Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/CHANGES =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/CHANGES (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/CHANGES (revision 340692) @@ -1,11609 +1,11639 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ This is a high-level summary of the most important changes. For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example, https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate release branch. + Changes between 1.0.2p and 1.0.2q [20 Nov 2018] + + *) Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication + + OpenSSL ECC scalar multiplication, used in e.g. ECDSA and ECDH, has been + shown to be vulnerable to a microarchitecture timing side channel attack. + An attacker with sufficient access to mount local timing attacks during + ECDSA signature generation could recover the private key. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th October 2018 by Alejandro + Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Cesar Pereida Garcia and + Nicola Tuveri. + (CVE-2018-5407) + [Billy Brumley] + + *) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation + + The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a + timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing + algorithm to recover the private key. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser. + (CVE-2018-0734) + [Paul Dale] + + *) Resolve a compatibility issue in EC_GROUP handling with the FIPS Object + Module, accidentally introduced while backporting security fixes from the + development branch and hindering the use of ECC in FIPS mode. + [Nicola Tuveri] + Changes between 1.0.2o and 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018] *) Client DoS due to large DH parameter During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken (CVE-2018-0732) [Guido Vranken] *) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could recover the private key. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia. (CVE-2018-0737) [Billy Brumley] *) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL pem_str is reserved for alias entries only. [Richard Levitte] *) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication. [Andy Polyakov] *) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input. For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin. The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered to 2^-128. [Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar] *) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group). [Matt Caswell] *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases. [Richard Levitte] *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets are no longer allowed. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.2n and 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018] *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources so this is considered safe. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz project. (CVE-2018-0739) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2m and 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017] *) Read/write after SSL object in error state OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state" mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer. In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having already received a fatal error. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). (CVE-2017-3737) [Matt Caswell] *) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701. This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions like Intel Haswell (4th generation). This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3738) [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.2l and 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017] *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3736) [Andy Polyakov] *) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension, OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3735) [Rich Salz] Changes between 1.0.2k and 1.0.2l [25 May 2017] *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target platform rather than 'mingw'. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.0.2j and 1.0.2k [26 Jan 2017] *) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google. (CVE-2017-3731) [Andy Polyakov] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3732) [Andy Polyakov] *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected. This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for providing reproducible case. (CVE-2016-7055) [Andy Polyakov] *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0 or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them. [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2i and 1.0.2j [26 Sep 2016] *) Missing CRL sanity check A bug fix which included a CRL sanity check was added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 but was omitted from OpenSSL 1.0.2i. As a result any attempt to use CRLs in OpenSSL 1.0.2i will crash with a null pointer exception. This issue only affects the OpenSSL 1.0.2i (CVE-2016-7052) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.0.2i [22 Sep 2016] *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6304) [Matt Caswell] *) In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack, the DES ciphers were moved from HIGH to MEDIUM. This issue was reported to OpenSSL Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaetan Leurent (INRIA) (CVE-2016-2183) [Rich Salz] *) OOB write in MDC2_Update() An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical on most platforms. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6303) [Stephen Henson] *) Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS If a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a DoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will ultimately crash. The use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires a custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6302) [Stephen Henson] *) OOB write in BN_bn2dec() The function BN_bn2dec() does not check the return value of BN_div_word(). This can cause an OOB write if an application uses this function with an overly large BIGNUM. This could be a problem if an overly large certificate or CRL is printed out from an untrusted source. TLS is not affected because record limits will reject an oversized certificate before it is parsed. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-2182) [Stephen Henson] *) OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() The function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is the total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount of data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are presented. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-2180) [Stephen Henson] *) Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic A common idiom in the codebase is to check limits in the following manner: "p + len > limit" Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and limit == p + SIZE "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS message). The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually undefined behaviour. For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken (CVE-2016-2177) [Matt Caswell] *) Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key. This issue was reported by César Pereida (Aalto University), Billy Brumley (Tampere University of Technology), and Yuval Yarom (The University of Adelaide and NICTA). (CVE-2016-2178) [César Pereida] *) DTLS buffered message DoS In a DTLS connection where handshake messages are delivered out-of-order those messages that OpenSSL is not yet ready to process will be buffered for later use. Under certain circumstances, a flaw in the logic means that those messages do not get removed from the buffer even though the handshake has been completed. An attacker could force up to approx. 15 messages to remain in the buffer when they are no longer required. These messages will be cleared when the DTLS connection is closed. The default maximum size for a message is 100k. Therefore the attacker could force an additional 1500k to be consumed per connection. By opening many simulataneous connections an attacker could cause a DoS attack through memory exhaustion. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Quan Luo. (CVE-2016-2179) [Matt Caswell] *) DTLS replay protection DoS A flaw in the DTLS replay attack protection mechanism means that records that arrive for future epochs update the replay protection "window" before the MAC for the record has been validated. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means that all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service for a specific DTLS connection. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OCAP audit team. (CVE-2016-2181) [Matt Caswell] *) Certificate message OOB reads In OpenSSL 1.0.2 and earlier some missing message length checks can result in OOB reads of up to 2 bytes beyond an allocated buffer. There is a theoretical DoS risk but this has not been observed in practice on common platforms. The messages affected are client certificate, client certificate request and server certificate. As a result the attack can only be performed against a client or a server which enables client authentication. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6306) [Stephen Henson] Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support AES-NI. This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding bytes. This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker. (CVE-2016-2107) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2105) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2106) [Matt Caswell] *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio() a short invalid encoding can casuse allocation of large amounts of memory potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory. Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected. Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS applications are not affected. This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2016-2109) [Stephen Henson] *) EBCDIC overread ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2176) [Matt Caswell] *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. [Todd Short] *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the default. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL. [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL. Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers. [Viktor Dukhovni] * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either of: SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); or SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available. (CVE-2016-0800) [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Fix a double-free in DSA code A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2016-0705) [Stephen Henson] *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak. Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly. SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour. In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed is configured. Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from that of a valid user. (CVE-2016-0798) [Emilia Käsper] *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence. All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0797) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur. The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour. These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl. This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0799) [Matt Caswell] *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at http://cachebleed.info. (CVE-2016-0702) [Andy Polyakov] *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default, if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation apps to use 2048 bits by default. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] *) DH small subgroups Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe" primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite. OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk. The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact. Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe). (CVE-2016-0701) [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and Sebastian Schinzel. (CVE-2015-3197) [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits. [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-3193) [Andy Polyakov] *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG). (CVE-2015-3194) [Stephen Henson] *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is affected. SSL/TLS is not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2015-3195) [Stephen Henson] *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs. This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages, though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible. [Emilia Käsper] *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, use a random seed, as already documented. [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen ] Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] *) Alternate chains certificate forgery During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL). (CVE-2015-1793) [Matt Caswell] *) Race condition handling PSK identify hint If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the identify hint data. (CVE-2015-3196) [Stephen Henson] Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been restored. Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial field. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which processes public keys, certificate requests or certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with client authentication enabled. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton. (CVE-2015-1788) [Andy Polyakov] *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition, X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the time string. An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification callbacks. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and independently by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-1789) [Emilia Käsper] *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-1790) [Emilia Käsper] *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using the CMS code. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer. (CVE-2015-1792) [Stephen Henson] *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data. (CVE-2015-1791) [Matt Caswell] *) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them. [Matt Caswell] *) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported curves, prefer P-256 (both). [Emilia Kasper] *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits. [Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper] Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford University. (CVE-2015-0291) [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell] *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection. However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller. (CVE-2015-0290) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only server. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson. (CVE-2015-0207) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. (CVE-2015-0286) [Stephen Henson] *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0208) [Stephen Henson] *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare. Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. (CVE-2015-0287) [Stephen Henson] *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-0289) [Emilia Käsper] *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message. This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper (OpenSSL development team). (CVE-2015-0293) [Emilia Käsper] *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack. (CVE-2015-1787) [Matt Caswell] *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are: - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded automatically, and the user has not seeded manually - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not SSL_client_methodv23) - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA). If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the output may be predictable. For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will succeed on an unpatched platform: openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA (CVE-2015-0285) [Matt Caswell] *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their commit 517073cd4b. (CVE-2015-0209) [Matt Caswell] *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice. This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0288) [Stephen Henson] *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015] *) Change RSA and DH/DSA key generation apps to generate 2048-bit keys by default. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one. So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing near-optimal performance even on newer platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64 (other platforms pending). [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and OCSP response extensions from RFC6962. [Rob Stradling] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8. This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target. [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)] *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES, SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported. [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)] *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1, SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation. [Andy Polyakov, David Miller] *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a. RSAZ. [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)] *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2, BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched" implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support for TLS encrypt. This work was sponsored by Intel Corp. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method() supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only. [Steve Henson] *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, MGF1 digest and OAEP label. [Steve Henson] *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap algorithms and include tests cases. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD structure. [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson] *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures. [Steve Henson] *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated summary of the connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary of connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions. [Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie] *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs from CRLDP extension in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download CRLs using the OCSP API. [Steve Henson] *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application configuration using configuration files or command lines. [Steve Henson] *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable tracing. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions. Print out extension in s_server and s_client. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature OID NID. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a client to OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring. [Steve Henson] *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert. [Steve Henson] *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name comparison. [Steve Henson] *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not use the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications to test if a chain is correctly configured. Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client hello and checking the requested ciphersuite. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate is required by client or server. An application can decide which certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server. This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing certificate and specify the whole chain. [Steve Henson] *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used to have similar checks in it. Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode". This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used with caution as it could cause interoperability issues. [Steve Henson] *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no shared signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server to support them. [Steve Henson] *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added it couldn't be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking functions. Add manual page. [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)] *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against a certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Fix OCSP checking. [Rob Stradling and Ben Laurie] *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509 utility) or reject. [Steve Henson] *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied. [Steve Henson] *) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE, platform support for Linux and Android. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework. [Andy Polyakov] *) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL. When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal, when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead. This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the (often lower perfomance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle the new parameter format automatically. [Steve Henson] *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest. [Steve Henson] *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call: SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use static structures instead of allocation if default values are used. New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves. Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client to set list of supported curves. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility to print out received values. [Steve Henson] *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both server and client use DH certificates with common parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of the certificate. Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info, X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review. Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] *) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms [Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3571) [Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0206) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3569) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3572) [Steve Henson] *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0204) [Steve Henson] *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification. An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0205) [Steve Henson] *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX. The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX, and can vary with the CTX. [Adam Langley] *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-8275) [Steve Henson] *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-3570) [Andy Polyakov] *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable sanity and breaks all known clients. [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.) [Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation: ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was announced in the initial ServerHello. Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] *) SRTP Memory Leak. A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected. The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team. (CVE-2014-3513) [OpenSSL team] *) Session Ticket Memory Leak. When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service attack. (CVE-2014-3567) [Steve Henson] *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete. When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be configured to send them. (CVE-2014-3568) [Akamai and the OpenSSL team] *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. Client applications doing fallback retries should call SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV). (CVE-2014-3566) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional DigestInfo checks. Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures. Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code. Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC Group for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3512) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records. Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3511) [David Benjamin] *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages. Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3510) [Emilia Käsper] *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3507) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3506) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3505) [Adam Langley] *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write up to 255 bytes to freed memory. Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3509) [Gabor Tyukasz] *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-5139) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing output to the attacker. Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3508) [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224) [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-0221) [Imre Rad, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195) [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3470) [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson] *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display compilation flags. [mancha ] *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue. [mancha ] *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. [mancha ] Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512 bytes long. [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception. Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues. (CVE-2013-4353) *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450) [Steve Henson] *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013] *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI supporting platforms or when small records were transferred. [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013] *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. (CVE-2013-0169) [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack. Thanks go to and to Adam Langley for discovering and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger for independently discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-2686) [Adam Langley] *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) [Steve Henson] *) Make openssl verify return errors. [Chris Palmer and Ben Laurie] *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() so it returns the certificate actually sent. See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. [Rob Stradling ] *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello if renegotiating. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack. Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic fuzzing as a service testing platform. (CVE-2012-2333) [Steve Henson] *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. [Steve Henson] *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not approved. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012] *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context, in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below]. [Steve Henson] *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to client side. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012] *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110) [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections. [Adam Langley] *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello record length exceeds 255 bytes. 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work. 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing: -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure. Most broken servers should now work. 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable TLS 1.2 client support entirely. [Steve Henson] *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012] *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET STRING form instead of a DigestInfo. [Steve Henson] *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work. [Steve Henson] *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add support for SCTP. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably: - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support; - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES); - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation; - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations; - s390x: z196 support; - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations; [Andy Polyakov] *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup (removal of unnecessary code) [Peter Sylvester ] *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated by Google. [Adam Langley and Ben Laurie] *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224, NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds). Code made available under Apache License version 2.0. Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs: EC_GFp_nistp224_method() EC_GFp_nistp256_method() EC_GFp_nistp521_method() EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible implementations). [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h [Steve Henson] *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional signature parameters can be passed using this option and in particular PSS. [Steve Henson] *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet. [Steve Henson] *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines. New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on the appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1 handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used. Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked against a number of sample certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs. [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser ] *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump. More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature parameters r, s. [Steve Henson] *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing RFC3211. [Steve Henson] *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as password based CMS). [Steve Henson] *) Session-handling fixes: - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID, but also support Session Tickets. - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client presented a ticket with an expired session. - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable. - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information. - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets. [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix PSK session representation. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations. This work was sponsored by Intel. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record) portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to inlclude GCM and add a special AESGCM string for GCM only. [Steve Henson] *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt. [Steve Henson] *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support. As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for versions of TLS earlier than 1.2. [Steve Henson] *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method as unset and return the appopriate default but do *not* set the default. This means we can return the appopriate method in applications that swicth between FIPS and non-FIPS modes. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed. [Steve Henson] *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities. [Peter Eckersley , Ben Laurie and Steve Henson] *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now. [Steve Henson] *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code. [Steve Henson] *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen, encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods. [Steve Henson] *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers. [Steve Henson] *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want to use them can use the private_* version instead. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed. [Steve Henson] *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first. This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers and enable MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying FIPS modules versions. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use until after the certificate request message is received. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246. [Steve Henson] *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch to new signature format when needed using client digest preference. All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client support yet and no support for client certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods and version checking. [Steve Henson] *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined. [Steve Henson] *) A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated. [Christophe Renou , Peter Sylvester , Tom Wu , and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id. [Steve Henson] *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(). [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used automatically instead of needing explicit application support. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705. [Robin Seggelmann , Steve Henson] *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only a few changes are required: Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag. Add TLSv1_1 methods. Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1. Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code). Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where an MMA defence is not necessary. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) [Steve Henson] *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012] *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) [Antonio Martin] Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012] *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing differences arising during decryption processing. A research paper describing this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann and Michael Tuexen for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. (CVE-2011-4576) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George Kadianakis for discovering this issue and Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027) [Andrey Kulikov ] *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) [Rob Austein ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different interpretations of the '..._len' fields). [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, the last update always remained unused). [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf. [Bob Buckholz (Google)] Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011] *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207) [Kaspar Brand ] *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead. Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only. [Steve Henson] *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011] *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014 [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is ambiguous. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010] *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack. Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180 [Steve Henson] *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252 [Ben Laurie] Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010] *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864 [Steve Henson] *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into a DLL. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010] *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover (CVE-2010-1633) [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager ] Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010] *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative. [Steve Henson] *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL. [Willy Weisz ] *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP request code to permit adding custom headers to the request: some responders need this. [Steve Henson] *) The function EVP_PKEY_sign() returns <=0 on error: check return code correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Update verify callback code in apps/s_cb.c and apps/verify.c, it needlessly dereferenced structures, used obsolete functions and didn't handle all updated verify codes correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Disable MD2 in the default configuration. [Steve Henson] *) In BIO_pop() and BIO_push() use the ctrl argument (which was NULL) to indicate the initial BIO being pushed or popped. This makes it possible to determine whether the BIO is the one explicitly called or as a result of the ctrl being passed down the chain. Fix BIO_pop() and SSL BIOs so it handles reference counts correctly and doesn't zero out the I/O bio when it is not being explicitly popped. WARNING: applications which included workarounds for the old buggy behaviour will need to be modified or they could free up already freed BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Extend the uni2asc/asc2uni => OPENSSL_uni2asc/OPENSSL_asc2uni renaming to all platforms (within the 0.9.8 branch, this was done conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash). [Guenter ] *) Add ECDHE and PSK support to DTLS. [Michael Tuexen ] *) Add CHECKED_STACK_OF macro to safestack.h, otherwise safestack can't be used on C++. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" function EVP_MD_flags() (without this the only way to retrieve a digest flags is by accessing the structure directly. Update EVP_MD_do_all*() and EVP_CIPHER_do_all*() to include the name a digest or cipher is registered as in the "from" argument. Print out all registered digests in the dgst usage message instead of manually attempting to work them out. [Steve Henson] *) If no SSLv2 ciphers are used don't use an SSLv2 compatible client hello: this allows the use of compression and extensions. Change default cipher string to remove SSLv2 ciphersuites. This effectively avoids ancient SSLv2 by default unless an application cipher string requests it. [Steve Henson] *) Alter match criteria in PKCS12_parse(). It used to try to use local key ids to find matching certificates and keys but some PKCS#12 files don't follow the (somewhat unwritten) rules and this strategy fails. Now just gather all certificates together and the first private key then look for the first certificate that matches the key. [Steve Henson] *) Support use of registered digest and cipher names for dgst and cipher commands instead of having to add each one as a special case. So now you can do: openssl sha256 foo as well as: openssl dgst -sha256 foo and this works for ENGINE based algorithms too. [Steve Henson] *) Update Gost ENGINE to support parameter files. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Support GeneralizedTime in ca utility. [Oliver Martin , Steve Henson] *) Enhance the hash format used for certificate directory links. The new form uses the canonical encoding (meaning equivalent names will work even if they aren't identical) and uses SHA1 instead of MD5. This form is incompatible with the older format and as a result c_rehash should be used to rebuild symbolic links. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS#8 the default write format for private keys, replacing the traditional format. This form is standardised, more secure and doesn't include an implicit MD5 dependency. [Steve Henson] *) Add a $gcc_devteam_warn option to Configure. The idea is that any code committed to OpenSSL should pass this lot as a minimum. [Steve Henson] *) Add session ticket override functionality for use by EAP-FAST. [Jouni Malinen ] *) Modify HMAC functions to return a value. Since these can be implemented in an ENGINE errors can occur. [Steve Henson] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch_ex. [Ben Laurie] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch. Also some constification necessitated by type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch_ex, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_adj() to add a specific number of days and seconds to a tm structure directly, instead of going through OS specific date routines. This avoids any issues with OS routines such as the year 2038 bug. New *_adj() functions for ASN1 time structures and X509_time_adj_ex() to cover the extended range. The existing X509_time_adj() is still usable and will no longer have any date issues. [Steve Henson] *) Delta CRL support. New use deltas option which will attempt to locate and search any appropriate delta CRLs available. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for CRLs partitioned by reason code. Reorganise CRL processing code and add additional score elements. Validate alternate CRL paths as part of the CRL checking and indicate a new error "CRL path validation error" in this case. Applications wanting additional details can use the verify callback and check the new "parent" field. If this is not NULL CRL path validation is taking place. Existing applications wont see this because it requires extended CRL support which is off by default. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for freshest CRL extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Initial indirect CRL support. Currently only supported in the CRLs passed directly and not via lookup. Process certificate issuer CRL entry extension and lookup CRL entries by bother issuer name and serial number. Check and process CRL issuer entry in IDP extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for distinct certificate and CRL paths. The CRL issuer certificate is validated separately in this case. Only enabled if an extended CRL support flag is set: this flag will enable additional CRL functionality in future. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for policy mappings extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to pathlength constraint, self issued certificate handling, policy processing to align with RFC3280 and PKITS tests. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for name constraints certificate extension. DN, email, DNS and URI types are currently supported. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) To cater for systems that provide a pointer-based thread ID rather than numeric, deprecate the current numeric thread ID mechanism and replace it with a structure and associated callback type. This mechanism allows a numeric "hash" to be extracted from a thread ID in either case, and on platforms where pointers are larger than 'long', mixing is done to help ensure the numeric 'hash' is usable even if it can't be guaranteed unique. The default mechanism is to use "&errno" as a pointer-based thread ID to distinguish between threads. Applications that want to provide their own thread IDs should now use CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback() to register a callback that will call either CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric() or CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(). Note that ERR_remove_state() is now deprecated, because it is tied to the assumption that thread IDs are numeric. ERR_remove_state(0) to free the current thread's error state should be replaced by ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL). (This new approach replaces the functions CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback(), CRYPTO_get_idptr_callback(), and CRYPTO_thread_idptr() that existed in OpenSSL 0.9.9-dev between June 2006 and August 2008. Also, if an application was previously providing a numeric thread callback that was inappropriate for distinguishing threads, then uniqueness might have been obtained with &errno that happened immediately in the intermediate development versions of OpenSSL; this is no longer the case, the numeric thread callback will now override the automatic use of &errno.) [Geoff Thorpe, with help from Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for different CRL issuing certificates. This covers a simple case where the self issued certificates in the chain exist and the real CRL issuer is higher in the existing chain. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Removed effectively defunct crypto/store from the build. [Ben Laurie] *) Revamp of STACK to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a new SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode flag to release unused buffer RAM on SSL connections. This option can save about 34k per idle SSL. [Nick Mathewson] *) Revamp of LHASH to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: STACK, TXT_DB, bsearch, qsort. [Ben Laurie] *) Initial support for Cryptographic Message Syntax (aka CMS) based on RFC3850, RFC3851 and RFC3852. New cms directory and cms utility, support for data, signedData, compressedData, digestedData and encryptedData, envelopedData types included. Scripts to check against RFC4134 examples draft and interop and consistency checks of many content types and variants. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to enc utility to support use of zlib compression BIO. [Steve Henson] *) Extend mk1mf to support importing of options and assembly language files from Configure script, currently only included in VC-WIN32. The assembly language rules can now optionally generate the source files from the associated perl scripts. [Steve Henson] *) Implement remaining functionality needed to support GOST ciphersuites. Interop testing has been performed using CryptoPro implementations. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) s390x assembler pack. [Andy Polyakov] *) ARMv4 assembler pack. ARMv4 refers to v4 and later ISA, not CPU "family." [Andy Polyakov] *) Implement Opaque PRF Input TLS extension as specified in draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt. Since this is not an official specification yet and no extension type assignment by IANA exists, this extension (for now) will have to be explicitly enabled when building OpenSSL by providing the extension number to use. For example, specify an option -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=0x9527 to the "config" or "Configure" script to enable the extension, assuming extension number 0x9527 (which is a completely arbitrary and unofficial assignment based on the MD5 hash of the Internet Draft). Note that by doing so, you potentially lose interoperability with other TLS implementations since these might be using the same extension number for other purposes. SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, src, len) is used to set the opaque PRF input value to use in the handshake. This will create an interal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will return non-zero for success. To get more control and flexibility, provide a callback function by using SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg) where int (*cb)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); void *arg; Callback function 'cb' will be called in handshakes, and is expected to use SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input() as appropriate. Argument 'arg' is for application purposes (the value as given to SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg() will directly be provided to the callback function). The callback function has to return non-zero to report success: usually 1 to use opaque PRF input just if possible, or 2 to enforce use of the opaque PRF input. In the latter case, the library will abort the handshake if opaque PRF input is not successfully negotiated. Arguments 'peerinput' and 'len' given to the callback function will always be NULL and 0 in the case of a client. A server will see the client's opaque PRF input through these variables if available (NULL and 0 otherwise). Note that if the server provides an opaque PRF input, the length must be the same as the length of the client's opaque PRF input. Note that the callback function will only be called when creating a new session (session resumption can resume whatever was previously negotiated), and will not be called in SSL 2.0 handshakes; thus, SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) is especially recommended for applications that need to enforce opaque PRF input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update ssl code to support digests other than SHA1+MD5 for handshake MAC. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Final changes to avoid use of pointer pointer casts in OpenSSL. OpenSSL should now compile cleanly on gcc 4.2 [Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Update SSL library to use new EVP_PKEY MAC API. Include generic MAC support including streaming MAC support: this is required for GOST ciphersuite support. [Victor B. Wagner , Steve Henson] *) Add option -stream to use PKCS#7 streaming in smime utility. New function i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() and PEM_write_PKCS7_bio_stream() to output in BER and PEM format. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental support for use of HMAC via EVP_PKEY interface. This allows HMAC to be handled via the EVP_DigestSign*() interface. The EVP_PKEY "key" in this case is the HMAC key, potentially allowing ENGINE support for HMAC keys which are unextractable. New -mac and -macopt options to dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use alternative signing paramaters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl_cipher_apply_rule(), the internal function that does the work each time a ciphersuite string requests enabling ("foo+bar"), moving ("+foo+bar"), disabling ("-foo+bar", or removing ("!foo+bar") a class of ciphersuites: Now it maintains the order of disabled ciphersuites such that those ciphersuites that most recently went from enabled to disabled not only stay in order with respect to each other, but also have higher priority than other disabled ciphersuites the next time ciphersuites are enabled again. This means that you can now say, e.g., "PSK:-PSK:HIGH" to enable the same ciphersuites as with "HIGH" alone, but in a specific order where the PSK ciphersuites come first (since they are the most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed). Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new funcionality) such that between otherwise identical cihpersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in the default order. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it automatically arranges the ciphersuites in reasonable order before starting to process the rule string. Thus, the definition for "DEFAULT" (SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST) now is just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL", but remains equivalent to "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+aECDH:+kRSA:+RC4:@STRENGTH". This makes it much easier to arrive at a reasonable default order in applications for which anonymous ciphers are OK (meaning that you can't actually use DEFAULT). [Bodo Moeller; suggested by Victor Duchovni] *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string processing) into multiple integers instead of setting "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK", "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer. (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't affect applications.) This give us more bits for each of these categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128 and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all kinds of kludges. Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and 0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9. With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and "CAMELLIA256". [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256. Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q). [Nils Larsch] *) Very *very* experimental PKCS#7 streaming encoder support. Nothing uses it yet and it is largely untested. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types. [Nils Larsch] *) Initial incomplete changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. Safestack is reimplemented. Update ASN1 to avoid use of legacy functions. [Steve Henson] *) Win32/64 targets are linked with Winsock2. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing the CRL revoked certificates in a database. [Steve Henson] *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors to be returned by the verify callback instead of carrying on no matter what. This reflects the way a "real world" verify callback would behave. [Steve Henson] *) GOST engine, supporting several GOST algorithms and public key formats. Kindly donated by Cryptocom. [Cryptocom] *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative lookup methods. X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names. Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_match() to check if two CRLs are identical. Normally this would be called X509_CRL_cmp() but that name is already used by a function that just compares CRL issuer names. Cache several CRL extensions in X509_CRL structure and cache CRLDP in X509. [Steve Henson] *) Store a "canonical" representation of X509_NAME structure (ASN1 Name) this maps equivalent X509_NAME structures into a consistent structure. Name comparison can then be performed rapidly using memcmp(). [Steve Henson] *) Non-blocking OCSP request processing. Add -timeout option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) Allow digests to supply their own micalg string for S/MIME type using the ctrl EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG. [Steve Henson] *) During PKCS7 signing pass the PKCS7 SignerInfo structure to the EVP_PKEY_METHOD before and after signing via the EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN ctrl. It can then customise the structure before and/or after signing if necessary. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_add_sigid() to allow application defined signature OIDs to be added to OpenSSLs internal tables. New function OBJ_sigid_free() to free up any added signature OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(), EVP_MD_do_all() and EVP_MD_do_all_sorted() to enumerate internal digest and cipher tables. New options added to openssl utility: list-message-digest-algorithms and list-cipher-algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Change the array representation of binary polynomials: the list of degrees of non-zero coefficients is now terminated with -1. Previously it was terminated with 0, which was also part of the value; thus, the array representation was not applicable to polynomials where t^0 has coefficient zero. This change makes the array representation useful in a more general context. [Douglas Stebila] *) Various modifications and fixes to SSL/TLS cipher string handling. For ECC, the code now distinguishes between fixed ECDH with RSA certificates on the one hand and with ECDSA certificates on the other hand, since these are separate ciphersuites. The unused code for Fortezza ciphersuites has been removed. For consistency with EDH, ephemeral ECDH is now called "EECDH" (not "ECDHE"). For consistency with the code for DH certificates, use of ECDH certificates is now considered ECDH authentication, not RSA or ECDSA authentication (the latter is merely the CA's signing algorithm and not actively used in the protocol). The temporary ciphersuite alias "ECCdraft" is no longer available, and ECC ciphersuites are no longer excluded from "ALL" and "DEFAULT". The following aliases now exist for RFC 4492 ciphersuites, most of these by analogy with the DH case: kECDHr - ECDH cert, signed with RSA kECDHe - ECDH cert, signed with ECDSA kECDH - ECDH cert (signed with either RSA or ECDSA) kEECDH - ephemeral ECDH ECDH - ECDH cert or ephemeral ECDH aECDH - ECDH cert aECDSA - ECDSA cert ECDSA - ECDSA cert AECDH - anonymous ECDH EECDH - non-anonymous ephemeral ECDH (equivalent to "kEECDH:-AECDH") [Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional S/MIME capabilities for AES and GOST ciphers if supported. Use correct micalg parameters depending on digest(s) in signed message. [Steve Henson] *) Add engine support for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. Add functions to process an ENGINE asn1 method. Support ENGINE lookups in the ASN1 code. [Steve Henson] *) Initial engine support for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. New functions to permit an engine to register a method. Add ENGINE lookups for methods and functional reference processing. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enchance versions of EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature process. [Steve Henson] *) New -resign option to smime utility. This adds one or more signers to an existing PKCS#7 signedData structure. Also -md option to use an alternative message digest algorithm for signing. [Steve Henson] *) Tidy up PKCS#7 routines and add new functions to make it easier to create PKCS7 structures containing multiple signers. Update smime application to support multiple signers. [Steve Henson] *) New -macalg option to pkcs12 utility to allow setting of an alternative digest MAC. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PRFs other than default SHA1 HMAC. Reorganize PBE internals to lookup from a static table using NIDs, add support for HMAC PBE OID translation. Add a EVP_CIPHER ctrl: EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID this allows a cipher to specify an alternative PRF which will be automatically used with PBES2. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the algorithm specific calls to generate keys in "req" with the new API. [Steve Henson] *) Update PKCS#7 enveloped data routines to use new API. This is now supported by any public key method supporting the encrypt operation. A ctrl is added to allow the public key algorithm to examine or modify the PKCS#7 RecipientInfo structure if it needs to: for RSA this is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Add a ctrl to asn1 method to allow a public key algorithm to express a default digest type to use. In most cases this will be SHA1 but some algorithms (such as GOST) need to specify an alternative digest. The return value indicates how strong the prefernce is 1 means optional and 2 is mandatory (that is it is the only supported type). Modify ASN1_item_sign() to accept a NULL digest argument to indicate it should use the default md. Update openssl utilities to use the default digest type for signing if it is not explicitly indicated. [Steve Henson] *) Use OID cross reference table in ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify(). New EVP_MD flag EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE. This uses the relevant signing method from the key type. This effectively removes the link between digests and public key types. [Steve Henson] *) Add an OID cross reference table and utility functions. Its purpose is to translate between signature OIDs such as SHA1WithrsaEncryption and SHA1, rsaEncryption. This will allow some of the algorithm specific hackery needed to use the correct OID to be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Remove algorithm specific dependencies when setting PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO structures for PKCS7_sign(). They are now set up by the relevant public key ASN1 method. [Steve Henson] *) Add provisional EC pkey method with support for ECDSA and ECDH. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for key derivation (agreement) in the API, DH method and pkeyutl. [Steve Henson] *) Add DSA pkey method and DH pkey methods, extend DH ASN1 method to support public and private key formats. As a side effect these add additional command line functionality not previously available: DSA signatures can be generated and verified using pkeyutl and DH key support and generation in pkey, genpkey. [Steve Henson] *) BeOS support. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New make target "install_html_docs" installs HTML renditions of the manual pages. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New utility "genpkey" this is analagous to "genrsa" etc except it can generate keys for any algorithm. Extend and update EVP_PKEY_METHOD to support key and parameter generation and add initial key generation functionality for RSA. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions for main EVP_PKEY_method operations. The undocumented functions EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt} have been renamed to EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt}_old. [Steve Henson] *) Initial definitions for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. This will be a high level public key API, doesn't do much yet. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to retrieve information about public key algorithms. New option to openssl utility: "list-public-key-algorithms" to print out info. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Don't free up OIDs in OBJ_cleanup() if they are in use by EVP_MD or EVP_CIPHER structures to avoid later problems in EVP_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) New utilities pkey and pkeyparam. These are similar to algorithm specific utilities such as rsa, dsa, dsaparam etc except they process any key type. [Steve Henson] *) Transfer public key printing routines to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. New functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private(), EVP_PKEY_print_param() to print public key data from an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for pluggable public key ASN1. De-spaghettify the public key ASN1 handling. Move public and private key ASN1 handling to a new EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure. Relocate algorithm specific handling to a single module within the relevant algorithm directory. Add functions to allow (near) opaque processing of public and private key structures. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Add initial support for RFC 4279 PSK TLS ciphersuites. Add members for the psk identity [hint] and the psk callback functions to the SSL_SESSION, SSL and SSL_CTX structure. New ciphersuites: PSK-RC4-SHA, PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA New functions: SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity SSL_use_psk_identity_hint [Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of Nokia Corporation] *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation and response verification functionality. [Zoltán Glózik , The OpenTSA Project] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou] *) Whirlpool hash implementation is added. [Andy Polyakov] *) BIGNUM code on 64-bit SPARCv9 targets is switched from bn(64,64) to bn(64,32). Because of instruction set limitations it doesn't have any negative impact on performance. This was done mostly in order to make it possible to share assembler modules, such as bn_mul_mont implementations, between 32- and 64-bit builds without hassle. [Andy Polyakov] *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont, dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced. BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets. [Andy Polyakov] *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size. Save memory by seeting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of using the maximum available value. [Steve Henson] *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code in addition to the text details. [Bodo Moeller] *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't handle several customised structures at all. [Steve Henson] *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now handled using new ASN1 code equivalents. [Steve Henson] *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'. [Nils Larsch] *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of all fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. [Steve Henson] *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010] *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never update s->server with a new major version number. As of - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type, - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits, the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740) [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley ] *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted). [Tomas Hoger ] Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010] *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245) [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta] *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!). [Bodo Moeller] *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too. [Steve Henson] *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally. This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while... [Steve Henson] *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later. This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and CVE-2009-4355. [Steve Henson] *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., ): a CAST_KEY doesn't change when encrypting or decrypting. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI. Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode. [Steve Henson] *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection. [Steve Henson] *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer renegotiation support in s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8. [Steve Henson] *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you know what you are doing. [Eric Rescorla , Ben Laurie, Steve Henson] *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in the handshake. [Steve Henson] *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(), CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam warnings in other configurations. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some systems need. [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley] *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs. [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky] *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in several standards that it is not used in new applications due to several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons the MD2 API is still compiled in by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved and restored. [Steve Henson] *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash. [Guenter ] *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(), it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything other than a simple chain. [David Woodhouse , Steve Henson] *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert() by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory left. Additionally every future messege was buffered, even if the sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake. So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be buffered. (CVE-2009-1378) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to detemine the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries. (CVE-2009-1377) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379) [Daniel Mentz] *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call. [Darryl Miles ] *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs [Ilya O. ] Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009] *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what you're doing. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009] *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789) [Paolo Ganci ] *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591) [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590) [Steve Henson] *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store level. [Steve Henson] *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice to handle some structures. [Steve Henson] *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time for a '\n' [Jeremy Shapiro ] *) New -hex option for openssl rand. [Matthieu Herrb] *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1. [Steve Henson] *) Support NumericString type for name components. [Steve Henson] *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the chosen compiler. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009] *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values (CVE-2008-5077). [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team] *) Enable TLS extensions by default. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.) [Sander Temme ] *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command. [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger] *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in s_client and s_server. [Ben Laurie] *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize(). [Rob Austein ] *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client. [Philip Paeps ] *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the server's preference list will be accepted. (Note that the option applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008] *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386). [PR #1679] *) Fix a state transitition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...). [Nagendra Modadugu] *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding, addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been doubly unsafe triple-checked locking. So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder] *) Various precautionary measures: - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h). - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c). (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.) - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs outside the expected range. - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG builds. [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller] *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if the load fails. Useful for distros. [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team] *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code. [Huang Ying] *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too. Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: dont set attribute using ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain attribute creation routines such as certifcate requests and PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008] *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672) [Steve Henson, Mark Cox] *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891) [Joe Orton] *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation. [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo] *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs: The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA. Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads. The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than 'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte invalid read after the end of 'db'). [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev: Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation. While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and 32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting. To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport). As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements, namely BN_from_montgomery_word. (To enable this otherwise, e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".) [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)] *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key sets may exist with different names. [Steve Henson] *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles. This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7 behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the 'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an implementation. [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)] *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9 implemention in the following ways: Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be hard coded. Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is ignored for embedded content. CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled with the enable-cms configuration option. [Steve Henson] *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used. [Paul Sheer ] *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and uncompresses any data passed through it. [Steve Henson] *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping. [Steve Henson] *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0(): sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier) data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied data. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set() to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior. [Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Netware support: - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT) - added some more tests to do_tests.pl - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc, netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32 platform - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD) - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply [Guenter Knauf ] *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546. A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples to s_client and s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007] *) Fix various bugs: + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session + Fix ia64 assembler code [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007] *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server. Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off" pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server. This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995. [Andy Polyakov] *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. [Kurt Roeckx , Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson] *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build. [Steve Henson] *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction. [Andy Polyakov] *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0 (which previously caused an internal error). [Bodo Moeller] *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out. [Ben Laurie] *) AES IGE mode speedup. [Dean Gaudet (Google)] *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162: TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA" TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA" To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-seed'. [KISA, Bodo Moeller] *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract information. For detailed background information, see http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron, J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(), respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to remove a conditional branch. BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name remains as a deprecated alias. Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation. Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias. BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)] *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID context matching (which matters if an application uses a single external cache for different purposes). Previously, out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that, with applications using a single external cache for quite different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session in a different context. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007] *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't). [Victor Duchovni] *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters): When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER encoding. (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RFC 3779 support. [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. Improve header file function name parsing. [Steve Henson] *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs. [Goetz Babin-Ebell] Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap. That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites -- namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0. So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions. Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite. Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now. The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning; however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into multiple values to extend the available space. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly. Now special treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias. However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation to avoid potential handshake problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key versions), which is now available for royalty-free use (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html). Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132. To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-camellia'. [NTT] *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by now or any which still have the bug do not support compression. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006] *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is. [Steve Henson] *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed. [Austin Ziegler ] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9 branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch). [Douglas Stebila] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32 to conform with the standards mentioned here: http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library can't be loaded. [Steve Henson] *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries under VC++ build system. [Steve Henson] *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO. Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags. [Steve Henson] *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Nils Larsch] *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman. [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions for well-known primes. [Nick Mathewson] *) Extended Windows CE support. [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov] *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to smime utility. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them. [Richard Levitte] *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private key into the same file any more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'. [Stefan and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code: - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after a fixed number of uses (currently 32) - add new function for parameter creation - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the BN_BLINDING parameters - hide BN_BLINDING structure Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve performance when a single RSA object is shared among several threads. [Nils Larsch] *) Add support for DTLS. [Nagendra Modadugu and Ben Laurie] *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() [Walter Goulet] *) Remove buggy and incompletet DH cert support from ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c [Nils Larsch] *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for the apps/openssl applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set. [Ben Laurie] *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default. The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx". The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified. (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented. This is because IDEA is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license fee for non-commercial use. As before, "no-idea" can be used to avoid this algorithm.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820). This work was sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-science in Europe). [Richard Levitte] *) RC4 performance overhaul on modern architectures/implementations, such as Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. [Andy Polyakov] *) New utility extract-section.pl. This can be used specify an alternative section number in a pod file instead of having to treat each file as a separate case in Makefile. This can be done by adding two lines to the pod file: =for comment openssl_section:XXX The blank line is mandatory. [Steve Henson] *) New arguments -certform, -keyform and -pass for s_client and s_server to allow alternative format key and certificate files and passphrase sources. [Steve Henson] *) New structure X509_VERIFY_PARAM which combines current verify parameters, update associated structures and add various utility functions. Add new policy related verify parameters, include policy checking in standard verify code. Enhance 'smime' application with extra parameters to support policy checking and print out. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new engine to support VIA PadLock ACE extensions in the VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. These extensions support AES encryption in hardware as well as RNG (though RNG support is currently disabled). [Michal Ludvig , with help from Andy Polyakov] *) Deprecate BN_[get|set]_params() functions (they were ignored internally). [Geoff Thorpe] *) New FIPS 180-2 algorithms, SHA-224/-256/-384/-512 are implemented. [Andy Polyakov and a number of other people] *) Improved PowerPC platform support. Most notably BIGNUM assembler implementation contributed by IBM. [Suresh Chari, Peter Waltenberg, Andy Polyakov] *) The new 'RSA_generate_key_ex' function now takes a BIGNUM for the public exponent rather than 'unsigned long'. There is a corresponding change to the new 'rsa_keygen' element of the RSA_METHOD structure. [Jelte Jansen, Geoff Thorpe] *) Functionality for creating the initial serial number file is now moved from CA.pl to the 'ca' utility with a new option -create_serial. (Before OpenSSL 0.9.7e, CA.pl used to initialize the serial number file to 1, which is bound to cause problems. To avoid the problems while respecting compatibility between different 0.9.7 patchlevels, 0.9.7e employed 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl for serial number initialization. With the new release 0.9.8, we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.) [Steve Henson] *) Reduced header interdepencies by declaring more opaque objects in ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always, developers should define this symbol when building and using openssl to ensure they track the recommended behaviour, interfaces, [etc], but backwards-compatible behaviour prevails when this isn't defined. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function X509_POLICY_NODE_print() which prints out policy nodes. [Steve Henson] *) Add new EVP function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key and associated functionality. This will generate a random key of the appropriate length based on the cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation routine to support keys of a specific form. This is used in the des and 3des routines to generate a key of the correct parity. Update S/MIME code to use new functions and hence generate correct parity DES keys. Add EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY #define to return an error if the key is not valid (weak or incorrect parity). [Steve Henson] *) Add a local set of CRLs that can be used by X509_verify_cert() as well as looking them up. This is useful when the verified structure may contain CRLs, for example PKCS#7 signedData. Modify PKCS7_verify() to use any CRLs present unless the new PKCS7_NO_CRL flag is asserted. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 oid configuration module. It now additionally accepts the syntax: shortName = some long name, 1.2.3.4 [Steve Henson] *) Reimplemented the BN_CTX implementation. There is now no more static limitation on the number of variables it can handle nor the depth of the "stack" handling for BN_CTX_start()/BN_CTX_end() pairs. The stack information can now expand as required, and rather than having a single static array of bignums, BN_CTX now uses a linked-list of such arrays allowing it to expand on demand whilst maintaining the usefulness of BN_CTX's "bundling". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07. [Steve Henson] *) bn_dup_expand() has been deprecated, it was introduced in 0.9.7 and remained unused and not that useful. A variety of other little bignum tweaks and fixes have also been made continuing on from the audit (see below). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Constify all or almost all d2i, c2i, s2i and r2i functions, along with associated ASN1, EVP and SSL functions and old ASN1 macros. [Richard Levitte] *) BN_zero() only needs to set 'top' and 'neg' to zero for correct results, and this should never fail. So the return value from the use of BN_set_word() (which can fail due to needless expansion) is now deprecated; if OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined, BN_zero() is a void macro. [Geoff Thorpe] *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same initialised value as BN_new(). [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller] *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) An audit of the BIGNUM code is underway, for which debugging code is enabled when BN_DEBUG is defined. This makes stricter enforcements on what is considered valid when processing BIGNUMs, and causes execution to assert() when a problem is discovered. If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined, further steps are taken to deliberately pollute unused data in BIGNUM structures to try and expose faulty code further on. For now, openssl will (in its default mode of operation) continue to tolerate the inconsistent forms that it has tolerated in the past, but authors and packagers should consider trying openssl and their own applications when compiled with these debugging symbols defined. It will help highlight potential bugs in their own code, and will improve the test coverage for OpenSSL itself. At some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details. [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller] *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly initialises it). The presence of this function only made it possible to overwrite an existing structure (and cause memory leaks). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Because of the callback-based approach for implementing LHASH as a template type, lh_insert() adds opaque objects to hash-tables and lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() are typically used with a destructor callback to clean up those corresponding objects before destroying the hash table (and losing the object pointers). So some over-zealous constifications in LHASH have been relaxed so that lh_insert() does not take (nor store) the objects as "const" and the lh_doall[_arg] callback wrappers are not prototyped to have "const" restrictions on the object pointers they are given (and so aren't required to cast them away any more). [Geoff Thorpe] *) The tmdiff.h API was so ugly and minimal that our own timing utility (speed) prefers to use its own implementation. The two implementations haven't been consolidated as yet (volunteers?) but the tmdiff API has had its object type properly exposed (MS_TM) instead of casting to/from "char *". This may still change yet if someone realises MS_TM and "ms_time_***" aren't necessarily the greatest nomenclatures - but this is what was used internally to the implementation so I've used that for now. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Ensure that deprecated functions do not get compiled when OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined. Some "openssl" subcommands and a few of the self-tests were still using deprecated key-generation functions so these have been updated also. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Reorganise PKCS#7 code to separate the digest location functionality into PKCS7_find_digest(), digest addtion into PKCS7_bio_add_digest(). New function PKCS7_set_digest() to set the digest type for PKCS#7 digestedData type. Add additional code to correctly generate the digestedData type and add support for this type in PKCS7 initialization functions. [Steve Henson] *) New function PKCS7_set0_type_other() this initializes a PKCS7 structure of type "other". [Steve Henson] *) Fix prime generation loop in crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl by making sure the loop does correctly stop and breaking ("division by zero") modulus operations are not performed. The (pre-generated) prime table crypto/bn/bn_prime.h was already correct, but it could not be re-generated on some platforms because of the "division by zero" situation in the script. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt: the KDF1 key derivation function with SHA-1 now is only used for "small" curves (where the representation of a field element takes up to 24 bytes); for larger curves, the field element resulting from ECDH is directly used as premaster secret. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add code for kP+lQ timings to crypto/ec/ectest.c, and add SEC2 curve secp160r1 to the tests. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO. [Götz Babin-Ebell via Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better control of the error stack. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for STORE in ENGINE. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the STORE type. The intention is to provide a common interface to certificate and key stores, be they simple file-based stores, or HSM-type store, or LDAP stores, or... NOTE: The code is currently UNTESTED and isn't really used anywhere. [Richard Levitte] *) Add a generic structure called OPENSSL_ITEM. This can be used to pass a list of arguments to any function as well as provide a way for a function to pass data back to the caller. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions BUF_strndup() and BUF_memdup(). BUF_strndup() works like BUF_strdup() but can be used to duplicate a portion of a string. The copy gets NUL-terminated. BUF_memdup() duplicates a memory area. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function sk_find_ex() which works like sk_find(), but will return an index to an element even if an exact match couldn't be found. The index is guaranteed to point at the element where the searched-for key would be inserted to preserve sorting order. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality. Currently, the following flags are defined: OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero number. OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns zero. This is useful if there are more than one element where the comparing function returns zero. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca' in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation as all other certificate signing. The new flag '-selfsign' enables this functionality. Adapt CA.sh and CA.pl.in. [Richard Levitte] *) Add functionality to check the public key of a certificate request against a given private. This is useful to check that a certificate request can be signed by that key (self-signing). [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) Generate muti valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for req and dirName. [Steve Henson] *) Support for nameConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyMappings certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure the default DSA_METHOD implementation only uses its dsa_mod_exp() and/or bn_mod_exp() handlers if they are non-NULL, and change its own handlers to be NULL so as to remove unnecessary indirection. This lets alternative implementations fallback to the default implementation more easily. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support for directoryName in GeneralName related extensions in config files. [Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to link applications using Makefile.shared. Make that possible even when linking against static libraries! [Richard Levitte] *) Support for single pass processing for S/MIME signing. This now means that S/MIME signing can be done from a pipe, in addition cleartext signing (multipart/signed type) is effectively streaming and the signed data does not need to be all held in memory. This is done with a new flag PKCS7_STREAM. When this flag is set PKCS7_sign() only initializes the PKCS7 structure and the actual signing is done after the data is output (and digests calculated) in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). [Steve Henson] *) Add full support for -rpath/-R, both in shared libraries and applications, at least on the platforms where it's known how to do it. [Richard Levitte] *) In crypto/ec/ec_mult.c, implement fast point multiplication with precomputation, based on wNAF splitting: EC_GROUP_precompute_mult() will now compute a table of multiples of the generator that makes subsequent invocations of EC_POINTs_mul() or EC_POINT_mul() faster (notably in the case of a single point multiplication, scalar * generator). [Nils Larsch, Bodo Moeller] *) IPv6 support for certificate extensions. The various extensions which use the IP:a.b.c.d can now take IPv6 addresses using the formats of RFC1884 2.2 . IPv6 addresses are now also displayed correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Added an ENGINE that implements RSA by performing private key exponentiations with the GMP library. The conversions to and from GMP's mpz_t format aren't optimised nor are any montgomery forms cached, and on x86 it appears OpenSSL's own performance has caught up. However there are likely to be other architectures where GMP could provide a boost. This ENGINE is not built in by default, but it can be specified at Configure time and should be accompanied by the necessary linker additions, eg; ./config -DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp [Geoff Thorpe] *) "openssl engine" will not display ENGINE/DSO load failure errors when testing availability of engines with "-t" - the old behaviour is produced by increasing the feature's verbosity with "-tt". [Geoff Thorpe] *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can also be overriden by providing the appropriate method callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and primality testing to functions that take a new BN_GENCB pointer in place of callback/argument pairs. The new API functions have "_ex" postfixes and the older functions are reimplemented as wrappers for the new ones. The OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol can be used to hide declarations of the old functions to help (graceful) attempts to migrate to the new functions. Also, the new key-generation API functions operate on a caller-supplied key-structure and return success/failure rather than returning a key or NULL - this is to help make "keygen" another member function of RSA_METHOD etc. Example for using the new callback interface: int (*my_callback)(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) = ...; void *my_arg = ...; BN_GENCB my_cb; BN_GENCB_set(&my_cb, my_callback, my_arg); return BN_is_prime_ex(some_bignum, BN_prime_checks, NULL, &cb); /* For the meaning of a, b in calls to my_callback(), see the * documentation of the function that calls the callback. * cb will point to my_cb; my_arg can be retrieved as cb->arg. * my_callback should return 1 if it wants BN_is_prime_ex() * to continue, or 0 to stop. */ [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the ZLIB compression method to be stateful, and make it available to TLS with the number defined in draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ASN.1 structures and functions for CertificatePair, which is defined as follows (according to X.509_4thEditionDraftV6.pdf): CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE { forward [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, reverse [1] Certificate OPTIONAL, -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- } Also implement the PEM functions to read and write certificate pairs, and defined the PEM tag as "CERTIFICATE PAIR". This needed to be defined, mostly for the sake of the LDAP attribute crossCertificatePair, but may prove useful elsewhere as well. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to inhibit symlinking of shared libraries in Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake. [Richard Levitte] *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg); and a macro that behave like int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a); to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c). EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() will now automatically use this if applicable. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add new lock type (CRYPTO_LOCK_BN). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the ENGINE framework to automatically load engines dynamically from specific directories unless they could be found to already be built in or loaded. Move all the current engines except for the cryptodev one to a new directory engines/. The engines in engines/ are built as shared libraries if the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config. Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a. /usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic engines, but that can be overriden at configure time through the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES. [Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte] *) Add Makefile.shared, a helper makefile to build shared libraries. Addapt Makefile.org. [Richard Levitte] *) Add version info to Win32 DLLs. [Peter 'Luna' Runestig" ] *) Add new 'medium level' PKCS#12 API. Certificates and keys can be added using this API to created arbitrary PKCS#12 files while avoiding the low level API. New options to PKCS12_create(), key or cert can be NULL and will then be omitted from the output file. The encryption algorithm NIDs can be set to -1 for no encryption, the mac iteration count can be set to 0 to omit the mac. Enhance pkcs12 utility by making the -nokeys and -nocerts options work when creating a PKCS#12 file. New option -nomac to omit the mac, NONE can be set for an encryption algorithm. New code is modified to use the enhanced PKCS12_create() instead of the low level API. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 encoder to support indefinite length constructed encoding. This can output sequences tags and octet strings in this form. Modify pk7_asn1.c to support indefinite length encoding. This is experimental and needs additional code to be useful, such as an ASN1 bio and some enhanced streaming PKCS#7 code. Extend template encode functionality so that tagging is passed down to the template encoder. [Steve Henson] *) Let 'openssl req' fail if an argument to '-newkey' is not recognized instead of using RSA as a default. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for ECC-based ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt. As these are not official, they are not included in "ALL"; the "ECCdraft" ciphersuite group alias can be used to select them. [Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH engine support. [Nils Gura and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH in new directory crypto/ecdh/. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Let BN_rand_range() abort with an error after 100 iterations without success (which indicates a broken PRNG). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_sqrt() so that it verifies that the input value is really the square of the return value. (Previously, BN_mod_sqrt would show GIGO behaviour.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add named elliptic curves over binary fields from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS; add OIDs that were still missing. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Extend the EC library for elliptic curves over binary fields (new files ec2_smpl.c, ec2_smpt.c, ec2_mult.c in crypto/ec/). New EC_METHOD: EC_GF2m_simple_method New API functions: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m Point compression for binary fields is disabled by default for patent reasons (compile with OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP defined to enable it). As binary polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs, various members of the EC_GROUP and EC_POINT data structures can be shared between the implementations for prime fields and binary fields; the above ..._GF2m functions (except for EX_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m) are essentially identical to their ..._GFp counterparts. (For simplicity, the '..._GFp' prefix has been dropped from various internal method names.) An internal 'field_div' method (similar to 'field_mul' and 'field_sqr') has been added; this is used only for binary fields. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Optionally dispatch EC_POINT_mul(), EC_POINT_precompute_mult() through methods ('mul', 'precompute_mult'). The generic implementations (now internally called 'ec_wNAF_mul' and 'ec_wNAF_precomputed_mult') remain the default if these methods are undefined. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New function EC_GROUP_get_degree, which is defined through EC_METHOD. For curves over prime fields, this returns the bit length of the modulus. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New functions EC_GROUP_dup, EC_POINT_dup. (These simply call ..._new and ..._copy). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add binary polynomial arithmetic software in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c. Polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs (where the sign bit is not used) in the following functions [macros]: BN_GF2m_add BN_GF2m_sub [= BN_GF2m_add] BN_GF2m_mod [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_mul [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_inv BN_GF2m_mod_exp [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr] BN_GF2m_cmp [= BN_ucmp] (Note that only the 'mod' functions are actually for fields GF(2^m). BN_GF2m_add() is misnomer, but this is for the sake of consistency.) For some functions, an the irreducible polynomial defining a field can be given as an 'unsigned int[]' with strictly decreasing elements giving the indices of those bits that are set; i.e., p[] represents the polynomial f(t) = t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] where p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. This applies to the following functions: BN_GF2m_mod_arr BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv] BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_div] BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly Conversion can be performed by the following functions: BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly bntest.c has additional tests for binary polynomial arithmetic. Two implementations for BN_GF2m_mod_div() are available. The default algorithm simply uses BN_GF2m_mod_inv() and BN_GF2m_mod_mul(). The alternative algorithm is compiled in only if OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV is defined (patent pending; read the copyright notice in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c before enabling it). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add new error code 'ERR_R_DISABLED' that can be used when some functionality is disabled at compile-time. [Douglas Stebila ] *) Change default behaviour of 'openssl asn1parse' so that more information is visible when viewing, e.g., a certificate: Modify asn1_parse2 (crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c) so that in non-'dump' mode the content of non-printable OCTET STRINGs is output in a style similar to INTEGERs, but with '[HEX DUMP]' prepended to avoid the appearance of a printable string. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'asn1_flag' and 'asn1_form' member to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form() EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form() These control ASN1 encoding details: - Curves (i.e., groups) are encoded explicitly unless asn1_flag has been set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE. - Points are encoded in uncompressed form by default; options for asn1_for are as for point2oct, namely POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID Also add 'seed' and 'seed_len' members to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_seed() EC_GROUP_get0_seed() EC_GROUP_get_seed_len() This is used only for ASN1 purposes (so far). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'field_type' member to EC_METHOD, which holds the NID of the appropriate field type OID. The new function EC_METHOD_get_field_type() returns this value. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add functions EC_POINT_point2bn() EC_POINT_bn2point() EC_POINT_point2hex() EC_POINT_hex2point() providing useful interfaces to EC_POINT_point2oct() and EC_POINT_oct2point(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Change internals of the EC library so that the functions EC_GROUP_set_generator() EC_GROUP_get_generator() EC_GROUP_get_order() EC_GROUP_get_cofactor() are implemented directly in crypto/ec/ec_lib.c and not dispatched to methods, which would lead to unnecessary code duplication when adding different types of curves. [Nils Larsch with input by Bodo Moeller] *) Implement compute_wNAF (crypto/ec/ec_mult.c) without BIGNUM arithmetic, and such that modified wNAFs are generated (which avoid length expansion in many cases). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant() (defined via EC_METHOD) that verifies that the curve discriminant is non-zero. Add a function EC_GROUP_check() that makes some sanity tests on a EC_GROUP, its generator and order. This includes EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add ECDSA in new directory crypto/ecdsa/. Add applications 'openssl ecparam' and 'openssl ecdsa' (these are based on 'openssl dsaparam' and 'openssl dsa'). ECDSA support is also included in various other files across the library. Most notably, - 'openssl req' now has a '-newkey ecdsa:file' option; - EVP_PKCS82PKEY (crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c) now can handle ECDSA; - X509_PUBKEY_get (crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c) and d2i_PublicKey (crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c) have been modified to make them suitable for ECDSA where domain parameters must be extracted before the specific public key; - ECDSA engine support has been added. [Nils Larsch ] *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS. Each curve can be obtained from the new function EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(), and the list of available named curves can be obtained with EC_get_builtin_curves(). Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be accessed via EC_GROUP_set_curve_name() EC_GROUP_get_curve_name() [Nils Larsch ] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't. [Victor Duchovni] *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module. [Steve Henson] *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature. [Steve Henson] *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to run algorithm test programs. [Steve Henson] *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace. [Steve Henson] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA" will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j [04 May 2006] *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows. [Steve Henson] *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++ build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005] *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS. The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not. BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of the difference induced by this change. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage. [Steve Henson] *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise, the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with biased k.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are independent of the particular secret key. This will mitigate cache-timing and potential related attacks. BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation, and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller] *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set. (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some clients need. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before). [Steve Henson] *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code structures constant. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++ complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up some needed definitions. [Steve Henson] *) Undo Cygwin change. [Ulf Möller] *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820. Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications, they must be explicitely allowed in run-time. See docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005] *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating server and client random values. Previously (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms). This change has negligible security impact because: 1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random data. 2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial handshake. 3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random values. The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue to our attention. [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC] *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed prematurely by EGD/PRNGD. [Darren Tucker via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014] *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format. [Steve Henson] *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs. [Nauticus Networks SSL Team , Steve Henson] *) Add new -passin argument to dgst. [Steve Henson] *) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp: this is needed for some certificates that reencode DNs into UTF8Strings (in violation of RFC3280) and can't or wont issue name rollover certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct. As a side effect always do the following basic checks on extensions, not just when there's an associated purpose to the check: - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user has chosen to ignore this fault) - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all) - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has been given) [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7d and 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004] *) Avoid a race condition when CRLs are checked in a multi threaded environment. This would happen due to the reordering of the revoked entries during signature checking and serial number lookup. Now the encoding is cached and the serial number sort performed under a lock. Add new STACK function sk_is_sorted(). [Steve Henson] *) Add Delta CRL to the extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to s3_pkt.c so alerts are sent properly. [David Holmes ] *) Reduce the chances of duplicate issuer name and serial numbers (in violation of RFC3280) using the OpenSSL certificate creation utilities. This is done by creating a random 64 bit value for the initial serial number when a serial number file is created or when a self signed certificate is created using 'openssl req -x509'. The initial serial number file is created using 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl rather than being initialized to 1. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites (CVE-2004-0112) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) X509 verify fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds when X509_V_FLAGS_X509_STRICT is set. Check CRL issuer has cRLSign set if keyUsage extension present. Don't accept CRLs with unhandled critical extensions: since verify currently doesn't process CRL extensions this rejects a CRL with *any* critical extensions. Add new verify error codes for these cases. [Steve Henson] *) When creating an OCSP nonce use an OCTET STRING inside the extnValue. A clarification of RFC2560 will require the use of OCTET STRINGs and some implementations cannot handle the current raw format. Since OpenSSL copies and compares OCSP nonces as opaque blobs without any attempt at parsing them this should not create any compatibility issues. [Steve Henson] *) New md flag EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE this allows md_data to be reused when calling EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() to avoid calling OPENSSL_malloc(). Without this HMAC (and other) operations are several times slower than OpenSSL < 0.9.7. [Steve Henson] *) Print out GeneralizedTime and UTCTime in ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). [Peter Sylvester ] *) Use the correct content when signing type "other". [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server exiting on the first error in a request. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] *) Change AES_cbc_encrypt() so it outputs exact multiple of blocks during encryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Various fixes to base64 BIO and non blocking I/O. On write flushes were not handled properly if the BIO retried. On read data was not being buffered properly and had various logic bugs. This also affects blocking I/O when the data being decoded is a certain size. [Steve Henson] *) Various S/MIME bugfixes and compatibility changes: output correct application/pkcs7 MIME type if PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE is set. Tolerate some broken signatures. Output CR+LF for EOL if PKCS7_CRLFEOL is set (this makes opening of files as .eml work). Correctly handle very long lines in MIME parser. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications should make sure they are passing it correctly. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Target "mingw" now allows native Windows code to be generated in the Cygwin environment as well as with the MinGW compiler. [Ulf Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] *) Make the no-err option work as intended. The intention with no-err is not to have the whole error stack handling routines removed from libcrypto, it's only intended to remove all the function name and reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway. NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have it's own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not used by default when no-err is given. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for FreeBSD on IA64. [dirk.meyer@dinoex.sub.org via Richard Levitte, resolves #454] *) Adjust DES_cbc_cksum() so it returns the same value as the MIT Kerberos function mit_des_cbc_cksum(). Before this change, the value returned by DES_cbc_cksum() was like the one from mit_des_cbc_cksum(), except the bytes were swapped. [Kevin Greaney and Richard Levitte] *) Allow an application to disable the automatic SSL chain building. Before this a rather primitive chain build was always performed in ssl3_output_cert_chain(): an application had no way to send the correct chain if the automatic operation produced an incorrect result. Now the chain builder is disabled if either: 1. Extra certificates are added via SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). 2. The mode flag SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN is set. The reasoning behind this is that an application would not want the auto chain building to take place if extra chain certificates are present and it might also want a means of sending no additional certificates (for example the chain has two certificates and the root is omitted). [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to build without the ENGINE framework. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Under Win32 gmtime() can return NULL: check return value in OPENSSL_gmtime(). Add error code for case where gmtime() fails. [Steve Henson] *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode , Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This behaviour is masked when SSL_OP_ALL is used due to SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG being set. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as followup to PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) IA-32 assembler support enhancements: unified ELF targets, support for SCO/Caldera platforms, fix for Cygwin shared build. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for FreeBSD on sparc64. As a consequence, support for FreeBSD on non-x86 processors is separate from x86 processors on the config script, much like the NetBSD support. [Richard Levitte & Kris Kennaway ] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7 [31 Dec 2002] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.6i and later 0.9.6 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.7.] *) Fix session ID handling in SSLv2 client code: the SERVER FINISHED code (06) was taken as the first octet of the session ID and the last octet was ignored consequently. As a result SSLv2 client side session caching could not have worked due to the session ID mismatch between client and server. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the declaration of needed Kerberos libraries to use EX_LIBS instead of the special (and badly supported) LIBKRB5. LIBKRB5 is removed entirely. [Richard Levitte] *) The hw_ncipher.c engine requires dynamic locks. Unfortunately, it seems that in spite of existing for more than a year, many application author have done nothing to provide the necessary callbacks, which means that this particular engine will not work properly anywhere. This is a very unfortunate situation which forces us, in the name of usability, to give the hw_ncipher.c a static lock, which is part of libcrypto. NOTE: This is for the 0.9.7 series ONLY. This hack will never appear in 0.9.8 or later. We EXPECT application authors to have dealt properly with this when 0.9.8 is released (unless we actually make such changes in the libcrypto locking code that changes will have to be made anyway). [Richard Levitte] *) In asn1_d2i_read_bio() repeatedly call BIO_read() until all content octets have been read, EOF or an error occurs. Without this change some truncated ASN1 structures will not produce an error. [Steve Henson] *) Disable Heimdal support, since it hasn't been fully implemented. Still give the possibility to force the use of Heimdal, but with warnings and a request that patches get sent to openssl-dev. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the VC-CE target, introduce the WINCE sysname, and add INSTALL.WCE and appropriate conditionals to make it build. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Change the DLL names for Cygwin to cygcrypto-x.y.z.dll and cygssl-x.y.z.dll, where x, y and z are the major, minor and edit numbers of the version. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Introduce safe string copy and catenation functions (BUF_strlcpy() and BUF_strlcat()). [Ben Laurie (CHATS) and Richard Levitte] *) Avoid using fixed-size buffers for one-line DNs. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BUF_MEM_grow_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid using fixed size buffers for configuration file location. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation for various CA files. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Use sizeof in preference to magic numbers. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation in cert requests. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to check for (supposedly impossible) buffer overflows. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Don't cache truncated DNS entries in the local cache (this could potentially lead to a spoofing attack). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix various buffers to be large enough for hex/decimal representations in a platform independent manner. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add CRYPTO_realloc_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BIO_indent() to avoid much slightly worrying code to do indents. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Convert sprintf()/BIO_puts() to BIO_printf(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) buffer_gets() could terminate with the buffer only half full. Fixed. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to prevent user-supplied crypto functions from overflowing internal buffers by having large block sizes, etc. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) New OPENSSL_assert() macro (similar to assert(), but enabled unconditionally). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused copy of key in RC4. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized buffers for IV in pem.h. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix off-by-one error in EGD path. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) If RANDFILE path is too long, ignore instead of truncating. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized X.509 structure CBCParameter. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous function knumber(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous structure, KSSL_ERR. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Protect against overlong session ID context length in an encoded session object. Since these are local, this does not appear to be exploitable. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect the 0.9.6 release series: Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions. (CVE-2002-0657) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712. [Richard Levitte] *) Make -nameopt work fully for req and add -reqopt switch. [Michael Bell , Steve Henson] *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1. [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen ] *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms have been removed entirely. This was also the last step to make OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions. [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman ] *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers, which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher. (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption. "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.) [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build directories. The recommended way to make a platform-dependent build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with some local tweaks: # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree. In # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory. mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f) | while read F; do mkdir -p `dirname $F` ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F done To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean" is a good thing. If it isn't successfull, don't worry about it, it probably means the source directory is very clean. [Richard Levitte] *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values. [Götz Babin-Ebell ] *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests. [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer ] *) Add AES modes CFB and OFB to the object database. Correct an error in AES-CFB decryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove most calls to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() in evp_enc.c, this allows existing EVP_CIPHER_CTX structures to be reused after calling EVP_*Final(). This behaviour is used by encryption BIOs and some applications. This has the side effect that applications must explicitly clean up cipher contexts with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() or they will leak memory. [Steve Henson] *) Check the values of dna and dnb in bn_mul_recursive before calling bn_mul_comba (a non zero value means the a or b arrays do not contain n2 elements) and fallback to bn_mul_normal if either is not zero. [Steve Henson] *) Fix escaping of non-ASCII characters when using the -subj option of the "openssl req" command line tool. (Robert Joop ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Make object definitions compliant to LDAP (RFC2256): SN is the short form for "surname", serialNumber has no short form. Use "mail" as the short name for "rfc822Mailbox" according to RFC2798; therefore remove "mail" short name for "internet 7". The OID for unique identifiers in X509 certificates is x500UniqueIdentifier, not uniqueIdentifier. Some more OID additions. (Michael Bell ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the ENGINE is initailized at that point (ctrls before that point are run on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If init=0 then the ENGINE will not be iniatialized at all. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined argument is actually passed to the callback: In the SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() prototype, the callback declaration has been changed from int (*cb)() into int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *); in ssl_verify_cert_chain (ssl/ssl_cert.c), the call i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx) has been changed into i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg). To update applications using SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(), a dummy argument can be added to their callback functions. [D. K. Smetters ] *) Added the '4758cca' ENGINE to support IBM 4758 cards. [Maurice Gittens , touchups by Geoff Thorpe] *) Add and OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF define which will cause OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() to load the openssl.cnf config file. This allows older applications to transparently support certain OpenSSL features: such as crypto acceleration and dynamic ENGINE loading. Two new functions OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() which will never load the config file and OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() which will always load it have also been added. [Steve Henson] *) Add the OFB, CFB and CTR (all with 128 bit feedback) to AES. Adjust NIDs and EVP layer. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) Config modules support in openssl utility. Most commands now load modules from the config file, though in a few (such as version) this isn't done because it couldn't be used for anything. In the case of ca and req the config file used is the same as the utility itself: that is the -config command line option can be used to specify an alternative file. [Steve Henson] *) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative config section name. Add a new flag to tolerate a missing config file and move code to CONF_modules_load_file(). [Steve Henson] *) Support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted/corrected to work with the new engine framework. [AEP Inc. and Richard Levitte] *) Support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted to work with the new engine framework. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the CHIL engine fork-safe (as defined by nCipher) and actually make the newer ENGINE framework commands for the CHIL engine work. [Toomas Kiisk and Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to produce shared libraries on ReliantUNIX. [Robert Dahlem via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target debug-linux-ppro. Make 'openssl rsa' use the general key loading routines implemented in apps.c, and make those routines able to handle the key format FORMAT_NETSCAPE and the variant FORMAT_IISSGC. [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add -keyform to rsautl, and document -engine. [Richard Levitte, inspired by Toomas Kiisk ] *) Change BIO_new_file (crypto/bio/bss_file.c) to use new BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE error code rather than the generic ERR_R_SYS_LIB error code if fopen() fails with ENOENT. [Ben Laurie] *) Add new functions ERR_peek_last_error ERR_peek_last_error_line ERR_peek_last_error_line_data. These are similar to ERR_peek_error ERR_peek_error_line ERR_peek_error_line_data, but report on the latest error recorded rather than the first one still in the error queue. [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller] *) default_algorithms option in ENGINE config module. This allows things like: default_algorithms = ALL default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS [Steve Henson] *) Prelminary ENGINE config module. [Steve Henson] *) New experimental application configuration code. [Steve Henson] *) Change the AES code to follow the same name structure as all other symmetric ciphers, and behave the same way. Move everything to the directory crypto/aes, thereby obsoleting crypto/rijndael. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) SECURITY: remove unsafe setjmp/signal interaction from ui_openssl.c. [Ben Laurie and Theo de Raadt] *) Add option to output public keys in req command. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Use wNAFs in EC_POINTs_mul() for improved efficiency (up to about 10% better than before for P-192 and P-224). [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions/macros SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, cb) SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) to request calling a callback function void cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) whenever a protocol message has been completely received (write_p == 0) or sent (write_p == 1). Here 'version' is the protocol version according to which the SSL library interprets the current protocol message (SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, or TLS1_VERSION). 'content_type' is 0 in the case of SSL 2.0, or the content type as defined in the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol specification (change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22)). 'buf' and 'len' point to the actual message, 'ssl' to the SSL object, and 'arg' is the application-defined value set by SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg(). 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server' have new '-msg' options to enable a callback that displays all protocol messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the shared library support so shared libraries are built as soon as the corresponding static library is finished, and thereby get openssl and the test programs linked against the shared library. This still only happens when the keyword "shard" has been given to the configuration scripts. NOTE: shared library support is still an experimental thing, and backward binary compatibility is still not guaranteed. ["Maciej W. Rozycki" and Richard Levitte] *) Add support for Subject Information Access extension. [Peter Sylvester ] *) Make BUF_MEM_grow() behaviour more consistent: Initialise to zero additional bytes when new memory had to be allocated, not just when reusing an existing buffer. [Bodo Moeller] *) New command line and configuration option 'utf8' for the req command. This allows field values to be specified as UTF8 strings. [Steve Henson] *) Add -multi and -mr options to "openssl speed" - giving multiple parallel runs for the former and machine-readable output for the latter. [Ben Laurie] *) Add '-noemailDN' option to 'openssl ca'. This prevents inclusion of the e-mail address in the DN (i.e., it will go into a certificate extension only). The new configuration file option 'email_in_dn = no' has the same effect. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Change all functions with names starting with des_ to be starting with DES_ instead. Add wrappers that are compatible with libdes, but are named _ossl_old_des_*. Finally, add macros that map the des_* symbols to the corresponding _ossl_old_des_* if libdes compatibility is desired. If OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility is desired, the des_* symbols will be mapped to DES_*, with one exception. Since we provide two compatibility mappings, the user needs to define the macro OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY if libdes compatibility is desired. The default (i.e., when that macro isn't defined) is OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility. There are also macros that enable and disable the support of old des functions altogether. Those are OPENSSL_ENABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT and OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT. If none or both of those are defined, the default will apply: to support the old des routines. In either case, one must include openssl/des.h to get the correct definitions. Do not try to just include openssl/des_old.h, that won't work. NOTE: This is a major break of an old API into a new one. Software authors are encouraged to switch to the DES_ style functions. Some time in the future, des_old.h and the libdes compatibility functions will be disable (i.e. OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT will be the default), and then completely removed. [Richard Levitte] *) Test for certificates which contain unsupported critical extensions. If such a certificate is found during a verify operation it is rejected by default: this behaviour can be overridden by either handling the new error X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION or by setting the verify flag X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL. A new function X509_supported_extension() has also been added which returns 1 if a particular extension is supported. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP cipher functions in similar way to digests to retain compatibility with existing code. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP_DigestInit() and EVP_DigestFinal() to retain compatibility with existing code. In particular the 'ctx' parameter does not have to be to be initialized before the call to EVP_DigestInit() and it is tidied up after a call to EVP_DigestFinal(). New function EVP_DigestFinal_ex() which does not tidy up the ctx. Similarly function EVP_MD_CTX_copy() changed to not require the destination to be initialized valid and new function EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() added which requires the destination to be valid. Modify all the OpenSSL digest calls to use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(). [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) and the functions using it so that complete 'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory instead of overwriting 'msg_type' and 'length' with 'body' data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add an implementation of SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack for Win32. [Massimo Santin via Richard Levitte] *) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation (initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations of specific crypto iterfaces. This change also introduces integrated support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README as it couldn't be adequately described here. However, there are a few API changes worth noting - some RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that were changed in the original introduction of ENGINE code have now reverted back - the hooking from this code to ENGINE is now a good deal more passive and at run-time, operations deal directly with RSA_METHODs, DSA_METHODs (etc) as they did before, rather than dereferencing through an ENGINE pointer any more. Also, the ENGINE functions dealing with BN_MOD_EXP[_CRT] handlers have been removed - they were not being used by the framework as there is no concept of a BIGNUM_METHOD and they could not be generalised to the new 'ENGINE_TABLE' mechanism that underlies the new code. Similarly, ENGINE_cpy() has been removed as it cannot be consistently defined in the new code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() to allow fractional seconds. [Steve Henson] *) Change mkdef.pl to sort symbols that get the same entry number, and make sure the automatically generated functions ERR_load_* become part of libeay.num as well. [Richard Levitte] *) New function SSL_renegotiate_pending(). This returns true once renegotiation has been requested (either SSL_renegotiate() call or HelloRequest/ClientHello receveived from the peer) and becomes false once a handshake has been completed. (For servers, SSL_renegotiate() followed by SSL_do_handshake() sends a HelloRequest, but does not ensure that a handshake takes place. SSL_renegotiate_pending() is useful for checking if the client has followed the request.) [Bodo Moeller] *) New SSL option SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION. By default, clients may request session resumption even during renegotiation (if session ID contexts permit); with this option, session resumption is possible only in the first handshake. SSL_OP_ALL is now 0x00000FFFL instead of 0x000FFFFFL. This makes more bits available for options that should not be part of SSL_OP_ALL (such as SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add some demos for certificate and certificate request creation. [Steve Henson] *) Make maximum certificate chain size accepted from the peer application settable (SSL*_get/set_max_cert_list()), as proposed by "Douglas E. Engert" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add support for shared libraries for Unixware-7 (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and "openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This makes them more flexible to be built both as statically-linked ENGINEs and self-contained shared-libraries loadable via the "dynamic" ENGINE. Also, add stub code to each that makes building them as self-contained shared-libraries easier (see README.ENGINE). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a "dynamic" ENGINE that provides a mechanism for binding ENGINE implementations into applications that are completely implemented in self-contained shared-libraries. The "dynamic" ENGINE exposes control commands that can be used to configure what shared-library to load and to control aspects of the way it is handled. Also, made an update to the README.ENGINE file that brings its information up-to-date and provides some information and instructions on the "dynamic" ENGINE (ie. how to use it, how to build "dynamic"-loadable ENGINEs, etc). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to unload ranges of ERR strings with a new "ERR_unload_strings" function. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a copy() function to EVP_MD. [Ben Laurie] *) Make EVP_MD routines take a context pointer instead of just the md_data void pointer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add flags to EVP_MD and EVP_MD_CTX. EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the digest can only process a single chunk of data (typically because it is provided by a piece of hardware). EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the application is only going to provide a single chunk of data, and hence the framework needn't accumulate the data for oneshot drivers. [Ben Laurie] *) As with "ERR", make it possible to replace the underlying "ex_data" functions. This change also alters the storage and management of global ex_data state - it's now all inside ex_data.c and all "class" code (eg. RSA, BIO, SSL_CTX, etc) no longer stores its own STACKS and per-class index counters. The API functions that use this state have been changed to take a "class_index" rather than pointers to the class's local STACK and counter, and there is now an API function to dynamically create new classes. This centralisation allows us to (a) plug a lot of the thread-safety problems that existed, and (b) makes it possible to clean up all allocated state using "CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data()". W.r.t. (b) such data would previously have always leaked in application code and workarounds were in place to make the memory debugging turn a blind eye to it. Application code that doesn't use this new function will still leak as before, but their memory debugging output will announce it now rather than letting it slide. Besides the addition of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), another API change induced by the "ex_data" overhaul is that X509_STORE_CTX_init() now has a return value to indicate success or failure. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to replace the underlying "ERR" functions such that the global state (2 LHASH tables and 2 locks) is only used by the "default" implementation. This change also adds two functions to "get" and "set" the implementation prior to it being automatically set the first time any other ERR function takes place. Ie. an application can call "get", pass the return value to a module it has just loaded, and that module can call its own "set" function using that value. This means the module's "ERR" operations will use (and modify) the error state in the application and not in its own statically linked copy of OpenSSL code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Give DH, DSA, and RSA types their own "**_up_ref()" function to increment reference counts. This performs normal REF_PRINT/REF_CHECK macros on the operation, and provides a more encapsulated way for external code (crypto/evp/ and ssl/) to do this. Also changed the evp and ssl code to use these functions rather than manually incrementing the counts. Also rename "DSO_up()" function to more descriptive "DSO_up_ref()". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add EVP test program. [Ben Laurie] *) Add symmetric cipher support to ENGINE. Expect the API to change! [Ben Laurie] *) New CRL functions: X509_CRL_set_version(), X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(), X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(), X509_CRL_sort(), X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), and X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(). These allow a CRL to be built without having to access X509_CRL fields directly. Modify 'ca' application to use new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Move SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG out of the SSL_OP_ALL list of recommended bug workarounds. Rollback attack detection is a security feature. The problem will only arise on OpenSSL servers when TLSv1 is not available (sslv3_server_method() or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1). Software authors not wanting to support TLSv1 will have special reasons for their choice and can explicitly enable this option. [Bodo Moeller, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rationalise EVP so it can be extended: don't include a union of cipher/digest structures, add init/cleanup functions for EVP_MD_CTX (similar to those existing for EVP_CIPHER_CTX). Usage example: EVP_MD_CTX md; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md); /* new function call */ EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_sha1()); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, in, len); EVP_DigestFinal(&md, out, NULL); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md); /* new function call */ [Ben Laurie] *) Make DES key schedule conform to the usual scheme, as well as correcting its structure. This means that calls to DES functions now have to pass a pointer to a des_key_schedule instead of a plain des_key_schedule (which was actually always a pointer anyway): E.g., des_key_schedule ks; des_set_key_checked(..., &ks); des_ncbc_encrypt(..., &ks, ...); (Note that a later change renames 'des_...' into 'DES_...'.) [Ben Laurie] *) Initial reduction of linker bloat: the use of some functions, such as PEM causes large amounts of unused functions to be linked in due to poor organisation. For example pem_all.c contains every PEM function which has a knock on effect of linking in large amounts of (unused) ASN1 code. Grouping together similar functions and splitting unrelated functions prevents this. [Steve Henson] *) Cleanup of EVP macros. [Ben Laurie] *) Change historical references to {NID,SN,LN}_des_ede and ede3 to add the correct _ecb suffix. [Ben Laurie] *) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The revocation information is handled using the text based index use by the ca application. The responder can either handle requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server. [Steve Henson] *) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS. [Richard Levitte] *) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance: 1. Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using KRB5 AP_REQ message. [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ] 2. Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper. Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req, and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/. Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries. [Vern Staats , Jeffrey Altman via Richard Levitte] *) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key' values for each of the key sizes rather than having just parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Speed up EVP routines. Before: encrypt type 8 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes des-cbc 4408.85k 5560.51k 5778.46k 5862.20k 5825.16k des-cbc 4389.55k 5571.17k 5792.23k 5846.91k 5832.11k des-cbc 4394.32k 5575.92k 5807.44k 5848.37k 5841.30k decrypt des-cbc 3482.66k 5069.49k 5496.39k 5614.16k 5639.28k des-cbc 3480.74k 5068.76k 5510.34k 5609.87k 5635.52k des-cbc 3483.72k 5067.62k 5504.60k 5708.01k 5724.80k After: encrypt des-cbc 4660.16k 5650.19k 5807.19k 5827.13k 5783.32k decrypt des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k [Ben Laurie] *) Added the OS2-EMX target. ["Brian Havard" and Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite apps to use NCONF routines instead of the old CONF. New functions to support NCONF routines in extension code. New function CONF_set_nconf() to allow functions which take an NCONF to also handle the old LHASH structure: this means that the old CONF compatible routines can be retained (in particular wrt extensions) without having to duplicate the code. New function X509V3_add_ext_nconf_sk to add extensions to a stack. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms for inner control and with possibilities to have yes/no kind of prompts. [Richard Levitte] *) Change all calls to low level digest routines in the library and applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy(). [Verdon Walker , Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to control engines through control names but with arbitrary arguments instead of just a string. Change the key loaders to take a UI_METHOD instead of a callback function pointer. NOTE: this breaks binary compatibility with earlier versions of OpenSSL [engine]. Adapt the nCipher code for these new conditions and add a card insertion callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms to better support dialog box interfaces, application-defined prompts, the possibility to use defaults (for example default passwords from somewhere else) and interrupts/cancellations. [Richard Levitte] *) Tidy up PKCS#12 attribute handling. Add support for the CSP name attribute in PKCS#12 files, add new -CSP option to pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a memory leak in 'sk_dup()' in the case reallocation fails. (Also tidy up some unnecessarily weird code in 'sk_new()'). [Geoff, reported by Diego Tartara ] *) Change the key loading routines for ENGINEs to use the same kind callback (pem_password_cb) as all other routines that need this kind of callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Increase ENTROPY_NEEDED to 32 bytes, as Rijndael can operate with 256 bit (=32 byte) keys. Of course seeding with more entropy bytes than this minimum value is recommended. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) New random seeder for OpenVMS, using the system process statistics that are easily reachable. [Richard Levitte] *) Windows apparently can't transparently handle global variables defined in DLLs. Initialisations such as: const ASN1_ITEM *it = &ASN1_INTEGER_it; wont compile. This is used by the any applications that need to declare their own ASN1 modules. This was fixed by adding the option EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN to all Win32 platforms, although this isn't strictly needed for static libraries under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) New functions X509_PURPOSE_set() and X509_TRUST_set() to handle setting of purpose and trust fields. New X509_STORE trust and purpose functions and tidy up setting in other SSL functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add copies of X509_STORE_CTX fields and callbacks to X509_STORE structure. These are inherited by X509_STORE_CTX when it is initialised. This allows various defaults to be set in the X509_STORE structure (such as flags for CRL checking and custom purpose or trust settings) for functions which only use X509_STORE_CTX internally such as S/MIME. Modify X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() so it only sets purposes and trust settings if they are not set in X509_STORE. This allows X509_STORE purposes and trust (in S/MIME for example) to override any set by default. Add command line options for CRL checking to smime, s_client and s_server applications. [Steve Henson] *) Initial CRL based revocation checking. If the CRL checking flag(s) are set then the CRL is looked up in the X509_STORE structure and its validity and signature checked, then if the certificate is found in the CRL the verify fails with a revoked error. Various new CRL related callbacks added to X509_STORE_CTX structure. Command line options added to 'verify' application to support this. This needs some additional work, such as being able to handle multiple CRLs with different times, extension based lookup (rather than just by subject name) and ultimately more complete V2 CRL extension handling. [Steve Henson] *) Add a general user interface API (crypto/ui/). This is designed to replace things like des_read_password and friends (backward compatibility functions using this new API are provided). The purpose is to remove prompting functions from the DES code section as well as provide for prompting through dialog boxes in a window system and the like. [Richard Levitte] *) Add "ex_data" support to ENGINE so implementations can add state at a per-structure level rather than having to store it globally. [Geoff] *) Make it possible for ENGINE structures to be copied when retrieved by ENGINE_by_id() if the ENGINE specifies a new flag: ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY. This causes the "original" ENGINE structure to act like a template, analogous to the RSA vs. RSA_METHOD type of separation. Because of this operational state can be localised to each ENGINE structure, despite the fact they all share the same "methods". New ENGINE structures returned in this case have no functional references and the return value is the single structural reference. This matches the single structural reference returned by ENGINE_by_id() normally, when it is incremented on the pre-existing ENGINE structure. [Geoff] *) Fix ASN1 decoder when decoding type ANY and V_ASN1_OTHER: since this needs to match any other type at all we need to manually clear the tag cache. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to the "openssl engine" utility to include; - verbosity levels ('-v', '-vv', and '-vvv') that provide information about an ENGINE's available control commands. - executing control commands from command line arguments using the '-pre' and '-post' switches. '-post' is only used if '-t' is specified and the ENGINE is successfully initialised. The syntax for the individual commands are colon-separated, for example; openssl engine chil -pre FORK_CHECK:0 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/test.so [Geoff] *) New dynamic control command support for ENGINEs. ENGINEs can now declare their own commands (numbers), names (strings), descriptions, and input types for run-time discovery by calling applications. A subset of these commands are implicitly classed as "executable" depending on their input type, and only these can be invoked through the new string-based API function ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). (Eg. this can be based on user input, config files, etc). The distinction is that "executable" commands cannot return anything other than a boolean result and can only support numeric or string input, whereas some discoverable commands may only be for direct use through ENGINE_ctrl(), eg. supporting the exchange of binary data, function pointers, or other custom uses. The "executable" commands are to support parameterisations of ENGINE behaviour that can be unambiguously defined by ENGINEs and used consistently across any OpenSSL-based application. Commands have been added to all the existing hardware-supporting ENGINEs, noticeably "SO_PATH" to allow control over shared-library paths without source code alterations. [Geoff] *) Changed all ENGINE implementations to dynamically allocate their ENGINEs rather than declaring them statically. Apart from this being necessary with the removal of the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED distinction, this also allows the implementations to compile without using the internal engine_int.h header. [Geoff] *) Minor adjustment to "rand" code. RAND_get_rand_method() now returns a 'const' value. Any code that should be able to modify a RAND_METHOD should already have non-const pointers to it (ie. they should only modify their own ones). [Geoff] *) Made a variety of little tweaks to the ENGINE code. - "atalla" and "ubsec" string definitions were moved from header files to C code. "nuron" string definitions were placed in variables rather than hard-coded - allowing parameterisation of these values later on via ctrl() commands. - Removed unused "#if 0"'d code. - Fixed engine list iteration code so it uses ENGINE_free() to release structural references. - Constified the RAND_METHOD element of ENGINE structures. - Constified various get/set functions as appropriate and added missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state). - Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set value. Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code. - Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for flags from engine_int.h to engine.h. - Changed prototypes for ENGINE handler functions (init(), finish(), ctrl(), key-load functions, etc) to take an (ENGINE*) parameter. [Geoff] *) Implement binary inversion algorithm for BN_mod_inverse in addition to the algorithm using long division. The binary algorithm can be used only if the modulus is odd. On 32-bit systems, it is faster only for relatively small moduli (roughly 20-30% for 128-bit moduli, roughly 5-15% for 256-bit moduli), so we use it only for moduli up to 450 bits. In 64-bit environments, the binary algorithm appears to be advantageous for much longer moduli; here we use it for moduli up to 2048 bits. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite CHOICE field setting in ASN1_item_ex_d2i(). The old code could not support the combine flag in choice fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add a 'copy_extensions' option to the 'ca' utility. This copies extensions from a certificate request to the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple 'certopt' and 'nameopt' options to be separated by commas. Add 'namopt' and 'certopt' options to the 'ca' config file: this allows the display of the certificate about to be signed to be customised, to allow certain fields to be included or excluded and extension details. The old system didn't display multicharacter strings properly, omitted fields not in the policy and couldn't display additional details such as extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Function EC_POINTs_mul for multiple scalar multiplication of an arbitrary number of elliptic curve points \sum scalars[i]*points[i], optionally including the generator defined for the EC_GROUP: scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i]. EC_POINT_mul is a simple wrapper function for the typical case that the point list has just one item (besides the optional generator). [Bodo Moeller] *) First EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p): EC_GFp_simple_method() uses the basic BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_sqr operations and provides various method functions that can also operate with faster implementations of modular arithmetic. EC_GFp_mont_method() reuses most functions that are part of EC_GFp_simple_method, but uses Montgomery arithmetic. [Bodo Moeller; point addition and point doubling implementation directly derived from source code provided by Lenka Fibikova ] *) Framework for elliptic curves (crypto/ec/ec.h, crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h, crypto/ec/ec_lib.c): Curves are EC_GROUP objects (with an optional group generator) based on EC_METHODs that are built into the library. Points are EC_POINT objects based on EC_GROUP objects. Most of the framework would be able to handle curves over arbitrary finite fields, but as there are no obvious types for fields other than GF(p), some functions are limited to that for now. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the -HTTP option to s_server. It is similar to -WWW, but requires that the file contains a complete HTTP response. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ec directory to mkdef.pl and mkfiles.pl. In mkdef.pl change the def and num file printf format specifier from "%-40sXXX" to "%-39s XXX". The latter will always guarantee a space after the field while the former will cause them to run together if the field is 40 of more characters long. [Steve Henson] *) Constify the cipher and digest 'method' functions and structures and modify related functions to take constant EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER pointers. [Steve Henson] *) Hide BN_CTX structure details in bn_lcl.h instead of publishing them in . Also further increase BN_CTX_NUM to 32. [Bodo Moeller] *) Modify EVP_Digest*() routines so they now return values. Although the internal software routines can never fail additional hardware versions might. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up crypto/err/err.h and change some error codes to avoid conflicts: Previously ERR_R_FATAL was too small and coincided with ERR_LIB_PKCS7 (= ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB); it is now 64 instead of 32. ASN1 error codes ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR ... ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS were 4 .. 9, conflicting with ERR_LIB_RSA (= ERR_R_RSA_LIB) ... ERR_LIB_PEM (= ERR_R_PEM_LIB). They are now 58 .. 63 (i.e., just below ERR_R_FATAL). Add new error code 'ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't overuse locks in crypto/err/err.c: For data retrieval, CRYPTO_r_lock suffices. [Bodo Moeller] *) New option '-subj arg' for 'openssl req' and 'openssl ca'. This sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the subject name in a given request. Formats that can be parsed are 'CN=Some Name, OU=myOU, C=IT' and 'CN=Some Name/OU=myOU/C=IT'. Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) Introduce the possibility to access global variables through functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting global variables in shared libraries. To enable this functionality, one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro "OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter is normally done by Configure or something similar). To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL in the source file (foo.c) like this: OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1; OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar); To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this: OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo); #define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo) OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar); #define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar) The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the header file everywhere where the defined globals are used. The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bit different. The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites). [Richard Levitte] *) In BN_div() keep a copy of the sign of 'num' before writing the result to 'rm' because if rm==num the value will be overwritten and produce the wrong result if 'num' is negative: this caused problems with BN_mod() and BN_nnmod(). [Steve Henson] *) Function OCSP_request_verify(). This checks the signature on an OCSP request and verifies the signer certificate. The signer certificate is just checked for a generic purpose and OCSP request trust settings. [Steve Henson] *) Add OCSP_check_validity() function to check the validity of OCSP responses. OCSP responses are prepared in real time and may only be a few seconds old. Simply checking that the current time lies between thisUpdate and nextUpdate max reject otherwise valid responses caused by either OCSP responder or client clock inaccuracy. Instead we allow thisUpdate and nextUpdate to fall within a certain period of the current time. The age of the response can also optionally be checked. Two new options -validity_period and -status_age added to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) If signature or public key algorithm is unrecognized print out its OID rather that just UNKNOWN. [Steve Henson] *) Change OCSP_cert_to_id() to tolerate a NULL subject certificate and OCSP_cert_id_new() a NULL serialNumber. This allows a partial certificate ID to be generated from the issuer certificate alone which can then be passed to OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(). [Steve Henson] *) New compilation option ASN1_ITEM_FUNCTIONS. This causes the new ASN1 modules to export functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers instead of the ASN1_ITEM structures themselves. This adds several new macros which allow the underlying ASN1 function/structure to be accessed transparently. As a result code should not use ASN1_ITEM references directly (such as &X509_it) but instead use the relevant macros (such as ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)). This option is to allow use of the new ASN1 code on platforms where exporting structures is problematical (for example in shared libraries) but exporting functions returning pointers to structures is not. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for overriding the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs. These callbacks can be registered either in an SSL_CTX or per SSL. The purpose of this is to allow applications to control, if they wish, the arbitrary values chosen for use as session IDs, particularly as it can be useful for session caching in multiple-server environments. A command-line switch for testing this (and any client code that wishes to use such a feature) has been added to "s_server". [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Modify mkdef.pl to recognise and parse preprocessor conditionals of the form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and '#if !defined(...) && !defined(...) && ...'. This also avoids the growing number of special cases it was previously handling. [Richard Levitte] *) Make all configuration macros available for application by making sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with opensslconf.h. Additionally, it is now possible to define configuration/platform- specific names (called "system identities"). In the C code, these are prefixed with "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_". e_os2.h will create another macro with the name beginning with "OPENSSL_SYS_", which is determined from "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_*" or compiler-specific macros depending on what is available. [Richard Levitte] *) New option -set_serial to 'req' and 'x509' this allows the serial number to use to be specified on the command line. Previously self signed certificates were hard coded with serial number 0 and the CA options of 'x509' had to use a serial number in a file which was auto incremented. [Steve Henson] *) New options to 'ca' utility to support V2 CRL entry extensions. Currently CRL reason, invalidity date and hold instruction are supported. Add new CRL extensions to V3 code and some new objects. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() this is used to disable standard block padding (aka PKCS#5 padding) in the EVP API, which was previously mandatory. This means that the data is not padded in any way and so the total length much be a multiple of the block size, otherwise an error occurs. [Steve Henson] *) Initial (incomplete) OCSP SSL support. [Steve Henson] *) New function OCSP_parse_url(). This splits up a URL into its host, port and path components: primarily to parse OCSP URLs. New -url option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) New nonce behavior. The return value of OCSP_check_nonce() now reflects the various checks performed. Applications can decide whether to tolerate certain situations such as an absent nonce in a response when one was present in a request: the ocsp application just prints out a warning. New function OCSP_add1_basic_nonce() this is to allow responders to include a nonce in a response even if the request is nonce-less. [Steve Henson] *) Disable stdin buffering in load_cert (apps/apps.c) so that no certs are skipped when using openssl x509 multiple times on a single input file, e.g. "(openssl x509 -out cert1; openssl x509 -out cert2) ] *) New OCSP verify flag OCSP_TRUSTOTHER. When set the "other" certificates passed by the function are trusted implicitly. If any of them signed the response then it is assumed to be valid and is not verified. [Steve Henson] *) In PKCS7_set_type() initialise content_type in PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT to data. This was previously part of the PKCS7 ASN1 code. This was causing problems with OpenSSL created PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 structures. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Add CRYPTO_push_info() and CRYPTO_pop_info() calls to new ASN1 routines: without these tracing memory leaks is very painful. Fix leaks in PKCS12 and PKCS7 routines. [Steve Henson] *) Make X509_time_adj() cope with the new behaviour of ASN1_TIME_new(). Previously it initialised the 'type' argument to V_ASN1_UTCTIME which effectively meant GeneralizedTime would never be used. Now it is initialised to -1 but X509_time_adj() now has to check the value and use ASN1_TIME_set() if the value is not V_ASN1_UTCTIME or V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, without this it always uses GeneralizedTime. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Fixes to BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER when bn is zero. This would previously result in a zero length in the ASN1_INTEGER structure which was not consistent with the structure when d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() was used and would cause ASN1_INTEGER_cmp() to fail. Enhance s2i_ASN1_INTEGER() to cope with hex and negative integers. Fix bug in i2a_ASN1_INTEGER() where it did not print out a minus for negative ASN1_INTEGER. [Steve Henson] *) Add summary printout to ocsp utility. The various functions which convert status values to strings have been renamed to: OCSP_response_status_str(), OCSP_cert_status_str() and OCSP_crl_reason_str() and are no longer static. New options to verify nonce values and to disable verification. OCSP response printout format cleaned up. [Steve Henson] *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response. [Steve Henson] *) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify() and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and to obtain the certificate chain. Then additional checks will be performed on the chain. Currently the root CA is checked to see if it is explicitly trusted for OCSP signing. This is used to set a root CA as a global signing root: that is any certificate that chains to that CA is an acceptable OCSP signing certificate. [Steve Henson] *) New '-extfile ...' option to 'openssl ca' for reading X.509v3 extensions from a separate configuration file. As when reading extensions from the main configuration file, the '-extensions ...' option may be used for specifying the section to use. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet: still needs to check the OCSP response validity. [Steve Henson] *) New subcommands for 'openssl ca': 'openssl ca -status ' prints the status of the cert with the given serial number (according to the index file). 'openssl ca -updatedb' updates the expiry status of certificates in the index file. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New '-newreq-nodes' command option to CA.pl. This is like '-newreq', but calls 'openssl req' with the '-nodes' option so that the resulting key is not encrypted. [Damien Miller ] *) New configuration for the GNU Hurd. [Jonathan Bartlett via Richard Levitte] *) Initial code to implement OCSP basic response verify. This is currently incomplete. Currently just finds the signer's certificate and verifies the signature on the response. [Steve Henson] *) New SSLeay_version code SSLEAY_DIR to determine the compiled-in value of OPENSSLDIR. This is available via the new '-d' option to 'openssl version', and is also included in 'openssl version -a'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allowing defining memory allocation callbacks that will be given file name and line number information in additional arguments (a const char* and an int). The basic functionality remains, as well as the original possibility to just replace malloc(), realloc() and free() by functions that do not know about these additional arguments. To register and find out the current settings for extended allocation functions, the following functions are provided: CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions These work the same way as CRYPTO_set_mem_functions and friends. CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_functions now writes 0 where such an extended allocation function is enabled. Similarly, CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_ex_functions writes 0 where a conventional allocation function is enabled. [Richard Levitte, Bodo Moeller] *) Finish off removing the remaining LHASH function pointer casts. There should no longer be any prototype-casting required when using the LHASH abstraction, and any casts that remain are "bugs". See the callback types and macros at the head of lhash.h for details (and "OBJ_cleanup" in crypto/objects/obj_dat.c as an example). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add automatic query of EGD sockets in RAND_poll() for the unix variant. If /dev/[u]random devices are not available or do not return enough entropy, EGD style sockets (served by EGD or PRNGD) will automatically be queried. The locations /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool, and /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, quering stops when enough entropy was collected without querying more sockets. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the Unix RAND_poll() variant to be able to poll several random devices, as specified by DEVRANDOM, until a sufficient amount of data has been collected. We spend at most 10 ms on each file (select timeout) and read in non-blocking mode. DEVRANDOM now defaults to the list "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/srandom" (previously it was just the string "/dev/urandom"), so on typical platforms the 10 ms delay will never occur. Also separate out the Unix variant to its own file, rand_unix.c. For VMS, there's a currently-empty rand_vms.c. [Richard Levitte] *) Move OCSP client related routines to ocsp_cl.c. These provide utility functions which an application needing to issue a request to an OCSP responder and analyse the response will typically need: as opposed to those which an OCSP responder itself would need which will be added later. OCSP_request_sign() signs an OCSP request with an API similar to PKCS7_sign(). OCSP_response_status() returns status of OCSP response. OCSP_response_get1_basic() extracts basic response from response. OCSP_resp_find_status(): finds and extracts status information from an OCSP_CERTID structure (which will be created when the request structure is built). These are built from lower level functions which work on OCSP_SINGLERESP structures but wont normally be used unless the application wishes to examine extensions in the OCSP response for example. Replace nonce routines with a pair of functions. OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce value and optionally generates a random value. OCSP_check_nonce() checks the validity of the nonce in an OCSP response. [Steve Henson] *) Change function OCSP_request_add() to OCSP_request_add0_id(). This doesn't copy the supplied OCSP_CERTID and avoids the need to free up the newly created id. Change return type to OCSP_ONEREQ to return the internal OCSP_ONEREQ structure. This can then be used to add extensions to the request. Deleted OCSP_request_new(), since most of its functionality is now in OCSP_REQUEST_new() (and the case insensitive name clash) apart from the ability to set the request name which will be added elsewhere. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP API. Remove obsolete extensions argument from various functions. Extensions are now handled using the new OCSP extension code. New simple OCSP HTTP function which can be used to send requests and parse the response. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code to work with new ASN1. Two new ASN1_ITEM structures help with sign and verify. PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN uses the special reorder version of SET OF to sort the attributes and reorder them to match the encoded order. This resolves a long standing problem: a verify on a PKCS7 structure just after signing it used to fail because the attribute order did not match the encoded order. PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY does not reorder the attributes: it uses the received order. This is necessary to tolerate some broken software that does not order SET OF. This is handled by encoding as a SEQUENCE OF but using implicit tagging (with UNIVERSAL class) to produce the required SET OF. [Steve Henson] *) Have mk1mf.pl generate the macros OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO and OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL and use them appropriately in the header files to get correct declarations of the ASN.1 item variables. [Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite of PKCS#12 code to use new ASN1 functionality. Replace many PKCS#12 macros with real functions. Fix two unrelated ASN1 bugs: asn1_check_tlen() would sometimes attempt to use 'ctx' when it was NULL and ASN1_TYPE was not dereferenced properly in asn1_ex_c2i(). New ASN1 macro: DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM() which just declares the relevant ASN1_ITEM and no wrapper functions. [Steve Henson] *) New functions or ASN1_item_d2i_fp() and ASN1_item_d2i_bio(). These replace the old function pointer based I/O routines. Change most of the *_d2i_bio() and *_d2i_fp() functions to use these. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor lines, recognice more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised. [Richard Levitte] *) New ASN1 functions to handle dup, sign, verify, digest, pack and unpack operations in terms of ASN1_ITEM. Modify existing wrappers to use new functions. Add NO_ASN1_OLD which can be set to remove some old style ASN1 functions: this can be used to determine if old code will still work when these eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) New extension functions for OCSP structures, these follow the same conventions as certificates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for certifcates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when an extension cannot be parsed. Correct a typo in the OCSP_SERVICELOC extension. Tidy up print OCSP format. [Steve Henson] *) Make mkdef.pl parse some of the ASN1 macros and add apropriate entries for variables. [Steve Henson] *) Add functionality to apps/openssl.c for detecting locking problems: As the program is single-threaded, all we have to do is register a locking callback using an array for storing which locks are currently held by the program. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use a lock around the call to CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() in SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_idx(), which is used in ssl_verify_cert_chain() and thus can be called at any time during TLS/SSL handshakes so that thread-safety is essential. Unfortunately, the ex_data design is not at all suited for multi-threaded use, so it probably should be abolished. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added Broadcom "ubsec" ENGINE to OpenSSL. [Broadcom, tweaked and integrated by Geoff Thorpe] *) Move common extension printing code to new function X509V3_print_extensions(). Reorganise OCSP print routines and implement some needed OCSP ASN1 functions. Add OCSP extensions. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_signature_print() to remove duplication in some print routines. [Steve Henson] *) Add a special meaning when SET OF and SEQUENCE OF flags are both set (this was treated exactly the same as SET OF previously). This is used to reorder the STACK representing the structure to match the encoding. This will be used to get round a problem where a PKCS7 structure which was signed could not be verified because the STACK order did not reflect the encoded order. [Steve Henson] *) Reimplement the OCSP ASN1 module using the new code. [Steve Henson] *) Update the X509V3 code to permit the use of an ASN1_ITEM structure for its ASN1 operations. The old style function pointers still exist for now but they will eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) Merge in replacement ASN1 code from the ASN1 branch. This almost completely replaces the old ASN1 functionality with a table driven encoder and decoder which interprets an ASN1_ITEM structure describing the ASN1 module. Compatibility with the existing ASN1 API (i2d,d2i) is largely maintained. Almost all of the old asn1_mac.h macro based ASN1 has also been converted to the new form. [Steve Henson] *) Change BN_mod_exp_recp so that negative moduli are tolerated (the sign is ignored). Similarly, ignore the sign in BN_MONT_CTX_set so that BN_mod_exp_mont and BN_mod_exp_mont_word work for negative moduli. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_uadd and BN_usub: Always return non-negative results instead of not touching the result's sign bit. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_div bugfix: If the result is 0, the sign (res->neg) must not be set. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changed the LHASH code to use prototypes for callbacks, and created macros to declare and implement thin (optionally static) functions that provide type-safety and avoid function pointer casting for the type-specific callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added Kerberos Cipher Suites to be used with TLS, as written in RFC 2712. [Veers Staats , Jeffrey Altman , via Richard Levitte] *) Reformat the FAQ so the different questions and answers can be divided in sections depending on the subject. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the zlib compression code load ZLIB.DLL dynamically under Windows. [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_sqrt for computing square roots modulo a prime (using the probabilistic Tonelli-Shanks algorithm unless p == 3 (mod 4) or p == 5 (mod 8), which are cases that can be handled deterministically). [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] *) Make BN_mod_inverse faster by explicitly handling small quotients in the Euclid loop. (Speed gain about 20% for small moduli [256 or 512 bits], about 30% for larger ones [1024 or 2048 bits].) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_kronecker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_gcd so that it works on negative inputs; the result is positive unless both parameters are zero. Previously something reasonably close to an infinite loop was possible because numbers could be growing instead of shrinking in the implementation of Euclid's algorithm. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_is_word() and BN_is_one() macros to take into account the sign of the number in question. Fix BN_is_word(a,w) to work correctly for w == 0. The old BN_is_word(a,w) macro is now called BN_abs_is_word(a,w) because its test if the absolute value of 'a' equals 'w'. Note that BN_abs_is_word does *not* handle w == 0 reliably; it exists mostly for use in the implementations of BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), and BN_is_word(). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_swap. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use BN_nnmod instead of BN_mod in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c so that the exponentiation functions are more likely to produce reasonable results on negative inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_mul so that the result is always non-negative. Previously, it could be negative if one of the factors was negative; I don't think anyone really wanted that behaviour. [Bodo Moeller] *) Move BN_mod_... functions into new file crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (except for exponentiation, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c, and BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_recp.c) and add new functions: BN_nnmod BN_mod_sqr BN_mod_add BN_mod_add_quick BN_mod_sub BN_mod_sub_quick BN_mod_lshift1 BN_mod_lshift1_quick BN_mod_lshift BN_mod_lshift_quick These functions always generate non-negative results. BN_nnmod otherwise is like BN_mod (if BN_mod computes a remainder r such that |m| < r < 0, BN_nnmod will output rem + |m| instead). BN_mod_XXX_quick(r, a, [b,] m) generates the same result as BN_mod_XXX(r, a, [b,] m, ctx), but requires that a [and b] be reduced modulo m. [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] #if 0 The following entry accidentily appeared in the CHANGES file distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7. The modifications described in it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7. *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul() required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(), bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with differing sizes. [Richard Levitte] #endif *) In 'openssl passwd', verify passwords read from the terminal unless the '-salt' option is used (which usually means that verification would just waste user's time since the resulting hash is going to be compared with some given password hash) or the new '-noverify' option is used. This is an incompatible change, but it does not affect non-interactive use of 'openssl passwd' (passwords on the command line, '-stdin' option, '-in ...' option) and thus should not cause any problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove all references to RSAref, since there's no more need for it. [Richard Levitte] *) Make DSO load along a path given through an environment variable (SHLIB_PATH) with shl_load(). [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the ENGINE code as a result of BIGNUM constification. Also constify the RSA code and most things related to it. In a few places, most notable in the depth of the ASN.1 code, ugly casts back to non-const were required (to be solved at a later time) [Richard Levitte] *) Make it so the openssl application has all engines loaded by default. [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the BIGNUM routines a little more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the following functions: ENGINE_load_cswift() ENGINE_load_chil() ENGINE_load_atalla() ENGINE_load_nuron() ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() That way, an application can itself choose if external engines that are built-in in OpenSSL shall ever be used or not. The benefit is that applications won't have to be linked with libdl or other dso libraries unless it's really needed. Changed 'openssl engine' to load all engines on demand. Changed the engine header files to avoid the duplication of some declarations (they differed!). [Richard Levitte] *) 'openssl engine' can now list capabilities. [Richard Levitte] *) Better error reporting in 'openssl engine'. [Richard Levitte] *) Never call load_dh_param(NULL) in s_server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add engine application. It can currently list engines by name and identity, and test if they are actually available. [Richard Levitte] *) Improve RPM specification file by forcing symbolic linking and making sure the installed documentation is also owned by root.root. [Damien Miller ] *) Give the OpenSSL applications more possibilities to make use of keys (public as well as private) handled by engines. [Richard Levitte] *) Add OCSP code that comes from CertCo. [Richard Levitte] *) Add VMS support for the Rijndael code. [Richard Levitte] *) Added untested support for Nuron crypto accelerator. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for external cryptographic devices. This code was previously distributed separately as the "engine" branch. [Geoff Thorpe, Richard Levitte] *) Rework the filename-translation in the DSO code. It is now possible to have far greater control over how a "name" is turned into a filename depending on the operating environment and any oddities about the different shared library filenames on each system. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support threads on FreeBSD-elf in Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for SHA1 assembly problem with MASM: it produces warnings about corrupt line number information when assembling with debugging information. This is caused by the overlapping of two sections. [Bernd Matthes , Steve Henson] *) NCONF changes. NCONF_get_number() has no error checking at all. As a replacement, NCONF_get_number_e() is defined (_e for "error checking") and is promoted strongly. The old NCONF_get_number is kept around for binary backward compatibility. Make it possible for methods to load from something other than a BIO, by providing a function pointer that is given a name instead of a BIO. For example, this could be used to load configuration data from an LDAP server. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for non blocking accept BIOs. Added new I/O special reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT to cover this case. Previously use of accept BIOs with non blocking I/O was not possible because no retry code was implemented. Also added new SSL code SSL_WANT_ACCEPT to cover this case. [Steve Henson] *) Added the beginnings of Rijndael support. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for bug in DirectoryString mask setting. Add support for X509_NAME_print_ex() in 'req' and X509_print_ex() function to allow certificate printing to more controllable, additional 'certopt' option to 'x509' to allow new printing options to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003] *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite: Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851) [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002] *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of memory from it's contents. This is done with a counter that will place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching, because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading from the external cache. This problem was masked, when SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set. (Found by Steve Haslam .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33. [Zeev Lieber ] *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling EVP_cleanup(). [Richard Levitte] *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not being properly terminated. [Richard Levitte] *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String. [stefank@valicert.com via Richard Levitte] *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural change. [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El] *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix initialization code race conditions in SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_client_method(), SSLv2_server_method(), SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_client_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_client_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(), ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(). [Patrick McCormick , Bodo Moeller] *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik (see [openssl.org #212]). [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6f and 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002] *) [In 0.9.6g-engine release:] Fix crypto/engine/vendor_defns/cswift.h for WIN32 (use '_stdcall'). [Lynn Gazis ] Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002] *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer , Alon Kantor (and others), Steve Henson] *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the assertions could call abort()). [Arne Ansper , Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly by the selection routines (PR #130). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix EVP_dsa_sha macro. [Nils Larsch] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659) [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not encoded as NULL) with id-dsa-with-sha1. [Nils Larsch ; problem pointed out by Bodo Moeller] *) Check various X509_...() return values in apps/req.c. [Nils Larsch ] *) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines: an end-of-file condition would erronously be flagged, when the CRLF was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov and Nedelcho Stanev. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello(). [Bodo Moeller] *) TLS/SSL library bugfix: use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently to prevent ssl3_read_internal() from incorrectly assuming that ssl3_read_bytes() found application data while handshake processing was enabled when in fact s->s3->in_read_app_data was merely automatically cleared during the initial handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix object definitions for Private and Enterprise: they were not recognized in their shortname (=lowercase) representation. Extend obj_dat.pl to issue an error when using undefined keywords instead of silently ignoring the problem (Svenning Sorensen ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix DH_generate_parameters() so that it works for 'non-standard' generators, i.e. generators other than 2 and 5. (Previously, the code did not properly initialise the 'add' and 'rem' values to BN_generate_prime().) In the new general case, we do not insist that 'generator' is actually a primitive root: This requirement is rather pointless; a generator of the order-q subgroup is just as good, if not better. [Bodo Moeller] *) Map new X509 verification errors to alerts. Discovered and submitted by Tom Wu . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending() (ssl/s3_lib.c) to prevent SSL_pending() from returning non-zero before the data has been completely received when using non-blocking I/O. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by John Hughes] *) Some of the ciphers missed the strength entry (SSL_LOW etc). [Ben Laurie, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix bug in SSL_clear(): bad sessions were not removed (found by Yoram Zahavi ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add information about CygWin 1.3 and on, and preserve proper configuration for the versions before that. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Make removal from session cache (SSL_CTX_remove_session()) more robust: check whether we deal with a copy of a session and do not delete from the cache in this case. Problem reported by "Izhar Shoshani Levi" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Do not store session data into the internal session cache, if it is never intended to be looked up (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP flag is set). Proposed by Aslam . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Have ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() really clear a bit when the requested value is 0. [Richard Levitte] *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:] Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x. [Neale Ferguson via Richard Levitte] *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been received. As the flag value will be lost between multiple invocations of ssl3_accept when using non-blocking I/O, the function may not be aware that a handshake has actually taken place, thus preventing a new session from being added to the session cache. To avoid this problem, we now set s->new_session to 2 instead of using a local variable. [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: Return -1 from ssl3_get_server_done (ssl3/s3_clnt.c) if the SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH error is detected. [Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) New 'shared_ldflag' column in Configure platform table. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix EVP_CIPHER_mode macro. ["Dan S. Camper" ] *) Fix ssl3_read_bytes (ssl/s3_pkt.c): To ignore messages of unknown type, we must throw them away by setting rr->length to 0. [D P Chang ] Changes between 0.9.6b and 0.9.6c [21 dec 2001] *) Fix BN_rand_range bug pointed out by Dominikus Scherkl . (The previous implementation worked incorrectly for those cases where range = 10..._2 and 3*range is two bits longer than range.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Only add signing time to PKCS7 structures if it is not already present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix crypto/objects/objects.h: "ld-ce" should be "id-ce", OBJ_ld_ce should be OBJ_id_ce. Also some ip-pda OIDs in crypto/objects/objects.txt were incorrect (cf. RFC 3039). [Matt Cooper, Frederic Giudicelli, Bodo Moeller] *) Release CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK when CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid() returns early because it has nothing to do. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Fix mutex callback return values in crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver technology. (Use engine 'keyclient') [Cryptographic Appliances and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a configuration entry for OS/390 Unix. The C compiler 'c89' is called via tools/c89.sh because arguments have to be rearranged (all '-L' options must appear before the first object modules). [Richard Shapiro ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Broadcom crypto accelerator cards, backported from 0.9.7. [Broadcom, Nalin Dahyabhai , Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') [Baltimore Technologies and Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') [AEP Inc. and Mark Cox] *) Add a configuration entry for gcc on UnixWare. [Gary Benson ] *) Change ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s2_srvr.c so that received handshake messages are stored in a single piece (fixed-length part and variable-length part combined) and fix various bugs found on the way. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable caching in BIO_gethostbyname(), directly use gethostbyname() instead. BIO_gethostbyname() does not know what timeouts are appropriate, so entries would stay in cache even when they have become invalid. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Rich Salz *) Change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) behaviour when faced with a pathologically small ClientHello fragment that does not contain client_version: Instead of aborting with an error, simply choose the highest available protocol version (i.e., TLS 1.0 unless it is disabled). In practice, ClientHello messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear() never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within one of the SSL handshake functions. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Niko Baric] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert (sent using the client's version number) if client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use. Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the client will at least see that alert. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) to handle message fragmentation correctly. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid infinite loop in ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) if a client receives HelloRequest while in a handshake. [Bodo Moeller; bug noticed by Andy Schneider ] *) Bugfix in ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c): Case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C should end in 'break', not 'goto end' which circuments various cleanups done in state SSL_ST_OK. But session related stuff must be disabled for SSL_ST_OK in the case that we just sent a HelloRequest. Also avoid some overhead by not calling ssl_init_wbio_buffer() before just sending a HelloRequest. [Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla ] *) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC verification error occured. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information may leak via logfiles.) Similar changes are not required for the SSL 2.0 implementation because the number of padding bytes is sent in clear for SSL 2.0, and the extra bytes are just ignored. However ssl/s2_pkt.c failed to verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in the legal range. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OpenUNIX-8 support including shared libraries (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid 'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf. James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_sqr() bug fix. [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis ] *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses, so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand() followed by modular reduction. [Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young ] *) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range() equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand(). [Bodo Moeller] *) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB). This function was broken, as the check for a new client hello message to handle SGC did not allow these large messages. (Tracked down by "Douglas E. Engert" .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add alert descriptions for TLSv1 to SSL_alert_desc_string[_long](). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix buggy behaviour of BIO_get_num_renegotiates() and BIO_ctrl() for BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE ("Stephen Hinton" ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rework the configuration and shared library support for Tru64 Unix. The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions of the OS. The shared library support part includes a variant that uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected automatically. [Tim Mooney via Richard Levitte] *) In ssl3_get_key_exchange (ssl/s3_clnt.c), call ssl3_get_message() with the same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request(). Otherwise, if no ServerKeyExchange message occurs, CertificateRequest messages might inadvertently be reject as too long. [Petr Lampa ] *) Enhanced support for IA-64 Unix platforms (well, Linux and HP-UX). [Andy Polyakov] *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced to allow the necessary settings. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) In OpenSSL 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b, crypto/dh/dh_key.c ignored dh->length and always used BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p). BN_rand_range() is not necessary for Diffie-Hellman, and this specific range makes Diffie-Hellman unnecessarily inefficient if dh->length (recommended exponent length) is much smaller than the length of dh->p. We could use BN_rand_range() if the order of the subgroup was stored in the DH structure, but we only have dh->length. So switch back to BN_rand(priv_key, l, ...) where 'l' is dh->length if this is defined, or BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1 otherwise. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RSA_eay_public_encrypt RSA_eay_private_decrypt RSA_eay_private_encrypt (signing) RSA_eay_public_decrypt (signature verification) (default implementations for RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt), always reject numbers >= n. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'. This is necessary on systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long' variable) is not atomic. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID *before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag. The previous code had a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID. [Travis Vitek ] *) Add support for shared libraries under Irix. [Albert Chin-A-Young ] *) Add configuration option to build on Linux on both big-endian and little-endian MIPS. [Ralf Baechle ] *) Add the possibility to create shared libraries on HP-UX. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen : PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s. [Andy Polyakov] *) When only the key is given to "enc", the IV is undefined. Print out an error message in this case. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Handle special case when X509_NAME is empty in X509 printing routines. [Steve Henson] *) In dsa_do_verify (crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c), verify that r and s are positive and less than q. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't change *pointer in CRYPTO_add_lock() is add_lock_callback is used: it isn't thread safe and the add_lock_callback should handle that itself. [Paul Rose ] *) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix OAEP check. [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096 (previously it was 1024). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings unless some valid trust or reject settings are present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the DSA routines if parameters are absent. [Steve Henson] *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd" in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set. RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case. This has caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME. Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set. For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require environment variables. *) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND. This is not strictly necessary, but avoids having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, replace 'add_do_not_lock' flag by a combination of a flag and a thread ID variable. Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change bctest again: '-x' expressions are not available in all versions of 'test'. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] *) Fix a couple of memory leaks in PKCS7_dataDecode() [Steve Henson, reported by Heyun Zheng ] *) Change Configure and Makefiles to provide EXE_EXT, which will contain the default extension for executables, if any. Also, make the perl scripts that use symlink() to test if it really exists and use "cp" if it doesn't. All this made OpenSSL compilable and installable in CygWin. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for asn1_GetSequence() for indefinite length constructed data. If SEQUENCE is length is indefinite just set c->slen to the total amount of data available. [Steve Henson, reported by shige@FreeBSD.org] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Change bctest to avoid here-documents inside command substitution (workaround for FreeBSD /bin/sh bug). For compatibility with Ultrix, avoid shell functions (introduced in the bctest version that searches along $PATH). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Check the result of RSA-CRT (see D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton: On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic Computations, J. Cryptology 14 (2001) 2, 101-119, http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz). [Ulf Moeller] *) MIPS assembler BIGNUM division bug fix. [Andy Polyakov] *) Disabled incorrect Alpha assembler code. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix PKCS#7 decode routines so they correctly update the length after reading an EOC for the EXPLICIT tag. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old (but broken) behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print it when found. [Tim Rice via Richard Levitte] *) Fix memory leaks in err.c: free err_data string if necessary; don't write to the wrong index in ERR_set_error_data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Implement ssl23_peek (analogous to ssl23_read), which previously did not exist. [Bodo Moeller] *) Replace rdtsc with _emit statements for VC++ version 5. [Jeremy Cooper ] *) Make it possible to reuse SSLv2 sessions. [Richard Levitte] *) In copy_email() check for >= 0 as a return value for X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() since 0 is a valid index. [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala ] *) Avoid coredump with unsupported or invalid public keys by checking if X509_get_pubkey() fails in PKCS7_verify(). Fix memory leak when PKCS7_verify() fails with non detached data. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Avoid false positives in memory leak detection code (crypto/mem_dbg.c) due to incorrect handling of multi-threading: 1. Fix timing glitch in the MemCheck_off() portion of CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(). 2. Fix logical glitch in is_MemCheck_on() aka CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on(). 3. Count how many times MemCheck_off() has been called so that nested use can be treated correctly. This also avoids inband-signalling in the previous code (which relied on the assumption that thread ID 0 is impossible). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add "-rand" option also to s_client and s_server. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix CPU detection on Irix 6.x. [Kurt Hockenbury and "Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) Fix X509_NAME bug which produced incorrect encoding if X509_NAME was empty. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Use the cached encoding of an X509_NAME structure rather than copying it. This is apparently the reason for the libsafe "errors" but the code is actually correct. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. Extend BN_[pseudo_]rand: As before, top=1 forces the highest two bits to be set and top=0 forces the highest bit to be set; top=-1 is new and leaves the highest bit random. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) In the NCONF_...-based implementations for CONF_... queries (crypto/conf/conf_lib.c), if the input LHASH is NULL, avoid using a temporary CONF structure with the data component set to NULL (which gives segmentation faults in lh_retrieve). Instead, use NULL for the CONF pointer in CONF_get_string and CONF_get_number (which may use environment variables) and directly return NULL from CONF_get_section. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix potential buffer overrun for EBCDIC. [Ulf Moeller] *) Tolerate nonRepudiation as being valid for S/MIME signing and certSign keyUsage if basicConstraints absent for a CA. [Steve Henson] *) Make SMIME_write_PKCS7() write mail header values with a format that is more generally accepted (no spaces before the semicolon), since some programs can't parse those values properly otherwise. Also make sure BIO's that break lines after each write do not create invalid headers. [Richard Levitte] *) Make the CRL encoding routines work with empty SEQUENCE OF. The macros previously used would not encode an empty SEQUENCE OF and break the signature. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. [Steve Henson] *) Add some EVP_add_digest_alias registrations (as found in OpenSSL_add_all_digests()) to SSL_library_init() aka OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(). This provides improved compatibility with peers using X.509 certificates with unconventional AlgorithmIdentifier OIDs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for Irix with NO_ASM. ["Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) ./config script fixes. [Ulf Moeller, Richard Levitte] *) Fix 'openssl passwd -1'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change PKCS12_key_gen_asc() so it can cope with non null terminated strings whose length is passed in the passlen parameter, for example from PEM callbacks. This was done by adding an extra length parameter to asc2uni(). [Steve Henson, reported by ] *) Fix C code generated by 'openssl dsaparam -C': If a BN_bin2bn call failed, free the DSA structure. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix to uni2asc() to cope with zero length Unicode strings. These are present in some PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Increase s2->wbuf allocation by one byte in ssl2_new (ssl/s2_lib.c). Otherwise do_ssl_write (ssl/s2_pkt.c) will write beyond buffer limits when writing a 32767 byte record. [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Eric Day ] *) In RSA_eay_public_{en,ed}crypt and RSA_eay_mod_exp (rsa_eay.c), obtain lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA before setting rsa->_method_mod_{n,p,q}. (RSA objects have a reference count access to which is protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA [see rsa_lib.c, s3_srvr.c, ssl_cert.c, ssl_rsa.c], so they are meant to be shared between threads.) [Bodo Moeller, Geoff Thorpe; original patch submitted by "Reddie, Steven" ] *) Fix a deadlock in CRYPTO_mem_leaks(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Use better test patterns in bntest. [Ulf Möller] *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C. [Ulf Möller] *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a 'bctest' script that checks for some known 'bc' bugs so that 'make test' does not abort just because 'bc' is broken. [Bodo Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending: If the record in s->s3->rrec is not of type SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, return 0. Similarly, change ssl2_pending to return 0 if SSL_in_init(s) is true. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL_peek: Both ssl2_peek and ssl3_peek, which were totally broken in earlier releases, have been re-implemented by renaming the previous implementations of ssl2_read and ssl3_read to ssl2_read_internal and ssl3_read_internal, respectively, and adding 'peek' parameters to them. The new ssl[23]_{read,peek} functions are calls to ssl[23]_read_internal with the 'peek' flag set appropriately. A 'peek' parameter has also been added to ssl3_read_bytes, which does the actual work for ssl3_read_internal. [Bodo Moeller] *) Initialise "ex_data" member of RSA/DSA/DH structures prior to calling the method-specific "init()" handler. Also clean up ex_data after calling the method-specific "finish()" handler. Previously, this was happening the other way round. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Increase BN_CTX_NUM (the number of BIGNUMs in a BN_CTX) to 16. The previous value, 12, was not always sufficient for BN_mod_exp(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix typo in get_cert_by_subject() in by_dir.c [Jean-Marc Desperrier ] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead macro to actually use its argument. Copy SSL_CTX's read_ahead flag to SSL object directly in SSL_new and not in SSL_clear because the latter is also used by the accept/connect functions; previously, the settings made by SSL_set_read_ahead would be lost during the handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problems reported by Anders Gertz ] *) Correct util/mkdef.pl to be selective about disabled algorithms. Previously, it would create entries for disableed algorithms no matter what. [Richard Levitte] *) Added several new manual pages for SSL_* function. [Lutz Jaenicke] Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6 [24 Sep 2000] *) In ssl23_get_client_hello, generate an error message when faced with an initial SSL 3.0/TLS record that is too small to contain the first two bytes of the ClientHello message, i.e. client_version. (Note that this is a pathologic case that probably has never happened in real life.) The previous approach was to use the version number from the record header as a substitute; but our protocol choice should not depend on that one because it is not authenticated by the Finished messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) More robust randomness gathering functions for Windows. [Jeffrey Altman ] *) For compatibility reasons if the flag X509_V_FLAG_ISSUER_CHECK is not set then we don't setup the error code for issuer check errors to avoid possibly overwriting other errors which the callback does handle. If an application does set the flag then we assume it knows what it is doing and can handle the new informational codes appropriately. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for a nasty bug in ASN1_TYPE handling. ASN1_TYPE is used for a general "ANY" type, as such it should be able to decode anything including tagged types. However it didn't check the class so it would wrongly interpret tagged types in the same way as their universal counterpart and unknown types were just rejected. Changed so that the tagged and unknown types are handled in the same way as a SEQUENCE: that is the encoding is stored intact. There is also a new type "V_ASN1_OTHER" which is used when the class is not universal, in this case we have no idea what the actual type is so we just lump them all together. [Steve Henson] *) On VMS, stdout may very well lead to a file that is written to in a record-oriented fashion. That means that every write() will write a separate record, which will be read separately by the programs trying to read from it. This can be very confusing. The solution is to put a BIO filter in the way that will buffer text until a linefeed is reached, and then write everything a line at a time, so every record written will be an actual line, not chunks of lines and not (usually doesn't happen, but I've seen it once) several lines in one record. BIO_f_linebuffer() is the answer. Currently, it's a VMS-only method, because that's where it has been tested well enough. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove 'optimized' squaring variant in BN_mod_mul_montgomery, it can return incorrect results. (Note: The buggy variant was not enabled in OpenSSL 0.9.5a, but it was in 0.9.6-beta[12].) [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable the check for content being present when verifying detached signatures in pk7_smime.c. Some versions of Netscape (wrongly) include zero length content when signing messages. [Steve Henson] *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs). [Bodo Möller] *) Add DSO method for VMS. [Richard Levitte] *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the wrong sign. [Ulf Möller] *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three packages. The default package contains applications, application documentation and run-time libraries. The devel package contains include files, static libraries and function documentation. The doc package contains the contents of the doc directory. The original openssl.spec was provided by Damien Miller . [Richard Levitte] *) Add a large number of documentation files for many SSL routines. [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Add a configuration entry for Sony News 4. [NAKAJI Hiroyuki ] *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a random number < q in the DSA library. [Ulf Möller] *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if the underlying transport is blocking) if a handshake took place. (The default behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client and s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read; but for applications that know in advance when to expect data, it just makes things more complicated.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RAND_egd_bytes(), which gives control over the number of bytes read from EGD. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a few more EBCDIC conditionals that make `req' and `x509' work better on such systems. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Add two demo programs for PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create(). Update PKCS12_parse() so it copies the friendlyName and the keyid to the certificates aux info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in PKCS7_verify() which caused an infinite loop if there was more than one signature. [Sven Uszpelkat ] *) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information about each symbol, as well as presentig variables as well as functions. This change means that there's n more need to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded. [Richard Levitte] *) Allow the verify time to be set by an application, rather than always using the current time. [Steve Henson] *) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a number of criteria: subject name, authority key id and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates by the same criteria. The main comparison function is X509_check_issued() which performs these checks. Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this without completely rewriting the lookup code. Authority and subject key identifier are now cached. The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with the same hash value. As a result various functions (which were all internal use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE structure. This will break anything that messed round with X509_STORE internally. The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an exact match, rather than just subject name. The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however this can be worked round by performing a lookup first (which will fill the cache with candidate certificates) and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP entirely (maybe later...). The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably. All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer() callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques in future. A very simple version which uses a simple STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(). The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents in the X509_STORE_CTX structure. X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used to customise the verify behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which excludes S/MIME capabilities. [Steve Henson] *) When a certificate request is read in keep a copy of the original encoding of the signed data and use it when outputing again. Signatures then use the original encoding rather than a decoded, encoded version which may cause problems if the request is improperly encoded. [Steve Henson] *) For consistency with other BIO_puts implementations, call buffer_write(b, ...) directly in buffer_puts instead of calling BIO_write(b, ...). In BIO_puts, increment b->num_write as in BIO_write. [Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr] *) Fix BN_mul_word for the case where the word is 0. (We have to use BN_zero, we may not return a BIGNUM with an array consisting of words set to zero.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid calling abort() from within the library when problems are detected, except if preprocessor symbols have been defined (such as REF_CHECK, BN_DEBUG etc.). [Bodo Moeller] *) New openssl application 'rsautl'. This utility can be used for low level RSA operations. DER public key BIO/fp routines also added. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure entry and patches for compiling on QNX 4. [Andreas Schneider ] *) A demo state-machine implementation was sponsored by Nuron (http://www.nuron.com/) and is now available in demos/state_machine. [Ben Laurie] *) New options added to the 'dgst' utility for signature generation and verification. [Steve Henson] *) Unrecognized PKCS#7 content types are now handled via a catch all ASN1_TYPE structure. This allows unsupported types to be stored as a "blob" and an application can encode and decode it manually. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various signed/unsigned issues to make a_strex.c compile under VC++. [Oscar Jacobsson ] *) ASN1 fixes. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was not returning the correct length if passed a buffer. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN failed if passed a NULL BN and its argument was negative. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Sven Heiberg ] *) Modification to PKCS#7 encoding routines to output definite length encoding. Since currently the whole structures are in memory there's not real point in using indefinite length constructed encoding. However if OpenSSL is compiled with the flag PKCS7_INDEFINITE_ENCODING the old form is used. [Steve Henson] *) Added BIO_vprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf(). [Richard Levitte] *) Added more prefixes to parse for in the the strings written through a logging bio, to cover all the levels that are available through syslog. The prefixes are now: PANIC, EMERG, EMR => LOG_EMERG ALERT, ALR => LOG_ALERT CRIT, CRI => LOG_CRIT ERROR, ERR => LOG_ERR WARNING, WARN, WAR => LOG_WARNING NOTICE, NOTE, NOT => LOG_NOTICE INFO, INF => LOG_INFO DEBUG, DBG => LOG_DEBUG and as before, if none of those prefixes are present at the beginning of the string, LOG_ERR is chosen. On Win32, the LOG_* levels are mapped according to this: LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR => EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE LOG_WARNING => EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, LOG_DEBUG => EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE [Richard Levitte] *) Made it possible to reconfigure with just the configuration argument "reconf" or "reconfigure". The command line arguments are stored in Makefile.ssl in the variable CONFIGURE_ARGS, and are retrieved from there when reconfiguring. [Richard Levitte] *) MD4 implemented. [Assar Westerlund , Richard Levitte] *) Add the arguments -CAfile and -CApath to the pkcs12 utility. [Richard Levitte] *) The obj_dat.pl script was messing up the sorting of object names. The reason was that it compared the quoted version of strings as a result "OCSP" > "OCSP Signing" because " > SPACE. Changed script to store unquoted versions of names and add quotes on output. It was also omitting some names from the lookup table if they were given a default value (that is if SN is missing it is given the same value as LN and vice versa), these are now added on the grounds that if an object has a name we should be able to look it up. Finally added warning output when duplicate short or long names are found. [Steve Henson] *) Changes needed for Tandem NSK. [Scott Uroff ] *) Fix SSL 2.0 rollback checking: Due to an off-by-one error in RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), special padding was never detected and thus the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 countermeasure against protocol version rollback attacks was not effective. In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Make it possible to get hexdumps of unprintable data with 'openssl asn1parse'. By implication, the functions ASN1_parse_dump() and BIO_dump_indent() are added. [Richard Levitte] *) New functions ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex() these print out strings and name structures based on various flags including RFC2253 support and proper handling of multibyte characters. Added options to the 'x509' utility to allow the various flags to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to use ASN1_TIME instead of ASN1_UTCTIME. Also change the functions X509_cmp_current_time() and X509_gmtime_adj() work with an ASN1_TIME structure, this will enable certificates using GeneralizedTime in validity dates to be checked. [Steve Henson] *) Make the NEG_PUBKEY_BUG code (which tolerates invalid negative public key encodings) on by default, NO_NEG_PUBKEY_BUG can be set to disable it. [Steve Henson] *) New function c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() which acts on ASN1_OBJECT content octets. An i2c_ASN1_OBJECT is unnecessary because the encoding can be trivially obtained from the structure. [Steve Henson] *) crypto/err.c locking bugfix: Use write locks (CRYPTO_w_[un]lock), not read locks (CRYPTO_r_[un]lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) A first attempt at creating official support for shared libraries through configuration. I've kept it so the default is static libraries only, and the OpenSSL programs are always statically linked for now, but there are preparations for dynamic linking in place. This has been tested on Linux and Tru64. [Richard Levitte] *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in: Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing DSA key. [Steve Henson] *) New options to smime application. -inform and -outform allow alternative formats for the S/MIME message including PEM and DER. The -content option allows the content to be specified separately. This should allow things like Netscape form signing output easier to verify. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the ASN1 encoding of tags using the 'long form'. [Steve Henson] *) New ASN1 functions, i2c_* and c2i_* for INTEGER and BIT STRING types. These convert content octets to and from the underlying type. The actual tag and length octets are already assumed to have been read in and checked. These are needed because all other string types have virtually identical handling apart from the tag. By having versions of the ASN1 functions that just operate on content octets IMPLICIT tagging can be handled properly. It also allows the ASN1_ENUMERATED code to be cut down because ASN1_ENUMERATED and ASN1_INTEGER are identical apart from the tag. [Steve Henson] *) Change the handling of OID objects as follows: - New object identifiers are inserted in objects.txt, following the syntax given in objects.README. - objects.pl is used to process obj_mac.num and create a new obj_mac.h. - obj_dat.pl is used to create a new obj_dat.h, using the data in obj_mac.h. This is currently kind of a hack, and the perl code in objects.pl isn't very elegant, but it works as I intended. The simplest way to check that it worked correctly is to look in obj_dat.h and check the array nid_objs and make sure the objects haven't moved around (this is important!). Additions are OK, as well as consistent name changes. [Richard Levitte] *) Add BSD-style MD5-based passwords to 'openssl passwd' (option '-1'). [Bodo Moeller] *) Addition of the command line parameter '-rand file' to 'openssl req'. The given file adds to whatever has already been seeded into the random pool through the RANDFILE configuration file option or environment variable, or the default random state file. [Richard Levitte] *) mkstack.pl now sorts each macro group into lexical order. Previously the output order depended on the order the files appeared in the directory, resulting in needless rewriting of safestack.h . [Steve Henson] *) Patches to make OpenSSL compile under Win32 again. Mostly work arounds for the VC++ problem that it treats func() as func(void). Also stripped out the parts of mkdef.pl that added extra typesafe functions: these no longer exist. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganisation of the stack code. The macros are now all collected in safestack.h . Each macro is defined in terms of a "stack macro" of the form SKM_(type, a, b). The DEBUG_SAFESTACK is now handled in terms of function casts, this has the advantage of retaining type safety without the use of additional functions. If DEBUG_SAFESTACK is not defined then the non typesafe macros are used instead. Also modified the mkstack.pl script to handle the new form. Needs testing to see if which (if any) compilers it chokes and maybe make DEBUG_SAFESTACK the default if no major problems. Similar behaviour for ASN1_SET_OF and PKCS12_STACK_OF. [Steve Henson] *) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used insted. Added some new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional 'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added an -sgckey command line option to the rsa utility. Thanks to Adrian Peck for posting details of the modified algorithm to openssl-dev. [Steve Henson] *) The evp_local.h macros were using 'c.##kname' which resulted in invalid expansion on some systems (SCO 5.0.5 for example). Corrected to 'c.kname'. [Phillip Porch ] *) New X509_get1_email() and X509_REQ_get1_email() functions that return a STACK of email addresses from a certificate or request, these look in the subject name and the subject alternative name extensions and omit any duplicate addresses. [Steve Henson] *) Re-implement BN_mod_exp2_mont using independent (and larger) windows. This makes DSA verification about 2 % faster. [Bodo Moeller] *) Increase maximum window size in BN_mod_exp_... to 6 bits instead of 5 (meaning that now 2^5 values will be precomputed, which is only 4 KB plus overhead for 1024 bit moduli). This makes exponentiations about 0.5 % faster for 1024 bit exponents (as measured by "openssl speed rsa2048"). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename memory handling macros to avoid conflicts with other software: Malloc => OPENSSL_malloc Malloc_locked => OPENSSL_malloc_locked Realloc => OPENSSL_realloc Free => OPENSSL_free [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_exp_mont_word for small bases (roughly 15% faster than BN_mod_exp_mont, i.e. 7% for a full DH exchange). [Bodo Moeller] *) CygWin32 support. [John Jarvie ] *) The type-safe stack code has been rejigged. It is now only compiled in when OpenSSL is configured with the DEBUG_SAFESTACK option and by default all type-specific stack functions are "#define"d back to standard stack functions. This results in more streamlined output but retains the type-safety checking possibilities of the original approach. [Geoff Thorpe] *) The STACK code has been cleaned up, and certain type declarations that didn't make a lot of sense have been brought in line. This has also involved a cleanup of sorts in safestack.h to more correctly map type-safe stack functions onto their plain stack counterparts. This work has also resulted in a variety of "const"ifications of lots of the code, especially "_cmp" operations which should normally be prototyped with "const" parameters anyway. [Geoff Thorpe] *) When generating bytes for the first time in md_rand.c, 'stir the pool' by seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes (with zero entropy count). (The PRNG state consists of two parts, the large pool 'state' and 'md', where all of 'md' is used each time the PRNG is used, but 'state' is used only indexed by a cyclic counter. As entropy may not be well distributed from the beginning, 'md' is important as a chaining variable. However, the output function chains only half of 'md', i.e. 80 bits. ssleay_rand_add, on the other hand, chains all of 'md', and seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes will result in all of 'state' being rewritten, with the new values depending on virtually all of 'md'. This overcomes the 80 bit limitation.) [Bodo Moeller] *) In ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s3_clnt.c, call ERR_clear_error() when the handshake is continued after ssl_verify_cert_chain(); otherwise, if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is set, remaining error codes can lead to 'unexplainable' connection aborts later. [Bodo Moeller; problem tracked down by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Major EVP API cipher revision. Add hooks for extra EVP features. This allows various cipher parameters to be set in the EVP interface. Support added for variable key length ciphers via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function and setting of RC2 and RC5 parameters. Modify EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() to cope with variable key length ciphers. Remove lots of duplicated code from the EVP library. For example *every* cipher init() function handles the 'iv' in the same way according to the cipher mode. They also all do nothing if the 'key' parameter is NULL and for CFB and OFB modes they zero ctx->num. New functionality allows removal of S/MIME code RC2 hack. Most of the routines have the same form and so can be declared in terms of macros. By shifting this to the top level EVP_CipherInit() it can be removed from all individual ciphers. If the cipher wants to handle IVs or keys differently it can set the EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV or EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT flags. Change lots of functions like EVP_EncryptUpdate() to now return a value: although software versions of the algorithms cannot fail any installed hardware versions can. [Steve Henson] *) Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG: In ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, if this option is set, tolerate broken clients that send the negotiated protocol version number instead of the requested protocol version number. [Bodo Moeller] *) Call dh_tmp_cb (set by ..._TMP_DH_CB) with correct 'is_export' flag; i.e. non-zero for export ciphersuites, zero otherwise. Previous versions had this flag inverted, inconsistent with rsa_tmp_cb (..._TMP_RSA_CB). [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Amit Chopra] *) Add missing DSA library text string. Work around for some IIS key files with invalid SEQUENCE encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Add a document (doc/standards.txt) that list all kinds of standards and so on that are implemented in OpenSSL. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance c_rehash script. Old version would mishandle certificates with the same subject name hash and wouldn't handle CRLs at all. Added -fingerprint option to crl utility, to support new c_rehash features. [Steve Henson] *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present but no ssl client purpose. [Steve Henson, reported by Rene Grosser ] *) Make PKCS#12 code work with no password. The PKCS#12 spec is a little unclear about how a blank password is handled. Since the password in encoded as a BMPString with terminating double NULL a zero length password would end up as just the double NULL. However no password at all is different and is handled differently in the PKCS#12 key generation code. NS treats a blank password as zero length. MSIE treats it as no password on export: but it will try both on import. We now do the same: PKCS12_parse() tries zero length and no password if the password is set to "" or NULL (NULL is now a valid password: it wasn't before) as does the pkcs12 application. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfixes in apps/x509.c: Avoid a memory leak; and don't use perror when PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ fails, the error message must be obtained from the error queue. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid 'thread_hash' memory leak in crypto/err/err.c by freeing it in ERR_remove_state if appropriate, and change ERR_get_state accordingly to avoid race conditions (this is necessary because thread_hash is no longer constant once set). [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one. [Ulf Möller] *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already. Previously this was only set during a call to RSA_new() or RSA_new_method(NULL) meaning it was possible for RSA_get_default_method() to return NULL. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added native name translation to the existing DSO code that will convert (if the flag to do so is set) filenames that are sufficiently small and have no path information into a canonical native form. Eg. "blah" converted to "libblah.so" or "blah.dll" etc. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function ERR_error_string_n(e, buf, len) which is like ERR_error_string(e, buf), but writes at most 'len' bytes including the 0 terminator. For ERR_error_string_n, 'buf' may not be NULL. [Damien Miller , Bodo Moeller] *) CONF library reworked to become more general. A new CONF configuration file reader "class" is implemented as well as a new functions (NCONF_*, for "New CONF") to handle it. The now old CONF_* functions are still there, but are reimplemented to work in terms of the new functions. Also, a set of functions to handle the internal storage of the configuration data is provided to make it easier to write new configuration file reader "classes" (I can definitely see something reading a configuration file in XML format, for example), called _CONF_*, or "the configuration storage API"... The new configuration file reading functions are: NCONF_new, NCONF_free, NCONF_load, NCONF_load_fp, NCONF_load_bio, NCONF_get_section, NCONF_get_string, NCONF_get_numbre NCONF_default, NCONF_WIN32 NCONF_dump_fp, NCONF_dump_bio NCONF_default and NCONF_WIN32 are method (or "class") choosers, NCONF_new creates a new CONF object. This works in the same way as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface. NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file, which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'. To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions, the function CONF_set_default_method is provided. [Richard Levitte] *) Add '-tls1' option to 'openssl ciphers', which was already mentioned in the documentation but had not been implemented. (This option is not yet really useful because even the additional experimental TLS 1.0 ciphers are currently treated as SSL 3.0 ciphers.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial DSO code added into libcrypto for letting OpenSSL (and OpenSSL-based applications) load shared libraries and bind to them in a portable way. [Geoff Thorpe, with contributions from Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.5 and 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000] *) Make sure _lrotl and _lrotr are only used with MSVC. *) Use lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND correctly in ssleay_rand_status (the default implementation of RAND_status). *) Rename openssl x509 option '-crlext', which was added in 0.9.5, to '-clrext' (= clear extensions), as intended and documented. [Bodo Moeller; inconsistency pointed out by Michael Attili ] *) Fix for HMAC. It wasn't zeroing the rest of the block if the key length was larger than the MD block size. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Yost William ] *) Modernise PKCS12_parse() so it uses STACK_OF(X509) for its ca argument fix a leak when the ca argument was passed as NULL. Stop X509_PUBKEY_set() using the passed key: if the passed key was a private key the result of X509_print(), for example, would be to print out all the private key components. [Steve Henson] *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix. [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear ] *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly discouraged. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Brian Korver ] *) For easily testing in shell scripts whether some command 'openssl XXX' exists, the new pseudo-command 'openssl no-XXX' returns with exit code 0 iff no command of the given name is available. 'no-XXX' is printed in this case, 'XXX' otherwise. In both cases, the output goes to stdout and nothing is printed to stderr. Additional arguments are always ignored. Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name, the 'no-cipher' compilation switches can be tested this way. ('openssl no-XXX' is not able to detect pseudo-commands such as 'quit', 'list-XXX-commands', or 'no-XXX' itself.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Update test suite so that 'make test' succeeds in 'no-rsa' configuration. [Bodo Moeller] *) For SSL_[CTX_]set_tmp_dh, don't create a DH key if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set; it will be thrown away anyway because each handshake creates its own key. ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meanining you effectivly got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and 'Q' and 'R' lose their special meanings (quit/renegotiate). This is part of what -quiet does; unlike -quiet, -ign_eof does not suppress any output. [Richard Levitte] *) Add compatibility options to the purpose and trust code. The purpose X509_PURPOSE_ANY is "any purpose" which automatically accepts a certificate or CA, this was the previous behaviour, with all the associated security issues. X509_TRUST_COMPAT is the old trust behaviour: only and automatically trust self signed roots in certificate store. A new trust setting X509_TRUST_DEFAULT is used to specify that a purpose has no associated trust setting and it should instead use the value in the default purpose. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#8 DSA private key code so it decodes keys again and fix a memory leak. [Steve Henson] *) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) In ERR_load_ERR_strings(), build an ERR_LIB_SYS error reason table using strerror. Previously, ERR_reason_error_string() returned library names as reason strings for SYSerr; but SYSerr is a special case where small numbers are errno values, not library numbers. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add '-dsaparam' option to 'openssl dhparam' application. This converts DSA parameters into DH parameters. (When creating parameters, DSA_generate_parameters is used.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Include 'length' (recommended exponent length) in C code generated by 'openssl dhparam -C'. [Bodo Moeller] *) The second argument to set_label in perlasm was already being used so couldn't be used as a "file scope" flag. Moved to third argument which was free. [Steve Henson] *) In PEM_ASN1_write_bio and some other functions, use RAND_pseudo_bytes instead of RAND_bytes for encryption IVs and salts. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include RAND_status() into RAND_METHOD instead of implementing it only for md_rand.c Otherwise replacing the PRNG by calling RAND_set_rand_method would be impossible. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't let DSA_generate_key() enter an infinite loop if the random number generation fails. [Bodo Moeller] *) New 'rand' application for creating pseudo-random output. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added configuration support for Linux/IA64 [Rolf Haberrecker ] *) Assembler module support for Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/). [Lutz Jaenicke and Anonymous] *) Shared library support for Solaris gcc. [Lutz Behnke ] Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [28 Feb 2000] *) PKCS7_encrypt() was adding text MIME headers twice because they were added manually and by SMIME_crlf_copy(). [Steve Henson] *) In bntest.c don't call BN_rand with zero bits argument. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Andrew W. Gray ] *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n] case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally. [Ulf Möller] *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set to 1 it signals that the assembler should use a symbol whose scope is the entire file, not just the current function. This is needed with MASM which uses the format label:: for this scope. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Peter Runestig ] *) Change the ASN1 types so they are typedefs by default. Before almost all types were #define'd to ASN1_STRING which was causing STACK_OF() problems: you couldn't declare STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) for example. [Steve Henson] *) Change names of new functions to the new get1/get0 naming convention: After 'get1', the caller owns a reference count and has to call ..._free; 'get0' returns a pointer to some data structure without incrementing reference counters. (Some of the existing 'get' functions increment a reference counter, some don't.) Similarly, 'set1' and 'add1' functions increase reference counters or duplicate objects. [Steve Henson] *) Allow for the possibility of temp RSA key generation failure: the code used to assume it always worked and crashed on failure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf(). [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem pointed out by David Sacerdote ] *) Support EGD . New functions RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application, the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE or -rand. [Ulf Möller] *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures. Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the SSL_ALLOW_ADH compile option and set the default cipher list to exclude them. This means that no special compilation option is needed to use anonymous DH: it just needs to be included in the cipher list. [Steve Henson] *) Change the EVP_MD_CTX_type macro so its meaning consistent with EVP_MD_type. The old functionality is available in a new macro called EVP_MD_md(). Change code that uses it and update docs. [Steve Henson] *) ..._ctrl functions now have corresponding ..._callback_ctrl functions where the 'void *' argument is replaced by a function pointer argument. Previously 'void *' was abused to point to functions, which works on many platforms, but is not correct. As these functions are usually called by macros defined in OpenSSL header files, most source code should work without changes. [Richard Levitte] *) (which is created by Configure) now contains sections with information on -D... compiler switches used for compiling the library so that applications can see them. To enable one of these sections, a pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_..._DEFINES must be defined. E.g., #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES #include defines all pertinent NO_ symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc. [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller] *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS record layer. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the 'other' type in certificate aux info to a STACK_OF X509_ALGOR. Although not an AlgorithmIdentifier as such it has the required ASN1 format: arbitrary types determined by an OID. [Steve Henson] *) Add some PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW() functions and a command line argument to 'req'. This is not because the function is newer or better than others it just uses the work 'NEW' in the certificate request header lines. Some software needs this. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganise password command line arguments: now passwords can be obtained from various sources. Delete the PEM_cb function and make it the default behaviour: i.e. if the callback is NULL and the usrdata argument is not NULL interpret it as a null terminated pass phrase. If usrdata and the callback are NULL then the pass phrase is prompted for as usual. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the Compaq Atalla crypto accelerator. If it is installed, the support is automatically enabled. The resulting binaries will autodetect the card and use it if present. [Ben Laurie and Compaq Inc.] *) Work around for Netscape hang bug. This sends certificate request and server done in one record. Since this is perfectly legal in the SSL/TLS protocol it isn't a "bug" option and is on by default. See the bugs/SSLv3 entry for more info. [Steve Henson] *) HP-UX tune-up: new unified configs, HP C compiler bug workaround. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -rand argument to smime and pkcs12 applications and read/write of seed file. [Steve Henson] *) New 'passwd' tool for crypt(3) and apr1 password hashes. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add command line password options to the remaining applications. [Steve Henson] *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of bits. [Ulf Möller] *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output. [Ulf Möller] *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now. [Andy Polyakov] *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0). [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line options to produce them. [Steve Henson] *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX. [Ulf Möller] *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont() for p == 0. [Ulf Möller] *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent was that statically linked binaries could for example just call SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not link with digests. This never worked becayse SSLeay_add_all_digests() and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new -notext option to 'ca' and a -pubkey option to 'spkac'. [Steve Henson] *) Use a less unusual form of the Miller-Rabin primality test (it used a binary algorithm for exponentiation integrated into the Miller-Rabin loop, our standard modexp algorithms are faster). [Bodo Moeller] *) Support for the EBCDIC character set completed. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts, use void * instead of char * in lhash. [Ulf Möller] *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of this the server could overwrite ephemeral keys that the client has already seen). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn DSA_is_prime into a macro that calls BN_is_prime, using 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test. DSA_generate_parameters now uses BN_is_prime_fasttest (with 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test as required by the appendix to FIPS PUB 186[-1]) instead of DSA_is_prime. As BN_is_prime_fasttest includes trial division, DSA parameter generation becomes much faster. This implies a change for the callback functions in DSA_is_prime and DSA_generate_parameters: The callback function is called once for each positive witness in the Rabin-Miller test, not just occasionally in the inner loop; and the parameters to the callback function now provide an iteration count for the outer loop rather than for the current invocation of the inner loop. DSA_generate_parameters additionally can call the callback function with an 'iteration count' of -1, meaning that a candidate has passed the trial division test (when q is generated from an application-provided seed, trial division is skipped). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_is_prime_fasttest that optionally does trial division before starting the Rabin-Miller test and has an additional BN_CTX * argument (whereas BN_is_prime always has to allocate at least one BN_CTX). 'callback(1, -1, cb_arg)' is called when a number has passed the trial division stage. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for bug in CRL encoding. The validity dates weren't being handled as ASN1_TIME. [Steve Henson] *) New -pkcs12 option to CA.pl script to write out a PKCS#12 file. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_pseudo_rand(). [Ulf Möller] *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable) bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up the comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in SSL2 clients in multiple threads. [Bodo Moeller] *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required). [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place. [Steve Henson] *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL. [Ulf Möller] *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro: BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of Rabin-Miller iterations. [Ulf Möller] *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME. (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".) [Ulf Möller] *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys (instead of parameters) in future. [Steve Henson] *) Make the ciphers, s_server and s_client programs check the return values when a new cipher list is set. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the SSL/TLS cipher mechanism to correctly handle the TLS 56bit ciphers. Before when the 56bit ciphers were enabled the sorting was wrong. The syntax for the cipher sorting has been extended to support sorting by cipher-strength (using the strength_bits hard coded in the tables). The new command is "@STRENGTH" (see also doc/apps/ciphers.pod). Fix a bug in the cipher-command parser: when supplying a cipher command string with an "undefined" symbol (neither command nor alphanumeric [A-Za-z0-9], ssl_set_cipher_list used to hang in an endless loop. Now an error is flagged. Due to the strength-sorting extension, the code of the ssl_create_cipher_list() function was completely rearranged. I hope that the readability was also increased :-) [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Minor change to 'x509' utility. The -CAcreateserial option now uses 1 for the first serial number and places 2 in the serial number file. This avoids problems when the root CA is created with serial number zero and the first user certificate has the same issuer name and serial number as the root CA. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities, change the 'req' program so it uses the new code. Add documentation for this stuff. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509 structures and behave in an analagous way to the X509v3 functions: they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used instead. So we also now have some wrapper functions that call the X509at functions when passed certificate requests. (TO DO: similar things can be done with PKCS#7 signed and unsigned attributes, PKCS#12 attributes and a few other things. Some of these need some d2i or i2d and print functionality because they handle more complex structures.) [Steve Henson] *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. [Kris Kennaway , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). Also an error is recorded on the thread's error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy). [Ulf Möller] *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically, 3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes instead of only 2 for all lengths; see BN_prime_checks_for_size definition in crypto/bn/bn_prime.c for the complete table). This guarantees a false-positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite ssl3_read_n (ssl/s3_pkt.c) avoiding a couple of bugs. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509_CTX_rget_chain() (renamed to X509_CTX_get1_chain in the 0.9.5 release), this returns the chain from an X509_CTX structure with a dup of the stack and all the X509 reference counts upped: so the stack will exist after X509_CTX_cleanup() has been called. Modify pkcs12.c to use this. Also make SSL_SESSION_print() print out the verify return code. [Steve Henson] *) Add manpage for the pkcs12 command. Also change the default behaviour so MAC iteration counts are used unless the new -nomaciter option is used. This improves file security and only older versions of MSIE (4.0 for example) need it. [Steve Henson] *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files. [Ulf Möller] *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from draft PKCS#9 v2.0 but are compatible with v1.2 provided no international characters are used. More changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE code: allow the setting of types based on strings. Remove the 'loc' parameter when adding attributes because these will be a SET OF encoding which is sorted in ASN1 order. [Steve Henson] *) Initial changes to the 'req' utility to allow request generation automation. This will allow an application to just generate a template file containing all the field values and have req construct the request. Initial support for X509_ATTRIBUTE handling. Stacks of these are used all over the place including certificate requests and PKCS#7 structures. They are currently handled manually where necessary with some primitive wrappers for PKCS#7. The new functions behave in a manner analogous to the X509 extension functions: they allow attributes to be looked up by NID and added. Later something similar to the X509V3 code would be desirable to automatically handle the encoding, decoding and printing of the more complex types. The string types like challengePassword can be handled by the string table functions. Also modified the multi byte string table handling. Now there is a 'global mask' which masks out certain types. The table itself can use the flag STABLE_NO_MASK to ignore the mask setting: this is useful when for example there is only one permissible type (as in countryName) and using the mask might result in no valid types at all. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up 'Finished' handling, and add functions SSL_get_finished and SSL_get_peer_finished to allow applications to obtain the latest Finished messages sent to the peer or expected from the peer, respectively. (SSL_get_peer_finished is usually the Finished message actually received from the peer, otherwise the protocol will be aborted.) As the Finished message are message digests of the complete handshake (with a total of 192 bits for TLS 1.0 and more for SSL 3.0), they can be used for external authentication procedures when the authentication provided by SSL/TLS is not desired or is not enough. [Bodo Moeller] *) Enhanced support for Alpha Linux is added. Now ./config checks if the host supports BWX extension and if Compaq C is present on the $PATH. Just exploiting of the BWX extension results in 20-30% performance kick for some algorithms, e.g. DES and RC4 to mention a couple. Compaq C in turn generates ~20% faster code for MD5 and SHA1. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for MS "fast SGC". This is arguably a violation of the SSL3/TLS protocol. Netscape SGC does two handshakes: the first with weak crypto and after checking the certificate is SGC a second one with strong crypto. MS SGC stops the first handshake after receiving the server certificate message and sends a second client hello. Since a server will typically do all the time consuming operations before expecting any further messages from the client (server key exchange is the most expensive) there is little difference between the two. To get OpenSSL to support MS SGC we have to permit a second client hello message after we have sent server done. In addition we have to reset the MAC if we do get this second client hello. [Steve Henson] *) Add a function 'd2i_AutoPrivateKey()' this will automatically decide if a DER encoded private key is RSA or DSA traditional format. Changed d2i_PrivateKey_bio() to use it. This is only needed for the "traditional" format DER encoded private key. Newer code should use PKCS#8 format which has the key type encoded in the ASN1 structure. Added DER private key support to pkcs8 application. [Steve Henson] *) SSL 3/TLS 1 servers now don't request certificates when an anonymous ciphersuites has been selected (as required by the SSL 3/TLS 1 specifications). Exception: When SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT is set, we interpret this as a request to violate the specification (the worst that can happen is a handshake failure, and 'correct' behaviour would result in a handshake failure anyway). [Bodo Moeller] *) In SSL_CTX_add_session, take into account that there might be multiple SSL_SESSION structures with the same session ID (e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain them from an external cache). The internal cache can handle only one SSL_SESSION with a given ID, so if there's a conflict, we now throw out the old one to achieve consistency. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OIDs for idea and blowfish in CBC mode. This will allow both to be used in PKCS#5 v2.0 and S/MIME. Also add checking to some routines that use cipher OIDs: some ciphers do not have OIDs defined and so they cannot be used for S/MIME and PKCS#5 v2.0 for example. [Steve Henson] *) Simplify the trust setting structure and code. Now we just have two sequences of OIDs for trusted and rejected settings. These will typically have values the same as the extended key usage extension and any application specific purposes. The trust checking code now has a default behaviour: it will just check for an object with the same NID as the passed id. Functions can be provided to override either the default behaviour or the behaviour for a given id. SSL client, server and email already have functions in place for compatibility: they check the NID and also return "trusted" if the certificate is self signed. [Steve Henson] *) Add d2i,i2d bio/fp functions for PrivateKey: these convert the traditional format into an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Add a password callback function PEM_cb() which either prompts for a password if usr_data is NULL or otherwise assumes it is a null terminated password. Allow passwords to be passed on command line environment or config files in a few more utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of DER and PEM functions to handle PKCS#8 format private keys. Add some short names for PKCS#8 PBE algorithms and allow them to be specified on the command line for the pkcs8 and pkcs12 utilities. Update documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Support for ASN1 "NULL" type. This could be handled before by using ASN1_TYPE but there wasn't any function that would try to read a NULL and produce an error if it couldn't. For compatibility we also have ASN1_NULL_new() and ASN1_NULL_free() functions but these are faked and don't allocate anything because they don't need to. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for MacOS is now provided. Examine INSTALL.MacOS for details. [Andy Polyakov, Roy Woods ] *) Rebuild of the memory allocation routines used by OpenSSL code and possibly others as well. The purpose is to make an interface that provide hooks so anyone can build a separate set of allocation and deallocation routines to be used by OpenSSL, for example memory pool implementations, or something else, which was previously hard since Malloc(), Realloc() and Free() were defined as macros having the values malloc, realloc and free, respectively (except for Win32 compilations). The same is provided for memory debugging code. OpenSSL already comes with functionality to find memory leaks, but this gives people a chance to debug other memory problems. With these changes, a new set of functions and macros have appeared: CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_set_options() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_get_options() [F] CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() [M] The memory debug functions are NULL by default, unless the library is compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG or friends is defined. If someone wants to debug memory anyway, CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() (which gives the standard debugging functions that come with OpenSSL) or CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() (tells OpenSSL to use functions provided by the library user) must be used. When the standard debugging functions are used, CRYPTO_dbg_set_options can be used to request additional information: CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CYRPTO_MDEBUG_xxx) corresponds to setting the CRYPTO_MDEBUG_xxx macro when compiling the library. Also, things like CRYPTO_set_mem_functions will always give the expected result (the new set of functions is used for allocation and deallocation) at all times, regardless of platform and compiler options. To finish it up, some functions that were never use in any other way than through macros have a new API and new semantic: CRYPTO_dbg_malloc() CRYPTO_dbg_realloc() CRYPTO_dbg_free() All macros of value have retained their old syntax. [Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Some S/MIME fixes. The OID for SMIMECapabilities was wrong, the ordering of SMIMECapabilities wasn't in "strength order" and there was a missing NULL in the AlgorithmIdentifier for the SHA1 signature algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Some ASN1 types with illegal zero length encoding (INTEGER, ENUMERATED and OBJECT IDENTIFIER) choked the ASN1 routines. [Frans Heymans , modified by Steve Henson] *) Merge in my S/MIME library for OpenSSL. This provides a simple S/MIME API on top of the PKCS#7 code, a MIME parser (with enough functionality to handle multipart/signed properly) and a utility called 'smime' to call all this stuff. This is based on code I originally wrote for Celo who have kindly allowed it to be included in OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add variants des_set_key_checked and des_set_key_unchecked of des_set_key (aka des_key_sched). Global variable des_check_key decides which of these is called by des_set_key; this way des_check_key behaves as it always did, but applications and the library itself, which was buggy for des_check_key == 1, have a cleaner way to pick the version they need. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function PKCS12_newpass() which changes the password of a PKCS12 structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify X509_TRUST and X509_PURPOSE so it also uses a static and dynamic mix. In both cases the ids can be used as an index into the table. Also modified the X509_TRUST_add() and X509_PURPOSE_add() functions so they accept a list of the field values and the application doesn't need to directly manipulate the X509_TRUST structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the ASN1_STRING_TABLE stuff so it also uses bsearch and doesn't need initialising. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the way the V3 extension code looks up extensions. This now works in a similar way to the object code: we have some "standard" extensions in a static table which is searched with OBJ_bsearch() and the application can add dynamic ones if needed. The file crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h now has the info: this file needs to be updated whenever a new extension is added to the core code and kept in ext_nid order. There is a simple program 'tabtest.c' which checks this. New extensions are not added too often so this file can readily be maintained manually. There are two big advantages in doing things this way. The extensions can be looked up immediately and no longer need to be "added" using X509V3_add_standard_extensions(): this function now does nothing. [Side note: I get *lots* of email saying the extension code doesn't work because people forget to call this function] Also no dynamic allocation is done unless new extensions are added: so if we don't add custom extensions there is no need to call X509V3_EXT_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) Modify enc utility's salting as follows: make salting the default. Add a magic header, so unsalted files fail gracefully instead of just decrypting to garbage. This is because not salting is a big security hole, so people should be discouraged from doing it. [Ben Laurie] *) Fixes and enhancements to the 'x509' utility. It allowed a message digest to be passed on the command line but it only used this parameter when signing a certificate. Modified so all relevant operations are affected by the digest parameter including the -fingerprint and -x509toreq options. Also -x509toreq choked if a DSA key was used because it didn't fix the digest. [Steve Henson] *) Initial certificate chain verify code. Currently tests the untrusted certificates for consistency with the verify purpose (which is set when the X509_STORE_CTX structure is set up) and checks the pathlength. There is a NO_CHAIN_VERIFY compilation option to keep the old behaviour: this is because it will reject chains with invalid extensions whereas every previous version of OpenSSL and SSLeay made no checks at all. Trust code: checks the root CA for the relevant trust settings. Trust settings have an initial value consistent with the verify purpose: e.g. if the verify purpose is for SSL client use it expects the CA to be trusted for SSL client use. However the default value can be changed to permit custom trust settings: one example of this would be to only trust certificates from a specific "secure" set of CAs. Also added X509_STORE_CTX_new() and X509_STORE_CTX_free() functions which should be used for version portability: especially since the verify structure is likely to change more often now. SSL integration. Add purpose and trust to SSL_CTX and SSL and functions to set them. If not set then assume SSL clients will verify SSL servers and vice versa. Two new options to the verify program: -untrusted allows a set of untrusted certificates to be passed in and -purpose which sets the intended purpose of the certificate. If a purpose is set then the new chain verify code is used to check extension consistency. [Steve Henson] *) Support for the authority information access extension. [Steve Henson] *) Modify RSA and DSA PEM read routines to transparently handle PKCS#8 format private keys. New *_PUBKEY_* functions that handle public keys in a format compatible with certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures. Unfortunately there were already functions called *_PublicKey_* which used various odd formats so these are retained for compatibility: however the DSA variants were never in a public release so they have been deleted. Changed dsa/rsa utilities to handle the new format: note no releases ever handled public keys so we should be OK. The primary motivation for this change is to avoid the same fiasco that dogs private keys: there are several incompatible private key formats some of which are standard and some OpenSSL specific and require various evil hacks to allow partial transparent handling and even then it doesn't work with DER formats. Given the option anything other than PKCS#8 should be dumped: but the other formats have to stay in the name of compatibility. With public keys and the benefit of hindsight one standard format is used which works with EVP_PKEY, RSA or DSA structures: though it clearly returns an error if you try to read the wrong kind of key. Added a -pubkey option to the 'x509' utility to output the public key. Also rename the EVP_PKEY_get_*() to EVP_PKEY_rget_*() (renamed to EVP_PKEY_get1_*() in the OpenSSL 0.9.5 release) and add EVP_PKEY_rset_*() functions (renamed to EVP_PKEY_set1_*()) that do the same as the EVP_PKEY_assign_*() except they up the reference count of the added key (they don't "swallow" the supplied key). [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to crypto/x509/by_file.c the code to read in certificates and CRLs would fail if the file contained no certificates or no CRLs: added a new function to read in both types and return the number read: this means that if none are read it will be an error. The DER versions of the certificate and CRL reader would always fail because it isn't possible to mix certificates and CRLs in DER format without choking one or the other routine. Changed this to just read a certificate: this is the best we can do. Also modified the code in apps/verify.c to take notice of return codes: it was previously attempting to read in certificates from NULL pointers and ignoring any errors: this is one reason why the cert and CRL reader seemed to work. It doesn't check return codes from the default certificate routines: these may well fail if the certificates aren't installed. [Steve Henson] *) Code to support otherName option in GeneralName. [Steve Henson] *) First update to verify code. Change the verify utility so it warns if it is passed a self signed certificate: for consistency with the normal behaviour. X509_verify has been modified to it will now verify a self signed certificate if *exactly* the same certificate appears in the store: it was previously impossible to trust a single self signed certificate. This means that: openssl verify ss.pem now gives a warning about a self signed certificate but openssl verify -CAfile ss.pem ss.pem is OK. [Steve Henson] *) For servers, store verify_result in SSL_SESSION data structure (and add it to external session representation). This is needed when client certificate verifications fails, but an application-provided verification callback (set by SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback) allows accepting the session anyway (i.e. leaves x509_store_ctx->error != X509_V_OK but returns 1): When the session is reused, we have to set ssl->verify_result to the appropriate error code to avoid security holes. [Bodo Moeller, problem pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix a bug in the new PKCS#7 code: it didn't consider the case in PKCS7_dataInit() where the signed PKCS7 structure didn't contain any existing data because it was being created. [Po-Cheng Chen , slightly modified by Steve Henson] *) Add a salt to the key derivation routines in enc.c. This forms the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file. Also add a -S option to allow a salt to be input on the command line. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_cmp(). Oddly enough there wasn't a function to compare two certificates. We do this by working out the SHA1 hash and comparing that. X509_cmp() will be needed by the trust code. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_get1_session() is like SSL_get_session(), but increments the reference count in the SSL_SESSION returned. [Geoff Thorpe ] *) Fix for 'req': it was adding a null to request attributes. Also change the X509_LOOKUP and X509_INFO code to handle certificate auxiliary information. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for 40 and 64 bit RC2 and RC4 algorithms: document the 'enc' command. [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to add extra information to the memory leak detecting output, to form tracebacks, showing from where each allocation was originated: CRYPTO_push_info("constant string") adds the string plus current file name and line number to a per-thread stack, CRYPTO_pop_info() does the obvious, CRYPTO_remove_all_info() is like calling CYRPTO_pop_info() until the stack is empty. Also updated memory leak detection code to be multi-thread-safe. [Richard Levitte] *) Add options -text and -noout to pkcs7 utility and delete the encryption options which never did anything. Update docs. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to some of the utilities to allow the pass phrase to be included on either the command line (not recommended on OSes like Unix) or read from the environment. Update the manpages and fix a few bugs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a few manpages for some of the openssl commands. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the -revoke option in ca. It was freeing up memory twice, leaking and not finding already revoked certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive changes to support certificate auxiliary information. This involves the use of X509_CERT_AUX structure and X509_AUX functions. An X509_AUX function such as PEM_read_X509_AUX() can still read in a certificate file in the usual way but it will also read in any additional "auxiliary information". By doing things this way a fair degree of compatibility can be retained: existing certificates can have this information added using the new 'x509' options. Current auxiliary information includes an "alias" and some trust settings. The trust settings will ultimately be used in enhanced certificate chain verification routines: currently a certificate can only be trusted if it is self signed and then it is trusted for all purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Fix assembler for Alpha (tested only on DEC OSF not Linux or *BSD). The problem was that one of the replacement routines had not been working since SSLeay releases. For now the offending routine has been replaced with non-optimised assembler. Even so, this now gives around 95% performance improvement for 1024 bit RSA signs. [Mark Cox] *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2 handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key. A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine the effective key length. In this case the effective key length can still be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes the key length and effective key length are equal. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0); and have it automatically work out the correct field type and fill in the structures. The more adventurous can try: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, field, MBSTRING_UTF8, str, -1, -1, 0); and it will (hopefully) work out the correct multibyte encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Change the 'req' utility to use the new field handling and multibyte copy routines. Before the DN field creation was handled in an ad hoc way in req, ca, and x509 which was rather broken and didn't support BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. Since some software doesn't implement BMPStrings or UTF8Strings yet, they can be enabled using the config file using the dirstring_type option. See the new comment in the default openssl.cnf for more info. [Steve Henson] *) Make crypto/rand/md_rand.c more robust: - Assure unique random numbers after fork(). - Make sure that concurrent threads access the global counter and md serializably so that we never lose entropy in them or use exactly the same state in multiple threads. Access to the large state is not always serializable because the additional locking could be a performance killer, and md should be large enough anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New file apps/app_rand.c with commonly needed functionality for handling the random seed file. Use the random seed file in some applications that previously did not: ca, dsaparam -genkey (which also ignored its '-rand' option), s_client, s_server, x509 (when signing). Except on systems with /dev/urandom, it is crucial to have a random seed file at least for key creation, DSA signing, and for DH exchanges; for RSA signatures we could do without one. gendh and gendsa (unlike genrsa) used to read only the first byte of each file listed in the '-rand' option. The function as previously found in genrsa is now in app_rand.c and is used by all programs that support '-rand'. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RAND_write_file, use mode 0600 for creating files; don't just chmod when it may be too late. [Bodo Moeller] *) Report an error from X509_STORE_load_locations when X509_LOOKUP_load_file or X509_LOOKUP_add_dir failed. [Bill Perry] *) New function ASN1_mbstring_copy() this copies a string in either ASCII, Unicode, Universal (4 bytes per character) or UTF8 format into an ASN1_STRING type. A mask of permissible types is passed and it chooses the "minimal" type to use or an error if not type is suitable. [Steve Henson] *) Add function equivalents to the various macros in asn1.h. The old macros are retained with an M_ prefix. Code inside the library can use the M_ macros. External code (including the openssl utility) should *NOT* in order to be "shared library friendly". [Steve Henson] *) Add various functions that can check a certificate's extensions to see if it usable for various purposes such as SSL client, server or S/MIME and CAs of these types. This is currently VERY EXPERIMENTAL but will ultimately be used for certificate chain verification. Also added a -purpose flag to x509 utility to print out all the purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Add a CRYPTO_EX_DATA to X509 certificate structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) New X509V3_{X509,CRL,REVOKED}_get_d2i() functions. These will search for, obtain and decode and extension and obtain its critical flag. This allows all the necessary extension code to be handled in a single function call. [Steve Henson] *) RC4 tune-up featuring 30-40% performance improvement on most RISC platforms. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. [Andy Polyakov] *) New -noout option to asn1parse. This causes no output to be produced its main use is when combined with -strparse and -out to extract data from a file (which may not be in ASN.1 format). [Steve Henson] *) Fix for pkcs12 program. It was hashing an invalid certificate pointer when producing the local key id. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -dhparam in s_server. This allows a DH parameter file to be stated explicitly. If it is not stated then it tries the first server certificate file. The previous behaviour hard coded the filename "server.pem". [Steve Henson] *) Add -pubin and -pubout options to the rsa and dsa commands. These allow a public key to be input or output. For example: openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem Also added necessary DSA public key functions to handle this. [Steve Henson] *) Fix so PKCS7_dataVerify() doesn't crash if no certificates are contained in the message. This was handled by allowing X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial() to tolerate a NULL passed to it. [Steve Henson, reported by Sampo Kellomaki ] *) Fix for bug in d2i_ASN1_bytes(): other ASN1 functions add an extra null to the end of the strings whereas this didn't. This would cause problems if strings read with d2i_ASN1_bytes() were later modified. [Steve Henson, reported by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix for base64 decode bug. When a base64 bio reads only one line of data and it contains EOF it will end up returning an error. This is caused by input 46 bytes long. The cause is due to the way base64 BIOs find the start of base64 encoded data. They do this by trying a trial decode on each line until they find one that works. When they do a flag is set and it starts again knowing it can pass all the data directly through the decoder. Unfortunately it doesn't reset the context it uses. This means that if EOF is reached an attempt is made to pass two EOFs through the context and this causes the resulting error. This can also cause other problems as well. As is usual with these problems it takes *ages* to find and the fix is trivial: move one line. [Steve Henson, reported by ian@uns.ns.ac.yu (Ivan Nejgebauer) ] *) Ugly workaround to get s_client and s_server working under Windows. The old code wouldn't work because it needed to select() on sockets and the tty (for keypresses and to see if data could be written). Win32 only supports select() on sockets so we select() with a 1s timeout on the sockets and then see if any characters are waiting to be read, if none are present then we retry, we also assume we can always write data to the tty. This isn't nice because the code then blocks until we've received a complete line of data and it is effectively polling the keyboard at 1s intervals: however it's quite a bit better than not working at all :-) A dedicated Windows application might handle this with an event loop for example. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available. For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead. This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1 for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt(). [Steve Henson] *) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it no longer accesses structures directly. Make the ASN1 CRL parsing a bit less strict. It will now permit CRL extensions even if it is not a V2 CRL: this will allow it to tolerate some broken CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Initialize all non-automatic variables each time one of the openssl sub-programs is started (this is necessary as they may be started multiple times from the "OpenSSL>" prompt). [Lennart Bang, Bodo Moeller] *) Preliminary compilation option RSA_NULL which disables RSA crypto without removing all other RSA functionality (this is what NO_RSA does). This is so (for example) those in the US can disable those operations covered by the RSA patent while allowing storage and parsing of RSA keys and RSA key generation. [Steve Henson] *) Non-copying interface to BIO pairs. (still largely untested) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function ANS1_tag2str() to convert an ASN1 tag to a descriptive ASCII string. This was handled independently in various places before. [Steve Henson] *) New functions UTF8_getc() and UTF8_putc() that parse and generate UTF8 strings a character at a time. [Steve Henson] *) Use client_version from client hello to select the protocol (s23_srvr.c) and for RSA client key exchange verification (s3_srvr.c), as required by the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 specifications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add various utility functions to handle SPKACs, these were previously handled by poking round in the structure internals. Added new function NETSCAPE_SPKI_print() to print out SPKAC and a new utility 'spkac' to print, verify and generate SPKACs. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala but extensively modified. [Steve Henson] *) RIPEMD160 is operational on all platforms and is back in 'make test'. [Andy Polyakov] *) Allow the config file extension section to be overwritten on the command line. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala . The new option is called -extensions and can be applied to ca, req and x509. Also -reqexts to override the request extensions in req and -crlexts to override the crl extensions in ca. [Steve Henson] *) Add new feature to the SPKAC handling in ca. Now you can include the same field multiple times by preceding it by "XXXX." for example: 1.OU="Unit name 1" 2.OU="Unit name 2" this is the same syntax as used in the req config file. [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate extensions to be added to certificate requests. These are specified in a 'req_extensions' option of the req section of the config file. They can be printed out with the -text option to req but are otherwise ignored at present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a horrible bug in enc_read() in crypto/evp/bio_enc.c: if the first data read consists of only the final block it would not decrypted because EVP_CipherUpdate() would correctly report zero bytes had been decrypted. A misplaced 'break' also meant the decrypted final block might not be copied until the next read. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DH_METHOD. Again based on RSA_METHOD. Also added a few extra parameters to the DH structure: these will be useful if for example we want the value of 'q' or implement X9.42 DH. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DSA_METHOD. This is based on the RSA_METHOD and provides hooks that allow the default DSA functions or functions on a "per key" basis to be replaced. This allows hardware acceleration and hardware key storage to be handled without major modification to the library. Also added low level modexp hooks and CRYPTO_EX structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new flag to memory BIOs, BIO_FLAG_MEM_RDONLY. This marks the BIO as "read only": it can't be written to and the buffer it points to will not be freed. Reading from a read only BIO is much more efficient than a normal memory BIO. This was added because there are several times when an area of memory needs to be read from a BIO. The previous method was to create a memory BIO and write the data to it, this results in two copies of the data and an O(n^2) reading algorithm. There is a new function BIO_new_mem_buf() which creates a read only memory BIO from an area of memory. Also modified the PKCS#7 routines to use read only memory BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read, but a retry condition occured while trying to read the rest. [Bodo Moeller] *) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as NID_pkcs7_encrypted by default: this was wrong since this should almost always be NID_pkcs7_data. Also modified the PKCS7_set_type() to handle the encrypted data type: this is a more sensible place to put it and it allows the PKCS#12 code to be tidied up that duplicated this functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Changed obj_dat.pl script so it takes its input and output files on the command line. This should avoid shell escape redirection problems under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included in things like Xenroll certificate requests. Included functions to allow extensions to be obtained and added. [Steve Henson] *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as CRLF (as required by many protocols). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3a and 0.9.4 [09 Aug 1999] *) Install libRSAglue.a when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) A few more ``#ifndef NO_FP_API / #endif'' pairs for consistency. [Andrija Antonijevic ] *) Fix -startdate and -enddate (which was missing) arguments to 'ca' program. [Steve Henson] *) New function DSA_dup_DH, which duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys (q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters contain its length). For 1024-bit p, DSA_generate_parameters followed by DSA_dup_DH is much faster than DH_generate_parameters (which creates parameters where p = 2*q + 1), and also the smaller q makes DH computations much more efficient (160-bit exponentiation instead of 1024-bit exponentiation); so this provides a convenient way to support DHE ciphersuites in SSL/TLS servers (see ssl/ssltest.c). It is of utter importance to use SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); or SSL_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); when such DH parameters are used, because otherwise small subgroup attacks may become possible! [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid memory leak in i2d_DHparams. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allow the -k option to be used more than once in the enc program: this allows the same encrypted message to be read by multiple recipients. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, no_name), this converts an ASN1_OBJECT to a text string. If the "no_name" parameter is set then it will always use the numerical form of the OID, even if it has a short or long name. [Steve Henson] *) Added an extra RSA flag: RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY. Previously the rsa_mod_exp method only got called if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp components were present, otherwise bn_mod_exp was called. In the case of hardware keys for example no private key components need be present and it might store extra data in the RSA structure, which cannot be accessed from bn_mod_exp. By setting RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY rsa_mod_exp will always be called for private key operations. [Steve Henson] *) Added support for SPARC Linux. [Andy Polyakov] *) pem_password_cb function type incompatibly changed from typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag); to ....(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata); so that applications can pass data to their callbacks: The PEM[_ASN1]_{read,write}... functions and macros now take an additional void * argument, which is just handed through whenever the password callback is called. [Damien Miller ; tiny changes by Bodo Moeller] New function SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata. Compatibility note: As many C implementations push function arguments onto the stack in reverse order, the new library version is likely to interoperate with programs that have been compiled with the old pem_password_cb definition (PEM_whatever takes some data that happens to be on the stack as its last argument, and the callback just ignores this garbage); but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this will work. *) The -DPLATFORM="\"$(PLATFORM)\"" definition and the similar -DCFLAGS=... (both in crypto/Makefile.ssl for use by crypto/cversion.c) caused problems not only on Windows, but also on some Unix platforms. To avoid problematic command lines, these definitions are now in an auto-generated file crypto/buildinf.h (created by crypto/Makefile.ssl for standard "make" builds, by util/mk1mf.pl for "mk1mf" builds). [Bodo Moeller] *) MIPS III/IV assembler module is reimplemented. [Andy Polyakov] *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and delete an unused file. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32, since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain. This is currently experimental but it seems to work OK and pass all the tests. Check out INSTALL.W32 for info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in s3_clnt.c: All non-anonymous SSL3/TLS1 connections without temporary keys kept an extra copy of the server key, and connections with temporary keys did not free everything in case of an error. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function RSA_check_key and new openssl rsa option -check for verifying the consistency of RSA keys. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) Various changes to make Win32 compile work: 1. Casts to avoid "loss of data" warnings in p5_crpt2.c 2. Change unsigned int to int in b_dump.c to avoid "signed/unsigned comparison" warnings. 3. Add sk__sort to DEF file generator and do make update. [Steve Henson] *) Add a debugging option to PKCS#5 v2 key generation function: when you #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 passwords, salts, iteration counts and derived keys are printed to stderr. [Steve Henson] *) Copy the flags in ASN1_STRING_dup(). [Roman E. Pavlov ] *) The x509 application mishandled signing requests containing DSA keys when the signing key was also DSA and the parameters didn't match. It was supposed to omit the parameters when they matched the signing key: the verifying software was then supposed to automatically use the CA's parameters if they were absent from the end user certificate. Omitting parameters is no longer recommended. The test was also the wrong way round! This was probably due to unusual behaviour in EVP_cmp_parameters() which returns 1 if the parameters match. This meant that parameters were omitted when they *didn't* match and the certificate was useless. Certificates signed with 'ca' didn't have this bug. [Steve Henson, reported by Doug Erickson ] *) Memory leak checking (-DCRYPTO_MDEBUG) had some problems. The interface is as follows: Applications can use CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) aka MemCheck_start(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) aka MemCheck_stop(); "off" is now the default. The library internally uses CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE) aka MemCheck_off(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) aka MemCheck_on() to disable memory-checking temporarily. Some inconsistent states that previously were possible (and were even the default) are now avoided. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME is new and additionally stores the current time with each memory chunk allocated; this is occasionally more helpful than just having a counter. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD is also new and adds the thread ID. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL enables all of the above, plus any future extensions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce "mode" for SSL structures (with defaults in SSL_CTX), which largely parallels "options", but is for changing API behaviour, whereas "options" are about protocol behaviour. Initial "mode" flags are: SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE Allow SSL_write to report success when a single record has been written. SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER Don't insist that SSL_write retries use the same buffer location. (But all of the contents must be copied!) [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options worked. *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc. [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington ] *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having to mess around with the internals of an RSA structure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in DSA_do_sign and DSA_is_prime. Also really enable memory leak checks in openssl.c and in some test programs. [Chad C. Mulligan, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() which can mess up the length of negative integers. This has now been simplified to just store the length when it is first determined and use it later, rather than trying to keep track of where data is copied and updating it to point to the end. [Steve Henson, reported by Brien Wheeler ] *) Add a new function PKCS7_signatureVerify. This allows the verification of a PKCS#7 signature but with the signing certificate passed to the function itself. This contrasts with PKCS7_dataVerify which assumes the certificate is present in the PKCS#7 structure. This isn't always the case: certificates can be omitted from a PKCS#7 structure and be distributed by "out of band" means (such as a certificate database). [Steve Henson] *) Complete the PEM_* macros with DECLARE_PEM versions to replace the function prototypes in pem.h, also change util/mkdef.pl to add the necessary function names. [Steve Henson] *) mk1mf.pl (used by Windows builds) did not properly read the options set by Configure in the top level Makefile, and Configure was not even able to write more than one option correctly. Fixed, now "no-idea no-rc5 -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG" etc. works as intended. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions CONF_load_bio() and CONF_load_fp() to allow a config file to be loaded from a BIO or FILE pointer. The BIO version will for example allow memory BIOs to contain config info. [Steve Henson] *) New function "CRYPTO_num_locks" that returns CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS. Whoever hopes to achieve shared-library compatibility across versions must use this, not the compile-time macro. (Exercise 0.9.4: Which is the minimum library version required by such programs?) Note: All this applies only to multi-threaded programs, others don't need locks. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add missing case to s3_clnt.c state machine -- one of the new SSL tests through a BIO pair triggered the default case, i.e. SSLerr(...,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE). [Bodo Moeller] *) New "BIO pair" concept (crypto/bio/bss_bio.c) so that applications can use the SSL library even if none of the specific BIOs is appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in i2d_DSAPublicKey() which meant it returned the wrong value for the encoded length. [Jeon KyoungHo ] *) Add initial documentation of the X509V3 functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new pair of functions PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() that are equivalent to PEM_write_PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() but use the more secure PKCS#8 private key format with a high iteration count. [Steve Henson] *) Fix determination of Perl interpreter: A perl or perl5 _directory_ in $PATH was also accepted as the interpreter. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix demos/sign/sign.c: well there wasn't anything strictly speaking wrong with it but it was very old and did things like calling PEM_ASN1_read() directly and used MD5 for the hash not to mention some unusual formatting. [Steve Henson] *) Fix demos/selfsign.c: it used obsolete and deleted functions, changed to use the new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the PEM_read/PEM_write functions in crypto/pem/pem_all.c with macros. This should make it easier to change their form, add extra arguments etc. Fix a few PEM prototypes which didn't have cipher as a constant. [Steve Henson] *) Add to configuration table a new entry that can specify an alternative name for unistd.h (for pre-POSIX systems); we need this for NeXTstep, according to Mark Crispin . [Bodo Moeller] #if 0 *) DES CBC did not update the IV. Weird. [Ben Laurie] #else des_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV, but des_ncbc_encrypt does. Changing the behaviour of the former might break existing programs -- where IV updating is needed, des_ncbc_encrypt can be used. #endif *) When bntest is run from "make test" it drives bc to check its calculations, as well as internally checking them. If an internal check fails, it needs to cause bc to give a non-zero result or make test carries on without noticing the failure. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) DES library cleanups. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit ciphers. NOTE: although the key derivation function has been verified against some published test vectors it has not been extensively tested yet. Added a -v2 "cipher" option to pkcs8 application to allow the use of v2.0. [Steve Henson] *) Instead of "mkdir -p", which is not fully portable, use new Perl script "util/mkdir-p.pl". [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite the way password based encryption (PBE) is handled. It used to assume that the ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier parameter was a PBEParameter structure. This was true for the PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 PBE algorithms but doesn't apply to PKCS#5 v2.0 where it can be something else. Now the 'parameter' field of the AlgorithmIdentifier is passed to the underlying key generation function so it must do its own ASN1 parsing. This has also changed the EVP_PBE_CipherInit() function which now has a 'parameter' argument instead of literal salt and iteration count values and the function EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit() has been deleted. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#5 v1.5 compatible password based encryption algorithms and PKCS#8 functionality. New 'pkcs8' application linked to openssl. Needed to change the PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY value which was just "PRIVATE KEY" because this clashed with PKCS#8 unencrypted string. Since this value was just used as a "magic string" and not used directly its value doesn't matter. [Steve Henson] *) Introduce some semblance of const correctness to BN. Shame C doesn't support mutable. [Ben Laurie] *) "linux-sparc64" configuration (ultrapenguin). [Ray Miller ] "linux-sparc" configuration. [Christian Forster ] *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers. [Ulf Möller] *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress). File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Support BS2000/OSD-POSIX. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Make callbacks for key generation use void * instead of char *. [Ben Laurie] *) Make S/MIME samples compile (not yet tested). [Ben Laurie] *) Additional typesafe stacks. [Ben Laurie] *) New configuration variants "bsdi-elf-gcc" (BSD/OS 4.x). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3 and 0.9.3a [29 May 1999] *) New configuration variant "sco5-gcc". *) Updated some demos. [Sean O Riordain, Wade Scholine] *) Add missing BIO_free at exit of pkcs12 application. [Wu Zhigang] *) Fix memory leak in conf.c. [Steve Henson] *) Updates for Win32 to assembler version of MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Set #! path to perl in apps/der_chop to where we found it instead of using a fixed path. [Bodo Moeller] *) SHA library changes for irix64-mips4-cc. [Andy Polyakov] *) Improvements for VMS support. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3 [24 May 1999] *) Bignum library bug fix. IRIX 6 passes "make test" now! This also avoids the problems with SC4.2 and unpatched SC5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) New functions sk_num, sk_value and sk_set to replace the previous macros. These are required because of the typesafe stack would otherwise break existing code. If old code used a structure member which used to be STACK and is now STACK_OF (for example cert in a PKCS7_SIGNED structure) with sk_num or sk_value it would produce an error because the num, data members are not present in STACK_OF. Now it just produces a warning. sk_set replaces the old method of assigning a value to sk_value (e.g. sk_value(x, i) = y) which the library used in a few cases. Any code that does this will no longer work (and should use sk_set instead) but this could be regarded as a "questionable" behaviour anyway. [Steve Henson] *) Fix most of the other PKCS#7 bugs. The "experimental" code can now correctly handle encrypted S/MIME data. [Steve Henson] *) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock (which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char) to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements), which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts. Introduce new type const_des_cblock. [Bodo Moeller] *) Reorganise the PKCS#7 library and get rid of some of the more obvious problems: find RecipientInfo structure that matches recipient certificate and initialise the ASN1 structures properly based on passed cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Belatedly make the BN tests actually check the results. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the encoding and decoding of negative ASN1 INTEGERS and conversion to and from BNs: it was completely broken. New compilation option NEG_PUBKEY_BUG to allow for some broken certificates that encode public key elements as negative integers. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganize and speed up MD5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) VMS support. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -out to asn1parse to allow the parsed structure to be output to a file. This is most useful when combined with the -strparse option to examine the output of things like OCTET STRINGS. [Steve Henson] *) Make SSL library a little more fool-proof by not requiring any longer that SSL_set_{accept,connect}_state be called before SSL_{accept,connect} may be used (SSL_set_..._state is omitted in many applications because usually everything *appeared* to work as intended anyway -- now it really works as intended). [Bodo Moeller] *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline'' with EGCS 1.1.2+ [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Various fixes to the EVP and PKCS#7 code. It may now be able to handle PKCS#7 enveloped data properly. [Sebastian Akerman , modified by Steve] *) Create a duplicate of the SSL_CTX's CERT in SSL_new instead of copying pointers. The cert_st handling is changed by this in various ways (and thus what used to be known as ctx->default_cert is now called ctx->cert, since we don't resort to s->ctx->[default_]cert any longer when s->cert does not give us what we need). ssl_cert_instantiate becomes obsolete by this change. As soon as we've got the new code right (possibly it already is?), we have solved a couple of bugs of the earlier code where s->cert was used as if it could not have been shared with other SSL structures. Note that using the SSL API in certain dirty ways now will result in different behaviour than observed with earlier library versions: Changing settings for an SSL_CTX *ctx after having done s = SSL_new(ctx) does not influence s as it used to. In order to clean up things more thoroughly, inside SSL_SESSION we don't use CERT any longer, but a new structure SESS_CERT that holds per-session data (if available); currently, this is the peer's certificate chain and, for clients, the server's certificate and temporary key. CERT holds only those values that can have meaningful defaults in an SSL_CTX. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509V3_EXT_i2d() to create an X509_EXTENSION structure from the internal representation. Various PKCS#7 fixes: remove some evil casts and set the enc_dig_alg field properly based on the signing key type. [Steve Henson] *) Allow PKCS#12 password to be set from the command line or the environment. Let 'ca' get its config file name from the environment variables "OPENSSL_CONF" or "SSLEAY_CONF" (for consistency with 'req' and 'x509'). [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate policies extension to use an IA5STRING for the organization field. This is contrary to the PKIX definition but VeriSign uses it and IE5 only recognises this form. Document 'x509' extension option. [Steve Henson] *) Add PEDANTIC compiler flag to allow compilation with gcc -pedantic, without disallowing inline assembler and the like for non-pedantic builds. [Ben Laurie] *) Support Borland C++ builder. [Janez Jere , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Support Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Sparc v8plus assembler for the bignum library. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) Update HPUX configuration. [Anonymous] *) Add missing sk__unshift() function to safestack.h [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) New function SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file that sets the "extra_cert"s in addition to the certificate. (This makes sense only for "PEM" format files, as chains as a whole are not DER-encoded.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Support verify_depth from the SSL API. x509_vfy.c had what can be considered an off-by-one-error: Its depth (which was not part of the external interface) was actually counting the number of certificates in a chain; now it really counts the depth. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix in crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c: The SSLerr macro was used instead of X509err, which often resulted in confusing error messages since the error codes are not globally unique (e.g. an alleged error in ssl3_accept when a certificate didn't match the private key). *) New function SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context that allows to set a default value (so that you don't need SSL_set_session_id_context for each connection using the SSL_CTX). [Bodo Moeller] *) OAEP decoding bug fix. [Ulf Möller] *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by David Harris. [Bodo Moeller] *) New Configure options "threads" and "no-threads". For systems where the proper compiler options are known (currently Solaris and Linux), "threads" is the default. [Bodo Moeller] *) New script util/mklink.pl as a faster substitute for util/mklink.sh. [Bodo Moeller] *) Install various scripts to $(OPENSSLDIR)/misc, not to $(INSTALLTOP)/bin -- they shouldn't clutter directories such as /usr/local/bin. [Bodo Moeller] *) "make linux-shared" to build shared libraries. [Niels Poppe ] *) New Configure option no- (rsa, idea, rc5, ...). [Ulf Möller] *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for extension adding in x509 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI prototypes. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR. [Ulf Möller] *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering, header rewriting and C source file generation. It should be much better than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all on one line (which resulted in some large lines...). [Steve Henson] *) Change #include filenames from to . [Bodo Moeller] *) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return 0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix some race conditions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for CRL distribution points extension. Add Certificate Policies and CRL distribution points documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of 8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix between OpenSSL and Baltimore C/SSL 2.0 and J/SSL 2.0. [Merlin Hughes ] *) Fix lots of warnings. [Richard Levitte ] *) In add_cert_dir() in crypto/x509/by_dir.c, break out of the loop if the directory spec didn't end with a LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix problems with sizeof(long) == 8. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Change functions to ANSI C. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix typos in error codes. [Martin Kraemer , Ulf Möller] *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Support for Certificate Policies extension: both print and set. Various additions to support the r2i method this uses. [Steve Henson] *) A lot of constification, and fix a bug in X509_NAME_oneline() that could return a const string when you are expecting an allocated buffer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for ASN1 types UTF8String and VISIBLESTRING, also the CHOICE types DirectoryString and DisplayText. [Steve Henson] *) Add code to allow r2i extensions to access the configuration database, add an LHASH database driver and add several ctx helper functions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix an evil bug in bn_expand2() which caused various BN functions to fail when they extended the size of a BIGNUM. [Steve Henson] *) Various utility functions to handle SXNet extension. Modify mkdef.pl to support typesafe stack. [Steve Henson] *) Fix typo in SSL_[gs]et_options(). [Nils Frostberg ] *) Delete various functions and files that belonged to the (now obsolete) old X509V3 handling code. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure option "rsaref". [Ulf Möller] *) Don't auto-generate pem.h. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce type-safe ASN.1 SETs. [Ben Laurie] *) Convert various additional casted stacks to type-safe STACK_OF() variants. [Ben Laurie, Ralf S. Engelschall, Steve Henson] *) Introduce type-safe STACKs. This will almost certainly break lots of code that links with OpenSSL (well at least cause lots of warnings), but fear not: the conversion is trivial, and it eliminates loads of evil casts. A few STACKed things have been converted already. Feel free to convert more. In the fullness of time, I'll do away with the STACK type altogether. [Ben Laurie] *) Add `openssl ca -revoke ' facility which revokes a certificate specified in by updating the entry in the index.txt file. This way one no longer has to edit the index.txt file manually for revoking a certificate. The -revoke option does the gory details now. [Massimiliano Pala , Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix `openssl crl -noout -text' combination where `-noout' killed the `-text' option at all and this way the `-noout -text' combination was inconsistent in `openssl crl' with the friends in `openssl x509|rsa|dsa'. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make sure a corresponding plain text error message exists for the X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED/23 error number which can occur when a verify callback function determined that a certificate was revoked. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl " for ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA. Also, test all available cipers including rc5, which was forgotten until now. In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command "openssl list-cipher-commands" is used. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: s_client occasionally would sleep in select() when it should have checked SSL_pending() first. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding. [Ulf Möller] *) Tweaks to Configure [Niels Poppe ] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 ASN1 PBES2 structures. No other support, yet... [Steve Henson] *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles. [Ulf Möller] *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386. The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486. [Ulf Möller] *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the same as SSL2_VERSION anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New "-showcerts" option for s_client. [Bodo Moeller] *) Still more PKCS#12 integration. Add pkcs12 application to openssl application. Various cleanups and fixes. [Steve Henson] *) More PKCS#12 integration. Add new pkcs12 directory with Makefile.ssl and modify error routines to work internally. Add error codes and PBE init to library startup routines. [Steve Henson] *) Further PKCS#12 integration. Added password based encryption, PKCS#8 and packing functions to asn1 and evp. Changed function names and error codes along the way. [Steve Henson] *) PKCS12 integration: and so it begins... First of several patches to slowly integrate PKCS#12 functionality into OpenSSL. Add PKCS#12 objects to objects.h [Steve Henson] *) Add a new 'indent' option to some X509V3 extension code. Initial ASN1 and display support for Thawte strong extranet extension. [Steve Henson] *) Add LinuxPPC support. [Jeff Dubrule ] *) Get rid of redundant BN file bn_mulw.c, and rename bn_div64 to bn_div_words in alpha.s. [Hannes Reinecke and Ben Laurie] *) Make sure the RSA OAEP test is skipped under -DRSAref because OAEP isn't supported when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Move definitions of IS_SET/IS_SEQUENCE inside crypto/asn1/asn1.h so they no longer are missing under -DNOPROTO. [Soren S. Jorvang ] Changes between 0.9.1c and 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999] *) Make SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() work in servers. Unfortunately, it still doesn't work when the session is reused. Coming soon! [Ben Laurie] *) Fix a security hole, that allows sessions to be reused in the wrong context thus bypassing client cert protection! All software that uses client certs and session caches in multiple contexts NEEDS PATCHING to allow session reuse! A fuller solution is in the works. [Ben Laurie, problem pointed out by Holger Reif, Bodo Moeller (and ???)] *) Some more source tree cleanups (removed obsolete files crypto/bf/asm/bf586.pl, test/test.txt and crypto/sha/asm/f.s; changed permission on "config" script to be executable) and a fix for the INSTALL document. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Remove some legacy and erroneous uses of malloc, free instead of Malloc, Free. [Lennart Bang , with minor changes by Steve] *) Make rsa_oaep_test return non-zero on error. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Add support for native Solaris shared libraries. Configure solaris-sparc-sc4-pic, make, then run shlib/solaris-sc4.sh. It'd be nice if someone would make that last step automatic. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) ctx_size was not built with the right compiler during "make links". Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the meaning of 'ALL' in the cipher list. It now means "everything except NULL ciphers". This means the default cipher list will no longer enable NULL ciphers. They need to be specifically enabled e.g. with the string "DEFAULT:eNULL". [Steve Henson] *) Fix to RSA private encryption routines: if p < q then it would occasionally produce an invalid result. This will only happen with externally generated keys because OpenSSL (and SSLeay) ensure p > q. [Steve Henson] *) Be less restrictive and allow also `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin/perl' in addition to `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin', because this way one can also use an interpreter named `perl5' (which is usually the name of Perl 5.xxx on platforms where an Perl 4.x is still installed as `perl'). [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Let util/clean-depend.pl work also with older Perl 5.00x versions. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparision to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener for the suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c. [Steve Henson] *) DES quad checksum was broken on big-endian architectures. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Comment out two functions in bio.h that aren't implemented. Fix up the Win32 test batch file so it (might) work again. The Win32 test batch file is horrible: I feel ill.... [Steve Henson] *) Move various #ifdefs around so NO_SYSLOG, NO_DIRENT etc are now selected in e_os.h. Audit of header files to check ANSI and non ANSI sections: 10 functions were absent from non ANSI section and not exported from Windows DLLs. Fixed up libeay.num for new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Make `openssl version' output lines consistent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix Win32 symbol export lists for BIO functions: Added BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_get_ex_num, BIO_get_ex_data and BIO_set_ex_data to ms/libeay{16,32}.def. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Second round of fixing the OpenSSL perl/ stuff. It now at least compiled fine under Unix and passes some trivial tests I've now added. But the whole stuff is horribly incomplete, so a README.1ST with a disclaimer was added to make sure no one expects that this stuff really works in the OpenSSL 0.9.2 release. Additionally I've started to clean the XS sources up and fixed a few little bugs and inconsistencies in OpenSSL.{pm,xs} and openssl_bio.xs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the generation of two part addresses in perl. [Kenji Miyake , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add config entry for Linux on MIPS. [John Tobey ] *) Make links whenever Configure is run, unless we are on Windoze. [Ben Laurie] *) Permit extensions to be added to CRLs using crl_section in openssl.cnf. Currently only issuerAltName and AuthorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure :
'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended to them (seperated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key with value
and ``perl Configure '' is called. So, when you want to perform a quick test-compile under FreeBSD 3.1 with pgcc and without assembler stuff you can use ``perl Configure "FreeBSD-elf:pgcc:-O6:::"'' now, which overrides the FreeBSD-elf entry on-the-fly. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Disable new TLS1 ciphersuites by default: they aren't official yet. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow DSO flags like -fpic, -fPIC, -KPIC etc. to be specified on the `perl Configure ...' command line. This way one can compile OpenSSL libraries with Position Independent Code (PIC) which is needed for linking it into DSOs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remarkably, export ciphers were totally broken and no-one had noticed! Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Cleaned up the LICENSE document: The official contact for any license questions now is the OpenSSL core team under openssl-core@openssl.org. And add a paragraph about the dual-license situation to make sure people recognize that _BOTH_ the OpenSSL license _AND_ the SSLeay license apply to the OpenSSL toolkit. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...' display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'. Additonally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Permit null encryption ciphersuites, used for authentication only. It used to be necessary to set the preprocessor define SSL_ALLOW_ENULL to do this. It is now necessary to set SSL_FORBID_ENULL to prevent the use of null encryption. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a bunch of fixes to the PKCS#7 stuff. It used to sometimes reorder signed attributes when verifying signatures (this would break them), the detached data encoding was wrong and public keys obtained using X509_get_pubkey() weren't freed. [Steve Henson] *) Add text documentation for the BUFFER functions. Also added a work around to a Win95 console bug. This was triggered by the password read stuff: the last character typed gets carried over to the next fread(). If you were generating a new cert request using 'req' for example then the last character of the passphrase would be CR which would then enter the first field as blank. [Steve Henson] *) Added the new `Includes OpenSSL Cryptography Software' button as doc/openssl_button.{gif,html} which is similar in style to the old SSLeay button and can be used by applications based on OpenSSL to show the relationship to the OpenSSL project. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remove confusing variables in function signatures in files ssl/ssl_lib.c and ssl/ssl.h. [Lennart Bong ] *) Don't install bss_file.c under PREFIX/include/ [Lennart Bong ] *) Get the Win32 compile working again. Modify mkdef.pl so it can handle functions that return function pointers and has support for NT specific stuff. Fix mk1mf.pl and VC-32.pl to support NT differences also. Various #ifdef WIN32 and WINNTs sprinkled about the place and some changes from unsigned to signed types: this was killing the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Add new certificate file to stack functions, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() and SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(). These largely supplant SSL_load_client_CA_file(), and can be used to add multiple certs easily to a stack (usually this is then handed to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list()). This means that Apache-SSL and similar packages don't have to mess around to add as many CAs as they want to the preferred list. [Ben Laurie] *) Experiment with doxygen documentation. Currently only partially applied to ssl/ssl_lib.c. See http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html, and run doxygen with openssl.doxy as the configuration file. [Ben Laurie] *) Get rid of remaining C++-style comments which strict C compilers hate. [Ralf S. Engelschall, pointed out by Carlos Amengual] *) Changed BN_RECURSION in bn_mont.c to BN_RECURSION_MONT so it is not compiled in by default: it has problems with large keys. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of SSL_xxx() functions for configuring the temporary RSA and DH private keys and/or callback functions which directly correspond to their SSL_CTX_xxx() counterparts but work on a per-connection basis. This is needed for applications which have to configure certificates on a per-connection basis (e.g. Apache+mod_ssl) instead of a per-context basis (e.g. s_server). For the RSA certificate situation is makes no difference, but for the DSA certificate situation this fixes the "no shared cipher" problem where the OpenSSL cipher selection procedure failed because the temporary keys were not overtaken from the context and the API provided no way to reconfigure them. The new functions now let applications reconfigure the stuff and they are in detail: SSL_need_tmp_RSA, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback. Additionally a new non-public-API function ssl_cert_instantiate() is used as a helper function and also to reduce code redundancy inside ssl_rsa.c. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Move s_server -dcert and -dkey options out of the undocumented feature area because they are useful for the DSA situation and should be recognized by the users. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the cipher decision scheme for export ciphers: the export bits are *not* within SSL_MKEY_MASK or SSL_AUTH_MASK, they are within SSL_EXP_MASK. So, the original variable has to be used instead of the already masked variable. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix 'port' variable from `int' to `unsigned int' in crypto/bio/b_sock.c [Richard Levitte ] *) Change type of another md_len variable in pk7_doit.c:PKCS7_dataFinal() from `int' to `unsigned int' because it's a length and initialized by EVP_DigestFinal() which expects an `unsigned int *'. [Richard Levitte ] *) Don't hard-code path to Perl interpreter on shebang line of Configure script. Instead use the usual Shell->Perl transition trick. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make `openssl x509 -noout -modulus' functional also for DSA certificates (in addition to RSA certificates) to match the behaviour of `openssl dsa -noout -modulus' as it's already the case for `openssl rsa -noout -modulus'. For RSA the -modulus is the real "modulus" while for DSA currently the public key is printed (a decision which was already done by `openssl dsa -modulus' in the past) which serves a similar purpose. Additionally the NO_RSA no longer completely removes the whole -modulus option; it now only avoids using the RSA stuff. Same applies to NO_DSA now, too. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Add Arne Ansper's reliable BIO - this is an encrypted, block-digested BIO. See the source (crypto/evp/bio_ok.c) for more info. [Arne Ansper ] *) Dump the old yucky req code that tried (and failed) to allow raw OIDs to be added. Now both 'req' and 'ca' can use new objects defined in the config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add cool BIO that does syslog (or event log on NT). [Arne Ansper , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add support for new TLS ciphersuites, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC4_56_MD5, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 and TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, as specified in "56-bit Export Cipher Suites For TLS", draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt. [Ben Laurie] *) Add preliminary config info for new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Make RSA_NO_PADDING really use no padding. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Generate errors when private/public key check is done. [Ben Laurie] *) Overhaul for 'crl' utility. New function X509_CRL_print. Partial support for some CRL extensions and new objects added. [Steve Henson] *) Really fix the ASN1 IMPLICIT bug this time... Partial support for private key usage extension and fuller support for authority key id. [Steve Henson] *) Add OAEP encryption for the OpenSSL crypto library. OAEP is the improved padding method for RSA, which is recommended for new applications in PKCS #1 v2.0 (RFC 2437, October 1998). OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) has better theoretical foundations than the ad-hoc padding used in PKCS #1 v1.5. It is secure against Bleichbacher's attack on RSA. [Ulf Moeller , reformatted, corrected and integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Updates to the new SSL compression code [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3 (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00 [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Run extensive memory leak checks on SSL apps. Fixed *lots* of memory leaks in ssl/ relating to new X509_get_pubkey() behaviour. Also fixes in apps/ and an unrelated leak in crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c [Steve Henson] *) Support for RAW extensions where an arbitrary extension can be created by including its DER encoding. See apps/openssl.cnf for an example. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure latest Perl versions don't interpret some generated C array code as Perl array code in the crypto/err/err_genc.pl script. [Lars Weber <3weber@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Modify ms/do_ms.bat to not generate assembly language makefiles since not many people have the assembler. Various Win32 compilation fixes and update to the INSTALL.W32 file with (hopefully) more accurate Win32 build instructions. [Steve Henson] *) Modify configure script 'Configure' to automatically create crypto/date.h file under Win32 and also build pem.h from pem.org. New script util/mkfiles.pl to create the MINFO file on environments that can't do a 'make files': perl util/mkfiles.pl >MINFO should work. [Steve Henson] *) Major rework of DES function declarations, in the pursuit of correctness and purity. As a result, many evil casts evaporated, and some weirdness, too. You may find this causes warnings in your code. Zapping your evil casts will probably fix them. Mostly. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for a typo in asn1.h. Bug fix to object creation script obj_dat.pl. It considered a zero in an object definition to mean "end of object": none of the objects in objects.h have any zeros so it wasn't spotted. [Steve Henson, reported by Erwann ABALEA ] *) Add support for Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output Feedback Masking (CBCM). In the absence of test vectors, the best I have been able to do is check that the decrypt undoes the encrypt, so far. Send me test vectors if you have them. [Ben Laurie] *) Correct calculation of key length for export ciphers (too much space was allocated for null ciphers). This has not been tested! [Ben Laurie] *) Modifications to the mkdef.pl for Win32 DEF file creation. The usage message is now correct (it understands "crypto" and "ssl" on its command line). There is also now an "update" option. This will update the util/ssleay.num and util/libeay.num files with any new functions. If you do a: perl util/mkdef.pl crypto ssl update it will update them. [Steve Henson] *) Overhauled the Perl interface (perl/*): - ported BN stuff to OpenSSL's different BN library - made the perl/ source tree CVS-aware - renamed the package from SSLeay to OpenSSL (the files still contain their history because I've copied them in the repository) - removed obsolete files (the test scripts will be replaced by better Test::Harness variants in the future) [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) First cut for a very conservative source tree cleanup: 1. merge various obsolete readme texts into doc/ssleay.txt where we collect the old documents and readme texts. 2. remove the first part of files where I'm already sure that we no longer need them because of three reasons: either they are just temporary files which were left by Eric or they are preserved original files where I've verified that the diff is also available in the CVS via "cvs diff -rSSLeay_0_8_1b" or they were renamed (as it was definitely the case for the crypto/md/ stuff). [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) More extension code. Incomplete support for subject and issuer alt name, issuer and authority key id. Change the i2v function parameters and add an extra 'crl' parameter in the X509V3_CTX structure: guess what that's for :-) Fix to ASN1 macro which messed up IMPLICIT tag and add f_enum.c which adds a2i, i2a for ENUMERATED. [Steve Henson] *) Preliminary support for ENUMERATED type. This is largely copied from the INTEGER code. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function, EVP_MD_CTX_copy() to replace frequent use of memcpy. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Make sure `make rehash' target really finds the `openssl' program. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Matthias Loepfe ] *) Squeeze another 7% of speed out of MD5 assembler, at least on a P2. I'd like to hear about it if this slows down other processors. [Ben Laurie] *) Add CygWin32 platform information to Configure script. [Alan Batie ] *) Fixed ms/32all.bat script: `no_asm' -> `no-asm' [Rainer W. Gerling ] *) New program nseq to manipulate netscape certificate sequences [Steve Henson] *) Modify crl2pkcs7 so it supports multiple -certfile arguments. Fix a few typos. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to BN code. Previously the default was to define BN_RECURSION but the BN code had some problems that would cause failures when doing certificate verification and some other functions. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add several PKIX and private extended key usage OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the 'ca' program to handle the new extension code. Modify openssl.cnf for new extension format, add comments. [Steve Henson] *) More X509 V3 changes. Fix typo in v3_bitstr.c. Add support to 'req' and add a sample to openssl.cnf so req -x509 now adds appropriate CA extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Continued X509 V3 changes. Add to other makefiles, integrate with the error code, add initial support to X509_print() and x509 application. [Steve Henson] *) Takes a deep breath and start addding X509 V3 extension support code. Add files in crypto/x509v3. Move original stuff to crypto/x509v3/old. All this stuff is currently isolated and isn't even compiled yet. [Steve Henson] *) Continuing patches for GeneralizedTime. Fix up certificate and CRL ASN1 to use ASN1_TIME and modify print routines to use ASN1_TIME_print. Removed the versions check from X509 routines when loading extensions: this allows certain broken certificates that don't set the version properly to be processed. [Steve Henson] *) Deal with irritating shit to do with dependencies, in YAAHW (Yet Another Ad Hoc Way) - Makefile.ssls now all contain local dependencies, which can still be regenerated with "make depend". [Ben Laurie] *) Spelling mistake in C version of CAST-128. [Ben Laurie, reported by Jeremy Hylton ] *) Changes to the error generation code. The perl script err-code.pl now reads in the old error codes and retains the old numbers, only adding new ones if necessary. It also only changes the .err files if new codes are added. The makefiles have been modified to only insert errors when needed (to avoid needlessly modifying header files). This is done by only inserting errors if the .err file is newer than the auto generated C file. To rebuild all the error codes from scratch (the old behaviour) either modify crypto/Makefile.ssl to pass the -regen flag to err_code.pl or delete all the .err files. [Steve Henson] *) CAST-128 was incorrectly implemented for short keys. The C version has been fixed, but is untested. The assembler versions are also fixed, but new assembler HAS NOT BEEN GENERATED FOR WIN32 - the Makefile needs fixing to regenerate it if needed. [Ben Laurie, reported (with fix for C version) by Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino ] *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c. [Ulf Möller ] *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. ASN1_TIME is the proper type used in certificates et al: it's just almost always a UTCTime. Note this patch adds new error codes so do a "make errors" if there are problems. [Steve Henson] *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config. [Ulf Möller ] *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca. [Anonymous ] *) Generate an error if given an empty string as a cert directory. Also generate an error if handed NULL (previously returned 0 to indicate an error, but didn't set one). [Ben Laurie, reported by Anonymous ] *) Add prototypes to SSL methods. Make SSL_write's buffer const, at last. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the dummy function BN_ref_mod_exp() in rsaref.c to have the correct parameters. This was causing a warning which killed off the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Remove C++ style comments from crypto/bn/bn_local.h. [Neil Costigan ] *) The function OBJ_txt2nid was broken. It was supposed to return a nid based on a text string, looking up short and long names and finally "dot" format. The "dot" format stuff didn't work. Added new function OBJ_txt2obj to do the same but return an ASN1_OBJECT and rewrote OBJ_txt2nid to use it. OBJ_txt2obj can also return objects even if the OID is not part of the table. [Steve Henson] *) Add prototypes to X509 lookup/verify methods, fixing a bug in X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(). [Ben Laurie] *) Sort openssl functions by name. [Ben Laurie] *) Get the gendsa program working (hopefully) and add it to app list. Remove encryption from sample DSA keys (in case anyone is interested the password was "1234"). [Steve Henson] *) Make _all_ *_free functions accept a NULL pointer. [Frans Heymans ] *) If a DH key is generated in s3_srvr.c, don't blow it by trying to use NULL pointers. [Anonymous ] *) s_server should send the CAfile as acceptable CAs, not its own cert. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Don't blow it for numeric -newkey arguments to apps/req. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Temp key "for export" tests were wrong in s3_srvr.c. [Anonymous ] *) Add prototype for temp key callback functions SSL_CTX_set_tmp_{rsa,dh}_callback(). [Ben Laurie] *) Make DH_free() tolerate being passed a NULL pointer (like RSA_free() and DSA_free()). Make X509_PUBKEY_set() check for errors in d2i_PublicKey(). [Steve Henson] *) X509_name_add_entry() freed the wrong thing after an error. [Arne Ansper ] *) rsa_eay.c would attempt to free a NULL context. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_s_socket() had a broken should_retry() on Windoze. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_f_buffer() didn't pass on BIO_CTRL_FLUSH. [Arne Ansper ] *) Make sure the already existing X509_STORE->depth variable is initialized in X509_STORE_new(), but document the fact that this variable is still unused in the certificate verification process. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the various library and apps files to free up pkeys obtained from X509_PUBKEY_get() et al. Also allow x509.c to handle netscape extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix reference counting in X509_PUBKEY_get(). This makes demos/maurice/example2.c work, amongst others, probably. [Steve Henson and Ben Laurie] *) First cut of a cleanup for apps/. First the `ssleay' program is now named `openssl' and second, the shortcut symlinks for the `openssl ' are no longer created. This way we have a single and consistent command line interface `openssl ', similar to `cvs '. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Paul Sutton and Ben Laurie] *) ca.c: move test for DSA keys inside #ifndef NO_DSA. Make pubkey BIT STRING wrapper always have zero unused bits. [Steve Henson] *) Add CA.pl, perl version of CA.sh, add extended key usage OID. [Steve Henson] *) Make the top-level INSTALL documentation easier to understand. [Paul Sutton] *) Makefiles updated to exit if an error occurs in a sub-directory make (including if user presses ^C) [Paul Sutton] *) Make Montgomery context stuff explicit in RSA data structure. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix build order of pem and err to allow for generated pem.h. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix renumbering bug in X509_NAME_delete_entry(). [Ben Laurie] *) Enhanced the err-ins.pl script so it makes the error library number global and can add a library name. This is needed for external ASN1 and other error libraries. [Steve Henson] *) Fixed sk_insert which never worked properly. [Steve Henson] *) Fix ASN1 macros so they can handle indefinite length construted EXPLICIT tags. Some non standard certificates use these: they can now be read in. [Steve Henson] *) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc) into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for the new set of documenation files. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they shared code with SEQUENCEs, which aren't coded the same. This means that almost everything to do with SETs or SEQUENCEs has either changed name or number of arguments. [Ben Laurie, based on a partial fix by GP Jayan ] *) Fix test data to work with the above. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems. [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller ] *) Autodetect FreeBSD3. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix various bugs in Configure. This affects the following platforms: nextstep ncr-scde unixware-2.0 unixware-2.0-pentium sco5-cc. [Ben Laurie] *) Eliminate generated files from CVS. Reorder tests to regenerate files before they are needed. [Ben Laurie] *) Generate Makefile.ssl from Makefile.org (to keep CVS happy). [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.1b and 0.9.1c [23-Dec-1998] *) Added OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to crypto/crypto.h and changed SSLeay to OpenSSL in version strings. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Some fixups to the top-level documents. [Paul Sutton] *) Fixed the nasty bug where rsaref.h was not found under compile-time because the symlink to include/ was missing. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay. [Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fixed nasty rehash problem under `make -f Makefile.ssl links' when "ssleay" is still not found. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added more platforms to Configure: Cray T3E, HPUX 11, [Ralf S. Engelschall, Beckmann ] *) Updated the README file. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various .cvsignore files in the CVS repository subdirs to make a "cvs update" really silent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Recompiled the error-definition header files and added missing symbols to the Win32 linker tables. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Cleaned up the top-level documents; o new files: CHANGES and LICENSE o merged VERSION, HISTORY* and README* files a CHANGES.SSLeay o merged COPYRIGHT into LICENSE o removed obsolete TODO file o renamed MICROSOFT to INSTALL.W32 [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Removed dummy files from the 0.9.1b source tree: crypto/asn1/x crypto/bio/cd crypto/bio/fg crypto/bio/grep crypto/bio/vi crypto/bn/asm/......add.c crypto/bn/asm/a.out crypto/dsa/f crypto/md5/f crypto/pem/gmon.out crypto/perlasm/f crypto/pkcs7/build crypto/rsa/f crypto/sha/asm/f crypto/threads/f ms/zzz ssl/f ssl/f.mak test/f util/f.mak util/pl/f util/pl/f.mak crypto/bf/bf_locl.old apps/f [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various platform portability fixes. [Mark J. Cox] *) The Genesis of the OpenSSL rpject: We start with the latest (unreleased) SSLeay version 0.9.1b which Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson created while they were working for C2Net until summer 1998. [The OpenSSL Project] Changes between 0.9.0b and 0.9.1b [not released] *) Updated a few CA certificates under certs/ [Eric A. Young] *) Changed some BIGNUM api stuff. [Eric A. Young] *) Various platform ports: OpenBSD, Ultrix, IRIX 64bit, NetBSD, DGUX x86, Linux Alpha, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) New COMP library [crypto/comp/] for SSL Record Layer Compression: RLE (dummy implemented) and ZLIB (really implemented when ZLIB is available). [Eric A. Young] *) Add -strparse option to asn1pars program which parses nested binary structures [Dr Stephen Henson ] *) Added "oid_file" to ssleay.cnf for "ca" and "req" programs. [Eric A. Young] *) DSA fix for "ca" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added "-genkey" option to "dsaparam" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added RIPE MD160 (rmd160) message digest. [Eric A. Young] *) Added -a (all) option to "ssleay version" command. [Eric A. Young] *) Added PLATFORM define which is the id given to Configure. [Eric A. Young] *) Added MemCheck_XXXX functions to crypto/mem.c for memory checking. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended the ASN.1 parser routines. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended BIO routines to support REUSEADDR, seek, tell, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) Added a BN_CTX to the BN library. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed the weak key values in DES library [Eric A. Young] *) Changed API in EVP library for cipher aliases. [Eric A. Young] *) Added support for RC2/64bit cipher. [Eric A. Young] *) Converted the lhash library to the crypto/mem.c functions. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more recognized ASN.1 object ids. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more RSA padding checks for SSL/TLS. [Eric A. Young] *) Added BIO proxy/filter functionality. [Eric A. Young] *) Added extra_certs to SSL_CTX which can be used send extra CA certificates to the client in the CA cert chain sending process. It can be configured with SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). [Eric A. Young] *) Now Fortezza is denied in the authentication phase because this is key exchange mechanism is not supported by SSLeay at all. [Eric A. Young] *) Additional PKCS1 checks. [Eric A. Young] *) Support the string "TLSv1" for all TLS v1 ciphers. [Eric A. Young] *) Added function SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() which gives the ex_data index of the SSL context in the X509_STORE_CTX ex_data. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed a few memory leaks. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed various code and comment typos. [Eric A. Young] *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0 bytes sent in the client random. [Edward Bishop ] Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/FREEBSD-upgrade =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/FREEBSD-upgrade (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/FREEBSD-upgrade (revision 340692) @@ -1,83 +1,83 @@ This contains various notes used to import a new OpenSSL version into the FreeBSD base system. It is not expected to be complete but just to contain some hints for imports. Note that this doesn't actually deal with getting OpenSSL to compile... XXX This file currently partly contain CVS and SVN instructions. First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports # Xlist setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://repo.freebsd.org/base" -setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2p -# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2p +setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2q +# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2q ###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _` cd /FreeBSD/work/openssl/merge fetch http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz \ http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz.asc gpg --verify openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz.asc openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz svn co $FSVN/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2 dist-1.0.2 tar -x -X $XLIST -f openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz cd dist-1.0.2 svn list -R | egrep -v -e '/$' -e '^FREEBSD-(Xlist|upgrade)$' | sort >../old cd ../openssl-${OSSLVER} find . -type f -or -type l | cut -c 3- | sort >../new cd .. # See that files to remove makes sense comm -23 old new # See that files to add makes sense comm -13 old new tar -cf - -C openssl-${OSSLVER} . | tar -xf - -C dist-1.0.2 cd dist-1.0.2 comm -23 ../old ../new | xargs svn rm # Make sure to remove empty directories comm -13 ../old ../new | xargs svn --parents add svn stat svn ci svn cp ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2 ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/$OSSLVER # Merge to head mkdir ../head cd ../head svn co $FSVN/head/crypto/openssl crypto/openssl svn merge ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2 crypto/openssl # Resolve conflicts manually svn co $FSVN/head/secure/lib/libcrypto secure/lib/libcrypto svn co $FSVN/head/secure/lib/libssl secure/lib/libssl svn co $FSVN/head/secure/usr.bin/openssl secure/usr.bin/openssl cd secure/lib/libcrypto # Update version number and release date in Makefile.inc # Update all opensslconf-${MACHINE_CPUARCH}.h # Regen assembly files if necessary make -f Makefile.asm all mv *.[Ss] ${MACHINE_CPUARCH} make -f Makefile.asm clean # Regen manual pages make man-makefile-update && make man-update cd ../libssl make man-makefile-update && make man-update cd ../../usr.bin/openssl make man-makefile-update && make man-update cd ../../.. # Commit! svn ci crypto/openssl secure/lib/libcrypto secure/lib/libssl secure/usr.bin/openssl -- simon@, jkim@ $FreeBSD$ Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/Makefile (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/Makefile (revision 340692) @@ -1,692 +1,692 @@ ### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure. ## ## Makefile for OpenSSL ## -VERSION=1.0.2p +VERSION=1.0.2q MAJOR=1 MINOR=0.2 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0 SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY= SHLIB_MAJOR=1 SHLIB_MINOR=0.0 -SHLIB_EXT= -PLATFORM=dist -OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-libunbound no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-ssl-trace no-ssl2 no-store no-unit-test no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine -CONFIGURE_ARGS=dist -SHLIB_TARGET= +SHLIB_EXT=.so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) +PLATFORM=linux-x86_64 +OPTIONS=-Wa,--noexecstack no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-libunbound no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-ssl-trace no-ssl2 no-store no-unit-test no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine +CONFIGURE_ARGS=linux-x86_64 -Wa,--noexecstack +SHLIB_TARGET=linux-shared # HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate # where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage, # and should probably not be bothered with at all. HERE=. # INSTALL_PREFIX is for package builders so that they can configure # for, say, /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/. # Normally it is left empty. INSTALL_PREFIX= INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl # NO_IDEA - Define to build without the IDEA algorithm # NO_RC4 - Define to build without the RC4 algorithm # NO_RC2 - Define to build without the RC2 algorithm # THREADS - Define when building with threads, you will probably also need any # system defines as well, i.e. _REENTERANT for Solaris 2.[34] # TERMIO - Define the termio terminal subsystem, needed if sgtty is missing. # TERMIOS - Define the termios terminal subsystem, Silicon Graphics. # LONGCRYPT - Define to use HPUX 10.x's long password modification to crypt(3). # DEVRANDOM - Give this the value of the 'random device' if your OS supports # one. 32 bytes will be read from this when the random # number generator is initalised. # SSL_FORBID_ENULL - define if you want the server to be not able to use the # NULL encryption ciphers. # # LOCK_DEBUG - turns on lots of lock debug output :-) # REF_CHECK - turn on some xyz_free() assertions. # REF_PRINT - prints some stuff on structure free. # CRYPTO_MDEBUG - turns on my 'memory leak' detecting stuff # MFUNC - Make all Malloc/Free/Realloc calls call # CRYPTO_malloc/CRYPTO_free/CRYPTO_realloc which can be setup to # call application defined callbacks via CRYPTO_set_mem_functions() # MD5_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for MD5 # SHA1_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for SHA1 # RMD160_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for RIPEMD160 # Do not define B_ENDIAN or L_ENDIAN if 'unsigned long' == 8. It must # equal 4. # PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests. -CC= cc -CFLAG= -O +CC= gcc +CFLAG= -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -Wa,--noexecstack -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -DRC4_ASM -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DAES_ASM -DVPAES_ASM -DBSAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS PEX_LIBS= -EX_LIBS= +EX_LIBS= -ldl EXE_EXT= ARFLAGS= AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r RANLIB= /usr/bin/ranlib RC= windres NM= nm PERL= /usr/bin/perl TAR= tar TARFLAGS= --no-recursion -MAKEDEPPROG= cc +MAKEDEPPROG= gcc LIBDIR=lib # We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in # order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture # dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC # gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus # and pass it down to assembler. AS=$(CC) -c ASFLAG=$(CFLAG) # For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support # the 80386. PROCESSOR= # CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets -CPUID_OBJ= mem_clr.o -BN_ASM= bn_asm.o -EC_ASM= +CPUID_OBJ= x86_64cpuid.o +BN_ASM= x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o rsaz_exp.o rsaz-x86_64.o rsaz-avx2.o +EC_ASM= ecp_nistz256.o ecp_nistz256-x86_64.o DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o -AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o +AES_ENC= aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o aesni-sha256-x86_64.o aesni-mb-x86_64.o BF_ENC= bf_enc.o CAST_ENC= c_enc.o -RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o +RC4_ENC= rc4-x86_64.o rc4-md5-x86_64.o RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o -MD5_ASM_OBJ= -SHA1_ASM_OBJ= +MD5_ASM_OBJ= md5-x86_64.o +SHA1_ASM_OBJ= sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o sha1-mb-x86_64.o sha256-mb-x86_64.o RMD160_ASM_OBJ= -WP_ASM_OBJ= wp_block.o -CMLL_ENC= camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o -MODES_ASM_OBJ= +WP_ASM_OBJ= wp-x86_64.o +CMLL_ENC= cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o +MODES_ASM_OBJ= ghash-x86_64.o aesni-gcm-x86_64.o ENGINES_ASM_OBJ= -PERLASM_SCHEME= +PERLASM_SCHEME= elf # KRB5 stuff KRB5_INCLUDES= LIBKRB5= # Zlib stuff ZLIB_INCLUDE= LIBZLIB= # TOP level FIPS install directory. FIPSDIR=/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0 # This is the location of fipscanister.o and friends. # The FIPS module build will place it $(INSTALLTOP)/lib # but since $(INSTALLTOP) can only take the default value # when the module is built it will be in /usr/local/ssl/lib # $(INSTALLTOP) for this build may be different so hard # code the path. FIPSLIBDIR= # The location of the library which contains fipscanister.o # normally it will be libcrypto unless fipsdso is set in which # case it will be libfips. If not compiling in FIPS mode at all # this is empty making it a useful test for a FIPS compile. FIPSCANLIB= # Shared library base address. Currently only used on Windows. # BASEADDR=0xFB00000 DIRS= crypto ssl engines apps test tools ENGDIRS= ccgost SHLIBDIRS= crypto ssl # dirs in crypto to build SDIRS= \ objects \ md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool \ des aes rc2 rc4 idea bf cast camellia seed modes \ bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \ buffer bio stack lhash rand err \ evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \ cms pqueue ts srp cmac # keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure # according to no-xxx arguments... # tests to perform. "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests # should be performed. TESTS = alltests MAKEFILE= Makefile MANDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/man MAN1=1 MAN3=3 MANSUFFIX= HTMLSUFFIX=html HTMLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/html SHELL=/bin/sh TOP= . ONEDIRS=out tmp EDIRS= times doc bugs util include certs ms shlib mt demos perl sf dep VMS WDIRS= windows LIBS= libcrypto.a libssl.a SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT) SHARED_LIBS= -SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS= -SHARED_LDFLAGS= +SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR) .so +SHARED_LDFLAGS=-m64 GENERAL= Makefile BASENAME= openssl NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION) TARFILE= ../$(NAME).tar EXHEADER= e_os2.h HEADER= e_os.h all: Makefile build_all # as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower # Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn # shell, which [annoyingly enough] terminates unset with error if VAR # is not present:-( TOP= && unset TOP is tribute to HP-UX /bin/sh, # which terminates unset with error if no variable was present:-( CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \ $${INCLUDE+INCLUDE} $${INCLUDES+INCLUDES} \ $${DIR+DIR} $${DIRS+DIRS} $${SRC+SRC} \ $${LIBSRC+LIBSRC} $${LIBOBJ+LIBOBJ} $${ALL+ALL} \ $${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER} \ $${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS} \ $${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS} \ $${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS} \ $${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \ $${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS} \ $${APPS+APPS} # LC_ALL=C ensures that error [and other] messages are delivered in # same language for uniform treatment. BUILDENV= LC_ALL=C PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)'\ CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \ AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \ AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \ RC='$(RC)' \ CROSS_COMPILE='$(CROSS_COMPILE)' \ PERL='$(PERL)' ENGDIRS='$(ENGDIRS)' \ SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' LIBRPATH='$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)' \ INSTALL_PREFIX='$(INSTALL_PREFIX)' \ INSTALLTOP='$(INSTALLTOP)' OPENSSLDIR='$(OPENSSLDIR)' \ LIBDIR='$(LIBDIR)' \ MAKEDEPEND='$$$${TOP}/util/domd $$$${TOP} -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)' \ DEPFLAG='-DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED $(DEPFLAG)' \ MAKEDEPPROG='$(MAKEDEPPROG)' \ SHARED_LDFLAGS='$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)' \ KRB5_INCLUDES='$(KRB5_INCLUDES)' LIBKRB5='$(LIBKRB5)' \ ZLIB_INCLUDE='$(ZLIB_INCLUDE)' LIBZLIB='$(LIBZLIB)' \ EXE_EXT='$(EXE_EXT)' SHARED_LIBS='$(SHARED_LIBS)' \ SHLIB_EXT='$(SHLIB_EXT)' SHLIB_TARGET='$(SHLIB_TARGET)' \ PEX_LIBS='$(PEX_LIBS)' EX_LIBS='$(EX_LIBS)' \ CPUID_OBJ='$(CPUID_OBJ)' BN_ASM='$(BN_ASM)' \ EC_ASM='$(EC_ASM)' DES_ENC='$(DES_ENC)' \ AES_ENC='$(AES_ENC)' CMLL_ENC='$(CMLL_ENC)' \ BF_ENC='$(BF_ENC)' CAST_ENC='$(CAST_ENC)' \ RC4_ENC='$(RC4_ENC)' RC5_ENC='$(RC5_ENC)' \ SHA1_ASM_OBJ='$(SHA1_ASM_OBJ)' \ MD5_ASM_OBJ='$(MD5_ASM_OBJ)' \ RMD160_ASM_OBJ='$(RMD160_ASM_OBJ)' \ WP_ASM_OBJ='$(WP_ASM_OBJ)' \ MODES_ASM_OBJ='$(MODES_ASM_OBJ)' \ ENGINES_ASM_OBJ='$(ENGINES_ASM_OBJ)' \ PERLASM_SCHEME='$(PERLASM_SCHEME)' \ FIPSLIBDIR='${FIPSLIBDIR}' \ FIPSDIR='${FIPSDIR}' \ FIPSCANLIB="$${FIPSCANLIB:-$(FIPSCANLIB)}" \ THIS=$${THIS:-$@} MAKEFILE=Makefile MAKEOVERRIDES= # MAKEOVERRIDES= effectively "equalizes" GNU-ish and SysV-ish make flavors, # which in turn eliminates ambiguities in variable treatment with -e. # BUILD_CMD is a generic macro to build a given target in a given # subdirectory. The target must be given through the shell variable # `target' and the subdirectory to build in must be given through `dir'. # This macro shouldn't be used directly, use RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD or # BUILD_ONE_CMD instead. # # BUILD_ONE_CMD is a macro to build a given target in a given # subdirectory if that subdirectory is part of $(DIRS). It requires # exactly the same shell variables as BUILD_CMD. # # RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD is a macro to build a given target in all # subdirectories defined in $(DIRS). It requires that the target # is given through the shell variable `target'. BUILD_CMD= if [ -d "$$dir" ]; then \ ( cd $$dir && echo "making $$target in $$dir..." && \ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. DIR=$$dir $$target \ ) || exit 1; \ fi RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD=for dir in $(DIRS); do $(BUILD_CMD); done BUILD_ONE_CMD=\ if expr " $(DIRS) " : ".* $$dir " >/dev/null 2>&1; then \ $(BUILD_CMD); \ fi reflect: @[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV) sub_all: build_all build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc build_crypto: @dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_ssl: build_crypto @dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_engines: build_crypto @dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_apps: build_libs @dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_tests: build_libs @dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_tools: build_libs @dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps build_testapps: @dir=crypto; target=testapps; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT): libcrypto.a [ -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] || $(CC) $(CFLAG) -Iinclude \ -DFINGERPRINT_PREMAIN_DSO_LOAD -o $@ \ $(FIPSLIBDIR)fips_premain.c $(FIPSLIBDIR)fipscanister.o \ libcrypto.a $(EX_LIBS) libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \ if [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libcrypto" ]; then \ FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO=libcrypto.a ; \ FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \ export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \ fi; \ $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \ (touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \ else \ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \ exit 1; \ fi libssl$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) libssl.a @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \ $(MAKE) SHLIBDIRS=ssl SHLIBDEPS='-lcrypto' build-shared; \ else \ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \ exit 1; \ fi clean-shared: @set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \ if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)" ]; then \ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)"; \ for j in $${tmp:-x}; do \ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$$j ); \ done; \ fi; \ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) ); \ if expr "$(PLATFORM)" : "Cygwin" >/dev/null; then \ ( set -x; rm -f cyg$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT).a ); \ fi; \ done link-shared: @ set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \ $(MAKE) -f $(HERE)/Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \ symlink.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \ libs="$$libs -l$$i"; \ done build-shared: do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared do_$(SHLIB_TARGET): @ set -e; libs='-L. $(SHLIBDEPS)'; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \ if [ "$$i" = "ssl" -a -n "$(LIBKRB5)" ]; then \ libs="$(LIBKRB5) $$libs"; \ fi; \ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \ LIBDEPS="$$libs $(EX_LIBS)" \ link_a.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \ libs="-l$$i $$libs"; \ done libcrypto.pc: Makefile @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \ echo 'enginesdir=$${libdir}/engines'; \ echo ''; \ echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \ echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \ echo 'Requires: '; \ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc libssl.pc: Makefile @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \ echo ''; \ echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libssl'; \ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \ echo 'Requires.private: libcrypto'; \ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl'; \ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc openssl.pc: Makefile @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \ echo ''; \ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \ echo 'Requires: libssl libcrypto' ) > openssl.pc Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config @echo "Makefile is older than Makefile.org, Configure or config." @echo "Reconfigure the source tree (via './config' or 'perl Configure'), please." @false libclean: rm -f *.map *.so *.so.* *.dylib *.dll engines/*.so engines/*.dll engines/*.dylib *.a engines/*.a */lib */*/lib clean: libclean rm -f shlib/*.o *.o core a.out fluff rehash.time testlog make.log cctest cctest.c @set -e; target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) rm -f $(LIBS) rm -f openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc rm -f speed.* .pure rm -f $(TARFILE) @set -e; for i in $(ONEDIRS) ;\ do \ rm -fr $$i/*; \ done distclean: clean -$(RM) `find . -name .git -prune -o -type l -print` $(RM) apps/CA.pl $(RM) test/evptests.txt test/newkey.pem test/testkey.pem test/testreq.pem $(RM) tools/c_rehash $(RM) crypto/opensslconf.h $(RM) Makefile Makefile.bak makefile.one: files $(PERL) util/mk1mf.pl >makefile.one; \ sh util/do_ms.sh files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile > $(TOP)/MINFO @set -e; target=files; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl include/openssl @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @set -e; target=links; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) gentests: @(cd test && echo "generating dummy tests (if needed)..." && \ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on generate ); dclean: rm -rf *.bak include/openssl certs/.0 @set -e; target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) rehash: rehash.time rehash.time: certs apps @if [ -z "$(CROSS_COMPILE)" ]; then \ (OPENSSL="`pwd`/util/opensslwrap.sh"; \ [ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \ OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \ export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \ $(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \ touch rehash.time; \ else :; fi test: tests tests: rehash @(cd test && echo "testing..." && \ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on OPENSSL_CONF=../apps/openssl.cnf tests ); OPENSSL_CONF=apps/openssl.cnf util/opensslwrap.sh version -a report: @$(PERL) util/selftest.pl update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) depend: @set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) lint: @set -e; target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) tags: rm -f TAGS find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a errors: $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write (cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors) stacks: $(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write util/libeay.num:: $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl crypto update util/ssleay.num:: $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update TABLE: Configure (echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \ $(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE # Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is # pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal # tar does not support the --files-from option. TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from $(TARFILE).list \ --owner 0 --group 0 \ --transform 's|^|$(NAME)/|' \ -cvf - $(TARFILE).list: find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \ \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \ \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \ \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \ | sort > $(TARFILE).list tar: $(TARFILE).list find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755 find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best > $(TARFILE).gz rm -f $(TARFILE).list ls -l $(TARFILE).gz tar-snap: $(TARFILE).list $(TAR_COMMAND) > $(TARFILE) rm -f $(TARFILE).list ls -l $(TARFILE) dist: $(PERL) Configure dist @$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' $(DISTTARVARS) tar install: all install_docs install_sw install_sw: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/engines \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private @set -e; headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist;\ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; @set -e; target=install; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) @set -e; liblist="$(LIBS)"; for i in $$liblist ;\ do \ if [ -f "$$i" ]; then \ ( echo installing $$i; \ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ $(RANLIB) $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i ); \ fi; \ done; @set -e; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS)"; \ for i in $${tmp:-x}; \ do \ if [ -f "$$i" -o -f "$$i.a" ]; then \ ( echo installing $$i; \ if expr "$(PLATFORM)" : "Cygwin" >/dev/null; then \ c=`echo $$i | sed 's/^lib\(.*\)\.dll\.a/cyg\1-$(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER).dll/'`; \ cp $$c $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c; \ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \ else \ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ chmod 555 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \ fi ); \ if expr $(PLATFORM) : 'mingw' > /dev/null; then \ ( case $$i in \ *crypto*) i=libeay32.dll;; \ *ssl*) i=ssleay32.dll;; \ esac; \ echo installing $$i; \ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i ); \ fi; \ fi; \ done; \ ( here="`pwd`"; \ cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR); \ $(MAKE) -f $$here/Makefile HERE="$$here" link-shared ); \ if [ "$(INSTALLTOP)" != "/usr" ]; then \ echo 'OpenSSL shared libraries have been installed in:'; \ echo ' $(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo ''; \ sed -e '1,/^$$/d' doc/openssl-shared.txt; \ fi; \ fi cp libcrypto.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc cp libssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc cp openssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc install_html_docs: here="`pwd`"; \ filecase=; \ case "$(PLATFORM)" in DJGPP|Cygwin*|mingw*|darwin*-*-cc) \ filecase=-i; \ esac; \ for subdir in apps crypto ssl; do \ mkdir -p $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \ for i in doc/$$subdir/*.pod; do \ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \ echo "installing html/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX)"; \ cat $$i \ | sed -r 's/L<([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?\|([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?>/L<\1|\3>/g' \ | pod2html --podroot=doc --htmlroot=.. --podpath=apps:crypto:ssl \ | sed -r 's/ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX); \ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \ grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$" | \ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \ while read n; do \ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX) "$$n".$(HTMLSUFFIX); \ done); \ done; \ done install_docs: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man1 \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7 @pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \ here="`pwd`"; \ filecase=; \ case "$(PLATFORM)" in DJGPP|Cygwin*|mingw*|darwin*-*-cc) \ filecase=-i; \ esac; \ set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \ sh -c "$$pod2man \ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \ while read n; do \ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ done); \ done; \ set -e; for i in doc/crypto/*.pod doc/ssl/*.pod; do \ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 3 < $$i`; \ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \ sh -c "$$pod2man \ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \ while read n; do \ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ done); \ done # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/NEWS =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/NEWS (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/NEWS (revision 340692) @@ -1,823 +1,828 @@ NEWS ==== This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2p and OpenSSL 1.0.2q [20 Nov 2018] + + o Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication (CVE-2018-5407) + o Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0734) + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2o and OpenSSL 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018] o Client DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732) o Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation (CVE-2018-0737) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2n and OpenSSL 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018] o Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack (CVE-2018-0739) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2m and OpenSSL 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017] o Read/write after SSL object in error state (CVE-2017-3737) o rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2l and OpenSSL 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017] o bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736) o Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read (CVE-2017-3735) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2k and OpenSSL 1.0.2l [25 May 2017] o config now recognises 64-bit mingw and chooses mingw64 instead of mingw Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2j and OpenSSL 1.0.2k [26 Jan 2017] o Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731) o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3732) o Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2i and OpenSSL 1.0.2j [26 Sep 2016] o Missing CRL sanity check (CVE-2016-7052) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2h and OpenSSL 1.0.2i [22 Sep 2016] o OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304) o SWEET32 Mitigation (CVE-2016-2183) o OOB write in MDC2_Update() (CVE-2016-6303) o Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS (CVE-2016-6302) o OOB write in BN_bn2dec() (CVE-2016-2182) o OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() (CVE-2016-2180) o Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour (CVE-2016-2177) o Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing (CVE-2016-2178) o DTLS buffered message DoS (CVE-2016-2179) o DTLS replay protection DoS (CVE-2016-2181) o Certificate message OOB reads (CVE-2016-6306) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2g and OpenSSL 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107) o Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105) o Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2106) o Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation (CVE-2016-2109) o EBCDIC overread (CVE-2016-2176) o Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. o Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the default. o Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL. o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers (CVE-2016-0800) o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705) o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak (CVE-2016-0798) o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption (CVE-2016-0797) o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799) o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701) o SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193) o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194) o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195) o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793) o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788) o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789) o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790) o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792) o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291) o Multiblock corrupted pointer fix (CVE-2015-0290) o Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix (CVE-2015-0207) o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286) o Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix (CVE-2015-0208) o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287) o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289) o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293) o Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix (CVE-2015-1787) o Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix (CVE-2015-0285) o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209) o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288) o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]: o Suite B support for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 o Support for DTLS 1.2 o TLS automatic EC curve selection. o API to set TLS supported signature algorithms and curves o SSL_CONF configuration API. o TLS Brainpool support. o ALPN support. o CMS support for RSA-PSS, RSA-OAEP, ECDH and X9.42 DH. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1k and OpenSSL 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] o Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1j and OpenSSL 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] o Fix for CVE-2014-3571 o Fix for CVE-2015-0206 o Fix for CVE-2014-3569 o Fix for CVE-2014-3572 o Fix for CVE-2015-0204 o Fix for CVE-2015-0205 o Fix for CVE-2014-8275 o Fix for CVE-2014-3570 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-3513 o Fix for CVE-2014-3567 o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability) o Fix for CVE-2014-3568 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-3512 o Fix for CVE-2014-3511 o Fix for CVE-2014-3510 o Fix for CVE-2014-3507 o Fix for CVE-2014-3506 o Fix for CVE-2014-3505 o Fix for CVE-2014-3509 o Fix for CVE-2014-5139 o Fix for CVE-2014-3508 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-0224 o Fix for CVE-2014-0221 o Fix for CVE-2014-0198 o Fix for CVE-2014-0195 o Fix for CVE-2014-3470 o Fix for CVE-2010-5298 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-0160 o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers. o Fix for CVE-2014-0076 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353 o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449 o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]: o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]: o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version. o Include the fips configuration module. o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166 o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169 o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]: o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333 o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]: o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms. o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode. o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]: o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110 o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos. o Fix SEGV in AES code. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]: o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support. o SCTP support. o RFC 5705 TLS key material exporter. o RFC 5764 DTLS-SRTP negotiation. o Next Protocol Negotiation. o PSS signatures in certificates, requests and CRLs. o Support for password based recipient info for CMS. o Support TLS v1.2 and TLS v1.1. o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module. o SRP support. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]: o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884 o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619 o Various DTLS fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108 o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576 o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619 o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027 o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]: o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207 o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210 o Protection against EC timing attacks. o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms. o Various DTLS fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180 o Fix for CVE-2010-4252 o Fix mishandling of absent EC point format extension. o Fix various platform compilation issues. o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. o Fix for CVE-2010-2939 o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633. o GOST MAC and CFB fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]: o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests. o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs. o Change default private key format to PKCS#8. o CMS support: able to process all examples in RFC4134 o Streaming ASN1 encode support for PKCS#7 and CMS. o Multiple signer and signer add support for PKCS#7 and CMS. o ASN1 printing support. o Whirlpool hash algorithm added. o RFC3161 time stamp support. o New generalised public key API supporting ENGINE based algorithms. o New generalised public key API utilities. o New ENGINE supporting GOST algorithms. o SSL/TLS GOST ciphersuite support. o PKCS#7 and CMS GOST support. o RFC4279 PSK ciphersuite support. o Supported points format extension for ECC ciphersuites. o ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types. o dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256 signature types. o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support. o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]: o CFB cipher definition fixes. o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]: o Cipher definition fixes. o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions. o Remove MD2 from algorithm tables. o SPKAC handling fixes. o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension. o Compression memory leak fixed. o Compression session resumption fixed. o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes. o Many fixes to DTLS handling. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]: o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]: o Fix various build issues. o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]: o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077) o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]: o CryptoAPI ENGINE support. o Various precautionary measures. o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation. o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]: o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8. o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]: o Add gcc 4.2 support. o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization for VC++ build. o Support for RFC4507bis and server name extensions if explicitly selected at compile time. o DTLS improvements. o RFC4507bis support. o TLS Extensions support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]: o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. o RFC3779 support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 o New cipher Camellia Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]: o Cipher string fixes. o Fixes for VC++ 2005. o Updated ECC cipher suite support. o New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(). o Zlib compression usage fixes. o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32. o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Extended Windows CE support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]: o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This is the result of a major audit of the BIGNUM library. o Addition of BIGNUM functions for fields GF(2^m) and NIST curves, to support the Elliptic Crypto functions. o Major work on Elliptic Crypto; ECDH and ECDSA added, including the use through EVP, X509 and ENGINE. o New ASN.1 mini-compiler that's usable through the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for ASN.1 indefinite length constructed encoding. o New PKCS#12 'medium level' API to manipulate PKCS#12 files. o Complete rework of shared library construction and linking programs with shared or static libraries, through a separate Makefile.shared. o Rework of the passing of parameters from one Makefile to another. o Changed ENGINE framework to load dynamic engine modules automatically from specifically given directories. o New structure and ASN.1 functions for CertificatePair. o Changed the ZLIB compression method to be stateful. o Changed the key-generation and primality testing "progress" mechanism to take a structure that contains the ticker function and an argument. o New engine module: GMP (performs private key exponentiation). o New engine module: VIA PadLOck ACE extension in VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. o Added support for IPv6 addresses in certificate extensions. See RFC 1884, section 2.2. o Added support for certificate policy mappings, policy constraints and name constraints. o Added support for multi-valued AVAs in the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for multiple certificates with the same subject in the 'openssl ca' index file. o Make it possible to create self-signed certificates using 'openssl ca -selfsign'. o Make it possible to generate a serial number file with 'openssl ca -create_serial'. o New binary search functions with extended functionality. o New BUF functions. o New STORE structure and library to provide an interface to all sorts of data repositories. Supports storage of public and private keys, certificates, CRLs, numbers and arbitrary blobs. This library is unfortunately unfinished and unused withing OpenSSL. o New control functions for the error stack. o Changed the PKCS#7 library to support one-pass S/MIME processing. o Added the possibility to compile without old deprecated functionality with the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED macro or the 'no-deprecated' argument to the config and Configure scripts. o Constification of all ASN.1 conversion functions, and other affected functions. o Improved platform support for PowerPC. o New FIPS 180-2 algorithms (SHA-224, -256, -384 and -512). o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parametrisation of X.509 path validation. o Major overhaul of RC4 performance on Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. o Changed the Configure script to have some algorithms disabled by default. Those can be explicitely enabled with the new argument form 'enable-xxx'. o Change the default digest in 'openssl' commands from MD5 to SHA-1. o Added support for DTLS. o New BIGNUM blinding. o Added support for the RSA-PSS encryption scheme o Added support for the RSA X.931 padding. o Added support for BSD sockets on NetWare. o Added support for files larger than 2GB. o Added initial support for Win64. o Added alternate pkg-config files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]: o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking. o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]: o Visual C++ 2005 fixes. o Update Windows build system for FIPS. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]: o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]: o More compilation issues fixed. o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API. o Enhanced or corrected configuration for Solaris64, Mingw and Cygwin. o Enhanced x86_64 assembler BIGNUM module. o More constification. o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]: o Several compilation issues fixed. o Many memory allocation failure checks added. o Improved comparison of X509 Name type. o Mandatory basic checks on certificates. o Performance improvements. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]: o Fix race condition in CRL checking code. o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]: o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() o Allow multiple active certificates with same subject in CA index o Multiple X509 verification fixes o Speed up HMAC and other operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility. o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Configuration: Irix fixes, AIX fixes, better mingw support. o Support for new platforms: linux-ia64-ecc. o Build: shared library support fixes. o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly. o Documentation: fixes and additions. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]: o Security: Important security related bugfixes. o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos. o Can be built without the ENGINE framework. o IA32 assembler enhancements. o Support for new platforms: FreeBSD/IA64 and FreeBSD/Sparc64. o Configuration: the no-err option now works properly. o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building. o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]: o New library section OCSP. o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code. o CRL checking in verify code and openssl utility. o Extension copying in 'ca' utility. o Flexible display options in 'ca' utility. o Provisional support for international characters with UTF8. o Support for external crypto devices ('engine') is no longer a separate distribution. o New elliptic curve library section. o New AES (Rijndael) library section. o Support for new platforms: Windows CE, Tandem OSS, A/UX, AIX 64-bit, Linux x86_64, Linux 64-bit on Sparc v9 o Extended support for some platforms: VxWorks o Enhanced support for shared libraries. o Now only builds PIC code when shared library support is requested. o Support for pkg-config. o Lots of new manuals. o Makes symbolic links to or copies of manuals to cover all described functions. o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also against libdes providing similar functions having the same name). Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the future). o Unify handling of cryptographic algorithms (software and engine) to be available via EVP routines for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers. o NCONF: new configuration handling routines. o Change API to use more 'const' modifiers to improve error checking and help optimizers. o Finally remove references to RSAref. o Reworked parts of the BIGNUM code. o Support for new engines: Broadcom ubsec, Accelerated Encryption Processing, IBM 4758. o A few new engines added in the demos area. o Extended and corrected OID (object identifier) table. o PRNG: query at more locations for a random device, automatic query for EGD style random sources at several locations. o SSL/TLS: allow optional cipher choice according to server's preference. o SSL/TLS: allow server to explicitly set new session ids. o SSL/TLS: support Kerberos cipher suites (RFC2712). Only supports MIT Kerberos for now. o SSL/TLS: allow more precise control of renegotiations and sessions. o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages. o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Build: shared library support fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]: o Important security related bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]: o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX. o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes. o Better handling of SSL session caching. o Better comparison of distinguished names. o Better handling of shared libraries in a mixed GNU/non-GNU environment. o Support assembler code with Borland C. o Fixes for length problems. o Fixes for uninitialised variables. o Fixes for memory leaks, some unusual crashes and some race conditions. o Fixes for smaller building problems. o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]: o Important building fixes on Unix. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]: o Various important bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]: o Important security related bugfixes. o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o BIGNUM library fixes. o RSA OAEP and random number generation fixes. o Object identifiers corrected and added. o Add assembler BN routines for IA64. o Add support for OS/390 Unix, UnixWare with gcc, OpenUNIX 8, MIPS Linux; shared library support for Irix, HP-UX. o Add crypto accelerator support for AEP, Baltimore SureWare, Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver [in 0.9.6c-engine release]. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]: o Security fix: PRNG improvements. o Security fix: RSA OAEP check. o Security fix: Reinsert and fix countermeasure to Bleichbacher's attack. o MIPS bug fix in BIGNUM. o Bug fix in "openssl enc". o Bug fix in X.509 printing routine. o Bug fix in DSA verification routine and DSA S/MIME verification. o Bug fix to make PRNG thread-safe. o Bug fix in RAND_file_name(). o Bug fix in compatibility mode trust settings. o Bug fix in blowfish EVP. o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter. o Compatibility fixes in some scripts. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]: o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using environment variables when running as root. o Security fix: check the result of RSA-CRT to reduce the possibility of deducing the private key from an incorrectly calculated signature. o Security fix: prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. o Security fix: Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. o Reimplement SSL_peek(), which had various problems. o Compatibility fix: the function des_encrypt() renamed to des_encrypt1() to avoid clashes with some Unixen libc. o Bug fixes for Win32, HP/UX and Irix. o Bug fixes in BIGNUM, SSL, PKCS#7, PKCS#12, X.509, CONF and memory checking routines. o Bug fixes for RSA operations in threaded environments. o Bug fixes in misc. openssl applications. o Remove a few potential memory leaks. o Add tighter checks of BIGNUM routines. o Shared library support has been reworked for generality. o More documentation. o New function BN_rand_range(). o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]: o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries. o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers. o New sign and verify options to 'dgst' application. o Support for DER and PEM encoded messages in 'smime' application. o New 'rsautl' application, low level RSA utility. o MD4 now included. o Bugfix for SSL rollback padding check. o Support for external crypto devices [1]. o Enhanced EVP interface. [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate distribution. See the file README.ENGINE. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]: o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8 o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc o Support of Linux/IA64 o Assembler support for Mingw32 o New 'rand' application o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]: o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application o Automation of 'req' application o Fixes to make s_client, s_server work under Windows o Support for multiple fieldnames in SPKACs o New SPKAC command line utilty and associated library functions o Options to allow passwords to be obtained from various sources o New public key PEM format and options to handle it o Many other fixes and enhancements to command line utilities o Usable certificate chain verification o Certificate purpose checking o Certificate trust settings o Support of authority information access extension o Extensions in certificate requests o Simplified X509 name and attribute routines o Initial (incomplete) support for international character sets o New DH_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and enhanced RSA_METHOD o Read only memory BIOs and simplified creation function o TLS/SSL protocol bugfixes: Accept TLS 'client hello' in SSL 3.0 record; allow fragmentation and interleaving of handshake and other data o TLS/SSL code now "tolerates" MS SGC o Work around for Netscape client certificate hang bug o RSA_NULL option that removes RSA patent code but keeps other RSA functionality o Memory leak detection now allows applications to add extra information via a per-thread stack o PRNG robustness improved o EGD support o BIGNUM library bug fixes o Faster DSA parameter generation o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux o Experimental MacOS support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]: o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used by several software packages and are more secure than the standard form o PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation o Password callbacks have a new void * argument for application data o Avoid various memory leaks o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O must be handled by the application (BIO pair) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]: o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism o RSA OEAP related fixes o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate o Source cleanups: const correctness, type-safe stacks and ASN.1 SETs o Source tree cleanups: removed lots of obsolete files o Thawte SXNet, certificate policies and CRL distribution points extension support o Preliminary (experimental) S/MIME support o Support for ASN.1 UTF8String and VisibleString o Full integration of PKCS#12 code o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions o Option to disable selected ciphers Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]: o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers" o Support for Triple-DES CBCM cipher o Support of Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for RSA o First support for new TLSv1 ciphers o Added a few new BIOs (syslog BIO, reliable BIO) o Extended support for DSA certificate/keys. o Extended support for Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) o Initial support for X.509v3 extensions o Extended support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Overhauled Win32 builds o Cleanups and fixes to the Big Number (BN) library o Support for ASN.1 GeneralizedTime o Splitted ASN.1 SETs from SEQUENCEs o ASN1 and PEM support for Netscape Certificate Sequences o Overhauled Perl interface o Lots of source tree cleanups. o Lots of memory leak fixes. o Lots of bug fixes. Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]: o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality o Extended Big Number (BN) library o Added RIPE MD160 message digest o Addeed support for RC2/64bit cipher o Extended ASN.1 parser routines o Adjustations of the source tree for CVS o Support for various new platforms Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/README =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/README (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/README (revision 340692) @@ -1,101 +1,101 @@ - OpenSSL 1.0.2p 14 Aug 2018 + OpenSSL 1.0.2q 20 Nov 2018 Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson All rights reserved. DESCRIPTION ----------- The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSLv3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptograpic library. The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related documentation. OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses. OVERVIEW -------- The OpenSSL toolkit includes: libssl.a: Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS. libcrypto.a: Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but not logically part of it. openssl: A command line tool that can be used for: Creation of key parameters Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs Calculation of message digests Encryption and decryption SSL/TLS client and server tests Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail And more... INSTALLATION ------------ See the appropriate file: INSTALL Linux, Unix, etc. INSTALL.DJGPP DOS platform with DJGPP INSTALL.NW Netware INSTALL.OS2 OS/2 INSTALL.VMS VMS INSTALL.W32 Windows (32bit) INSTALL.W64 Windows (64bit) INSTALL.WCE Windows CE SUPPORT ------- See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain commercial technical support. If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps first: - Download the latest version from the repository to see if the problem has already been addressed - Configure with no-asm - Remove compiler optimisation flags If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information and create an issue on GitHub: - On Unix systems: Self-test report generated by 'make report' - On other systems: OpenSSL version: output of 'openssl version -a' OS Name, Version, Hardware platform Compiler Details (name, version) - Application Details (name, version) - Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known) - Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core) Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL. HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL ---------------------------- See CONTRIBUTING LEGALITIES ---------- A number of nations restrict the use or export of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to develop or distribute cryptographic code. Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/req.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/req.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/req.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,1731 +1,1730 @@ /* apps/req.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* * Until the key-gen callbacks are modified to use newer prototypes, we allow * deprecated functions for openssl-internal code */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED # undef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # define APPS_WIN16 #endif #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include #endif #define SECTION "req" #define BITS "default_bits" #define KEYFILE "default_keyfile" #define PROMPT "prompt" #define DISTINGUISHED_NAME "distinguished_name" #define ATTRIBUTES "attributes" #define V3_EXTENSIONS "x509_extensions" #define REQ_EXTENSIONS "req_extensions" #define STRING_MASK "string_mask" #define UTF8_IN "utf8" #define DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH 2048 #define MIN_KEY_LENGTH 512 #undef PROG #define PROG req_main /*- * -inform arg - input format - default PEM (DER or PEM) * -outform arg - output format - default PEM * -in arg - input file - default stdin * -out arg - output file - default stdout * -verify - check request signature * -noout - don't print stuff out. * -text - print out human readable text. * -nodes - no des encryption * -config file - Load configuration file. * -key file - make a request using key in file (or use it for verification). * -keyform arg - key file format. * -rand file(s) - load the file(s) into the PRNG. * -newkey - make a key and a request. * -modulus - print RSA modulus. * -pubkey - output Public Key. * -x509 - output a self signed X509 structure instead. * -asn1-kludge - output new certificate request in a format that some CA's * require. This format is wrong */ static int make_REQ(X509_REQ *req, EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *dn, int mutlirdn, int attribs, unsigned long chtype); static int build_subject(X509_REQ *req, char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn); static int prompt_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, char *dn_sect, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr_sk, char *attr_sect, int attribs, unsigned long chtype); static int auto_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr, int attribs, unsigned long chtype); static int add_attribute_object(X509_REQ *req, char *text, const char *def, char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max, unsigned long chtype); static int add_DN_object(X509_NAME *n, char *text, const char *def, char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max, unsigned long chtype, int mval); static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); static int req_check_len(int len, int n_min, int n_max); static int check_end(const char *str, const char *end); static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(BIO *err, const char *gstr, int *pkey_type, long *pkeylen, char **palgnam, ENGINE *keygen_engine); #ifndef MONOLITH static char *default_config_file = NULL; #endif static CONF *req_conf = NULL; static int batch = 0; int MAIN(int, char **); int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL, *gen_eng = NULL; unsigned long nmflag = 0, reqflag = 0; int ex = 1, x509 = 0, days = 30; X509 *x509ss = NULL; X509_REQ *req = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *genctx = NULL; const char *keyalg = NULL; char *keyalgstr = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL, *sigopts = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int i = 0, badops = 0, newreq = 0, verbose = 0, pkey_type = -1; long newkey = -1; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; int informat, outformat, verify = 0, noout = 0, text = 0, keyform = FORMAT_PEM; int nodes = 0, kludge = 0, newhdr = 0, subject = 0, pubkey = 0; char *infile, *outfile, *prog, *keyfile = NULL, *template = NULL, *keyout = NULL; char *engine = NULL; char *extensions = NULL; char *req_exts = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL; int modulus = 0; char *inrand = NULL; char *passargin = NULL, *passargout = NULL; char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL; char *p; char *subj = NULL; int multirdn = 0; const EVP_MD *md_alg = NULL, *digest = NULL; unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC; #ifndef MONOLITH char *to_free; long errline; #endif req_conf = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); #endif apps_startup(); if (bio_err == NULL) if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL) BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); infile = NULL; outfile = NULL; informat = FORMAT_PEM; outformat = FORMAT_PEM; prog = argv[0]; argc--; argv++; while (argc >= 1) { if (strcmp(*argv, "-inform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; informat = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-outform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; outformat = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; engine = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keygen_engine") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; gen_eng = ENGINE_by_id(*(++argv)); if (gen_eng == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't find keygen engine %s\n", *argv); goto end; } } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keyfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pubkey") == 0) { pubkey = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-new") == 0) { newreq = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-config") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; template = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keyform = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-in") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; infile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; outfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyout") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keyout = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-passin") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; passargin = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-passout") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; passargout = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rand") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; inrand = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-newkey") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keyalg = *(++argv); newreq = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pkeyopt") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; if (!pkeyopts) pkeyopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!pkeyopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pkeyopts, *(++argv))) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sigopt") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; if (!sigopts) sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, *(++argv))) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-batch") == 0) batch = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-newhdr") == 0) newhdr = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-modulus") == 0) modulus = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify") == 0) verify = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nodes") == 0) nodes = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noout") == 0) noout = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verbose") == 0) verbose = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-utf8") == 0) chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nameopt") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, *(++argv))) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reqopt") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; if (!set_cert_ex(&reqflag, *(++argv))) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-subject") == 0) subject = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-text") == 0) text = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-x509") == 0) { x509 = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-asn1-kludge") == 0) kludge = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no-asn1-kludge") == 0) kludge = 0; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-subj") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; subj = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-multivalue-rdn") == 0) multirdn = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-days") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; days = atoi(*(++argv)); if (days == 0) days = 30; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-set_serial") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; serial = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, *(++argv)); if (!serial) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-extensions") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; extensions = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reqexts") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; req_exts = *(++argv); } else if ((md_alg = EVP_get_digestbyname(&((*argv)[1]))) != NULL) { /* ok */ digest = md_alg; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv); badops = 1; break; } argc--; argv++; } if (badops) { bad: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [options] outfile\n", prog); BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -inform arg input format - DER or PEM\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -outform arg output format - DER or PEM\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -in arg input file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -out arg output file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -text text form of request\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -pubkey output public key\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -noout do not output REQ\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify verify signature on REQ\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -modulus RSA modulus\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nodes don't encrypt the output key\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE BIO_printf(bio_err, " -engine e use engine e, possibly a hardware device\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -subject output the request's subject\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -passin private key password source\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -key file use the private key contained in file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -keyform arg key file format\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -keyout arg file to send the key to\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR, LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR); BIO_printf(bio_err, " load the file (or the files in the directory) into\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " the random number generator\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -newkey rsa:bits generate a new RSA key of 'bits' in size\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -newkey dsa:file generate a new DSA key, parameters taken from CA in 'file'\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA BIO_printf(bio_err, " -newkey ec:file generate a new EC key, parameters taken from CA in 'file'\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -[digest] Digest to sign with (md5, sha1, md2, mdc2, md4)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -config file request template file.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -subj arg set or modify request subject\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -multivalue-rdn enable support for multivalued RDNs\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -new new request.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -batch do not ask anything during request generation\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -x509 output a x509 structure instead of a cert. req.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -days number of days a certificate generated by -x509 is valid for.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -set_serial serial number to use for a certificate generated by -x509.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -newhdr output \"NEW\" in the header lines\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -asn1-kludge Output the 'request' in a format that is wrong but some CA's\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " have been reported as requiring\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -extensions .. specify certificate extension section (override value in config file)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -reqexts .. specify request extension section (override value in config file)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -utf8 input characters are UTF8 (default ASCII)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nameopt arg - various certificate name options\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -reqopt arg - various request text options\n\n"); goto end; } if (x509 && infile == NULL) newreq = 1; ERR_load_crypto_strings(); if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passargin, passargout, &passin, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n"); goto end; } #ifndef MONOLITH /* else this has happened in openssl.c * (global `config') */ /* Lets load up our environment a little */ p = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF"); if (p == NULL) p = getenv("SSLEAY_CONF"); if (p == NULL) p = to_free = make_config_name(); default_config_file = p; config = NCONF_new(NULL); i = NCONF_load(config, p, &errline); #endif if (template != NULL) { long errline = -1; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", template); req_conf = NCONF_new(NULL); i = NCONF_load(req_conf, template, &errline); if (i == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of %s\n", errline, template); goto end; } } else { req_conf = config; if (req_conf == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to load config info from %s\n", default_config_file); if (newreq) goto end; } else if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", default_config_file); } if (req_conf != NULL) { if (!load_config(bio_err, req_conf)) goto end; p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, NULL, "oid_file"); if (p == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if (p != NULL) { BIO *oid_bio; oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r"); if (oid_bio == NULL) { /*- BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); */ } else { OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio); BIO_free(oid_bio); } } } if (!add_oid_section(bio_err, req_conf)) goto end; if (md_alg == NULL) { p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "default_md"); if (p == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if (p != NULL) { if ((md_alg = EVP_get_digestbyname(p)) != NULL) digest = md_alg; } } if (!extensions) { extensions = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, V3_EXTENSIONS); if (!extensions) ERR_clear_error(); } if (extensions) { /* Check syntax of file */ X509V3_CTX ctx; X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, req_conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(req_conf, &ctx, extensions, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n", extensions); goto end; } } if (!passin) { passin = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "input_password"); if (!passin) ERR_clear_error(); } if (!passout) { passout = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "output_password"); if (!passout) ERR_clear_error(); } p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, STRING_MASK); if (!p) ERR_clear_error(); if (p && !ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(p)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid global string mask setting %s\n", p); goto end; } if (chtype != MBSTRING_UTF8) { p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, UTF8_IN); if (!p) ERR_clear_error(); else if (!strcmp(p, "yes")) chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8; } if (!req_exts) { req_exts = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, REQ_EXTENSIONS); if (!req_exts) ERR_clear_error(); } if (req_exts) { /* Check syntax of file */ X509V3_CTX ctx; X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, req_conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(req_conf, &ctx, req_exts, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading request extension section %s\n", req_exts); goto end; } } in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if ((in == NULL) || (out == NULL)) goto end; e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0); if (keyfile != NULL) { pkey = load_key(bio_err, keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "Private Key"); if (!pkey) { /* * load_key() has already printed an appropriate message */ goto end; } else { char *randfile = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "RANDFILE"); if (randfile == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); app_RAND_load_file(randfile, bio_err, 0); } } if (newreq && (pkey == NULL)) { char *randfile = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "RANDFILE"); if (randfile == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); app_RAND_load_file(randfile, bio_err, 0); if (inrand) app_RAND_load_files(inrand); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, SECTION, BITS, &newkey)) { newkey = DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH; } if (keyalg) { genctx = set_keygen_ctx(bio_err, keyalg, &pkey_type, &newkey, &keyalgstr, gen_eng); if (!genctx) goto end; } if (newkey < MIN_KEY_LENGTH && (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "private key length is too short,\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "it needs to be at least %d bits, not %ld\n", MIN_KEY_LENGTH, newkey); goto end; } if (!genctx) { genctx = set_keygen_ctx(bio_err, NULL, &pkey_type, &newkey, &keyalgstr, gen_eng); if (!genctx) goto end; } if (pkeyopts) { char *genopt; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(pkeyopts); i++) { genopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(pkeyopts, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(genctx, genopt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", genopt); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } } - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating a %ld bit %s private key\n", - newkey, keyalgstr); + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating a %s private key\n", keyalgstr); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(genctx, genpkey_cb); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(genctx, bio_err); if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(genctx, &pkey) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error Generating Key\n"); goto end; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(genctx); genctx = NULL; app_RAND_write_file(randfile, bio_err); if (keyout == NULL) { keyout = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, KEYFILE); if (keyout == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } if (keyout == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new private key to stdout\n"); BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS { BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()); out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out); } #endif } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new private key to '%s'\n", keyout); if (BIO_write_filename(out, keyout) <= 0) { perror(keyout); goto end; } } p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "encrypt_rsa_key"); if (p == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "encrypt_key"); if (p == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } if ((p != NULL) && (strcmp(p, "no") == 0)) cipher = NULL; if (nodes) cipher = NULL; i = 0; loop: if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, cipher, NULL, 0, NULL, passout)) { if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD) && (i < 3)) { ERR_clear_error(); i++; goto loop; } goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "-----\n"); } if (!newreq) { /* * Since we are using a pre-existing certificate request, the kludge * 'format' info should not be changed. */ kludge = -1; if (infile == NULL) BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); else { if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) { perror(infile); goto end; } } if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) req = d2i_X509_REQ_bio(in, NULL); else if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for X509 request\n"); goto end; } if (req == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load X509 request\n"); goto end; } } if (newreq || x509) { if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "you need to specify a private key\n"); goto end; } if (req == NULL) { req = X509_REQ_new(); if (req == NULL) { goto end; } i = make_REQ(req, pkey, subj, multirdn, !x509, chtype); subj = NULL; /* done processing '-subj' option */ if ((kludge > 0) && !sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(req->req_info->attributes)) { sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(req->req_info->attributes); req->req_info->attributes = NULL; } if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "problems making Certificate Request\n"); goto end; } } if (x509) { EVP_PKEY *tmppkey; X509V3_CTX ext_ctx; if ((x509ss = X509_new()) == NULL) goto end; /* Set version to V3 */ if (extensions && !X509_set_version(x509ss, 2)) goto end; if (serial) { if (!X509_set_serialNumber(x509ss, serial)) goto end; } else { if (!rand_serial(NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x509ss))) goto end; } if (!X509_set_issuer_name(x509ss, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req))) goto end; if (!X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509ss), 0)) goto end; if (!X509_time_adj_ex(X509_get_notAfter(x509ss), days, 0, NULL)) goto end; if (!X509_set_subject_name (x509ss, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req))) goto end; tmppkey = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req); if (!tmppkey || !X509_set_pubkey(x509ss, tmppkey)) goto end; EVP_PKEY_free(tmppkey); /* Set up V3 context struct */ X509V3_set_ctx(&ext_ctx, x509ss, x509ss, NULL, NULL, 0); X509V3_set_nconf(&ext_ctx, req_conf); /* Add extensions */ if (extensions && !X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(req_conf, &ext_ctx, extensions, x509ss)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n", extensions); goto end; } i = do_X509_sign(bio_err, x509ss, pkey, digest, sigopts); if (!i) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else { X509V3_CTX ext_ctx; /* Set up V3 context struct */ X509V3_set_ctx(&ext_ctx, NULL, NULL, req, NULL, 0); X509V3_set_nconf(&ext_ctx, req_conf); /* Add extensions */ if (req_exts && !X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf(req_conf, &ext_ctx, req_exts, req)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n", req_exts); goto end; } i = do_X509_REQ_sign(bio_err, req, pkey, digest, sigopts); if (!i) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } } if (subj && x509) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot modifiy certificate subject\n"); goto end; } if (subj && !x509) { if (verbose) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Modifying Request's Subject\n"); print_name(bio_err, "old subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag); } if (build_subject(req, subj, chtype, multirdn) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: cannot modify subject\n"); ex = 1; goto end; } req->req_info->enc.modified = 1; if (verbose) { print_name(bio_err, "new subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag); } } if (verify && !x509) { int tmp = 0; if (pkey == NULL) { pkey = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req); tmp = 1; if (pkey == NULL) goto end; } i = X509_REQ_verify(req, pkey); if (tmp) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); pkey = NULL; } if (i < 0) { goto end; } else if (i == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } else /* if (i > 0) */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify OK\n"); } if (noout && !text && !modulus && !subject && !pubkey) { ex = 0; goto end; } if (outfile == NULL) { BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS { BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()); out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out); } #endif } else { if ((keyout != NULL) && (strcmp(outfile, keyout) == 0)) i = (int)BIO_append_filename(out, outfile); else i = (int)BIO_write_filename(out, outfile); if (!i) { perror(outfile); goto end; } } if (pubkey) { EVP_PKEY *tpubkey; tpubkey = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req); if (tpubkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting public key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, tpubkey); EVP_PKEY_free(tpubkey); } if (text) { if (x509) X509_print_ex(out, x509ss, nmflag, reqflag); else X509_REQ_print_ex(out, req, nmflag, reqflag); } if (subject) { if (x509) print_name(out, "subject=", X509_get_subject_name(x509ss), nmflag); else print_name(out, "subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag); } if (modulus) { EVP_PKEY *tpubkey; if (x509) tpubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509ss); else tpubkey = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req); if (tpubkey == NULL) { fprintf(stdout, "Modulus=unavailable\n"); goto end; } fprintf(stdout, "Modulus="); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(tpubkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) BN_print(out, tpubkey->pkey.rsa->n); else #endif fprintf(stdout, "Wrong Algorithm type"); EVP_PKEY_free(tpubkey); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } if (!noout && !x509) { if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_X509_REQ_bio(out, req); else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) { if (newhdr) i = PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW(out, req); else i = PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ(out, req); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n"); goto end; } if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write X509 request\n"); goto end; } } if (!noout && x509 && (x509ss != NULL)) { if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_X509_bio(out, x509ss); else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) i = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509ss); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n"); goto end; } if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write X509 certificate\n"); goto end; } } ex = 0; end: #ifndef MONOLITH if (to_free) OPENSSL_free(to_free); #endif if (ex) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } if ((req_conf != NULL) && (req_conf != config)) NCONF_free(req_conf); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (genctx) EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(genctx); if (pkeyopts) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pkeyopts); if (sigopts) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (gen_eng) ENGINE_free(gen_eng); #endif if (keyalgstr) OPENSSL_free(keyalgstr); X509_REQ_free(req); X509_free(x509ss); ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial); release_engine(e); if (passargin && passin) OPENSSL_free(passin); if (passargout && passout) OPENSSL_free(passout); OBJ_cleanup(); apps_shutdown(); OPENSSL_EXIT(ex); } static int make_REQ(X509_REQ *req, EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *subj, int multirdn, int attribs, unsigned long chtype) { int ret = 0, i; char no_prompt = 0; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, *attr_sk = NULL; char *tmp, *dn_sect, *attr_sect; tmp = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, PROMPT); if (tmp == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if ((tmp != NULL) && !strcmp(tmp, "no")) no_prompt = 1; dn_sect = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, DISTINGUISHED_NAME); if (dn_sect == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to find '%s' in config\n", DISTINGUISHED_NAME); goto err; } dn_sk = NCONF_get_section(req_conf, dn_sect); if (dn_sk == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get '%s' section\n", dn_sect); goto err; } attr_sect = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, ATTRIBUTES); if (attr_sect == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); attr_sk = NULL; } else { attr_sk = NCONF_get_section(req_conf, attr_sect); if (attr_sk == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get '%s' section\n", attr_sect); goto err; } } /* setup version number */ if (!X509_REQ_set_version(req, 0L)) goto err; /* version 1 */ if (no_prompt) i = auto_info(req, dn_sk, attr_sk, attribs, chtype); else { if (subj) i = build_subject(req, subj, chtype, multirdn); else i = prompt_info(req, dn_sk, dn_sect, attr_sk, attr_sect, attribs, chtype); } if (!i) goto err; if (!X509_REQ_set_pubkey(req, pkey)) goto err; ret = 1; err: return (ret); } /* * subject is expected to be in the format /type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=... * where characters may be escaped by \ */ static int build_subject(X509_REQ *req, char *subject, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn) { X509_NAME *n; if (!(n = parse_name(subject, chtype, multirdn))) return 0; if (!X509_REQ_set_subject_name(req, n)) { X509_NAME_free(n); return 0; } X509_NAME_free(n); return 1; } static int prompt_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, char *dn_sect, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr_sk, char *attr_sect, int attribs, unsigned long chtype) { int i; char *p, *q; char buf[100]; int nid, mval; long n_min, n_max; char *type, *value; const char *def; CONF_VALUE *v; X509_NAME *subj; subj = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req); if (!batch) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "into your certificate request.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "For some fields there will be a default value,\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-----\n"); } if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk)) { i = -1; start:for (;;) { i++; if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk) <= i) break; v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i); p = q = NULL; type = v->name; if (!check_end(type, "_min") || !check_end(type, "_max") || !check_end(type, "_default") || !check_end(type, "_value")) continue; /* * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple * instances */ for (p = v->name; *p; p++) if ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.')) { p++; if (*p) type = p; break; } if (*type == '+') { mval = -1; type++; } else mval = 0; /* If OBJ not recognised ignore it */ if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef) goto start; if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_default", v->name) >= (int)sizeof(buf)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Name '%s' too long\n", v->name); return 0; } if ((def = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, dn_sect, buf)) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); def = ""; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_value", v->name); if ((value = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, dn_sect, buf)) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); value = NULL; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_min", v->name); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, dn_sect, buf, &n_min)) { ERR_clear_error(); n_min = -1; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_max", v->name); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, dn_sect, buf, &n_max)) { ERR_clear_error(); n_max = -1; } if (!add_DN_object(subj, v->value, def, value, nid, n_min, n_max, chtype, mval)) return 0; } if (X509_NAME_entry_count(subj) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error, no objects specified in config file\n"); return 0; } if (attribs) { if ((attr_sk != NULL) && (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk) > 0) && (!batch)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nPlease enter the following 'extra' attributes\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "to be sent with your certificate request\n"); } i = -1; start2: for (;;) { i++; if ((attr_sk == NULL) || (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk) <= i)) break; v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(attr_sk, i); type = v->name; if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef) goto start2; if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_default", type) >= (int)sizeof(buf)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Name '%s' too long\n", v->name); return 0; } if ((def = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, attr_sect, buf)) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); def = ""; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_value", type); if ((value = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, attr_sect, buf)) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); value = NULL; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_min", type); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, attr_sect, buf, &n_min)) { ERR_clear_error(); n_min = -1; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_max", type); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, attr_sect, buf, &n_max)) { ERR_clear_error(); n_max = -1; } if (!add_attribute_object(req, v->value, def, value, nid, n_min, n_max, chtype)) return 0; } } } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No template, please set one up.\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int auto_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr_sk, int attribs, unsigned long chtype) { int i; char *p, *q; char *type; CONF_VALUE *v; X509_NAME *subj; subj = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk); i++) { int mval; v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i); p = q = NULL; type = v->name; /* * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances */ for (p = v->name; *p; p++) #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC if ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.')) { #else if ((*p == os_toascii[':']) || (*p == os_toascii[',']) || (*p == os_toascii['.'])) { #endif p++; if (*p) type = p; break; } #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC if (*type == '+') { #else if (*type == os_toascii['+']) { #endif type++; mval = -1; } else mval = 0; if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(subj, type, chtype, (unsigned char *)v->value, -1, -1, mval)) return 0; } if (!X509_NAME_entry_count(subj)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error, no objects specified in config file\n"); return 0; } if (attribs) { for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk); i++) { v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(attr_sk, i); if (!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(req, v->name, chtype, (unsigned char *)v->value, -1)) return 0; } } return 1; } static int add_DN_object(X509_NAME *n, char *text, const char *def, char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max, unsigned long chtype, int mval) { int i, ret = 0; MS_STATIC char buf[1024]; start: if (!batch) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [%s]:", text, def); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); if (value != NULL) { BUF_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof(buf)); BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", value); } else { buf[0] = '\0'; if (!batch) { if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)) return 0; } else { buf[0] = '\n'; buf[1] = '\0'; } } if (buf[0] == '\0') return (0); else if (buf[0] == '\n') { if ((def == NULL) || (def[0] == '\0')) return (1); BUF_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof(buf)); BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf)); } else if ((buf[0] == '.') && (buf[1] == '\n')) return (1); i = strlen(buf); if (buf[i - 1] != '\n') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "weird input :-(\n"); return (0); } buf[--i] = '\0'; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i); #endif if (!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) { if (batch || value) return 0; goto start; } if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)buf, -1, -1, mval)) goto err; ret = 1; err: return (ret); } static int add_attribute_object(X509_REQ *req, char *text, const char *def, char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max, unsigned long chtype) { int i; static char buf[1024]; start: if (!batch) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [%s]:", text, def); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); if (value != NULL) { BUF_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof(buf)); BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", value); } else { buf[0] = '\0'; if (!batch) { if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)) return 0; } else { buf[0] = '\n'; buf[1] = '\0'; } } if (buf[0] == '\0') return (0); else if (buf[0] == '\n') { if ((def == NULL) || (def[0] == '\0')) return (1); BUF_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof(buf)); BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof(buf)); } else if ((buf[0] == '.') && (buf[1] == '\n')) return (1); i = strlen(buf); if (buf[i - 1] != '\n') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "weird input :-(\n"); return (0); } buf[--i] = '\0'; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i); #endif if (!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) { if (batch || value) return 0; goto start; } if (!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)buf, -1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error adding attribute\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } return (1); err: return (0); } static int req_check_len(int len, int n_min, int n_max) { if ((n_min > 0) && (len < n_min)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "string is too short, it needs to be at least %d bytes long\n", n_min); return (0); } if ((n_max >= 0) && (len > n_max)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "string is too long, it needs to be less than %d bytes long\n", n_max); return (0); } return (1); } /* Check if the end of a string matches 'end' */ static int check_end(const char *str, const char *end) { int elen, slen; const char *tmp; elen = strlen(end); slen = strlen(str); if (elen > slen) return 1; tmp = str + slen - elen; return strcmp(tmp, end); } static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(BIO *err, const char *gstr, int *pkey_type, long *pkeylen, char **palgnam, ENGINE *keygen_engine) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *gctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *param = NULL; long keylen = -1; BIO *pbio = NULL; const char *paramfile = NULL; if (gstr == NULL) { *pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_RSA; keylen = *pkeylen; } else if (gstr[0] >= '0' && gstr[0] <= '9') { *pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_RSA; keylen = atol(gstr); *pkeylen = keylen; } else if (!strncmp(gstr, "param:", 6)) paramfile = gstr + 6; else { const char *p = strchr(gstr, ':'); int len; ENGINE *tmpeng; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (p) len = p - gstr; else len = strlen(gstr); /* * The lookup of a the string will cover all engines so keep a note * of the implementation. */ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, gstr, len); if (!ameth) { BIO_printf(err, "Unknown algorithm %.*s\n", len, gstr); return NULL; } EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, pkey_type, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (tmpeng) ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); #endif if (*pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { if (p) { keylen = atol(p + 1); *pkeylen = keylen; } else keylen = *pkeylen; } else if (p) paramfile = p + 1; } if (paramfile) { pbio = BIO_new_file(paramfile, "r"); if (!pbio) { BIO_printf(err, "Can't open parameter file %s\n", paramfile); return NULL; } param = PEM_read_bio_Parameters(pbio, NULL); if (!param) { X509 *x; (void)BIO_reset(pbio); x = PEM_read_bio_X509(pbio, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (x) { param = X509_get_pubkey(x); X509_free(x); } } BIO_free(pbio); if (!param) { BIO_printf(err, "Error reading parameter file %s\n", paramfile); return NULL; } if (*pkey_type == -1) *pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_id(param); else if (*pkey_type != EVP_PKEY_base_id(param)) { BIO_printf(err, "Key Type does not match parameters\n"); EVP_PKEY_free(param); return NULL; } } if (palgnam) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE *tmpeng; const char *anam; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&tmpeng, *pkey_type); if (!ameth) { BIO_puts(err, "Internal error: can't find key algorithm\n"); return NULL; } EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &anam, ameth); *palgnam = BUF_strdup(anam); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (tmpeng) ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); #endif } if (param) { gctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(param, keygen_engine); *pkeylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(param); EVP_PKEY_free(param); } else gctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(*pkey_type, keygen_engine); if (!gctx) { BIO_puts(err, "Error allocating keygen context\n"); ERR_print_errors(err); return NULL; } if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(gctx) <= 0) { BIO_puts(err, "Error initializing keygen context\n"); ERR_print_errors(err); return NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if ((*pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) && (keylen != -1)) { if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(gctx, keylen) <= 0) { BIO_puts(err, "Error setting RSA keysize\n"); ERR_print_errors(err); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(gctx); return NULL; } } #endif return gctx; } static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { char c = '*'; BIO *b = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(ctx); int p; p = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(ctx, 0); if (p == 0) c = '.'; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) c = '*'; if (p == 3) c = '\n'; BIO_write(b, &c, 1); (void)BIO_flush(b); #ifdef LINT p = n; #endif return 1; } static int do_sign_init(BIO *err, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL; int i; EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx); if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey)) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sigopts); i++) { char *sigopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sigopts, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(pkctx, sigopt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", sigopt); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } } return 1; } int do_X509_sign(BIO *err, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts) { int rv; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); rv = do_sign_init(err, &mctx, pkey, md, sigopts); if (rv > 0) rv = X509_sign_ctx(x, &mctx); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0; } int do_X509_REQ_sign(BIO *err, X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts) { int rv; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); rv = do_sign_init(err, &mctx, pkey, md, sigopts); if (rv > 0) rv = X509_REQ_sign_ctx(x, &mctx); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0; } int do_X509_CRL_sign(BIO *err, X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts) { int rv; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); rv = do_sign_init(err, &mctx, pkey, md, sigopts); if (rv > 0) rv = X509_CRL_sign_ctx(x, &mctx); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/config =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/config (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/config (revision 340692) @@ -1,996 +1,997 @@ #!/bin/sh # # OpenSSL config: determine the operating system and run ./Configure # # "config -h" for usage information. # # this is a merge of minarch and GuessOS from the Apache Group. # Originally written by Tim Hudson . # Original Apache Group comments on GuessOS # Simple OS/Platform guesser. Similar to config.guess but # much, much smaller. Since it was developed for use with # Apache, it follows under Apache's regular licensing # with one specific addition: Any changes or additions # to this script should be Emailed to the Apache # group (apache@apache.org) in general and to # Jim Jagielski (jim@jaguNET.com) in specific. # # Be as similar to the output of config.guess/config.sub # as possible. PREFIX="" SUFFIX="" TEST="false" EXE="" # pick up any command line args to config for i do case "$i" in -d*) PREFIX="debug-";; -t*) TEST="true";; -h*) TEST="true"; cat </dev/null` || MACHINE="unknown" [ "$RELEASE" ] || RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || RELEASE="unknown" [ "$SYSTEM" ] || SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || SYSTEM="unknown" [ "$BUILD" ] || VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || VERSION="unknown" # Now test for ISC and SCO, since it is has a braindamaged uname. # # We need to work around FreeBSD 1.1.5.1 ( XREL=`uname -X 2>/dev/null | grep "^Release" | awk '{print $3}'` if [ "x$XREL" != "x" ]; then if [ -f /etc/kconfig ]; then case "$XREL" in 4.0|4.1) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-isc4"; exit 0 ;; esac else case "$XREL" in 3.2v4.2) echo "whatever-whatever-sco3"; exit 0 ;; 3.2v5.0*) echo "whatever-whatever-sco5"; exit 0 ;; 4.2MP) case "x${VERSION}" in x2.0*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware20"; exit 0 ;; x2.1*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware21"; exit 0 ;; x2*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware2"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; 4.2) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware1"; exit 0 ;; 5*) case "x${VERSION}" in # We hardcode i586 in place of ${MACHINE} for the # following reason. The catch is that even though Pentium # is minimum requirement for platforms in question, # ${MACHINE} gets always assigned to i386. Now, problem # with i386 is that it makes ./config pass 386 to # ./Configure, which in turn makes make generate # inefficient SHA-1 (for this moment) code. x[678]*) echo "i586-sco-unixware7"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; esac fi fi # Now we simply scan though... In most cases, the SYSTEM info is enough # case "${SYSTEM}:${RELEASE}:${VERSION}:${MACHINE}" in MPE/iX:*) MACHINE=`echo "$MACHINE" | sed -e 's/-/_/g'` echo "parisc-hp-MPE/iX"; exit 0 ;; A/UX:*) echo "m68k-apple-aux3"; exit 0 ;; AIX:[3-9]:4:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix"; exit 0 ;; AIX:*:[5-9]:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix"; exit 0 ;; AIX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix3"; exit 0 ;; BeOS:*:BePC) if [ -e /boot/develop/headers/be/bone ]; then echo "beos-x86-bone"; exit 0 else echo "beos-x86-r5"; exit 0 fi ;; dgux:*) echo "${MACHINE}-dg-dgux"; exit 0 ;; HI-UX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-hi-hiux"; exit 0 ;; HP-UX:*) HPUXVER=`echo ${RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` case "$HPUXVER" in 1[0-9].*) # HPUX 10 and 11 targets are unified echo "${MACHINE}-hp-hpux1x"; exit 0 ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-hp-hpux"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; IRIX:5.*) echo "mips2-sgi-irix"; exit 0 ;; IRIX:6.*) echo "mips3-sgi-irix"; exit 0 ;; IRIX64:*) echo "mips4-sgi-irix64"; exit 0 ;; Linux:[2-9].*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-linux2"; exit 0 ;; Linux:1.*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-linux1"; exit 0 ;; GNU*) echo "hurd-x86"; exit 0; ;; LynxOS:*) echo "${MACHINE}-lynx-lynxos"; exit 0 ;; BSD/OS:4.*) # BSD/OS always says 386 echo "i486-whatever-bsdi4"; exit 0 ;; BSD/386:*:*:*486*|BSD/OS:*:*:*:*486*) case `/sbin/sysctl -n hw.model` in Pentium*) echo "i586-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0 ;; *) echo "i386-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0 ;; esac; ;; BSD/386:*|BSD/OS:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0 ;; FreeBSD:*:*:*386*) VERS=`echo ${RELEASE} | sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` MACH=`sysctl -n hw.model` ARCH='whatever' case ${MACH} in *386* ) MACH="i386" ;; *486* ) MACH="i486" ;; Pentium\ II*) MACH="i686" ;; Pentium* ) MACH="i586" ;; * ) MACH="$MACHINE" ;; esac case ${MACH} in i[0-9]86 ) ARCH="pc" ;; esac echo "${MACH}-${ARCH}-freebsd${VERS}"; exit 0 ;; FreeBSD:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-freebsd"; exit 0 ;; NetBSD:*:*:*386*) echo "`(/usr/sbin/sysctl -n hw.model || /sbin/sysctl -n hw.model) | sed 's,.*\(.\)86-class.*,i\186,'`-whatever-netbsd"; exit 0 ;; NetBSD:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-netbsd"; exit 0 ;; OpenBSD:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-openbsd"; exit 0 ;; OpenUNIX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-unknown-OpenUNIX${VERSION}"; exit 0 ;; OSF1:*:*:*alpha*) OSFMAJOR=`echo ${RELEASE}| sed -e 's/^V\([0-9]*\)\..*$/\1/'` case "$OSFMAJOR" in 4|5) echo "${MACHINE}-dec-tru64"; exit 0 ;; 1|2|3) echo "${MACHINE}-dec-osf"; exit 0 ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-dec-osf"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; QNX:*) case "$RELEASE" in 4*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-qnx4" ;; 6*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-qnx6" ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-qnx" ;; esac exit 0 ;; Paragon*:*:*:*) echo "i860-intel-osf1"; exit 0 ;; Rhapsody:*) echo "ppc-apple-rhapsody"; exit 0 ;; Darwin:*) case "$MACHINE" in Power*) echo "ppc-apple-darwin${VERSION}" ;; *) echo "i686-apple-darwin${VERSION}" ;; esac exit 0 ;; SunOS:5.*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-solaris2"; exit 0 ;; SunOS:*) echo "${MACHINE}-sun-sunos4"; exit 0 ;; UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; VOS:*:*:i786) echo "i386-stratus-vos"; exit 0 ;; VOS:*:*:*) echo "hppa1.1-stratus-vos"; exit 0 ;; *:4*:R4*:m88k) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; DYNIX/ptx:4*:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; *:4.0:3.0:3[34]?? | *:4.0:3.0:3[34]??,*) echo "i486-ncr-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; ULTRIX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-unknown-ultrix"; exit 0 ;; SINIX*|ReliantUNIX*) echo "${MACHINE}-siemens-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; POSIX-BC*) echo "${MACHINE}-siemens-sysv4"; exit 0 # Here, $MACHINE == "BS2000" ;; machten:*) echo "${MACHINE}-tenon-${SYSTEM}"; exit 0; ;; library:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ncr-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; ConvexOS:*:11.0:*) echo "${MACHINE}-v11-${SYSTEM}"; exit 0; ;; NEWS-OS:4.*) echo "mips-sony-newsos4"; exit 0; ;; # The following combinations are supported # MINGW64* on x86_64 => mingw64 # MINGW32* on x86_64 => mingw # MINGW32* on i?86 => mingw # # MINGW64* on i?86 isn't expected to work... MINGW64*:*:*:x86_64) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-mingw64"; exit 0; ;; MINGW*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-mingw"; exit 0; ;; CYGWIN*) case "$RELEASE" in [bB]*|1.0|1.[12].*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-cygwin_pre1.3" ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-cygwin" ;; esac exit 0 ;; *"CRAY T3E") echo "t3e-cray-unicosmk"; exit 0; ;; *CRAY*) echo "j90-cray-unicos"; exit 0; ;; NONSTOP_KERNEL*) echo "nsr-tandem-nsk"; exit 0; ;; vxworks*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-vxworks"; exit 0; ;; esac # # Ugg. These are all we can determine by what we know about # the output of uname. Be more creative: # # Do the Apollo stuff first. Here, we just simply assume # that the existance of the /usr/apollo directory is proof # enough if [ -d /usr/apollo ]; then echo "whatever-apollo-whatever" exit 0 fi # Now NeXT ISNEXT=`hostinfo 2>/dev/null` case "$ISNEXT" in *'NeXT Mach 3.3'*) echo "whatever-next-nextstep3.3"; exit 0 ;; *NeXT*) echo "whatever-next-nextstep"; exit 0 ;; esac # At this point we gone through all the one's # we know of: Punt echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-${SYSTEM}" exit 0 ) 2>/dev/null | ( # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # this is where the translation occurs into SSLeay terms # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Only set CC if not supplied already if [ -z "$CROSS_COMPILE$CC" ]; then GCCVER=`sh -c "gcc -dumpversion" 2>/dev/null` if [ "$GCCVER" != "" ]; then # then strip off whatever prefix egcs prepends the number with... # Hopefully, this will work for any future prefixes as well. GCCVER=`echo $GCCVER | LC_ALL=C sed 's/^[a-zA-Z]*\-//'` # Since gcc 3.1 gcc --version behaviour has changed. gcc -dumpversion # does give us what we want though, so we use that. We just just the # major and minor version numbers. # peak single digit before and after first dot, e.g. 2.95.1 gives 29 GCCVER=`echo $GCCVER | sed 's/\([0-9]\)\.\([0-9]\).*/\1\2/'` CC=gcc else CC=cc fi fi GCCVER=${GCCVER:-0} if [ "$SYSTEM" = "HP-UX" ];then # By default gcc is a ILP32 compiler (with long long == 64). GCC_BITS="32" if [ $GCCVER -ge 30 ]; then # PA64 support only came in with gcc 3.0.x. # We check if the preprocessor symbol __LP64__ is defined... if echo "__LP64__" | gcc -v -E -x c - 2>/dev/null | grep "^__LP64__" 2>&1 > /dev/null; then : # __LP64__ has slipped through, it therefore is not defined else GCC_BITS="64" fi fi fi if [ "$SYSTEM" = "SunOS" ]; then if [ $GCCVER -ge 30 ]; then # 64-bit ABI isn't officially supported in gcc 3.0, but it appears # to be working, at the very least 'make test' passes... if gcc -v -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 | grep __arch64__ > /dev/null; then GCC_ARCH="-m64" else GCC_ARCH="-m32" fi fi # check for WorkShop C, expected output is "cc: blah-blah C x.x" CCVER=`(cc -V 2>&1) 2>/dev/null | \ egrep -e '^cc: .* C [0-9]\.[0-9]' | \ sed 's/.* C \([0-9]\)\.\([0-9]\).*/\1\2/'` CCVER=${CCVER:-0} if [ $MACHINE != i86pc -a $CCVER -gt 40 ]; then CC=cc # overrides gcc!!! if [ $CCVER -eq 50 ]; then echo "WARNING! Detected WorkShop C 5.0. Do make sure you have" echo " patch #107357-01 or later applied." sleep 5 fi fi fi if [ "${SYSTEM}-${MACHINE}" = "Linux-alpha" ]; then # check for Compaq C, expected output is "blah-blah C Vx.x" CCCVER=`(ccc -V 2>&1) 2>/dev/null | \ egrep -e '.* C V[0-9]\.[0-9]' | \ sed 's/.* C V\([0-9]\)\.\([0-9]\).*/\1\2/'` CCCVER=${CCCVER:-0} if [ $CCCVER -gt 60 ]; then CC=ccc # overrides gcc!!! well, ccc outperforms inoticeably # only on hash routines and des, otherwise gcc (2.95) # keeps along rather tight... fi fi if [ "${SYSTEM}" = "AIX" ]; then # favor vendor cc over gcc (cc) 2>&1 | grep -iv "not found" > /dev/null && CC=cc fi CCVER=${CCVER:-0} # read the output of the embedded GuessOS read GUESSOS echo Operating system: $GUESSOS # now map the output into SSLeay terms ... really should hack into the # script above so we end up with values in vars but that would take # more time that I want to waste at the moment case "$GUESSOS" in uClinux*64*) OUT=uClinux-dist64 ;; uClinux*) OUT=uClinux-dist ;; mips2-sgi-irix) CPU=`(hinv -t cpu) 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/^CPU:[^R]*R\([0-9]*\).*/\1/'` CPU=${CPU:-0} if [ $CPU -ge 4000 ]; then options="$options -mips2" fi OUT="irix-$CC" ;; mips3-sgi-irix) #CPU=`(hinv -t cpu) 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/^CPU:[^R]*R\([0-9]*\).*/\1/'` #CPU=${CPU:-0} #if [ $CPU -ge 5000 ]; then # options="$options -mips4" #else # options="$options -mips3" #fi OUT="irix-mips3-$CC" ;; mips4-sgi-irix64) echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure irix64-mips4-$CC' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi #CPU=`(hinv -t cpu) 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/^CPU:[^R]*R\([0-9]*\).*/\1/'` #CPU=${CPU:-0} #if [ $CPU -ge 5000 ]; then # options="$options -mips4" #else # options="$options -mips3" #fi OUT="irix-mips3-$CC" ;; ppc-apple-rhapsody) OUT="rhapsody-ppc-cc" ;; ppc-apple-darwin*) ISA64=`(sysctl -n hw.optional.64bitops) 2>/dev/null` if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure darwin64-ppc-cc' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="darwin64-ppc-cc" else OUT="darwin-ppc-cc" fi ;; i?86-apple-darwin*) ISA64=`(sysctl -n hw.optional.x86_64) 2>/dev/null` if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure darwin64-x86_64-cc' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="darwin64-x86_64-cc" else OUT="darwin-i386-cc" fi ;; armv6+7-*-iphoneos) options="$options -arch%20armv6 -arch%20armv7" OUT="iphoneos-cross" ;; *-*-iphoneos) options="$options -arch%20${MACHINE}" OUT="iphoneos-cross" ;; alpha-*-linux2) ISA=`awk '/cpu model/{print$4;exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` case ${ISA:-generic} in *[678]) OUT="linux-alpha+bwx-$CC" ;; *) OUT="linux-alpha-$CC" ;; esac if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then case ${ISA:-generic} in EV5|EV45) options="$options -mcpu=ev5";; EV56|PCA56) options="$options -mcpu=ev56";; *) options="$options -mcpu=ev6";; esac fi ;; ppc64-*-linux2) if [ -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure linux-ppc64' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi if [ "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="linux-ppc64" else OUT="linux-ppc" (echo "__LP64__" | gcc -E -x c - 2>/dev/null | grep "^__LP64__" 2>&1 > /dev/null) || options="$options -m32" fi ;; ppc64le-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc64le" ;; ppc-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc" ;; mips64*-*-linux2) echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure linux64-mips64' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi OUT="linux-mips64" ;; mips*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-mips32" ;; ppc60x-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppc60x" ;; ppcgen-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppcgen" ;; pentium-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-pentium" ;; simlinux-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-simlinux" ;; mips-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-mips";; ia64-*-linux?) OUT="linux-ia64" ;; sparc64-*-linux2) echo "WARNING! If you *know* that your GNU C supports 64-bit/V9 ABI" echo " and wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure linux64-sparcv9' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi OUT="linux-sparcv9" ;; sparc-*-linux2) KARCH=`awk '/^type/{print$3;exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` case ${KARCH:-sun4} in sun4u*) OUT="linux-sparcv9" ;; sun4m) OUT="linux-sparcv8" ;; sun4d) OUT="linux-sparcv8" ;; *) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; esac ;; parisc*-*-linux2) # 64-bit builds under parisc64 linux are not supported and # compiler is expected to generate 32-bit objects... CPUARCH=`awk '/cpu family/{print substr($5,1,3); exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` CPUSCHEDULE=`awk '/^cpu.[ ]*: PA/{print substr($3,3); exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` # ??TODO ?? Model transformations # 0. CPU Architecture for the 1.1 processor has letter suffixes. We strip that off # assuming no further arch. identification will ever be used by GCC. # 1. I'm most concerned about whether is a 7300LC is closer to a 7100 versus a 7100LC. # 2. The variant 64-bit processors cause concern should GCC support explicit schedulers # for these chips in the future. # PA7300LC -> 7100LC (1.1) # PA8200 -> 8000 (2.0) # PA8500 -> 8000 (2.0) # PA8600 -> 8000 (2.0) CPUSCHEDULE=`echo $CPUSCHEDULE|sed -e 's/7300LC/7100LC/' -e 's/8.00/8000/'` # Finish Model transformations options="$options -DB_ENDIAN -mschedule=$CPUSCHEDULE -march=$CPUARCH" OUT="linux-generic32" ;; armv[1-3]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32" ;; armv[7-9]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4"; options="$options -march=armv7-a" ;; arm*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4" ;; aarch64-*-linux2) OUT="linux-aarch64" ;; sh*b-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; sh*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DL_ENDIAN" ;; m68k*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; s390-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; s390x-*-linux2) # To be uncommented when glibc bug is fixed, see Configure... #if egrep -e '^features.* highgprs' /proc/cpuinfo >/dev/null ; then # echo "WARNING! If you wish to build \"highgprs\" 32-bit library, then you" # echo " have to invoke './Configure linux32-s390x' *manually*." # if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t -1 ]; then # echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." # (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 # fi #fi OUT="linux64-s390x" ;; x86_64-*-linux?) OUT="linux-x86_64" ;; *86-*-linux2) OUT="linux-elf" if [ "$GCCVER" -gt 28 ]; then if grep '^model.*Pentium' /proc/cpuinfo >/dev/null ; then options="$options -march=pentium" fi if grep '^model.*Pentium Pro' /proc/cpuinfo >/dev/null ; then options="$options -march=pentiumpro" fi if grep '^model.*K6' /proc/cpuinfo >/dev/null ; then options="$options -march=k6" fi fi ;; *-*-linux1) OUT="linux-aout" ;; *-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32" ;; sun4[uv]*-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv9-$CC" ISA64=`(isalist) 2>/dev/null | grep sparcv9` if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "" ]; then if [ "$CC" = "cc" -a $CCVER -ge 50 ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure solaris64-sparcv9-cc' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi elif [ "$CC" = "gcc" -a "$GCC_ARCH" = "-m64" ]; then # $GCC_ARCH denotes default ABI chosen by compiler driver # (first one found on the $PATH). I assume that user # expects certain consistency with the rest of his builds # and therefore switch over to 64-bit. OUT="solaris64-sparcv9-gcc" echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 32-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure solaris-sparcv9-gcc' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi elif [ "$GCC_ARCH" = "-m32" ]; then echo "NOTICE! If you *know* that your GNU C supports 64-bit/V9 ABI" echo " and wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure solaris64-sparcv9-gcc' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi fi if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="solaris64-sparcv9-$CC" fi ;; sun4m-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv8-$CC" ;; sun4d-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv8-$CC" ;; sun4*-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv7-$CC" ;; *86*-*-solaris2) ISA64=`(isalist) 2>/dev/null | grep amd64` if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a ${KERNEL_BITS:-64} -eq 64 ]; then OUT="solaris64-x86_64-$CC" else OUT="solaris-x86-$CC" if [ `uname -r | sed -e 's/5\.//'` -lt 10 ]; then options="$options no-sse2" fi fi ;; *-*-sunos4) OUT="sunos-$CC" ;; *86*-*-bsdi4) OUT="BSD-x86-elf"; options="$options no-sse2 -ldl" ;; alpha*-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-generic64"; options="$options -DL_ENDIAN" ;; powerpc64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-generic64"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; sparc64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-sparc64" ;; ia64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-ia64" ;; amd64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-x86_64" ;; *86*-*-*bsd*) # mimic ld behaviour when it's looking for libc... if [ -L /usr/lib/libc.so ]; then # [Free|Net]BSD libc=/usr/lib/libc.so else # OpenBSD # ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null` fi case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in *ELF*) OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;; *) OUT="BSD-x86"; options="$options no-sse2" ;; esac ;; *-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-generic32" ;; *-*-osf) OUT="osf1-alpha-cc" ;; *-*-tru64) OUT="tru64-alpha-cc" ;; *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are7) if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then OUT="unixware-7-gcc" ; options="$options no-sse2" else OUT="unixware-7" ; options="$options no-sse2 -D__i386__" fi ;; *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are20*) OUT="unixware-2.0"; options="$options no-sse2 no-sha512" ;; *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are21*) OUT="unixware-2.1"; options="$options no-sse2 no-sha512" ;; *-*-vos) options="$options no-threads no-shared no-asm no-dso" EXE=".pm" OUT="vos-$CC" ;; BS2000-siemens-sysv4) OUT="BS2000-OSD" ;; RM*-siemens-sysv4) OUT="ReliantUNIX" ;; *-siemens-sysv4) OUT="SINIX" ;; *-hpux1*) if [ $CC = "gcc" -a $GCC_BITS = "64" ]; then OUT="hpux64-parisc2-gcc" fi [ "$KERNEL_BITS" ] || KERNEL_BITS=`(getconf KERNEL_BITS) 2>/dev/null` KERNEL_BITS=${KERNEL_BITS:-32} CPU_VERSION=`(getconf CPU_VERSION) 2>/dev/null` CPU_VERSION=${CPU_VERSION:-0} # See for further info on CPU_VERSION. if [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 768 ]; then # IA-64 CPU if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 -a "$CC" = "cc" ]; then OUT="hpux64-ia64-cc" else OUT="hpux-ia64-cc" fi elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 532 ]; then # PA-RISC 2.x CPU OUT=${OUT:-"hpux-parisc2-${CC}"} if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 -a "$CC" = "cc" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure hpux64-parisc2-cc' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 528 ]; then # PA-RISC 1.1+ CPU OUT="hpux-parisc-${CC}" elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 523 ]; then # PA-RISC 1.0 CPU OUT="hpux-parisc-${CC}" else # Motorola(?) CPU OUT="hpux-$CC" fi options="$options -D_REENTRANT" ;; *-hpux) OUT="hpux-parisc-$CC" ;; *-aix) [ "$KERNEL_BITS" ] || KERNEL_BITS=`(getconf KERNEL_BITMODE) 2>/dev/null` KERNEL_BITS=${KERNEL_BITS:-32} OBJECT_MODE=${OBJECT_MODE:-32} if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then OUT="aix-gcc" if [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64' OUT="aix64-gcc" fi elif [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64' OUT="aix64-cc" else OUT="aix-cc" if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit kit, then you have to" echo " invoke './Configure aix64-cc' *manually*." if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have ~5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi fi if (lsattr -E -O -l `lsdev -c processor|awk '{print$1;exit}'` | grep -i powerpc) >/dev/null 2>&1; then : # this applies even to Power3 and later, as they return PowerPC_POWER[345] else options="$options no-asm" fi ;; # these are all covered by the catchall below # *-dgux) OUT="dgux" ;; mips-sony-newsos4) OUT="newsos4-gcc" ;; *-*-cygwin_pre1.3) OUT="Cygwin-pre1.3" ;; i[3456]86-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin" ;; *-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin-${MACHINE}" ;; t3e-cray-unicosmk) OUT="cray-t3e" ;; j90-cray-unicos) OUT="cray-j90" ;; nsr-tandem-nsk) OUT="tandem-c89" ;; beos-*) OUT="$GUESSOS" ;; x86pc-*-qnx6) OUT="QNX6-i386" ;; *-*-qnx6) OUT="QNX6" ;; x86-*-android|i?86-*-android) OUT="android-x86" ;; armv[7-9]*-*-android) OUT="android-armv7" ;; *) OUT=`echo $GUESSOS | awk -F- '{print $3}'`;; esac # NB: This atalla support has been superceded by the ENGINE support # That contains its own header and definitions anyway. Support can # be enabled or disabled on any supported platform without external # headers, eg. by adding the "hw-atalla" switch to ./config or # perl Configure # # See whether we can compile Atalla support #if [ -f /usr/include/atasi.h ] #then # options="$options -DATALLA" #fi if expr "$options" : '.*no\-asm' > /dev/null; then :; else sh -c "$CROSS_COMPILE${CC:-gcc} -Wa,--help -c -o /tmp/null.$$.o -x assembler /dev/null && rm /tmp/null.$$.o" 2>&1 | \ grep \\--noexecstack >/dev/null && \ options="$options -Wa,--noexecstack" fi # gcc < 2.8 does not support -march=ultrasparc if [ "$OUT" = solaris-sparcv9-gcc -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ] then echo "WARNING! Falling down to 'solaris-sparcv8-gcc'." echo " Upgrade to gcc-2.8 or later." sleep 5 OUT=solaris-sparcv8-gcc fi if [ "$OUT" = "linux-sparcv9" -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ] then echo "WARNING! Falling down to 'linux-sparcv8'." echo " Upgrade to gcc-2.8 or later." sleep 5 OUT=linux-sparcv8 fi case "$GUESSOS" in i386-*) options="$options 386" ;; esac for i in aes bf camellia cast des dh dsa ec hmac idea md2 md5 mdc2 rc2 rc4 rc5 ripemd rsa seed sha do if [ ! -d crypto/$i ] then options="$options no-$i" fi done # Discover Kerberos 5 (since it's still a prototype, we don't # do any guesses yet, that's why this section is commented away. #if [ -d /usr/kerberos ]; then # krb5_dir=/usr/kerberos # if [ \( -f $krb5_dir/lib/libgssapi_krb5.a -o -f $krb5_dir/lib/libgssapi_krb5.so* \)\ # -a \( -f $krb5_dir/lib/libkrb5.a -o -f $krb5_dir/lib/libkrb5.so* \)\ # -a \( -f $krb5_dir/lib/libcom_err.a -o -f $krb5_dir/lib/libcom_err.so* \)\ # -a \( -f $krb5_dir/lib/libk5crypto.a -o -f $krb5_dir/lib/libk5crypto.so* \)\ # -a \( -f $krb5_dir/include/krb5.h \) ]; then # options="$options --with-krb5-flavor=MIT" # fi #elif [ -d /usr/heimdal ]; then # krb5_dir=/usr/heimdal # if [ \( -f $krb5_dir/lib/libgssapi.a -o -f $krb5_dir/lib/libgssapi.so* \)\ # -a \( -f $krb5_dir/lib/libkrb5.a -o -f $krb5_dir/lib/libkrb5.so* \)\ # -a \( -f $krb5_dir/lib/libcom_err.a -o -f $krb5_dir/lib/libcom_err.so* \)\ # -a \( -f $krb5_dir/include/krb5.h \) ]; then # options="$options --with-krb5-flavor=Heimdal" # fi #fi if [ -z "$OUT" ]; then OUT="$CC" fi if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then for i in . `echo $PATH | sed 's/:/ /g'`; do if [ -f "$i/perl5$EXE" ] ; then PERL="$i/perl5$EXE" break; fi; done fi if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then for i in . `echo $PATH | sed 's/:/ /g'`; do if [ -f "$i/perl$EXE" ] ; then if "$i/perl$EXE" -e 'exit($]<5.0)'; then PERL="$i/perl$EXE" break; fi; fi; done fi if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then echo "You need Perl 5." exit 1 fi # run Configure to check to see if we need to specify the # compiler for the platform ... in which case we add it on # the end ... otherwise we leave it off $PERL ./Configure LIST | grep "$OUT-$CC" > /dev/null if [ $? = "0" ]; then OUT="$OUT-$CC" fi OUT="$PREFIX$OUT" $PERL ./Configure LIST | grep "$OUT" > /dev/null if [ $? = "0" ]; then echo Configuring for $OUT if [ "$TEST" = "true" ]; then echo $PERL ./Configure $OUT $options else $PERL ./Configure $OUT $options fi else echo "This system ($OUT) is not supported. See file INSTALL for details." + exit 1 fi ) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/Makefile (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/Makefile (revision 340692) @@ -1,221 +1,230 @@ # # OpenSSL/crypto/Makefile # DIR= crypto TOP= .. CC= cc INCLUDE= -I. -I$(TOP) -I../include $(ZLIB_INCLUDE) # INCLUDES targets sudbirs! INCLUDES= -I.. -I../.. -I../modes -I../asn1 -I../evp -I../../include $(ZLIB_INCLUDE) CFLAG= -g MAKEDEPPROG= makedepend MAKEDEPEND= $(TOP)/util/domd $(TOP) -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG) MAKEFILE= Makefile RM= rm -f AR= ar r RECURSIVE_MAKE= [ -n "$(SDIRS)" ] && for i in $(SDIRS) ; do \ (cd $$i && echo "making $$target in $(DIR)/$$i..." && \ $(MAKE) -e TOP=../.. DIR=$$i INCLUDES='$(INCLUDES)' $$target ) || exit 1; \ done; PEX_LIBS= EX_LIBS= CFLAGS= $(INCLUDE) $(CFLAG) ASFLAGS= $(INCLUDE) $(ASFLAG) AFLAGS=$(ASFLAGS) CPUID_OBJ=mem_clr.o LIBS= GENERAL=Makefile README crypto-lib.com install.com TEST=constant_time_test.c LIB= $(TOP)/libcrypto.a SHARED_LIB= libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) LIBSRC= cryptlib.c mem.c mem_clr.c mem_dbg.c cversion.c ex_data.c cpt_err.c \ - ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_dir.c o_fips.c o_init.c fips_ers.c + ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_dir.c o_fips.c o_init.c fips_ers.c \ + getenv.c LIBOBJ= cryptlib.o mem.o mem_dbg.o cversion.o ex_data.o cpt_err.o ebcdic.o \ - uid.o o_time.o o_str.o o_dir.o o_fips.o o_init.o fips_ers.o $(CPUID_OBJ) + uid.o o_time.o o_str.o o_dir.o o_fips.o o_init.o fips_ers.o getenv.o \ + $(CPUID_OBJ) SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= crypto.h opensslv.h opensslconf.h ebcdic.h symhacks.h \ ossl_typ.h HEADER= cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h \ constant_time_locl.h bn_int.h $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: @(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) all) all: shared buildinf.h: ../Makefile $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(CFLAGS)" "$(PLATFORM)" >buildinf.h x86cpuid.s: x86cpuid.pl perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) x86cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ applink.o: $(TOP)/ms/applink.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $(TOP)/ms/applink.c uplink.o: $(TOP)/ms/uplink.c applink.o $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $(TOP)/ms/uplink.c uplink-x86.s: $(TOP)/ms/uplink-x86.pl $(PERL) $(TOP)/ms/uplink-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ x86_64cpuid.s: x86_64cpuid.pl; $(PERL) x86_64cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ ia64cpuid.s: ia64cpuid.S; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E ia64cpuid.S > $@ ppccpuid.s: ppccpuid.pl; $(PERL) ppccpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ pariscid.s: pariscid.pl; $(PERL) pariscid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ alphacpuid.s: alphacpuid.pl (preproc=$$$$.$@.S; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \ $(PERL) alphacpuid.pl > $$preproc && \ $(CC) -E -P $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc) testapps: [ -z "$(THIS)" ] || ( if echo $(SDIRS) | fgrep ' des '; \ then cd des && $(MAKE) -e des; fi ) [ -z "$(THIS)" ] || ( cd pkcs7 && $(MAKE) -e testapps ); @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi subdirs: @target=all; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl "CPUID_OBJ=$(CPUID_OBJ)" Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO @target=files; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../test $(TEST) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../apps $(APPS) @target=links; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) # lib: $(LIB): are splitted to avoid end-less loop lib: $(LIB) @touch lib $(LIB): $(LIBOBJ) $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) test -z "$(FIPSLIBDIR)" || $(AR) $(LIB) $(FIPSLIBDIR)fipscanister.o $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. shared: buildinf.h lib subdirs if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \ (cd ..; $(MAKE) $(SHARED_LIB)); \ fi libs: @target=lib; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ;\ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; @target=install; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) lint: @target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) update: local_depend @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi depend: local_depend @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi local_depend: @[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -f buildinf.h ] || touch buildinf.h # fake buildinf.h if it does not exist @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDE) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) @[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -s buildinf.h ] || rm buildinf.h clean: rm -f buildinf.h *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff @target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) rm -f opensslconf.h @target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cpt_err.c cryptlib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.c cryptlib.o: cryptlib.h cversion.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h buildinf.h cversion.o: cryptlib.h cversion.c ebcdic.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ebcdic.c ex_data.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h ex_data.o: ex_data.c fips_ers.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h fips_ers.c +getenv.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h +getenv.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h +getenv.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h +getenv.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h +getenv.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h +getenv.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h +getenv.o: getenv.c mem.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h mem.o: mem.c mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h mem_clr.c mem_dbg.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h mem_dbg.o: mem_dbg.c o_dir.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_dir.o: LPdir_unix.c o_dir.c o_dir.h o_fips.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h o_fips.o: o_fips.c o_init.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h o_init.c o_str.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_str.o: o_str.c o_str.h o_time.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_time.c o_time.o: o_time.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h uid.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bio/b_sock.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bio/b_sock.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bio/b_sock.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,962 +1,983 @@ /* crypto/bio/b_sock.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ +#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE +#define _BSD_SOURCE + #include #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "cryptlib.h" #include #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) # include # if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) # include NETDB_DEFINE_CONTEXT # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # include # define SOCKET_PROTOCOL IPPROTO_TCP # ifdef SO_MAXCONN # define MAX_LISTEN SO_MAXCONN # elif defined(SOMAXCONN) # define MAX_LISTEN SOMAXCONN # else # define MAX_LISTEN 32 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)) static int wsa_init_done = 0; # endif +# if defined(__GLIBC__) +# define HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R +# define GETHOSTNAME_R_BUF (2 * 1024) +# endif + /* * WSAAPI specifier is required to make indirect calls to run-time * linked WinSock 2 functions used in this module, to be specific * [get|free]addrinfo and getnameinfo. This is because WinSock uses * uses non-C calling convention, __stdcall vs. __cdecl, on x86 * Windows. On non-WinSock platforms WSAAPI needs to be void. */ # ifndef WSAAPI # define WSAAPI # endif # if 0 static unsigned long BIO_ghbn_hits = 0L; static unsigned long BIO_ghbn_miss = 0L; # define GHBN_NUM 4 static struct ghbn_cache_st { char name[129]; struct hostent *ent; unsigned long order; } ghbn_cache[GHBN_NUM]; # endif static int get_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip); # if 0 static void ghbn_free(struct hostent *a); static struct hostent *ghbn_dup(struct hostent *a); # endif int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip) { int i; int err = 1; int locked = 0; - struct hostent *he; + struct hostent *he = NULL; +# ifdef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R + char buf[GETHOSTNAME_R_BUF]; + struct hostent hostent; + int h_errnop; +# endif i = get_ip(str, ip); if (i < 0) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP, BIO_R_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS); goto err; } /* * At this point, we have something that is most probably correct in some * way, so let's init the socket. */ if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return 0; /* don't generate another error code here */ /* * If the string actually contained an IP address, we need not do * anything more */ if (i > 0) return (1); + /* if gethostbyname_r is supported, use it. */ +# ifdef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R + memset(&hostent, 0x00, sizeof(hostent)); + /* gethostbyname_r() sets |he| to NULL on error, we check it further down */ + gethostbyname_r(str, &hostent, buf, sizeof(buf), &he, &h_errnop); +# else /* do a gethostbyname */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME); locked = 1; he = BIO_gethostbyname(str); +# endif + if (he == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP, BIO_R_BAD_HOSTNAME_LOOKUP); goto err; } /* cast to short because of win16 winsock definition */ if ((short)he->h_addrtype != AF_INET) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP, BIO_R_GETHOSTBYNAME_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) ip[i] = he->h_addr_list[0][i]; err = 0; err: if (locked) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME); if (err) { ERR_add_error_data(2, "host=", str); return 0; } else return 1; } int BIO_get_port(const char *str, unsigned short *port_ptr) { int i; struct servent *s; if (str == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT, BIO_R_NO_PORT_DEFINED); return (0); } i = atoi(str); if (i != 0) *port_ptr = (unsigned short)i; else { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETSERVBYNAME); /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR, it seems like the first parameter * is 'char *', instead of 'const char *' */ # ifndef CONST_STRICT s = getservbyname((char *)str, "tcp"); # else s = getservbyname(str, "tcp"); # endif if (s != NULL) *port_ptr = ntohs((unsigned short)s->s_port); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETSERVBYNAME); if (s == NULL) { if (strcmp(str, "http") == 0) *port_ptr = 80; else if (strcmp(str, "telnet") == 0) *port_ptr = 23; else if (strcmp(str, "socks") == 0) *port_ptr = 1080; else if (strcmp(str, "https") == 0) *port_ptr = 443; else if (strcmp(str, "ssl") == 0) *port_ptr = 443; else if (strcmp(str, "ftp") == 0) *port_ptr = 21; else if (strcmp(str, "gopher") == 0) *port_ptr = 70; # if 0 else if (strcmp(str, "wais") == 0) *port_ptr = 21; # endif else { SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, get_last_socket_error()); ERR_add_error_data(3, "service='", str, "'"); return (0); } } } return (1); } int BIO_sock_error(int sock) { int j, i; union { size_t s; int i; } size; # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) return 0; # endif /* heuristic way to adapt for platforms that expect 64-bit optlen */ size.s = 0, size.i = sizeof(j); /* * Note: under Windows the third parameter is of type (char *) whereas * under other systems it is (void *) if you don't have a cast it will * choke the compiler: if you do have a cast then you can either go for * (char *) or (void *). */ i = getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (void *)&j, (void *)&size); if (i < 0) return (1); else return (j); } # if 0 long BIO_ghbn_ctrl(int cmd, int iarg, char *parg) { int i; char **p; switch (cmd) { case BIO_GHBN_CTRL_HITS: return (BIO_ghbn_hits); /* break; */ case BIO_GHBN_CTRL_MISSES: return (BIO_ghbn_miss); /* break; */ case BIO_GHBN_CTRL_CACHE_SIZE: return (GHBN_NUM); /* break; */ case BIO_GHBN_CTRL_GET_ENTRY: if ((iarg >= 0) && (iarg < GHBN_NUM) && (ghbn_cache[iarg].order > 0)) { p = (char **)parg; if (p == NULL) return (0); *p = ghbn_cache[iarg].name; ghbn_cache[iarg].name[128] = '\0'; return (1); } return (0); /* break; */ case BIO_GHBN_CTRL_FLUSH: for (i = 0; i < GHBN_NUM; i++) ghbn_cache[i].order = 0; break; default: return (0); } return (1); } # endif # if 0 static struct hostent *ghbn_dup(struct hostent *a) { struct hostent *ret; int i, j; MemCheck_off(); ret = (struct hostent *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct hostent)); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); memset(ret, 0, sizeof(struct hostent)); for (i = 0; a->h_aliases[i] != NULL; i++) ; i++; ret->h_aliases = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(i * sizeof(char *)); if (ret->h_aliases == NULL) goto err; memset(ret->h_aliases, 0, i * sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; a->h_addr_list[i] != NULL; i++) ; i++; ret->h_addr_list = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(i * sizeof(char *)); if (ret->h_addr_list == NULL) goto err; memset(ret->h_addr_list, 0, i * sizeof(char *)); j = strlen(a->h_name) + 1; if ((ret->h_name = OPENSSL_malloc(j)) == NULL) goto err; memcpy((char *)ret->h_name, a->h_name, j); for (i = 0; a->h_aliases[i] != NULL; i++) { j = strlen(a->h_aliases[i]) + 1; if ((ret->h_aliases[i] = OPENSSL_malloc(j)) == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->h_aliases[i], a->h_aliases[i], j); } ret->h_length = a->h_length; ret->h_addrtype = a->h_addrtype; for (i = 0; a->h_addr_list[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((ret->h_addr_list[i] = OPENSSL_malloc(a->h_length)) == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->h_addr_list[i], a->h_addr_list[i], a->h_length); } if (0) { err: if (ret != NULL) ghbn_free(ret); ret = NULL; } MemCheck_on(); return (ret); } static void ghbn_free(struct hostent *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; if (a->h_aliases != NULL) { for (i = 0; a->h_aliases[i] != NULL; i++) OPENSSL_free(a->h_aliases[i]); OPENSSL_free(a->h_aliases); } if (a->h_addr_list != NULL) { for (i = 0; a->h_addr_list[i] != NULL; i++) OPENSSL_free(a->h_addr_list[i]); OPENSSL_free(a->h_addr_list); } if (a->h_name != NULL) OPENSSL_free(a->h_name); OPENSSL_free(a); } # endif struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name) { # if 1 /* * Caching gethostbyname() results forever is wrong, so we have to let * the true gethostbyname() worry about this */ # if (defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) && !defined(__NOVELL_LIBC__)) return gethostbyname((char *)name); # else return gethostbyname(name); # endif # else struct hostent *ret; int i, lowi = 0, j; unsigned long low = (unsigned long)-1; # if 0 /* * It doesn't make sense to use locking here: The function interface is * not thread-safe, because threads can never be sure when some other * thread destroys the data they were given a pointer to. */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME); # endif j = strlen(name); if (j < 128) { for (i = 0; i < GHBN_NUM; i++) { if (low > ghbn_cache[i].order) { low = ghbn_cache[i].order; lowi = i; } if (ghbn_cache[i].order > 0) { if (strncmp(name, ghbn_cache[i].name, 128) == 0) break; } } } else i = GHBN_NUM; if (i == GHBN_NUM) { /* no hit */ BIO_ghbn_miss++; /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR, it seems like the first parameter * is 'char *', instead of 'const char *' */ # ifndef CONST_STRICT ret = gethostbyname((char *)name); # else ret = gethostbyname(name); # endif if (ret == NULL) goto end; if (j > 128) { /* too big to cache */ # if 0 /* * If we were trying to make this function thread-safe (which is * bound to fail), we'd have to give up in this case (or allocate * more memory). */ ret = NULL; # endif goto end; } /* else add to cache */ if (ghbn_cache[lowi].ent != NULL) ghbn_free(ghbn_cache[lowi].ent); /* XXX not thread-safe */ ghbn_cache[lowi].name[0] = '\0'; if ((ret = ghbn_cache[lowi].ent = ghbn_dup(ret)) == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GETHOSTBYNAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } strncpy(ghbn_cache[lowi].name, name, 128); ghbn_cache[lowi].order = BIO_ghbn_miss + BIO_ghbn_hits; } else { BIO_ghbn_hits++; ret = ghbn_cache[i].ent; ghbn_cache[i].order = BIO_ghbn_miss + BIO_ghbn_hits; } end: # if 0 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_GETHOSTBYNAME); # endif return (ret); # endif } int BIO_sock_init(void) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS static struct WSAData wsa_state; if (!wsa_init_done) { int err; wsa_init_done = 1; memset(&wsa_state, 0, sizeof(wsa_state)); /* * Not making wsa_state available to the rest of the code is formally * wrong. But the structures we use are [beleived to be] invariable * among Winsock DLLs, while API availability is [expected to be] * probed at run-time with DSO_global_lookup. */ if (WSAStartup(0x0202, &wsa_state) != 0) { err = WSAGetLastError(); SYSerr(SYS_F_WSASTARTUP, err); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT, BIO_R_WSASTARTUP); return (-1); } } # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS */ # ifdef WATT32 extern int _watt_do_exit; _watt_do_exit = 0; /* don't make sock_init() call exit() */ if (sock_init()) return (-1); # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) WORD wVerReq; WSADATA wsaData; int err; if (!wsa_init_done) { wsa_init_done = 1; wVerReq = MAKEWORD(2, 0); err = WSAStartup(wVerReq, &wsaData); if (err != 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_WSASTARTUP, err); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT, BIO_R_WSASTARTUP); return (-1); } } # endif return (1); } void BIO_sock_cleanup(void) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS if (wsa_init_done) { wsa_init_done = 0; # if 0 /* this call is claimed to be non-present in * Winsock2 */ WSACancelBlockingCall(); # endif WSACleanup(); } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) if (wsa_init_done) { wsa_init_done = 0; WSACleanup(); } # endif } # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || __VMS_VER >= 70000000 int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg) { int i; # ifdef __DJGPP__ i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, (char *)arg); # else # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /*- * 2011-02-18 SMS. * VMS ioctl() can't tolerate a 64-bit "void *arg", but we * observe that all the consumers pass in an "unsigned long *", * so we arrange a local copy with a short pointer, and use * that, instead. */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define ARG arg_32p # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 unsigned long arg_32; unsigned long *arg_32p; # pragma pointer_size restore arg_32p = &arg_32; arg_32 = *((unsigned long *)arg); # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define ARG arg # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ # else /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) */ # define ARG arg # endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) [else] */ i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, ARG); # endif /* __DJGPP__ */ if (i < 0) SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTLSOCKET, get_last_socket_error()); return (i); } # endif /* __VMS_VER */ /* * The reason I have implemented this instead of using sscanf is because * Visual C 1.52c gives an unresolved external when linking a DLL :-( */ static int get_ip(const char *str, unsigned char ip[4]) { unsigned int tmp[4]; int num = 0, c, ok = 0; tmp[0] = tmp[1] = tmp[2] = tmp[3] = 0; for (;;) { c = *(str++); if ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) { ok = 1; tmp[num] = tmp[num] * 10 + c - '0'; if (tmp[num] > 255) return (0); } else if (c == '.') { if (!ok) return (-1); if (num == 3) return (0); num++; ok = 0; } else if (c == '\0' && (num == 3) && ok) break; else return (0); } ip[0] = tmp[0]; ip[1] = tmp[1]; ip[2] = tmp[2]; ip[3] = tmp[3]; return (1); } int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host, int bind_mode) { int ret = 0; union { struct sockaddr sa; struct sockaddr_in sa_in; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6; # endif } server, client; int s = INVALID_SOCKET, cs, addrlen; unsigned char ip[4]; unsigned short port; char *str = NULL, *e; char *h, *p; unsigned long l; int err_num; if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return (INVALID_SOCKET); if ((str = BUF_strdup(host)) == NULL) return (INVALID_SOCKET); h = p = NULL; h = str; for (e = str; *e; e++) { if (*e == ':') { p = e; } else if (*e == '/') { *e = '\0'; break; } } if (p) *p++ = '\0'; /* points at last ':', '::port' is special * [see below] */ else p = h, h = NULL; # ifdef EAI_FAMILY do { static union { void *p; int (WSAAPI *f) (const char *, const char *, const struct addrinfo *, struct addrinfo **); } p_getaddrinfo = { NULL }; static union { void *p; void (WSAAPI *f) (struct addrinfo *); } p_freeaddrinfo = { NULL }; struct addrinfo *res, hint; if (p_getaddrinfo.p == NULL) { if ((p_getaddrinfo.p = DSO_global_lookup("getaddrinfo")) == NULL || (p_freeaddrinfo.p = DSO_global_lookup("freeaddrinfo")) == NULL) p_getaddrinfo.p = (void *)-1; } if (p_getaddrinfo.p == (void *)-1) break; /* * '::port' enforces IPv6 wildcard listener. Some OSes, e.g. Solaris, * default to IPv6 without any hint. Also note that commonly IPv6 * wildchard socket can service IPv4 connections just as well... */ memset(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint)); hint.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; if (h) { if (strchr(h, ':')) { if (h[1] == '\0') h = NULL; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 hint.ai_family = AF_INET6; # else h = NULL; # endif } else if (h[0] == '*' && h[1] == '\0') { hint.ai_family = AF_INET; h = NULL; } } if ((*p_getaddrinfo.f) (h, p, &hint, &res)) break; addrlen = res->ai_addrlen <= sizeof(server) ? res->ai_addrlen : sizeof(server); memcpy(&server, res->ai_addr, addrlen); (*p_freeaddrinfo.f) (res); goto again; } while (0); # endif if (!BIO_get_port(p, &port)) goto err; memset((char *)&server, 0, sizeof(server)); server.sa_in.sin_family = AF_INET; server.sa_in.sin_port = htons(port); addrlen = sizeof(server.sa_in); if (h == NULL || strcmp(h, "*") == 0) server.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; else { if (!BIO_get_host_ip(h, &(ip[0]))) goto err; l = (unsigned long) ((unsigned long)ip[0] << 24L) | ((unsigned long)ip[1] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)ip[2] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)ip[3]); server.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(l); } again: s = socket(server.sa.sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, SOCKET_PROTOCOL); if (s == INVALID_SOCKET) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SOCKET, get_last_socket_error()); ERR_add_error_data(3, "port='", host, "'"); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_ACCEPT_SOCKET, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET); goto err; } # ifdef SO_REUSEADDR if (bind_mode == BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR) { int i = 1; ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)&i, sizeof(i)); bind_mode = BIO_BIND_NORMAL; } # endif if (bind(s, &server.sa, addrlen) == -1) { # ifdef SO_REUSEADDR err_num = get_last_socket_error(); if ((bind_mode == BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED) && # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS /* * Some versions of Windows define EADDRINUSE to a dummy value. */ (err_num == WSAEADDRINUSE)) # else (err_num == EADDRINUSE)) # endif { client = server; if (h == NULL || strcmp(h, "*") == 0) { # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 if (client.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { memset(&client.sa_in6.sin6_addr, 0, sizeof(client.sa_in6.sin6_addr)); client.sa_in6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[15] = 1; } else # endif if (client.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) { client.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7F000001); } else goto err; } cs = socket(client.sa.sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, SOCKET_PROTOCOL); if (cs != INVALID_SOCKET) { int ii; ii = connect(cs, &client.sa, addrlen); closesocket(cs); if (ii == INVALID_SOCKET) { bind_mode = BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR; closesocket(s); goto again; } /* else error */ } /* else error */ } # endif SYSerr(SYS_F_BIND, err_num); ERR_add_error_data(3, "port='", host, "'"); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_ACCEPT_SOCKET, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_BIND_SOCKET); goto err; } if (listen(s, MAX_LISTEN) == -1) { SYSerr(SYS_F_BIND, get_last_socket_error()); ERR_add_error_data(3, "port='", host, "'"); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_ACCEPT_SOCKET, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_LISTEN_SOCKET); goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (str != NULL) OPENSSL_free(str); if ((ret == 0) && (s != INVALID_SOCKET)) { closesocket(s); s = INVALID_SOCKET; } return (s); } int BIO_accept(int sock, char **addr) { int ret = INVALID_SOCKET; unsigned long l; unsigned short port; char *p; struct { /* * As for following union. Trouble is that there are platforms * that have socklen_t and there are platforms that don't, on * some platforms socklen_t is int and on some size_t. So what * one can do? One can cook #ifdef spaghetti, which is nothing * but masochistic. Or one can do union between int and size_t. * One naturally does it primarily for 64-bit platforms where * sizeof(int) != sizeof(size_t). But would it work? Note that * if size_t member is initialized to 0, then later int member * assignment naturally does the job on little-endian platforms * regardless accept's expectations! What about big-endians? * If accept expects int*, then it works, and if size_t*, then * length value would appear as unreasonably large. But this * won't prevent it from filling in the address structure. The * trouble of course would be if accept returns more data than * actual buffer can accomodate and overwrite stack... That's * where early OPENSSL_assert comes into picture. Besides, the * only 64-bit big-endian platform found so far that expects * size_t* is HP-UX, where stack grows towards higher address. * */ union { size_t s; int i; } len; union { struct sockaddr sa; struct sockaddr_in sa_in; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6; # endif } from; } sa; sa.len.s = 0; sa.len.i = sizeof(sa.from); memset(&sa.from, 0, sizeof(sa.from)); ret = accept(sock, &sa.from.sa, (void *)&sa.len); if (sizeof(sa.len.i) != sizeof(sa.len.s) && sa.len.i == 0) { OPENSSL_assert(sa.len.s <= sizeof(sa.from)); sa.len.i = (int)sa.len.s; /* use sa.len.i from this point */ } if (ret == INVALID_SOCKET) { if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) return -2; SYSerr(SYS_F_ACCEPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT, BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR); goto end; } if (addr == NULL) goto end; # ifdef EAI_FAMILY do { char h[NI_MAXHOST], s[NI_MAXSERV]; size_t nl; static union { void *p; int (WSAAPI *f) (const struct sockaddr *, size_t /* socklen_t */ , char *, size_t, char *, size_t, int); } p_getnameinfo = { NULL }; /* * 2nd argument to getnameinfo is specified to be socklen_t. * Unfortunately there is a number of environments where socklen_t is * not defined. As it's passed by value, it's safe to pass it as * size_t... */ if (p_getnameinfo.p == NULL) { if ((p_getnameinfo.p = DSO_global_lookup("getnameinfo")) == NULL) p_getnameinfo.p = (void *)-1; } if (p_getnameinfo.p == (void *)-1) break; if ((*p_getnameinfo.f) (&sa.from.sa, sa.len.i, h, sizeof(h), s, sizeof(s), NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV)) break; nl = strlen(h) + strlen(s) + 2; p = *addr; if (p) { *p = '\0'; p = OPENSSL_realloc(p, nl); } else { p = OPENSSL_malloc(nl); } if (p == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } *addr = p; BIO_snprintf(*addr, nl, "%s:%s", h, s); goto end; } while (0); # endif if (sa.from.sa.sa_family != AF_INET) goto end; l = ntohl(sa.from.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr); port = ntohs(sa.from.sa_in.sin_port); if (*addr == NULL) { if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(24)) == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } *addr = p; } BIO_snprintf(*addr, 24, "%d.%d.%d.%d:%d", (unsigned char)(l >> 24L) & 0xff, (unsigned char)(l >> 16L) & 0xff, (unsigned char)(l >> 8L) & 0xff, (unsigned char)(l) & 0xff, port); end: return (ret); } int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int s, int on) { int ret = 0; # if defined(TCP_NODELAY) && (defined(IPPROTO_TCP) || defined(SOL_TCP)) int opt; # ifdef SOL_TCP opt = SOL_TCP; # else # ifdef IPPROTO_TCP opt = IPPROTO_TCP; # endif # endif ret = setsockopt(s, opt, TCP_NODELAY, (char *)&on, sizeof(on)); # endif return (ret == 0); } int BIO_socket_nbio(int s, int mode) { int ret = -1; int l; l = mode; # ifdef FIONBIO ret = BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &l); # endif return (ret == 0); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,638 +1,632 @@ #include "../bn_lcl.h" #if !(defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2) # include "../bn_asm.c" /* kind of dirty hack for Sun Studio */ #else /*- * x86_64 BIGNUM accelerator version 0.1, December 2002. * * Implemented by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL * project. * * Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are * granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is * disclaimed. * * Q. Version 0.1? It doesn't sound like Andy, he used to assign real * versions, like 1.0... * A. Well, that's because this code is basically a quick-n-dirty * proof-of-concept hack. As you can see it's implemented with * inline assembler, which means that you're bound to GCC and that * there might be enough room for further improvement. * * Q. Why inline assembler? * A. x86_64 features own ABI which I'm not familiar with. This is * why I decided to let the compiler take care of subroutine * prologue/epilogue as well as register allocation. For reference. * Win64 implements different ABI for AMD64, different from Linux. * * Q. How much faster does it get? * A. 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with no-asm: * * sign verify sign/s verify/s * rsa 512 bits 0.0006s 0.0001s 1683.8 18456.2 * rsa 1024 bits 0.0028s 0.0002s 356.0 6407.0 * rsa 2048 bits 0.0172s 0.0005s 58.0 1957.8 * rsa 4096 bits 0.1155s 0.0018s 8.7 555.6 * sign verify sign/s verify/s * dsa 512 bits 0.0005s 0.0006s 2100.8 1768.3 * dsa 1024 bits 0.0014s 0.0018s 692.3 559.2 * dsa 2048 bits 0.0049s 0.0061s 204.7 165.0 * * 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with this module: * * sign verify sign/s verify/s * rsa 512 bits 0.0004s 0.0000s 2767.1 33297.9 * rsa 1024 bits 0.0012s 0.0001s 867.4 14674.7 * rsa 2048 bits 0.0061s 0.0002s 164.0 5270.0 * rsa 4096 bits 0.0384s 0.0006s 26.1 1650.8 * sign verify sign/s verify/s * dsa 512 bits 0.0002s 0.0003s 4442.2 3786.3 * dsa 1024 bits 0.0005s 0.0007s 1835.1 1497.4 * dsa 2048 bits 0.0016s 0.0020s 620.4 504.6 * * For the reference. IA-32 assembler implementation performs * very much like 64-bit code compiled with no-asm on the same * machine. */ -# if defined(_WIN64) || !defined(__LP64__) -# define BN_ULONG unsigned long long -# else -# define BN_ULONG unsigned long -# endif - # undef mul # undef mul_add /*- * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code; * "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it * want to keep the value of zero; */ # define mul_add(r,a,word,carry) do { \ register BN_ULONG high,low; \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \ : "a"(word),"m"(a) \ : "cc"); \ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \ : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\ : "a"(low),"g"(0) \ : "cc"); \ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \ : "+m"(r),"+d"(high) \ : "r"(carry),"g"(0) \ : "cc"); \ carry=high; \ } while (0) # define mul(r,a,word,carry) do { \ register BN_ULONG high,low; \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \ : "a"(word),"g"(a) \ : "cc"); \ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \ : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\ : "a"(low),"g"(0) \ : "cc"); \ (r)=carry, carry=high; \ } while (0) # undef sqr # define sqr(r0,r1,a) \ asm ("mulq %2" \ : "=a"(r0),"=d"(r1) \ : "a"(a) \ : "cc"); BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1 = 0; if (num <= 0) return (c1); while (num & ~3) { mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); mul_add(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1); ap += 4; rp += 4; num -= 4; } if (num) { mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); return c1; } return (c1); } BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1 = 0; if (num <= 0) return (c1); while (num & ~3) { mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); mul(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1); ap += 4; rp += 4; num -= 4; } if (num) { mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); } return (c1); } void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n) { if (n <= 0) return; while (n & ~3) { sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]); sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]); sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]); sqr(r[6], r[7], a[3]); a += 4; r += 8; n -= 4; } if (n) { sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]); if (--n == 0) return; sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]); if (--n == 0) return; sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]); } } BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) { BN_ULONG ret, waste; asm("divq %4":"=a"(ret), "=d"(waste) : "a"(l), "d"(h), "r"(d) : "cc"); return ret; } BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int n) { BN_ULONG ret; size_t i = 0; if (n <= 0) return 0; asm volatile (" subq %0,%0 \n" /* clear carry */ " jmp 1f \n" ".p2align 4 \n" "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n" " adcq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n" " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n" " lea 1(%2),%2 \n" " loop 1b \n" " sbbq %0,%0 \n":"=&r" (ret), "+c"(n), "+r"(i) :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp) :"cc", "memory"); return ret & 1; } # ifndef SIMICS BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int n) { BN_ULONG ret; size_t i = 0; if (n <= 0) return 0; asm volatile (" subq %0,%0 \n" /* clear borrow */ " jmp 1f \n" ".p2align 4 \n" "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n" " sbbq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n" " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n" " lea 1(%2),%2 \n" " loop 1b \n" " sbbq %0,%0 \n":"=&r" (ret), "+c"(n), "+r"(i) :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp) :"cc", "memory"); return ret & 1; } # else /* Simics 1.4<7 has buggy sbbq:-( */ # define BN_MASK2 0xffffffffffffffffL BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) { BN_ULONG t1, t2; int c = 0; if (n <= 0) return ((BN_ULONG)0); for (;;) { t1 = a[0]; t2 = b[0]; r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1 = a[1]; t2 = b[1]; r[1] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1 = a[2]; t2 = b[2]; r[2] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1 = a[3]; t2 = b[3]; r[3] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; a += 4; b += 4; r += 4; } return (c); } # endif /* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* * sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number * c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones. */ # if 0 /* original macros are kept for reference purposes */ # define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \ BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b); \ BN_ULONG lo, hi; \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb); \ c0 += lo; hi += (c0 #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #define BN_BLINDING_COUNTER 32 struct bn_blinding_st { BIGNUM *A; BIGNUM *Ai; BIGNUM *e; BIGNUM *mod; /* just a reference */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED unsigned long thread_id; /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b; used * only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */ #endif CRYPTO_THREADID tid; int counter; unsigned long flags; BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx; int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); }; BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod) { BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL; bn_check_top(mod); if ((ret = (BN_BLINDING *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_BLINDING))) == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BN_BLINDING)); if (A != NULL) { if ((ret->A = BN_dup(A)) == NULL) goto err; } if (Ai != NULL) { if ((ret->Ai = BN_dup(Ai)) == NULL) goto err; } /* save a copy of mod in the BN_BLINDING structure */ if ((ret->mod = BN_dup(mod)) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* * Set the counter to the special value -1 to indicate that this is * never-used fresh blinding that does not need updating before first * use. */ ret->counter = -1; CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&ret->tid); return (ret); err: if (ret != NULL) BN_BLINDING_free(ret); return (NULL); } void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *r) { if (r == NULL) return; if (r->A != NULL) BN_free(r->A); if (r->Ai != NULL) BN_free(r->Ai); if (r->e != NULL) BN_free(r->e); if (r->mod != NULL) BN_free(r->mod); OPENSSL_free(r); } int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_UPDATE, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); goto err; } if (b->counter == -1) b->counter = 0; if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL && !(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE)) { /* re-create blinding parameters */ if (!BN_BLINDING_create_param(b, NULL, NULL, ctx, NULL, NULL)) goto err; } else if (!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE)) { - if (!BN_mod_mul(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->mod, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!BN_mod_mul(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx)) - goto err; + if (b->m_ctx != NULL) { + if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->m_ctx, ctx) + || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->m_ctx, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + if (!BN_mod_mul(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx) + || !BN_mod_mul(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->mod, ctx)) + goto err; + } } ret = 1; err: if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER) b->counter = 0; return (ret); } int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(n, NULL, b, ctx); } int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 1; bn_check_top(n); if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CONVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return (0); } if (b->counter == -1) /* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */ b->counter = 0; else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b, ctx)) return (0); - if (r != NULL) { - if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) - ret = 0; - } + if (r != NULL && (BN_copy(r, b->Ai) == NULL)) + return 0; - if (!BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->A, b->mod, ctx)) - ret = 0; + if (b->m_ctx != NULL) + ret = BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, b->A, b->m_ctx, ctx); + else + ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->A, b->mod, ctx); return ret; } int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(n, NULL, b, ctx); } int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret; bn_check_top(n); - if (r != NULL) - ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx); - else { - if (b->Ai == NULL) { - BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); - return (0); + if (r == NULL && (r = b->Ai) == NULL) { + BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return 0; + } + + if (b->m_ctx != NULL) { + /* ensure that BN_mod_mul_montgomery takes pre-defined path */ + if (n->dmax >= r->top) { + size_t i, rtop = r->top, ntop = n->top; + BN_ULONG mask; + + for (i = 0; i < rtop; i++) { + mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - ntop) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1)); + n->d[i] &= mask; + } + mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((rtop - ntop) >> (8 * sizeof(ntop) - 1)); + /* always true, if (rtop >= ntop) n->top = r->top; */ + n->top = (int)(rtop & ~mask) | (ntop & mask); + n->flags |= (BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP & ~mask); } - ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx); + ret = BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, r, b->m_ctx, ctx); + } else { + ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx); } bn_check_top(n); return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(const BN_BLINDING *b) { return b->thread_id; } void BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id(BN_BLINDING *b, unsigned long n) { b->thread_id = n; } #endif CRYPTO_THREADID *BN_BLINDING_thread_id(BN_BLINDING *b) { return &b->tid; } unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *b) { return b->flags; } void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *b, unsigned long flags) { b->flags = flags; } BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx), BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) { int retry_counter = 32; BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL; if (b == NULL) ret = BN_BLINDING_new(NULL, NULL, m); else ret = b; if (ret == NULL) goto err; if (ret->A == NULL && (ret->A = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (ret->Ai == NULL && (ret->Ai = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (e != NULL) { if (ret->e != NULL) BN_free(ret->e); ret->e = BN_dup(e); } if (ret->e == NULL) goto err; if (bn_mod_exp != NULL) ret->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp; if (m_ctx != NULL) ret->m_ctx = m_ctx; do { if (!BN_rand_range(ret->A, ret->mod)) goto err; if (BN_mod_inverse(ret->Ai, ret->A, ret->mod, ctx) == NULL) { /* * this should almost never happen for good RSA keys */ unsigned long error = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { if (retry_counter-- == 0) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CREATE_PARAM, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); goto err; } ERR_clear_error(); } else goto err; } else break; } while (1); if (ret->bn_mod_exp != NULL && ret->m_ctx != NULL) { - if (!ret->bn_mod_exp - (ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx, ret->m_ctx)) + if (!ret->bn_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx, ret->m_ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + if (ret->m_ctx != NULL) { + if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(ret->Ai, ret->Ai, ret->m_ctx, ctx) + || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(ret->A, ret->A, ret->m_ctx, ctx)) goto err; } return ret; err: if (b == NULL && ret != NULL) { BN_BLINDING_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,926 +1,972 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #ifndef BN_DEBUG # undef NDEBUG /* avoid conflicting definitions */ # define NDEBUG #endif #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" const char BN_version[] = "Big Number" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; /* This stuff appears to be completely unused, so is deprecated */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED /*- * For a 32 bit machine * 2 - 4 == 128 * 3 - 8 == 256 * 4 - 16 == 512 * 5 - 32 == 1024 * 6 - 64 == 2048 * 7 - 128 == 4096 * 8 - 256 == 8192 */ static int bn_limit_bits = 0; static int bn_limit_num = 8; /* (1<= 0) { if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) mult = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits = mult; bn_limit_num = 1 << mult; } if (high >= 0) { if (high > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) high = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits_high = high; bn_limit_num_high = 1 << high; } if (low >= 0) { if (low > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) low = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits_low = low; bn_limit_num_low = 1 << low; } if (mont >= 0) { if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) mont = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits_mont = mont; bn_limit_num_mont = 1 << mont; } } int BN_get_params(int which) { if (which == 0) return (bn_limit_bits); else if (which == 1) return (bn_limit_bits_high); else if (which == 2) return (bn_limit_bits_low); else if (which == 3) return (bn_limit_bits_mont); else return (0); } #endif const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void) { static const BN_ULONG data_one = 1L; static const BIGNUM const_one = { (BN_ULONG *)&data_one, 1, 1, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; return (&const_one); } int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l) { BN_ULONG x, mask; int bits = (l != 0); #if BN_BITS2 > 32 x = l >> 32; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 32 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; #endif x = l >> 16; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 16 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; x = l >> 8; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 8 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; x = l >> 4; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 4 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; x = l >> 2; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 2 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; x = l >> 1; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 1 & mask; return bits; } int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a) { int i = a->top - 1; bn_check_top(a); if (BN_is_zero(a)) return 0; return ((i * BN_BITS2) + BN_num_bits_word(a->d[i])); } void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; bn_check_top(a); if (a->d != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0])); if (!(BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))) OPENSSL_free(a->d); } i = BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_MALLOCED); OPENSSL_cleanse(a, sizeof(BIGNUM)); if (i) OPENSSL_free(a); } void BN_free(BIGNUM *a) { if (a == NULL) return; bn_check_top(a); if ((a->d != NULL) && !(BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))) OPENSSL_free(a->d); if (a->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) OPENSSL_free(a); else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED a->flags |= BN_FLG_FREE; #endif a->d = NULL; } } void BN_init(BIGNUM *a) { memset(a, 0, sizeof(BIGNUM)); bn_check_top(a); } BIGNUM *BN_new(void) { BIGNUM *ret; if ((ret = (BIGNUM *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIGNUM))) == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED; ret->top = 0; ret->neg = 0; ret->dmax = 0; ret->d = NULL; bn_check_top(ret); return (ret); } /* This is used both by bn_expand2() and bn_dup_expand() */ /* The caller MUST check that words > b->dmax before calling this */ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words) { BN_ULONG *A, *a = NULL; const BN_ULONG *B; int i; if (words > (INT_MAX / (4 * BN_BITS2))) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG); return NULL; } if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA); return (NULL); } a = A = (BN_ULONG *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words); if (A == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } #ifdef PURIFY /* * Valgrind complains in BN_consttime_swap because we process the whole * array even if it's not initialised yet. This doesn't matter in that * function - what's important is constant time operation (we're not * actually going to use the data) */ memset(a, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words); #endif #if 1 B = b->d; /* Check if the previous number needs to be copied */ if (B != NULL) { for (i = b->top >> 2; i > 0; i--, A += 4, B += 4) { /* * The fact that the loop is unrolled * 4-wise is a tribute to Intel. It's * the one that doesn't have enough * registers to accomodate more data. * I'd unroll it 8-wise otherwise:-) * * */ BN_ULONG a0, a1, a2, a3; a0 = B[0]; a1 = B[1]; a2 = B[2]; a3 = B[3]; A[0] = a0; A[1] = a1; A[2] = a2; A[3] = a3; } /* * workaround for ultrix cc: without 'case 0', the optimizer does * the switch table by doing a=top&3; a--; goto jump_table[a]; * which fails for top== 0 */ switch (b->top & 3) { case 3: A[2] = B[2]; case 2: A[1] = B[1]; case 1: A[0] = B[0]; case 0: ; } } #else memset(A, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words); memcpy(A, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top); #endif return (a); } /* * This is an internal function that can be used instead of bn_expand2() when * there is a need to copy BIGNUMs instead of only expanding the data part, * while still expanding them. Especially useful when needing to expand * BIGNUMs that are declared 'const' and should therefore not be changed. The * reason to use this instead of a BN_dup() followed by a bn_expand2() is * memory allocation overhead. A BN_dup() followed by a bn_expand2() will * allocate new memory for the BIGNUM data twice, and free it once, while * bn_dup_expand() makes sure allocation is made only once. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED BIGNUM *bn_dup_expand(const BIGNUM *b, int words) { BIGNUM *r = NULL; bn_check_top(b); /* * This function does not work if words <= b->dmax && top < words because * BN_dup() does not preserve 'dmax'! (But bn_dup_expand() is not used * anywhere yet.) */ if (words > b->dmax) { BN_ULONG *a = bn_expand_internal(b, words); if (a) { r = BN_new(); if (r) { r->top = b->top; r->dmax = words; r->neg = b->neg; r->d = a; } else { /* r == NULL, BN_new failure */ OPENSSL_free(a); } } /* * If a == NULL, there was an error in allocation in * bn_expand_internal(), and NULL should be returned */ } else { r = BN_dup(b); } bn_check_top(r); return r; } #endif /* * This is an internal function that should not be used in applications. It * ensures that 'b' has enough room for a 'words' word number and initialises * any unused part of b->d with leading zeros. It is mostly used by the * various BIGNUM routines. If there is an error, NULL is returned. If not, * 'b' is returned. */ BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words) { if (words > b->dmax) { BN_ULONG *a = bn_expand_internal(b, words); if (!a) return NULL; if (b->d) OPENSSL_free(b->d); b->d = a; b->dmax = words; } /* None of this should be necessary because of what b->top means! */ #if 0 /* * NB: bn_wexpand() calls this only if the BIGNUM really has to grow */ if (b->top < b->dmax) { int i; BN_ULONG *A = &(b->d[b->top]); for (i = (b->dmax - b->top) >> 3; i > 0; i--, A += 8) { A[0] = 0; A[1] = 0; A[2] = 0; A[3] = 0; A[4] = 0; A[5] = 0; A[6] = 0; A[7] = 0; } for (i = (b->dmax - b->top) & 7; i > 0; i--, A++) A[0] = 0; assert(A == &(b->d[b->dmax])); } #endif return b; } BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a) { BIGNUM *t; if (a == NULL) return NULL; bn_check_top(a); t = BN_new(); if (t == NULL) return NULL; if (!BN_copy(t, a)) { BN_free(t); return NULL; } bn_check_top(t); return t; } BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; BN_ULONG *A; const BN_ULONG *B; bn_check_top(b); if (a == b) return (a); if (bn_wexpand(a, b->top) == NULL) return (NULL); #if 1 A = a->d; B = b->d; for (i = b->top >> 2; i > 0; i--, A += 4, B += 4) { BN_ULONG a0, a1, a2, a3; a0 = B[0]; a1 = B[1]; a2 = B[2]; a3 = B[3]; A[0] = a0; A[1] = a1; A[2] = a2; A[3] = a3; } /* ultrix cc workaround, see comments in bn_expand_internal */ switch (b->top & 3) { case 3: A[2] = B[2]; case 2: A[1] = B[1]; case 1: A[0] = B[0]; case 0:; } #else memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top); #endif a->neg = b->neg; a->top = b->top; a->flags |= b->flags & BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; bn_check_top(a); return (a); } #define FLAGS_DATA(flags) ((flags) & (BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA \ | BN_FLG_CONSTTIME \ | BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP)) #define FLAGS_STRUCT(flags) ((flags) & (BN_FLG_MALLOCED)) void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b) { int flags_old_a, flags_old_b; BN_ULONG *tmp_d; int tmp_top, tmp_dmax, tmp_neg; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); flags_old_a = a->flags; flags_old_b = b->flags; tmp_d = a->d; tmp_top = a->top; tmp_dmax = a->dmax; tmp_neg = a->neg; a->d = b->d; a->top = b->top; a->dmax = b->dmax; a->neg = b->neg; b->d = tmp_d; b->top = tmp_top; b->dmax = tmp_dmax; b->neg = tmp_neg; a->flags = FLAGS_STRUCT(flags_old_a) | FLAGS_DATA(flags_old_b); b->flags = FLAGS_STRUCT(flags_old_b) | FLAGS_DATA(flags_old_a); bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); } void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a) { bn_check_top(a); if (a->d != NULL) OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0])); a->top = 0; a->neg = 0; a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; } BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a) { if (a->top > 1) return BN_MASK2; else if (a->top == 1) return a->d[0]; /* a->top == 0 */ return 0; } int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) { bn_check_top(a); if (bn_expand(a, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8) == NULL) return (0); a->neg = 0; a->d[0] = w; a->top = (w ? 1 : 0); a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; bn_check_top(a); return (1); } BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret) { unsigned int i, m; unsigned int n; BN_ULONG l; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; if (ret == NULL) ret = bn = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); bn_check_top(ret); l = 0; n = len; if (n == 0) { ret->top = 0; return (ret); } i = ((n - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1; m = ((n - 1) % (BN_BYTES)); if (bn_wexpand(ret, (int)i) == NULL) { if (bn) BN_free(bn); return NULL; } ret->top = i; ret->neg = 0; while (n--) { l = (l << 8L) | *(s++); if (m-- == 0) { ret->d[--i] = l; l = 0; m = BN_BYTES - 1; } } /* * need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding having the top * bit set (-ve number) */ bn_correct_top(ret); return (ret); } /* ignore negative */ static int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen) { int n; - size_t i, inc, lasti, j; + size_t i, lasti, j, atop, mask; BN_ULONG l; + /* + * In case |a| is fixed-top, BN_num_bytes can return bogus length, + * but it's assumed that fixed-top inputs ought to be "nominated" + * even for padded output, so it works out... + */ n = BN_num_bytes(a); - if (tolen == -1) + if (tolen == -1) { tolen = n; - else if (tolen < n) - return -1; + } else if (tolen < n) { /* uncommon/unlike case */ + BIGNUM temp = *a; - if (n == 0) { + bn_correct_top(&temp); + n = BN_num_bytes(&temp); + if (tolen < n) + return -1; + } + + /* Swipe through whole available data and don't give away padded zero. */ + atop = a->dmax * BN_BYTES; + if (atop == 0) { OPENSSL_cleanse(to, tolen); return tolen; } - lasti = n - 1; - for (i = 0, inc = 1, j = tolen; j > 0;) { + lasti = atop - 1; + atop = a->top * BN_BYTES; + for (i = 0, j = 0, to += tolen; j < (size_t)tolen; j++) { l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES]; - to[--j] = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES)) & (0 - inc)); - inc = (i - lasti) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); - i += inc; /* stay on top limb */ + mask = 0 - ((j - atop) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1)); + *--to = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES)) & mask); + i += (i - lasti) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); /* stay on last limb */ } return tolen; } int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen) { if (tolen < 0) return -1; return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen); } int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to) { int n, i; BN_ULONG l; bn_check_top(a); n = i = BN_num_bytes(a); while (i--) { l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES]; *(to++) = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff; } return (n); } int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; BN_ULONG t1, t2, *ap, *bp; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); i = a->top - b->top; if (i != 0) return (i); ap = a->d; bp = b->d; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { t1 = ap[i]; t2 = bp[i]; if (t1 != t2) return ((t1 > t2) ? 1 : -1); } return (0); } int BN_cmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; int gt, lt; BN_ULONG t1, t2; if ((a == NULL) || (b == NULL)) { if (a != NULL) return (-1); else if (b != NULL) return (1); else return (0); } bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (a->neg != b->neg) { if (a->neg) return (-1); else return (1); } if (a->neg == 0) { gt = 1; lt = -1; } else { gt = -1; lt = 1; } if (a->top > b->top) return (gt); if (a->top < b->top) return (lt); for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { t1 = a->d[i]; t2 = b->d[i]; if (t1 > t2) return (gt); if (t1 < t2) return (lt); } return (0); } int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j, k; if (n < 0) return 0; i = n / BN_BITS2; j = n % BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) { if (bn_wexpand(a, i + 1) == NULL) return (0); for (k = a->top; k < i + 1; k++) a->d[k] = 0; a->top = i + 1; a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; } a->d[i] |= (((BN_ULONG)1) << j); bn_check_top(a); return (1); } int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j; bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; i = n / BN_BITS2; j = n % BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) return (0); a->d[i] &= (~(((BN_ULONG)1) << j)); bn_correct_top(a); return (1); } int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j; bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; i = n / BN_BITS2; j = n % BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) return 0; return (int)(((a->d[i]) >> j) & ((BN_ULONG)1)); } int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int b, w; bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; w = n / BN_BITS2; b = n % BN_BITS2; if (w >= a->top) return 0; if (b == 0) a->top = w; else { a->top = w + 1; a->d[w] &= ~(BN_MASK2 << b); } bn_correct_top(a); return (1); } void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int b) { if (b && !BN_is_zero(a)) a->neg = 1; else a->neg = 0; } int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n) { int i; BN_ULONG aa, bb; aa = a[n - 1]; bb = b[n - 1]; if (aa != bb) return ((aa > bb) ? 1 : -1); for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { aa = a[i]; bb = b[i]; if (aa != bb) return ((aa > bb) ? 1 : -1); } return (0); } /* * Here follows a specialised variants of bn_cmp_words(). It has the * property of performing the operation on arrays of different sizes. The * sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common length * ( basicall, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta between the * two lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the number of * BN_ULONGs... */ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) { int n, i; n = cl - 1; if (dl < 0) { for (i = dl; i < 0; i++) { if (b[n - i] != 0) return -1; /* a < b */ } } if (dl > 0) { for (i = dl; i > 0; i--) { if (a[n + i] != 0) return 1; /* a > b */ } } return bn_cmp_words(a, b, cl); } /* * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b. * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0. The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set. * nwords is the number of words to swap. The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b, * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b. * a and b cannot be the same number */ void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords) { BN_ULONG t; int i; bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords); bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords); assert(a != b); assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0); assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int)); condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1; t = (a->top ^ b->top) & condition; a->top ^= t; b->top ^= t; + + t = (a->neg ^ b->neg) & condition; + a->neg ^= t; + b->neg ^= t; + + /*- + * BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA: indicates that data may not be written to. Intention + * is actually to treat it as it's read-only data, and some (if not most) + * of it does reside in read-only segment. In other words observation of + * BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA in BN_consttime_swap should be treated as fatal + * condition. It would either cause SEGV or effectively cause data + * corruption. + * + * BN_FLG_MALLOCED: refers to BN structure itself, and hence must be + * preserved. + * + * BN_FLG_SECURE: must be preserved, because it determines how x->d was + * allocated and hence how to free it. + * + * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME: sufficient to mask and swap + * + * BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP: indicates that we haven't called bn_correct_top() on + * the data, so the d array may be padded with additional 0 values (i.e. + * top could be greater than the minimal value that it could be). We should + * be swapping it + */ + +#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP_FLAGS (BN_FLG_CONSTTIME | BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP) + + t = ((a->flags ^ b->flags) & BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP_FLAGS) & condition; + a->flags ^= t; + b->flags ^= t; #define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \ do { \ t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \ a->d[ind] ^= t; \ b->d[ind] ^= t; \ } while (0) switch (nwords) { default: for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i); /* Fallthrough */ case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */ case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */ case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */ case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */ case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */ case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */ case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */ case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */ case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */ case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0); } #undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,371 +1,436 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_mod.c */ /* * Includes code written by Lenka Fibikova * for the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #if 0 /* now just a #define */ int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) { return (BN_div(NULL, rem, m, d, ctx)); /* note that rem->neg == m->neg (unless the remainder is zero) */ } #endif int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* * like BN_mod, but returns non-negative remainder (i.e., 0 <= r < |d| * always holds) */ if (!(BN_mod(r, m, d, ctx))) return 0; if (!r->neg) return 1; /* now -|d| < r < 0, so we have to set r := r + |d| */ return (d->neg ? BN_sub : BN_add) (r, r, d); } int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_add(r, a, b)) return 0; return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx); } /* * BN_mod_add variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and * less than m. The original algorithm was * * if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b)) * return 0; * if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0) * return BN_usub(r, r, m); * * which is replaced with addition, subtracting modulus, and conditional * move depending on whether or not subtraction borrowed. */ int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m) { size_t i, ai, bi, mtop = m->top; BN_ULONG storage[1024 / BN_BITS2]; BN_ULONG carry, temp, mask, *rp, *tp = storage; const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp; if (bn_wexpand(r, m->top) == NULL) return 0; if (mtop > sizeof(storage) / sizeof(storage[0]) && (tp = OPENSSL_malloc(mtop * sizeof(BN_ULONG))) == NULL) - return 0; + return 0; ap = a->d != NULL ? a->d : tp; bp = b->d != NULL ? b->d : tp; for (i = 0, ai = 0, bi = 0, carry = 0; i < mtop;) { mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - a->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1)); temp = ((ap[ai] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2; carry = (temp < carry); mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - b->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1)); tp[i] = ((bp[bi] & mask) + temp) & BN_MASK2; carry += (tp[i] < temp); i++; ai += (i - a->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); bi += (i - b->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); } rp = r->d; carry -= bn_sub_words(rp, tp, m->d, mtop); for (i = 0; i < mtop; i++) { rp[i] = (carry & tp[i]) | (~carry & rp[i]); ((volatile BN_ULONG *)tp)[i] = 0; } r->top = mtop; + r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; r->neg = 0; if (tp != storage) OPENSSL_free(tp); return 1; } int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m) { int ret = bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r, a, b, m); if (ret) bn_correct_top(r); return ret; } int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) return 0; return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx); +} + +/* + * BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative, + * a is less than m, while b is of same bit width as m. It's implemented + * as subtraction followed by two conditional additions. + * + * 0 <= a < m + * 0 <= b < 2^w < 2*m + * + * after subtraction + * + * -2*m < r = a - b < m + * + * Thus it takes up to two conditional additions to make |r| positive. + */ +int bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const BIGNUM *m) +{ + size_t i, ai, bi, mtop = m->top; + BN_ULONG borrow, carry, ta, tb, mask, *rp; + const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp; + + if (bn_wexpand(r, m->top) == NULL) + return 0; + + rp = r->d; + ap = a->d != NULL ? a->d : rp; + bp = b->d != NULL ? b->d : rp; + + for (i = 0, ai = 0, bi = 0, borrow = 0; i < mtop;) { + mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - a->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1)); + ta = ap[ai] & mask; + + mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - b->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1)); + tb = bp[bi] & mask; + rp[i] = ta - tb - borrow; + if (ta != tb) + borrow = (ta < tb); + + i++; + ai += (i - a->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); + bi += (i - b->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); + } + ap = m->d; + for (i = 0, mask = 0 - borrow, carry = 0; i < mtop; i++) { + ta = ((ap[i] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2; + carry = (ta < carry); + rp[i] = (rp[i] + ta) & BN_MASK2; + carry += (rp[i] < ta); + } + borrow -= carry; + for (i = 0, mask = 0 - borrow, carry = 0; i < mtop; i++) { + ta = ((ap[i] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2; + carry = (ta < carry); + rp[i] = (rp[i] + ta) & BN_MASK2; + carry += (rp[i] < ta); + } + + r->top = mtop; + r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; + r->neg = 0; + + return 1; } /* * BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and * less than m */ int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m) { if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) return 0; if (r->neg) return BN_add(r, r, m); return 1; } /* slow but works */ int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *t; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); bn_check_top(m); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (a == b) { if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mul(t, a, b, ctx)) goto err; } if (!BN_nnmod(r, t, m, ctx)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx)) return 0; /* r->neg == 0, thus we don't need BN_nnmod */ return BN_mod(r, r, m, ctx); } int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) return 0; bn_check_top(r); return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx); } /* * BN_mod_lshift1 variant that may be used if a is non-negative and less than * m */ int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m) { if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) return 0; bn_check_top(r); if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) return BN_sub(r, r, m); return 1; } int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *abs_m = NULL; int ret; if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) return 0; if (m->neg) { abs_m = BN_dup(m); if (abs_m == NULL) return 0; abs_m->neg = 0; } ret = BN_mod_lshift_quick(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m : m)); bn_check_top(r); if (abs_m) BN_free(abs_m); return ret; } /* * BN_mod_lshift variant that may be used if a is non-negative and less than * m */ int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m) { if (r != a) { if (BN_copy(r, a) == NULL) return 0; } while (n > 0) { int max_shift; /* 0 < r < m */ max_shift = BN_num_bits(m) - BN_num_bits(r); /* max_shift >= 0 */ if (max_shift < 0) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_LSHIFT_QUICK, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED); return 0; } if (max_shift > n) max_shift = n; if (max_shift) { if (!BN_lshift(r, r, max_shift)) return 0; n -= max_shift; } else { if (!BN_lshift1(r, r)) return 0; --n; } /* BN_num_bits(r) <= BN_num_bits(m) */ if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_sub(r, r, m)) return 0; } } bn_check_top(r); return 1; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,550 +1,559 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_mont.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* * Details about Montgomery multiplication algorithms can be found at * http://security.ece.orst.edu/publications.html, e.g. * http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/j37acmon.pdf and * sections 3.8 and 4.2 in http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/r01rsasw.pdf */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #define MONT_WORD /* use the faster word-based algorithm */ #ifdef MONT_WORD static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont); #endif int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, a, b, mont, ctx); bn_correct_top(r); bn_check_top(r); return ret; } int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *tmp; int ret = 0; #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && defined(MONT_WORD) int num = mont->N.top; if (num > 1 && a->top == num && b->top == num) { if (bn_wexpand(r, num) == NULL) return (0); if (bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) { r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg; r->top = num; r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; return 1; } } #endif BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; bn_check_top(tmp); if (a == b) { - if (!BN_sqr(tmp, a, ctx)) + if (!bn_sqr_fixed_top(tmp, a, ctx)) goto err; } else { - if (!BN_mul(tmp, a, b, ctx)) + if (!bn_mul_fixed_top(tmp, a, b, ctx)) goto err; } /* reduce from aRR to aR */ #ifdef MONT_WORD if (!bn_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont)) goto err; #else if (!BN_from_montgomery(r, tmp, mont, ctx)) goto err; #endif ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } #ifdef MONT_WORD static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont) { BIGNUM *n; BN_ULONG *ap, *np, *rp, n0, v, carry; int nl, max, i; + unsigned int rtop; n = &(mont->N); nl = n->top; if (nl == 0) { ret->top = 0; return (1); } max = (2 * nl); /* carry is stored separately */ if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL) return (0); r->neg ^= n->neg; np = n->d; rp = r->d; /* clear the top words of T */ -# if 1 - for (i = r->top; i < max; i++) /* memset? XXX */ - rp[i] = 0; -# else - memset(&(rp[r->top]), 0, (max - r->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); -# endif + for (rtop = r->top, i = 0; i < max; i++) { + v = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - rtop) >> (8 * sizeof(rtop) - 1)); + rp[i] &= v; + } r->top = max; r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; n0 = mont->n0[0]; /* * Add multiples of |n| to |r| until R = 2^(nl * BN_BITS2) divides it. On * input, we had |r| < |n| * R, so now |r| < 2 * |n| * R. Note that |r| * includes |carry| which is stored separately. */ for (carry = 0, i = 0; i < nl; i++, rp++) { v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (rp[0] * n0) & BN_MASK2); v = (v + carry + rp[nl]) & BN_MASK2; carry |= (v != rp[nl]); carry &= (v <= rp[nl]); rp[nl] = v; } if (bn_wexpand(ret, nl) == NULL) return (0); ret->top = nl; ret->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; ret->neg = r->neg; rp = ret->d; /* * Shift |nl| words to divide by R. We have |ap| < 2 * |n|. Note that |ap| * includes |carry| which is stored separately. */ ap = &(r->d[nl]); carry -= bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl); /* * |carry| is -1 if |ap| - |np| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note * |carry| cannot be 1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in * |nl| words, and we know at most one subtraction is needed. */ for (i = 0; i < nl; i++) { rp[i] = (carry & ap[i]) | (~carry & rp[i]); ap[i] = 0; } return (1); } #endif /* MONT_WORD */ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) { + int retn; + + retn = bn_from_mont_fixed_top(ret, a, mont, ctx); + bn_correct_top(ret); + bn_check_top(ret); + + return retn; +} + +int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ int retn = 0; #ifdef MONT_WORD BIGNUM *t; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a)) { retn = bn_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont); - bn_correct_top(ret); - bn_check_top(ret); } BN_CTX_end(ctx); #else /* !MONT_WORD */ BIGNUM *t1, *t2; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_copy(t1, a)) goto err; BN_mask_bits(t1, mont->ri); if (!BN_mul(t2, t1, &mont->Ni, ctx)) goto err; BN_mask_bits(t2, mont->ri); if (!BN_mul(t1, t2, &mont->N, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(t2, a, t1)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift(ret, t2, mont->ri)) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(ret, &(mont->N)) >= 0) { if (!BN_usub(ret, ret, &(mont->N))) goto err; } retn = 1; bn_check_top(ret); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); #endif /* MONT_WORD */ return (retn); } int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) { return bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, a, &(mont->RR), mont, ctx); } BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void) { BN_MONT_CTX *ret; if ((ret = (BN_MONT_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX))) == NULL) return (NULL); BN_MONT_CTX_init(ret); ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED; return (ret); } void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx) { ctx->ri = 0; BN_init(&(ctx->RR)); BN_init(&(ctx->N)); BN_init(&(ctx->Ni)); ctx->n0[0] = ctx->n0[1] = 0; ctx->flags = 0; } void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) { if (mont == NULL) return; BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR)); BN_clear_free(&(mont->N)); BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni)); if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) OPENSSL_free(mont); } int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, ret = 0; BIGNUM *Ri, *R; if (BN_is_zero(mod)) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; R = &(mont->RR); /* grab RR as a temp */ if (!BN_copy(&(mont->N), mod)) goto err; /* Set N */ if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) BN_set_flags(&(mont->N), BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); mont->N.neg = 0; #ifdef MONT_WORD { BIGNUM tmod; BN_ULONG buf[2]; BN_init(&tmod); tmod.d = buf; tmod.dmax = 2; tmod.neg = 0; if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) BN_set_flags(&tmod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2; # if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2<=32) /* * Only certain BN_BITS2<=32 platforms actually make use of n0[1], * and we could use the #else case (with a shorter R value) for the * others. However, currently only the assembler files do know which * is which. */ BN_zero(R); if (!(BN_set_bit(R, 2 * BN_BITS2))) goto err; tmod.top = 0; if ((buf[0] = mod->d[0])) tmod.top = 1; if ((buf[1] = mod->top > 1 ? mod->d[1] : 0)) tmod.top = 2; if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, 2 * BN_BITS2)) goto err; /* R*Ri */ if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) { if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) goto err; } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */ if (bn_expand(Ri, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 2) == NULL) goto err; /* Ri-- (mod double word size) */ Ri->neg = 0; Ri->d[0] = BN_MASK2; Ri->d[1] = BN_MASK2; Ri->top = 2; } if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx)) goto err; /* * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only couple of least significant words: */ mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0; mont->n0[1] = (Ri->top > 1) ? Ri->d[1] : 0; # else BN_zero(R); if (!(BN_set_bit(R, BN_BITS2))) goto err; /* R */ buf[0] = mod->d[0]; /* tmod = N mod word size */ buf[1] = 0; tmod.top = buf[0] != 0 ? 1 : 0; /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, BN_BITS2)) goto err; /* R*Ri */ if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) { if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) goto err; } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */ if (!BN_set_word(Ri, BN_MASK2)) goto err; /* Ri-- (mod word size) */ } if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx)) goto err; /* * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only least significant word: */ mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0; mont->n0[1] = 0; # endif } #else /* !MONT_WORD */ { /* bignum version */ mont->ri = BN_num_bits(&mont->N); BN_zero(R); if (!BN_set_bit(R, mont->ri)) goto err; /* R = 2^ri */ /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &mont->N, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, mont->ri)) goto err; /* R*Ri */ if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) goto err; /* * Ni = (R*Ri-1) / N */ if (!BN_div(&(mont->Ni), NULL, Ri, &mont->N, ctx)) goto err; } #endif /* setup RR for conversions */ BN_zero(&(mont->RR)); if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), mont->ri * 2)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx)) goto err; for (i = mont->RR.top, ret = mont->N.top; i < ret; i++) mont->RR.d[i] = 0; mont->RR.top = ret; mont->RR.flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from) { if (to == from) return (to); if (!BN_copy(&(to->RR), &(from->RR))) return NULL; if (!BN_copy(&(to->N), &(from->N))) return NULL; if (!BN_copy(&(to->Ni), &(from->Ni))) return NULL; to->ri = from->ri; to->n0[0] = from->n0[0]; to->n0[1] = from->n0[1]; return (to); } BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_MONT_CTX *ret; CRYPTO_r_lock(lock); ret = *pmont; CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock); if (ret) return ret; /* * We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race * (the losers throw away the work they've done). */ ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (!ret) return NULL; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx)) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret); return NULL; } /* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */ CRYPTO_w_lock(lock); if (*pmont) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret); ret = *pmont; } else *pmont = ret; CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock); return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,1125 +1,1135 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_mul.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #ifndef BN_DEBUG # undef NDEBUG /* avoid conflicting definitions */ # define NDEBUG #endif #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) || !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS) /* * Here follows specialised variants of bn_add_words() and bn_sub_words(). * They have the property performing operations on arrays of different sizes. * The sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common * length ( basicall, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta * between the two lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the * number of BN_ULONGs... For the operations that require a result array as * parameter, it must have the length cl+abs(dl). These functions should * probably end up in bn_asm.c as soon as there are assembler counterparts * for the systems that use assembler files. */ BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) { BN_ULONG c, t; assert(cl >= 0); c = bn_sub_words(r, a, b, cl); if (dl == 0) return c; r += cl; a += cl; b += cl; if (dl < 0) { # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_sub_part_words %d + %d (dl < 0, c = %d)\n", cl, dl, c); # endif for (;;) { t = b[0]; r[0] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 1; if (++dl >= 0) break; t = b[1]; r[1] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 1; if (++dl >= 0) break; t = b[2]; r[2] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 1; if (++dl >= 0) break; t = b[3]; r[3] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 1; if (++dl >= 0) break; b += 4; r += 4; } } else { int save_dl = dl; # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_sub_part_words %d + %d (dl > 0, c = %d)\n", cl, dl, c); # endif while (c) { t = a[0]; r[0] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 0; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = a[1]; r[1] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 0; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = a[2]; r[2] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 0; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = a[3]; r[3] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 0; if (--dl <= 0) break; save_dl = dl; a += 4; r += 4; } if (dl > 0) { # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_sub_part_words %d + %d (dl > 0, c == 0)\n", cl, dl); # endif if (save_dl > dl) { switch (save_dl - dl) { case 1: r[1] = a[1]; if (--dl <= 0) break; case 2: r[2] = a[2]; if (--dl <= 0) break; case 3: r[3] = a[3]; if (--dl <= 0) break; } a += 4; r += 4; } } if (dl > 0) { # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_sub_part_words %d + %d (dl > 0, copy)\n", cl, dl); # endif for (;;) { r[0] = a[0]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[1] = a[1]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[2] = a[2]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[3] = a[3]; if (--dl <= 0) break; a += 4; r += 4; } } } return c; } #endif BN_ULONG bn_add_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) { BN_ULONG c, l, t; assert(cl >= 0); c = bn_add_words(r, a, b, cl); if (dl == 0) return c; r += cl; a += cl; b += cl; if (dl < 0) { int save_dl = dl; #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_add_part_words %d + %d (dl < 0, c = %d)\n", cl, dl, c); #endif while (c) { l = (c + b[0]) & BN_MASK2; c = (l < c); r[0] = l; if (++dl >= 0) break; l = (c + b[1]) & BN_MASK2; c = (l < c); r[1] = l; if (++dl >= 0) break; l = (c + b[2]) & BN_MASK2; c = (l < c); r[2] = l; if (++dl >= 0) break; l = (c + b[3]) & BN_MASK2; c = (l < c); r[3] = l; if (++dl >= 0) break; save_dl = dl; b += 4; r += 4; } if (dl < 0) { #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_add_part_words %d + %d (dl < 0, c == 0)\n", cl, dl); #endif if (save_dl < dl) { switch (dl - save_dl) { case 1: r[1] = b[1]; if (++dl >= 0) break; case 2: r[2] = b[2]; if (++dl >= 0) break; case 3: r[3] = b[3]; if (++dl >= 0) break; } b += 4; r += 4; } } if (dl < 0) { #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_add_part_words %d + %d (dl < 0, copy)\n", cl, dl); #endif for (;;) { r[0] = b[0]; if (++dl >= 0) break; r[1] = b[1]; if (++dl >= 0) break; r[2] = b[2]; if (++dl >= 0) break; r[3] = b[3]; if (++dl >= 0) break; b += 4; r += 4; } } } else { int save_dl = dl; #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_add_part_words %d + %d (dl > 0)\n", cl, dl); #endif while (c) { t = (a[0] + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); r[0] = t; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = (a[1] + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); r[1] = t; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = (a[2] + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); r[2] = t; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = (a[3] + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); r[3] = t; if (--dl <= 0) break; save_dl = dl; a += 4; r += 4; } #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_add_part_words %d + %d (dl > 0, c == 0)\n", cl, dl); #endif if (dl > 0) { if (save_dl > dl) { switch (save_dl - dl) { case 1: r[1] = a[1]; if (--dl <= 0) break; case 2: r[2] = a[2]; if (--dl <= 0) break; case 3: r[3] = a[3]; if (--dl <= 0) break; } a += 4; r += 4; } } if (dl > 0) { #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_add_part_words %d + %d (dl > 0, copy)\n", cl, dl); #endif for (;;) { r[0] = a[0]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[1] = a[1]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[2] = a[2]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[3] = a[3]; if (--dl <= 0) break; a += 4; r += 4; } } } return c; } #ifdef BN_RECURSION /* * Karatsuba recursive multiplication algorithm (cf. Knuth, The Art of * Computer Programming, Vol. 2) */ /*- * r is 2*n2 words in size, * a and b are both n2 words in size. * n2 must be a power of 2. * We multiply and return the result. * t must be 2*n2 words in size * We calculate * a[0]*b[0] * a[0]*b[0]+a[1]*b[1]+(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) * a[1]*b[1] */ /* dnX may not be positive, but n2/2+dnX has to be */ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *t) { int n = n2 / 2, c1, c2; int tna = n + dna, tnb = n + dnb; unsigned int neg, zero; BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p; # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_mul_recursive %d%+d * %d%+d\n", n2, dna, n2, dnb); # endif # ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA # if 0 if (n2 == 4) { bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b); return; } # endif /* * Only call bn_mul_comba 8 if n2 == 8 and the two arrays are complete * [steve] */ if (n2 == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) { bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b); return; } # endif /* BN_MUL_COMBA */ /* Else do normal multiply */ if (n2 < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_mul_normal(r, a, n2 + dna, b, n2 + dnb); if ((dna + dnb) < 0) memset(&r[2 * n2 + dna + dnb], 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * -(dna + dnb)); return; } /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */ c1 = bn_cmp_part_words(a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); c2 = bn_cmp_part_words(&(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); zero = neg = 0; switch (c1 * 3 + c2) { case -4: bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */ break; case -3: zero = 1; break; case -2: bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); /* + */ neg = 1; break; case -1: case 0: case 1: zero = 1; break; case 2: bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); /* + */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */ neg = 1; break; case 3: zero = 1; break; case 4: bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); break; } # ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA if (n == 4 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) { /* XXX: bn_mul_comba4 could take * extra args to do this well */ if (!zero) bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); else memset(&(t[n2]), 0, 8 * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b); bn_mul_comba4(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n])); } else if (n == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) { /* XXX: bn_mul_comba8 could * take extra args to do * this well */ if (!zero) bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); else memset(&(t[n2]), 0, 16 * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b); bn_mul_comba8(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n])); } else # endif /* BN_MUL_COMBA */ { p = &(t[n2 * 2]); if (!zero) bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p); else memset(&(t[n2]), 0, n2 * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p); bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, dna, dnb, p); } /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2)); if (neg) { /* if t[32] is negative */ c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2)); } else { /* Might have a carry */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2)); } /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2)); if (c1) { p = &(r[n + n2]); lo = *p; ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; /* * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not * overwrite */ if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) { do { p++; lo = *p; ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; } while (ln == 0); } } } /* * n+tn is the word length t needs to be n*4 is size, as does r */ /* tnX may not be negative but less than n */ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n, int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *t) { int i, j, n2 = n * 2; int c1, c2, neg; BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p; # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_mul_part_recursive (%d%+d) * (%d%+d)\n", n, tna, n, tnb); # endif if (n < 8) { bn_mul_normal(r, a, n + tna, b, n + tnb); return; } /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */ c1 = bn_cmp_part_words(a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); c2 = bn_cmp_part_words(&(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); neg = 0; switch (c1 * 3 + c2) { case -4: bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */ break; case -3: /* break; */ case -2: bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); /* + */ neg = 1; break; case -1: case 0: case 1: /* break; */ case 2: bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); /* + */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */ neg = 1; break; case 3: /* break; */ case 4: bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); break; } /* * The zero case isn't yet implemented here. The speedup would probably * be negligible. */ # if 0 if (n == 4) { bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b); bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tn, &(b[n]), tn); memset(&(r[n2 + tn * 2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tn * 2)); } else # endif if (n == 8) { bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b); bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb); memset(&(r[n2 + tna + tnb]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb)); } else { p = &(t[n2 * 2]); bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p); bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p); i = n / 2; /* * If there is only a bottom half to the number, just do it */ if (tna > tnb) j = tna - i; else j = tnb - i; if (j == 0) { bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); memset(&(r[n2 + i * 2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - i * 2)); } else if (j > 0) { /* eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 11 */ bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); memset(&(r[n2 + tna + tnb]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb)); } else { /* (j < 0) eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 5 */ memset(&(r[n2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * n2); if (tna < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL && tnb < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb); } else { for (;;) { i /= 2; /* * these simplified conditions work exclusively because * difference between tna and tnb is 1 or 0 */ if (i < tna || i < tnb) { bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); break; } else if (i == tna || i == tnb) { bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); break; } } } } } /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2)); if (neg) { /* if t[32] is negative */ c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2)); } else { /* Might have a carry */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2)); } /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2)); if (c1) { p = &(r[n + n2]); lo = *p; ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; /* * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not * overwrite */ if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) { do { p++; lo = *p; ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; } while (ln == 0); } } } /*- * a and b must be the same size, which is n2. * r needs to be n2 words and t needs to be n2*2 */ void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, BN_ULONG *t) { int n = n2 / 2; # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_mul_low_recursive %d * %d\n", n2, n2); # endif bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, &(t[0])); if (n >= BN_MUL_LOW_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_mul_low_recursive(&(t[0]), &(a[0]), &(b[n]), n, &(t[n2])); bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[0]), n); bn_mul_low_recursive(&(t[0]), &(a[n]), &(b[0]), n, &(t[n2])); bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[0]), n); } else { bn_mul_low_normal(&(t[0]), &(a[0]), &(b[n]), n); bn_mul_low_normal(&(t[n]), &(a[n]), &(b[0]), n); bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[0]), n); bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n]), n); } } /*- * a and b must be the same size, which is n2. * r needs to be n2 words and t needs to be n2*2 * l is the low words of the output. * t needs to be n2*3 */ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2, BN_ULONG *t) { int i, n; int c1, c2; int neg, oneg, zero; BN_ULONG ll, lc, *lp, *mp; # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_mul_high %d * %d\n", n2, n2); # endif n = n2 / 2; /* Calculate (al-ah)*(bh-bl) */ neg = zero = 0; c1 = bn_cmp_words(&(a[0]), &(a[n]), n); c2 = bn_cmp_words(&(b[n]), &(b[0]), n); switch (c1 * 3 + c2) { case -4: bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[n]), &(a[0]), n); bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[0]), &(b[n]), n); break; case -3: zero = 1; break; case -2: bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[n]), &(a[0]), n); bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[n]), &(b[0]), n); neg = 1; break; case -1: case 0: case 1: zero = 1; break; case 2: bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[0]), &(a[n]), n); bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[0]), &(b[n]), n); neg = 1; break; case 3: zero = 1; break; case 4: bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[0]), &(a[n]), n); bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[n]), &(b[0]), n); break; } oneg = neg; /* t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */ /* r[10] = (a[1]*b[1]) */ # ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA if (n == 8) { bn_mul_comba8(&(t[0]), &(r[0]), &(r[n])); bn_mul_comba8(r, &(a[n]), &(b[n])); } else # endif { bn_mul_recursive(&(t[0]), &(r[0]), &(r[n]), n, 0, 0, &(t[n2])); bn_mul_recursive(r, &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, 0, 0, &(t[n2])); } /*- * s0 == low(al*bl) * s1 == low(ah*bh)+low((al-ah)*(bh-bl))+low(al*bl)+high(al*bl) * We know s0 and s1 so the only unknown is high(al*bl) * high(al*bl) == s1 - low(ah*bh+s0+(al-ah)*(bh-bl)) * high(al*bl) == s1 - (r[0]+l[0]+t[0]) */ if (l != NULL) { lp = &(t[n2 + n]); c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(r[0]), &(l[0]), n)); } else { c1 = 0; lp = &(r[0]); } if (neg) neg = (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), lp, &(t[0]), n)); else { bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), lp, &(t[0]), n); neg = 0; } if (l != NULL) { bn_sub_words(&(t[n2 + n]), &(l[n]), &(t[n2]), n); } else { lp = &(t[n2 + n]); mp = &(t[n2]); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) lp[i] = ((~mp[i]) + 1) & BN_MASK2; } /*- * s[0] = low(al*bl) * t[3] = high(al*bl) * t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) neg is the sign * r[10] = (a[1]*b[1]) */ /*- * R[10] = al*bl * R[21] = al*bl + ah*bh + (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) * R[32] = ah*bh */ /*- * R[1]=t[3]+l[0]+r[0](+-)t[0] (have carry/borrow) * R[2]=r[0]+t[3]+r[1](+-)t[1] (have carry/borrow) * R[3]=r[1]+(carry/borrow) */ if (l != NULL) { lp = &(t[n2]); c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(t[n2 + n]), &(l[0]), n)); } else { lp = &(t[n2 + n]); c1 = 0; } c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), lp, &(r[0]), n)); if (oneg) c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), &(t[0]), n)); else c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), &(t[0]), n)); c2 = (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(t[n2 + n]), n)); c2 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(r[n]), n)); if (oneg) c2 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(t[n]), n)); else c2 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(t[n]), n)); if (c1 != 0) { /* Add starting at r[0], could be +ve or -ve */ i = 0; if (c1 > 0) { lc = c1; do { ll = (r[i] + lc) & BN_MASK2; r[i++] = ll; lc = (lc > ll); } while (lc); } else { lc = -c1; do { ll = r[i]; r[i++] = (ll - lc) & BN_MASK2; lc = (lc > ll); } while (lc); } } if (c2 != 0) { /* Add starting at r[1] */ i = n; if (c2 > 0) { lc = c2; do { ll = (r[i] + lc) & BN_MASK2; r[i++] = ll; lc = (lc > ll); } while (lc); } else { lc = -c2; do { ll = r[i]; r[i++] = (ll - lc) & BN_MASK2; lc = (lc > ll); } while (lc); } } } #endif /* BN_RECURSION */ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + int ret = bn_mul_fixed_top(r, a, b, ctx); + + bn_correct_top(r); + bn_check_top(r); + + return ret; +} + +int bn_mul_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) +{ int ret = 0; int top, al, bl; BIGNUM *rr; #if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION) int i; #endif #ifdef BN_RECURSION BIGNUM *t = NULL; int j = 0, k; #endif #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, "BN_mul %d * %d\n", a->top, b->top); #endif bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); bn_check_top(r); al = a->top; bl = b->top; if ((al == 0) || (bl == 0)) { BN_zero(r); return (1); } top = al + bl; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((r == a) || (r == b)) { if ((rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; } else rr = r; rr->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg; #if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION) i = al - bl; #endif #ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA if (i == 0) { # if 0 if (al == 4) { if (bn_wexpand(rr, 8) == NULL) goto err; rr->top = 8; bn_mul_comba4(rr->d, a->d, b->d); goto end; } # endif if (al == 8) { if (bn_wexpand(rr, 16) == NULL) goto err; rr->top = 16; bn_mul_comba8(rr->d, a->d, b->d); goto end; } } #endif /* BN_MUL_COMBA */ #ifdef BN_RECURSION if ((al >= BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL) && (bl >= BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL)) { if (i >= -1 && i <= 1) { /* * Find out the power of two lower or equal to the longest of the * two numbers */ if (i >= 0) { j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al); } if (i == -1) { j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)bl); } j = 1 << (j - 1); assert(j <= al || j <= bl); k = j + j; t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t == NULL) goto err; if (al > j || bl > j) { if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 4) == NULL) goto err; if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 4) == NULL) goto err; bn_mul_part_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, j, al - j, bl - j, t->d); } else { /* al <= j || bl <= j */ if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 2) == NULL) goto err; if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 2) == NULL) goto err; bn_mul_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, j, al - j, bl - j, t->d); } rr->top = top; goto end; } } #endif /* BN_RECURSION */ if (bn_wexpand(rr, top) == NULL) goto err; rr->top = top; bn_mul_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, b->d, bl); #if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION) end: #endif - bn_correct_top(rr); + rr->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL) goto err; ret = 1; err: bn_check_top(r); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b, int nb) { BN_ULONG *rr; #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_mul_normal %d * %d\n", na, nb); #endif if (na < nb) { int itmp; BN_ULONG *ltmp; itmp = na; na = nb; nb = itmp; ltmp = a; a = b; b = ltmp; } rr = &(r[na]); if (nb <= 0) { (void)bn_mul_words(r, a, na, 0); return; } else rr[0] = bn_mul_words(r, a, na, b[0]); for (;;) { if (--nb <= 0) return; rr[1] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, na, b[1]); if (--nb <= 0) return; rr[2] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, na, b[2]); if (--nb <= 0) return; rr[3] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, na, b[3]); if (--nb <= 0) return; rr[4] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]), a, na, b[4]); rr += 4; r += 4; b += 4; } } void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) { #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_mul_low_normal %d * %d\n", n, n); #endif bn_mul_words(r, a, n, b[0]); for (;;) { if (--n <= 0) return; bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, n, b[1]); if (--n <= 0) return; bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, n, b[2]); if (--n <= 0) return; bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, n, b[3]); if (--n <= 0) return; bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]), a, n, b[4]); r += 4; b += 4; } } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,285 +1,295 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /* r must not be a */ /* * I've just gone over this and it is now %20 faster on x86 - eay - 27 Jun 96 */ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { + int ret = bn_sqr_fixed_top(r, a, ctx); + + bn_correct_top(r); + bn_check_top(r); + + return ret; +} + +int bn_sqr_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) +{ int max, al; int ret = 0; BIGNUM *tmp, *rr; #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, "BN_sqr %d * %d\n", a->top, a->top); #endif bn_check_top(a); al = a->top; if (al <= 0) { r->top = 0; r->neg = 0; return 1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); rr = (a != r) ? r : BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!rr || !tmp) goto err; max = 2 * al; /* Non-zero (from above) */ if (bn_wexpand(rr, max) == NULL) goto err; if (al == 4) { #ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA BN_ULONG t[8]; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, 4, t); #else bn_sqr_comba4(rr->d, a->d); #endif } else if (al == 8) { #ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA BN_ULONG t[16]; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, 8, t); #else bn_sqr_comba8(rr->d, a->d); #endif } else { #if defined(BN_RECURSION) if (al < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { BN_ULONG t[BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL * 2]; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, t); } else { int j, k; j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al); j = 1 << (j - 1); k = j + j; if (al == j) { if (bn_wexpand(tmp, k * 2) == NULL) goto err; bn_sqr_recursive(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d); } else { if (bn_wexpand(tmp, max) == NULL) goto err; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d); } } #else if (bn_wexpand(tmp, max) == NULL) goto err; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d); #endif } rr->neg = 0; rr->top = max; - bn_correct_top(rr); + rr->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL) goto err; ret = 1; err: bn_check_top(rr); bn_check_top(tmp); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } /* tmp must have 2*n words */ void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp) { int i, j, max; const BN_ULONG *ap; BN_ULONG *rp; max = n * 2; ap = a; rp = r; rp[0] = rp[max - 1] = 0; rp++; j = n; if (--j > 0) { ap++; rp[j] = bn_mul_words(rp, ap, j, ap[-1]); rp += 2; } for (i = n - 2; i > 0; i--) { j--; ap++; rp[j] = bn_mul_add_words(rp, ap, j, ap[-1]); rp += 2; } bn_add_words(r, r, r, max); /* There will not be a carry */ bn_sqr_words(tmp, a, n); bn_add_words(r, r, tmp, max); } #ifdef BN_RECURSION /*- * r is 2*n words in size, * a and b are both n words in size. (There's not actually a 'b' here ...) * n must be a power of 2. * We multiply and return the result. * t must be 2*n words in size * We calculate * a[0]*b[0] * a[0]*b[0]+a[1]*b[1]+(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) * a[1]*b[1] */ void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t) { int n = n2 / 2; int zero, c1; BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p; # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_sqr_recursive %d * %d\n", n2, n2); # endif if (n2 == 4) { # ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 4, t); # else bn_sqr_comba4(r, a); # endif return; } else if (n2 == 8) { # ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 8, t); # else bn_sqr_comba8(r, a); # endif return; } if (n2 < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_sqr_normal(r, a, n2, t); return; } /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]) */ c1 = bn_cmp_words(a, &(a[n]), n); zero = 0; if (c1 > 0) bn_sub_words(t, a, &(a[n]), n); else if (c1 < 0) bn_sub_words(t, &(a[n]), a, n); else zero = 1; /* The result will always be negative unless it is zero */ p = &(t[n2 * 2]); if (!zero) bn_sqr_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, n, p); else memset(&(t[n2]), 0, n2 * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p); bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p); /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2)); /* t[32] is negative */ c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2)); /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0]) * r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2)); if (c1) { p = &(r[n + n2]); lo = *p; ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; /* * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not * overwrite */ if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) { do { p++; lo = *p; ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; } while (ln == 0); } } } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,281 +1,283 @@ /* bn_x931p.c */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include /* X9.31 routines for prime derivation */ /* * X9.31 prime derivation. This is used to generate the primes pi (p1, p2, * q1, q2) from a parameter Xpi by checking successive odd integers. */ static int bn_x931_derive_pi(BIGNUM *pi, const BIGNUM *Xpi, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) { int i = 0; if (!BN_copy(pi, Xpi)) return 0; if (!BN_is_odd(pi) && !BN_add_word(pi, 1)) return 0; for (;;) { i++; BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i); /* NB 27 MR is specificed in X9.31 */ if (BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(pi, 27, ctx, 1, cb)) break; if (!BN_add_word(pi, 2)) return 0; } BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, i); return 1; } /* * This is the main X9.31 prime derivation function. From parameters Xp1, Xp2 * and Xp derive the prime p. If the parameters p1 or p2 are not NULL they * will be returned too: this is needed for testing. */ int BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *t, *p1p2, *pm1; /* Only even e supported */ if (!BN_is_odd(e)) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (!p1) p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!p2) p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p1p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); pm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p1, Xp1, ctx, cb)) goto err; if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p2, Xp2, ctx, cb)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(p1p2, p1, p2, ctx)) goto err; /* First set p to value of Rp */ if (!BN_mod_inverse(p, p2, p1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(p, p, p2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_inverse(t, p1, p2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(t, t, p1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(p, p, t)) goto err; if (p->neg && !BN_add(p, p, p1p2)) goto err; /* p now equals Rp */ if (!BN_mod_sub(p, p, Xp, p1p2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(p, p, Xp)) goto err; /* p now equals Yp0 */ for (;;) { int i = 1; BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i++); if (!BN_copy(pm1, p)) goto err; if (!BN_sub_word(pm1, 1)) goto err; if (!BN_gcd(t, pm1, e, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_one(t) /* * X9.31 specifies 8 MR and 1 Lucas test or any prime test * offering similar or better guarantees 50 MR is considerably * better. */ && BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, 50, ctx, 1, cb)) break; if (!BN_add(p, p, p1p2)) goto err; } BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Generate pair of paramters Xp, Xq for X9.31 prime generation. Note: nbits * paramter is sum of number of bits in both. */ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *t; int i; /* * Number of bits for each prime is of the form 512+128s for s = 0, 1, * ... */ if ((nbits < 1024) || (nbits & 0xff)) return 0; nbits >>= 1; /* * The random value Xp must be between sqrt(2) * 2^(nbits-1) and 2^nbits * - 1. By setting the top two bits we ensure that the lower bound is * exceeded. */ if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0)) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0)) goto err; + /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */ - BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq); + if (!BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq)) + goto err; if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100)) break; } BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (i < 1000) return 1; return 0; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return 0; } /* * Generate primes using X9.31 algorithm. Of the values p, p1, p2, Xp1 and * Xp2 only 'p' needs to be non-NULL. If any of the others are not NULL the * relevant parameter will be stored in it. Due to the fact that |Xp - Xq| > * 2^(nbits - 100) must be satisfied Xp and Xq are generated using the * previous function and supplied as input. */ int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *Xp1, BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (Xp1 == NULL) Xp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Xp2 == NULL) Xp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Xp1 == NULL || Xp2 == NULL) goto error; if (!BN_rand(Xp1, 101, 0, 0)) goto error; if (!BN_rand(Xp2, 101, 0, 0)) goto error; if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(p, p1, p2, Xp, Xp1, Xp2, e, ctx, cb)) goto error; ret = 1; error: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn_int.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn_int.h (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn_int.h (revision 340692) @@ -1,15 +1,21 @@ /* * Some BIGNUM functions assume most significant limb to be non-zero, which * is customarily arranged by bn_correct_top. Output from below functions * is not processed with bn_correct_top, and for this reason it may not be * returned out of public API. It may only be passed internally into other * functions known to support non-minimal or zero-padded BIGNUMs. */ int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); +int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx); int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m); +int bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const BIGNUM *m); +int bn_mul_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); +int bn_sqr_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen); Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/Makefile (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/Makefile (revision 340692) @@ -1,154 +1,155 @@ # # OpenSSL/crypto/conf/Makefile # DIR= conf TOP= ../.. CC= cc INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include CFLAG=-g MAKEFILE= Makefile AR= ar r CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile TEST= APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a LIBSRC= conf_err.c conf_lib.c conf_api.c conf_def.c conf_mod.c \ conf_mall.c conf_sap.c LIBOBJ= conf_err.o conf_lib.o conf_api.o conf_def.o conf_mod.o \ conf_mall.o conf_sap.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= conf.h conf_api.h HEADER= conf_def.h $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all) all: lib lib: $(LIBOBJ) $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. @touch lib files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; tags: ctags $(SRC) tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff update: depend depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) clean: rm -f *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. conf_api.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h -conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/conf_api.h -conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h +conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/conf.h +conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/conf_api.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h +conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h conf_api.c +conf_api.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h conf_api.c conf_def.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h conf_def.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/conf.h conf_def.o: ../../include/openssl/conf_api.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h conf_def.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h conf_def.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h conf_def.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h conf_def.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h conf_def.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h conf_def.c conf_def.o: conf_def.h conf_err.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/conf.h conf_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h conf_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h conf_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h conf_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h conf_err.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h conf_err.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h conf_err.c conf_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/conf.h conf_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/conf_api.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h conf_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h conf_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h conf_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h conf_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h conf_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h conf_lib.c conf_mall.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h conf_mall.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h conf_mall.c conf_mod.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h conf_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h conf_mod.c conf_sap.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h conf_sap.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h conf_sap.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/conf_api.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/conf_api.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/conf_api.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,307 +1,308 @@ /* conf_api.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* Part of the code in here was originally in conf.c, which is now removed */ #ifndef CONF_DEBUG # undef NDEBUG /* avoid conflicting definitions */ # define NDEBUG #endif #include #include #include +#include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "e_os.h" static void value_free_hash_doall_arg(CONF_VALUE *a, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf); static void value_free_stack_doall(CONF_VALUE *a); static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(value_free_hash, CONF_VALUE, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE)) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_FN(value_free_stack, CONF_VALUE) /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was get_section */ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section) { CONF_VALUE *v, vv; if ((conf == NULL) || (section == NULL)) return (NULL); vv.name = NULL; vv.section = (char *)section; v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv); return (v); } /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was CONF_get_section */ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *_CONF_get_section_values(const CONF *conf, const char *section) { CONF_VALUE *v; v = _CONF_get_section(conf, section); if (v != NULL) return ((STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)v->value); else return (NULL); } int _CONF_add_string(CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section, CONF_VALUE *value) { CONF_VALUE *v = NULL; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ts; ts = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)section->value; value->section = section->section; if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(ts, value)) { return 0; } v = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, value); if (v != NULL) { (void)sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(ts, v); OPENSSL_free(v->name); OPENSSL_free(v->value); OPENSSL_free(v); } return 1; } char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *name) { CONF_VALUE *v, vv; char *p; if (name == NULL) return (NULL); if (conf != NULL) { if (section != NULL) { vv.name = (char *)name; vv.section = (char *)section; v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv); if (v != NULL) return (v->value); if (strcmp(section, "ENV") == 0) { - p = getenv(name); + p = ossl_safe_getenv(name); if (p != NULL) return (p); } } vv.section = "default"; vv.name = (char *)name; v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv); if (v != NULL) return (v->value); else return (NULL); } else - return (getenv(name)); + return (ossl_safe_getenv(name)); } #if 0 /* There's no way to provide error checking * with this function, so force implementors * of the higher levels to get a string and * read the number themselves. */ long _CONF_get_number(CONF *conf, char *section, char *name) { char *str; long ret = 0; str = _CONF_get_string(conf, section, name); if (str == NULL) return (0); for (;;) { if (conf->meth->is_number(conf, *str)) ret = ret * 10 + conf->meth->to_int(conf, *str); else return (ret); str++; } } #endif static unsigned long conf_value_hash(const CONF_VALUE *v) { return (lh_strhash(v->section) << 2) ^ lh_strhash(v->name); } static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(conf_value, CONF_VALUE) static int conf_value_cmp(const CONF_VALUE *a, const CONF_VALUE *b) { int i; if (a->section != b->section) { i = strcmp(a->section, b->section); if (i) return (i); } if ((a->name != NULL) && (b->name != NULL)) { i = strcmp(a->name, b->name); return (i); } else if (a->name == b->name) return (0); else return ((a->name == NULL) ? -1 : 1); } static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(conf_value, CONF_VALUE) int _CONF_new_data(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL) { return 0; } if (conf->data == NULL) if ((conf->data = lh_CONF_VALUE_new()) == NULL) { return 0; } return 1; } void _CONF_free_data(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL || conf->data == NULL) return; lh_CONF_VALUE_down_load(conf->data) = 0; /* evil thing to make * sure the * 'OPENSSL_free()' works as * * expected */ lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_arg(conf->data, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(value_free_hash), LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE), conf->data); /* * We now have only 'section' entries in the hash table. Due to problems * with */ lh_CONF_VALUE_doall(conf->data, LHASH_DOALL_FN(value_free_stack)); lh_CONF_VALUE_free(conf->data); } static void value_free_hash_doall_arg(CONF_VALUE *a, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf) { if (a->name != NULL) (void)lh_CONF_VALUE_delete(conf, a); } static void value_free_stack_doall(CONF_VALUE *a) { CONF_VALUE *vv; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk; int i; if (a->name != NULL) return; sk = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)a->value; for (i = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { vv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk, i); OPENSSL_free(vv->value); OPENSSL_free(vv->name); OPENSSL_free(vv); } if (sk != NULL) sk_CONF_VALUE_free(sk); OPENSSL_free(a->section); OPENSSL_free(a); } /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was new_section */ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_new_section(CONF *conf, const char *section) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL; int ok = 0, i; CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *vv; if ((sk = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if ((v = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE))) == NULL) goto err; i = strlen(section) + 1; if ((v->section = OPENSSL_malloc(i)) == NULL) goto err; memcpy(v->section, section, i); v->name = NULL; v->value = (char *)sk; vv = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, v); OPENSSL_assert(vv == NULL); if (lh_CONF_VALUE_error(conf->data) > 0) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { if (sk != NULL) sk_CONF_VALUE_free(sk); if (v != NULL) OPENSSL_free(v); v = NULL; } return (v); } IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,601 +1,601 @@ /* conf_mod.c */ /* * Written by Stephen Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2001. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #define DSO_mod_init_name "OPENSSL_init" #define DSO_mod_finish_name "OPENSSL_finish" /* * This structure contains a data about supported modules. entries in this * table correspond to either dynamic or static modules. */ struct conf_module_st { /* DSO of this module or NULL if static */ DSO *dso; /* Name of the module */ char *name; /* Init function */ conf_init_func *init; /* Finish function */ conf_finish_func *finish; /* Number of successfully initialized modules */ int links; void *usr_data; }; /* * This structure contains information about modules that have been * successfully initialized. There may be more than one entry for a given * module. */ struct conf_imodule_st { CONF_MODULE *pmod; char *name; char *value; unsigned long flags; void *usr_data; }; static STACK_OF(CONF_MODULE) *supported_modules = NULL; static STACK_OF(CONF_IMODULE) *initialized_modules = NULL; static void module_free(CONF_MODULE *md); static void module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *imod); static int module_run(const CONF *cnf, char *name, char *value, unsigned long flags); static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name, conf_init_func *ifunc, conf_finish_func *ffunc); static CONF_MODULE *module_find(char *name); static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, char *name, char *value, const CONF *cnf); static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, char *name, char *value, unsigned long flags); /* Main function: load modules from a CONF structure */ int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname, unsigned long flags) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values; CONF_VALUE *vl; char *vsection = NULL; int ret, i; if (!cnf) return 1; if (appname) vsection = NCONF_get_string(cnf, NULL, appname); if (!appname || (!vsection && (flags & CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION))) vsection = NCONF_get_string(cnf, NULL, "openssl_conf"); if (!vsection) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } values = NCONF_get_section(cnf, vsection); if (!values) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) { vl = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i); ret = module_run(cnf, vl->name, vl->value, flags); if (ret <= 0) if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS)) return ret; } return 1; } int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname, unsigned long flags) { char *file = NULL; CONF *conf = NULL; int ret = 0; conf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (!conf) goto err; if (filename == NULL) { file = CONF_get1_default_config_file(); if (!file) goto err; } else file = (char *)filename; if (NCONF_load(conf, file, NULL) <= 0) { if ((flags & CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) && (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE)) { ERR_clear_error(); ret = 1; } goto err; } ret = CONF_modules_load(conf, appname, flags); err: if (filename == NULL) OPENSSL_free(file); NCONF_free(conf); return ret; } static int module_run(const CONF *cnf, char *name, char *value, unsigned long flags) { CONF_MODULE *md; int ret; md = module_find(name); /* Module not found: try to load DSO */ if (!md && !(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_NO_DSO)) md = module_load_dso(cnf, name, value, flags); if (!md) { if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT)) { CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_RUN, CONF_R_UNKNOWN_MODULE_NAME); ERR_add_error_data(2, "module=", name); } return -1; } ret = module_init(md, name, value, cnf); if (ret <= 0) { if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT)) { char rcode[DECIMAL_SIZE(ret) + 1]; CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_RUN, CONF_R_MODULE_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); BIO_snprintf(rcode, sizeof(rcode), "%-8d", ret); ERR_add_error_data(6, "module=", name, ", value=", value, ", retcode=", rcode); } } return ret; } /* Load a module from a DSO */ static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, char *name, char *value, unsigned long flags) { DSO *dso = NULL; conf_init_func *ifunc; conf_finish_func *ffunc; char *path = NULL; int errcode = 0; CONF_MODULE *md; /* Look for alternative path in module section */ path = NCONF_get_string(cnf, value, "path"); if (!path) { ERR_clear_error(); path = name; } dso = DSO_load(NULL, path, NULL, 0); if (!dso) { errcode = CONF_R_ERROR_LOADING_DSO; goto err; } ifunc = (conf_init_func *)DSO_bind_func(dso, DSO_mod_init_name); if (!ifunc) { errcode = CONF_R_MISSING_INIT_FUNCTION; goto err; } ffunc = (conf_finish_func *)DSO_bind_func(dso, DSO_mod_finish_name); /* All OK, add module */ md = module_add(dso, name, ifunc, ffunc); if (!md) goto err; return md; err: if (dso) DSO_free(dso); CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_LOAD_DSO, errcode); ERR_add_error_data(4, "module=", name, ", path=", path); return NULL; } /* add module to list */ static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name, conf_init_func *ifunc, conf_finish_func *ffunc) { CONF_MODULE *tmod = NULL; if (supported_modules == NULL) supported_modules = sk_CONF_MODULE_new_null(); if (supported_modules == NULL) return NULL; tmod = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_MODULE)); if (tmod == NULL) return NULL; tmod->dso = dso; tmod->name = BUF_strdup(name); if (tmod->name == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(tmod); return NULL; } tmod->init = ifunc; tmod->finish = ffunc; tmod->links = 0; if (!sk_CONF_MODULE_push(supported_modules, tmod)) { OPENSSL_free(tmod); return NULL; } return tmod; } /* * Find a module from the list. We allow module names of the form * modname.XXXX to just search for modname to allow the same module to be * initialized more than once. */ static CONF_MODULE *module_find(char *name) { CONF_MODULE *tmod; int i, nchar; char *p; p = strrchr(name, '.'); if (p) nchar = p - name; else nchar = strlen(name); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules); i++) { tmod = sk_CONF_MODULE_value(supported_modules, i); if (!strncmp(tmod->name, name, nchar)) return tmod; } return NULL; } /* initialize a module */ static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, char *name, char *value, const CONF *cnf) { int ret = 1; int init_called = 0; CONF_IMODULE *imod = NULL; /* Otherwise add initialized module to list */ imod = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_IMODULE)); if (!imod) goto err; imod->pmod = pmod; imod->name = BUF_strdup(name); imod->value = BUF_strdup(value); imod->usr_data = NULL; if (!imod->name || !imod->value) goto memerr; /* Try to initialize module */ if (pmod->init) { ret = pmod->init(imod, cnf); init_called = 1; /* Error occurred, exit */ if (ret <= 0) goto err; } if (initialized_modules == NULL) { initialized_modules = sk_CONF_IMODULE_new_null(); if (!initialized_modules) { CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (!sk_CONF_IMODULE_push(initialized_modules, imod)) { CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } pmod->links++; return ret; err: /* We've started the module so we'd better finish it */ if (pmod->finish && init_called) pmod->finish(imod); memerr: if (imod) { if (imod->name) OPENSSL_free(imod->name); if (imod->value) OPENSSL_free(imod->value); OPENSSL_free(imod); } return -1; } /* * Unload any dynamic modules that have a link count of zero: i.e. have no * active initialized modules. If 'all' is set then all modules are unloaded * including static ones. */ void CONF_modules_unload(int all) { int i; CONF_MODULE *md; CONF_modules_finish(); /* unload modules in reverse order */ for (i = sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { md = sk_CONF_MODULE_value(supported_modules, i); /* If static or in use and 'all' not set ignore it */ if (((md->links > 0) || !md->dso) && !all) continue; /* Since we're working in reverse this is OK */ (void)sk_CONF_MODULE_delete(supported_modules, i); module_free(md); } if (sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules) == 0) { sk_CONF_MODULE_free(supported_modules); supported_modules = NULL; } } /* unload a single module */ static void module_free(CONF_MODULE *md) { if (md->dso) DSO_free(md->dso); OPENSSL_free(md->name); OPENSSL_free(md); } /* finish and free up all modules instances */ void CONF_modules_finish(void) { CONF_IMODULE *imod; while (sk_CONF_IMODULE_num(initialized_modules) > 0) { imod = sk_CONF_IMODULE_pop(initialized_modules); module_finish(imod); } sk_CONF_IMODULE_free(initialized_modules); initialized_modules = NULL; } /* finish a module instance */ static void module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *imod) { if (imod->pmod->finish) imod->pmod->finish(imod); imod->pmod->links--; OPENSSL_free(imod->name); OPENSSL_free(imod->value); OPENSSL_free(imod); } /* Add a static module to OpenSSL */ int CONF_module_add(const char *name, conf_init_func *ifunc, conf_finish_func *ffunc) { if (module_add(NULL, name, ifunc, ffunc)) return 1; else return 0; } void CONF_modules_free(void) { CONF_modules_finish(); CONF_modules_unload(1); } /* Utility functions */ const char *CONF_imodule_get_name(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->name; } const char *CONF_imodule_get_value(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->value; } void *CONF_imodule_get_usr_data(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->usr_data; } void CONF_imodule_set_usr_data(CONF_IMODULE *md, void *usr_data) { md->usr_data = usr_data; } CONF_MODULE *CONF_imodule_get_module(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->pmod; } unsigned long CONF_imodule_get_flags(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->flags; } void CONF_imodule_set_flags(CONF_IMODULE *md, unsigned long flags) { md->flags = flags; } void *CONF_module_get_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod) { return pmod->usr_data; } void CONF_module_set_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod, void *usr_data) { pmod->usr_data = usr_data; } /* Return default config file name */ char *CONF_get1_default_config_file(void) { char *file; int len; - file = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF"); + file = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_CONF"); if (file) return BUF_strdup(file); len = strlen(X509_get_default_cert_area()); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS len++; #endif len += strlen(OPENSSL_CONF); file = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); if (!file) return NULL; BUF_strlcpy(file, X509_get_default_cert_area(), len + 1); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS BUF_strlcat(file, "/", len + 1); #endif BUF_strlcat(file, OPENSSL_CONF, len + 1); return file; } /* * This function takes a list separated by 'sep' and calls the callback * function giving the start and length of each member optionally stripping * leading and trailing whitespace. This can be used to parse comma separated * lists for example. */ int CONF_parse_list(const char *list_, int sep, int nospc, int (*list_cb) (const char *elem, int len, void *usr), void *arg) { int ret; const char *lstart, *tmpend, *p; if (list_ == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_CONF_PARSE_LIST, CONF_R_LIST_CANNOT_BE_NULL); return 0; } lstart = list_; for (;;) { if (nospc) { while (*lstart && isspace((unsigned char)*lstart)) lstart++; } p = strchr(lstart, sep); if (p == lstart || !*lstart) ret = list_cb(NULL, 0, arg); else { if (p) tmpend = p - 1; else tmpend = lstart + strlen(lstart) - 1; if (nospc) { while (isspace((unsigned char)*tmpend)) tmpend--; } ret = list_cb(lstart, tmpend - lstart + 1, arg); } if (ret <= 0) return ret; if (p == NULL) return 1; lstart = p + 1; } } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/cryptlib.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/cryptlib.h (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/cryptlib.h (revision 340692) @@ -1,111 +1,113 @@ /* crypto/cryptlib.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #ifndef HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H # define HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H # include # include # include "e_os.h" # ifdef OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK # define BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK 0x8000 # include "ms/uplink.h" # endif # include # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # define X509_CERT_AREA OPENSSLDIR # define X509_CERT_DIR OPENSSLDIR "/certs" # define X509_CERT_FILE OPENSSLDIR "/cert.pem" # define X509_PRIVATE_DIR OPENSSLDIR "/private" # else # define X509_CERT_AREA "SSLROOT:[000000]" # define X509_CERT_DIR "SSLCERTS:" # define X509_CERT_FILE "SSLCERTS:cert.pem" # define X509_PRIVATE_DIR "SSLPRIVATE:" # endif # define X509_CERT_DIR_EVP "SSL_CERT_DIR" # define X509_CERT_FILE_EVP "SSL_CERT_FILE" /* size of string representations */ # define DECIMAL_SIZE(type) ((sizeof(type)*8+2)/3+1) # define HEX_SIZE(type) (sizeof(type)*2) void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void); extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...); void *OPENSSL_stderr(void); extern int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated; +char *ossl_safe_getenv(const char *); + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,760 +1,766 @@ /* crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #undef GENUINE_DSA #ifdef GENUINE_DSA /* * Parameter generation follows the original release of FIPS PUB 186, * Appendix 2.2 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB 180) */ # define HASH EVP_sha() #else /* * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186, * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB * 180-1) */ # define HASH EVP_sha1() #endif #include /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_SHA is defined */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA # include # include "cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include # include "dsa_locl.h" # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS /* Workaround bug in prototype */ # define fips_dsa_builtin_paramgen2 fips_dsa_paramgen_bad # include # endif int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits, const unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb) { # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && !(ret->meth->flags & DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && !(ret->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX, DSA_R_NON_FIPS_DSA_METHOD); return 0; } # endif if (ret->meth->dsa_paramgen) return ret->meth->dsa_paramgen(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS else if (FIPS_mode()) { return FIPS_dsa_generate_parameters_ex(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); } # endif else { const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1(); size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8; return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd, seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); } } int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ok = 0; unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test; BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = qbits >> 3; int counter = 0; int r = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned int h = 2; if (qsize != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) /* invalid q size */ return 0; if (evpmd == NULL) { if (qsize == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) evpmd = EVP_sha1(); else if (qsize == SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH) evpmd = EVP_sha224(); else evpmd = EVP_sha256(); } else { qsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd); } if (bits < 512) bits = 512; bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64; /* * NB: seed_len == 0 is special case: copy generated seed to seed_in if * it is not NULL. */ if (seed_len && (seed_len < (size_t)qsize)) seed_in = NULL; /* seed buffer too small -- ignore */ if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize) seed_len = qsize; /* App. 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186 allows larger * SEED, but our internal buffers are * restricted to 160 bits */ if (seed_in != NULL) memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len); if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); g = BN_CTX_get(ctx); W = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); c = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); test = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (test == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1)) goto err; for (;;) { for (;;) { /* find q */ int seed_is_random; /* step 1 */ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) goto err; if (!seed_len || !seed_in) { if (RAND_bytes(seed, qsize) <= 0) goto err; seed_is_random = 1; } else { seed_is_random = 0; seed_len = 0; /* use random seed if 'seed_in' turns out to * be bad */ } memcpy(buf, seed, qsize); memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize); /* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */ for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) { buf[i]++; if (buf[i] != 0) break; } /* step 2 */ if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++) md[i] ^= buf2[i]; /* step 3 */ md[0] |= 0x80; md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01; if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q)) goto err; /* step 4 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, seed_is_random, cb); if (r > 0) break; if (r != 0) goto err; /* do a callback call */ /* step 5 */ } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0)) goto err; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; /* step 6 */ counter = 0; /* "offset = 2" */ n = (bits - 1) / 160; for (;;) { if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)) goto err; /* step 7 */ BN_zero(W); /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */ for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) { /* * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */ for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) { buf[i]++; if (buf[i] != 0) break; } if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; /* step 8 */ if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0)) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k)) goto err; if (!BN_add(W, W, r0)) goto err; } /* more of step 8 */ if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(X, W)) goto err; if (!BN_add(X, X, test)) goto err; /* step 9 */ if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0)) goto err; /* step 10 */ if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) { /* step 11 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb); if (r > 0) goto end; /* found it */ if (r != 0) goto err; } /* step 13 */ counter++; /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */ /* step 14 */ if (counter >= 4096) break; } } end: if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) goto err; /* We now need to generate g */ /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */ if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(test, h)) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) goto err; for (;;) { /* g=test^r0%p */ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) goto err; if (!BN_is_one(g)) break; if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) goto err; h++; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (ok) { if (ret->p) BN_free(ret->p); if (ret->q) BN_free(ret->q); if (ret->g) BN_free(ret->g); ret->p = BN_dup(p); ret->q = BN_dup(q); ret->g = BN_dup(g); if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) { ok = 0; goto err; } if (counter_ret != NULL) *counter_ret = counter; if (h_ret != NULL) *h_ret = h; if (seed_out) memcpy(seed_out, seed, qsize); } if (ctx) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (mont != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); return ok; } # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # undef fips_dsa_builtin_paramgen2 extern int fips_dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); # endif /* * This is a parameter generation algorithm for the DSA2 algorithm as * described in FIPS 186-3. */ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ok = -1; unsigned char *seed = NULL, *seed_tmp = NULL; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdsize; BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test; BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = N >> 3; int counter = 0; int r = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; unsigned int h = 2; # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode()) return fips_dsa_builtin_paramgen2(ret, L, N, evpmd, seed_in, seed_len, idx, seed_out, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); # endif EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); + /* make sure L > N, otherwise we'll get trapped in an infinite loop */ + if (L <= N) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + if (evpmd == NULL) { if (N == 160) evpmd = EVP_sha1(); else if (N == 224) evpmd = EVP_sha224(); else evpmd = EVP_sha256(); } mdsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd); /* If unverificable g generation only don't need seed */ if (!ret->p || !ret->q || idx >= 0) { if (seed_len == 0) seed_len = mdsize; seed = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len); if (seed_out) seed_tmp = seed_out; else seed_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len); if (!seed || !seed_tmp) goto err; if (seed_in) memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len); } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); g = BN_CTX_get(ctx); W = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); c = BN_CTX_get(ctx); test = BN_CTX_get(ctx); /* if p, q already supplied generate g only */ if (ret->p && ret->q) { p = ret->p; q = ret->q; if (idx >= 0) memcpy(seed_tmp, seed, seed_len); goto g_only; } else { p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (q == NULL) goto err; } if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), L - 1)) goto err; for (;;) { for (;;) { /* find q */ unsigned char *pmd; /* step 1 */ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) goto err; if (!seed_in) { if (RAND_bytes(seed, seed_len) <= 0) goto err; } /* step 2 */ if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; /* Take least significant bits of md */ if (mdsize > qsize) pmd = md + mdsize - qsize; else pmd = md; if (mdsize < qsize) memset(md + mdsize, 0, qsize - mdsize); /* step 3 */ pmd[0] |= 0x80; pmd[qsize - 1] |= 0x01; if (!BN_bin2bn(pmd, qsize, q)) goto err; /* step 4 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, seed_in ? 1 : 0, cb); if (r > 0) break; if (r != 0) goto err; /* Provided seed didn't produce a prime: error */ if (seed_in) { ok = 0; DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME); goto err; } /* do a callback call */ /* step 5 */ } /* Copy seed to seed_out before we mess with it */ if (seed_out) memcpy(seed_out, seed, seed_len); if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0)) goto err; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; /* step 6 */ counter = 0; /* "offset = 1" */ n = (L - 1) / (mdsize << 3); for (;;) { if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)) goto err; /* step 7 */ BN_zero(W); /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */ for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) { /* * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */ for (i = seed_len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { seed[i]++; if (seed[i] != 0) break; } if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; /* step 8 */ if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, r0)) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (mdsize << 3) * k)) goto err; if (!BN_add(W, W, r0)) goto err; } /* more of step 8 */ if (!BN_mask_bits(W, L - 1)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(X, W)) goto err; if (!BN_add(X, X, test)) goto err; /* step 9 */ if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0)) goto err; /* step 10 */ if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) { /* step 11 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb); if (r > 0) goto end; /* found it */ if (r != 0) goto err; } /* step 13 */ counter++; /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */ /* step 14 */ if (counter >= (int)(4 * L)) break; } if (seed_in) { ok = 0; DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS); goto err; } } end: if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) goto err; g_only: /* We now need to generate g */ /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */ if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) goto err; if (idx < 0) { if (!BN_set_word(test, h)) goto err; } else h = 1; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) goto err; for (;;) { static const unsigned char ggen[4] = { 0x67, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6e }; if (idx >= 0) { md[0] = idx & 0xff; md[1] = (h >> 8) & 0xff; md[2] = h & 0xff; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, seed_tmp, seed_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, ggen, sizeof(ggen))) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, md, 3)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)) goto err; if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, test)) goto err; } /* g=test^r0%p */ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) goto err; if (!BN_is_one(g)) break; if (idx < 0 && !BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) goto err; h++; if (idx >= 0 && h > 0xffff) goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (ok == 1) { if (p != ret->p) { if (ret->p) BN_free(ret->p); ret->p = BN_dup(p); } if (q != ret->q) { if (ret->q) BN_free(ret->q); ret->q = BN_dup(q); } if (ret->g) BN_free(ret->g); ret->g = BN_dup(g); if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) { ok = -1; goto err; } if (counter_ret != NULL) *counter_ret = counter; if (h_ret != NULL) *h_ret = h; } if (seed) OPENSSL_free(seed); if (seed_out != seed_tmp) OPENSSL_free(seed_tmp); if (ctx) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (mont != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); return ok; } int dsa_paramgen_check_g(DSA *dsa) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM *tmp; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int rv = -1; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) return -1; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (BN_cmp(dsa->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) return 0; if (BN_cmp(dsa->g, dsa->p) >= 0) return 0; tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!tmp) goto err; if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, dsa->p, ctx)) goto err; /* Work out g^q mod p */ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(tmp, dsa->g, dsa->q, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) goto err; if (!BN_cmp(tmp, BN_value_one())) rv = 1; else rv = 0; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (mont) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return rv; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,470 +1,500 @@ /* crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* Original version from Steven Schoch */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa); static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa); +static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q, + BN_CTX *ctx); static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { "OpenSSL DSA method", dsa_do_sign, dsa_sign_setup, dsa_do_verify, NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp, */ NULL, /* dsa_bn_mod_exp, */ dsa_init, dsa_finish, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL }; /*- * These macro wrappers replace attempts to use the dsa_mod_exp() and * bn_mod_exp() handlers in the DSA_METHOD structure. We avoid the problem of * having a the macro work as an expression by bundling an "err_instr". So; * * if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r,dsa->g,&k,dsa->p,ctx, * dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err; * * can be replaced by; * * DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, &k, dsa->p, ctx, * dsa->method_mont_p); */ #define DSA_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,rr,a1,p1,a2,p2,m,ctx,in_mont) \ do { \ int _tmp_res53; \ if ((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \ _tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp((dsa), (rr), (a1), (p1), \ (a2), (p2), (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \ else \ _tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp2_mont((rr), (a1), (p1), (a2), (p2), \ (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \ if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \ } while(0) #define DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,r,a,p,m,ctx,m_ctx) \ do { \ int _tmp_res53; \ if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \ _tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp((dsa), (r), (a), (p), \ (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \ else \ _tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp_mont((r), (a), (p), (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \ if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \ } while(0) const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void) { return &openssl_dsa_meth; } static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) { BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL; BIGNUM *m, *blind, *blindm, *tmp; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB; DSA_SIG *ret = NULL; int noredo = 0; if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) { reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS; goto err; } s = BN_new(); if (s == NULL) goto err; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx); blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; redo: if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL)) { if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) goto err; } else { kinv = dsa->kinv; dsa->kinv = NULL; r = dsa->r; dsa->r = NULL; noredo = 1; } if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) /* * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3, * 4.2 */ dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL) goto err; /* * The normal signature calculation is: * * s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod q * * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks * * s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod q */ /* Generate a blinding value */ do { if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->q) - 1, -1, 0)) goto err; } while (BN_is_zero(blind)); BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, r, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* blindm := blind * m mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, dsa->q)) goto err; /* s := s * k^-1 mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */ if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very * unlikely. */ if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) { if (noredo) { reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES; goto err; } goto redo; } ret = DSA_SIG_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; ret->r = r; ret->s = s; err: if (ret == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason); BN_free(r); BN_free(s); } BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(kinv); return ret; } static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL; BIGNUM l, m; int ret = 0; int q_bits; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } BN_init(&k); BN_init(&kq); BN_init(&l); BN_init(&m); if (ctx_in == NULL) { if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; } else ctx = ctx_in; if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* Preallocate space */ - q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); + q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q) + sizeof(dsa->q->d[0]) * 16; if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits) || !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits) || !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits)) goto err; /* Get random k */ do if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) goto err; while (BN_is_zero(&k)); if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(&l, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } - if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { /* * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length. * * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is * one bit longer than the modulus. * * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic * conditional copy. */ if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q) || !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q) || !BN_copy(&kq, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m)) goto err; BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); K = &kq; } else { K = &k; } DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p); if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; - /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ - if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) + /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ + if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(&k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (*kinvp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*kinvp); *kinvp = kinv; kinv = NULL; if (*rp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*rp); *rp = r; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r); } if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(&k); BN_clear_free(&kq); BN_clear_free(&l); BN_clear_free(&m); return ret; } static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM u1, u2, t1; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int ret = -1, i; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return -1; } i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); /* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */ if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE); return -1; } if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } BN_init(&u1); BN_init(&u2); BN_init(&t1); if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } /* * Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2 */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; /* save M in u1 */ if (dgst_len > (i >> 3)) /* * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3, * 4.2 */ dgst_len = (i >> 3); if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, &u1) == NULL) goto err; /* u1 = M * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* u2 = r * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx); if (!mont) goto err; } DSA_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, &t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont); /* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */ /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ if (!BN_mod(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* * V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be equal to R. */ ret = (BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0); err: if (ret < 0) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_free(&u1); BN_free(&u2); BN_free(&t1); return (ret); } static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa) { dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; return (1); } static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) { if (dsa->method_mont_p) BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p); return (1); +} + +/* + * Compute the inverse of k modulo q. + * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to + * mod-exp operation. Both the exponent and modulus are public information + * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient. A newly allocated + * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free. + */ +static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q, + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + BIGNUM *res = NULL; + BIGNUM *r, e; + + if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + + BN_init(&e); + + if (BN_set_word(r, 2) + && BN_sub(&e, q, r) + && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, &e, q, ctx, NULL)) + res = r; + else + BN_free(r); + BN_free(&e); + return res; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h (revision 340692) @@ -1,568 +1,567 @@ /* crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h */ /* * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2010 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include #include #include #if defined(__SUNPRO_C) # if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520 # pragma error_messages (off,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE) # endif #endif /* Use default functions for poin2oct, oct2point and compressed coordinates */ #define EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT 0x1 /* * Structure details are not part of the exported interface, so all this may * change in future versions. */ struct ec_method_st { /* Various method flags */ int flags; /* used by EC_METHOD_get_field_type: */ int field_type; /* a NID */ /* * used by EC_GROUP_new, EC_GROUP_free, EC_GROUP_clear_free, * EC_GROUP_copy: */ int (*group_init) (EC_GROUP *); void (*group_finish) (EC_GROUP *); void (*group_clear_finish) (EC_GROUP *); int (*group_copy) (EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); /* used by EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp, */ /* EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m, and EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m: */ int (*group_set_curve) (EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int (*group_get_curve) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); /* used by EC_GROUP_get_degree: */ int (*group_get_degree) (const EC_GROUP *); /* used by EC_GROUP_check: */ int (*group_check_discriminant) (const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *); /* * used by EC_POINT_new, EC_POINT_free, EC_POINT_clear_free, * EC_POINT_copy: */ int (*point_init) (EC_POINT *); void (*point_finish) (EC_POINT *); void (*point_clear_finish) (EC_POINT *); int (*point_copy) (EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *); /*- * used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity, * EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, * EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m, * EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m, * EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m: */ int (*point_set_to_infinity) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); int (*point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); int (*point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); int (*point_set_affine_coordinates) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int (*point_get_affine_coordinates) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int (*point_set_compressed_coordinates) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *); /* used by EC_POINT_point2oct, EC_POINT_oct2point: */ size_t (*point2oct) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int (*oct2point) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); /* used by EC_POINT_add, EC_POINT_dbl, ECP_POINT_invert: */ int (*add) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int (*dbl) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *); int (*invert) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); /* * used by EC_POINT_is_at_infinity, EC_POINT_is_on_curve, EC_POINT_cmp: */ int (*is_at_infinity) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int (*is_on_curve) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int (*point_cmp) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); /* used by EC_POINT_make_affine, EC_POINTs_make_affine: */ int (*make_affine) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int (*points_make_affine) (const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *); /* * used by EC_POINTs_mul, EC_POINT_mul, EC_POINT_precompute_mult, * EC_POINT_have_precompute_mult (default implementations are used if the * 'mul' pointer is 0): */ int (*mul) (const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int (*precompute_mult) (EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *); int (*have_precompute_mult) (const EC_GROUP *group); /* internal functions */ /* * 'field_mul', 'field_sqr', and 'field_div' can be used by 'add' and * 'dbl' so that the same implementations of point operations can be used * with different optimized implementations of expensive field * operations: */ int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int (*field_div) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); /* e.g. to Montgomery */ int (*field_encode) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); /* e.g. from Montgomery */ int (*field_decode) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int (*field_set_to_one) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *); } /* EC_METHOD */ ; typedef struct ec_extra_data_st { struct ec_extra_data_st *next; void *data; void *(*dup_func) (void *); void (*free_func) (void *); void (*clear_free_func) (void *); } EC_EXTRA_DATA; /* used in EC_GROUP */ struct ec_group_st { const EC_METHOD *meth; EC_POINT *generator; /* optional */ BIGNUM order, cofactor; int curve_name; /* optional NID for named curve */ int asn1_flag; /* flag to control the asn1 encoding */ /* * Kludge: upper bit of ans1_flag is used to denote structure - * version. Is set, then last field is present. This is done + * version. If set, then last field is present. This is done * for interoperation with FIPS code. */ #define EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK 0x7fffffff #define EC_GROUP_VERSION(p) (p->asn1_flag&~EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK) point_conversion_form_t asn1_form; unsigned char *seed; /* optional seed for parameters (appears in * ASN1) */ size_t seed_len; EC_EXTRA_DATA *extra_data; /* linked list */ /* * The following members are handled by the method functions, even if * they appear generic */ /* * Field specification. For curves over GF(p), this is the modulus; for * curves over GF(2^m), this is the irreducible polynomial defining the * field. */ BIGNUM field; /* * Field specification for curves over GF(2^m). The irreducible f(t) is * then of the form: t^poly[0] + t^poly[1] + ... + t^poly[k] where m = * poly[0] > poly[1] > ... > poly[k] = 0. The array is terminated with * poly[k+1]=-1. All elliptic curve irreducibles have at most 5 non-zero * terms. */ int poly[6]; /* * Curve coefficients. (Here the assumption is that BIGNUMs can be used * or abused for all kinds of fields, not just GF(p).) For characteristic * > 3, the curve is defined by a Weierstrass equation of the form y^2 = * x^3 + a*x + b. For characteristic 2, the curve is defined by an * equation of the form y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b. */ BIGNUM a, b; /* enable optimized point arithmetics for special case */ int a_is_minus3; /* method-specific (e.g., Montgomery structure) */ void *field_data1; /* method-specific */ void *field_data2; /* method-specific */ int (*field_mod_func) (BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); BN_MONT_CTX *mont_data; /* data for ECDSA inverse */ } /* EC_GROUP */ ; struct ec_key_st { int version; EC_GROUP *group; EC_POINT *pub_key; BIGNUM *priv_key; unsigned int enc_flag; point_conversion_form_t conv_form; int references; int flags; EC_EXTRA_DATA *method_data; } /* EC_KEY */ ; /* * Basically a 'mixin' for extra data, but available for EC_GROUPs/EC_KEYs * only (with visibility limited to 'package' level for now). We use the * function pointers as index for retrieval; this obviates global * ex_data-style index tables. */ int EC_EX_DATA_set_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **, void *data, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)); void *EC_EX_DATA_get_data(const EC_EXTRA_DATA *, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)); void EC_EX_DATA_free_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)); void EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)); void EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **); void EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **); struct ec_point_st { const EC_METHOD *meth; /* * All members except 'meth' are handled by the method functions, even if * they appear generic */ BIGNUM X; BIGNUM Y; BIGNUM Z; /* Jacobian projective coordinates: (X, Y, Z) * represents (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) if Z != 0 */ int Z_is_one; /* enable optimized point arithmetics for * special case */ } /* EC_POINT */ ; /* * method functions in ec_mult.c (ec_lib.c uses these as defaults if * group->method->mul is 0) */ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *); int ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /* method functions in ecp_smpl.c */ int ec_GFp_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *); void ec_GFp_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *); void ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); int ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *); size_t ec_GFp_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); /* method functions in ecp_mont.c */ int ec_GFp_mont_group_init(EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); void ec_GFp_mont_group_finish(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_mont_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_decode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *); /* method functions in ecp_nist.c */ int ec_GFp_nist_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src); int ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nist_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); /* method functions in ec2_smpl.c */ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GF2m_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *); void ec_GF2m_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *); void ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *); size_t ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_field_div(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); /* method functions in ec2_mult.c */ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 /* method functions in ecp_nistp224.c */ int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group); int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp224_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp224_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp224_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp224_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /* method functions in ecp_nistp256.c */ int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_init(EC_GROUP *group); int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp256_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp256_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp256_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /* method functions in ecp_nistp521.c */ int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_init(EC_GROUP *group); int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp521_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp521_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp521_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp521_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /* utility functions in ecp_nistputil.c */ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array, size_t felem_size, void *tmp_felems, void (*felem_one) (void *out), int (*felem_is_zero) (const void *in), void (*felem_assign) (void *out, const void *in), void (*felem_square) (void *out, const void *in), void (*felem_mul) (void *out, const void *in1, const void *in2), void (*felem_inv) (void *out, const void *in), void (*felem_contract) (void *out, const void *in)); void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign, unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in); #endif -int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *); #ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM /** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication, with x86-64 optimized * P256. See http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816. * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistz256_method(void); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS EC_GROUP *FIPS_ec_group_new_curve_gfp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); EC_GROUP *FIPS_ec_group_new_curve_gf2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); EC_GROUP *FIPS_ec_group_new_by_curve_name(int nid); #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,1138 +1,1155 @@ /* crypto/ec/ec_lib.c */ /* * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Binary polynomial ECC support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" const char EC_version[] = "EC" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; +/* local function prototypes */ + +static int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group); + /* functions for EC_GROUP objects */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth) { EC_GROUP *ret; if (meth == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, EC_R_SLOT_FULL); return NULL; } if (meth->group_init == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return NULL; } ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->meth = meth; ret->extra_data = NULL; ret->mont_data = NULL; ret->generator = NULL; BN_init(&ret->order); BN_init(&ret->cofactor); ret->curve_name = 0; ret->asn1_flag = ~EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK; ret->asn1_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED; ret->seed = NULL; ret->seed_len = 0; if (!meth->group_init(ret)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group) { if (!group) return; if (group->meth->group_finish != 0) group->meth->group_finish(group); EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&group->extra_data); if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) && group->mont_data) BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); if (group->generator != NULL) EC_POINT_free(group->generator); BN_free(&group->order); BN_free(&group->cofactor); if (group->seed) OPENSSL_free(group->seed); OPENSSL_free(group); } void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group) { if (!group) return; if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0) group->meth->group_clear_finish(group); else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0) group->meth->group_finish(group); EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data); if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) && group->mont_data) BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); if (group->generator != NULL) EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator); BN_clear_free(&group->order); BN_clear_free(&group->cofactor); if (group->seed) { OPENSSL_cleanse(group->seed, group->seed_len); OPENSSL_free(group->seed); } OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof(*group)); OPENSSL_free(group); } int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; if (dest->meth->group_copy == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (dest->meth != src->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (dest == src) return 1; EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&dest->extra_data); for (d = src->extra_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) { void *t = d->dup_func(d->data); if (t == NULL) return 0; if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data (&dest->extra_data, t, d->dup_func, d->free_func, d->clear_free_func)) return 0; } if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(src) && src->mont_data != NULL) { if (dest->mont_data == NULL) { dest->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (dest->mont_data == NULL) return 0; } if (!BN_MONT_CTX_copy(dest->mont_data, src->mont_data)) return 0; } else { /* src->generator == NULL */ if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(dest) && dest->mont_data != NULL) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->mont_data); dest->mont_data = NULL; } } if (src->generator != NULL) { if (dest->generator == NULL) { dest->generator = EC_POINT_new(dest); if (dest->generator == NULL) return 0; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->generator, src->generator)) return 0; } else { /* src->generator == NULL */ if (dest->generator != NULL) { EC_POINT_clear_free(dest->generator); dest->generator = NULL; } } if (!BN_copy(&dest->order, &src->order)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(&dest->cofactor, &src->cofactor)) return 0; dest->curve_name = src->curve_name; dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag; dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form; if (src->seed) { if (dest->seed) OPENSSL_free(dest->seed); dest->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(src->seed_len); if (dest->seed == NULL) return 0; if (!memcpy(dest->seed, src->seed, src->seed_len)) return 0; dest->seed_len = src->seed_len; } else { if (dest->seed) OPENSSL_free(dest->seed); dest->seed = NULL; dest->seed_len = 0; } return dest->meth->group_copy(dest, src); } EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *a) { EC_GROUP *t = NULL; int ok = 0; if (a == NULL) return NULL; if ((t = EC_GROUP_new(a->meth)) == NULL) return (NULL); if (!EC_GROUP_copy(t, a)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { if (t) EC_GROUP_free(t); return NULL; } else return t; } const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->meth; } int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth) { return meth->field_type; } int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator, const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor) { if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (group->generator == NULL) { group->generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (group->generator == NULL) return 0; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(group->generator, generator)) return 0; if (order != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(&group->order, order)) return 0; } else BN_zero(&group->order); if (cofactor != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(&group->cofactor, cofactor)) return 0; } else BN_zero(&group->cofactor); - /* - * Some groups have an order with - * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail. - * |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case. + /*- + * Access to the `mont_data` field of an EC_GROUP struct should always be + * guarded by an EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) check to avoid OOB accesses, as the + * group might come from the FIPS module, which does not define the + * `mont_data` field inside the EC_GROUP structure. */ - if (BN_is_odd(&group->order)) { - return ec_precompute_mont_data(group); + if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(group)) { + /*- + * Some groups have an order with + * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail. + * |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case. + */ + if (BN_is_odd(&group->order)) + return ec_precompute_mont_data(group); + + BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); + group->mont_data = NULL; } - BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); - group->mont_data = NULL; return 1; } const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->generator; } BN_MONT_CTX *EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(const EC_GROUP *group) { return EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) ? group->mont_data : NULL; } int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_copy(order, &group->order)) return 0; return !BN_is_zero(order); } int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_copy(cofactor, &group->cofactor)) return 0; return !BN_is_zero(&group->cofactor); } void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid) { group->curve_name = nid; } int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->curve_name; } void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag) { group->asn1_flag &= ~EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK; group->asn1_flag |= flag & EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK; } int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->asn1_flag & EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK; } void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group, point_conversion_form_t form) { group->asn1_form = form; } point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->asn1_form; } size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *group, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) { if (group->seed) { OPENSSL_free(group->seed); group->seed = NULL; group->seed_len = 0; } if (!len || !p) return 1; if ((group->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) return 0; memcpy(group->seed, p, len); group->seed_len = len; return len; } unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->seed; } size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->seed_len; } int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_set_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_get_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_get_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_set_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_get_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_get_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } #endif int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group) { if (group->meth->group_get_degree == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_get_degree(group); } int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_check_discriminant == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_check_discriminant(group, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int r = 0; BIGNUM *a1, *a2, *a3, *b1, *b2, *b3; BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL; /* compare the field types */ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) != EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b))) return 1; /* compare the curve name (if present in both) */ if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b)) return 1; if (!ctx) ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) return -1; BN_CTX_start(ctx); a1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); a2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); a3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!b3) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_new) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return -1; } /* * XXX This approach assumes that the external representation of curves * over the same field type is the same. */ if (!a->meth->group_get_curve(a, a1, a2, a3, ctx) || !b->meth->group_get_curve(b, b1, b2, b3, ctx)) r = 1; if (r || BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2) || BN_cmp(a3, b3)) r = 1; /* XXX EC_POINT_cmp() assumes that the methods are equal */ if (r || EC_POINT_cmp(a, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(a), EC_GROUP_get0_generator(b), ctx)) r = 1; if (!r) { /* compare the order and cofactor */ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(a, a1, ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_order(b, b1, ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(a, a2, ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(b, b2, ctx)) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_new) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return -1; } if (BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2)) r = 1; } BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_new) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return r; } /* this has 'package' visibility */ int EC_EX_DATA_set_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data, void *data, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; if (ex_data == NULL) return 0; for (d = *ex_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) { if (d->dup_func == dup_func && d->free_func == free_func && d->clear_free_func == clear_free_func) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_EX_DATA_SET_DATA, EC_R_SLOT_FULL); return 0; } } if (data == NULL) /* no explicit entry needed */ return 1; d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d)); if (d == NULL) return 0; d->data = data; d->dup_func = dup_func; d->free_func = free_func; d->clear_free_func = clear_free_func; d->next = *ex_data; *ex_data = d; return 1; } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void *EC_EX_DATA_get_data(const EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) { const EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; for (d = ex_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) { if (d->dup_func == dup_func && d->free_func == free_func && d->clear_free_func == clear_free_func) return d->data; } return NULL; } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void EC_EX_DATA_free_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) { EC_EXTRA_DATA **p; if (ex_data == NULL) return; for (p = ex_data; *p != NULL; p = &((*p)->next)) { if ((*p)->dup_func == dup_func && (*p)->free_func == free_func && (*p)->clear_free_func == clear_free_func) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *next = (*p)->next; (*p)->free_func((*p)->data); OPENSSL_free(*p); *p = next; return; } } } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) { EC_EXTRA_DATA **p; if (ex_data == NULL) return; for (p = ex_data; *p != NULL; p = &((*p)->next)) { if ((*p)->dup_func == dup_func && (*p)->free_func == free_func && (*p)->clear_free_func == clear_free_func) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *next = (*p)->next; (*p)->clear_free_func((*p)->data); OPENSSL_free(*p); *p = next; return; } } } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; if (ex_data == NULL) return; d = *ex_data; while (d) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *next = d->next; d->free_func(d->data); OPENSSL_free(d); d = next; } *ex_data = NULL; } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; if (ex_data == NULL) return; d = *ex_data; while (d) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *next = d->next; d->clear_free_func(d->data); OPENSSL_free(d); d = next; } *ex_data = NULL; } /* functions for EC_POINT objects */ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group) { EC_POINT *ret; if (group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } if (group->meth->point_init == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return NULL; } ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->meth = group->meth; if (!ret->meth->point_init(ret)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point) { if (!point) return; if (point->meth->point_finish != 0) point->meth->point_finish(point); OPENSSL_free(point); } void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point) { if (!point) return; if (point->meth->point_clear_finish != 0) point->meth->point_clear_finish(point); else if (point->meth->point_finish != 0) point->meth->point_finish(point); OPENSSL_cleanse(point, sizeof(*point)); OPENSSL_free(point); } int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src) { if (dest->meth->point_copy == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (dest->meth != src->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (dest == src) return 1; return dest->meth->point_copy(dest, src); } EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *a, const EC_GROUP *group) { EC_POINT *t; int r; if (a == NULL) return NULL; t = EC_POINT_new(group); if (t == NULL) return (NULL); r = EC_POINT_copy(t, a); if (!r) { EC_POINT_free(t); return NULL; } else return t; } const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point) { return point->meth; } int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point) { if (group->meth->point_set_to_infinity == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_to_infinity(group, point); } int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, z, ctx); } int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, z, ctx); } int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #endif int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #endif int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->add == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->add(group, r, a, b, ctx); } int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->dbl == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->dbl(group, r, a, ctx); } int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->invert == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != a->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->invert(group, a, ctx); } int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { if (group->meth->is_at_infinity == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->is_at_infinity(group, point); } /* * Check whether an EC_POINT is on the curve or not. Note that the return * value for this function should NOT be treated as a boolean. Return values: * 1: The point is on the curve * 0: The point is not on the curve * -1: An error occurred */ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->is_on_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->is_on_curve(group, point, ctx); } int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; } if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return -1; } return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx); } int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->make_affine == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->make_affine(group, point, ctx); } int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t i; if (group->meth->points_make_affine == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } } return group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx); } /* * Functions for point multiplication. If group->meth->mul is 0, we use the * wNAF-based implementations in ec_mult.c; otherwise we dispatch through * methods. */ int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->mul == 0) /* use default */ return ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx); return group->meth->mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx); } int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar, const EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *p_scalar, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* just a convenient interface to EC_POINTs_mul() */ const EC_POINT *points[1]; const BIGNUM *scalars[1]; points[0] = point; scalars[0] = p_scalar; return EC_POINTs_mul(group, r, g_scalar, (point != NULL && p_scalar != NULL), points, scalars, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->mul == 0) /* use default */ return ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(group, ctx); if (group->meth->precompute_mult != 0) return group->meth->precompute_mult(group, ctx); else return 1; /* nothing to do, so report success */ } int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { if (group->meth->mul == 0) /* use default */ return ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(group); if (group->meth->have_precompute_mult != 0) return group->meth->have_precompute_mult(group); else return 0; /* cannot tell whether precomputation has * been performed */ } -/* +/*- * ec_precompute_mont_data sets |group->mont_data| from |group->order| and * returns one on success. On error it returns zero. + * + * Note: this function must be called only after verifying that + * EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) returns true. + * The reason for this is that access to the `mont_data` field of an EC_GROUP + * struct should always be guarded by an EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) check to avoid + * OOB accesses, as the group might come from the FIPS module, which does not + * define the `mont_data` field inside the EC_GROUP structure. */ +static int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group) { BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); int ret = 0; - - if (!EC_GROUP_VERSION(group)) - goto err; if (group->mont_data) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); group->mont_data = NULL; } if (ctx == NULL) goto err; group->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (!group->mont_data) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(group->mont_data, &group->order, ctx)) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); group->mont_data = NULL; goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (ctx) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,917 +1,1163 @@ /* crypto/ec/ec_mult.c */ /* * Originally written by Bodo Moeller and Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., * and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" /* * This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentiation method * Formerly at: * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp * You might now find it here: * http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-45537-X_13 * http://www.bmoeller.de/pdf/TI-01-08.multiexp.pdf * For multiplication with precomputation, we use wNAF splitting, formerly at: * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#fastexp */ /* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */ typedef struct ec_pre_comp_st { const EC_GROUP *group; /* parent EC_GROUP object */ size_t blocksize; /* block size for wNAF splitting */ size_t numblocks; /* max. number of blocks for which we have * precomputation */ size_t w; /* window size */ EC_POINT **points; /* array with pre-calculated multiples of * generator: 'num' pointers to EC_POINT * objects followed by a NULL */ size_t num; /* numblocks * 2^(w-1) */ int references; } EC_PRE_COMP; /* functions to manage EC_PRE_COMP within the EC_GROUP extra_data framework */ static void *ec_pre_comp_dup(void *); static void ec_pre_comp_free(void *); static void ec_pre_comp_clear_free(void *); static EC_PRE_COMP *ec_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group) { EC_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL; if (!group) return NULL; ret = (EC_PRE_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_PRE_COMP)); if (!ret) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; } ret->group = group; ret->blocksize = 8; /* default */ ret->numblocks = 0; ret->w = 4; /* default */ ret->points = NULL; ret->num = 0; ret->references = 1; return ret; } static void *ec_pre_comp_dup(void *src_) { EC_PRE_COMP *src = src_; /* no need to actually copy, these objects never change! */ CRYPTO_add(&src->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP); return src_; } static void ec_pre_comp_free(void *pre_) { int i; EC_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_; if (!pre) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&pre->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP); if (i > 0) return; if (pre->points) { EC_POINT **p; for (p = pre->points; *p != NULL; p++) EC_POINT_free(*p); OPENSSL_free(pre->points); } OPENSSL_free(pre); } static void ec_pre_comp_clear_free(void *pre_) { int i; EC_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_; if (!pre) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&pre->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP); if (i > 0) return; if (pre->points) { EC_POINT **p; for (p = pre->points; *p != NULL; p++) { EC_POINT_clear_free(*p); OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(*p)); } OPENSSL_free(pre->points); } OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof(*pre)); OPENSSL_free(pre); } /*- * Determine the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of 'scalar'. * This is an array r[] of values that are either zero or odd with an * absolute value less than 2^w satisfying * scalar = \sum_j r[j]*2^j * where at most one of any w+1 consecutive digits is non-zero * with the exception that the most significant digit may be only * w-1 zeros away from that next non-zero digit. */ static signed char *compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len) { int window_val; int ok = 0; signed char *r = NULL; int sign = 1; int bit, next_bit, mask; size_t len = 0, j; if (BN_is_zero(scalar)) { r = OPENSSL_malloc(1); if (!r) { ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } r[0] = 0; *ret_len = 1; return r; } if (w <= 0 || w > 7) { /* 'signed char' can represent integers with * absolute values less than 2^7 */ ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } bit = 1 << w; /* at most 128 */ next_bit = bit << 1; /* at most 256 */ mask = next_bit - 1; /* at most 255 */ if (BN_is_negative(scalar)) { sign = -1; } if (scalar->d == NULL || scalar->top == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } len = BN_num_bits(scalar); r = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); /* modified wNAF may be one digit longer * than binary representation (*ret_len will * be set to the actual length, i.e. at most * BN_num_bits(scalar) + 1) */ if (r == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } window_val = scalar->d[0] & mask; j = 0; while ((window_val != 0) || (j + w + 1 < len)) { /* if j+w+1 >= len, * window_val will not * increase */ int digit = 0; /* 0 <= window_val <= 2^(w+1) */ if (window_val & 1) { /* 0 < window_val < 2^(w+1) */ if (window_val & bit) { digit = window_val - next_bit; /* -2^w < digit < 0 */ #if 1 /* modified wNAF */ if (j + w + 1 >= len) { /* * special case for generating modified wNAFs: no new * bits will be added into window_val, so using a * positive digit here will decrease the total length of * the representation */ digit = window_val & (mask >> 1); /* 0 < digit < 2^w */ } #endif } else { digit = window_val; /* 0 < digit < 2^w */ } if (digit <= -bit || digit >= bit || !(digit & 1)) { ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } window_val -= digit; /* * now window_val is 0 or 2^(w+1) in standard wNAF generation; * for modified window NAFs, it may also be 2^w */ if (window_val != 0 && window_val != next_bit && window_val != bit) { ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } r[j++] = sign * digit; window_val >>= 1; window_val += bit * BN_is_bit_set(scalar, j + w); if (window_val > next_bit) { ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (j > len + 1) { ECerr(EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } len = j; ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { OPENSSL_free(r); r = NULL; } if (ok) *ret_len = len; return r; } +#define EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(P, flags) do { \ + BN_set_flags(&(P)->X, (flags)); \ + BN_set_flags(&(P)->Y, (flags)); \ + BN_set_flags(&(P)->Z, (flags)); \ +} while(0) + +/*- + * This functions computes (in constant time) a point multiplication over the + * EC group. + * + * At a high level, it is Montgomery ladder with conditional swaps. + * + * It performs either a fixed scalar point multiplication + * (scalar * generator) + * when point is NULL, or a generic scalar point multiplication + * (scalar * point) + * when point is not NULL. + * + * scalar should be in the range [0,n) otherwise all constant time bets are off. + * + * NB: This says nothing about EC_POINT_add and EC_POINT_dbl, + * which of course are not constant time themselves. + * + * The product is stored in r. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. + */ +static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, + const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point, + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + int i, cardinality_bits, group_top, kbit, pbit, Z_is_one; + EC_POINT *s = NULL; + BIGNUM *k = NULL; + BIGNUM *lambda = NULL; + BIGNUM *cardinality = NULL; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return 0; + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + + s = EC_POINT_new(group); + if (s == NULL) + goto err; + + if (point == NULL) { + if (!EC_POINT_copy(s, group->generator)) + goto err; + } else { + if (!EC_POINT_copy(s, point)) + goto err; + } + + EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(s, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + cardinality = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + lambda = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + k = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (k == NULL || !BN_mul(cardinality, &group->order, &group->cofactor, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* + * Group cardinalities are often on a word boundary. + * So when we pad the scalar, some timing diff might + * pop if it needs to be expanded due to carries. + * So expand ahead of time. + */ + cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality); + group_top = cardinality->top; + if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL) + || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) + goto err; + + if (!BN_copy(k, scalar)) + goto err; + + BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + if ((BN_num_bits(k) > cardinality_bits) || (BN_is_negative(k))) { + /*- + * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee + * constant-timeness + */ + if (!BN_nnmod(k, k, cardinality, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + if (!BN_add(lambda, k, cardinality)) + goto err; + BN_set_flags(lambda, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_add(k, lambda, cardinality)) + goto err; + /* + * lambda := scalar + cardinality + * k := scalar + 2*cardinality + */ + kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits); + BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2); + + group_top = group->field.top; + if ((bn_wexpand(&s->X, group_top) == NULL) + || (bn_wexpand(&s->Y, group_top) == NULL) + || (bn_wexpand(&s->Z, group_top) == NULL) + || (bn_wexpand(&r->X, group_top) == NULL) + || (bn_wexpand(&r->Y, group_top) == NULL) + || (bn_wexpand(&r->Z, group_top) == NULL)) + goto err; + + /* top bit is a 1, in a fixed pos */ + if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, s)) + goto err; + + EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, s, s, ctx)) + goto err; + + pbit = 0; + +#define EC_POINT_CSWAP(c, a, b, w, t) do { \ + BN_consttime_swap(c, &(a)->X, &(b)->X, w); \ + BN_consttime_swap(c, &(a)->Y, &(b)->Y, w); \ + BN_consttime_swap(c, &(a)->Z, &(b)->Z, w); \ + t = ((a)->Z_is_one ^ (b)->Z_is_one) & (c); \ + (a)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \ + (b)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \ +} while(0) + + /*- + * The ladder step, with branches, is + * + * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R) + * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S) + * + * Swapping R, S conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state + * + * k[i] == 0: T, U = R, S + * k[i] == 1: T, U = S, R + * + * Then perform the ECC ops. + * + * U = add(T, U) + * T = dbl(T) + * + * Which leaves you with state + * + * k[i] == 0: U = add(R, S), T = dbl(R) + * k[i] == 1: U = add(S, R), T = dbl(S) + * + * Swapping T, U conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state + * + * k[i] == 0: R, S = T, U + * k[i] == 1: R, S = U, T + * + * Which leaves you with state + * + * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R) + * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S) + * + * So we get the same logic, but instead of a branch it's a + * conditional swap, followed by ECC ops, then another conditional swap. + * + * Optimization: The end of iteration i and start of i-1 looks like + * + * ... + * CSWAP(k[i], R, S) + * ECC + * CSWAP(k[i], R, S) + * (next iteration) + * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S) + * ECC + * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S) + * ... + * + * So instead of two contiguous swaps, you can merge the condition + * bits and do a single swap. + * + * k[i] k[i-1] Outcome + * 0 0 No Swap + * 0 1 Swap + * 1 0 Swap + * 1 1 No Swap + * + * This is XOR. pbit tracks the previous bit of k. + */ + + for (i = cardinality_bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + kbit = BN_is_bit_set(k, i) ^ pbit; + EC_POINT_CSWAP(kbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one); + if (!EC_POINT_add(group, s, r, s, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx)) + goto err; + /* + * pbit logic merges this cswap with that of the + * next iteration + */ + pbit ^= kbit; + } + /* one final cswap to move the right value into r */ + EC_POINT_CSWAP(pbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one); +#undef EC_POINT_CSWAP + + ret = 1; + + err: + EC_POINT_free(s); + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#undef EC_POINT_BN_set_flags + /* * TODO: table should be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation, * sometimes smaller windows will give better performance (thus the * boundaries should be increased) */ #define EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(b) \ ((size_t) \ ((b) >= 2000 ? 6 : \ (b) >= 800 ? 5 : \ (b) >= 300 ? 4 : \ (b) >= 70 ? 3 : \ (b) >= 20 ? 2 : \ 1)) /*- * Compute * \sum scalars[i]*points[i], * also including * scalar*generator * in the addition if scalar != NULL */ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; const EC_POINT *generator = NULL; EC_POINT *tmp = NULL; size_t totalnum; size_t blocksize = 0, numblocks = 0; /* for wNAF splitting */ size_t pre_points_per_block = 0; size_t i, j; int k; int r_is_inverted = 0; int r_is_at_infinity = 1; size_t *wsize = NULL; /* individual window sizes */ signed char **wNAF = NULL; /* individual wNAFs */ size_t *wNAF_len = NULL; size_t max_len = 0; size_t num_val; EC_POINT **val = NULL; /* precomputation */ EC_POINT **v; EC_POINT ***val_sub = NULL; /* pointers to sub-arrays of 'val' or * 'pre_comp->points' */ const EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL; int num_scalar = 0; /* flag: will be set to 1 if 'scalar' must be * treated like other scalars, i.e. * precomputation is not available */ int ret = 0; if (group->meth != r->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) { return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); + } + + if (!BN_is_zero(&group->order) && !BN_is_zero(&group->cofactor)) { + /*- + * Handle the common cases where the scalar is secret, enforcing a constant + * time scalar multiplication algorithm. + */ + if ((scalar != NULL) && (num == 0)) { + /*- + * In this case we want to compute scalar * GeneratorPoint: this + * codepath is reached most prominently by (ephemeral) key generation + * of EC cryptosystems (i.e. ECDSA keygen and sign setup, ECDH + * keygen/first half), where the scalar is always secret. This is why + * we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and we always call the + * constant time version. + */ + return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalar, NULL, ctx); + } + if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 1)) { + /*- + * In this case we want to compute scalar * GenericPoint: this codepath + * is reached most prominently by the second half of ECDH, where the + * secret scalar is multiplied by the peer's public point. To protect + * the secret scalar, we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and + * we always call the constant time version. + */ + return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalars[0], points[0], ctx); + } } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; } if (scalar != NULL) { generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } /* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */ pre_comp = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(group->extra_data, ec_pre_comp_dup, ec_pre_comp_free, ec_pre_comp_clear_free); if (pre_comp && pre_comp->numblocks && (EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp->points[0], ctx) == 0)) { blocksize = pre_comp->blocksize; /* * determine maximum number of blocks that wNAF splitting may * yield (NB: maximum wNAF length is bit length plus one) */ numblocks = (BN_num_bits(scalar) / blocksize) + 1; /* * we cannot use more blocks than we have precomputation for */ if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) numblocks = pre_comp->numblocks; pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (pre_comp->w - 1); /* check that pre_comp looks sane */ if (pre_comp->num != (pre_comp->numblocks * pre_points_per_block)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } else { /* can't use precomputation */ pre_comp = NULL; numblocks = 1; num_scalar = 1; /* treat 'scalar' like 'num'-th element of * 'scalars' */ } } totalnum = num + numblocks; wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wsize[0])); wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wNAF_len[0])); /* include space for pivot */ wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof(wNAF[0])); val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(val_sub[0])); /* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err */ if (wNAF) wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */ if (!wsize || !wNAF_len || !wNAF || !val_sub) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * num_val will be the total number of temporarily precomputed points */ num_val = 0; for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { size_t bits; bits = i < num ? BN_num_bits(scalars[i]) : BN_num_bits(scalar); wsize[i] = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); num_val += (size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1); wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; /* make sure we always have a pivot */ wNAF[i] = compute_wNAF((i < num ? scalars[i] : scalar), wsize[i], &wNAF_len[i]); if (wNAF[i] == NULL) goto err; if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) max_len = wNAF_len[i]; } if (numblocks) { /* we go here iff scalar != NULL */ if (pre_comp == NULL) { if (num_scalar != 1) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* we have already generated a wNAF for 'scalar' */ } else { signed char *tmp_wNAF = NULL; size_t tmp_len = 0; if (num_scalar != 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * use the window size for which we have precomputation */ wsize[num] = pre_comp->w; tmp_wNAF = compute_wNAF(scalar, wsize[num], &tmp_len); if (!tmp_wNAF) goto err; if (tmp_len <= max_len) { /* * One of the other wNAFs is at least as long as the wNAF * belonging to the generator, so wNAF splitting will not buy * us anything. */ numblocks = 1; totalnum = num + 1; /* don't use wNAF splitting */ wNAF[num] = tmp_wNAF; wNAF[num + 1] = NULL; wNAF_len[num] = tmp_len; if (tmp_len > max_len) max_len = tmp_len; /* * pre_comp->points starts with the points that we need here: */ val_sub[num] = pre_comp->points; } else { /* * don't include tmp_wNAF directly into wNAF array - use wNAF * splitting and include the blocks */ signed char *pp; EC_POINT **tmp_points; if (tmp_len < numblocks * blocksize) { /* * possibly we can do with fewer blocks than estimated */ numblocks = (tmp_len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } totalnum = num + numblocks; } /* split wNAF in 'numblocks' parts */ pp = tmp_wNAF; tmp_points = pre_comp->points; for (i = num; i < totalnum; i++) { if (i < totalnum - 1) { wNAF_len[i] = blocksize; if (tmp_len < blocksize) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tmp_len -= blocksize; } else /* * last block gets whatever is left (this could be * more or less than 'blocksize'!) */ wNAF_len[i] = tmp_len; wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; wNAF[i] = OPENSSL_malloc(wNAF_len[i]); if (wNAF[i] == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); goto err; } memcpy(wNAF[i], pp, wNAF_len[i]); if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) max_len = wNAF_len[i]; if (*tmp_points == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); goto err; } val_sub[i] = tmp_points; tmp_points += pre_points_per_block; pp += blocksize; } OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); } } } /* * All points we precompute now go into a single array 'val'. * 'val_sub[i]' is a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point, or to a * subarray of 'pre_comp->points' if we already have precomputation. */ val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof(val[0])); if (val == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } val[num_val] = NULL; /* pivot element */ /* allocate points for precomputation */ v = val; for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { val_sub[i] = v; for (j = 0; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { *v = EC_POINT_new(group); if (*v == NULL) goto err; v++; } } if (!(v == val + num_val)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!(tmp = EC_POINT_new(group))) goto err; /*- * prepare precomputed values: * val_sub[i][0] := points[i] * val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i] * val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i] * ... */ for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { if (i < num) { if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i])) goto err; } else { if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], generator)) goto err; } if (wsize[i] > 1) { if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp, val_sub[i][0], ctx)) goto err; for (j = 1; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { if (!EC_POINT_add (group, val_sub[i][j], val_sub[i][j - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err; } } } #if 1 /* optional; EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size * assumes we do this step */ if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num_val, val, ctx)) goto err; #endif r_is_at_infinity = 1; for (k = max_len - 1; k >= 0; k--) { if (!r_is_at_infinity) { if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx)) goto err; } for (i = 0; i < totalnum; i++) { if (wNAF_len[i] > (size_t)k) { int digit = wNAF[i][k]; int is_neg; if (digit) { is_neg = digit < 0; if (is_neg) digit = -digit; if (is_neg != r_is_inverted) { if (!r_is_at_infinity) { if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) goto err; } r_is_inverted = !r_is_inverted; } /* digit > 0 */ if (r_is_at_infinity) { if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1])) goto err; r_is_at_infinity = 0; } else { if (!EC_POINT_add (group, r, r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1], ctx)) goto err; } } } } } if (r_is_at_infinity) { if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) goto err; } else { if (r_is_inverted) if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (new_ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); if (tmp != NULL) EC_POINT_free(tmp); if (wsize != NULL) OPENSSL_free(wsize); if (wNAF_len != NULL) OPENSSL_free(wNAF_len); if (wNAF != NULL) { signed char **w; for (w = wNAF; *w != NULL; w++) OPENSSL_free(*w); OPENSSL_free(wNAF); } if (val != NULL) { for (v = val; *v != NULL; v++) EC_POINT_clear_free(*v); OPENSSL_free(val); } if (val_sub != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(val_sub); } return ret; } /*- * ec_wNAF_precompute_mult() * creates an EC_PRE_COMP object with preprecomputed multiples of the generator * for use with wNAF splitting as implemented in ec_wNAF_mul(). * * 'pre_comp->points' is an array of multiples of the generator * of the following form: * points[0] = generator; * points[1] = 3 * generator; * ... * points[2^(w-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)-1) * generator; * points[2^(w-1)] = 2^blocksize * generator; * points[2^(w-1)+1] = 3 * 2^blocksize * generator; * ... * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-2)) * generator * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)] = 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator * ... * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks] = NULL */ int ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { const EC_POINT *generator; EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL, *base = NULL, **var; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *order; size_t i, bits, w, pre_points_per_block, blocksize, numblocks, num; EC_POINT **points = NULL; EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp; int ret = 0; /* if there is an old EC_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */ EC_EX_DATA_free_data(&group->extra_data, ec_pre_comp_dup, ec_pre_comp_free, ec_pre_comp_clear_free); if ((pre_comp = ec_pre_comp_new(group)) == NULL) return 0; generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (order == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(order)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER); goto err; } bits = BN_num_bits(order); /* * The following parameters mean we precompute (approximately) one point * per bit. TBD: The combination 8, 4 is perfect for 160 bits; for other * bit lengths, other parameter combinations might provide better * efficiency. */ blocksize = 8; w = 4; if (EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits) > w) { /* let's not make the window too small ... */ w = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); } numblocks = (bits + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; /* max. number of blocks * to use for wNAF * splitting */ pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (w - 1); num = pre_points_per_block * numblocks; /* number of points to compute * and store */ points = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_POINT *) * (num + 1)); if (!points) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } var = points; var[num] = NULL; /* pivot */ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if ((var[i] = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (!(tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) || !(base = EC_POINT_new(group))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(base, generator)) goto err; /* do the precomputation */ for (i = 0; i < numblocks; i++) { size_t j; if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp_point, base, ctx)) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_copy(*var++, base)) goto err; for (j = 1; j < pre_points_per_block; j++, var++) { /* * calculate odd multiples of the current base point */ if (!EC_POINT_add(group, *var, tmp_point, *(var - 1), ctx)) goto err; } if (i < numblocks - 1) { /* * get the next base (multiply current one by 2^blocksize) */ size_t k; if (blocksize <= 2) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, tmp_point, ctx)) goto err; for (k = 2; k < blocksize; k++) { if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, base, ctx)) goto err; } } } if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx)) goto err; pre_comp->group = group; pre_comp->blocksize = blocksize; pre_comp->numblocks = numblocks; pre_comp->w = w; pre_comp->points = points; points = NULL; pre_comp->num = num; if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre_comp, ec_pre_comp_dup, ec_pre_comp_free, ec_pre_comp_clear_free)) goto err; pre_comp = NULL; ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (new_ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); if (pre_comp) ec_pre_comp_free(pre_comp); if (points) { EC_POINT **p; for (p = points; *p != NULL; p++) EC_POINT_free(*p); OPENSSL_free(points); } if (tmp_point) EC_POINT_free(tmp_point); if (base) EC_POINT_free(base); return ret; } int ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { if (EC_EX_DATA_get_data (group->extra_data, ec_pre_comp_dup, ec_pre_comp_free, ec_pre_comp_clear_free) != NULL) return 1; else return 0; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/engine/eng_list.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/engine/eng_list.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/engine/eng_list.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,405 +1,406 @@ /* crypto/engine/eng_list.c */ /* * Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project * 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ +#include "cryptlib.h" #include "eng_int.h" /* * The linked-list of pointers to engine types. engine_list_head incorporates * an implicit structural reference but engine_list_tail does not - the * latter is a computational niceity and only points to something that is * already pointed to by its predecessor in the list (or engine_list_head * itself). In the same way, the use of the "prev" pointer in each ENGINE is * to save excessive list iteration, it doesn't correspond to an extra * structural reference. Hence, engine_list_head, and each non-null "next" * pointer account for the list itself assuming exactly 1 structural * reference on each list member. */ static ENGINE *engine_list_head = NULL; static ENGINE *engine_list_tail = NULL; /* * This cleanup function is only needed internally. If it should be called, * we register it with the "ENGINE_cleanup()" stack to be called during * cleanup. */ static void engine_list_cleanup(void) { ENGINE *iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator != NULL) { ENGINE_remove(iterator); iterator = engine_list_head; } return; } /* * These static functions starting with a lower case "engine_" always take * place when CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE has been locked up. */ static int engine_list_add(ENGINE *e) { int conflict = 0; ENGINE *iterator = NULL; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator && !conflict) { conflict = (strcmp(iterator->id, e->id) == 0); iterator = iterator->next; } if (conflict) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID); return 0; } if (engine_list_head == NULL) { /* We are adding to an empty list. */ if (engine_list_tail) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); return 0; } engine_list_head = e; e->prev = NULL; /* * The first time the list allocates, we should register the cleanup. */ engine_cleanup_add_last(engine_list_cleanup); } else { /* We are adding to the tail of an existing list. */ if ((engine_list_tail == NULL) || (engine_list_tail->next != NULL)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); return 0; } engine_list_tail->next = e; e->prev = engine_list_tail; } /* * Having the engine in the list assumes a structural reference. */ e->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(e, 0, 1) /* However it came to be, e is the last item in the list. */ engine_list_tail = e; e->next = NULL; return 1; } static int engine_list_remove(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE *iterator; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } /* We need to check that e is in our linked list! */ iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator && (iterator != e)) iterator = iterator->next; if (iterator == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE, ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST); return 0; } /* un-link e from the chain. */ if (e->next) e->next->prev = e->prev; if (e->prev) e->prev->next = e->next; /* Correct our head/tail if necessary. */ if (engine_list_head == e) engine_list_head = e->next; if (engine_list_tail == e) engine_list_tail = e->prev; engine_free_util(e, 0); return 1; } /* Get the first/last "ENGINE" type available. */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void) { ENGINE *ret; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); ret = engine_list_head; if (ret) { ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1) } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); return ret; } ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void) { ENGINE *ret; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); ret = engine_list_tail; if (ret) { ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1) } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); return ret; } /* Iterate to the next/previous "ENGINE" type (NULL = end of the list). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE *ret = NULL; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); ret = e->next; if (ret) { /* Return a valid structural refernce to the next ENGINE */ ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1) } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */ ENGINE_free(e); return ret; } ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE *ret = NULL; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); ret = e->prev; if (ret) { /* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */ ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1) } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */ ENGINE_free(e); return ret; } /* Add another "ENGINE" type into the list. */ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e) { int to_return = 1; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING); return 0; } CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); if (!engine_list_add(e)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); to_return = 0; } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); return to_return; } /* Remove an existing "ENGINE" type from the array. */ int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e) { int to_return = 1; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); if (!engine_list_remove(e)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); to_return = 0; } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); return to_return; } static void engine_cpy(ENGINE *dest, const ENGINE *src) { dest->id = src->id; dest->name = src->name; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA dest->rsa_meth = src->rsa_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA dest->dsa_meth = src->dsa_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dest->dh_meth = src->dh_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH dest->ecdh_meth = src->ecdh_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA dest->ecdsa_meth = src->ecdsa_meth; #endif dest->rand_meth = src->rand_meth; dest->store_meth = src->store_meth; dest->ciphers = src->ciphers; dest->digests = src->digests; dest->pkey_meths = src->pkey_meths; dest->destroy = src->destroy; dest->init = src->init; dest->finish = src->finish; dest->ctrl = src->ctrl; dest->load_privkey = src->load_privkey; dest->load_pubkey = src->load_pubkey; dest->cmd_defns = src->cmd_defns; dest->flags = src->flags; } ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id) { ENGINE *iterator; char *load_dir = NULL; if (id == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator && (strcmp(id, iterator->id) != 0)) iterator = iterator->next; if (iterator) { /* * We need to return a structural reference. If this is an ENGINE * type that returns copies, make a duplicate - otherwise increment * the existing ENGINE's reference count. */ if (iterator->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) { ENGINE *cp = ENGINE_new(); if (!cp) iterator = NULL; else { engine_cpy(cp, iterator); iterator = cp; } } else { iterator->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(iterator, 0, 1) } } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); #if 0 if (iterator == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "id=", id); } return iterator; #else /* EEK! Experimental code starts */ if (iterator) return iterator; /* * Prevent infinite recusrion if we're looking for the dynamic engine. */ if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS - if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0) + if ((load_dir = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0) load_dir = "SSLROOT:[ENGINES]"; # else - if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0) + if ((load_dir = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0) load_dir = ENGINESDIR; # endif iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic"); if (!iterator || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "ID", id, 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD", load_dir, 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LIST_ADD", "1", 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) goto notfound; return iterator; } notfound: ENGINE_free(iterator); ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "id=", id); return NULL; /* EEK! Experimental code ends */ #endif } int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e) { if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_add(&e->struct_ref, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); return 1; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/getenv.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/getenv.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/getenv.c (revision 340692) @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE +# define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + +#include +#include "cryptlib.h" + +char *ossl_safe_getenv(const char *name) +{ +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) +# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17) +# define SECURE_GETENV + return secure_getenv(name); +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef SECURE_GETENV + if (OPENSSL_issetugid()) + return NULL; + return getenv(name); +#endif +} Property changes on: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/getenv.c ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/opensslconf.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/opensslconf.h (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/opensslconf.h (revision 340692) @@ -1,265 +1,270 @@ /* opensslconf.h */ /* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */ #ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 # define OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP # define OPENSSL_NO_GMP #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE # define OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 # define OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND # define OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 # define OPENSSL_NO_MD2 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 # define OPENSSL_NO_RC5 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 # define OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP # define OPENSSL_NO_SCTP #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE # define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 # define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE # define OPENSSL_NO_STORE #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST # define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS # define OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS #endif #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS +# define OPENSSL_THREADS +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE #endif /* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application asks for it. This is a transient feature that is provided for those who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their applications. */ #ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) && !defined(NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) # define NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_GMP) && !defined(NO_GMP) # define NO_GMP # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(NO_JPAKE) # define NO_JPAKE # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_KRB5) && !defined(NO_KRB5) # define NO_KRB5 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND) && !defined(NO_LIBUNBOUND) # define NO_LIBUNBOUND # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2) && !defined(NO_MD2) # define NO_MD2 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC5) && !defined(NO_RC5) # define NO_RC5 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779) && !defined(NO_RFC3779) # define NO_RFC3779 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SCTP) && !defined(NO_SCTP) # define NO_SCTP # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE) && !defined(NO_SSL_TRACE) # define NO_SSL_TRACE # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(NO_SSL2) # define NO_SSL2 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE) # define NO_STORE # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST) # define NO_UNIT_TEST # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS) && !defined(NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS) # define NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS # endif #endif +#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ + /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */ /* Generate 80386 code? */ #undef I386_ONLY #if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */ #if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR) #define ENGINESDIR "/usr/local/ssl/lib/engines" #define OPENSSLDIR "/usr/local/ssl" #endif #endif #undef OPENSSL_UNISTD #define OPENSSL_UNISTD #undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION #if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT) #define IDEA_INT unsigned int #endif #if defined(HEADER_MD2_H) && !defined(MD2_INT) #define MD2_INT unsigned int #endif #if defined(HEADER_RC2_H) && !defined(RC2_INT) /* I need to put in a mod for the alpha - eay */ #define RC2_INT unsigned int #endif #if defined(HEADER_RC4_H) #if !defined(RC4_INT) /* using int types make the structure larger but make the code faster * on most boxes I have tested - up to %20 faster. */ /* * I don't know what does "most" mean, but declaring "int" is a must on: * - Intel P6 because partial register stalls are very expensive; * - elder Alpha because it lacks byte load/store instructions; */ #define RC4_INT unsigned int #endif #if !defined(RC4_CHUNK) /* * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. */ -#undef RC4_CHUNK +#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long #endif #endif #if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG) /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ #ifndef DES_LONG -#define DES_LONG unsigned long +#define DES_LONG unsigned int #endif #endif #if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H) #define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H #undef BN_LLONG /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ /* Only one for the following should be defined */ -#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG +#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT -#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT +#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT #endif #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) #define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H /* if this is defined data[i] is used instead of *data, this is a %20 * speedup on x86 */ #undef RC4_INDEX #endif #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H #undef BF_PTR #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */ #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) #define CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H #ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS /* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a * protected undef/define */ #ifndef DES_PTR #undef DES_PTR #endif /* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional * units. It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more * registers */ #ifndef DES_RISC1 #undef DES_RISC1 #endif #ifndef DES_RISC2 #undef DES_RISC2 #endif #if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2) #error YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!! #endif /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. * Very mucy CPU dependant */ #ifndef DES_UNROLL -#undef DES_UNROLL +#define DES_UNROLL #endif /* These default values were supplied by * Peter Gutman * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */ #if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL) /* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the CPU and OS. For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */ #if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */ # define DES_PTR # define DES_RISC1 # define DES_UNROLL #elif defined( __ultrix ) /* Older MIPS */ # define DES_PTR # define DES_RISC2 # define DES_UNROLL #elif defined( __osf1__ ) /* Alpha */ # define DES_PTR # define DES_RISC2 #elif defined ( _AIX ) /* RS6000 */ /* Unknown */ #elif defined( __hpux ) /* HP-PA */ /* Unknown */ #elif defined( __aux ) /* 68K */ /* Unknown */ #elif defined( __dgux ) /* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */ # define DES_UNROLL #elif defined( __sgi ) /* Newer MIPS */ # define DES_PTR # define DES_RISC2 # define DES_UNROLL #elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__) /* x86 boxes, should be gcc */ # define DES_PTR # define DES_RISC1 # define DES_UNROLL #endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */ #endif #endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */ #endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/opensslv.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/opensslv.h (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/opensslv.h (revision 340692) @@ -1,97 +1,97 @@ #ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H # define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- * Numeric release version identifier: * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas * 1 to 14, and f for release. The patch level is exactly that. * For example: * 0.9.3-dev 0x00903000 * 0.9.3-beta1 0x00903001 * 0.9.3-beta2-dev 0x00903002 * 0.9.3-beta2 0x00903002 (same as ...beta2-dev) * 0.9.3 0x0090300f * 0.9.3a 0x0090301f * 0.9.4 0x0090400f * 1.2.3z 0x102031af * * For continuity reasons (because 0.9.5 is already out, and is coded * 0x00905100), between 0.9.5 and 0.9.6 the coding of the patch level * part is slightly different, by setting the highest bit. This means * that 0.9.5a looks like this: 0x0090581f. At 0.9.6, we can start * with 0x0090600S... * * (Prior to 0.9.3-dev a different scheme was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.) * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000210fL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000211fL # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2p-fips 14 Aug 2018" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2q-fips 20 Nov 2018" # else -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2p 14 Aug 2018" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2q 20 Nov 2018" # endif # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT /*- * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...) * versioning. That kind of versioning works a bit differently between * operating systems. The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal * to what it was at application link time, while the minor number has to * be greater or equal to what it was at application link time. With this * scheme, the version number is usually part of the file name, like this: * * libcrypto.so.0.9 * * Some unixen also make a softlink with the major verson number only: * * libcrypto.so.0 * * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently. There, the * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series * of versions, separated by colons. The rightmost version present in the * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be * matched at run time. When the application is run, a check is done to * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the * versions in the version string of the library itself. * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what * kind of matching is desired. However, to implement the same scheme as * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest * to highest, should be part of the string. Consecutive builds would * give the following versions strings: * * 3.0 * 3.0:3.1 * 3.0:3.1:3.2 * 4.0 * 4.0:4.1 * * Notice how version 4 is completely incompatible with version, and * therefore give the breach you can see. * * There may be other schemes as well that I haven't yet discovered. * * So, here's the way it works here: first of all, the library version * number doesn't need at all to match the overall OpenSSL version. * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does. * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER, * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit). * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways, * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY. The numbers are separated by colons and * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current. */ # define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY "" # define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0" #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,92 +1,93 @@ /* p12_init.c */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 1999. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include /* Initialise a PKCS12 structure to take data */ PKCS12 *PKCS12_init(int mode) { PKCS12 *pkcs12; if (!(pkcs12 = PKCS12_new())) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } - ASN1_INTEGER_set(pkcs12->version, 3); + if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pkcs12->version, 3)) + goto err; pkcs12->authsafes->type = OBJ_nid2obj(mode); switch (mode) { case NID_pkcs7_data: if (!(pkcs12->authsafes->d.data = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new())) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } break; default: PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, PKCS12_R_UNSUPPORTED_PKCS12_MODE); goto err; } return pkcs12; err: if (pkcs12 != NULL) PKCS12_free(pkcs12); return NULL; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,646 +1,645 @@ /* crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "asn1_locl.h" long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg) { int nid; long ret; nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (cmd) { /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */ case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE: if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) { ret = p7->detached = (int)larg; if (ret && PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents)) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os; os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data; ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL; } } else { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE); ret = 0; } break; case PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE: if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) { if (!p7->d.sign || !p7->d.sign->contents->d.ptr) ret = 1; else ret = 0; p7->detached = ret; } else { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE); ret = 0; } break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION); ret = 0; } return (ret); } int PKCS7_content_new(PKCS7 *p7, int type) { PKCS7 *ret = NULL; if ((ret = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!PKCS7_set_type(ret, type)) goto err; if (!PKCS7_set_content(p7, ret)) goto err; return (1); err: if (ret != NULL) PKCS7_free(ret); return (0); } int PKCS7_set_content(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7 *p7_data) { int i; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: if (p7->d.sign->contents != NULL) PKCS7_free(p7->d.sign->contents); p7->d.sign->contents = p7_data; break; case NID_pkcs7_digest: if (p7->d.digest->contents != NULL) PKCS7_free(p7->d.digest->contents); p7->d.digest->contents = p7_data; break; case NID_pkcs7_data: case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: case NID_pkcs7_encrypted: default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CONTENT, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } return (1); err: return (0); } int PKCS7_set_type(PKCS7 *p7, int type) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; /* * PKCS7_content_free(p7); */ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(type); /* will not fail */ switch (type) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.sign = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.sign->version, 1)) { PKCS7_SIGNED_free(p7->d.sign); p7->d.sign = NULL; goto err; } break; case NID_pkcs7_data: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.data = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.signed_and_enveloped = PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; - ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1); if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1)) goto err; p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.enveloped = PKCS7_ENVELOPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.enveloped->version, 0)) goto err; p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); break; case NID_pkcs7_encrypted: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.encrypted = PKCS7_ENCRYPT_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.encrypted->version, 0)) goto err; p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); break; case NID_pkcs7_digest: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.digest = PKCS7_DIGEST_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.digest->version, 0)) goto err; break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_TYPE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } return (1); err: return (0); } int PKCS7_set0_type_other(PKCS7 *p7, int type, ASN1_TYPE *other) { p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(type); p7->d.other = other; return 1; } int PKCS7_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *psi) { int i, j, nid; X509_ALGOR *alg; STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *signer_sk; STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: signer_sk = p7->d.sign->signer_info; md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: signer_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info; md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs; break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } nid = OBJ_obj2nid(psi->digest_alg->algorithm); /* If the digest is not currently listed, add it */ j = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) { alg = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) == nid) { j = 1; break; } } if (!j) { /* we need to add another algorithm */ if (!(alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) || !(alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new())) { X509_ALGOR_free(alg); PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL; if (!sk_X509_ALGOR_push(md_sk, alg)) { X509_ALGOR_free(alg); return 0; } } if (!sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_push(signer_sk, psi)) return 0; return (1); } int PKCS7_add_certificate(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509) { int i; STACK_OF(X509) **sk; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: sk = &(p7->d.sign->cert); break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: sk = &(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert); break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } if (*sk == NULL) *sk = sk_X509_new_null(); if (*sk == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } CRYPTO_add(&x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); if (!sk_X509_push(*sk, x509)) { X509_free(x509); return 0; } return (1); } int PKCS7_add_crl(PKCS7 *p7, X509_CRL *crl) { int i; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **sk; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: sk = &(p7->d.sign->crl); break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: sk = &(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl); break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } if (*sk == NULL) *sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (*sk == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*sk, crl)) { X509_CRL_free(crl); return 0; } return (1); } int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *dgst) { int ret; /* We now need to add another PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO entry */ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7i->version, 1)) goto err; if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7i->issuer_and_serial->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x509))) goto err; /* * because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do things the * ugly way. */ M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial); if (!(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x509)))) goto err; /* lets keep the pkey around for a while */ CRYPTO_add(&pkey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); p7i->pkey = pkey; /* Set the algorithms */ X509_ALGOR_set0(p7i->digest_alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(dgst)), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL); if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl) { ret = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 0, p7i); if (ret > 0) return 1; if (ret != -2) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_SIGNING_CTRL_FAILURE); return 0; } } PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_SIGNING_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); err: return 0; } PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_add_signature(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *dgst) { PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si = NULL; if (dgst == NULL) { int def_nid; if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) <= 0) goto err; dgst = EVP_get_digestbynid(def_nid); if (dgst == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE, PKCS7_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST); goto err; } } if ((si = PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(si, x509, pkey, dgst)) goto err; if (!PKCS7_add_signer(p7, si)) goto err; return (si); err: if (si) PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_free(si); return (NULL); } int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md) { if (PKCS7_type_is_digest(p7)) { if (!(p7->d.digest->md->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new())) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } p7->d.digest->md->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL; p7->d.digest->md->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_nid(md)); return 1; } PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return 1; } STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7) { if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL) return NULL; if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) { return (p7->d.sign->signer_info); } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) { return (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info); } else return (NULL); } void PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, EVP_PKEY **pk, X509_ALGOR **pdig, X509_ALGOR **psig) { if (pk) *pk = si->pkey; if (pdig) *pdig = si->digest_alg; if (psig) *psig = si->digest_enc_alg; } void PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, X509_ALGOR **penc) { if (penc) *penc = ri->key_enc_algor; } PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *PKCS7_add_recipient(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509) { PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri; if ((ri = PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set(ri, x509)) goto err; if (!PKCS7_add_recipient_info(p7, ri)) goto err; return ri; err: if (ri) PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_free(ri); return NULL; } int PKCS7_add_recipient_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri) { int i; STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *sk; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo; break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: sk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo; break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_RECIPIENT_INFO, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } if (!sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_push(sk, ri)) return 0; return (1); } int PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509) { int ret; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7i->version, 0)) return 0; if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7i->issuer_and_serial->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x509))) return 0; M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial); if (!(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x509)))) return 0; pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509); if (!pkey || !pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } ret = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0, p7i); if (ret == -2) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } if (ret <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_CTRL_FAILURE); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); CRYPTO_add(&x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); p7i->cert = x509; return 1; err: if (pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 0; } X509 *PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si) { if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) return (X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(p7->d.sign->cert, si->issuer_and_serial->issuer, si-> issuer_and_serial->serial)); else return (NULL); } int PKCS7_set_cipher(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { int i; PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT *ec; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: ec = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data; break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: ec = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data; break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } /* Check cipher OID exists and has data in it */ i = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher); if (i == NID_undef) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); return (0); } ec->cipher = cipher; return 1; } int PKCS7_stream(unsigned char ***boundary, PKCS7 *p7) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; switch (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type)) { case NID_pkcs7_data: os = p7->d.data; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: os = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; if (os == NULL) { os = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os; } break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: os = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; if (os == NULL) { os = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os; } break; case NID_pkcs7_signed: os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data; break; default: os = NULL; break; } if (os == NULL) return 0; os->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF; *boundary = &os->data; return 1; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/Makefile (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/Makefile (revision 340692) @@ -1,166 +1,167 @@ # # OpenSSL/crypto/rand/Makefile # DIR= rand TOP= ../.. CC= cc INCLUDES= CFLAG=-g MAKEFILE= Makefile AR= ar r CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile TEST= randtest.c APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a LIBSRC=md_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \ rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_os2.c rand_nw.c LIBOBJ=md_rand.o randfile.o rand_lib.o rand_err.o rand_egd.o \ rand_win.o rand_unix.o rand_os2.o rand_nw.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= rand.h HEADER= $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all) all: lib lib: $(LIBOBJ) $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. @touch lib files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; tags: ctags $(SRC) tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff update: depend depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) clean: rm -f *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. md_rand.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h md_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h md_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h md_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h md_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h md_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h md_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h md_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h md_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h md_rand.o: md_rand.c rand_lcl.h rand_egd.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rand_egd.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rand_egd.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h rand_egd.o: rand_egd.c rand_err.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rand_err.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rand_err.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rand_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rand_err.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rand_err.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rand_err.o: rand_err.c rand_lib.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rand_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h rand_lib.o: ../cryptlib.h rand_lib.c rand_nw.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rand_nw.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h rand_nw.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rand_nw.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h rand_nw.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rand_nw.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rand_nw.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rand_nw.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rand_nw.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rand_nw.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rand_lcl.h rand_nw.c rand_os2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rand_os2.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h rand_os2.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rand_os2.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h rand_os2.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rand_os2.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rand_os2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rand_os2.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rand_os2.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rand_os2.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rand_lcl.h rand_os2.o: rand_os2.c rand_unix.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rand_unix.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rand_lcl.h rand_unix.o: rand_unix.c rand_win.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rand_win.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rand_lcl.h rand_win.o: rand_win.c -randfile.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h -randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h -randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h +randfile.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h +randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h +randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h +randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h randfile.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -randfile.o: randfile.c +randfile.o: ../cryptlib.h randfile.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/md_rand.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/md_rand.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/md_rand.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,616 +1,626 @@ /* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #define OPENSSL_FIPSEVP #ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG # ifndef NDEBUG # define NDEBUG # endif #endif #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include "rand_lcl.h" #include #ifdef BN_DEBUG # define PREDICT #endif /* #define PREDICT 1 */ #define STATE_SIZE 1023 static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0; static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 }; static double entropy = 0; static int initialized = 0; static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND (to * prevent double locking) */ /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; #ifdef PREDICT int rand_predictable = 0; #endif const char RAND_version[] = "RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); static int ssleay_rand_status(void); RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth = { ssleay_rand_seed, ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes, ssleay_rand_cleanup, ssleay_rand_add, ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, ssleay_rand_status }; RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) { return (&rand_ssleay_meth); } static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void) { OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state)); state_num = 0; state_index = 0; OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); md_count[0] = 0; md_count[1] = 0; entropy = 0; initialized = 0; } static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) { int i, j, k, st_idx; long md_c[2]; unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX m; int do_not_lock; if (!num) return; /* * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) * * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' * (which is incremented after each use). * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the * hash function. */ /* check if we already have the lock */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { CRYPTO_THREADID cur; CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else do_not_lock = 0; if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); st_idx = state_index; /* * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's * _some_ difference */ md_c[0] = md_count[0]; md_c[1] = md_count[1]; memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof(md)); /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ state_index += num; if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) { state_index %= STATE_SIZE; state_num = STATE_SIZE; } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) { if (state_index > state_num) state_num = state_index; } /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ /* * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we * will use now, but other threads may use them as well */ md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) { j = (num - i); j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j; if (!MD_Init(&m) || !MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE; if (k > 0) { if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k) || !MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k)) goto err; } else if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j)) goto err; /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ if (!MD_Update(&m, buf, j)) goto err; /* * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind * to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not, * it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very * insecure keys. */ if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)) || !MD_Final(&m, local_md)) goto err; md_c[1]++; buf = (const char *)buf + j; for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { /* * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and * local_md (itermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking * could hurt performance more than necessary given that * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the * random state. */ state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k]; if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) st_idx = 0; } } if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); /* * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into * md. */ for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) { md[k] ^= local_md[k]; } if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ entropy += add; if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]); #endif err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); } static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) { ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); } int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock) { static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; int i, j, k; size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num; - int ok; long md_c[2]; unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX m; #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); #endif int do_stir_pool = 0; #ifdef PREDICT if (rand_predictable) { static unsigned char val = 0; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) buf[i] = val++; return (1); } #endif if (num <= 0) return 1; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ num_ceil = (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); /* * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) * * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: * * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. * * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the * global 'md'. */ if (lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; if (!initialized) { RAND_poll(); - initialized = 1; + initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); } if (!stirred_pool) do_stir_pool = 1; - ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); - if (!ok) { + if (!initialized) { /* * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though, * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic* * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the * entropy limit has been reached. */ entropy -= num; if (entropy < 0) entropy = 0; } if (do_stir_pool) { /* * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input * function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more * suitable for this purpose. */ int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ while (n > 0) { #if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 # error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." #endif #define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ /* * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */ ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; } - if (ok) + if (initialized) stirred_pool = 1; } st_idx = state_index; st_num = state_num; md_c[0] = md_count[0]; md_c[1] = md_count[1]; memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof(md)); state_index += num_ceil; if (state_index > state_num) state_index %= state_num; /* * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now * ours (but other threads may use them too) */ md_count[0] += 1; /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ crypto_lock_rand = 0; if (lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); while (num > 0) { /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num; num -= j; if (!MD_Init(&m)) goto err; #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof(curr_pid))) goto err; curr_pid = 0; } #endif if (!MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) goto err; #ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */ /* * The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small source of * entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised it may cause * programs such as purify or valgrind to complain. So for those * builds it is not used: the removal of such a small source of * entropy has negligible impact on security. */ if (!MD_Update(&m, buf, j)) goto err; #endif k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num; if (k > 0) { if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k) || !MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k)) goto err; } else { if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) goto err; } if (!MD_Final(&m, local_md)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) { /* may compete with other threads */ state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i]; if (st_idx >= st_num) st_idx = 0; if (i < j) *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2]; } } if (!MD_Init(&m) || !MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)) || !MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; if (lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); if (!MD_Update(&m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(&m, md)) { if (lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); goto err; } if (lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); - if (ok) + if (initialized) return (1); else if (pseudo) return 0; else { RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html"); return (0); } err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); return (0); } +/* + * Returns ssleay_rand_bytes(), enforcing a reseeding from the + * system entropy sources using RAND_poll() before generating +`* the random bytes. + */ + +int ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system(unsigned char *buf, int num) +{ + initialized = 0; + return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0, 0); +} + static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0, 1); } /* * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable */ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1, 1); } static int ssleay_rand_status(void) { CRYPTO_THREADID cur; int ret; int do_not_lock; CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); /* * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll() * implementation calls RAND_status()) */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else do_not_lock = 0; if (!do_not_lock) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); /* * prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; } if (!initialized) { RAND_poll(); - initialized = 1; + initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); } - ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; + ret = initialized; if (!do_not_lock) { /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ crypto_lock_rand = 0; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); } return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h (revision 340692) @@ -1,158 +1,158 @@ /* crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H # define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H # define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */ # if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND) # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1) # define USE_SHA1_RAND # elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) # define USE_MD5_RAND # elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) # define USE_MDC2_RAND # elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2) # define USE_MD2_RAND # else # error No message digest algorithm available # endif # endif # include # define MD_Update(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) # define MD_Final(a,b) EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL) # if defined(USE_MD5_RAND) # include # define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH # define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL) # define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL) # elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) # include # define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH # define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL) # define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL) # elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) # include # define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH # define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL) # define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL) # elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND) # include # define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH # define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL) # define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL) # endif int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock); - +int ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system(unsigned char *buf, int num); #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,300 +1,318 @@ /* crypto/rand/rand_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include # include # include "rand_lcl.h" #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */ static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL; #endif static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL; int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (funct_ref) { ENGINE_finish(funct_ref); funct_ref = NULL; } #endif default_RAND_meth = meth; return 1; } const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void) { if (!default_RAND_meth) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND(); if (e) { default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e); if (!default_RAND_meth) { ENGINE_finish(e); e = NULL; } } if (e) funct_ref = e; else #endif default_RAND_meth = RAND_SSLeay(); } return default_RAND_meth; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine) { const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL; if (engine) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) return 0; tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine); if (!tmp_meth) { ENGINE_finish(engine); return 0; } } /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */ RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth); funct_ref = engine; return 1; } #endif void RAND_cleanup(void) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->cleanup) meth->cleanup(); RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); } void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->seed) meth->seed(buf, num); } void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->add) meth->add(buf, num, entropy); } int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->bytes) return meth->bytes(buf, num); return (-1); } int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->pseudorand) return meth->pseudorand(buf, num); return (-1); } int RAND_status(void) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->status) return meth->status(); return 0; } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS /* * FIPS DRBG initialisation code. This sets up the DRBG for use by the rest * of OpenSSL. */ /* * Entropy gatherer: use standard OpenSSL PRNG to seed (this will gather - * entropy internally through RAND_poll(). + * entropy internally through RAND_poll()). */ static size_t drbg_get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout, int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) { /* Round up request to multiple of block size */ min_len = ((min_len + 19) / 20) * 20; *pout = OPENSSL_malloc(min_len); if (!*pout) return 0; + + /* Enforces a reseed of the SSLEAY PRNG before generating random bytes */ + if (ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system(*pout, min_len) <= 0) { + OPENSSL_free(*pout); + *pout = NULL; + return 0; + } + return min_len; +} + +static size_t drbg_get_nonce(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout, + int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) +{ + /* Round up request to multiple of block size */ + min_len = ((min_len + 19) / 20) * 20; + *pout = OPENSSL_malloc(min_len); + if (!*pout) + return 0; if (ssleay_rand_bytes(*pout, min_len, 0, 0) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(*pout); *pout = NULL; return 0; } return min_len; } static void drbg_free_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen) { if (out) { OPENSSL_cleanse(out, olen); OPENSSL_free(out); } } /* * Set "additional input" when generating random data. This uses the current * PID, a time value and a counter. */ static size_t drbg_get_adin(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout) { /* Use of static variables is OK as this happens under a lock */ static unsigned char buf[16]; static unsigned long counter; FIPS_get_timevec(buf, &counter); *pout = buf; return sizeof(buf); } /* * RAND_add() and RAND_seed() pass through to OpenSSL PRNG so it is * correctly seeded by RAND_poll(). */ static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen, double entropy) { RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy); return 1; } static int drbg_rand_seed(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen) { RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen); return 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_DRBG_DEFAULT_TYPE # define OPENSSL_DRBG_DEFAULT_TYPE NID_aes_256_ctr # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_DRBG_DEFAULT_FLAGS # define OPENSSL_DRBG_DEFAULT_FLAGS DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF # endif static int fips_drbg_type = OPENSSL_DRBG_DEFAULT_TYPE; static int fips_drbg_flags = OPENSSL_DRBG_DEFAULT_FLAGS; void RAND_set_fips_drbg_type(int type, int flags) { fips_drbg_type = type; fips_drbg_flags = flags; } int RAND_init_fips(void) { DRBG_CTX *dctx; size_t plen; unsigned char pers[32], *p; # ifndef OPENSSL_ALLOW_DUAL_EC_DRBG if (fips_drbg_type >> 16) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_INIT_FIPS, RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED); return 0; } # endif dctx = FIPS_get_default_drbg(); if (FIPS_drbg_init(dctx, fips_drbg_type, fips_drbg_flags) <= 0) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_INIT_FIPS, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG); return 0; } FIPS_drbg_set_callbacks(dctx, drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy, 20, - drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy); + drbg_get_nonce, drbg_free_entropy); FIPS_drbg_set_rand_callbacks(dctx, drbg_get_adin, 0, drbg_rand_seed, drbg_rand_add); /* Personalisation string: a string followed by date time vector */ strcpy((char *)pers, "OpenSSL DRBG2.0"); plen = drbg_get_adin(dctx, &p); memcpy(pers + 16, p, plen); if (FIPS_drbg_instantiate(dctx, pers, sizeof(pers)) <= 0) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_INIT_FIPS, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG); return 0; } FIPS_rand_set_method(FIPS_drbg_method()); return 1; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/randfile.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/randfile.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rand/randfile.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,372 +1,371 @@ /* crypto/rand/randfile.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include #include +#include "cryptlib.h" #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include #endif #ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # include # include /* * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback... */ # if !defined(S_ISBLK) # if defined(_S_IFBLK) # define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & _S_IFBLK) # elif defined(S_IFBLK) # define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & S_IFBLK) # elif defined(_WIN32) # define S_ISBLK(m) 0 /* no concept of block devices on Windows */ # endif # endif # if !defined(S_ISCHR) # if defined(_S_IFCHR) # define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & _S_IFCHR) # elif defined(S_IFCHR) # define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & S_IFCHR) # endif # endif #endif #ifdef _WIN32 # define stat _stat # define chmod _chmod # define open _open # define fdopen _fdopen #endif #undef BUFSIZE #define BUFSIZE 1024 #define RAND_DATA 1024 #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64))) /* * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for * passing in sharing options being disabled by our /STANDARD=ANSI89 */ static FILE *(*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) = (FILE *(*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen; # define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0" #endif /* #define RFILE ".rnd" - defined in ../../e_os.h */ /* * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c */ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) { /*- * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes. * if bytes == -1, read complete file. */ MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO struct stat sb; #endif int i, ret = 0, n; /* * If setvbuf() is to be called, then the FILE pointer * to it must be 32 bit. */ #if !defined OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__VMS_VER) && (__VMS_VER >= 70000000) /* For 64-bit-->32 bit API Support*/ #if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 #pragma __required_pointer_size __save #pragma __required_pointer_size 32 #endif FILE *in; /* setvbuf() requires 32-bit pointers */ #if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 #pragma __required_pointer_size __restore #endif #else FILE *in; #endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VMS */ if (file == NULL) return (0); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # ifdef PURIFY /* * struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be * initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire * structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from * applications such as Valgrind. */ memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); # endif if (stat(file, &sb) < 0) return (0); RAND_add(&sb, sizeof(sb), 0.0); #endif if (bytes == 0) return (ret); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS in = vms_fopen(file, "rb", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS); #else in = fopen(file, "rb"); #endif if (in == NULL) goto err; #if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) { /* * this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number of * bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered I/O * because we will waste system entropy. */ bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF setvbuf(in, NULL, _IONBF, 0); /* don't do buffered reads */ # endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */ } #endif for (;;) { if (bytes > 0) n = (bytes < BUFSIZE) ? (int)bytes : BUFSIZE; else n = BUFSIZE; i = fread(buf, 1, n, in); if (i <= 0) break; #ifdef PURIFY RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i); #else /* even if n != i, use the full array */ RAND_add(buf, n, (double)i); #endif ret += i; if (bytes > 0) { bytes -= n; if (bytes <= 0) break; } } fclose(in); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE); err: return (ret); } int RAND_write_file(const char *file) { unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; int i, ret = 0, rand_err = 0; FILE *out = NULL; int n; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO struct stat sb; i = stat(file, &sb); if (i != -1) { # if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) { /* * this file is a device. we don't write back to it. we * "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort of random * device. Otherwise attempting to write to and chmod the device * causes problems. */ return (1); } # endif } #endif #if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) { # ifndef O_BINARY # define O_BINARY 0 # endif /* * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions * should be restrictive from the start */ int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600); if (fd != -1) out = fdopen(fd, "wb"); } #endif #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64))) /* * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent * rand file in a concurrent use situation. */ out = vms_fopen(file, "rb+", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS); if (out == NULL) out = vms_fopen(file, "wb", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS); #else if (out == NULL) out = fopen(file, "wb"); #endif if (out == NULL) goto err; #ifndef NO_CHMOD chmod(file, 0600); #endif n = RAND_DATA; for (;;) { i = (n > BUFSIZE) ? BUFSIZE : n; n -= BUFSIZE; if (RAND_bytes(buf, i) <= 0) rand_err = 1; i = fwrite(buf, 1, i, out); if (i <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } ret += i; if (n <= 0) break; } fclose(out); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE); err: return (rand_err ? -1 : ret); } const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size) { char *s = NULL; #ifdef __OpenBSD__ struct stat sb; #endif - if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0) - s = getenv("RANDFILE"); + s = ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE"); if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size) { if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size) return NULL; } else { - if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0) - s = getenv("HOME"); + s = ossl_safe_getenv("HOME"); #ifdef DEFAULT_HOME if (s == NULL) { s = DEFAULT_HOME; } #endif if (s && *s && strlen(s) + strlen(RFILE) + 2 < size) { BUF_strlcpy(buf, s, size); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS BUF_strlcat(buf, "/", size); #endif BUF_strlcat(buf, RFILE, size); } else buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */ } #ifdef __OpenBSD__ /* * given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be seen on a * stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it fails, use /dev/arandom * instead. this allows the user to use their own source for good random * data, but defaults to something hopefully decent if that isn't * available. */ if (!buf[0]) if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) { return (NULL); } if (stat(buf, &sb) == -1) if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) { return (NULL); } #endif return (buf); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,891 +1,957 @@ /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "bn_int.h" #ifndef RSA_NULL static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = { "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", RSA_eay_public_encrypt, RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ RSA_eay_private_decrypt, RSA_eay_mod_exp, BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery * if e == 3 */ RSA_eay_init, RSA_eay_finish, 0, /* flags */ NULL, 0, /* rsa_sign */ 0, /* rsa_verify */ NULL /* rsa_keygen */ }; const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) { return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); } static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int i, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); break; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); break; # endif case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (i <= 0) goto err; if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, + rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; /* * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than * the length of the modulus. */ r = bn_bn2binpad(ret, to, num); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); } static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_BLINDING *ret; int got_write_lock = 0; CRYPTO_THREADID cur; CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); got_write_lock = 1; if (rsa->blinding == NULL) rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); } ret = rsa->blinding; if (ret == NULL) goto err; CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) { /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ *local = 1; } else { /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ /* * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING */ *local = 0; if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { if (!got_write_lock) { CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); got_write_lock = 1; } if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); } ret = rsa->mt_blinding; } err: if (got_write_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); else CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); return ret; } static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (unblind == NULL) /* * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING. */ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); else { /* * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING. */ int ret; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); return ret; } } static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe * to access the blinding without a lock. */ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); } /* signing */ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; int i, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int local_blinding = 0; /* * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (i <= 0) goto err; if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (blinding != NULL) { if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; } if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; } else { BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { BN_init(&local_d); d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, + rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } if (blinding) if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) res = f; else res = ret; } else res = ret; /* * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than * the length of the modulus. */ r = bn_bn2binpad(res, to, num); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); } static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int j, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int local_blinding = 0; /* * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the * top '0' bytes */ if (flen > num) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); goto err; } /* make data into a big number */ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (blinding != NULL) { if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; } /* do the decrypt */ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; } else { BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, + rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } if (blinding) if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; j = bn_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num); switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); break; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); break; # endif case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: memcpy(to, buf, (r = j)); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (r < 0) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); } /* signature verification */ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int i, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the * top '0' bytes */ if (flen > num) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); goto err; } if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, + rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)) if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err; i = bn_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num); switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: memcpy(to, buf, (r = i)); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (r < 0) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); } static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; - int ret = 0; + int ret = 0, smooth = 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); { BIGNUM local_p, local_q; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; /* * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { BN_init(&local_p); p = &local_p; BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_init(&local_q); q = &local_q; BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else { p = rsa->p; q = rsa->q; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, + p, ctx)) goto err; - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, + q, ctx)) goto err; + + smooth = (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont) + && (BN_num_bits(q) == BN_num_bits(p)); } } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, + rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; + if (smooth) { + /* + * Conversion from Montgomery domain, a.k.a. Montgomery reduction, + * accepts values in [0-m*2^w) range. w is m's bit width rounded up + * to limb width. So that at the very least if |I| is fully reduced, + * i.e. less than p*q, we can count on from-to round to perform + * below modulo operations on |I|. Unlike BN_mod it's constant time. + */ + if (/* m1 = I moq q */ + !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(m1, I, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx) + || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(m1, m1, rsa->_method_mod_q, ctx) + /* m1 = m1^dmq1 mod q */ + || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, m1, rsa->dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_q) + /* r1 = I mod p */ + || !bn_from_mont_fixed_top(r1, I, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx) + || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx) + /* r1 = r1^dmp1 mod p */ + || !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r1, r1, rsa->dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_p) + /* r1 = (r1 - m1) mod p */ + /* + * bn_mod_sub_fixed_top is not regular modular subtraction, + * it can tolerate subtrahend to be larger than modulus, but + * not bit-wise wider. This makes up for uncommon q>p case, + * when |m1| can be larger than |rsa->p|. + */ + || !bn_mod_sub_fixed_top(r1, r1, m1, rsa->p) + + /* r1 = r1 * iqmp mod p */ + || !bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->_method_mod_p, ctx) + || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r1, r1, rsa->iqmp, rsa->_method_mod_p, + ctx) + /* r0 = r1 * q + m1 */ + || !bn_mul_fixed_top(r0, r1, rsa->q, ctx) + || !bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r0, r0, m1, rsa->n)) + goto err; + + goto tail; + } + /* compute I mod q */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; } /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmq1 = &local_dmq1; BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; /* compute I mod p */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmp1 = &local_dmp1; BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) goto err; /* * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) goto err; /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { pr1 = &local_r1; BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else pr1 = r1; if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) goto err; /* * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can * break the private key operations: the following second correction * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) goto err; + tail: if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) - goto err; + if (rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp == BN_mod_exp_mont) { + if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + } else { + bn_correct_top(r0); + if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n)) + goto err; + } /* * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for * absolute equality, just congruency. */ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err; + if (BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { + bn_correct_top(r0); + ret = 1; + goto err; /* not actually error */ + } if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { /* * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and * return that instead. */ BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } } + /* + * It's unfortunate that we have to bn_correct_top(r0). What hopefully + * saves the day is that correction is highly unlike, and private key + * operations are customarily performed on blinded message. Which means + * that attacker won't observe correlation with chosen plaintext. + * Secondly, remaining code would still handle it in same computational + * time and even conceal memory access pattern around corrected top. + */ + bn_correct_top(r0); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) { rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; return (1); } static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) { if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); return (1); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,730 +1,748 @@ /* crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c */ /* * Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) and others for the * OpenSSL project 2001. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /*- * The lowest level part of this file was previously in crypto/des/read_pwd.c, * Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include /* * need for #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE arises whenever you pass -ansi to gcc * [maybe others?], because it masks interfaces not discussed in standard, * sigaction and fileno included. -pedantic would be more appropriate for the * intended purposes, but we can't prevent users from adding -ansi. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VXWORKS) # include #endif #if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE # define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2 # endif #endif #include #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # ifdef OPENSSL_UNISTD # include OPENSSL_UNISTD # else # include # endif /* * If unistd.h defines _POSIX_VERSION, we conclude that we are on a POSIX * system and have sigaction and termios. */ # if defined(_POSIX_VERSION) # define SIGACTION # if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY) # define TERMIOS # endif # endif #endif #ifdef WIN16TTY # undef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 # undef WIN16 # undef _WINDOWS # include #endif /* 06-Apr-92 Luke Brennan Support for VMS */ #include "ui_locl.h" #include "cryptlib.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* prototypes for sys$whatever */ # include # ifdef __DECC # pragma message disable DOLLARID # endif #endif #ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG # include # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE # include # endif #endif /* * There are 5 types of terminal interface supported, TERMIO, TERMIOS, VMS, * MSDOS and SGTTY. * * If someone defines one of the macros TERMIO, TERMIOS or SGTTY, it will * remain respected. Otherwise, we default to TERMIOS except for a few * systems that require something different. * * Note: we do not use SGTTY unless it's defined by the configuration. We * may eventually opt to remove it's use entirely. */ #if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY) # if defined(_LIBC) # undef TERMIOS # define TERMIO # undef SGTTY /* * We know that VMS, MSDOS, VXWORKS, NETWARE use entirely other mechanisms. * MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE should probably go away, but that needs to be confirmed. */ # elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) \ && !defined(MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # define TERMIOS # undef TERMIO # undef SGTTY # endif #endif #ifdef TERMIOS # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct termios # define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag # define TTY_get(tty,data) tcgetattr(tty,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) tcsetattr(tty,TCSANOW,data) #endif #ifdef TERMIO # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct termio # define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag # define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCGETA,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCSETA,data) #endif #ifdef SGTTY # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct sgttyb # define TTY_FLAGS sg_flags # define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCGETP,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCSETP,data) #endif #if !defined(_LIBC) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS) # include #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # include #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include # include # include # include struct IOSB { short iosb$w_value; short iosb$w_count; long iosb$l_info; }; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS typedef int sig_atomic_t; #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) || defined(MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) /* * This one needs work. As a matter of fact the code is unoperational * and this is only a trick to get it compiled. * */ # define TTY_STRUCT int #endif #ifndef NX509_SIG # define NX509_SIG 32 #endif /* Define globals. They are protected by a lock */ #ifdef SIGACTION static struct sigaction savsig[NX509_SIG]; #else static void (*savsig[NX509_SIG]) (int); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS static struct IOSB iosb; static $DESCRIPTOR(terminal, "TT"); static long tty_orig[3], tty_new[3]; /* XXX Is there any guarantee that this * will always suffice for the actual * structures? */ static long status; static unsigned short channel = 0; #else # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(__DJGPP__) static TTY_STRUCT tty_orig, tty_new; # endif #endif static FILE *tty_in, *tty_out; static int is_a_tty; /* Declare static functions */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) static int read_till_nl(FILE *); static void recsig(int); static void pushsig(void); static void popsig(void); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty); #endif static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl); static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); static int open_console(UI *ui); static int echo_console(UI *ui); static int noecho_console(UI *ui); static int close_console(UI *ui); static UI_METHOD ui_openssl = { "OpenSSL default user interface", open_console, write_string, NULL, /* No flusher is needed for command lines */ read_string, close_console, NULL }; /* The method with all the built-in thingies */ UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void) { return &ui_openssl; } /* * The following function makes sure that info and error strings are printed * before any prompt. */ static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_ERROR: case UIT_INFO: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); break; default: break; } return 1; } static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { int ok = 0; switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_BOOLEAN: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fputs(UI_get0_action_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); return read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 0); case UIT_PROMPT: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); return read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 1); case UIT_VERIFY: fprintf(tty_out, "Verifying - %s", UI_get0_output_string(uis)); fflush(tty_out); if ((ok = read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 1)) <= 0) return ok; if (strcmp(UI_get0_result_string(uis), UI_get0_test_string(uis)) != 0) { fprintf(tty_out, "Verify failure\n"); fflush(tty_out); return 0; } break; default: break; } return 1; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) /* Internal functions to read a string without echoing */ static int read_till_nl(FILE *in) { # define SIZE 4 char buf[SIZE + 1]; do { if (!fgets(buf, SIZE, in)) return 0; } while (strchr(buf, '\n') == NULL); return 1; } static volatile sig_atomic_t intr_signal; #endif static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl) { static int ps; int ok; char result[BUFSIZ]; int maxsize = BUFSIZ - 1; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) char *p; intr_signal = 0; ok = 0; ps = 0; pushsig(); ps = 1; if (!echo && !noecho_console(ui)) goto error; ps = 2; result[0] = '\0'; # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS if (!echo) { noecho_fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); p = result; /* FIXME: noecho_fgets doesn't return errors */ } else p = fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); # else p = fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); # endif if (p == NULL) goto error; if (feof(tty_in)) goto error; if (ferror(tty_in)) goto error; if ((p = (char *)strchr(result, '\n')) != NULL) { if (strip_nl) *p = '\0'; } else if (!read_till_nl(tty_in)) goto error; if (UI_set_result(ui, uis, result) >= 0) ok = 1; error: if (intr_signal == SIGINT) ok = -1; if (!echo) fprintf(tty_out, "\n"); if (ps >= 2 && !echo && !echo_console(ui)) ok = 0; if (ps >= 1) popsig(); #else ok = 1; #endif OPENSSL_cleanse(result, BUFSIZ); return ok; } /* Internal functions to open, handle and close a channel to the console. */ static int open_console(UI *ui) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_UI); is_a_tty = 1; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS) tty_in = stdin; tty_out = stderr; #else # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # define DEV_TTY "con" # else # define DEV_TTY "/dev/tty" # endif if ((tty_in = fopen(DEV_TTY, "r")) == NULL) tty_in = stdin; if ((tty_out = fopen(DEV_TTY, "w")) == NULL) tty_out = stderr; #endif #if defined(TTY_get) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (TTY_get(fileno(tty_in), &tty_orig) == -1) { # ifdef ENOTTY if (errno == ENOTTY) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef EINVAL /* * Ariel Glenn ariel@columbia.edu reports that solaris can return * EINVAL instead. This should be ok */ if (errno == EINVAL) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif +# ifdef ENXIO + /* + * Solaris can return ENXIO. + * This should be ok + */ + if (errno == ENXIO) + is_a_tty = 0; + else +# endif +# ifdef EIO + /* + * Linux can return EIO. + * This should be ok + */ + if (errno == EIO) + is_a_tty = 0; + else +# endif # ifdef ENODEV /* * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device), * which seems appropriate. */ if (errno == ENODEV) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif return 0; } #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS status = sys$assign(&terminal, &channel, 0, 0); /* if there isn't a TT device, something is very wrong */ if (status != SS$_NORMAL) return 0; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SENSEMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_orig, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); /* If IO$_SENSEMODE doesn't work, this is not a terminal device */ if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) is_a_tty = 0; #endif return 1; } static int noecho_console(UI *ui) { #ifdef TTY_FLAGS memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig)); tty_new.TTY_FLAGS &= ~ECHO; #endif #if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1)) return 0; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (is_a_tty) { tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0]; tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] | TT$M_NOECHO; tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2]; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) return 0; } #endif return 1; } static int echo_console(UI *ui) { #if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig)); if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1)) return 0; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (is_a_tty) { tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0]; tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1]; tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2]; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) return 0; } #endif return 1; } static int close_console(UI *ui) { if (tty_in != stdin) fclose(tty_in); if (tty_out != stderr) fclose(tty_out); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS status = sys$dassgn(channel); if (status != SS$_NORMAL) return 0; #endif CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_UI); return 1; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) /* Internal functions to handle signals and act on them */ static void pushsig(void) { # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 int i; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION struct sigaction sa; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sa_handler = recsig; # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 savsig[SIGABRT] = signal(SIGABRT, recsig); savsig[SIGFPE] = signal(SIGFPE, recsig); savsig[SIGILL] = signal(SIGILL, recsig); savsig[SIGINT] = signal(SIGINT, recsig); savsig[SIGSEGV] = signal(SIGSEGV, recsig); savsig[SIGTERM] = signal(SIGTERM, recsig); # else for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) { # ifdef SIGUSR1 if (i == SIGUSR1) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGUSR2 if (i == SIGUSR2) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGKILL if (i == SIGKILL) /* We can't make any action on that. */ continue; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION sigaction(i, &sa, &savsig[i]); # else savsig[i] = signal(i, recsig); # endif } # endif # ifdef SIGWINCH signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); # endif } static void popsig(void) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 signal(SIGABRT, savsig[SIGABRT]); signal(SIGFPE, savsig[SIGFPE]); signal(SIGILL, savsig[SIGILL]); signal(SIGINT, savsig[SIGINT]); signal(SIGSEGV, savsig[SIGSEGV]); signal(SIGTERM, savsig[SIGTERM]); # else int i; for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) { # ifdef SIGUSR1 if (i == SIGUSR1) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGUSR2 if (i == SIGUSR2) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION sigaction(i, &savsig[i], NULL); # else signal(i, savsig[i]); # endif } # endif } static void recsig(int i) { intr_signal = i; } #endif /* Internal functions specific for Windows */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty) { int i; char *p; p = buf; for (;;) { if (size == 0) { *p = '\0'; break; } size--; # ifdef WIN16TTY i = _inchar(); # elif defined(_WIN32) i = _getch(); # else i = getch(); # endif if (i == '\r') i = '\n'; *(p++) = i; if (i == '\n') { *p = '\0'; break; } } # ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG /* * Win95 has several evil console bugs: one of these is that the last * character read using getch() is passed to the next read: this is * usually a CR so this can be trouble. No STDIO fix seems to work but * flushing the console appears to do the trick. */ { HANDLE inh; inh = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); FlushConsoleInputBuffer(inh); } # endif return (strlen(buf)); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/by_dir.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/by_dir.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/by_dir.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,441 +1,441 @@ /* crypto/x509/by_dir.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # include #endif #include #include typedef struct lookup_dir_hashes_st { unsigned long hash; int suffix; } BY_DIR_HASH; typedef struct lookup_dir_entry_st { char *dir; int dir_type; STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH) *hashes; } BY_DIR_ENTRY; typedef struct lookup_dir_st { BUF_MEM *buffer; STACK_OF(BY_DIR_ENTRY) *dirs; } BY_DIR; DECLARE_STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH) DECLARE_STACK_OF(BY_DIR_ENTRY) static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl, char **ret); static int new_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu); static void free_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu); static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type); static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret); X509_LOOKUP_METHOD x509_dir_lookup = { "Load certs from files in a directory", new_dir, /* new */ free_dir, /* free */ NULL, /* init */ NULL, /* shutdown */ dir_ctrl, /* ctrl */ get_cert_by_subject, /* get_by_subject */ NULL, /* get_by_issuer_serial */ NULL, /* get_by_fingerprint */ NULL, /* get_by_alias */ }; X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(void) { return (&x509_dir_lookup); } static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl, char **retp) { int ret = 0; BY_DIR *ld; char *dir = NULL; ld = (BY_DIR *)ctx->method_data; switch (cmd) { case X509_L_ADD_DIR: if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) { - dir = (char *)getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env()); + dir = (char *)ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env()); if (dir) ret = add_cert_dir(ld, dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); else ret = add_cert_dir(ld, X509_get_default_cert_dir(), X509_FILETYPE_PEM); if (!ret) { X509err(X509_F_DIR_CTRL, X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR); } } else ret = add_cert_dir(ld, argp, (int)argl); break; } return (ret); } static int new_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu) { BY_DIR *a; if ((a = (BY_DIR *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BY_DIR))) == NULL) return (0); if ((a->buffer = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(a); return (0); } a->dirs = NULL; lu->method_data = (char *)a; return (1); } static void by_dir_hash_free(BY_DIR_HASH *hash) { OPENSSL_free(hash); } static int by_dir_hash_cmp(const BY_DIR_HASH *const *a, const BY_DIR_HASH *const *b) { if ((*a)->hash > (*b)->hash) return 1; if ((*a)->hash < (*b)->hash) return -1; return 0; } static void by_dir_entry_free(BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent) { if (ent->dir) OPENSSL_free(ent->dir); if (ent->hashes) sk_BY_DIR_HASH_pop_free(ent->hashes, by_dir_hash_free); OPENSSL_free(ent); } static void free_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu) { BY_DIR *a; a = (BY_DIR *)lu->method_data; if (a->dirs != NULL) sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_pop_free(a->dirs, by_dir_entry_free); if (a->buffer != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(a->buffer); OPENSSL_free(a); } static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type) { int j, len; const char *s, *ss, *p; if (dir == NULL || !*dir) { X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY); return 0; } s = dir; p = s; do { if ((*p == LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR) || (*p == '\0')) { BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent; ss = s; s = p + 1; len = (int)(p - ss); if (len == 0) continue; for (j = 0; j < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); j++) { ent = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_value(ctx->dirs, j); if (strlen(ent->dir) == (size_t)len && strncmp(ent->dir, ss, (unsigned int)len) == 0) break; } if (j < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs)) continue; if (ctx->dirs == NULL) { ctx->dirs = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_new_null(); if (!ctx->dirs) { X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } ent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BY_DIR_ENTRY)); if (!ent) return 0; ent->dir_type = type; ent->hashes = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_new(by_dir_hash_cmp); ent->dir = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)len + 1); if (!ent->dir || !ent->hashes) { by_dir_entry_free(ent); return 0; } strncpy(ent->dir, ss, (unsigned int)len); ent->dir[len] = '\0'; if (!sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_push(ctx->dirs, ent)) { by_dir_entry_free(ent); return 0; } } } while (*p++ != '\0'); return 1; } static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret) { BY_DIR *ctx; union { struct { X509 st_x509; X509_CINF st_x509_cinf; } x509; struct { X509_CRL st_crl; X509_CRL_INFO st_crl_info; } crl; } data; int ok = 0; int i, j, k; unsigned long h; BUF_MEM *b = NULL; X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp; const char *postfix = ""; if (name == NULL) return (0); stmp.type = type; if (type == X509_LU_X509) { data.x509.st_x509.cert_info = &data.x509.st_x509_cinf; data.x509.st_x509_cinf.subject = name; stmp.data.x509 = &data.x509.st_x509; postfix = ""; } else if (type == X509_LU_CRL) { data.crl.st_crl.crl = &data.crl.st_crl_info; data.crl.st_crl_info.issuer = name; stmp.data.crl = &data.crl.st_crl; postfix = "r"; } else { X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE); goto finish; } if ((b = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto finish; } ctx = (BY_DIR *)xl->method_data; h = X509_NAME_hash(name); for (i = 0; i < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); i++) { BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent; int idx; BY_DIR_HASH htmp, *hent; ent = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_value(ctx->dirs, i); j = strlen(ent->dir) + 1 + 8 + 6 + 1 + 1; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, j)) { X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto finish; } if (type == X509_LU_CRL && ent->hashes) { htmp.hash = h; CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); idx = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find(ent->hashes, &htmp); if (idx >= 0) { hent = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_value(ent->hashes, idx); k = hent->suffix; } else { hent = NULL; k = 0; } CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); } else { k = 0; hent = NULL; } for (;;) { char c = '/'; #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS c = ent->dir[strlen(ent->dir) - 1]; if (c != ':' && c != '>' && c != ']') { /* * If no separator is present, we assume the directory * specifier is a logical name, and add a colon. We really * should use better VMS routines for merging things like * this, but this will do for now... -- Richard Levitte */ c = ':'; } else { c = '\0'; } #endif if (c == '\0') { /* * This is special. When c == '\0', no directory separator * should be added. */ BIO_snprintf(b->data, b->max, "%s%08lx.%s%d", ent->dir, h, postfix, k); } else { BIO_snprintf(b->data, b->max, "%s%c%08lx.%s%d", ent->dir, c, h, postfix, k); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # ifdef _WIN32 # define stat _stat # endif { struct stat st; if (stat(b->data, &st) < 0) break; } #endif /* found one. */ if (type == X509_LU_X509) { if ((X509_load_cert_file(xl, b->data, ent->dir_type)) == 0) break; } else if (type == X509_LU_CRL) { if ((X509_load_crl_file(xl, b->data, ent->dir_type)) == 0) break; } /* else case will caught higher up */ k++; } /* * we have added it to the cache so now pull it out again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); j = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(xl->store_ctx->objs, &stmp); if (j != -1) tmp = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(xl->store_ctx->objs, j); else tmp = NULL; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); /* If a CRL, update the last file suffix added for this */ if (type == X509_LU_CRL) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); /* * Look for entry again in case another thread added an entry * first. */ if (!hent) { htmp.hash = h; idx = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find(ent->hashes, &htmp); if (idx >= 0) hent = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_value(ent->hashes, idx); } if (!hent) { hent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BY_DIR_HASH)); if (hent == NULL) { CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto finish; } hent->hash = h; hent->suffix = k; if (!sk_BY_DIR_HASH_push(ent->hashes, hent)) { CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); OPENSSL_free(hent); ok = 0; goto finish; } } else if (hent->suffix < k) hent->suffix = k; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); } if (tmp != NULL) { ok = 1; ret->type = tmp->type; memcpy(&ret->data, &tmp->data, sizeof(ret->data)); /* * If we were going to up the reference count, we would need to * do it on a perl 'type' basis */ /*- CRYPTO_add(&tmp->data.x509->references,1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/ goto finish; } } finish: if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b); return (ok); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/by_file.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/by_file.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/by_file.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,277 +1,278 @@ /* crypto/x509/by_file.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl, char **ret); X509_LOOKUP_METHOD x509_file_lookup = { "Load file into cache", NULL, /* new */ NULL, /* free */ NULL, /* init */ NULL, /* shutdown */ by_file_ctrl, /* ctrl */ NULL, /* get_by_subject */ NULL, /* get_by_issuer_serial */ NULL, /* get_by_fingerprint */ NULL, /* get_by_alias */ }; X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_file(void) { return (&x509_file_lookup); } static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl, char **ret) { int ok = 0; const char *file; switch (cmd) { case X509_L_FILE_LOAD: if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) { - file = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env()); + file = ossl_safe_getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env()); + if (file) ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0); else ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file (ctx, X509_get_default_cert_file(), X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0); if (!ok) { X509err(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL, X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS); } } else { if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, argp, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0); else ok = (X509_load_cert_file(ctx, argp, (int)argl) != 0); } break; } return (ok); } int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type) { int ret = 0; BIO *in = NULL; int i, count = 0; X509 *x = NULL; if (file == NULL) return (1); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal()); if ((in == NULL) || (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto err; } if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) { for (;;) { x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, ""); if (x == NULL) { if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) { ERR_clear_error(); break; } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB); goto err; } } i = X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, x); if (!i) goto err; count++; X509_free(x); x = NULL; } ret = count; } else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1) { x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL); if (x == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } i = X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, x); if (!i) goto err; ret = i; } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE); goto err; } err: if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type) { int ret = 0; BIO *in = NULL; int i, count = 0; X509_CRL *x = NULL; if (file == NULL) return (1); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal()); if ((in == NULL) || (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto err; } if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) { for (;;) { x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, ""); if (x == NULL) { if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) { ERR_clear_error(); break; } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB); goto err; } } i = X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, x); if (!i) goto err; count++; X509_CRL_free(x); x = NULL; } ret = count; } else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1) { x = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL); if (x == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } i = X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, x); if (!i) goto err; ret = i; } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE); goto err; } err: if (x != NULL) X509_CRL_free(x); if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type) { STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf; X509_INFO *itmp; BIO *in; int i, count = 0; if (type != X509_FILETYPE_PEM) return X509_load_cert_file(ctx, file, type); in = BIO_new_file(file, "r"); if (!in) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); return 0; } inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, ""); BIO_free(in); if (!inf) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); i++) { itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i); if (itmp->x509) { X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->x509); count++; } if (itmp->crl) { X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->crl); count++; } } sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free); return count; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,2578 +1,2577 @@ /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "vpm_int.h" /* CRL score values */ /* No unhandled critical extensions */ #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* CRL times valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons); static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) { return ok; } #if 0 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) { return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); } #endif /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) { X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) return 1; else return 0; } /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs; X509 *xtmp = NULL; int i; /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); if (certs == NULL) return NULL; /* Look for exact match */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) break; } if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); else xtmp = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); return xtmp; } int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; int bad_chain = 0; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; int depth, i, ok = 0; int num, j, retry; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; int err; if (ctx->cert == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } if (ctx->chain != NULL) { /* * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We * cannot do another one. */ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that * the first entry is in place */ if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); ctx->last_untrusted = 1; /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); depth = param->depth; for (;;) { /* If we have enough, we break */ if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take * note of it and, if appropriate, use the * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code * later. */ /* If we are self signed, we break */ if (cert_self_signed(x)) break; /* * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; goto err; } /* * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up * again later. */ if (ok > 0) { X509_free(xtmp); break; } } /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); if (xtmp != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); ctx->last_untrusted++; x = xtmp; num++; /* * reparse the full chain for the next one */ continue; } } break; } /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ j = num; /* * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we * complain. */ do { /* * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. */ i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); if (cert_self_signed(x)) { /* we have a self signed certificate */ if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { /* * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid * possible impersonation. */ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->error_depth = i - 1; if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); bad_chain = 1; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } else { /* * We have a match: replace certificate with store * version so we get any trust settings. */ X509_free(x); x = xtmp; (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); ctx->last_untrusted = 0; } } else { /* * extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); ctx->last_untrusted--; num--; j--; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); } } /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ for (;;) { /* If we have enough, we break */ if (depth < num) break; /* If we are self signed, we break */ if (cert_self_signed(x)) break; ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; goto err; } if (ok == 0) break; x = xtmp; if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } num++; } /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { /* Callback already issued */ ok = 0; goto err; } /* * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate * chain checking */ retry = 0; if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { while (j-- > 1) { xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); if (ok < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; goto err; } /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ if (ok > 0) { /* * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later */ X509_free(xtmp); /* * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an * alternate chain */ while (num > j) { xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); X509_free(xtmp); num--; } ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); retry = 1; break; } } } } while (retry); /* * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already * and set bad_chain == 1 */ if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; else ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; ctx->current_cert = x; } else { sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); num++; ctx->last_untrusted = num; ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; chain_ss = NULL; } ctx->error_depth = num - 1; bad_chain = 1; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; /* Check name constraints */ ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; ok = check_id(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); /* * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. */ ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, ctx->param->flags); if (err != X509_V_OK) { ctx->error = err; ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ if (ctx->verify != NULL) ok = ctx->verify(ctx); else ok = internal_verify(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; #endif /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; if (0) { err: /* Ensure we return an error */ if (ok > 0) ok = 0; X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); } if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */ if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return ok; } /* * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) */ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) { int i; X509 *issuer; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) return issuer; } return NULL; } /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) { int ret; ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); if (ret == X509_V_OK) return 1; /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) return 0; ctx->error = ret; ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->current_issuer = issuer; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); if (*issuer) { CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); return 1; } else return 0; } /* * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied * purpose */ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY return 1; #else int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; X509 *x; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); int proxy_path_length = 0; int purpose; int allow_proxy_certs; cb = ctx->verify_cb; /*- * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. */ must_be_ca = -1; /* CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) { allow_proxy_certs = 0; purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; } else { allow_proxy_certs = ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); /* * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software * happy */ - if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) + if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) allow_proxy_certs = 1; purpose = ctx->param->purpose; } /* Check all untrusted certificates */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { int ret; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } ret = X509_check_ca(x); switch (must_be_ca) { case -1: if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; case 0: if (ret != 0) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; } else ret = 1; break; default: if ((ret == 0) || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1))) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; } if (ret == 0) { ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); if ((ret == 0) || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1))) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } } - /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ - if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) - && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) - && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { + /* Check pathlen */ + if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) + && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } - /* Increment path length if not self issued */ - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) + /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */ + if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0) plen++; /* * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { /* * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. * * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, * increment proxy_path_length. */ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; } proxy_path_length++; must_be_ca = 0; } else must_be_ca = 1; } ok = 1; end: return ok; #endif } static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *x; int i, j, rv; /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) continue; /* * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry * added. * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; int last_object_nid = 0; int err = X509_V_OK; int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ if (last_object_loc < 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as * there is in issuer. */ if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a * multivalued RDN */ if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly */ tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); if (tmpsubject == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc); last_object_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; } X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); proxy_name_done: if (err != X509_V_OK) { ctx->error = err; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } } /* * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them * to be obeyed. */ for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; if (nc) { rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); switch (rv) { case X509_V_OK: continue; case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: ctx->error = rv; return 0; default: ctx->error = rv; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; break; } } } } return 1; } static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) { ctx->error = errcode; ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; ctx->error_depth = 0; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) { int i; int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); char *name; if (id->peername != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(id->peername); id->peername = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0) return 1; } return n == 0; } static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; X509 *x = ctx->cert; if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i, ok; X509 *x = NULL; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; /* * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not * overridden. */ if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; } } /* * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate * return success. */ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { X509 *mx; if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); if (mx) { (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); X509_free(x); ctx->last_untrusted = 0; return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; } } /* * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. */ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i, last, ok; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) return 1; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; else { /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ if (ctx->parent) return 1; last = 0; } for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { ctx->error_depth = i; ok = check_cert(ctx); if (!ok) return ok; } return 1; } static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; X509 *x; int ok, cnum; unsigned int last_reasons; cnum = ctx->error_depth; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) return 1; while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ if (ctx->get_crl) ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); else ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); /* * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */ if (!ok) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); goto err; } ctx->current_crl = crl; ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); if (!ok) goto err; if (dcrl) { ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); if (!ok) goto err; ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); if (!ok) goto err; } else ok = 1; /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ if (ok != 2) { ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); if (!ok) goto err; } X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); crl = NULL; dcrl = NULL; /* * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, * so exit loop. */ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); goto err; } } err: X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); ctx->current_crl = NULL; return ok; } /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (notify) ctx->current_crl = crl; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } if (i > 0) { if (!notify) return 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { if (!notify) return 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } } if (notify) ctx->current_crl = NULL; return 1; } static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); reasons = *preasons; crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) continue; /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { int day, sec; if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl), X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) continue; /* * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| * and |sec|. */ if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) continue; } best_crl = crl; best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; best_score = crl_score; best_reasons = reasons; } if (best_crl) { if (*pcrl) X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); *pcrl = best_crl; *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; *pscore = best_score; *preasons = best_reasons; CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); if (*pdcrl) { X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); *pdcrl = NULL; } get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); } if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) return 1; return 0; } /* * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. */ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; int i; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) return 0; exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); } else exta = NULL; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) return 0; extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); } else extb = NULL; if (!exta && !extb) return 1; if (!exta || !extb) return 0; if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) return 0; return 1; } /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) { /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ if (!delta->base_crl_number) return 0; /* Base must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number) return 0; /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) return 0; /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) return 0; if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) return 0; /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 0; /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or * retrieve a chain of deltas... */ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { X509_CRL *delta; int i; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) return; if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); *dcrl = delta; return; } } *dcrl = NULL; } /* * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. */ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { int crl_score = 0; unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) return 0; /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) return 0; } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; } /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ else if (crl->base_crl_number) return 0; /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) return 0; } else crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; /* Check expiry */ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) return 0; /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; } *preasons = tmp_reasons; return crl_score; } static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) { X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); int cidx = ctx->error_depth; int i; if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) cidx++; crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) return; /* * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of * untrusted certificates. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pissuer = crl_issuer; *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; return; } } } /* * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. */ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; int ret; /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) return 0; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) return -1; crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; /* Copy verify params across */ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); crl_ctx.parent = ctx; crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* Verify CRL issuer */ ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); if (ret <= 0) goto err; /* Check chain is acceptable */ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); err: X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); return ret; } /* * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the * RFC5280 version */ static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) { X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) return 1; return 0; } /*- * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. */ static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) { X509_NAME *nm = NULL; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; int i, j; if (!a || !b) return 1; if (a->type == 1) { if (!a->dpname) return 0; /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) return 1; else return 0; } /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ nm = a->dpname; gens = b->name.fullname; } else if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ gens = a->name.fullname; nm = b->dpname; } /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ if (nm) { for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) return 1; } } return 0; } static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) { int i; X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ if (!dp->CRLissuer) return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons) { int i; if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) return 0; } else { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) return 0; } *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; return 1; } } } if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) return 1; return 0; } /* * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try * to find a delta CRL too */ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) { int ok; X509 *issuer = NULL; int crl_score = 0; unsigned int reasons; X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); reasons = ctx->current_reasons; ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); if (ok) goto done; /* Lookup CRLs from store */ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ if (!skcrl && crl) goto done; get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); done: /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ if (crl) { ctx->current_issuer = issuer; ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; ctx->current_reasons = reasons; *pcrl = crl; *pdcrl = dcrl; return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRL validity */ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) { X509 *issuer = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; cnum = ctx->error_depth; chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ if (ctx->current_issuer) issuer = ctx->current_issuer; /* * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next * certificate in chain. */ else if (cnum < chnum) issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); else { issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } } if (issuer) { /* * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done */ if (!crl->base_crl_number) { /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } } if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } } if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); if (!ok) goto err; } /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); if (!ikey) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } else { int rv; rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { ctx->error = rv; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } /* Verify CRL signature */ if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } } } ok = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); return ok; } /* Check certificate against CRL */ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { int ok; X509_REVOKED *rev; /* * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can * change the meaning of CRL entries. */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) return 0; } /* * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason * is not removeFromCRL. */ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) return 2; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (ctx->parent) return 1; ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); if (ret == 0) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ if (ret == -1) { /* * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ X509 *x; int i; for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) continue; ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } if (ret == -2) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; /* * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. */ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); if (i == 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } if (i > 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); if (i == 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } if (i < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int ok = 0, n; X509 *xs, *xi; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); cb = ctx->verify_cb; n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); ctx->error_depth = n - 1; n--; xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) xs = xi; else { if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { xs = xi; goto check_cert; } if (n <= 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; ctx->current_cert = xi; ok = cb(0, ctx); goto end; } else { n--; ctx->error_depth = n; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } } /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ while (n >= 0) { ctx->error_depth = n; /* * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes * time. */ if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; ctx->current_cert = xi; ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; ctx->current_cert = xs; ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); if (!ok) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); goto end; } } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); pkey = NULL; } xs->valid = 1; check_cert: ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); if (!ok) goto end; /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ ctx->current_issuer = xi; ctx->current_cert = xs; ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; n--; if (n >= 0) { xi = xs; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } } ok = 1; end: return ok; } int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) { return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); } int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) { static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; int i, day, sec, ret = 0; /* * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ * * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." */ switch (ctm->type) { case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) return 0; break; case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) return 0; break; default: return 0; } /** * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. */ for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i])) return 0; } if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z') return 0; /* * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, * so we go through ASN.1 */ asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time)) goto err; /* * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. */ ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; err: ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); return ret; } ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) { return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { time_t t; if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; else time(&t); if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; int i, j; if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) break; else { EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); ktmp = NULL; } } if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); return 0; } /* first, populate the other certs */ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); } if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); return 1; } /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL; int i; STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; /* CRLs can't be delta already */ if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); return NULL; } /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); return NULL; } /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); return NULL; } if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); return NULL; } /* CRLs must verify */ if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* Create new CRL */ crl = X509_CRL_new(); if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) goto memerr; /* Set issuer name */ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) goto memerr; /* * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL * number to correct value too. */ for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { X509_EXTENSION *ext; ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) goto memerr; } /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); /* * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. */ if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) { rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); if (!rvtmp) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); goto memerr; } } } /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) goto memerr; return crl; memerr: X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if (crl) X509_CRL_free(crl); return NULL; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { /* * This function is (usually) called only once, by * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); } void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) { ctx->error = err; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error_depth; } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_cert; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->chain; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx->chain) return NULL; return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_issuer; } X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->parent; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->cert = x; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->untrusted = sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) { ctx->crls = sk; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) { return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) { return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); } /* * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL * client/server. */ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, int purpose, int trust) { int idx; /* If purpose not set use default */ if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ if (purpose) { X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); } /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; } if (trust) { idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); return 0; } } if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; return 1; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) { X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); if (!ctx) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); return ctx; } void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) return; X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int ret = 1; ctx->ctx = store; ctx->current_method = 0; ctx->cert = x509; ctx->untrusted = chain; ctx->crls = NULL; ctx->last_untrusted = 0; ctx->other_ctx = NULL; ctx->valid = 0; ctx->chain = NULL; ctx->error = 0; ctx->explicit_policy = 0; ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; ctx->tree = NULL; ctx->parent = NULL; /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!ctx->param) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */ if (store) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); else ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; if (store) { ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */ ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; } else ctx->cleanup = 0; if (ret) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); if (ret == 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (store && store->check_issued) ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; else ctx->check_issued = check_issued; if (store && store->get_issuer) ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; else ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; if (store && store->verify_cb) ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; else ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; if (store && store->verify) ctx->verify = store->verify; else ctx->verify = internal_verify; if (store && store->check_revocation) ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; else ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; if (store && store->get_crl) ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; else ctx->get_crl = NULL; if (store && store->check_crl) ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; else ctx->check_crl = check_crl; if (store && store->cert_crl) ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; else ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; if (store && store->lookup_certs) ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; else ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; if (store && store->lookup_crls) ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; else ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; ctx->check_policy = check_policy; if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &ctx->ex_data)) return 1; X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: /* * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. */ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return 0; } /* * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. */ void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->other_ctx = sk; ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { /* * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the * pointers below after they're freed! */ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { ctx->cleanup(ctx); ctx->cleanup = NULL; } if (ctx->param != NULL) { if (ctx->parent == NULL) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = NULL; } if (ctx->tree != NULL) { X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); ctx->tree = NULL; } if (ctx->chain != NULL) { sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); ctx->chain = NULL; } CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; } X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->tree; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->explicit_policy; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) { const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); if (!param) return 0; return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { if (ctx->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = param; } IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c (revision 340692) @@ -1,858 +1,854 @@ /* v3_purp.c */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2001. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b); static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", NULL}, }; #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) { return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; } /* * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const * things. */ int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) { int idx; const X509_PURPOSE *pt; x509v3_cache_extensions(x); /* Return if side-effect only call */ if (id == -1) return 1; idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); if (idx == -1) return -1; pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); } int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) { if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); return 0; } *p = purpose; return 1; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) { if (!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; } X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) { if (idx < 0) return NULL; if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx; return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); } int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) { int i; X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i; } return -1; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) { X509_PURPOSE tmp; int idx; if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; tmp.purpose = purpose; if (!xptable) return -1; idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); if (idx == -1) return -1; return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; } int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), char *name, char *sname, void *arg) { int idx; X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; /* * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */ flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; /* Get existing entry if any */ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); /* Need a new entry */ if (idx == -1) { if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; } else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); } /* dup supplied name */ ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name); ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname); if (!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; /* Set all other flags */ ptmp->flags |= flags; ptmp->purpose = id; ptmp->trust = trust; ptmp->check_purpose = ck; ptmp->usr_data = arg; /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ if (idx == -1) { if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } return 1; } static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) { if (!p) return; if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { OPENSSL_free(p->name); OPENSSL_free(p->sname); } OPENSSL_free(p); } } void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) { unsigned int i; sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i); xptable = NULL; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->purpose; } char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->name; } char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->sname; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->trust; } static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b) { return *a - *b; } DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) { /* * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical * order because it will be searched using bsearch. */ static const int supported_nids[] = { NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ NID_crl_distribution_points, /* 103 */ NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */ NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */ #endif NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ }; int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); if (ex_nid == NID_undef) return 0; if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int))) return 1; return 0; } static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) { X509_NAME *iname = NULL; int i; if (dp->reasons) { if (dp->reasons->length > 0) dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; if (dp->reasons->length > 1) dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; } else dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { iname = gen->d.directoryName; break; } } if (!iname) iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); } static void setup_crldp(X509 *x) { int i; x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); } #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) { BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; X509_EXTENSION *ex; - int i; - - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) - return; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); return; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); #endif /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ if (!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; /* Handle basic constraints */ if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { if (bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; if (bs->pathlen) { if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || !bs->ca) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; x->ex_pathlen = 0; } else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); } else x->ex_pathlen = -1; BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; } /* Handle proxy certificates */ if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; } if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); } else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; } /* Handle key usage */ if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { if (usage->length > 0) { x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; if (usage->length > 1) x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; } else x->ex_kusage = 0; x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); } x->ex_xkusage = 0; if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { case NID_server_auth: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; break; case NID_client_auth: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; break; case NID_email_protect: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; break; case NID_code_sign: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; break; case NID_ms_sgc: case NID_ns_sgc: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; break; case NID_OCSP_sign: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; break; case NID_time_stamp: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; break; case NID_dvcs: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; break; case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; break; } } sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); } if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { if (ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; else x->ex_nscert = 0; x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); } x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */ if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; } x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); if (!x->nc && (i != -1)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; setup_crldp(x); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL); x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, NULL, NULL); #endif for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) { ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) == NID_freshest_crl) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) continue; if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; break; } } x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); } /*- * CA checks common to all purposes * return codes: * 0 not a CA * 1 is a CA * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. */ static int check_ca(const X509 *x) { /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1; /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ else return 0; } else { /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3; /* * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */ else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4; /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5; /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ return 0; } } int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) { x509v3_cache_extensions(x); return check_ca(x); } /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) { int ca_ret; ca_ret = check_ca(x); if (!ca_ret) return 0; /* check nsCertType if present */ if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret; else return 0; } static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; if (ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) return 0; /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; return 1; } /* * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual * key types. */ #define KU_TLS \ KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) return 0; if (ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0; if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) return 0; return 1; } static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int ret; ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); if (!ret || ca) return ret; /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; return ret; } /* common S/MIME checks */ static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) return 0; if (ca) { int ca_ret; ca_ret = check_ca(x); if (!ca_ret) return 0; /* check nsCertType if present */ if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret; else return 0; } if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1; /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2; return 0; } return 1; } static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int ret; ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); if (!ret || ca) return ret; if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0; return ret; } static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int ret; ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); if (!ret || ca) return ret; if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; return ret; } static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { if (ca) { int ca_ret; if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret; else return 0; } if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0; return 1; } /* * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. */ static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { /* * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value * (2)? */ if (ca) return check_ca(x); /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ return 1; } static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int i_ext; /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ if (ca) return check_ca(x); /* * Check the optional key usage field: * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall * be rejected). */ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) return 0; /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) return 0; /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); if (i_ext >= 0) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) return 0; } return 1; } static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { return 1; } /*- * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by * subject name. * These are: * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match * codes for X509_verify_cert() */ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) { if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); if (subject->akid) { int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); if (ret != X509_V_OK) return ret; } if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; return X509_V_OK; } int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) { if (!akid) return X509_V_OK; /* Check key ids (if present) */ if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; /* Check serial number */ if (akid->serial && ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; /* Check issuer name */ if (akid->issuer) { /* * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but * we only take any notice of the first. */ GENERAL_NAMES *gens; GENERAL_NAME *gen; X509_NAME *nm = NULL; int i; gens = akid->issuer; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { nm = gen->d.dirn; break; } } if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; } return X509_V_OK; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/crl.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/crl.pod (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/crl.pod (revision 340692) @@ -1,129 +1,129 @@ =pod =head1 NAME openssl-crl, crl - CRL utility =head1 SYNOPSIS B B [B<-inform PEM|DER>] [B<-outform PEM|DER>] [B<-text>] [B<-in filename>] [B<-out filename>] [B<-nameopt option>] [B<-noout>] [B<-hash>] [B<-issuer>] [B<-lastupdate>] [B<-nextupdate>] [B<-CAfile file>] [B<-CApath dir>] =head1 DESCRIPTION The B command processes CRL files in DER or PEM format. =head1 COMMAND OPTIONS =over 4 =item B<-inform DER|PEM> This specifies the input format. B format is DER encoded CRL structure. B (the default) is a base64 encoded version of the DER form with header and footer lines. =item B<-outform DER|PEM> This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the B<-inform> option. =item B<-in filename> This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this option is not specified. =item B<-out filename> specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by default. =item B<-text> print out the CRL in text form. =item B<-nameopt option> option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. See the description of B<-nameopt> in L. =item B<-noout> don't output the encoded version of the CRL. =item B<-hash> output a hash of the issuer name. This can be use to lookup CRLs in a directory by issuer name. =item B<-hash_old> outputs the "hash" of the CRL issuer name using the older algorithm as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0. =item B<-issuer> output the issuer name. =item B<-lastupdate> output the lastUpdate field. =item B<-nextupdate> output the nextUpdate field. =item B<-CAfile file> verify the signature on a CRL by looking up the issuing certificate in B =item B<-CApath dir> verify the signature on a CRL by looking up the issuing certificate in B. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that is a hash of each subject name (using B) should be linked to each certificate. =back =head1 NOTES The PEM CRL format uses the header and footer lines: -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- -----END X509 CRL----- =head1 EXAMPLES Convert a CRL file from PEM to DER: openssl crl -in crl.pem -outform DER -out crl.der Output the text form of a DER encoded certificate: - openssl crl -in crl.der -text -noout + openssl crl -in crl.der -inform DER -text -noout =head1 BUGS Ideally it should be possible to create a CRL using appropriate options and files too. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/req.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/req.pod (revision 340691) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/req.pod (revision 340692) @@ -1,684 +1,683 @@ =pod =head1 NAME openssl-req, req - PKCS#10 certificate request and certificate generating utility. =head1 SYNOPSIS B B [B<-inform PEM|DER>] [B<-outform PEM|DER>] [B<-in filename>] [B<-passin arg>] [B<-out filename>] [B<-passout arg>] [B<-text>] [B<-pubkey>] [B<-noout>] [B<-verify>] [B<-modulus>] [B<-new>] [B<-rand file(s)>] [B<-newkey rsa:bits>] [B<-newkey alg:file>] [B<-nodes>] [B<-key filename>] [B<-keyform PEM|DER>] [B<-keyout filename>] [B<-keygen_engine id>] [B<-[digest]>] [B<-config filename>] [B<-multivalue-rdn>] [B<-x509>] [B<-days n>] [B<-set_serial n>] [B<-asn1-kludge>] [B<-no-asn1-kludge>] [B<-newhdr>] [B<-extensions section>] [B<-reqexts section>] [B<-utf8>] [B<-nameopt>] [B<-reqopt>] [B<-subject>] [B<-subj arg>] [B<-batch>] [B<-verbose>] [B<-engine id>] =head1 DESCRIPTION The B command primarily creates and processes certificate requests in PKCS#10 format. It can additionally create self signed certificates for use as root CAs for example. =head1 COMMAND OPTIONS =over 4 =item B<-inform DER|PEM> This specifies the input format. The B option uses an ASN1 DER encoded form compatible with the PKCS#10. The B form is the default format: it consists of the B format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines. =item B<-outform DER|PEM> This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the B<-inform> option. =item B<-in filename> This specifies the input filename to read a request from or standard input if this option is not specified. A request is only read if the creation options (B<-new> and B<-newkey>) are not specified. =item B<-passin arg> the input file password source. For more information about the format of B see the B section in L. =item B<-out filename> This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by default. =item B<-passout arg> the output file password source. For more information about the format of B see the B section in L. =item B<-text> prints out the certificate request in text form. =item B<-subject> prints out the request subject (or certificate subject if B<-x509> is specified) =item B<-pubkey> outputs the public key. =item B<-noout> this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request. =item B<-modulus> this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key contained in the request. =item B<-verify> verifies the signature on the request. =item B<-new> this option generates a new certificate request. It will prompt the user for the relevant field values. The actual fields prompted for and their maximum and minimum sizes are specified in the configuration file and any requested extensions. If the B<-key> option is not used it will generate a new RSA private key using information specified in the configuration file. =item B<-subj arg> Replaces subject field of input request with specified data and outputs modified request. The arg must be formatted as I, characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped. =item B<-rand file(s)> a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see L). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for all others. =item B<-newkey arg> this option creates a new certificate request and a new private key. The argument takes one of several forms. B, where B is the number of bits, generates an RSA key B in size. If B is omitted, i.e. B<-newkey rsa> specified, the default key size, specified in the configuration file is used. All other algorithms support the B<-newkey alg:file> form, where file may be an algorithm parameter file, created by the B command or and X.509 certificate for a key with approriate algorithm. B generates a key using the parameter file or certificate B, the algorithm is determined by the parameters. B use algorithm B and parameter file B: the two algorithms must match or an error occurs. B just uses algorithm B, and parameters, if neccessary should be specified via B<-pkeyopt> parameter. B generates a DSA key using the parameters in the file B. B generates EC key (usable both with ECDSA or ECDH algorithms), B generates GOST R 34.10-2001 key (requires B engine configured in the configuration file). If just B is specified a parameter set should be specified by B<-pkeyopt paramset:X> =item B<-pkeyopt opt:value> set the public key algorithm option B to B. The precise set of options supported depends on the public key algorithm used and its implementation. See B in the B manual page for more details. =item B<-key filename> This specifies the file to read the private key from. It also accepts PKCS#8 format private keys for PEM format files. =item B<-keyform PEM|DER> the format of the private key file specified in the B<-key> argument. PEM is the default. =item B<-keyout filename> this gives the filename to write the newly created private key to. If this option is not specified then the filename present in the configuration file is used. =item B<-nodes> if this option is specified then if a private key is created it will not be encrypted. =item B<-[digest]> this specifies the message digest to sign the request with (such as B<-md5>, B<-sha1>). This overrides the digest algorithm specified in the configuration file. Some public key algorithms may override this choice. For instance, DSA signatures always use SHA1, GOST R 34.10 signatures always use GOST R 34.11-94 (B<-md_gost94>). =item B<-config filename> this allows an alternative configuration file to be specified, this overrides the compile time filename or any specified in the B environment variable. =item B<-subj arg> sets subject name for new request or supersedes the subject name when processing a request. The arg must be formatted as I, characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped. =item B<-multivalue-rdn> this option causes the -subj argument to be interpreted with full support for multivalued RDNs. Example: I If -multi-rdn is not used then the UID value is I<123456+CN=John Doe>. =item B<-x509> this option outputs a self signed certificate instead of a certificate request. This is typically used to generate a test certificate or a self signed root CA. The extensions added to the certificate (if any) are specified in the configuration file. Unless specified using the B option, a large random number will be used for the serial number. If existing request is specified with the B<-in> option, it is converted to the self signed certificate otherwise new request is created. =item B<-days n> when the B<-x509> option is being used this specifies the number of days to certify the certificate for. The default is 30 days. =item B<-set_serial n> serial number to use when outputting a self signed certificate. This may be specified as a decimal value or a hex value if preceded by B<0x>. It is possible to use negative serial numbers but this is not recommended. =item B<-extensions section> =item B<-reqexts section> these options specify alternative sections to include certificate extensions (if the B<-x509> option is present) or certificate request extensions. This allows several different sections to be used in the same configuration file to specify requests for a variety of purposes. =item B<-utf8> this option causes field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings. =item B<-nameopt option> option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The B