest, result, STRING_LENGTH); } Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,259 +1,259 @@ /* * Routines for testing only. Not really industrial strength. * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef lint static char sccs_id[] = "@(#) scaffold.c 1.6 97/03/21 19:27:24"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #ifndef INADDR_NONE #define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ #endif /* Application-specific. */ #include "tcpd.h" #include "scaffold.h" /* * These are referenced by the options module and by rfc931.c. */ int allow_severity = SEVERITY; int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; -int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT; #ifndef INET6 /* dup_hostent - create hostent in one memory block */ static struct hostent *dup_hostent(hp) struct hostent *hp; { struct hostent_block { struct hostent host; char *addr_list[1]; }; struct hostent_block *hb; int count; char *data; char *addr; for (count = 0; hp->h_addr_list[count] != 0; count++) /* void */ ; if ((hb = (struct hostent_block *) malloc(sizeof(struct hostent_block) + (hp->h_length + sizeof(char *)) * count)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, out of memory\n"); exit(1); } memset((char *) &hb->host, 0, sizeof(hb->host)); hb->host.h_length = hp->h_length; hb->host.h_addr_list = hb->addr_list; hb->host.h_addr_list[count] = 0; data = (char *) (hb->host.h_addr_list + count + 1); for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { hb->host.h_addr_list[count] = data + hp->h_length * count; memcpy(hb->host.h_addr_list[count], addr, hp->h_length); } return (&hb->host); } #endif /* find_inet_addr - find all addresses for this host, result to free() */ #ifdef INET6 struct addrinfo *find_inet_addr(host) char *host; { struct addrinfo hints, *res; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; if (getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0) return (res); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_CANONNAME; if (getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &res) != 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: host not found", host); return (0); } if (res->ai_family != AF_INET6 && res->ai_family != AF_INET) { tcpd_warn("%d: not an internet host", res->ai_family); freeaddrinfo(res); return (0); } if (!res->ai_canonname) { tcpd_warn("%s: hostname alias", host); tcpd_warn("(cannot obtain official name)", res->ai_canonname); } else if (STR_NE(host, res->ai_canonname)) { tcpd_warn("%s: hostname alias", host); tcpd_warn("(official name: %.*s)", STRING_LENGTH, res->ai_canonname); } return (res); } #else struct hostent *find_inet_addr(host) char *host; { struct in_addr addr; struct hostent *hp; static struct hostent h; static char *addr_list[2]; /* * Host address: translate it to internal form. */ if ((addr.s_addr = dot_quad_addr(host)) != INADDR_NONE) { h.h_addr_list = addr_list; h.h_addr_list[0] = (char *) &addr; h.h_length = sizeof(addr); return (dup_hostent(&h)); } /* * Map host name to a series of addresses. Watch out for non-internet * forms or aliases. The NOT_INADDR() is here in case gethostbyname() has * been "enhanced" to accept numeric addresses. Make a copy of the * address list so that later gethostbyXXX() calls will not clobber it. */ if (NOT_INADDR(host) == 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: not an internet address", host); return (0); } if ((hp = gethostbyname(host)) == 0) { tcpd_warn("%s: host not found", host); return (0); } if (hp->h_addrtype != AF_INET) { tcpd_warn("%d: not an internet host", hp->h_addrtype); return (0); } if (STR_NE(host, hp->h_name)) { tcpd_warn("%s: hostname alias", host); tcpd_warn("(official name: %.*s)", STRING_LENGTH, hp->h_name); } return (dup_hostent(hp)); } #endif /* check_dns - give each address thorough workout, return address count */ int check_dns(host) char *host; { struct request_info request; #ifdef INET6 struct sockaddr_storage sin; struct addrinfo *hp, *res; #else struct sockaddr_in sin; struct hostent *hp; #endif int count; char *addr; if ((hp = find_inet_addr(host)) == 0) return (0); request_init(&request, RQ_CLIENT_SIN, &sin, 0); sock_methods(&request); #ifndef INET6 memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); sin.sin_family = AF_INET; #endif #ifdef INET6 for (res = hp, count = 0; res; res = res->ai_next, count++) { memcpy(&sin, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); #else for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr, addr, sizeof(sin.sin_addr)); #endif /* * Force host name and address conversions. Use the request structure * as a cache. Detect hostname lookup problems. Any name/name or * name/address conflicts will be reported while eval_hostname() does * its job. */ request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, "", RQ_CLIENT_NAME, "", 0); if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), unknown)) tcpd_warn("host address %s->name lookup failed", eval_hostaddr(request.client)); } #ifdef INET6 freeaddrinfo(hp); #else free((char *) hp); #endif return (count); } /* dummy function to intercept the real shell_cmd() */ /* ARGSUSED */ void shell_cmd(command) char *command; { if (hosts_access_verbose) printf("command: %s", command); } /* dummy function to intercept the real clean_exit() */ /* ARGSUSED */ void clean_exit(request) struct request_info *request; { exit(0); } /* check_path - examine accessibility */ int check_path(path, st) char *path; struct stat *st; { struct stat stbuf; char buf[BUFSIZ]; if (stat(path, st) < 0) return (-1); #ifdef notdef if (st->st_uid != 0) tcpd_warn("%s: not owned by root", path); if (st->st_mode & 020) tcpd_warn("%s: group writable", path); #endif if (st->st_mode & 002) tcpd_warn("%s: world writable", path); if (path[0] == '/' && path[1] != 0) { strrchr(strcpy(buf, path), '/')[0] = 0; (void) check_path(buf[0] ? buf : "/", &stbuf); } return (0); } Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.h =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.h (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.h (revision 350296) @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ /* * @(#) scaffold.h 1.3 94/12/31 18:19:19 * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifdef INET6 -extern struct addrinfo *find_inet_addr(); +extern struct addrinfo *find_inet_addr(char *host); #else -extern struct hostent *find_inet_addr(); +extern struct hostent *find_inet_addr(char *host); #endif -extern int check_dns(); -extern int check_path(); +extern int check_dns(char *host); +extern int check_path(char *path, struct stat *st); Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/shell_cmd.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/shell_cmd.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/shell_cmd.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,95 +1,94 @@ /* * shell_cmd() takes a shell command after % substitutions. The * command is executed by a /bin/sh child process, with standard input, * standard output and standard error connected to /dev/null. * * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) shell_cmd.c 1.5 94/12/28 17:42:44"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include extern void exit(); /* Local stuff. */ #include "tcpd.h" /* Forward declarations. */ -static void do_child(); +static void do_child(char *command); /* shell_cmd - execute shell command */ void shell_cmd(command) char *command; { int child_pid; int wait_pid; /* * Most of the work is done within the child process, to minimize the * risk of damage to the parent. */ switch (child_pid = fork()) { case -1: /* error */ tcpd_warn("cannot fork: %m"); break; case 00: /* child */ do_child(command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: /* parent */ while ((wait_pid = wait((int *) 0)) != -1 && wait_pid != child_pid) /* void */ ; } } /* do_child - exec command with { stdin, stdout, stderr } to /dev/null */ -static void do_child(command) -char *command; +static void do_child(char *command) { char *error; int tmp_fd; /* * Systems with POSIX sessions may send a SIGHUP to grandchildren if the * child exits first. This is sick, sessions were invented for terminals. */ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* Set up new stdin, stdout, stderr, and exec the shell command. */ for (tmp_fd = 0; tmp_fd < 3; tmp_fd++) (void) close(tmp_fd); if (open("/dev/null", 2) != 0) { error = "open /dev/null: %m"; } else if (dup(0) != 1 || dup(0) != 2) { error = "dup: %m"; } else { (void) execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", command, (char *) 0); error = "execl /bin/sh: %m"; } /* Something went wrong. We MUST terminate the child process. */ tcpd_warn(error); _exit(0); } Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/socket.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/socket.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/socket.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,426 +1,425 @@ /* * This module determines the type of socket (datagram, stream), the client * socket address and port, the server socket address and port. In addition, * it provides methods to map a transport address to a printable host name * or address. Socket address information results are in static memory. * * The result from the hostname lookup method is STRING_PARANOID when a host * pretends to have someone elses name, or when a host name is available but * could not be verified. * * When lookup or conversion fails the result is set to STRING_UNKNOWN. * * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) socket.c 1.15 97/03/21 19:27:24"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef INET6 extern char *inet_ntoa(); #endif /* Local stuff. */ #include "tcpd.h" /* Forward declarations. */ -static void sock_sink(); +static void sock_sink(int); #ifdef APPEND_DOT /* * Speed up DNS lookups by terminating the host name with a dot. Should be * done with care. The speedup can give problems with lookups from sources * that lack DNS-style trailing dot magic, such as local files or NIS maps. */ static struct hostent *gethostbyname_dot(name) char *name; { char dot_name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; /* * Don't append dots to unqualified names. Such names are likely to come * from local hosts files or from NIS. */ if (strchr(name, '.') == 0 || strlen(name) >= MAXHOSTNAMELEN - 1) { return (gethostbyname(name)); } else { sprintf(dot_name, "%s.", name); return (gethostbyname(dot_name)); } } #define gethostbyname gethostbyname_dot #endif /* sock_host - look up endpoint addresses and install conversion methods */ void sock_host(request) struct request_info *request; { #ifdef INET6 static struct sockaddr_storage client; static struct sockaddr_storage server; #else static struct sockaddr_in client; static struct sockaddr_in server; #endif int len; char buf[BUFSIZ]; int fd = request->fd; sock_methods(request); /* * Look up the client host address. Hal R. Brand * suggested how to get the client host info in case of UDP connections: * peek at the first message without actually looking at its contents. We * really should verify that client.sin_family gets the value AF_INET, * but this program has already caused too much grief on systems with * broken library code. */ len = sizeof(client); if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr *) & client, &len) < 0) { request->sink = sock_sink; len = sizeof(client); if (recvfrom(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_PEEK, (struct sockaddr *) & client, &len) < 0) { tcpd_warn("can't get client address: %m"); return; /* give up */ } #ifdef really_paranoid memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); #endif } #ifdef INET6 request->client->sin = (struct sockaddr *)&client; #else request->client->sin = &client; #endif /* * Determine the server binding. This is used for client username * lookups, and for access control rules that trigger on the server * address or name. */ len = sizeof(server); if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *) & server, &len) < 0) { tcpd_warn("getsockname: %m"); return; } #ifdef INET6 request->server->sin = (struct sockaddr *)&server; #else request->server->sin = &server; #endif } /* sock_hostaddr - map endpoint address to printable form */ void sock_hostaddr(host) struct host_info *host; { #ifdef INET6 struct sockaddr *sin = host->sin; int salen; if (!sin) return; #ifdef SIN6_LEN salen = sin->sa_len; #else salen = (sin->sa_family == AF_INET) ? sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) : sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); #endif getnameinfo(sin, salen, host->addr, sizeof(host->addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST); #else struct sockaddr_in *sin = host->sin; if (sin != 0) STRN_CPY(host->addr, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), sizeof(host->addr)); #endif } /* sock_hostname - map endpoint address to host name */ void sock_hostname(host) struct host_info *host; { #ifdef INET6 struct sockaddr *sin = host->sin; struct sockaddr_in sin4; struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0 = NULL; int salen, alen, err = 1; char *ap = NULL, *rap, hname[NI_MAXHOST]; if (sin != NULL) { if (sin->sa_family == AF_INET6) { struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sin; if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sin6->sin6_addr)) { memset(&sin4, 0, sizeof(sin4)); #ifdef SIN6_LEN sin4.sin_len = sizeof(sin4); #endif sin4.sin_family = AF_INET; sin4.sin_port = sin6->sin6_port; sin4.sin_addr.s_addr = *(u_int32_t *)&sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr[12]; sin = (struct sockaddr *)&sin4; } } switch (sin->sa_family) { case AF_INET: ap = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)sin)->sin_addr; alen = sizeof(struct in_addr); salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: ap = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sin)->sin6_addr; alen = sizeof(struct in6_addr); salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: break; } if (ap) err = getnameinfo(sin, salen, hname, sizeof(hname), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD); } if (!err) { STRN_CPY(host->name, hname, sizeof(host->name)); /* reject numeric addresses */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = sin->sa_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_CANONNAME | AI_NUMERICHOST; if ((err = getaddrinfo(host->name, NULL, &hints, &res0)) == 0) { freeaddrinfo(res0); tcpd_warn("host name/name mismatch: " "reverse lookup results in non-FQDN %s", host->name); strcpy(host->name, paranoid); /* name is bad, clobber it */ } err = !err; } if (!err) { /* we are now sure that this is non-numeric */ /* * Verify that the address is a member of the address list returned * by gethostbyname(hostname). * * Verify also that gethostbyaddr() and gethostbyname() return the same * hostname, or rshd and rlogind may still end up being spoofed. * * On some sites, gethostbyname("localhost") returns "localhost.domain". * This is a DNS artefact. We treat it as a special case. When we * can't believe the address list from gethostbyname("localhost") * we're in big trouble anyway. */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = sin->sa_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_CANONNAME; if (getaddrinfo(host->name, NULL, &hints, &res0) != 0) { /* * Unable to verify that the host name matches the address. This * may be a transient problem or a botched name server setup. */ tcpd_warn("can't verify hostname: getaddrinfo(%s, %s) failed", host->name, (sin->sa_family == AF_INET) ? "AF_INET" : "AF_INET6"); } else if ((res0->ai_canonname == NULL || STR_NE(host->name, res0->ai_canonname)) && STR_NE(host->name, "localhost")) { /* * The gethostbyaddr() and gethostbyname() calls did not return * the same hostname. This could be a nameserver configuration * problem. It could also be that someone is trying to spoof us. */ tcpd_warn("host name/name mismatch: %s != %.*s", host->name, STRING_LENGTH, (res0->ai_canonname == NULL) ? "" : res0->ai_canonname); } else { /* * The address should be a member of the address list returned by * gethostbyname(). We should first verify that the h_addrtype * field is AF_INET, but this program has already caused too much * grief on systems with broken library code. */ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) { if (res->ai_family != sin->sa_family) continue; switch (res->ai_family) { case AF_INET: rap = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)res->ai_addr)->sin_addr; break; case AF_INET6: /* need to check scope_id */ if (((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sin)->sin6_scope_id != ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_scope_id) { continue; } rap = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_addr; break; default: continue; } if (memcmp(rap, ap, alen) == 0) { freeaddrinfo(res0); return; /* name is good, keep it */ } } /* * The host name does not map to the initial address. Perhaps * someone has messed up. Perhaps someone compromised a name * server. */ getnameinfo(sin, salen, hname, sizeof(hname), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST); tcpd_warn("host name/address mismatch: %s != %.*s", hname, STRING_LENGTH, (res0->ai_canonname == NULL) ? "" : res0->ai_canonname); } strcpy(host->name, paranoid); /* name is bad, clobber it */ if (res0) freeaddrinfo(res0); } #else /* INET6 */ struct sockaddr_in *sin = host->sin; struct hostent *hp; int i; /* * On some systems, for example Solaris 2.3, gethostbyaddr(0.0.0.0) does * not fail. Instead it returns "INADDR_ANY". Unfortunately, this does * not work the other way around: gethostbyname("INADDR_ANY") fails. We * have to special-case 0.0.0.0, in order to avoid false alerts from the * host name/address checking code below. */ if (sin != 0 && sin->sin_addr.s_addr != 0 && (hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &(sin->sin_addr), sizeof(sin->sin_addr), AF_INET)) != 0) { STRN_CPY(host->name, hp->h_name, sizeof(host->name)); /* * Verify that the address is a member of the address list returned * by gethostbyname(hostname). * * Verify also that gethostbyaddr() and gethostbyname() return the same * hostname, or rshd and rlogind may still end up being spoofed. * * On some sites, gethostbyname("localhost") returns "localhost.domain". * This is a DNS artefact. We treat it as a special case. When we * can't believe the address list from gethostbyname("localhost") * we're in big trouble anyway. */ if ((hp = gethostbyname(host->name)) == 0) { /* * Unable to verify that the host name matches the address. This * may be a transient problem or a botched name server setup. */ tcpd_warn("can't verify hostname: gethostbyname(%s) failed", host->name); } else if (STR_NE(host->name, hp->h_name) && STR_NE(host->name, "localhost")) { /* * The gethostbyaddr() and gethostbyname() calls did not return * the same hostname. This could be a nameserver configuration * problem. It could also be that someone is trying to spoof us. */ tcpd_warn("host name/name mismatch: %s != %.*s", host->name, STRING_LENGTH, hp->h_name); } else { /* * The address should be a member of the address list returned by * gethostbyname(). We should first verify that the h_addrtype * field is AF_INET, but this program has already caused too much * grief on systems with broken library code. */ for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) { if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i], (char *) &sin->sin_addr, sizeof(sin->sin_addr)) == 0) return; /* name is good, keep it */ } /* * The host name does not map to the initial address. Perhaps * someone has messed up. Perhaps someone compromised a name * server. */ tcpd_warn("host name/address mismatch: %s != %.*s", inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), STRING_LENGTH, hp->h_name); } strcpy(host->name, paranoid); /* name is bad, clobber it */ } #endif /* INET6 */ } /* sock_sink - absorb unreceived IP datagram */ -static void sock_sink(fd) -int fd; +static void sock_sink(int fd) { char buf[BUFSIZ]; #ifdef INET6 struct sockaddr_storage sin; #else struct sockaddr_in sin; #endif int size = sizeof(sin); /* * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a * non-zero source address argument in the recvfrom() call below. */ (void) recvfrom(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, &size); } Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,136 +1,137 @@ /* * General front end for stream and datagram IP services. This program logs * the remote host name and then invokes the real daemon. For example, * install as /usr/etc/{tftpd,fingerd,telnetd,ftpd,rlogind,rshd,rexecd}, * after saving the real daemons in the directory specified with the * REAL_DAEMON_DIR macro. This arrangement requires that the network daemons * are started by inetd or something similar. Connections and diagnostics * are logged through syslog(3). * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tcpd.c 1.10 96/02/11 17:01:32"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #ifndef MAXPATHNAMELEN #define MAXPATHNAMELEN BUFSIZ #endif #ifndef STDIN_FILENO #define STDIN_FILENO 0 #endif /* Local stuff. */ #include "patchlevel.h" #include "tcpd.h" int allow_severity = SEVERITY; /* run-time adjustable */ int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; /* ditto */ main(argc, argv) int argc; char **argv; { struct request_info request; char path[MAXPATHNAMELEN]; /* Attempt to prevent the creation of world-writable files. */ #ifdef DAEMON_UMASK umask(DAEMON_UMASK); #endif /* * If argv[0] is an absolute path name, ignore REAL_DAEMON_DIR, and strip * argv[0] to its basename. */ if (argv[0][0] == '/') { strlcpy(path, argv[0], sizeof(path)); argv[0] = strrchr(argv[0], '/') + 1; } else { snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", REAL_DAEMON_DIR, argv[0]); } /* * Open a channel to the syslog daemon. Older versions of openlog() * require only two arguments. */ #ifdef LOG_MAIL (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, FACILITY); #else (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID); #endif /* * Find out the endpoint addresses of this conversation. Host name * lookups and double checks will be done on demand. */ request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, argv[0], RQ_FILE, STDIN_FILENO, 0); fromhost(&request); /* * Optionally look up and double check the remote host name. Sites * concerned with security may choose to refuse connections from hosts * that pretend to have someone elses host name. */ #ifdef PARANOID if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), paranoid)) refuse(&request); #endif /* * The BSD rlogin and rsh daemons that came out after 4.3 BSD disallow * socket options at the IP level. They do so for a good reason. * Unfortunately, we cannot use this with SunOS 4.1.x because the * getsockopt() system call can panic the system. */ #ifdef KILL_IP_OPTIONS fix_options(&request); #endif /* * Check whether this host can access the service in argv[0]. The * access-control code invokes optional shell commands as specified in * the access-control tables. */ #ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS if (!hosts_access(&request)) refuse(&request); #endif /* Report request and invoke the real daemon program. */ #ifdef INET6 syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s (%s)", eval_client(&request), eval_hostaddr(request.client)); #else syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s", eval_client(&request)); #endif closelog(); (void) execv(path, argv); syslog(LOG_ERR, "error: cannot execute %s: %m", path); clean_exit(&request); /* NOTREACHED */ } Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdchk.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdchk.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdchk.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,531 +1,526 @@ /* * tcpdchk - examine all tcpd access control rules and inetd.conf entries * * Usage: tcpdchk [-a] [-d] [-i inet_conf] [-v] * * -a: complain about implicit "allow" at end of rule. * * -d: rules in current directory. * * -i: location of inetd.conf file. * * -v: show all rules. * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tcpdchk.c 1.8 97/02/12 02:13:25"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include #include #ifdef INET6 #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include -#include -extern int errno; -extern void exit(); -extern int optind; -extern char *optarg; - #ifndef INADDR_NONE #define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ #endif #ifndef S_ISDIR #define S_ISDIR(m) (((m) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) #endif /* Application-specific. */ #include "tcpd.h" #include "inetcf.h" #include "scaffold.h" /* * Stolen from hosts_access.c... */ static char sep[] = ", \t\n"; #define BUFLEN 2048 int resident = 0; int hosts_access_verbose = 0; char *hosts_allow_table = HOSTS_ALLOW; char *hosts_deny_table = HOSTS_DENY; extern jmp_buf tcpd_buf; /* * Local stuff. */ -static void usage(); -static void parse_table(); -static void print_list(); -static void check_daemon_list(); -static void check_client_list(); -static void check_daemon(); -static void check_user(); -static int check_host(); -static int reserved_name(); +static void usage(void); +static void parse_table(char *table, struct request_info *request); +static void print_list(char *title, char *list); +static void check_daemon_list(char *list); +static void check_client_list(char *list); +static void check_daemon(char *pat); +static void check_user(char *pat); +static int check_host(char *pat); +static int reserved_name(char *pat); #define PERMIT 1 #define DENY 0 #define YES 1 #define NO 0 static int defl_verdict; static char *myname; static int allow_check; static char *inetcf; int main(argc, argv) int argc; char **argv; { struct request_info request; struct stat st; int c; myname = argv[0]; /* * Parse the JCL. */ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "adi:v")) != EOF) { switch (c) { case 'a': allow_check = 1; break; case 'd': hosts_allow_table = "hosts.allow"; hosts_deny_table = "hosts.deny"; break; case 'i': inetcf = optarg; break; case 'v': hosts_access_verbose++; break; default: usage(); /* NOTREACHED */ } } if (argc != optind) usage(); /* * When confusion really strikes... */ if (check_path(REAL_DAEMON_DIR, &st) < 0) { tcpd_warn("REAL_DAEMON_DIR %s: %m", REAL_DAEMON_DIR); } else if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { tcpd_warn("REAL_DAEMON_DIR %s is not a directory", REAL_DAEMON_DIR); } /* * Process the inet configuration file (or its moral equivalent). This * information is used later to find references in hosts.allow/deny to * unwrapped services, and other possible problems. */ inetcf = inet_cfg(inetcf); if (hosts_access_verbose) printf("Using network configuration file: %s\n", inetcf); /* * These are not run from inetd but may have built-in access control. */ inet_set("portmap", WR_NOT); inet_set("rpcbind", WR_NOT); /* * Check accessibility of access control files. */ (void) check_path(hosts_allow_table, &st); (void) check_path(hosts_deny_table, &st); /* * Fake up an arbitrary service request. */ request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, "daemon_name", RQ_SERVER_NAME, "server_hostname", RQ_SERVER_ADDR, "server_addr", RQ_USER, "user_name", RQ_CLIENT_NAME, "client_hostname", RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, "client_addr", RQ_FILE, 1, 0); /* * Examine all access-control rules. */ defl_verdict = PERMIT; parse_table(hosts_allow_table, &request); defl_verdict = DENY; parse_table(hosts_deny_table, &request); return (0); } /* usage - explain */ -static void usage() +static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-a] [-d] [-i inet_conf] [-v]\n", myname); fprintf(stderr, " -a: report rules with implicit \"ALLOW\" at end\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -d: use allow/deny files in current directory\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -i: location of inetd.conf file\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -v: list all rules\n"); exit(1); } /* parse_table - like table_match(), but examines _all_ entries */ static void parse_table(table, request) char *table; struct request_info *request; { FILE *fp; int real_verdict; char sv_list[BUFLEN]; /* becomes list of daemons */ char *cl_list; /* becomes list of requests */ char *sh_cmd; /* becomes optional shell command */ char buf[BUFSIZ]; int verdict; struct tcpd_context saved_context; saved_context = tcpd_context; /* stupid compilers */ if (fp = fopen(table, "r")) { tcpd_context.file = table; tcpd_context.line = 0; while (xgets(sv_list, sizeof(sv_list), fp)) { if (sv_list[strlen(sv_list) - 1] != '\n') { tcpd_warn("missing newline or line too long"); continue; } if (sv_list[0] == '#' || sv_list[strspn(sv_list, " \t\r\n")] == 0) continue; if ((cl_list = split_at(sv_list, ':')) == 0) { tcpd_warn("missing \":\" separator"); continue; } sh_cmd = split_at(cl_list, ':'); if (hosts_access_verbose) printf("\n>>> Rule %s line %d:\n", tcpd_context.file, tcpd_context.line); if (hosts_access_verbose) print_list("daemons: ", sv_list); check_daemon_list(sv_list); if (hosts_access_verbose) print_list("clients: ", cl_list); check_client_list(cl_list); #ifdef PROCESS_OPTIONS real_verdict = defl_verdict; if (sh_cmd) { verdict = setjmp(tcpd_buf); if (verdict != 0) { real_verdict = (verdict == AC_PERMIT); } else { dry_run = 1; process_options(sh_cmd, request); if (dry_run == 1 && real_verdict && allow_check) tcpd_warn("implicit \"allow\" at end of rule"); } } else if (defl_verdict && allow_check) { tcpd_warn("implicit \"allow\" at end of rule"); } if (hosts_access_verbose) printf("access: %s\n", real_verdict ? "granted" : "denied"); #else if (sh_cmd) shell_cmd(percent_x(buf, sizeof(buf), sh_cmd, request)); if (hosts_access_verbose) printf("access: %s\n", defl_verdict ? "granted" : "denied"); #endif } (void) fclose(fp); } else if (errno != ENOENT) { tcpd_warn("cannot open %s: %m", table); } tcpd_context = saved_context; } /* print_list - pretty-print a list */ static void print_list(title, list) char *title; char *list; { char buf[BUFLEN]; char *cp; char *next; fputs(title, stdout); strcpy(buf, list); for (cp = strtok(buf, sep); cp != 0; cp = next) { fputs(cp, stdout); next = strtok((char *) 0, sep); if (next != 0) fputs(" ", stdout); } fputs("\n", stdout); } /* check_daemon_list - criticize daemon list */ static void check_daemon_list(list) char *list; { char buf[BUFLEN]; char *cp; char *host; int daemons = 0; strcpy(buf, list); for (cp = strtok(buf, sep); cp != 0; cp = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) { if (STR_EQ(cp, "EXCEPT")) { daemons = 0; } else { daemons++; if ((host = split_at(cp + 1, '@')) != 0 && check_host(host) > 1) { tcpd_warn("host %s has more than one address", host); tcpd_warn("(consider using an address instead)"); } check_daemon(cp); } } if (daemons == 0) tcpd_warn("daemon list is empty or ends in EXCEPT"); } /* check_client_list - criticize client list */ static void check_client_list(list) char *list; { char buf[BUFLEN]; char *cp; char *host; int clients = 0; strcpy(buf, list); for (cp = strtok(buf, sep); cp != 0; cp = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) { if (STR_EQ(cp, "EXCEPT")) { clients = 0; } else { clients++; if (host = split_at(cp + 1, '@')) { /* user@host */ check_user(cp); check_host(host); } else { check_host(cp); } } } if (clients == 0) tcpd_warn("client list is empty or ends in EXCEPT"); } /* check_daemon - criticize daemon pattern */ static void check_daemon(pat) char *pat; { if (pat[0] == '@') { tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat); } else if (pat[0] == '/') { tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat); } else if (pat[0] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat); } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name ends in dot", pat); } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "ALL") || STR_EQ(pat, unknown)) { /* void */ ; } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "FAIL")) { /* obsolete */ tcpd_warn("FAIL is no longer recognized"); tcpd_warn("(use EXCEPT or DENY instead)"); } else if (reserved_name(pat)) { tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name may be reserved word", pat); } else { switch (inet_get(pat)) { case WR_UNKNOWN: tcpd_warn("%s: no such process name in %s", pat, inetcf); inet_set(pat, WR_YES); /* shut up next time */ break; case WR_NOT: tcpd_warn("%s: service possibly not wrapped", pat); inet_set(pat, WR_YES); break; } } } /* check_user - criticize user pattern */ static void check_user(pat) char *pat; { if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat); } else if (pat[0] == '/') { tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat); } else if (pat[0] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat); } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: user name ends in dot", pat); } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "ALL") || STR_EQ(pat, unknown) || STR_EQ(pat, "KNOWN")) { /* void */ ; } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "FAIL")) { /* obsolete */ tcpd_warn("FAIL is no longer recognized"); tcpd_warn("(use EXCEPT or DENY instead)"); } else if (reserved_name(pat)) { tcpd_warn("%s: user name may be reserved word", pat); } } #ifdef INET6 static int is_inet6_addr(pat) char *pat; { struct addrinfo hints, *res; int len, ret; char ch; if (*pat != '[') return (0); len = strlen(pat); if ((ch = pat[len - 1]) != ']') return (0); pat[len - 1] = '\0'; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = AF_INET6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; if ((ret = getaddrinfo(pat + 1, NULL, &hints, &res)) == 0) freeaddrinfo(res); pat[len - 1] = ch; return (ret == 0); } #endif /* check_host - criticize host pattern */ static int check_host(pat) char *pat; { char buf[BUFSIZ]; char *mask; int addr_count = 1; FILE *fp; struct tcpd_context saved_context; char *cp; char *wsp = " \t\r\n"; if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ #ifdef NO_NETGRENT /* SCO has no *netgrent() support */ #else #ifdef NETGROUP char *machinep; char *userp; char *domainp; setnetgrent(pat + 1); if (getnetgrent(&machinep, &userp, &domainp) == 0) tcpd_warn("%s: unknown or empty netgroup", pat + 1); endnetgrent(); #else tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled"); #endif #endif } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */ if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) { saved_context = tcpd_context; tcpd_context.file = pat; tcpd_context.line = 0; while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { tcpd_context.line++; for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp)) check_host(cp); } tcpd_context = saved_context; fclose(fp); } else if (errno != ENOENT) { tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat); } } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */ #ifdef INET6 int mask_len; if ((dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) && (!is_inet6_addr(pat) || ((mask_len = atoi(mask)) < 0 || mask_len > 128))) #else if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) #endif tcpd_warn("%s/%s: bad net/mask pattern", pat, mask); } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "FAIL")) { /* obsolete */ tcpd_warn("FAIL is no longer recognized"); tcpd_warn("(use EXCEPT or DENY instead)"); } else if (reserved_name(pat)) { /* other reserved */ /* void */ ; #ifdef INET6 } else if (is_inet6_addr(pat)) { /* IPv6 address */ addr_count = 1; #endif } else if (NOT_INADDR(pat)) { /* internet name */ if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: domain or host name ends in dot", pat); } else if (pat[0] != '.') { addr_count = check_dns(pat); } } else { /* numeric form */ if (STR_EQ(pat, "0.0.0.0") || STR_EQ(pat, "255.255.255.255")) { /* void */ ; } else if (pat[0] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: network number begins with dot", pat); } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] != '.') { check_dns(pat); } } return (addr_count); } /* reserved_name - determine if name is reserved */ static int reserved_name(pat) char *pat; { return (STR_EQ(pat, unknown) || STR_EQ(pat, "KNOWN") || STR_EQ(pat, paranoid) || STR_EQ(pat, "ALL") || STR_EQ(pat, "LOCAL")); } Index: stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdmatch.c =================================================================== --- stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdmatch.c (revision 350295) +++ stable/12/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdmatch.c (revision 350296) @@ -1,392 +1,389 @@ /* * tcpdmatch - explain what tcpd would do in a specific case * * usage: tcpdmatch [-d] [-i inet_conf] daemon[@host] [user@]host * * -d: use the access control tables in the current directory. * * -i: location of inetd.conf file. * * All errors are reported to the standard error stream, including the errors * that would normally be reported via the syslog daemon. * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tcpdmatch.c 1.5 96/02/11 17:01:36"; #endif /* System libraries. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include -extern void exit(); -extern int optind; -extern char *optarg; - #ifndef INADDR_NONE #define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ #endif #ifndef S_ISDIR #define S_ISDIR(m) (((m) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) #endif /* Application-specific. */ #include "tcpd.h" #include "inetcf.h" #include "scaffold.h" -static void usage(); -static void tcpdmatch(); +static void usage(char *myname); +static void tcpdmatch(struct request_info *request); /* The main program */ int main(argc, argv) int argc; char **argv; { #ifdef INET6 struct addrinfo hints, *hp, *res; #else struct hostent *hp; #endif char *myname = argv[0]; char *client; char *server; char *addr; char *user; char *daemon; struct request_info request; int ch; char *inetcf = 0; int count; #ifdef INET6 struct sockaddr_storage server_sin; struct sockaddr_storage client_sin; #else struct sockaddr_in server_sin; struct sockaddr_in client_sin; #endif struct stat st; /* * Show what rule actually matched. */ hosts_access_verbose = 2; /* * Parse the JCL. */ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "di:")) != EOF) { switch (ch) { case 'd': hosts_allow_table = "hosts.allow"; hosts_deny_table = "hosts.deny"; break; case 'i': inetcf = optarg; break; default: usage(myname); /* NOTREACHED */ } } if (argc != optind + 2) usage(myname); /* * When confusion really strikes... */ if (check_path(REAL_DAEMON_DIR, &st) < 0) { tcpd_warn("REAL_DAEMON_DIR %s: %m", REAL_DAEMON_DIR); } else if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { tcpd_warn("REAL_DAEMON_DIR %s is not a directory", REAL_DAEMON_DIR); } /* * Default is to specify a daemon process name. When daemon@host is * specified, separate the two parts. */ if ((server = split_at(argv[optind], '@')) == 0) server = unknown; if (argv[optind][0] == '/') { daemon = strrchr(argv[optind], '/') + 1; tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name normalized to: %s", argv[optind], daemon); } else { daemon = argv[optind]; } /* * Default is to specify a client hostname or address. When user@host is * specified, separate the two parts. */ if ((client = split_at(argv[optind + 1], '@')) != 0) { user = argv[optind + 1]; } else { client = argv[optind + 1]; user = unknown; } /* * Analyze the inetd (or tlid) configuration file, so that we can warn * the user about services that may not be wrapped, services that are not * configured, or services that are wrapped in an incorrect manner. Allow * for services that are not run from inetd, or that have tcpd access * control built into them. */ inetcf = inet_cfg(inetcf); inet_set("portmap", WR_NOT); inet_set("rpcbind", WR_NOT); switch (inet_get(daemon)) { case WR_UNKNOWN: tcpd_warn("%s: no such process name in %s", daemon, inetcf); break; case WR_NOT: tcpd_warn("%s: service possibly not wrapped", daemon); break; } /* * Check accessibility of access control files. */ (void) check_path(hosts_allow_table, &st); (void) check_path(hosts_deny_table, &st); /* * Fill in what we have figured out sofar. Use socket and DNS routines * for address and name conversions. We attach stdout to the request so * that banner messages will become visible. */ request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, daemon, RQ_USER, user, RQ_FILE, 1, 0); sock_methods(&request); /* * If a server hostname is specified, insist that the name maps to at * most one address. eval_hostname() warns the user about name server * problems, while using the request.server structure as a cache for host * address and name conversion results. */ if (NOT_INADDR(server) == 0 || HOSTNAME_KNOWN(server)) { if ((hp = find_inet_addr(server)) == 0) exit(1); #ifndef INET6 memset((char *) &server_sin, 0, sizeof(server_sin)); server_sin.sin_family = AF_INET; #endif request_set(&request, RQ_SERVER_SIN, &server_sin, 0); #ifdef INET6 for (res = hp, count = 0; res; res = res->ai_next, count++) { memcpy(&server_sin, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); #else for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { memcpy((char *) &server_sin.sin_addr, addr, sizeof(server_sin.sin_addr)); #endif /* * Force evaluation of server host name and address. Host name * conflicts will be reported while eval_hostname() does its job. */ request_set(&request, RQ_SERVER_NAME, "", RQ_SERVER_ADDR, "", 0); if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.server), unknown)) tcpd_warn("host address %s->name lookup failed", eval_hostaddr(request.server)); } if (count > 1) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s has more than one address\n", server); fprintf(stderr, "Please specify an address instead\n"); exit(1); } #ifdef INET6 freeaddrinfo(hp); #else free((char *) hp); #endif } else { request_set(&request, RQ_SERVER_NAME, server, 0); } /* * If a client address is specified, we simulate the effect of client * hostname lookup failure. */ if (dot_quad_addr(client) != INADDR_NONE) { request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, client, 0); tcpdmatch(&request); exit(0); } #ifdef INET6 memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = AF_INET6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; if (getaddrinfo(client, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0) { freeaddrinfo(res); request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, client, 0); tcpdmatch(&request); exit(0); } #endif /* * Perhaps they are testing special client hostname patterns that aren't * really host names at all. */ if (NOT_INADDR(client) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(client) == 0) { request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_NAME, client, 0); tcpdmatch(&request); exit(0); } /* * Otherwise, assume that a client hostname is specified, and insist that * the address can be looked up. The reason for this requirement is that * in real life the client address is available (at least with IP). Let * eval_hostname() figure out if this host is properly registered, while * using the request.client structure as a cache for host name and * address conversion results. */ if ((hp = find_inet_addr(client)) == 0) exit(1); #ifdef INET6 request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_SIN, &client_sin, 0); for (res = hp, count = 0; res; res = res->ai_next, count++) { memcpy(&client_sin, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); /* * getnameinfo() doesn't do reverse lookup against link-local * address. So, we pass through host name evaluation against * such addresses. */ if (res->ai_family != AF_INET6 || !IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_addr)) { /* * Force evaluation of client host name and address. Host name * conflicts will be reported while eval_hostname() does its job. */ request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_NAME, "", RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, "", 0); if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), unknown)) tcpd_warn("host address %s->name lookup failed", eval_hostaddr(request.client)); } tcpdmatch(&request); if (res->ai_next) printf("\n"); } freeaddrinfo(hp); #else memset((char *) &client_sin, 0, sizeof(client_sin)); client_sin.sin_family = AF_INET; request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_SIN, &client_sin, 0); for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { memcpy((char *) &client_sin.sin_addr, addr, sizeof(client_sin.sin_addr)); /* * Force evaluation of client host name and address. Host name * conflicts will be reported while eval_hostname() does its job. */ request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_NAME, "", RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, "", 0); if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), unknown)) tcpd_warn("host address %s->name lookup failed", eval_hostaddr(request.client)); tcpdmatch(&request); if (hp->h_addr_list[count + 1]) printf("\n"); } free((char *) hp); #endif exit(0); } /* Explain how to use this program */ static void usage(myname) char *myname; { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d] [-i inet_conf] daemon[@host] [user@]host\n", myname); fprintf(stderr, " -d: use allow/deny files in current directory\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -i: location of inetd.conf file\n"); exit(1); } /* Print interesting expansions */ static void expand(text, pattern, request) char *text; char *pattern; struct request_info *request; { char buf[BUFSIZ]; if (STR_NE(percent_x(buf, sizeof(buf), pattern, request), unknown)) printf("%s %s\n", text, buf); } /* Try out a (server,client) pair */ static void tcpdmatch(request) struct request_info *request; { int verdict; /* * Show what we really know. Suppress uninteresting noise. */ expand("client: hostname", "%n", request); expand("client: address ", "%a", request); expand("client: username", "%u", request); expand("server: hostname", "%N", request); expand("server: address ", "%A", request); expand("server: process ", "%d", request); /* * Reset stuff that might be changed by options handlers. In dry-run * mode, extension language routines that would not return should inform * us of their plan, by clearing the dry_run flag. This is a bit clumsy * but we must be able to verify hosts with more than one network * address. */ rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT; allow_severity = SEVERITY; deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; dry_run = 1; /* * When paranoid mode is enabled, access is rejected no matter what the * access control rules say. */ #ifdef PARANOID if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request->client), paranoid)) { printf("access: denied (PARANOID mode)\n\n"); return; } #endif /* * Report the access control verdict. */ verdict = hosts_access(request); printf("access: %s\n", dry_run == 0 ? "delegated" : verdict ? "granted" : "denied"); } Index: stable/12 =================================================================== --- stable/12 (revision 350295) +++ stable/12 (revision 350296) Property changes on: stable/12 ___________________________________________________________________ Modified: svn:mergeinfo ## -0,0 +0,1 ## Merged /head:r350098,350100-350101