Index: stable/11/sbin/geom/class/eli/geli.8 =================================================================== --- stable/11/sbin/geom/class/eli/geli.8 (revision 348587) +++ stable/11/sbin/geom/class/eli/geli.8 (revision 348588) @@ -1,1123 +1,1135 @@ .\" Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Pawel Jakub Dawidek .\" All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND .\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE .\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE .\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL .\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS .\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) .\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT .\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF .\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .\" $FreeBSD$ .\" -.Dd May 9, 2018 +.Dd May 23, 2019 .Dt GELI 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm geli .Nd "control utility for the cryptographic GEOM class" .Sh SYNOPSIS To compile GEOM_ELI into your kernel, add the following lines to your kernel configuration file: .Bd -ragged -offset indent .Cd "device crypto" .Cd "options GEOM_ELI" .Ed .Pp Alternatively, to load the GEOM_ELI module at boot time, add the following line to your .Xr loader.conf 5 : .Bd -literal -offset indent geom_eli_load="YES" .Ed .Pp Usage of the .Nm utility: .Pp .Nm .Cm init .Op Fl bdgPTv .Op Fl a Ar aalgo .Op Fl B Ar backupfile .Op Fl e Ar ealgo .Op Fl i Ar iterations .Op Fl J Ar newpassfile .Op Fl K Ar newkeyfile .Op Fl l Ar keylen .Op Fl s Ar sectorsize .Op Fl V Ar version .Ar prov .Nm .Cm label - an alias for .Cm init .Nm .Cm attach .Op Fl Cdprv .Op Fl n Ar keyno .Op Fl j Ar passfile .Op Fl k Ar keyfile .Ar prov .Nm .Cm detach .Op Fl fl .Ar prov ... .Nm .Cm stop - an alias for .Cm detach .Nm .Cm onetime .Op Fl dT .Op Fl a Ar aalgo .Op Fl e Ar ealgo .Op Fl l Ar keylen .Op Fl s Ar sectorsize .Ar prov .Nm .Cm configure .Op Fl bBdDgGtT .Ar prov ... .Nm .Cm setkey .Op Fl pPv .Op Fl i Ar iterations .Op Fl j Ar passfile .Op Fl J Ar newpassfile .Op Fl k Ar keyfile .Op Fl K Ar newkeyfile .Op Fl n Ar keyno .Ar prov .Nm .Cm delkey .Op Fl afv .Op Fl n Ar keyno .Ar prov .Nm .Cm kill .Op Fl av .Op Ar prov ... .Nm .Cm backup .Op Fl v .Ar prov .Ar file .Nm .Cm restore .Op Fl fv .Ar file .Ar prov .Nm .Cm suspend .Op Fl v .Fl a | Ar prov ... .Nm .Cm resume .Op Fl pv .Op Fl j Ar passfile .Op Fl k Ar keyfile .Ar prov .Nm .Cm resize .Op Fl v .Fl s Ar oldsize .Ar prov .Nm .Cm version .Op Ar prov ... .Nm .Cm clear .Op Fl v .Ar prov ... .Nm .Cm dump .Op Fl v .Ar prov ... .Nm .Cm list .Nm .Cm status .Nm .Cm load .Nm .Cm unload .Sh DESCRIPTION The .Nm utility is used to configure encryption on GEOM providers. .Pp The following is a list of the most important features: .Pp .Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact .It Utilizes the .Xr crypto 9 framework, so when there is crypto hardware available, .Nm will make use of it automatically. .It Supports many cryptographic algorithms (currently .Nm AES-XTS , .Nm AES-CBC , .Nm Blowfish-CBC , .Nm Camellia-CBC and .Nm 3DES-CBC ) . .It Can optionally perform data authentication (integrity verification) utilizing one of the following algorithms: .Nm HMAC/MD5 , .Nm HMAC/SHA1 , .Nm HMAC/RIPEMD160 , .Nm HMAC/SHA256 , .Nm HMAC/SHA384 or .Nm HMAC/SHA512 . .It Can create a User Key from up to two, piecewise components: a passphrase entered via prompt or read from one or more passfiles; a keyfile read from one or more files. .It Allows encryption of the root partition. The user will be asked for the passphrase before the root file system is mounted. .It Strengthens the passphrase component of the User Key with: .Rs .%A B. Kaliski .%T "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification, Version 2.0." .%R RFC .%N 2898 .Re .It Allows the use of two independent User Keys (e.g., a .Qq "user key" and a .Qq "company key" ) . .It It is fast - .Nm performs simple sector-to-sector encryption. .It Allows the encrypted Master Key to be backed up and restored, so that if a user has to quickly destroy key material, it is possible to get the data back by restoring keys from backup. .It Providers can be configured to automatically detach on last close (so users do not have to remember to detach providers after unmounting the file systems). .It Allows attaching a provider with a random, one-time Master Key - useful for swap partitions and temporary file systems. .It Allows verification of data integrity (data authentication). .It Allows suspending and resuming encrypted devices. .El .Pp The first argument to .Nm indicates an action to be performed: .Bl -tag -width ".Cm configure" .It Cm init Initialize the provider which needs to be encrypted. Here you can set up the cryptographic algorithm to use, Data Key length, etc. The last sector of the provider is used to store metadata. The .Cm init subcommand also automatically writes metadata backups to .Pa /var/backups/.eli file. The metadata can be recovered with the .Cm restore subcommand described below. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl J Ar newpassfile" .It Fl a Ar aalgo Enable data integrity verification (authentication) using the given algorithm. This will reduce the size of storage available and also reduce speed. For example, when using 4096 bytes sector and .Nm HMAC/SHA256 algorithm, 89% of the original provider storage will be available for use. Currently supported algorithms are: .Nm HMAC/MD5 , .Nm HMAC/SHA1 , .Nm HMAC/RIPEMD160 , .Nm HMAC/SHA256 , .Nm HMAC/SHA384 and .Nm HMAC/SHA512 . If the option is not given, there will be no authentication, only encryption. The recommended algorithm is .Nm HMAC/SHA256 . .It Fl b Try to decrypt this partition during boot, before the root partition is mounted. This makes it possible to use an encrypted root partition. One will still need bootable unencrypted storage with a .Pa /boot/ directory, which can be a CD-ROM disc or USB pen-drive, that can be removed after boot. .It Fl B Ar backupfile File name to use for metadata backup instead of the default .Pa /var/backups/.eli . To inhibit backups, you can use .Pa none as the .Ar backupfile . .It Fl d When entering the passphrase to boot from this encrypted root filesystem, echo .Ql * characters. This makes the length of the passphrase visible. .It Fl e Ar ealgo Encryption algorithm to use. Currently supported algorithms are: .Nm AES-XTS , .Nm AES-CBC , .Nm Blowfish-CBC , .Nm Camellia-CBC , .Nm 3DES-CBC , and .Nm NULL . The default and recommended algorithm is .Nm AES-XTS . .Nm NULL is unencrypted. .It Fl g Enable booting from this encrypted root filesystem. The boot loader prompts for the passphrase and loads .Xr loader 8 from the encrypted partition. .It Fl i Ar iterations Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2 when processing User Key passphrase component. If this option is not specified, .Nm will find the number of iterations which is equal to 2 seconds of crypto work. If 0 is given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used. PKCS#5v2 processing is performed once, after all parts of the passphrase component have been read. .It Fl J Ar newpassfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key (or part of it). If .Ar newpassfile is given as -, standard input will be used. Only the first line (excluding new-line character) is taken from the given file. This argument can be specified multiple times, which has the effect of reassembling a single passphrase split across multiple files. Cannot be combined with the .Fl P option. .It Fl K Ar newkeyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key (or part of it). If .Ar newkeyfile is given as -, standard input will be used. This argument can be specified multiple times, which has the effect of reassembling a single keyfile split across multiple keyfile parts. .It Fl l Ar keylen Data Key length to use with the given cryptographic algorithm. If the length is not specified, the selected algorithm uses its .Em default key length. .Bl -ohang -offset indent .It Nm AES-XTS .Em 128 , 256 .It Nm AES-CBC , Nm Camellia-CBC .Em 128 , 192, 256 .It Nm Blowfish-CBC .Em 128 + n * 32, for n=[0..10] .It Nm 3DES-CBC .Em 192 .El .It Fl P Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Key. Cannot be combined with the .Fl J option. .It Fl s Ar sectorsize Change decrypted provider's sector size. Increasing the sector size allows increased performance, because encryption/decryption which requires an initialization vector is done per sector; fewer sectors means less computational work. .It Fl T Don't pass through .Dv BIO_DELETE calls (i.e., TRIM/UNMAP). This can prevent an attacker from knowing how much space you're actually using and which sectors contain live data, but will also prevent the backing store (SSD, etc) from reclaiming space you're not using, which may degrade its performance and lifespan. The underlying provider may or may not actually obliterate the deleted sectors when TRIM is enabled, so it should not be considered to add any security. .It Fl V Ar version Metadata version to use. This option is helpful when creating a provider that may be used by older .Nm FreeBSD/GELI versions. Consult the .Sx HISTORY section to find which metadata version is supported by which FreeBSD version. Note that using an older version of metadata may limit the number of features available. .El .It Cm attach Attach the given provider. The encrypted Master Key will be loaded from the metadata and decrypted using the given passphrase/keyfile and a new GEOM provider will be created using the given provider's name with an .Qq .eli suffix. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl j Ar passfile" .It Fl C Do a dry-run decryption. This is useful to verify passphrase and keyfile without decrypting the device. .It Fl d If specified, a decrypted provider will be detached automatically on last close. This can help with scarce memory so the user does not have to remember to detach the provider after unmounting the file system. It only works when the provider was opened for writing, so it will not work if the file system on the provider is mounted read-only. Probably a better choice is the .Fl l option for the .Cm detach subcommand. .It Fl n Ar keyno Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy to use (could be 0 or 1). If the index number is not provided all keys will be tested. .It Fl j Ar passfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key (or part of it). For more information see the description of the .Fl J option for the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl k Ar keyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key (or part of it). For more information see the description of the .Fl K option for the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl p Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Key. Cannot be combined with the .Fl j option. .It Fl r Attach read-only provider. It will not be opened for writing. .El .It Cm detach Detach the given providers, which means remove the devfs entry and clear the Master Key and Data Keys from memory. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl f" .It Fl f Force detach - detach even if the provider is open. .It Fl l Mark provider to detach on last close. If this option is specified, the provider will not be detached while it is open, but will be automatically detached when it is closed for the last time even if it was only opened for reading. .El .It Cm onetime Attach the given providers with a random, one-time (ephemeral) Master Key. The command can be used to encrypt swap partitions or temporary file systems. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl a Ar sectorsize" .It Fl a Ar aalgo Enable data integrity verification (authentication). For more information, see the description of the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl e Ar ealgo Encryption algorithm to use. For more information, see the description of the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl d Detach on last close. Note: this option is not usable for temporary file systems as the provider will be detached after creating the file system on it. It still can (and should be) used for swap partitions. For more information, see the description of the .Cm attach subcommand. .It Fl l Ar keylen Data Key length to use with the given cryptographic algorithm. For more information, see the description of the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl s Ar sectorsize Change decrypted provider's sector size. For more information, see the description of the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl T Disable TRIM/UNMAP passthru. For more information, see the description of the .Cm init subcommand. .El .It Cm configure Change configuration of the given providers. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl b" .It Fl b Set the BOOT flag on the given providers. For more information, see the description of the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl B Remove the BOOT flag from the given providers. .It Fl d When entering the passphrase to boot from this encrypted root filesystem, echo .Ql * characters. This makes the length of the passphrase visible. .It Fl D Disable echoing of any characters when a passphrase is entered to boot from this encrypted root filesystem. This hides the passphrase length. .It Fl g Enable booting from this encrypted root filesystem. The boot loader prompts for the passphrase and loads .Xr loader 8 from the encrypted partition. .It Fl G Deactivate booting from this encrypted root partition. .It Fl t Enable TRIM/UNMAP passthru. For more information, see the description of the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl T Disable TRIM/UNMAP passthru. .El .It Cm setkey Install a copy of the Master Key into the selected slot, encrypted with a new User Key. If the selected slot is populated, replace the existing copy. A provider has one Master Key, which can be stored in one or both slots, each encrypted with an independent User Key. With the .Cm init subcommand, only key number 0 is initialized. The User Key can be changed at any time: for an attached provider, for a detached provider, or on the backup file. When a provider is attached, the user does not have to provide an existing passphrase/keyfile. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl J Ar newpassfile" .It Fl i Ar iterations Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2. If 0 is given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used. To be able to use this option with the .Cm setkey subcommand, only one key has to be defined and this key must be changed. .It Fl j Ar passfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of a current User Key (or part of it). .It Fl J Ar newpassfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the new User Key (or part of it). .It Fl k Ar keyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of a current User Key (or part of it). .It Fl K Ar newkeyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the new User Key (or part of it). .It Fl n Ar keyno Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy to change (could be 0 or 1). If the provider is attached and no key number is given, the key used for attaching the provider will be changed. If the provider is detached (or we are operating on a backup file) and no key number is given, the first Master Key copy to be successfully decrypted with the provided User Key passphrase/keyfile will be changed. .It Fl p Do not use a passphrase as a component of the current User Key. Cannot be combined with the .Fl j option. .It Fl P Do not use a passphrase as a component of the new User Key. Cannot be combined with the .Fl J option. .El .It Cm delkey Destroy (overwrite with random data) the selected Master Key copy. If one is destroying keys for an attached provider, the provider will not be detached even if all copies of the Master Key are destroyed. It can even be rescued with the .Cm setkey subcommand because the Master Key is still in memory. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl a Ar keyno" .It Fl a Destroy all copies of the Master Key (does not need .Fl f option). .It Fl f Force key destruction. This option is needed to destroy the last copy of the Master Key. .It Fl n Ar keyno Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy. If the provider is attached and no key number is given, the key used for attaching the provider will be destroyed. If provider is detached (or we are operating on a backup file) the key number has to be given. .El .It Cm kill This command should be used only in emergency situations. It will destroy all copies of the Master Key on a given provider and will detach it forcibly (if it is attached). This is absolutely a one-way command - if you do not have a metadata backup, your data is gone for good. In case the provider was attached with the .Fl r flag, the keys will not be destroyed, only the provider will be detached. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl a" .It Fl a If specified, all currently attached providers will be killed. .El .It Cm backup Backup metadata from the given provider to the given file. .It Cm restore Restore metadata from the given file to the given provider. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl f" .It Fl f Metadata contains the size of the provider to ensure that the correct partition or slice is attached. If an attempt is made to restore metadata to a provider that has a different size, .Nm will refuse to restore the data unless the .Fl f switch is used. If the partition or slice has been grown, the .Cm resize subcommand should be used rather than attempting to relocate the metadata through .Cm backup and .Cm restore . .El .It Cm suspend Suspend device by waiting for all inflight requests to finish, clearing all sensitive information (like the Master Key and Data Keys) from kernel memory, and blocking all further I/O requests until the .Cm resume subcommand is executed. This functionality is useful for laptops: when one wants to suspend a laptop, one does not want to leave an encrypted device attached. Instead of closing all files and directories opened from a file system located on an encrypted device, unmounting the file system, and detaching the device, the .Cm suspend subcommand can be used. Any access to the encrypted device will be blocked until the Master Key is reloaded through the .Cm resume subcommand. Thus there is no need to close nor unmount anything. The .Cm suspend subcommand does not work with devices created with the .Cm onetime subcommand. Please note that sensitive data might still be present in memory after suspending an encrypted device due to the file system cache, etc. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl a" .It Fl a Suspend all .Nm devices. .El .It Cm resume Resume previously suspended device. The caller must ensure that executing this subcommand does not access the suspended device, leading to a deadlock. For example suspending a device which contains the file system where the .Nm utility is stored is bad idea. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl j Ar passfile" .It Fl j Ar passfile Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key (or part of it). For more information see the description of the .Fl J option for the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl k Ar keyfile Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key (or part of it). For more information see the description of the .Fl K option for the .Cm init subcommand. .It Fl p Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Key. Cannot be combined with the .Fl j option. .El .It Cm resize Inform .Nm that the provider has been resized. The old metadata block is relocated to the correct position at the end of the provider and the provider size is updated. .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl s Ar oldsize" .It Fl s Ar oldsize The size of the provider before it was resized. .El .It Cm version If no arguments are given, the .Cm version subcommand will print the version of .Nm userland utility as well as the version of the .Nm ELI GEOM class. .Pp If GEOM providers are specified, the .Cm version subcommand will print metadata version used by each of them. .It Cm clear Clear metadata from the given providers. .Em WARNING : This will erase with zeros the encrypted Master Key copies stored in the metadata. .It Cm dump Dump metadata stored on the given providers. .It Cm list See .Xr geom 8 . .It Cm status See .Xr geom 8 . .It Cm load See .Xr geom 8 . .It Cm unload See .Xr geom 8 . .El .Pp Additional options include: .Bl -tag -width ".Fl v" .It Fl v Be more verbose. .El .Sh KEY SUMMARY .Ss Master Key Upon .Cm init , the .Nm utility generates a random Master Key for the provider. The Master Key never changes during the lifetime of the provider. Each copy of the provider metadata, active or backed up to a file, can store up to two, independently-encrypted copies of the Master Key. .Ss User Key Each stored copy of the Master Key is encrypted with a User Key, which is generated by the .Nm utility from a passphrase and/or a keyfile. The .Nm utility first reads all parts of the keyfile in the order specified on the command line, then reads all parts of the stored passphrase in the order specified on the command line. If no passphrase parts are specified, the system prompts the user to enter the passphrase. The passphrase is optionally strengthened by PKCS#5v2. The User Key is a digest computed over the concatenated keyfile and passphrase. .Ss Data Key During operation, one or more Data Keys are deterministically derived by the kernel from the Master Key and cached in memory. The number of Data Keys used by a given provider, and the way they are derived, depend on the GELI version and whether the provider is configured to use data authentication. .Sh SYSCTL VARIABLES The following .Xr sysctl 8 variables can be used to control the behavior of the .Nm ELI GEOM class. The default value is shown next to each variable. Some variables can also be set in .Pa /boot/loader.conf . .Bl -tag -width indent .It Va kern.geom.eli.version Version number of the .Nm ELI GEOM class. .It Va kern.geom.eli.debug : No 0 Debug level of the .Nm ELI GEOM class. This can be set to a number between 0 and 3 inclusive. If set to 0, minimal debug information is printed. If set to 3, the maximum amount of debug information is printed. .It Va kern.geom.eli.tries : No 3 Number of times a user is asked for the passphrase. This is only used for providers which are attached on boot (before the root file system is mounted). If set to 0, attaching providers on boot will be disabled. This variable should be set in .Pa /boot/loader.conf . .It Va kern.geom.eli.overwrites : No 5 Specifies how many times the Master Key will be overwritten with random values when it is destroyed. After this operation it is filled with zeros. .It Va kern.geom.eli.visible_passphrase : No 0 If set to 1, the passphrase entered on boot (before the root file system is mounted) will be visible. This alternative should be used with caution as the entered passphrase can be logged and exposed via .Xr dmesg 8 . This variable should be set in .Pa /boot/loader.conf . .It Va kern.geom.eli.threads : No 0 Specifies how many kernel threads should be used for doing software cryptography. Its purpose is to increase performance on SMP systems. If set to 0, a CPU-pinned thread will be started for every active CPU. .It Va kern.geom.eli.batch : No 0 When set to 1, can speed-up crypto operations by using batching. Batching reduces the number of interrupts by responding to a group of crypto requests with one interrupt. The crypto card and the driver has to support this feature. .It Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit : No 8192 Specifies how many Data Keys to cache. The default limit (8192 keys) will allow caching of all keys for a 4TB provider with 512 byte sectors and will take around 1MB of memory. .It Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_hits Reports how many times we were looking up a Data Key and it was already in cache. This sysctl is not updated for providers that need fewer Data Keys than the limit specified in .Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit . .It Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_misses Reports how many times we were looking up a Data Key and it was not in cache. This sysctl is not updated for providers that need fewer Data Keys than the limit specified in .Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit . .El .Sh EXIT STATUS Exit status is 0 on success, and 1 if the command fails. +.Sh DEPRECATION NOTICE +Support for the +.Nm Blowfish-CBC +and +.Nm 3DES-CBC +cryptographic algorithms and +.Nm HMAC/MD5 +authentication algorithm will be removed in +.Fx 13.0 . +New volumes cannot be created using these algorithms. +Existing volumes should be migrated to a new volume that uses +non-deprecated algorithms. .Sh EXAMPLES Initialize a provider which is going to be encrypted with a passphrase and random data from a file on the user's pen drive. Use 4kB sector size. Attach the provider, create a file system, and mount it. Do the work. Unmount the provider and detach it: .Bd -literal -offset indent # dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/da2.key bs=64 count=1 # geli init -s 4096 -K /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # geli attach -k /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2 Enter passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da2.eli bs=1m # newfs /dev/da2.eli # mount /dev/da2.eli /mnt/secret \&... # umount /mnt/secret # geli detach da2.eli .Ed .Pp Create an encrypted provider, but use two User Keys: one for your employee and one for you as the company's security officer (so it is not a tragedy if the employee .Qq accidentally forgets his passphrase): .Bd -literal -offset indent # geli init /dev/da2 Enter new passphrase: (enter security officer's passphrase) Reenter new passphrase: # geli setkey -n 1 /dev/da2 Enter passphrase: (enter security officer's passphrase) Enter new passphrase: (let your employee enter his passphrase ...) Reenter new passphrase: (... twice) .Ed .Pp You are the security officer in your company. Create an encrypted provider for use by the user, but remember that users forget their passphrases, so backup the Master Key with your own random key: .Bd -literal -offset indent # dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` bs=64 count=1 # geli init -P -K /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ada0s1e # geli backup /dev/ada0s1e /mnt/pendrive/backups/`hostname` (use key number 0, so the encrypted Master Key will be re-encrypted by this) # geli setkey -n 0 -k /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ada0s1e (allow the user to enter his passphrase) Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: .Ed .Pp Encrypted swap partition setup: .Bd -literal -offset indent # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/ada0s1b bs=1m # geli onetime -d -e 3des ada0s1b # swapon /dev/ada0s1b.eli .Ed .Pp The example below shows how to configure two providers which will be attached on boot (before the root file system is mounted). One of them is using passphrase and three keyfile parts and the other is using only a keyfile in one part: .Bd -literal -offset indent # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0 bs=1m # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key0 bs=32k count=1 # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key1 bs=32k count=1 # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key2 bs=32k count=1 # geli init -b -K /boot/keys/da0.key0 -K /boot/keys/da0.key1 -K /boot/keys/da0.key2 da0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da1s3a bs=1m # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da1s3a.key bs=128k count=1 # geli init -b -P -K /boot/keys/da1s3a.key da1s3a .Ed .Pp The providers are initialized, now we have to add these lines to .Pa /boot/loader.conf : .Bd -literal -offset indent geli_da0_keyfile0_load="YES" geli_da0_keyfile0_type="da0:geli_keyfile0" geli_da0_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da0.key0" geli_da0_keyfile1_load="YES" geli_da0_keyfile1_type="da0:geli_keyfile1" geli_da0_keyfile1_name="/boot/keys/da0.key1" geli_da0_keyfile2_load="YES" geli_da0_keyfile2_type="da0:geli_keyfile2" geli_da0_keyfile2_name="/boot/keys/da0.key2" geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_load="YES" geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile0" geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key" .Ed .Pp If there is only one keyfile, the index might be omitted: .Bd -literal -offset indent geli_da1s3a_keyfile_load="YES" geli_da1s3a_keyfile_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile" geli_da1s3a_keyfile_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key" .Ed .Pp Not only configure encryption, but also data integrity verification using .Nm HMAC/SHA256 . .Bd -literal -offset indent # geli init -a hmac/sha256 -s 4096 /dev/da0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: # geli attach /dev/da0 Enter passphrase: # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0.eli bs=1m # newfs /dev/da0.eli # mount /dev/da0.eli /mnt/secret .Ed .Pp .Cm geli writes the metadata backup by default to the .Pa /var/backups/.eli file. If the metadata is lost in any way (e.g., by accidental overwrite), it can be restored. Consider the following situation: .Bd -literal -offset indent # geli init /dev/da0 Enter new passphrase: Reenter new passphrase: Metadata backup can be found in /var/backups/da0.eli and can be restored with the following command: # geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0 # geli clear /dev/da0 # geli attach /dev/da0 geli: Cannot read metadata from /dev/da0: Invalid argument. # geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0 # geli attach /dev/da0 Enter passphrase: .Ed .Pp If an encrypted file system is extended, it is necessary to relocate and update the metadata: .Bd -literal -offset indent # gpart create -s GPT ada0 # gpart add -s 1g -t freebsd-ufs -i 1 ada0 # geli init -K keyfile -P ada0p1 # gpart resize -s 2g -i 1 ada0 # geli resize -s 1g ada0p1 # geli attach -k keyfile -p ada0p1 .Ed .Pp Initialize provider with the passphrase split into two files. The provider can be attached using those two files or by entering .Dq foobar as the passphrase at the .Nm prompt: .Bd -literal -offset indent # echo foo > da0.pass0 # echo bar > da0.pass1 # geli init -J da0.pass0 -J da0.pass1 da0 # geli attach -j da0.pass0 -j da0.pass1 da0 # geli detach da0 # geli attach da0 Enter passphrase: foobar .Ed .Pp Suspend all .Nm devices on a laptop, suspend the laptop, then resume devices one by one after resuming the laptop: .Bd -literal -offset indent # geli suspend -a # zzz # geli resume -p -k keyfile gpt/secret # geli resume gpt/private Enter passphrase: .Ed .Sh ENCRYPTION MODES .Nm supports two encryption modes: .Nm XTS , which was standardized as .Nm IEEE P1619 and .Nm CBC with unpredictable IV. The .Nm CBC mode used by .Nm is very similar to the mode .Nm ESSIV . .Sh DATA AUTHENTICATION .Nm can verify data integrity when an authentication algorithm is specified. When data corruption/modification is detected, .Nm will not return any data, but instead will return an error .Pq Er EINVAL . The offset and size of the corrupted data will be printed on the console. It is important to know against which attacks .Nm provides protection for your data. If data is modified in-place or copied from one place on the disk to another even without modification, .Nm should be able to detect such a change. If an attacker can remember the encrypted data, he can overwrite any future changes with the data he owns without it being noticed. In other words .Nm will not protect your data against replay attacks. .Pp It is recommended to write to the whole provider before first use, in order to make sure that all sectors and their corresponding checksums are properly initialized into a consistent state. One can safely ignore data authentication errors that occur immediately after the first time a provider is attached and before it is initialized in this way. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr crypto 4 , .Xr gbde 4 , .Xr geom 4 , .Xr loader.conf 5 , .Xr gbde 8 , .Xr geom 8 , .Xr crypto 9 .Sh HISTORY The .Nm utility appeared in .Fx 6.0 . Support for the .Nm Camellia -block cipher is implemented by Yoshisato Yanagisawa in +block cipher was implemented by Yoshisato Yanagisawa in .Fx 7.0 . .Pp Highest .Nm GELI metadata version supported by the given FreeBSD version: .Bl -column -offset indent ".Sy FreeBSD" ".Sy version" .It Sy FreeBSD Ta Sy GELI .It Sy version Ta Sy version .Pp .It Li 6.0 Ta 0 .It Li 6.1 Ta 0 .It Li 6.2 Ta 3 .It Li 6.3 Ta 3 .It Li 6.4 Ta 3 .Pp .It Li 7.0 Ta 3 .It Li 7.1 Ta 3 .It Li 7.2 Ta 3 .It Li 7.3 Ta 3 .It Li 7.4 Ta 3 .Pp .It Li 8.0 Ta 3 .It Li 8.1 Ta 3 .It Li 8.2 Ta 5 .Pp .It Li 9.0 Ta 6 .Pp .It Li 10.0 Ta 7 .El .Sh AUTHORS .An Pawel Jakub Dawidek Aq Mt pjd@FreeBSD.org Index: stable/11/sbin/geom/class/eli/geom_eli.c =================================================================== --- stable/11/sbin/geom/class/eli/geom_eli.c (revision 348587) +++ stable/11/sbin/geom/class/eli/geom_eli.c (revision 348588) @@ -1,1769 +1,1785 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD * * Copyright (c) 2004-2010 Pawel Jakub Dawidek * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "core/geom.h" #include "misc/subr.h" uint32_t lib_version = G_LIB_VERSION; uint32_t version = G_ELI_VERSION; #define GELI_BACKUP_DIR "/var/backups/" #define GELI_ENC_ALGO "aes" static void eli_main(struct gctl_req *req, unsigned flags); static void eli_init(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_attach(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_configure(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_setkey(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_delkey(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_resume(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_kill(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_backup(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_restore(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_resize(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_version(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_clear(struct gctl_req *req); static void eli_dump(struct gctl_req *req); static int eli_backup_create(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov, const char *file); /* * Available commands: * * init [-bdgPTv] [-a aalgo] [-B backupfile] [-e ealgo] [-i iterations] [-l keylen] [-J newpassfile] [-K newkeyfile] [-s sectorsize] [-V version] prov * label - alias for 'init' * attach [-Cdprv] [-n keyno] [-j passfile] [-k keyfile] prov * detach [-fl] prov ... * stop - alias for 'detach' * onetime [-d] [-a aalgo] [-e ealgo] [-l keylen] prov * configure [-bBgGtT] prov ... * setkey [-pPv] [-n keyno] [-j passfile] [-J newpassfile] [-k keyfile] [-K newkeyfile] prov * delkey [-afv] [-n keyno] prov * suspend [-v] -a | prov ... * resume [-pv] [-j passfile] [-k keyfile] prov * kill [-av] [prov ...] * backup [-v] prov file * restore [-fv] file prov * resize [-v] -s oldsize prov * version [prov ...] * clear [-v] prov ... * dump [-v] prov ... */ struct g_command class_commands[] = { { "init", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, { { 'a', "aalgo", "", G_TYPE_STRING }, { 'b', "boot", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'B', "backupfile", "", G_TYPE_STRING }, { 'd', "displaypass", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'e', "ealgo", "", G_TYPE_STRING }, { 'g', "geliboot", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'i', "iterations", "-1", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'J', "newpassfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'K', "newkeyfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'l', "keylen", "0", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'P', "nonewpassphrase", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 's', "sectorsize", "0", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'T', "notrim", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'V', "mdversion", "-1", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-bdgPTv] [-a aalgo] [-B backupfile] [-e ealgo] [-i iterations] [-l keylen] [-J newpassfile] [-K newkeyfile] [-s sectorsize] [-V version] prov" }, { "label", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, { { 'a', "aalgo", "", G_TYPE_STRING }, { 'b', "boot", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'B', "backupfile", "", G_TYPE_STRING }, { 'd', "displaypass", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'e', "ealgo", "", G_TYPE_STRING }, { 'g', "geliboot", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'i', "iterations", "-1", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'J', "newpassfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'K', "newkeyfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'l', "keylen", "0", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'P', "nonewpassphrase", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 's', "sectorsize", "0", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'V', "mdversion", "-1", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "- an alias for 'init'" }, { "attach", G_FLAG_VERBOSE | G_FLAG_LOADKLD, eli_main, { { 'C', "dryrun", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'd', "detach", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'j', "passfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'k', "keyfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'n', "keyno", "-1", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'p', "nopassphrase", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'r', "readonly", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-Cdprv] [-n keyno] [-j passfile] [-k keyfile] prov" }, { "detach", 0, NULL, { { 'f', "force", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'l', "last", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-fl] prov ..." }, { "stop", 0, NULL, { { 'f', "force", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'l', "last", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "- an alias for 'detach'" }, { "onetime", G_FLAG_VERBOSE | G_FLAG_LOADKLD, NULL, { { 'a', "aalgo", "", G_TYPE_STRING }, { 'd', "detach", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'e', "ealgo", GELI_ENC_ALGO, G_TYPE_STRING }, { 'l', "keylen", "0", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 's', "sectorsize", "0", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'T', "notrim", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-dT] [-a aalgo] [-e ealgo] [-l keylen] [-s sectorsize] prov" }, { "configure", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, { { 'b', "boot", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'B', "noboot", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'd', "displaypass", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'D', "nodisplaypass", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'g', "geliboot", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'G', "nogeliboot", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 't', "trim", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'T', "notrim", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-bBdDgGtT] prov ..." }, { "setkey", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, { { 'i', "iterations", "-1", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'j', "passfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'J', "newpassfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'k', "keyfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'K', "newkeyfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'n', "keyno", "-1", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, { 'p', "nopassphrase", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'P', "nonewpassphrase", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-pPv] [-n keyno] [-i iterations] [-j passfile] [-J newpassfile] [-k keyfile] [-K newkeyfile] prov" }, { "delkey", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, { { 'a', "all", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'f', "force", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, { 'n', "keyno", "-1", G_TYPE_NUMBER }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-afv] [-n keyno] prov" }, { "suspend", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, NULL, { { 'a', "all", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-v] -a | prov ..." }, { "resume", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, { { 'j', "passfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'k', "keyfile", G_VAL_OPTIONAL, G_TYPE_STRING | G_TYPE_MULTI }, { 'p', "nopassphrase", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-pv] [-j passfile] [-k keyfile] prov" }, { "kill", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, { { 'a', "all", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-av] [prov ...]" }, { "backup", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, G_NULL_OPTS, "[-v] prov file" }, { "restore", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, { { 'f', "force", NULL, G_TYPE_BOOL }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-fv] file prov" }, { "resize", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, { { 's', "oldsize", NULL, G_TYPE_NUMBER }, G_OPT_SENTINEL }, "[-v] -s oldsize prov" }, { "version", G_FLAG_LOADKLD, eli_main, G_NULL_OPTS, "[prov ...]" }, { "clear", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, G_NULL_OPTS, "[-v] prov ..." }, { "dump", G_FLAG_VERBOSE, eli_main, G_NULL_OPTS, "[-v] prov ..." }, G_CMD_SENTINEL }; static int verbose = 0; #define BUFSIZE 1024 static int eli_protect(struct gctl_req *req) { struct rlimit rl; /* Disable core dumps. */ rl.rlim_cur = 0; rl.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl) == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot disable core dumps: %s.", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } /* Disable swapping. */ if (mlockall(MCL_FUTURE) == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot lock memory: %s.", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } static void eli_main(struct gctl_req *req, unsigned int flags) { const char *name; if (eli_protect(req) == -1) return; if ((flags & G_FLAG_VERBOSE) != 0) verbose = 1; name = gctl_get_ascii(req, "verb"); if (name == NULL) { gctl_error(req, "No '%s' argument.", "verb"); return; } if (strcmp(name, "init") == 0 || strcmp(name, "label") == 0) eli_init(req); else if (strcmp(name, "attach") == 0) eli_attach(req); else if (strcmp(name, "configure") == 0) eli_configure(req); else if (strcmp(name, "setkey") == 0) eli_setkey(req); else if (strcmp(name, "delkey") == 0) eli_delkey(req); else if (strcmp(name, "resume") == 0) eli_resume(req); else if (strcmp(name, "kill") == 0) eli_kill(req); else if (strcmp(name, "backup") == 0) eli_backup(req); else if (strcmp(name, "restore") == 0) eli_restore(req); else if (strcmp(name, "resize") == 0) eli_resize(req); else if (strcmp(name, "version") == 0) eli_version(req); else if (strcmp(name, "dump") == 0) eli_dump(req); else if (strcmp(name, "clear") == 0) eli_clear(req); else gctl_error(req, "Unknown command: %s.", name); } static bool eli_is_attached(const char *prov) { char name[MAXPATHLEN]; /* * Not the best way to do it, but the easiest. * We try to open provider and check if it is a GEOM provider * by asking about its sectorsize. */ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s%s", prov, G_ELI_SUFFIX); return (g_get_sectorsize(name) > 0); } static int eli_genkey_files(struct gctl_req *req, bool new, const char *type, struct hmac_ctx *ctxp, char *passbuf, size_t passbufsize) { char *p, buf[BUFSIZE], argname[16]; const char *file; int error, fd, i; ssize_t done; assert((strcmp(type, "keyfile") == 0 && ctxp != NULL && passbuf == NULL && passbufsize == 0) || (strcmp(type, "passfile") == 0 && ctxp == NULL && passbuf != NULL && passbufsize > 0)); assert(strcmp(type, "keyfile") == 0 || passbuf[0] == '\0'); for (i = 0; ; i++) { snprintf(argname, sizeof(argname), "%s%s%d", new ? "new" : "", type, i); /* No more {key,pass}files? */ if (!gctl_has_param(req, argname)) return (i); file = gctl_get_ascii(req, "%s", argname); assert(file != NULL); if (strcmp(file, "-") == 0) fd = STDIN_FILENO; else { fd = open(file, O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot open %s %s: %s.", type, file, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } } if (strcmp(type, "keyfile") == 0) { while ((done = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(ctxp, buf, done); } else /* if (strcmp(type, "passfile") == 0) */ { assert(strcmp(type, "passfile") == 0); while ((done = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) > 0) { buf[done] = '\0'; p = strchr(buf, '\n'); if (p != NULL) { *p = '\0'; done = p - buf; } if (strlcat(passbuf, buf, passbufsize) >= passbufsize) { gctl_error(req, "Passphrase in %s too long.", file); bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); return (-1); } if (p != NULL) break; } } error = errno; if (strcmp(file, "-") != 0) close(fd); bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); if (done == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot read %s %s: %s.", type, file, strerror(error)); return (-1); } } /* NOTREACHED */ } static int eli_genkey_passphrase_prompt(struct gctl_req *req, bool new, char *passbuf, size_t passbufsize) { char *p; for (;;) { p = readpassphrase( new ? "Enter new passphrase: " : "Enter passphrase: ", passbuf, passbufsize, RPP_ECHO_OFF | RPP_REQUIRE_TTY); if (p == NULL) { bzero(passbuf, passbufsize); gctl_error(req, "Cannot read passphrase: %s.", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (new) { char tmpbuf[BUFSIZE]; p = readpassphrase("Reenter new passphrase: ", tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), RPP_ECHO_OFF | RPP_REQUIRE_TTY); if (p == NULL) { bzero(passbuf, passbufsize); gctl_error(req, "Cannot read passphrase: %s.", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (strcmp(passbuf, tmpbuf) != 0) { bzero(passbuf, passbufsize); fprintf(stderr, "They didn't match.\n"); continue; } bzero(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf)); } return (0); } /* NOTREACHED */ } static int eli_genkey_passphrase(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_eli_metadata *md, bool new, struct hmac_ctx *ctxp) { char passbuf[BUFSIZE]; bool nopassphrase; int nfiles; nopassphrase = gctl_get_int(req, new ? "nonewpassphrase" : "nopassphrase"); if (nopassphrase) { if (gctl_has_param(req, new ? "newpassfile0" : "passfile0")) { gctl_error(req, "Options -%c and -%c are mutually exclusive.", new ? 'J' : 'j', new ? 'P' : 'p'); return (-1); } return (0); } if (!new && md->md_iterations == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Missing -p flag."); return (-1); } passbuf[0] = '\0'; nfiles = eli_genkey_files(req, new, "passfile", NULL, passbuf, sizeof(passbuf)); if (nfiles == -1) return (-1); else if (nfiles == 0) { if (eli_genkey_passphrase_prompt(req, new, passbuf, sizeof(passbuf)) == -1) { return (-1); } } /* * Field md_iterations equal to -1 means "choose some sane * value for me". */ if (md->md_iterations == -1) { assert(new); if (verbose) printf("Calculating number of iterations...\n"); md->md_iterations = pkcs5v2_calculate(2000000); assert(md->md_iterations > 0); if (verbose) { printf("Done, using %d iterations.\n", md->md_iterations); } } /* * If md_iterations is equal to 0, user doesn't want PKCS#5v2. */ if (md->md_iterations == 0) { g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(ctxp, md->md_salt, sizeof(md->md_salt)); g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(ctxp, passbuf, strlen(passbuf)); } else /* if (md->md_iterations > 0) */ { unsigned char dkey[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN]; pkcs5v2_genkey(dkey, sizeof(dkey), md->md_salt, sizeof(md->md_salt), passbuf, md->md_iterations); g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(ctxp, dkey, sizeof(dkey)); bzero(dkey, sizeof(dkey)); } bzero(passbuf, sizeof(passbuf)); return (0); } static unsigned char * eli_genkey(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_eli_metadata *md, unsigned char *key, bool new) { struct hmac_ctx ctx; bool nopassphrase; int nfiles; nopassphrase = gctl_get_int(req, new ? "nonewpassphrase" : "nopassphrase"); g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(&ctx, NULL, 0); nfiles = eli_genkey_files(req, new, "keyfile", &ctx, NULL, 0); if (nfiles == -1) return (NULL); else if (nfiles == 0 && nopassphrase) { gctl_error(req, "No key components given."); return (NULL); } if (eli_genkey_passphrase(req, md, new, &ctx) == -1) return (NULL); g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(&ctx, key, 0); return (key); } static int eli_metadata_read(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov, struct g_eli_metadata *md) { unsigned char sector[sizeof(struct g_eli_metadata)]; int error; if (g_get_sectorsize(prov) == 0) { int fd; /* This is a file probably. */ fd = open(prov, O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot open %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (read(fd, sector, sizeof(sector)) != sizeof(sector)) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot read metadata from %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (-1); } close(fd); } else { /* This is a GEOM provider. */ error = g_metadata_read(prov, sector, sizeof(sector), G_ELI_MAGIC); if (error != 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot read metadata from %s: %s.", prov, strerror(error)); return (-1); } } error = eli_metadata_decode(sector, md); switch (error) { case 0: break; case EOPNOTSUPP: gctl_error(req, "Provider's %s metadata version %u is too new.\n" "geli: The highest supported version is %u.", prov, (unsigned int)md->md_version, G_ELI_VERSION); return (-1); case EINVAL: gctl_error(req, "Inconsistent provider's %s metadata.", prov); return (-1); default: gctl_error(req, "Unexpected error while decoding provider's %s metadata: %s.", prov, strerror(error)); return (-1); } return (0); } static int eli_metadata_store(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov, struct g_eli_metadata *md) { unsigned char sector[sizeof(struct g_eli_metadata)]; int error; eli_metadata_encode(md, sector); if (g_get_sectorsize(prov) == 0) { int fd; /* This is a file probably. */ fd = open(prov, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC); if (fd == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot open %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); bzero(sector, sizeof(sector)); return (-1); } if (write(fd, sector, sizeof(sector)) != sizeof(sector)) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot write metadata to %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); bzero(sector, sizeof(sector)); close(fd); return (-1); } close(fd); } else { /* This is a GEOM provider. */ error = g_metadata_store(prov, sector, sizeof(sector)); if (error != 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot write metadata to %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); bzero(sector, sizeof(sector)); return (-1); } } bzero(sector, sizeof(sector)); return (0); } static void eli_init(struct gctl_req *req) { struct g_eli_metadata md; unsigned char sector[sizeof(struct g_eli_metadata)] __aligned(4); unsigned char key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN]; char backfile[MAXPATHLEN]; const char *str, *prov; unsigned int secsize, version; off_t mediasize; intmax_t val; int error, nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs != 1) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid number of arguments."); return; } prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg0"); mediasize = g_get_mediasize(prov); secsize = g_get_sectorsize(prov); if (mediasize == 0 || secsize == 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot get informations about %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); return; } bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); strlcpy(md.md_magic, G_ELI_MAGIC, sizeof(md.md_magic)); val = gctl_get_intmax(req, "mdversion"); if (val == -1) { version = G_ELI_VERSION; } else if (val < 0 || val > G_ELI_VERSION) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid version specified should be between %u and %u.", G_ELI_VERSION_00, G_ELI_VERSION); return; } else { version = val; } md.md_version = version; md.md_flags = 0; if (gctl_get_int(req, "boot")) md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT; if (gctl_get_int(req, "geliboot")) md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT; if (gctl_get_int(req, "displaypass")) md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS; if (gctl_get_int(req, "notrim")) md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_NODELETE; md.md_ealgo = CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN - 1; str = gctl_get_ascii(req, "aalgo"); if (*str != '\0') { if (version < G_ELI_VERSION_01) { gctl_error(req, "Data authentication is supported starting from version %u.", G_ELI_VERSION_01); return; } md.md_aalgo = g_eli_str2aalgo(str); if (md.md_aalgo >= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN && md.md_aalgo <= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) { md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH; } else { /* * For backward compatibility, check if the -a option * was used to provide encryption algorithm. */ md.md_ealgo = g_eli_str2ealgo(str); if (md.md_ealgo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN || md.md_ealgo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid authentication algorithm."); return; } else { fprintf(stderr, "warning: The -e option, not " "the -a option is now used to specify " "encryption algorithm to use.\n"); } } } if (md.md_ealgo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN || md.md_ealgo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) { str = gctl_get_ascii(req, "ealgo"); if (*str == '\0') { if (version < G_ELI_VERSION_05) str = "aes-cbc"; else str = GELI_ENC_ALGO; } md.md_ealgo = g_eli_str2ealgo(str); if (md.md_ealgo < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN || md.md_ealgo > CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid encryption algorithm."); return; } if (md.md_ealgo == CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_CBC && version < G_ELI_VERSION_04) { gctl_error(req, "Camellia-CBC algorithm is supported starting from version %u.", G_ELI_VERSION_04); return; } if (md.md_ealgo == CRYPTO_AES_XTS && version < G_ELI_VERSION_05) { gctl_error(req, "AES-XTS algorithm is supported starting from version %u.", G_ELI_VERSION_05); return; } } + if (md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) { + switch (md.md_aalgo) { + case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC: + gctl_error(req, + "The %s authentication algorithm is deprecated.", + g_eli_algo2str(md.md_aalgo)); + return; + } + } + switch (md.md_ealgo) { + case CRYPTO_3DES_CBC: + case CRYPTO_BLF_CBC: + gctl_error(req, "The %s encryption algorithm is deprecated.", + g_eli_algo2str(md.md_ealgo)); + return; + } val = gctl_get_intmax(req, "keylen"); md.md_keylen = val; md.md_keylen = g_eli_keylen(md.md_ealgo, md.md_keylen); if (md.md_keylen == 0) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid key length."); return; } md.md_provsize = mediasize; val = gctl_get_intmax(req, "iterations"); if (val != -1) { int nonewpassphrase; /* * Don't allow to set iterations when there will be no * passphrase. */ nonewpassphrase = gctl_get_int(req, "nonewpassphrase"); if (nonewpassphrase) { gctl_error(req, "Options -i and -P are mutually exclusive."); return; } } md.md_iterations = val; val = gctl_get_intmax(req, "sectorsize"); if (val == 0) md.md_sectorsize = secsize; else { if (val < 0 || (val % secsize) != 0 || !powerof2(val)) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid sector size."); return; } if (val > sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE)) { fprintf(stderr, "warning: Using sectorsize bigger than the page size!\n"); } md.md_sectorsize = val; } md.md_keys = 0x01; arc4random_buf(md.md_salt, sizeof(md.md_salt)); arc4random_buf(md.md_mkeys, sizeof(md.md_mkeys)); /* Generate user key. */ if (eli_genkey(req, &md, key, true) == NULL) { bzero(key, sizeof(key)); bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); return; } /* Encrypt the first and the only Master Key. */ error = g_eli_mkey_encrypt(md.md_ealgo, key, md.md_keylen, md.md_mkeys); bzero(key, sizeof(key)); if (error != 0) { bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); gctl_error(req, "Cannot encrypt Master Key: %s.", strerror(error)); return; } eli_metadata_encode(&md, sector); bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); error = g_metadata_store(prov, sector, sizeof(sector)); bzero(sector, sizeof(sector)); if (error != 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot store metadata on %s: %s.", prov, strerror(error)); return; } if (verbose) printf("Metadata value stored on %s.\n", prov); /* Backup metadata to a file. */ str = gctl_get_ascii(req, "backupfile"); if (str[0] != '\0') { /* Backupfile given be the user, just copy it. */ strlcpy(backfile, str, sizeof(backfile)); } else { /* Generate file name automatically. */ const char *p = prov; unsigned int i; if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0) p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1; snprintf(backfile, sizeof(backfile), "%s%s.eli", GELI_BACKUP_DIR, p); /* Replace all / with _. */ for (i = strlen(GELI_BACKUP_DIR); backfile[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (backfile[i] == '/') backfile[i] = '_'; } } if (strcmp(backfile, "none") != 0 && eli_backup_create(req, prov, backfile) == 0) { printf("\nMetadata backup can be found in %s and\n", backfile); printf("can be restored with the following command:\n"); printf("\n\t# geli restore %s %s\n\n", backfile, prov); } } static void eli_attach(struct gctl_req *req) { struct g_eli_metadata md; unsigned char key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN]; const char *prov; off_t mediasize; int nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs != 1) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid number of arguments."); return; } prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg0"); if (eli_metadata_read(req, prov, &md) == -1) return; mediasize = g_get_mediasize(prov); if (md.md_provsize != (uint64_t)mediasize) { gctl_error(req, "Provider size mismatch."); return; } if (eli_genkey(req, &md, key, false) == NULL) { bzero(key, sizeof(key)); return; } gctl_ro_param(req, "key", sizeof(key), key); if (gctl_issue(req) == NULL) { if (verbose) printf("Attached to %s.\n", prov); } bzero(key, sizeof(key)); } static void eli_configure_detached(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov, int boot, int geliboot, int displaypass, int trim) { struct g_eli_metadata md; bool changed = 0; if (eli_metadata_read(req, prov, &md) == -1) return; if (boot == 1 && (md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT)) { if (verbose) printf("BOOT flag already configured for %s.\n", prov); } else if (boot == 0 && !(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT)) { if (verbose) printf("BOOT flag not configured for %s.\n", prov); } else if (boot >= 0) { if (boot) md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT; else md.md_flags &= ~G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT; changed = 1; } if (geliboot == 1 && (md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT)) { if (verbose) printf("GELIBOOT flag already configured for %s.\n", prov); } else if (geliboot == 0 && !(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT)) { if (verbose) printf("GELIBOOT flag not configured for %s.\n", prov); } else if (geliboot >= 0) { if (geliboot) md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT; else md.md_flags &= ~G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT; changed = 1; } if (displaypass == 1 && (md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS)) { if (verbose) printf("GELIDISPLAYPASS flag already configured for %s.\n", prov); } else if (displaypass == 0 && !(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS)) { if (verbose) printf("GELIDISPLAYPASS flag not configured for %s.\n", prov); } else if (displaypass >= 0) { if (displaypass) md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS; else md.md_flags &= ~G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS; changed = 1; } if (trim == 0 && (md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_NODELETE)) { if (verbose) printf("TRIM disable flag already configured for %s.\n", prov); } else if (trim == 1 && !(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_NODELETE)) { if (verbose) printf("TRIM disable flag not configured for %s.\n", prov); } else if (trim >= 0) { if (trim) md.md_flags &= ~G_ELI_FLAG_NODELETE; else md.md_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_NODELETE; changed = 1; } if (changed) eli_metadata_store(req, prov, &md); bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); } static void eli_configure(struct gctl_req *req) { const char *prov; bool boot, noboot, geliboot, nogeliboot, displaypass, nodisplaypass; bool trim, notrim; int doboot, dogeliboot, dodisplaypass, dotrim; int i, nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs == 0) { gctl_error(req, "Too few arguments."); return; } boot = gctl_get_int(req, "boot"); noboot = gctl_get_int(req, "noboot"); geliboot = gctl_get_int(req, "geliboot"); nogeliboot = gctl_get_int(req, "nogeliboot"); displaypass = gctl_get_int(req, "displaypass"); nodisplaypass = gctl_get_int(req, "nodisplaypass"); trim = gctl_get_int(req, "trim"); notrim = gctl_get_int(req, "notrim"); doboot = -1; if (boot && noboot) { gctl_error(req, "Options -b and -B are mutually exclusive."); return; } if (boot) doboot = 1; else if (noboot) doboot = 0; dogeliboot = -1; if (geliboot && nogeliboot) { gctl_error(req, "Options -g and -G are mutually exclusive."); return; } if (geliboot) dogeliboot = 1; else if (nogeliboot) dogeliboot = 0; dodisplaypass = -1; if (displaypass && nodisplaypass) { gctl_error(req, "Options -d and -D are mutually exclusive."); return; } if (displaypass) dodisplaypass = 1; else if (nodisplaypass) dodisplaypass = 0; dotrim = -1; if (trim && notrim) { gctl_error(req, "Options -t and -T are mutually exclusive."); return; } if (trim) dotrim = 1; else if (notrim) dotrim = 0; if (doboot == -1 && dogeliboot == -1 && dodisplaypass == -1 && dotrim == -1) { gctl_error(req, "No option given."); return; } /* First attached providers. */ gctl_issue(req); /* Now the rest. */ for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg%d", i); if (!eli_is_attached(prov)) { eli_configure_detached(req, prov, doboot, dogeliboot, dodisplaypass, dotrim); } } } static void eli_setkey_attached(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_eli_metadata *md) { unsigned char key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN]; intmax_t val, old = 0; int error; val = gctl_get_intmax(req, "iterations"); /* Check if iterations number should be changed. */ if (val != -1) md->md_iterations = val; else old = md->md_iterations; /* Generate key for Master Key encryption. */ if (eli_genkey(req, md, key, true) == NULL) { bzero(key, sizeof(key)); return; } /* * If number of iterations has changed, but wasn't given as a * command-line argument, update the request. */ if (val == -1 && md->md_iterations != old) { error = gctl_change_param(req, "iterations", sizeof(intmax_t), &md->md_iterations); assert(error == 0); } gctl_ro_param(req, "key", sizeof(key), key); gctl_issue(req); bzero(key, sizeof(key)); } static void eli_setkey_detached(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov, struct g_eli_metadata *md) { unsigned char key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN], mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN]; unsigned char *mkeydst; unsigned int nkey; intmax_t val; int error; if (md->md_keys == 0) { gctl_error(req, "No valid keys on %s.", prov); return; } /* Generate key for Master Key decryption. */ if (eli_genkey(req, md, key, false) == NULL) { bzero(key, sizeof(key)); return; } /* Decrypt Master Key. */ error = g_eli_mkey_decrypt_any(md, key, mkey, &nkey); bzero(key, sizeof(key)); if (error != 0) { bzero(md, sizeof(*md)); if (error == -1) gctl_error(req, "Wrong key for %s.", prov); else /* if (error > 0) */ { gctl_error(req, "Cannot decrypt Master Key: %s.", strerror(error)); } return; } if (verbose) printf("Decrypted Master Key %u.\n", nkey); val = gctl_get_intmax(req, "keyno"); if (val != -1) nkey = val; #if 0 else ; /* Use the key number which was found during decryption. */ #endif if (nkey >= G_ELI_MAXMKEYS) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid '%s' argument.", "keyno"); return; } val = gctl_get_intmax(req, "iterations"); /* Check if iterations number should and can be changed. */ if (val != -1 && md->md_iterations == -1) { md->md_iterations = val; } else if (val != -1 && val != md->md_iterations) { if (bitcount32(md->md_keys) != 1) { gctl_error(req, "To be able to use '-i' option, only " "one key can be defined."); return; } if (md->md_keys != (1 << nkey)) { gctl_error(req, "Only already defined key can be " "changed when '-i' option is used."); return; } md->md_iterations = val; } mkeydst = md->md_mkeys + nkey * G_ELI_MKEYLEN; md->md_keys |= (1 << nkey); bcopy(mkey, mkeydst, sizeof(mkey)); bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey)); /* Generate key for Master Key encryption. */ if (eli_genkey(req, md, key, true) == NULL) { bzero(key, sizeof(key)); bzero(md, sizeof(*md)); return; } /* Encrypt the Master-Key with the new key. */ error = g_eli_mkey_encrypt(md->md_ealgo, key, md->md_keylen, mkeydst); bzero(key, sizeof(key)); if (error != 0) { bzero(md, sizeof(*md)); gctl_error(req, "Cannot encrypt Master Key: %s.", strerror(error)); return; } /* Store metadata with fresh key. */ eli_metadata_store(req, prov, md); bzero(md, sizeof(*md)); } static void eli_setkey(struct gctl_req *req) { struct g_eli_metadata md; const char *prov; int nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs != 1) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid number of arguments."); return; } prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg0"); if (eli_metadata_read(req, prov, &md) == -1) return; if (eli_is_attached(prov)) eli_setkey_attached(req, &md); else eli_setkey_detached(req, prov, &md); if (req->error == NULL || req->error[0] == '\0') { printf("Note, that the master key encrypted with old keys " "and/or passphrase may still exists in a metadata backup " "file.\n"); } } static void eli_delkey_attached(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov __unused) { gctl_issue(req); } static void eli_delkey_detached(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov) { struct g_eli_metadata md; unsigned char *mkeydst; unsigned int nkey; intmax_t val; bool all, force; if (eli_metadata_read(req, prov, &md) == -1) return; all = gctl_get_int(req, "all"); if (all) arc4random_buf(md.md_mkeys, sizeof(md.md_mkeys)); else { force = gctl_get_int(req, "force"); val = gctl_get_intmax(req, "keyno"); if (val == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Key number has to be specified."); return; } nkey = val; if (nkey >= G_ELI_MAXMKEYS) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid '%s' argument.", "keyno"); return; } if (!(md.md_keys & (1 << nkey)) && !force) { gctl_error(req, "Master Key %u is not set.", nkey); return; } md.md_keys &= ~(1 << nkey); if (md.md_keys == 0 && !force) { gctl_error(req, "This is the last Master Key. Use '-f' " "option if you really want to remove it."); return; } mkeydst = md.md_mkeys + nkey * G_ELI_MKEYLEN; arc4random_buf(mkeydst, G_ELI_MKEYLEN); } eli_metadata_store(req, prov, &md); bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); } static void eli_delkey(struct gctl_req *req) { const char *prov; int nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs != 1) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid number of arguments."); return; } prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg0"); if (eli_is_attached(prov)) eli_delkey_attached(req, prov); else eli_delkey_detached(req, prov); } static void eli_resume(struct gctl_req *req) { struct g_eli_metadata md; unsigned char key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN]; const char *prov; off_t mediasize; int nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs != 1) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid number of arguments."); return; } prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg0"); if (eli_metadata_read(req, prov, &md) == -1) return; mediasize = g_get_mediasize(prov); if (md.md_provsize != (uint64_t)mediasize) { gctl_error(req, "Provider size mismatch."); return; } if (eli_genkey(req, &md, key, false) == NULL) { bzero(key, sizeof(key)); return; } gctl_ro_param(req, "key", sizeof(key), key); if (gctl_issue(req) == NULL) { if (verbose) printf("Resumed %s.\n", prov); } bzero(key, sizeof(key)); } static int eli_trash_metadata(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov, int fd, off_t offset) { unsigned int overwrites; unsigned char *sector; ssize_t size; int error; size = sizeof(overwrites); if (sysctlbyname("kern.geom.eli.overwrites", &overwrites, &size, NULL, 0) == -1 || overwrites == 0) { overwrites = G_ELI_OVERWRITES; } size = g_sectorsize(fd); if (size <= 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot obtain provider sector size %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } sector = malloc(size); if (sector == NULL) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot allocate %zd bytes of memory.", size); return (-1); } error = 0; do { arc4random_buf(sector, size); if (pwrite(fd, sector, size, offset) != size) { if (error == 0) error = errno; } (void)g_flush(fd); } while (--overwrites > 0); free(sector); if (error != 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot trash metadata on provider %s: %s.", prov, strerror(error)); return (-1); } return (0); } static void eli_kill_detached(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov) { off_t offset; int fd; /* * NOTE: Maybe we should verify if this is geli provider first, * but 'kill' command is quite critical so better don't waste * the time. */ #if 0 error = g_metadata_read(prov, (unsigned char *)&md, sizeof(md), G_ELI_MAGIC); if (error != 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot read metadata from %s: %s.", prov, strerror(error)); return; } #endif fd = g_open(prov, 1); if (fd == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot open provider %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); return; } offset = g_mediasize(fd) - g_sectorsize(fd); if (offset <= 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot obtain media size or sector size for provider %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); (void)g_close(fd); return; } (void)eli_trash_metadata(req, prov, fd, offset); (void)g_close(fd); } static void eli_kill(struct gctl_req *req) { const char *prov; int i, nargs, all; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); all = gctl_get_int(req, "all"); if (!all && nargs == 0) { gctl_error(req, "Too few arguments."); return; } /* * How '-a' option combine with a list of providers: * Delete Master Keys from all attached providers: * geli kill -a * Delete Master Keys from all attached providers and from * detached da0 and da1: * geli kill -a da0 da1 * Delete Master Keys from (attached or detached) da0 and da1: * geli kill da0 da1 */ /* First detached providers. */ for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg%d", i); if (!eli_is_attached(prov)) eli_kill_detached(req, prov); } /* Now attached providers. */ gctl_issue(req); } static int eli_backup_create(struct gctl_req *req, const char *prov, const char *file) { unsigned char *sector; ssize_t secsize; int error, filefd, ret; ret = -1; filefd = -1; sector = NULL; secsize = 0; secsize = g_get_sectorsize(prov); if (secsize == 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot get informations about %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); goto out; } sector = malloc(secsize); if (sector == NULL) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot allocate memory."); goto out; } /* Read metadata from the provider. */ error = g_metadata_read(prov, sector, secsize, G_ELI_MAGIC); if (error != 0) { gctl_error(req, "Unable to read metadata from %s: %s.", prov, strerror(error)); goto out; } filefd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_CREAT, 0600); if (filefd == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Unable to open %s: %s.", file, strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* Write metadata to the destination file. */ if (write(filefd, sector, secsize) != secsize) { gctl_error(req, "Unable to write to %s: %s.", file, strerror(errno)); (void)close(filefd); (void)unlink(file); goto out; } (void)fsync(filefd); (void)close(filefd); /* Success. */ ret = 0; out: if (sector != NULL) { bzero(sector, secsize); free(sector); } return (ret); } static void eli_backup(struct gctl_req *req) { const char *file, *prov; int nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs != 2) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid number of arguments."); return; } prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg0"); file = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg1"); eli_backup_create(req, prov, file); } static void eli_restore(struct gctl_req *req) { struct g_eli_metadata md; const char *file, *prov; off_t mediasize; int nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs != 2) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid number of arguments."); return; } file = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg0"); prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg1"); /* Read metadata from the backup file. */ if (eli_metadata_read(req, file, &md) == -1) return; /* Obtain provider's mediasize. */ mediasize = g_get_mediasize(prov); if (mediasize == 0) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot get informations about %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); return; } /* Check if the provider size has changed since we did the backup. */ if (md.md_provsize != (uint64_t)mediasize) { if (gctl_get_int(req, "force")) { md.md_provsize = mediasize; } else { gctl_error(req, "Provider size mismatch: " "wrong backup file?"); return; } } /* Write metadata to the provider. */ (void)eli_metadata_store(req, prov, &md); } static void eli_resize(struct gctl_req *req) { struct g_eli_metadata md; const char *prov; unsigned char *sector; ssize_t secsize; off_t mediasize, oldsize; int error, nargs, provfd; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs != 1) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid number of arguments."); return; } prov = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg0"); provfd = -1; sector = NULL; secsize = 0; provfd = g_open(prov, 1); if (provfd == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot open %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); goto out; } mediasize = g_mediasize(provfd); secsize = g_sectorsize(provfd); if (mediasize == -1 || secsize == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot get information about %s: %s.", prov, strerror(errno)); goto out; } sector = malloc(secsize); if (sector == NULL) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot allocate memory."); goto out; } oldsize = gctl_get_intmax(req, "oldsize"); if (oldsize < 0 || oldsize > mediasize) { gctl_error(req, "Invalid oldsize: Out of range."); goto out; } if (oldsize == mediasize) { gctl_error(req, "Size hasn't changed."); goto out; } /* Read metadata from the 'oldsize' offset. */ if (pread(provfd, sector, secsize, oldsize - secsize) != secsize) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot read old metadata: %s.", strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* Check if this sector contains geli metadata. */ error = eli_metadata_decode(sector, &md); switch (error) { case 0: break; case EOPNOTSUPP: gctl_error(req, "Provider's %s metadata version %u is too new.\n" "geli: The highest supported version is %u.", prov, (unsigned int)md.md_version, G_ELI_VERSION); goto out; case EINVAL: gctl_error(req, "Inconsistent provider's %s metadata.", prov); goto out; default: gctl_error(req, "Unexpected error while decoding provider's %s metadata: %s.", prov, strerror(error)); goto out; } /* * If the old metadata doesn't have a correct provider size, refuse * to resize. */ if (md.md_provsize != (uint64_t)oldsize) { gctl_error(req, "Provider size mismatch at oldsize."); goto out; } /* * Update the old metadata with the current provider size and write * it back to the correct place on the provider. */ md.md_provsize = mediasize; /* Write metadata to the provider. */ (void)eli_metadata_store(req, prov, &md); /* Now trash the old metadata. */ (void)eli_trash_metadata(req, prov, provfd, oldsize - secsize); out: if (provfd != -1) (void)g_close(provfd); if (sector != NULL) { bzero(sector, secsize); free(sector); } } static void eli_version(struct gctl_req *req) { struct g_eli_metadata md; const char *name; unsigned int version; int error, i, nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs == 0) { unsigned int kernver; ssize_t size; size = sizeof(kernver); if (sysctlbyname("kern.geom.eli.version", &kernver, &size, NULL, 0) == -1) { warn("Unable to obtain GELI kernel version"); } else { printf("kernel: %u\n", kernver); } printf("userland: %u\n", G_ELI_VERSION); return; } for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { name = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg%d", i); error = g_metadata_read(name, (unsigned char *)&md, sizeof(md), G_ELI_MAGIC); if (error != 0) { warn("%s: Unable to read metadata: %s.", name, strerror(error)); gctl_error(req, "Not fully done."); continue; } version = le32dec(&md.md_version); printf("%s: %u\n", name, version); } } static void eli_clear(struct gctl_req *req) { const char *name; int error, i, nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs < 1) { gctl_error(req, "Too few arguments."); return; } for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { name = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg%d", i); error = g_metadata_clear(name, G_ELI_MAGIC); if (error != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Cannot clear metadata on %s: %s.\n", name, strerror(error)); gctl_error(req, "Not fully done."); continue; } if (verbose) printf("Metadata cleared on %s.\n", name); } } static void eli_dump(struct gctl_req *req) { struct g_eli_metadata md; const char *name; int i, nargs; nargs = gctl_get_int(req, "nargs"); if (nargs < 1) { gctl_error(req, "Too few arguments."); return; } for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { name = gctl_get_ascii(req, "arg%d", i); if (eli_metadata_read(NULL, name, &md) == -1) { gctl_error(req, "Not fully done."); continue; } printf("Metadata on %s:\n", name); eli_metadata_dump(&md); printf("\n"); } } Index: stable/11/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.c =================================================================== --- stable/11/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.c (revision 348587) +++ stable/11/sys/geom/eli/g_eli.c (revision 348588) @@ -1,1336 +1,1353 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Pawel Jakub Dawidek * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include FEATURE(geom_eli, "GEOM crypto module"); MALLOC_DEFINE(M_ELI, "eli data", "GEOM_ELI Data"); SYSCTL_DECL(_kern_geom); SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_geom, OID_AUTO, eli, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "GEOM_ELI stuff"); static int g_eli_version = G_ELI_VERSION; SYSCTL_INT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, version, CTLFLAG_RD, &g_eli_version, 0, "GELI version"); int g_eli_debug = 0; SYSCTL_INT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, debug, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &g_eli_debug, 0, "Debug level"); static u_int g_eli_tries = 3; SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, tries, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &g_eli_tries, 0, "Number of tries for entering the passphrase"); static u_int g_eli_visible_passphrase = GETS_NOECHO; SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, visible_passphrase, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &g_eli_visible_passphrase, 0, "Visibility of passphrase prompt (0 = invisible, 1 = visible, 2 = asterisk)"); u_int g_eli_overwrites = G_ELI_OVERWRITES; SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, overwrites, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &g_eli_overwrites, 0, "Number of times on-disk keys should be overwritten when destroying them"); static u_int g_eli_threads = 0; SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, threads, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &g_eli_threads, 0, "Number of threads doing crypto work"); u_int g_eli_batch = 0; SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, batch, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &g_eli_batch, 0, "Use crypto operations batching"); /* * Passphrase cached during boot, in order to be more user-friendly if * there are multiple providers using the same passphrase. */ static char cached_passphrase[256]; static u_int g_eli_boot_passcache = 1; TUNABLE_INT("kern.geom.eli.boot_passcache", &g_eli_boot_passcache); SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_geom_eli, OID_AUTO, boot_passcache, CTLFLAG_RD, &g_eli_boot_passcache, 0, "Passphrases are cached during boot process for possible reuse"); static void fetch_loader_passphrase(void * dummy) { char * env_passphrase; KASSERT(dynamic_kenv, ("need dynamic kenv")); if ((env_passphrase = kern_getenv("kern.geom.eli.passphrase")) != NULL) { /* Extract passphrase from the environment. */ strlcpy(cached_passphrase, env_passphrase, sizeof(cached_passphrase)); freeenv(env_passphrase); /* Wipe the passphrase from the environment. */ kern_unsetenv("kern.geom.eli.passphrase"); } } SYSINIT(geli_fetch_loader_passphrase, SI_SUB_KMEM + 1, SI_ORDER_ANY, fetch_loader_passphrase, NULL); static void zero_boot_passcache(void) { explicit_bzero(cached_passphrase, sizeof(cached_passphrase)); } static void zero_geli_intake_keys(void) { struct keybuf *keybuf; int i; if ((keybuf = get_keybuf()) != NULL) { /* Scan the key buffer, clear all GELI keys. */ for (i = 0; i < keybuf->kb_nents; i++) { if (keybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_type == KEYBUF_TYPE_GELI) { explicit_bzero(keybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data, sizeof(keybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data)); keybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_type = KEYBUF_TYPE_NONE; } } } } static void zero_intake_passcache(void *dummy) { zero_boot_passcache(); zero_geli_intake_keys(); } EVENTHANDLER_DEFINE(mountroot, zero_intake_passcache, NULL, 0); static eventhandler_tag g_eli_pre_sync = NULL; static int g_eli_destroy_geom(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, struct g_geom *gp); static void g_eli_init(struct g_class *mp); static void g_eli_fini(struct g_class *mp); static g_taste_t g_eli_taste; static g_dumpconf_t g_eli_dumpconf; struct g_class g_eli_class = { .name = G_ELI_CLASS_NAME, .version = G_VERSION, .ctlreq = g_eli_config, .taste = g_eli_taste, .destroy_geom = g_eli_destroy_geom, .init = g_eli_init, .fini = g_eli_fini }; /* * Code paths: * BIO_READ: * g_eli_start -> g_eli_crypto_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_read_done -> g_io_deliver * BIO_WRITE: * g_eli_start -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_write_done -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver */ /* * EAGAIN from crypto(9) means, that we were probably balanced to another crypto * accelerator or something like this. * The function updates the SID and rerun the operation. */ int g_eli_crypto_rerun(struct cryptop *crp) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; struct g_eli_worker *wr; struct bio *bp; int error; bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque; sc = bp->bio_to->geom->softc; LIST_FOREACH(wr, &sc->sc_workers, w_next) { if (wr->w_number == bp->bio_pflags) break; } KASSERT(wr != NULL, ("Invalid worker (%u).", bp->bio_pflags)); G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Rerunning crypto %s request (sid: %ju -> %ju).", bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ ? "READ" : "WRITE", (uintmax_t)wr->w_sid, (uintmax_t)crp->crp_sid); wr->w_sid = crp->crp_sid; crp->crp_etype = 0; error = crypto_dispatch(crp); if (error == 0) return (0); G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "%s: crypto_dispatch() returned %d.", __func__, error); crp->crp_etype = error; return (error); } static void g_eli_getattr_done(struct bio *bp) { if (bp->bio_error == 0 && !strcmp(bp->bio_attribute, "GEOM::physpath")) { strlcat(bp->bio_data, "/eli", bp->bio_length); } g_std_done(bp); } /* * The function is called afer reading encrypted data from the provider. * * g_eli_start -> g_eli_crypto_read -> g_io_request -> G_ELI_READ_DONE -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_read_done -> g_io_deliver */ void g_eli_read_done(struct bio *bp) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; struct bio *pbp; G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, bp, "Request done."); pbp = bp->bio_parent; if (pbp->bio_error == 0 && bp->bio_error != 0) pbp->bio_error = bp->bio_error; g_destroy_bio(bp); /* * Do we have all sectors already? */ pbp->bio_inbed++; if (pbp->bio_inbed < pbp->bio_children) return; sc = pbp->bio_to->geom->softc; if (pbp->bio_error != 0) { G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, pbp, "%s() failed (error=%d)", __func__, pbp->bio_error); pbp->bio_completed = 0; if (pbp->bio_driver2 != NULL) { free(pbp->bio_driver2, M_ELI); pbp->bio_driver2 = NULL; } g_io_deliver(pbp, pbp->bio_error); if (sc != NULL) atomic_subtract_int(&sc->sc_inflight, 1); return; } mtx_lock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); bioq_insert_tail(&sc->sc_queue, pbp); mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); wakeup(sc); } /* * The function is called after we encrypt and write data. * * g_eli_start -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_write_done -> g_io_request -> G_ELI_WRITE_DONE -> g_io_deliver */ void g_eli_write_done(struct bio *bp) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; struct bio *pbp; G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, bp, "Request done."); pbp = bp->bio_parent; if (pbp->bio_error == 0 && bp->bio_error != 0) pbp->bio_error = bp->bio_error; g_destroy_bio(bp); /* * Do we have all sectors already? */ pbp->bio_inbed++; if (pbp->bio_inbed < pbp->bio_children) return; free(pbp->bio_driver2, M_ELI); pbp->bio_driver2 = NULL; if (pbp->bio_error != 0) { G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, pbp, "%s() failed (error=%d)", __func__, pbp->bio_error); pbp->bio_completed = 0; } else pbp->bio_completed = pbp->bio_length; /* * Write is finished, send it up. */ sc = pbp->bio_to->geom->softc; g_io_deliver(pbp, pbp->bio_error); if (sc != NULL) atomic_subtract_int(&sc->sc_inflight, 1); } /* * This function should never be called, but GEOM made as it set ->orphan() * method for every geom. */ static void g_eli_orphan_spoil_assert(struct g_consumer *cp) { panic("Function %s() called for %s.", __func__, cp->geom->name); } static void g_eli_orphan(struct g_consumer *cp) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; g_topology_assert(); sc = cp->geom->softc; if (sc == NULL) return; g_eli_destroy(sc, TRUE); } /* * BIO_READ: * G_ELI_START -> g_eli_crypto_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_read_done -> g_io_deliver * BIO_WRITE: * G_ELI_START -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_write_done -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver */ static void g_eli_start(struct bio *bp) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; struct g_consumer *cp; struct bio *cbp; sc = bp->bio_to->geom->softc; KASSERT(sc != NULL, ("Provider's error should be set (error=%d)(device=%s).", bp->bio_to->error, bp->bio_to->name)); G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, bp, "Request received."); switch (bp->bio_cmd) { case BIO_READ: case BIO_WRITE: case BIO_GETATTR: case BIO_FLUSH: case BIO_ZONE: break; case BIO_DELETE: /* * If the user hasn't set the NODELETE flag, we just pass * it down the stack and let the layers beneath us do (or * not) whatever they do with it. If they have, we * reject it. A possible extension would be an * additional flag to take it as a hint to shred the data * with [multiple?] overwrites. */ if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_NODELETE)) break; default: g_io_deliver(bp, EOPNOTSUPP); return; } cbp = g_clone_bio(bp); if (cbp == NULL) { g_io_deliver(bp, ENOMEM); return; } bp->bio_driver1 = cbp; bp->bio_pflags = G_ELI_NEW_BIO; switch (bp->bio_cmd) { case BIO_READ: if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH)) { g_eli_crypto_read(sc, bp, 0); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case BIO_WRITE: mtx_lock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); bioq_insert_tail(&sc->sc_queue, bp); mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); wakeup(sc); break; case BIO_GETATTR: case BIO_FLUSH: case BIO_DELETE: case BIO_ZONE: if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_GETATTR) cbp->bio_done = g_eli_getattr_done; else cbp->bio_done = g_std_done; cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer); cbp->bio_to = cp->provider; G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request."); g_io_request(cbp, cp); break; } } static int g_eli_newsession(struct g_eli_worker *wr) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; struct cryptoini crie, cria; int error; sc = wr->w_softc; bzero(&crie, sizeof(crie)); crie.cri_alg = sc->sc_ealgo; crie.cri_klen = sc->sc_ekeylen; if (sc->sc_ealgo == CRYPTO_AES_XTS) crie.cri_klen <<= 1; if ((sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY) != 0) { crie.cri_key = g_eli_key_hold(sc, 0, LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer)->provider->sectorsize); } else { crie.cri_key = sc->sc_ekey; } if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) { bzero(&cria, sizeof(cria)); cria.cri_alg = sc->sc_aalgo; cria.cri_klen = sc->sc_akeylen; cria.cri_key = sc->sc_akey; crie.cri_next = &cria; } switch (sc->sc_crypto) { case G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW: error = crypto_newsession(&wr->w_sid, &crie, CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE); break; case G_ELI_CRYPTO_HW: error = crypto_newsession(&wr->w_sid, &crie, CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE); break; case G_ELI_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN: error = crypto_newsession(&wr->w_sid, &crie, CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE); if (error == 0) { mtx_lock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); if (sc->sc_crypto == G_ELI_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN) sc->sc_crypto = G_ELI_CRYPTO_HW; mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); } else { error = crypto_newsession(&wr->w_sid, &crie, CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE); mtx_lock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); if (sc->sc_crypto == G_ELI_CRYPTO_UNKNOWN) sc->sc_crypto = G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW; mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); } break; default: panic("%s: invalid condition", __func__); } if ((sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY) != 0) g_eli_key_drop(sc, crie.cri_key); return (error); } static void g_eli_freesession(struct g_eli_worker *wr) { crypto_freesession(wr->w_sid); } static void g_eli_cancel(struct g_eli_softc *sc) { struct bio *bp; mtx_assert(&sc->sc_queue_mtx, MA_OWNED); while ((bp = bioq_takefirst(&sc->sc_queue)) != NULL) { KASSERT(bp->bio_pflags == G_ELI_NEW_BIO, ("Not new bio when canceling (bp=%p).", bp)); g_io_deliver(bp, ENXIO); } } static struct bio * g_eli_takefirst(struct g_eli_softc *sc) { struct bio *bp; mtx_assert(&sc->sc_queue_mtx, MA_OWNED); if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_SUSPEND)) return (bioq_takefirst(&sc->sc_queue)); /* * Device suspended, so we skip new I/O requests. */ TAILQ_FOREACH(bp, &sc->sc_queue.queue, bio_queue) { if (bp->bio_pflags != G_ELI_NEW_BIO) break; } if (bp != NULL) bioq_remove(&sc->sc_queue, bp); return (bp); } /* * This is the main function for kernel worker thread when we don't have * hardware acceleration and we have to do cryptography in software. * Dedicated thread is needed, so we don't slow down g_up/g_down GEOM * threads with crypto work. */ static void g_eli_worker(void *arg) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; struct g_eli_worker *wr; struct bio *bp; int error; wr = arg; sc = wr->w_softc; #ifdef EARLY_AP_STARTUP MPASS(!sc->sc_cpubind || smp_started); #elif defined(SMP) /* Before sched_bind() to a CPU, wait for all CPUs to go on-line. */ if (sc->sc_cpubind) { while (!smp_started) tsleep(wr, 0, "geli:smp", hz / 4); } #endif thread_lock(curthread); sched_prio(curthread, PUSER); if (sc->sc_cpubind) sched_bind(curthread, wr->w_number % mp_ncpus); thread_unlock(curthread); G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Thread %s started.", curthread->td_proc->p_comm); for (;;) { mtx_lock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); again: bp = g_eli_takefirst(sc); if (bp == NULL) { if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_DESTROY) { g_eli_cancel(sc); LIST_REMOVE(wr, w_next); g_eli_freesession(wr); free(wr, M_ELI); G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Thread %s exiting.", curthread->td_proc->p_comm); wakeup(&sc->sc_workers); mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); kproc_exit(0); } while (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_SUSPEND) { if (sc->sc_inflight > 0) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "inflight=%d", sc->sc_inflight); /* * We still have inflight BIOs, so * sleep and retry. */ msleep(sc, &sc->sc_queue_mtx, PRIBIO, "geli:inf", hz / 5); goto again; } /* * Suspend requested, mark the worker as * suspended and go to sleep. */ if (wr->w_active) { g_eli_freesession(wr); wr->w_active = FALSE; } wakeup(&sc->sc_workers); msleep(sc, &sc->sc_queue_mtx, PRIBIO, "geli:suspend", 0); if (!wr->w_active && !(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_SUSPEND)) { error = g_eli_newsession(wr); KASSERT(error == 0, ("g_eli_newsession() failed on resume (error=%d)", error)); wr->w_active = TRUE; } goto again; } msleep(sc, &sc->sc_queue_mtx, PDROP, "geli:w", 0); continue; } if (bp->bio_pflags == G_ELI_NEW_BIO) atomic_add_int(&sc->sc_inflight, 1); mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); if (bp->bio_pflags == G_ELI_NEW_BIO) { bp->bio_pflags = 0; if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) { if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ) g_eli_auth_read(sc, bp); else g_eli_auth_run(wr, bp); } else { if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ) g_eli_crypto_read(sc, bp, 1); else g_eli_crypto_run(wr, bp); } } else { if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) g_eli_auth_run(wr, bp); else g_eli_crypto_run(wr, bp); } } } int g_eli_read_metadata(struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *pp, struct g_eli_metadata *md) { struct g_geom *gp; struct g_consumer *cp; u_char *buf = NULL; int error; g_topology_assert(); gp = g_new_geomf(mp, "eli:taste"); gp->start = g_eli_start; gp->access = g_std_access; /* * g_eli_read_metadata() is always called from the event thread. * Our geom is created and destroyed in the same event, so there * could be no orphan nor spoil event in the meantime. */ gp->orphan = g_eli_orphan_spoil_assert; gp->spoiled = g_eli_orphan_spoil_assert; cp = g_new_consumer(gp); error = g_attach(cp, pp); if (error != 0) goto end; error = g_access(cp, 1, 0, 0); if (error != 0) goto end; g_topology_unlock(); buf = g_read_data(cp, pp->mediasize - pp->sectorsize, pp->sectorsize, &error); g_topology_lock(); if (buf == NULL) goto end; error = eli_metadata_decode(buf, md); if (error != 0) goto end; /* Metadata was read and decoded successfully. */ end: if (buf != NULL) g_free(buf); if (cp->provider != NULL) { if (cp->acr == 1) g_access(cp, -1, 0, 0); g_detach(cp); } g_destroy_consumer(cp); g_destroy_geom(gp); return (error); } /* * The function is called when we had last close on provider and user requested * to close it when this situation occur. */ static void g_eli_last_close(void *arg, int flags __unused) { struct g_geom *gp; char gpname[64]; int error; g_topology_assert(); gp = arg; strlcpy(gpname, gp->name, sizeof(gpname)); error = g_eli_destroy(gp->softc, TRUE); KASSERT(error == 0, ("Cannot detach %s on last close (error=%d).", gpname, error)); G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Detached %s on last close.", gpname); } int g_eli_access(struct g_provider *pp, int dr, int dw, int de) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; struct g_geom *gp; gp = pp->geom; sc = gp->softc; if (dw > 0) { if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_RO) { /* Deny write attempts. */ return (EROFS); } /* Someone is opening us for write, we need to remember that. */ sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_WOPEN; return (0); } /* Is this the last close? */ if (pp->acr + dr > 0 || pp->acw + dw > 0 || pp->ace + de > 0) return (0); /* * Automatically detach on last close if requested. */ if ((sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_RW_DETACH) || (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_WOPEN)) { g_post_event(g_eli_last_close, gp, M_WAITOK, NULL); } return (0); } static int g_eli_cpu_is_disabled(int cpu) { #ifdef SMP return (CPU_ISSET(cpu, &hlt_cpus_mask)); #else return (0); #endif } struct g_geom * g_eli_create(struct gctl_req *req, struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *bpp, const struct g_eli_metadata *md, const u_char *mkey, int nkey) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; struct g_eli_worker *wr; struct g_geom *gp; struct g_provider *pp; struct g_consumer *cp; u_int i, threads; int error; G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Creating device %s%s.", bpp->name, G_ELI_SUFFIX); gp = g_new_geomf(mp, "%s%s", bpp->name, G_ELI_SUFFIX); sc = malloc(sizeof(*sc), M_ELI, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); gp->start = g_eli_start; /* * Spoiling can happen even though we have the provider open * exclusively, e.g. through media change events. */ gp->spoiled = g_eli_orphan; gp->orphan = g_eli_orphan; gp->dumpconf = g_eli_dumpconf; /* * If detach-on-last-close feature is not enabled and we don't operate * on read-only provider, we can simply use g_std_access(). */ if (md->md_flags & (G_ELI_FLAG_WO_DETACH | G_ELI_FLAG_RO)) gp->access = g_eli_access; else gp->access = g_std_access; eli_metadata_softc(sc, md, bpp->sectorsize, bpp->mediasize); sc->sc_nkey = nkey; gp->softc = sc; sc->sc_geom = gp; bioq_init(&sc->sc_queue); mtx_init(&sc->sc_queue_mtx, "geli:queue", NULL, MTX_DEF); mtx_init(&sc->sc_ekeys_lock, "geli:ekeys", NULL, MTX_DEF); pp = NULL; cp = g_new_consumer(gp); error = g_attach(cp, bpp); if (error != 0) { if (req != NULL) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot attach to %s (error=%d).", bpp->name, error); } else { G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Cannot attach to %s (error=%d).", bpp->name, error); } goto failed; } /* * Keep provider open all the time, so we can run critical tasks, * like Master Keys deletion, without wondering if we can open * provider or not. * We don't open provider for writing only when user requested read-only * access. */ if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_RO) error = g_access(cp, 1, 0, 1); else error = g_access(cp, 1, 1, 1); if (error != 0) { if (req != NULL) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot access %s (error=%d).", bpp->name, error); } else { G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Cannot access %s (error=%d).", bpp->name, error); } goto failed; } /* * Remember the keys in our softc structure. */ g_eli_mkey_propagate(sc, mkey); LIST_INIT(&sc->sc_workers); threads = g_eli_threads; if (threads == 0) threads = mp_ncpus; sc->sc_cpubind = (mp_ncpus > 1 && threads == mp_ncpus); for (i = 0; i < threads; i++) { if (g_eli_cpu_is_disabled(i)) { G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "%s: CPU %u disabled, skipping.", bpp->name, i); continue; } wr = malloc(sizeof(*wr), M_ELI, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); wr->w_softc = sc; wr->w_number = i; wr->w_active = TRUE; error = g_eli_newsession(wr); if (error != 0) { free(wr, M_ELI); if (req != NULL) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot set up crypto session " "for %s (error=%d).", bpp->name, error); } else { G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Cannot set up crypto session " "for %s (error=%d).", bpp->name, error); } goto failed; } error = kproc_create(g_eli_worker, wr, &wr->w_proc, 0, 0, "g_eli[%u] %s", i, bpp->name); if (error != 0) { g_eli_freesession(wr); free(wr, M_ELI); if (req != NULL) { gctl_error(req, "Cannot create kernel thread " "for %s (error=%d).", bpp->name, error); } else { G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Cannot create kernel thread " "for %s (error=%d).", bpp->name, error); } goto failed; } LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&sc->sc_workers, wr, w_next); } /* * Create decrypted provider. */ pp = g_new_providerf(gp, "%s%s", bpp->name, G_ELI_SUFFIX); pp->mediasize = sc->sc_mediasize; pp->sectorsize = sc->sc_sectorsize; g_error_provider(pp, 0); G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Device %s created.", pp->name); G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Encryption: %s %u", g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_ealgo), sc->sc_ekeylen); - if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) + switch (sc->sc_ealgo) { + case CRYPTO_3DES_CBC: + gone_in(13, + "support for GEOM_ELI volumes encrypted with 3des"); + break; + case CRYPTO_BLF_CBC: + gone_in(13, + "support for GEOM_ELI volumes encrypted with blowfish"); + break; + } + if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, " Integrity: %s", g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_aalgo)); + switch (sc->sc_aalgo) { + case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC: + gone_in(13, + "support for GEOM_ELI volumes authenticated with hmac/md5"); + break; + } + } G_ELI_DEBUG(0, " Crypto: %s", sc->sc_crypto == G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW ? "software" : "hardware"); return (gp); failed: mtx_lock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_DESTROY; wakeup(sc); /* * Wait for kernel threads self destruction. */ while (!LIST_EMPTY(&sc->sc_workers)) { msleep(&sc->sc_workers, &sc->sc_queue_mtx, PRIBIO, "geli:destroy", 0); } mtx_destroy(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); if (cp->provider != NULL) { if (cp->acr == 1) g_access(cp, -1, -1, -1); g_detach(cp); } g_destroy_consumer(cp); g_destroy_geom(gp); g_eli_key_destroy(sc); bzero(sc, sizeof(*sc)); free(sc, M_ELI); return (NULL); } int g_eli_destroy(struct g_eli_softc *sc, boolean_t force) { struct g_geom *gp; struct g_provider *pp; g_topology_assert(); if (sc == NULL) return (ENXIO); gp = sc->sc_geom; pp = LIST_FIRST(&gp->provider); if (pp != NULL && (pp->acr != 0 || pp->acw != 0 || pp->ace != 0)) { if (force) { G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Device %s is still open, so it " "cannot be definitely removed.", pp->name); sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_RW_DETACH; gp->access = g_eli_access; g_wither_provider(pp, ENXIO); return (EBUSY); } else { G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Device %s is still open (r%dw%de%d).", pp->name, pp->acr, pp->acw, pp->ace); return (EBUSY); } } mtx_lock(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_DESTROY; wakeup(sc); while (!LIST_EMPTY(&sc->sc_workers)) { msleep(&sc->sc_workers, &sc->sc_queue_mtx, PRIBIO, "geli:destroy", 0); } mtx_destroy(&sc->sc_queue_mtx); gp->softc = NULL; g_eli_key_destroy(sc); bzero(sc, sizeof(*sc)); free(sc, M_ELI); if (pp == NULL || (pp->acr == 0 && pp->acw == 0 && pp->ace == 0)) G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Device %s destroyed.", gp->name); g_wither_geom_close(gp, ENXIO); return (0); } static int g_eli_destroy_geom(struct gctl_req *req __unused, struct g_class *mp __unused, struct g_geom *gp) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; sc = gp->softc; return (g_eli_destroy(sc, FALSE)); } static int g_eli_keyfiles_load(struct hmac_ctx *ctx, const char *provider) { u_char *keyfile, *data; char *file, name[64]; size_t size; int i; for (i = 0; ; i++) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s:geli_keyfile%d", provider, i); keyfile = preload_search_by_type(name); if (keyfile == NULL && i == 0) { /* * If there is only one keyfile, allow simpler name. */ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s:geli_keyfile", provider); keyfile = preload_search_by_type(name); } if (keyfile == NULL) return (i); /* Return number of loaded keyfiles. */ data = preload_fetch_addr(keyfile); if (data == NULL) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Cannot find key file data for %s.", name); return (0); } size = preload_fetch_size(keyfile); if (size == 0) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Cannot find key file size for %s.", name); return (0); } file = preload_search_info(keyfile, MODINFO_NAME); if (file == NULL) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Cannot find key file name for %s.", name); return (0); } G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Loaded keyfile %s for %s (type: %s).", file, provider, name); g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(ctx, data, size); } } static void g_eli_keyfiles_clear(const char *provider) { u_char *keyfile, *data; char name[64]; size_t size; int i; for (i = 0; ; i++) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s:geli_keyfile%d", provider, i); keyfile = preload_search_by_type(name); if (keyfile == NULL) return; data = preload_fetch_addr(keyfile); size = preload_fetch_size(keyfile); if (data != NULL && size != 0) bzero(data, size); } } /* * Tasting is only made on boot. * We detect providers which should be attached before root is mounted. */ static struct g_geom * g_eli_taste(struct g_class *mp, struct g_provider *pp, int flags __unused) { struct g_eli_metadata md; struct g_geom *gp; struct hmac_ctx ctx; char passphrase[256]; u_char key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN], mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN]; u_int i, nkey, nkeyfiles, tries, showpass; int error; struct keybuf *keybuf; g_trace(G_T_TOPOLOGY, "%s(%s, %s)", __func__, mp->name, pp->name); g_topology_assert(); if (root_mounted() || g_eli_tries == 0) return (NULL); G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Tasting %s.", pp->name); error = g_eli_read_metadata(mp, pp, &md); if (error != 0) return (NULL); gp = NULL; if (strcmp(md.md_magic, G_ELI_MAGIC) != 0) return (NULL); if (md.md_version > G_ELI_VERSION) { printf("geom_eli.ko module is too old to handle %s.\n", pp->name); return (NULL); } if (md.md_provsize != pp->mediasize) return (NULL); /* Should we attach it on boot? */ if (!(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT)) return (NULL); if (md.md_keys == 0x00) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "No valid keys on %s.", pp->name); return (NULL); } if (md.md_iterations == -1) { /* If there is no passphrase, we try only once. */ tries = 1; } else { /* Ask for the passphrase no more than g_eli_tries times. */ tries = g_eli_tries; } if ((keybuf = get_keybuf()) != NULL) { /* Scan the key buffer, try all GELI keys. */ for (i = 0; i < keybuf->kb_nents; i++) { if (keybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_type == KEYBUF_TYPE_GELI) { memcpy(key, keybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data, sizeof(key)); if (g_eli_mkey_decrypt_any(&md, key, mkey, &nkey) == 0 ) { explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key)); goto have_key; } } } } for (i = 0; i <= tries; i++) { g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(&ctx, NULL, 0); /* * Load all key files. */ nkeyfiles = g_eli_keyfiles_load(&ctx, pp->name); if (nkeyfiles == 0 && md.md_iterations == -1) { /* * No key files and no passphrase, something is * definitely wrong here. * geli(8) doesn't allow for such situation, so assume * that there was really no passphrase and in that case * key files are no properly defined in loader.conf. */ G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Found no key files in loader.conf for %s.", pp->name); return (NULL); } /* Ask for the passphrase if defined. */ if (md.md_iterations >= 0) { /* Try first with cached passphrase. */ if (i == 0) { if (!g_eli_boot_passcache) continue; memcpy(passphrase, cached_passphrase, sizeof(passphrase)); } else { printf("Enter passphrase for %s: ", pp->name); showpass = g_eli_visible_passphrase; if ((md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS) != 0) showpass = GETS_ECHOPASS; cngets(passphrase, sizeof(passphrase), showpass); memcpy(cached_passphrase, passphrase, sizeof(passphrase)); } } /* * Prepare Derived-Key from the user passphrase. */ if (md.md_iterations == 0) { g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, md.md_salt, sizeof(md.md_salt)); g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); explicit_bzero(passphrase, sizeof(passphrase)); } else if (md.md_iterations > 0) { u_char dkey[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN]; pkcs5v2_genkey(dkey, sizeof(dkey), md.md_salt, sizeof(md.md_salt), passphrase, md.md_iterations); bzero(passphrase, sizeof(passphrase)); g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, dkey, sizeof(dkey)); explicit_bzero(dkey, sizeof(dkey)); } g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(&ctx, key, 0); /* * Decrypt Master-Key. */ error = g_eli_mkey_decrypt_any(&md, key, mkey, &nkey); bzero(key, sizeof(key)); if (error == -1) { if (i == tries) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Wrong key for %s. No tries left.", pp->name); g_eli_keyfiles_clear(pp->name); return (NULL); } if (i > 0) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Wrong key for %s. Tries left: %u.", pp->name, tries - i); } /* Try again. */ continue; } else if (error > 0) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Cannot decrypt Master Key for %s (error=%d).", pp->name, error); g_eli_keyfiles_clear(pp->name); return (NULL); } g_eli_keyfiles_clear(pp->name); G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Using Master Key %u for %s.", nkey, pp->name); break; } have_key: /* * We have correct key, let's attach provider. */ gp = g_eli_create(NULL, mp, pp, &md, mkey, nkey); bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey)); bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); if (gp == NULL) { G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Cannot create device %s%s.", pp->name, G_ELI_SUFFIX); return (NULL); } return (gp); } static void g_eli_dumpconf(struct sbuf *sb, const char *indent, struct g_geom *gp, struct g_consumer *cp, struct g_provider *pp) { struct g_eli_softc *sc; g_topology_assert(); sc = gp->softc; if (sc == NULL) return; if (pp != NULL || cp != NULL) return; /* Nothing here. */ sbuf_printf(sb, "%s%ju\n", indent, (uintmax_t)sc->sc_ekeys_total); sbuf_printf(sb, "%s%ju\n", indent, (uintmax_t)sc->sc_ekeys_allocated); sbuf_printf(sb, "%s", indent); if (sc->sc_flags == 0) sbuf_printf(sb, "NONE"); else { int first = 1; #define ADD_FLAG(flag, name) do { \ if (sc->sc_flags & (flag)) { \ if (!first) \ sbuf_printf(sb, ", "); \ else \ first = 0; \ sbuf_printf(sb, name); \ } \ } while (0) ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_SUSPEND, "SUSPEND"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_SINGLE_KEY, "SINGLE-KEY"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_NATIVE_BYTE_ORDER, "NATIVE-BYTE-ORDER"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME, "ONETIME"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_BOOT, "BOOT"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_WO_DETACH, "W-DETACH"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_RW_DETACH, "RW-DETACH"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH, "AUTH"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_WOPEN, "W-OPEN"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_DESTROY, "DESTROY"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_RO, "READ-ONLY"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_NODELETE, "NODELETE"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT, "GELIBOOT"); ADD_FLAG(G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS, "GELIDISPLAYPASS"); #undef ADD_FLAG } sbuf_printf(sb, "\n"); if (!(sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME)) { sbuf_printf(sb, "%s%u\n", indent, sc->sc_nkey); } sbuf_printf(sb, "%s%u\n", indent, sc->sc_version); sbuf_printf(sb, "%s", indent); switch (sc->sc_crypto) { case G_ELI_CRYPTO_HW: sbuf_printf(sb, "hardware"); break; case G_ELI_CRYPTO_SW: sbuf_printf(sb, "software"); break; default: sbuf_printf(sb, "UNKNOWN"); break; } sbuf_printf(sb, "\n"); if (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) { sbuf_printf(sb, "%s%s\n", indent, g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_aalgo)); } sbuf_printf(sb, "%s%u\n", indent, sc->sc_ekeylen); sbuf_printf(sb, "%s%s\n", indent, g_eli_algo2str(sc->sc_ealgo)); sbuf_printf(sb, "%s%s\n", indent, (sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_SUSPEND) ? "SUSPENDED" : "ACTIVE"); } static void g_eli_shutdown_pre_sync(void *arg, int howto) { struct g_class *mp; struct g_geom *gp, *gp2; struct g_provider *pp; struct g_eli_softc *sc; int error; mp = arg; g_topology_lock(); LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(gp, &mp->geom, geom, gp2) { sc = gp->softc; if (sc == NULL) continue; pp = LIST_FIRST(&gp->provider); KASSERT(pp != NULL, ("No provider? gp=%p (%s)", gp, gp->name)); if (pp->acr + pp->acw + pp->ace == 0) error = g_eli_destroy(sc, TRUE); else { sc->sc_flags |= G_ELI_FLAG_RW_DETACH; gp->access = g_eli_access; } } g_topology_unlock(); } static void g_eli_init(struct g_class *mp) { g_eli_pre_sync = EVENTHANDLER_REGISTER(shutdown_pre_sync, g_eli_shutdown_pre_sync, mp, SHUTDOWN_PRI_FIRST); if (g_eli_pre_sync == NULL) G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "Warning! Cannot register shutdown event."); } static void g_eli_fini(struct g_class *mp) { if (g_eli_pre_sync != NULL) EVENTHANDLER_DEREGISTER(shutdown_pre_sync, g_eli_pre_sync); } DECLARE_GEOM_CLASS(g_eli_class, g_eli); MODULE_DEPEND(g_eli, crypto, 1, 1, 1); MODULE_VERSION(geom_eli, 0); Index: stable/11/tests/sys/geom/class/eli/conf.sh =================================================================== --- stable/11/tests/sys/geom/class/eli/conf.sh (revision 348587) +++ stable/11/tests/sys/geom/class/eli/conf.sh (revision 348588) @@ -1,102 +1,92 @@ #!/bin/sh # $FreeBSD$ class="eli" base=$(atf_get ident) MAX_SECSIZE=8192 attach_md() { local test_md test_md=$(mdconfig -a "$@") || atf_fail "failed to allocate md(4)" echo $test_md >> $TEST_MDS_FILE || exit echo $test_md } # Execute `func` for each combination of cipher, sectorsize, and hmac algo # `func` usage should be: # func for_each_geli_config() { func=$1 backing_filename=$2 # Double the sector size to allow for the HMACs' storage space. osecsize=$(( $MAX_SECSIZE * 2 )) # geli needs 512B for the label. bytes=`expr $osecsize \* $sectors + 512`b if [ -n "$backing_filename" ]; then # Use a file-backed md(4) device, so we can deliberatly corrupt # it without detaching the geli device first. truncate -s $bytes backing_file md=$(attach_md -t vnode -f backing_file) else md=$(attach_md -t malloc -s $bytes) fi for cipher in aes-xts:128 aes-xts:256 \ aes-cbc:128 aes-cbc:192 aes-cbc:256 \ - 3des-cbc:192 \ - blowfish-cbc:128 blowfish-cbc:160 blowfish-cbc:192 \ - blowfish-cbc:224 blowfish-cbc:256 blowfish-cbc:288 \ - blowfish-cbc:320 blowfish-cbc:352 blowfish-cbc:384 \ - blowfish-cbc:416 blowfish-cbc:448 \ camellia-cbc:128 camellia-cbc:192 camellia-cbc:256; do ealgo=${cipher%%:*} keylen=${cipher##*:} - for aalgo in hmac/md5 hmac/sha1 hmac/ripemd160 hmac/sha256 \ + for aalgo in hmac/sha1 hmac/ripemd160 hmac/sha256 \ hmac/sha384 hmac/sha512; do for secsize in 512 1024 2048 4096 $MAX_SECSIZE; do ${func} $cipher $aalgo $secsize geli detach ${md} 2>/dev/null done done done } # Execute `func` for each combination of cipher, and sectorsize, with no hmac # `func` usage should be: # func for_each_geli_config_nointegrity() { func=$1 # geli needs 512B for the label. bytes=`expr $MAX_SECSIZE \* $sectors + 512`b md=$(attach_md -t malloc -s $bytes) for cipher in aes-xts:128 aes-xts:256 \ aes-cbc:128 aes-cbc:192 aes-cbc:256 \ - 3des-cbc:192 \ - blowfish-cbc:128 blowfish-cbc:160 blowfish-cbc:192 \ - blowfish-cbc:224 blowfish-cbc:256 blowfish-cbc:288 \ - blowfish-cbc:320 blowfish-cbc:352 blowfish-cbc:384 \ - blowfish-cbc:416 blowfish-cbc:448 \ camellia-cbc:128 camellia-cbc:192 camellia-cbc:256; do ealgo=${cipher%%:*} keylen=${cipher##*:} for secsize in 512 1024 2048 4096 $MAX_SECSIZE; do ${func} $cipher $secsize geli detach ${md} 2>/dev/null done done } geli_test_cleanup() { if [ -f "$TEST_MDS_FILE" ]; then while read md; do [ -c /dev/${md}.eli ] && \ geli detach $md.eli 2>/dev/null mdconfig -d -u $md 2>/dev/null done < $TEST_MDS_FILE fi true } geli_test_setup() { geom_atf_test_setup } ATF_TEST=true . `dirname $0`/../geom_subr.sh Index: stable/11/tests/sys/geom/class/eli/init_test.sh =================================================================== --- stable/11/tests/sys/geom/class/eli/init_test.sh (revision 348587) +++ stable/11/tests/sys/geom/class/eli/init_test.sh (revision 348588) @@ -1,387 +1,380 @@ #!/bin/sh # $FreeBSD$ . $(atf_get_srcdir)/conf.sh init_test() { cipher=$1 secsize=$2 ealgo=${cipher%%:*} keylen=${cipher##*:} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore \ geli init -B none -e $ealgo -l $keylen -P -K keyfile \ -s $secsize ${md} atf_check geli attach -p -k keyfile ${md} atf_check dd if=rnd of=/dev/${md}.eli bs=${secsize} count=${sectors} \ status=none md_rnd=`dd if=rnd bs=${secsize} count=${sectors} status=none | md5` atf_check_equal 0 $? md_ddev=`dd if=/dev/${md}.eli bs=${secsize} count=${sectors} status=none | md5` atf_check_equal 0 $? md_edev=`dd if=/dev/${md} bs=${secsize} count=${sectors} status=none | md5` atf_check_equal 0 $? if [ ${md_rnd} != ${md_ddev} ]; then atf_fail "Miscompare for ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}" fi if [ ${md_rnd} == ${md_edev} ]; then atf_fail "Data was not encrypted for ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}" fi } atf_test_case init cleanup init_head() { atf_set "descr" "Basic I/O with geli" atf_set "require.user" "root" atf_set "timeout" 600 } init_body() { geli_test_setup sectors=32 atf_check dd if=/dev/random of=keyfile bs=512 count=16 status=none atf_check dd if=/dev/random of=rnd bs=$MAX_SECSIZE count=${sectors} \ status=none for_each_geli_config_nointegrity init_test } init_cleanup() { geli_test_cleanup } atf_test_case init_B cleanup init_B_head() { atf_set "descr" "init -B can select an alternate backup metadata file" atf_set "require.user" "root" } init_B_body() { geli_test_setup sectors=100 atf_check dd if=/dev/random of=keyfile bs=512 count=16 status=none md=$(attach_md -t malloc -s $sectors) # -B none rm -f /var/backups/${md}.eli atf_check -s exit:0 -o ignore geli init -B none -P -K keyfile ${md} if [ -f /var/backups/${md}.eli ]; then atf_fail "geli created a backup file even with -B none" fi # no -B rm -f /var/backups/${md}.eli atf_check -s exit:0 -o ignore geli init -P -K keyfile ${md} if [ ! -f /var/backups/${md}.eli ]; then atf_fail "geli did not create a backup file" fi atf_check geli clear ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore geli attach -p -k keyfile ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -o ignore geli restore /var/backups/${md}.eli ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -o ignore geli attach -p -k keyfile ${md} atf_check geli detach ${md} rm -f /var/backups/${md}.eli # -B file rm -f backupfile atf_check -s exit:0 -o ignore \ geli init -B backupfile -P -K keyfile ${md} if [ ! -f backupfile ]; then atf_fail "geli init -B did not create a backup file" fi atf_check geli clear ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore geli attach -p -k keyfile ${md} atf_check geli restore backupfile ${md} atf_check geli attach -p -k keyfile ${md} } init_B_cleanup() { geli_test_cleanup } atf_test_case init_J cleanup init_J_head() { atf_set "descr" "init -J accepts a passfile" atf_set "require.user" "root" } init_J_body() { geli_test_setup sectors=100 md=$(attach_md -t malloc -s `expr $sectors + 1`) atf_check dd if=/dev/random of=keyfile0 bs=512 count=16 status=none atf_check dd if=/dev/random of=keyfile1 bs=512 count=16 status=none dd if=/dev/random bs=512 count=16 status=none | sha1 > passfile0 atf_check_equal 0 $? dd if=/dev/random bs=512 count=16 status=none | sha1 > passfile1 atf_check_equal 0 $? for iter in -1 0 64; do atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli init -i ${iter} -B none -J passfile0 -P ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli init -i ${iter} -B none -J passfile0 -P -K keyfile0 ${md} atf_check geli init -i ${iter} -B none -J passfile0 -K keyfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile0 -p ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j passfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j keyfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k passfile0 -p ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j keyfile0 -k passfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j keyfile0 -k keyfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j passfile0 -k passfile0 ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j passfile0 -k keyfile0 ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore -x \ "cat keyfile0 | geli attach -j passfile0 -k - ${md}" atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore -x \ "cat passfile0 | geli attach -j - -k keyfile0 ${md}" atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli init -i ${iter} -B none -J passfile0 -J passfile1 -P ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli init -i ${iter} -B none -J passfile0 -J passfile1 -P -K keyfile0 -K keyfile1 ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore \ geli init -i ${iter} -B none -J passfile0 -J passfile1 -K keyfile0 -K keyfile1 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile0 -p ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile1 -p ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j passfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j passfile1 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile0 -k keyfile1 -p ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j passfile0 -j passfile1 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile0 -j passfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile0 -j passfile1 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile1 -j passfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile1 -j passfile1 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile0 -j passfile0 -j passfile1 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile1 -j passfile0 -j passfile1 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile0 -k keyfile1 -j passfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile0 -k keyfile1 -j passfile1 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile1 -k keyfile0 -j passfile0 -j passfile1 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile0 -k keyfile1 -j passfile1 -j passfile0 ${md} atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -k keyfile1 -k keyfile0 -j passfile1 -j passfile0 ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore \ geli attach -j passfile0 -j passfile1 -k keyfile0 -k keyfile1 ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore -x \ "cat passfile0 | geli attach -j - -j passfile1 -k keyfile0 -k keyfile1 ${md}" atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore -x \ "cat passfile1 | geli attach -j passfile0 -j - -k keyfile0 -k keyfile1 ${md}" atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore -x \ "cat keyfile0 | geli attach -j passfile0 -j passfile1 -k - -k keyfile1 ${md}" atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore -x \ "cat keyfile1 | geli attach -j passfile0 -j passfile1 -k keyfile0 -k - ${md}" atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore -x \ "cat keyfile0 keyfile1 | geli attach -j passfile0 -j passfile1 -k - ${md}" atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore -x \ "cat passfile0 passfile1 | awk '{printf \"%s\", \$0}' | geli attach -j - -k keyfile0 -k keyfile1 ${md}" atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore geli detach ${md} done } init_J_cleanup() { geli_test_cleanup } init_a_test() { cipher=$1 aalgo=$2 secsize=$3 ealgo=${cipher%%:*} keylen=${cipher##*:} atf_check -s exit:0 -e ignore \ geli init -B none -a $aalgo -e $ealgo -l $keylen -P -K keyfile \ -s $secsize ${md} atf_check geli attach -p -k keyfile ${md} atf_check dd if=rnd of=/dev/${md}.eli bs=${secsize} count=${sectors} status=none md_rnd=`dd if=rnd bs=${secsize} count=${sectors} status=none | md5` atf_check_equal 0 $? md_ddev=`dd if=/dev/${md}.eli bs=${secsize} count=${sectors} status=none | md5` atf_check_equal 0 $? if [ ${md_rnd} != ${md_ddev} ]; then atf_fail "Miscompare for aalgo=${aalgo} ealgo=${ealgo} keylen=${keylen} sec=${secsize}" fi } atf_test_case init_a cleanup init_a_head() { atf_set "descr" "I/O with geli and HMACs" atf_set "require.user" "root" atf_set "timeout" 3600 } init_a_body() { geli_test_setup sectors=100 atf_check dd if=/dev/random of=keyfile bs=512 count=16 status=none atf_check dd if=/dev/random of=rnd bs=$MAX_SECSIZE count=${sectors} \ status=none for_each_geli_config init_a_test true } init_a_cleanup() { geli_test_cleanup } init_alias_test() { ealgo=$1 keylen=$2 expected_ealgo=$3 expected_keylen=$4 atf_check geli init -B none -e $ealgo -l $keylen -P -K keyfile ${md} atf_check geli attach -p -k keyfile ${md} real_ealgo=`geli list ${md}.eli | awk '/EncryptionAlgorithm/ {print $2}'` real_keylen=`geli list ${md}.eli | awk '/KeyLength/ {print $2}'` if [ "${real_ealgo}" != "${expected_ealgo}" ]; then atf_fail "expected ${expected_ealgo} but got ${real_ealgo}" fi if [ "${real_keylen}" != "${expected_keylen}" ]; then atf_fail "expected ${expected_keylen} but got ${real_keylen}" fi atf_check geli detach ${md} } atf_test_case init_alias cleanup init_alias_head() { atf_set "descr" "geli init accepts cipher aliases" atf_set "require.user" "root" } init_alias_body() { geli_test_setup md=$(attach_md -t malloc -s 1024k) atf_check dd if=/dev/random of=keyfile bs=512 count=16 status=none for spec in aes:0:AES-XTS:128 aes:128:AES-XTS:128 aes:256:AES-XTS:256 \ - 3des:0:3DES-CBC:192 3des:192:3DES-CBC:192 \ - blowfish:0:Blowfish-CBC:128 blowfish:128:Blowfish-CBC:128 \ - blowfish:160:Blowfish-CBC:160 blowfish:192:Blowfish-CBC:192 \ - blowfish:224:Blowfish-CBC:224 blowfish:256:Blowfish-CBC:256 \ - blowfish:288:Blowfish-CBC:288 blowfish:352:Blowfish-CBC:352 \ - blowfish:384:Blowfish-CBC:384 blowfish:416:Blowfish-CBC:416 \ - blowfish:448:Blowfish-CBC:448 \ camellia:0:CAMELLIA-CBC:128 camellia:128:CAMELLIA-CBC:128 \ camellia:256:CAMELLIA-CBC:256 ; do ealgo=`echo $spec | cut -d : -f 1` keylen=`echo $spec | cut -d : -f 2` expected_ealgo=`echo $spec | cut -d : -f 3` expected_keylen=`echo $spec | cut -d : -f 4` init_alias_test $ealgo $keylen $expected_ealgo $expected_keylen done } init_alias_cleanup() { geli_test_cleanup } atf_test_case init_i_P cleanup init_i_P_head() { atf_set "descr" "geli: Options -i and -P are mutually exclusive" atf_set "require.user" "root" } init_i_P_body() { geli_test_setup sectors=100 md=$(attach_md -t malloc -s `expr $sectors + 1`) atf_check dd if=/dev/random of=keyfile bs=512 count=16 status=none atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e "match:Options -i and -P are mutually exclusive"\ geli init -B none -i 64 -P -K keyfile $md } init_i_P_cleanup() { geli_test_cleanup } atf_test_case nokey cleanup nokey_head() { atf_set "descr" "geli init fails if called with no key component" atf_set "require.user" "root" } nokey_body() { geli_test_setup sectors=100 md=$(attach_md -t malloc -s `expr $sectors + 1`) atf_check -s not-exit:0 -e match:"No key components given" \ geli init -B none -P ${md} } nokey_cleanup() { geli_test_cleanup } atf_init_test_cases() { atf_add_test_case init atf_add_test_case init_B atf_add_test_case init_J atf_add_test_case init_a atf_add_test_case init_alias atf_add_test_case init_i_P atf_add_test_case nokey } Index: stable/11 =================================================================== --- stable/11 (revision 348587) +++ stable/11 (revision 348588) Property changes on: stable/11 ___________________________________________________________________ Modified: svn:mergeinfo ## -0,0 +0,1 ## Merged /head:r348206,348231,348454