Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/CHANGES =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/CHANGES (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/CHANGES (revision 337764) @@ -1,11551 +1,11609 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ This is a high-level summary of the most important changes. For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example, https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate release branch. + Changes between 1.0.2o and 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018] + + *) Client DoS due to large DH parameter + + During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a + malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will + cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a + key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This + could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken + (CVE-2018-0732) + [Guido Vranken] + + *) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation + + The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to + a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to + mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could + recover the private key. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera + Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia. + (CVE-2018-0737) + [Billy Brumley] + + *) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str + parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL + pem_str is reserved for alias entries only. + [Richard Levitte] + + *) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition + length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication. + [Andy Polyakov] + + *) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not + being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input. + For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin. + The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered + to 2^-128. + [Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar] + + *) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64. + [Kurt Roeckx] + + *) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel + attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group). + [Matt Caswell] + + *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we + now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases. + [Richard Levitte] + + *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter + compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets + are no longer allowed. + [Emilia Käsper] + Changes between 1.0.2n and 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018] *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources so this is considered safe. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz project. (CVE-2018-0739) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2m and 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017] *) Read/write after SSL object in error state OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state" mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer. In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having already received a fatal error. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). (CVE-2017-3737) [Matt Caswell] *) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701. This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions like Intel Haswell (4th generation). This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3738) [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.2l and 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017] *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3736) [Andy Polyakov] *) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension, OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3735) [Rich Salz] Changes between 1.0.2k and 1.0.2l [25 May 2017] *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target platform rather than 'mingw'. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.0.2j and 1.0.2k [26 Jan 2017] *) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google. (CVE-2017-3731) [Andy Polyakov] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3732) [Andy Polyakov] *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected. This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for providing reproducible case. (CVE-2016-7055) [Andy Polyakov] *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0 or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them. [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2i and 1.0.2j [26 Sep 2016] *) Missing CRL sanity check A bug fix which included a CRL sanity check was added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 but was omitted from OpenSSL 1.0.2i. As a result any attempt to use CRLs in OpenSSL 1.0.2i will crash with a null pointer exception. This issue only affects the OpenSSL 1.0.2i (CVE-2016-7052) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.0.2i [22 Sep 2016] *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6304) [Matt Caswell] *) In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack, the DES ciphers were moved from HIGH to MEDIUM. This issue was reported to OpenSSL Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaetan Leurent (INRIA) (CVE-2016-2183) [Rich Salz] *) OOB write in MDC2_Update() An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical on most platforms. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6303) [Stephen Henson] *) Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS If a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a DoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will ultimately crash. The use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires a custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6302) [Stephen Henson] *) OOB write in BN_bn2dec() The function BN_bn2dec() does not check the return value of BN_div_word(). This can cause an OOB write if an application uses this function with an overly large BIGNUM. This could be a problem if an overly large certificate or CRL is printed out from an untrusted source. TLS is not affected because record limits will reject an oversized certificate before it is parsed. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-2182) [Stephen Henson] *) OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() The function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is the total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount of data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are presented. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-2180) [Stephen Henson] *) Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic A common idiom in the codebase is to check limits in the following manner: "p + len > limit" Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and limit == p + SIZE "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS message). The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually undefined behaviour. For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken (CVE-2016-2177) [Matt Caswell] *) Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key. This issue was reported by César Pereida (Aalto University), Billy Brumley (Tampere University of Technology), and Yuval Yarom (The University of Adelaide and NICTA). (CVE-2016-2178) [César Pereida] *) DTLS buffered message DoS In a DTLS connection where handshake messages are delivered out-of-order those messages that OpenSSL is not yet ready to process will be buffered for later use. Under certain circumstances, a flaw in the logic means that those messages do not get removed from the buffer even though the handshake has been completed. An attacker could force up to approx. 15 messages to remain in the buffer when they are no longer required. These messages will be cleared when the DTLS connection is closed. The default maximum size for a message is 100k. Therefore the attacker could force an additional 1500k to be consumed per connection. By opening many simulataneous connections an attacker could cause a DoS attack through memory exhaustion. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Quan Luo. (CVE-2016-2179) [Matt Caswell] *) DTLS replay protection DoS A flaw in the DTLS replay attack protection mechanism means that records that arrive for future epochs update the replay protection "window" before the MAC for the record has been validated. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means that all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service for a specific DTLS connection. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OCAP audit team. (CVE-2016-2181) [Matt Caswell] *) Certificate message OOB reads In OpenSSL 1.0.2 and earlier some missing message length checks can result in OOB reads of up to 2 bytes beyond an allocated buffer. There is a theoretical DoS risk but this has not been observed in practice on common platforms. The messages affected are client certificate, client certificate request and server certificate. As a result the attack can only be performed against a client or a server which enables client authentication. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6306) [Stephen Henson] Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support AES-NI. This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding bytes. This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker. (CVE-2016-2107) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2105) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2106) [Matt Caswell] *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio() a short invalid encoding can casuse allocation of large amounts of memory potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory. Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected. Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS applications are not affected. This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2016-2109) [Stephen Henson] *) EBCDIC overread ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2176) [Matt Caswell] *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. [Todd Short] *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the default. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL. [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL. Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers. [Viktor Dukhovni] * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either of: SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); or SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available. (CVE-2016-0800) [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Fix a double-free in DSA code A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2016-0705) [Stephen Henson] *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak. Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly. SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour. In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed is configured. Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from that of a valid user. (CVE-2016-0798) [Emilia Käsper] *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence. All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0797) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur. The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour. These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl. This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0799) [Matt Caswell] *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at http://cachebleed.info. (CVE-2016-0702) [Andy Polyakov] *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default, if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation apps to use 2048 bits by default. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] *) DH small subgroups Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe" primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite. OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk. The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact. Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe). (CVE-2016-0701) [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and Sebastian Schinzel. (CVE-2015-3197) [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits. [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-3193) [Andy Polyakov] *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG). (CVE-2015-3194) [Stephen Henson] *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is affected. SSL/TLS is not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2015-3195) [Stephen Henson] *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs. This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages, though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible. [Emilia Käsper] *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, use a random seed, as already documented. [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen ] Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] *) Alternate chains certificate forgery During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL). (CVE-2015-1793) [Matt Caswell] *) Race condition handling PSK identify hint If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the identify hint data. (CVE-2015-3196) [Stephen Henson] Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been restored. Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial field. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which processes public keys, certificate requests or certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with client authentication enabled. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton. (CVE-2015-1788) [Andy Polyakov] *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition, X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the time string. An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification callbacks. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and independently by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-1789) [Emilia Käsper] *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-1790) [Emilia Käsper] *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using the CMS code. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer. (CVE-2015-1792) [Stephen Henson] *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data. (CVE-2015-1791) [Matt Caswell] *) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them. [Matt Caswell] *) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported curves, prefer P-256 (both). [Emilia Kasper] *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits. [Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper] Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford University. (CVE-2015-0291) [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell] *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection. However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller. (CVE-2015-0290) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only server. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson. (CVE-2015-0207) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. (CVE-2015-0286) [Stephen Henson] *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0208) [Stephen Henson] *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare. Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. (CVE-2015-0287) [Stephen Henson] *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-0289) [Emilia Käsper] *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message. This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper (OpenSSL development team). (CVE-2015-0293) [Emilia Käsper] *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack. (CVE-2015-1787) [Matt Caswell] *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are: - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded automatically, and the user has not seeded manually - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not SSL_client_methodv23) - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA). If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the output may be predictable. For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will succeed on an unpatched platform: openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA (CVE-2015-0285) [Matt Caswell] *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their commit 517073cd4b. (CVE-2015-0209) [Matt Caswell] *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice. This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0288) [Stephen Henson] *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015] *) Change RSA and DH/DSA key generation apps to generate 2048-bit keys by default. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one. So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing near-optimal performance even on newer platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64 (other platforms pending). [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and OCSP response extensions from RFC6962. [Rob Stradling] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8. This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target. [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)] *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES, SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported. [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)] *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1, SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation. [Andy Polyakov, David Miller] *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a. RSAZ. [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)] *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2, BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched" implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support for TLS encrypt. This work was sponsored by Intel Corp. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method() supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only. [Steve Henson] *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, MGF1 digest and OAEP label. [Steve Henson] *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap algorithms and include tests cases. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD structure. [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson] *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures. [Steve Henson] *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated summary of the connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary of connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions. [Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie] *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs from CRLDP extension in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download CRLs using the OCSP API. [Steve Henson] *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application configuration using configuration files or command lines. [Steve Henson] *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable tracing. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions. Print out extension in s_server and s_client. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature OID NID. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a client to OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring. [Steve Henson] *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert. [Steve Henson] *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name comparison. [Steve Henson] *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not use the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications to test if a chain is correctly configured. Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client hello and checking the requested ciphersuite. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate is required by client or server. An application can decide which certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server. This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing certificate and specify the whole chain. [Steve Henson] *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used to have similar checks in it. Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode". This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used with caution as it could cause interoperability issues. [Steve Henson] *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no shared signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server to support them. [Steve Henson] *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added it couldn't be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking functions. Add manual page. [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)] *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against a certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Fix OCSP checking. [Rob Stradling and Ben Laurie] *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509 utility) or reject. [Steve Henson] *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied. [Steve Henson] *) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE, platform support for Linux and Android. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework. [Andy Polyakov] *) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL. When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal, when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead. This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the (often lower perfomance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle the new parameter format automatically. [Steve Henson] *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest. [Steve Henson] *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call: SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use static structures instead of allocation if default values are used. New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves. Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client to set list of supported curves. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility to print out received values. [Steve Henson] *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both server and client use DH certificates with common parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of the certificate. Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info, X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review. Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] *) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms [Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3571) [Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0206) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3569) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3572) [Steve Henson] *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0204) [Steve Henson] *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification. An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0205) [Steve Henson] *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX. The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX, and can vary with the CTX. [Adam Langley] *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-8275) [Steve Henson] *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-3570) [Andy Polyakov] *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable sanity and breaks all known clients. [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.) [Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation: ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was announced in the initial ServerHello. Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] *) SRTP Memory Leak. A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected. The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team. (CVE-2014-3513) [OpenSSL team] *) Session Ticket Memory Leak. When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service attack. (CVE-2014-3567) [Steve Henson] *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete. When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be configured to send them. (CVE-2014-3568) [Akamai and the OpenSSL team] *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. Client applications doing fallback retries should call SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV). (CVE-2014-3566) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional DigestInfo checks. Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures. Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code. Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC Group for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3512) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records. Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3511) [David Benjamin] *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages. Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3510) [Emilia Käsper] *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3507) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3506) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3505) [Adam Langley] *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write up to 255 bytes to freed memory. Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3509) [Gabor Tyukasz] *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-5139) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing output to the attacker. Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3508) [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224) [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-0221) [Imre Rad, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195) [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3470) [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson] *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display compilation flags. [mancha ] *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue. [mancha ] *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. [mancha ] Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512 bytes long. [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception. Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues. (CVE-2013-4353) *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450) [Steve Henson] *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013] *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI supporting platforms or when small records were transferred. [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013] *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. (CVE-2013-0169) [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack. Thanks go to and to Adam Langley for discovering and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger for independently discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-2686) [Adam Langley] *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) [Steve Henson] *) Make openssl verify return errors. [Chris Palmer and Ben Laurie] *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() so it returns the certificate actually sent. See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. [Rob Stradling ] *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello if renegotiating. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack. Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic fuzzing as a service testing platform. (CVE-2012-2333) [Steve Henson] *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. [Steve Henson] *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not approved. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012] *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context, in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below]. [Steve Henson] *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to client side. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012] *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110) [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections. [Adam Langley] *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello record length exceeds 255 bytes. 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work. 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing: -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure. Most broken servers should now work. 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable TLS 1.2 client support entirely. [Steve Henson] *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012] *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET STRING form instead of a DigestInfo. [Steve Henson] *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work. [Steve Henson] *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add support for SCTP. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably: - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support; - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES); - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation; - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations; - s390x: z196 support; - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations; [Andy Polyakov] *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup (removal of unnecessary code) [Peter Sylvester ] *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated by Google. [Adam Langley and Ben Laurie] *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224, NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds). Code made available under Apache License version 2.0. Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs: EC_GFp_nistp224_method() EC_GFp_nistp256_method() EC_GFp_nistp521_method() EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible implementations). [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h [Steve Henson] *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional signature parameters can be passed using this option and in particular PSS. [Steve Henson] *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet. [Steve Henson] *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines. New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on the appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1 handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used. Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked against a number of sample certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs. [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser ] *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump. More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature parameters r, s. [Steve Henson] *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing RFC3211. [Steve Henson] *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as password based CMS). [Steve Henson] *) Session-handling fixes: - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID, but also support Session Tickets. - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client presented a ticket with an expired session. - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable. - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information. - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets. [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix PSK session representation. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations. This work was sponsored by Intel. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record) portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to inlclude GCM and add a special AESGCM string for GCM only. [Steve Henson] *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt. [Steve Henson] *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support. As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for versions of TLS earlier than 1.2. [Steve Henson] *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method as unset and return the appopriate default but do *not* set the default. This means we can return the appopriate method in applications that swicth between FIPS and non-FIPS modes. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed. [Steve Henson] *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities. [Peter Eckersley , Ben Laurie and Steve Henson] *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now. [Steve Henson] *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code. [Steve Henson] *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen, encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods. [Steve Henson] *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers. [Steve Henson] *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want to use them can use the private_* version instead. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed. [Steve Henson] *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first. This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers and enable MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying FIPS modules versions. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use until after the certificate request message is received. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246. [Steve Henson] *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch to new signature format when needed using client digest preference. All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client support yet and no support for client certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods and version checking. [Steve Henson] *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined. [Steve Henson] *) A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated. [Christophe Renou , Peter Sylvester , Tom Wu , and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id. [Steve Henson] *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(). [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used automatically instead of needing explicit application support. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705. [Robin Seggelmann , Steve Henson] *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only a few changes are required: Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag. Add TLSv1_1 methods. Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1. Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code). Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where an MMA defence is not necessary. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) [Steve Henson] *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012] *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) [Antonio Martin] Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012] *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing differences arising during decryption processing. A research paper describing this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann and Michael Tuexen for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. (CVE-2011-4576) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George Kadianakis for discovering this issue and Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027) [Andrey Kulikov ] *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) [Rob Austein ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different interpretations of the '..._len' fields). [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, the last update always remained unused). [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf. [Bob Buckholz (Google)] Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011] *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207) [Kaspar Brand ] *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead. Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only. [Steve Henson] *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011] *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014 [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is ambiguous. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010] *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack. Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180 [Steve Henson] *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252 [Ben Laurie] Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010] *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864 [Steve Henson] *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into a DLL. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010] *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover (CVE-2010-1633) [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager ] Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010] *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative. [Steve Henson] *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL. [Willy Weisz ] *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP request code to permit adding custom headers to the request: some responders need this. [Steve Henson] *) The function EVP_PKEY_sign() returns <=0 on error: check return code correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Update verify callback code in apps/s_cb.c and apps/verify.c, it needlessly dereferenced structures, used obsolete functions and didn't handle all updated verify codes correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Disable MD2 in the default configuration. [Steve Henson] *) In BIO_pop() and BIO_push() use the ctrl argument (which was NULL) to indicate the initial BIO being pushed or popped. This makes it possible to determine whether the BIO is the one explicitly called or as a result of the ctrl being passed down the chain. Fix BIO_pop() and SSL BIOs so it handles reference counts correctly and doesn't zero out the I/O bio when it is not being explicitly popped. WARNING: applications which included workarounds for the old buggy behaviour will need to be modified or they could free up already freed BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Extend the uni2asc/asc2uni => OPENSSL_uni2asc/OPENSSL_asc2uni renaming to all platforms (within the 0.9.8 branch, this was done conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash). [Guenter ] *) Add ECDHE and PSK support to DTLS. [Michael Tuexen ] *) Add CHECKED_STACK_OF macro to safestack.h, otherwise safestack can't be used on C++. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" function EVP_MD_flags() (without this the only way to retrieve a digest flags is by accessing the structure directly. Update EVP_MD_do_all*() and EVP_CIPHER_do_all*() to include the name a digest or cipher is registered as in the "from" argument. Print out all registered digests in the dgst usage message instead of manually attempting to work them out. [Steve Henson] *) If no SSLv2 ciphers are used don't use an SSLv2 compatible client hello: this allows the use of compression and extensions. Change default cipher string to remove SSLv2 ciphersuites. This effectively avoids ancient SSLv2 by default unless an application cipher string requests it. [Steve Henson] *) Alter match criteria in PKCS12_parse(). It used to try to use local key ids to find matching certificates and keys but some PKCS#12 files don't follow the (somewhat unwritten) rules and this strategy fails. Now just gather all certificates together and the first private key then look for the first certificate that matches the key. [Steve Henson] *) Support use of registered digest and cipher names for dgst and cipher commands instead of having to add each one as a special case. So now you can do: openssl sha256 foo as well as: openssl dgst -sha256 foo and this works for ENGINE based algorithms too. [Steve Henson] *) Update Gost ENGINE to support parameter files. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Support GeneralizedTime in ca utility. [Oliver Martin , Steve Henson] *) Enhance the hash format used for certificate directory links. The new form uses the canonical encoding (meaning equivalent names will work even if they aren't identical) and uses SHA1 instead of MD5. This form is incompatible with the older format and as a result c_rehash should be used to rebuild symbolic links. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS#8 the default write format for private keys, replacing the traditional format. This form is standardised, more secure and doesn't include an implicit MD5 dependency. [Steve Henson] *) Add a $gcc_devteam_warn option to Configure. The idea is that any code committed to OpenSSL should pass this lot as a minimum. [Steve Henson] *) Add session ticket override functionality for use by EAP-FAST. [Jouni Malinen ] *) Modify HMAC functions to return a value. Since these can be implemented in an ENGINE errors can occur. [Steve Henson] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch_ex. [Ben Laurie] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch. Also some constification necessitated by type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch_ex, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_adj() to add a specific number of days and seconds to a tm structure directly, instead of going through OS specific date routines. This avoids any issues with OS routines such as the year 2038 bug. New *_adj() functions for ASN1 time structures and X509_time_adj_ex() to cover the extended range. The existing X509_time_adj() is still usable and will no longer have any date issues. [Steve Henson] *) Delta CRL support. New use deltas option which will attempt to locate and search any appropriate delta CRLs available. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for CRLs partitioned by reason code. Reorganise CRL processing code and add additional score elements. Validate alternate CRL paths as part of the CRL checking and indicate a new error "CRL path validation error" in this case. Applications wanting additional details can use the verify callback and check the new "parent" field. If this is not NULL CRL path validation is taking place. Existing applications wont see this because it requires extended CRL support which is off by default. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for freshest CRL extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Initial indirect CRL support. Currently only supported in the CRLs passed directly and not via lookup. Process certificate issuer CRL entry extension and lookup CRL entries by bother issuer name and serial number. Check and process CRL issuer entry in IDP extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for distinct certificate and CRL paths. The CRL issuer certificate is validated separately in this case. Only enabled if an extended CRL support flag is set: this flag will enable additional CRL functionality in future. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for policy mappings extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to pathlength constraint, self issued certificate handling, policy processing to align with RFC3280 and PKITS tests. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for name constraints certificate extension. DN, email, DNS and URI types are currently supported. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) To cater for systems that provide a pointer-based thread ID rather than numeric, deprecate the current numeric thread ID mechanism and replace it with a structure and associated callback type. This mechanism allows a numeric "hash" to be extracted from a thread ID in either case, and on platforms where pointers are larger than 'long', mixing is done to help ensure the numeric 'hash' is usable even if it can't be guaranteed unique. The default mechanism is to use "&errno" as a pointer-based thread ID to distinguish between threads. Applications that want to provide their own thread IDs should now use CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback() to register a callback that will call either CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric() or CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(). Note that ERR_remove_state() is now deprecated, because it is tied to the assumption that thread IDs are numeric. ERR_remove_state(0) to free the current thread's error state should be replaced by ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL). (This new approach replaces the functions CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback(), CRYPTO_get_idptr_callback(), and CRYPTO_thread_idptr() that existed in OpenSSL 0.9.9-dev between June 2006 and August 2008. Also, if an application was previously providing a numeric thread callback that was inappropriate for distinguishing threads, then uniqueness might have been obtained with &errno that happened immediately in the intermediate development versions of OpenSSL; this is no longer the case, the numeric thread callback will now override the automatic use of &errno.) [Geoff Thorpe, with help from Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for different CRL issuing certificates. This covers a simple case where the self issued certificates in the chain exist and the real CRL issuer is higher in the existing chain. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Removed effectively defunct crypto/store from the build. [Ben Laurie] *) Revamp of STACK to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a new SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode flag to release unused buffer RAM on SSL connections. This option can save about 34k per idle SSL. [Nick Mathewson] *) Revamp of LHASH to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: STACK, TXT_DB, bsearch, qsort. [Ben Laurie] *) Initial support for Cryptographic Message Syntax (aka CMS) based on RFC3850, RFC3851 and RFC3852. New cms directory and cms utility, support for data, signedData, compressedData, digestedData and encryptedData, envelopedData types included. Scripts to check against RFC4134 examples draft and interop and consistency checks of many content types and variants. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to enc utility to support use of zlib compression BIO. [Steve Henson] *) Extend mk1mf to support importing of options and assembly language files from Configure script, currently only included in VC-WIN32. The assembly language rules can now optionally generate the source files from the associated perl scripts. [Steve Henson] *) Implement remaining functionality needed to support GOST ciphersuites. Interop testing has been performed using CryptoPro implementations. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) s390x assembler pack. [Andy Polyakov] *) ARMv4 assembler pack. ARMv4 refers to v4 and later ISA, not CPU "family." [Andy Polyakov] *) Implement Opaque PRF Input TLS extension as specified in draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt. Since this is not an official specification yet and no extension type assignment by IANA exists, this extension (for now) will have to be explicitly enabled when building OpenSSL by providing the extension number to use. For example, specify an option -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=0x9527 to the "config" or "Configure" script to enable the extension, assuming extension number 0x9527 (which is a completely arbitrary and unofficial assignment based on the MD5 hash of the Internet Draft). Note that by doing so, you potentially lose interoperability with other TLS implementations since these might be using the same extension number for other purposes. SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, src, len) is used to set the opaque PRF input value to use in the handshake. This will create an interal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will return non-zero for success. To get more control and flexibility, provide a callback function by using SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg) where int (*cb)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); void *arg; Callback function 'cb' will be called in handshakes, and is expected to use SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input() as appropriate. Argument 'arg' is for application purposes (the value as given to SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg() will directly be provided to the callback function). The callback function has to return non-zero to report success: usually 1 to use opaque PRF input just if possible, or 2 to enforce use of the opaque PRF input. In the latter case, the library will abort the handshake if opaque PRF input is not successfully negotiated. Arguments 'peerinput' and 'len' given to the callback function will always be NULL and 0 in the case of a client. A server will see the client's opaque PRF input through these variables if available (NULL and 0 otherwise). Note that if the server provides an opaque PRF input, the length must be the same as the length of the client's opaque PRF input. Note that the callback function will only be called when creating a new session (session resumption can resume whatever was previously negotiated), and will not be called in SSL 2.0 handshakes; thus, SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) is especially recommended for applications that need to enforce opaque PRF input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update ssl code to support digests other than SHA1+MD5 for handshake MAC. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Final changes to avoid use of pointer pointer casts in OpenSSL. OpenSSL should now compile cleanly on gcc 4.2 [Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Update SSL library to use new EVP_PKEY MAC API. Include generic MAC support including streaming MAC support: this is required for GOST ciphersuite support. [Victor B. Wagner , Steve Henson] *) Add option -stream to use PKCS#7 streaming in smime utility. New function i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() and PEM_write_PKCS7_bio_stream() to output in BER and PEM format. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental support for use of HMAC via EVP_PKEY interface. This allows HMAC to be handled via the EVP_DigestSign*() interface. The EVP_PKEY "key" in this case is the HMAC key, potentially allowing ENGINE support for HMAC keys which are unextractable. New -mac and -macopt options to dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use alternative signing paramaters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl_cipher_apply_rule(), the internal function that does the work each time a ciphersuite string requests enabling ("foo+bar"), moving ("+foo+bar"), disabling ("-foo+bar", or removing ("!foo+bar") a class of ciphersuites: Now it maintains the order of disabled ciphersuites such that those ciphersuites that most recently went from enabled to disabled not only stay in order with respect to each other, but also have higher priority than other disabled ciphersuites the next time ciphersuites are enabled again. This means that you can now say, e.g., "PSK:-PSK:HIGH" to enable the same ciphersuites as with "HIGH" alone, but in a specific order where the PSK ciphersuites come first (since they are the most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed). Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new funcionality) such that between otherwise identical cihpersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in the default order. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it automatically arranges the ciphersuites in reasonable order before starting to process the rule string. Thus, the definition for "DEFAULT" (SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST) now is just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL", but remains equivalent to "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+aECDH:+kRSA:+RC4:@STRENGTH". This makes it much easier to arrive at a reasonable default order in applications for which anonymous ciphers are OK (meaning that you can't actually use DEFAULT). [Bodo Moeller; suggested by Victor Duchovni] *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string processing) into multiple integers instead of setting "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK", "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer. (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't affect applications.) This give us more bits for each of these categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128 and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all kinds of kludges. Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and 0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9. With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and "CAMELLIA256". [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256. Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q). [Nils Larsch] *) Very *very* experimental PKCS#7 streaming encoder support. Nothing uses it yet and it is largely untested. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types. [Nils Larsch] *) Initial incomplete changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. Safestack is reimplemented. Update ASN1 to avoid use of legacy functions. [Steve Henson] *) Win32/64 targets are linked with Winsock2. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing the CRL revoked certificates in a database. [Steve Henson] *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors to be returned by the verify callback instead of carrying on no matter what. This reflects the way a "real world" verify callback would behave. [Steve Henson] *) GOST engine, supporting several GOST algorithms and public key formats. Kindly donated by Cryptocom. [Cryptocom] *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative lookup methods. X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names. Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_match() to check if two CRLs are identical. Normally this would be called X509_CRL_cmp() but that name is already used by a function that just compares CRL issuer names. Cache several CRL extensions in X509_CRL structure and cache CRLDP in X509. [Steve Henson] *) Store a "canonical" representation of X509_NAME structure (ASN1 Name) this maps equivalent X509_NAME structures into a consistent structure. Name comparison can then be performed rapidly using memcmp(). [Steve Henson] *) Non-blocking OCSP request processing. Add -timeout option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) Allow digests to supply their own micalg string for S/MIME type using the ctrl EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG. [Steve Henson] *) During PKCS7 signing pass the PKCS7 SignerInfo structure to the EVP_PKEY_METHOD before and after signing via the EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN ctrl. It can then customise the structure before and/or after signing if necessary. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_add_sigid() to allow application defined signature OIDs to be added to OpenSSLs internal tables. New function OBJ_sigid_free() to free up any added signature OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(), EVP_MD_do_all() and EVP_MD_do_all_sorted() to enumerate internal digest and cipher tables. New options added to openssl utility: list-message-digest-algorithms and list-cipher-algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Change the array representation of binary polynomials: the list of degrees of non-zero coefficients is now terminated with -1. Previously it was terminated with 0, which was also part of the value; thus, the array representation was not applicable to polynomials where t^0 has coefficient zero. This change makes the array representation useful in a more general context. [Douglas Stebila] *) Various modifications and fixes to SSL/TLS cipher string handling. For ECC, the code now distinguishes between fixed ECDH with RSA certificates on the one hand and with ECDSA certificates on the other hand, since these are separate ciphersuites. The unused code for Fortezza ciphersuites has been removed. For consistency with EDH, ephemeral ECDH is now called "EECDH" (not "ECDHE"). For consistency with the code for DH certificates, use of ECDH certificates is now considered ECDH authentication, not RSA or ECDSA authentication (the latter is merely the CA's signing algorithm and not actively used in the protocol). The temporary ciphersuite alias "ECCdraft" is no longer available, and ECC ciphersuites are no longer excluded from "ALL" and "DEFAULT". The following aliases now exist for RFC 4492 ciphersuites, most of these by analogy with the DH case: kECDHr - ECDH cert, signed with RSA kECDHe - ECDH cert, signed with ECDSA kECDH - ECDH cert (signed with either RSA or ECDSA) kEECDH - ephemeral ECDH ECDH - ECDH cert or ephemeral ECDH aECDH - ECDH cert aECDSA - ECDSA cert ECDSA - ECDSA cert AECDH - anonymous ECDH EECDH - non-anonymous ephemeral ECDH (equivalent to "kEECDH:-AECDH") [Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional S/MIME capabilities for AES and GOST ciphers if supported. Use correct micalg parameters depending on digest(s) in signed message. [Steve Henson] *) Add engine support for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. Add functions to process an ENGINE asn1 method. Support ENGINE lookups in the ASN1 code. [Steve Henson] *) Initial engine support for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. New functions to permit an engine to register a method. Add ENGINE lookups for methods and functional reference processing. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enchance versions of EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature process. [Steve Henson] *) New -resign option to smime utility. This adds one or more signers to an existing PKCS#7 signedData structure. Also -md option to use an alternative message digest algorithm for signing. [Steve Henson] *) Tidy up PKCS#7 routines and add new functions to make it easier to create PKCS7 structures containing multiple signers. Update smime application to support multiple signers. [Steve Henson] *) New -macalg option to pkcs12 utility to allow setting of an alternative digest MAC. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PRFs other than default SHA1 HMAC. Reorganize PBE internals to lookup from a static table using NIDs, add support for HMAC PBE OID translation. Add a EVP_CIPHER ctrl: EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID this allows a cipher to specify an alternative PRF which will be automatically used with PBES2. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the algorithm specific calls to generate keys in "req" with the new API. [Steve Henson] *) Update PKCS#7 enveloped data routines to use new API. This is now supported by any public key method supporting the encrypt operation. A ctrl is added to allow the public key algorithm to examine or modify the PKCS#7 RecipientInfo structure if it needs to: for RSA this is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Add a ctrl to asn1 method to allow a public key algorithm to express a default digest type to use. In most cases this will be SHA1 but some algorithms (such as GOST) need to specify an alternative digest. The return value indicates how strong the prefernce is 1 means optional and 2 is mandatory (that is it is the only supported type). Modify ASN1_item_sign() to accept a NULL digest argument to indicate it should use the default md. Update openssl utilities to use the default digest type for signing if it is not explicitly indicated. [Steve Henson] *) Use OID cross reference table in ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify(). New EVP_MD flag EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE. This uses the relevant signing method from the key type. This effectively removes the link between digests and public key types. [Steve Henson] *) Add an OID cross reference table and utility functions. Its purpose is to translate between signature OIDs such as SHA1WithrsaEncryption and SHA1, rsaEncryption. This will allow some of the algorithm specific hackery needed to use the correct OID to be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Remove algorithm specific dependencies when setting PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO structures for PKCS7_sign(). They are now set up by the relevant public key ASN1 method. [Steve Henson] *) Add provisional EC pkey method with support for ECDSA and ECDH. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for key derivation (agreement) in the API, DH method and pkeyutl. [Steve Henson] *) Add DSA pkey method and DH pkey methods, extend DH ASN1 method to support public and private key formats. As a side effect these add additional command line functionality not previously available: DSA signatures can be generated and verified using pkeyutl and DH key support and generation in pkey, genpkey. [Steve Henson] *) BeOS support. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New make target "install_html_docs" installs HTML renditions of the manual pages. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New utility "genpkey" this is analagous to "genrsa" etc except it can generate keys for any algorithm. Extend and update EVP_PKEY_METHOD to support key and parameter generation and add initial key generation functionality for RSA. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions for main EVP_PKEY_method operations. The undocumented functions EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt} have been renamed to EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt}_old. [Steve Henson] *) Initial definitions for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. This will be a high level public key API, doesn't do much yet. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to retrieve information about public key algorithms. New option to openssl utility: "list-public-key-algorithms" to print out info. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Don't free up OIDs in OBJ_cleanup() if they are in use by EVP_MD or EVP_CIPHER structures to avoid later problems in EVP_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) New utilities pkey and pkeyparam. These are similar to algorithm specific utilities such as rsa, dsa, dsaparam etc except they process any key type. [Steve Henson] *) Transfer public key printing routines to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. New functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private(), EVP_PKEY_print_param() to print public key data from an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for pluggable public key ASN1. De-spaghettify the public key ASN1 handling. Move public and private key ASN1 handling to a new EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure. Relocate algorithm specific handling to a single module within the relevant algorithm directory. Add functions to allow (near) opaque processing of public and private key structures. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Add initial support for RFC 4279 PSK TLS ciphersuites. Add members for the psk identity [hint] and the psk callback functions to the SSL_SESSION, SSL and SSL_CTX structure. New ciphersuites: PSK-RC4-SHA, PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA New functions: SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity SSL_use_psk_identity_hint [Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of Nokia Corporation] *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation and response verification functionality. [Zoltán Glózik , The OpenTSA Project] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou] *) Whirlpool hash implementation is added. [Andy Polyakov] *) BIGNUM code on 64-bit SPARCv9 targets is switched from bn(64,64) to bn(64,32). Because of instruction set limitations it doesn't have any negative impact on performance. This was done mostly in order to make it possible to share assembler modules, such as bn_mul_mont implementations, between 32- and 64-bit builds without hassle. [Andy Polyakov] *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont, dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced. BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets. [Andy Polyakov] *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size. Save memory by seeting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of using the maximum available value. [Steve Henson] *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code in addition to the text details. [Bodo Moeller] *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't handle several customised structures at all. [Steve Henson] *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now handled using new ASN1 code equivalents. [Steve Henson] *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'. [Nils Larsch] *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of all fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. [Steve Henson] *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010] *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never update s->server with a new major version number. As of - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type, - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits, the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740) [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley ] *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted). [Tomas Hoger ] Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010] *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245) [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta] *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!). [Bodo Moeller] *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too. [Steve Henson] *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally. This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while... [Steve Henson] *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later. This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and CVE-2009-4355. [Steve Henson] *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., ): a CAST_KEY doesn't change when encrypting or decrypting. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI. Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode. [Steve Henson] *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection. [Steve Henson] *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer renegotiation support in s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8. [Steve Henson] *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you know what you are doing. [Eric Rescorla , Ben Laurie, Steve Henson] *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in the handshake. [Steve Henson] *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(), CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam warnings in other configurations. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some systems need. [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley] *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs. [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky] *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in several standards that it is not used in new applications due to several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons the MD2 API is still compiled in by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved and restored. [Steve Henson] *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash. [Guenter ] *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(), it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything other than a simple chain. [David Woodhouse , Steve Henson] *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert() by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory left. Additionally every future messege was buffered, even if the sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake. So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be buffered. (CVE-2009-1378) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to detemine the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries. (CVE-2009-1377) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379) [Daniel Mentz] *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call. [Darryl Miles ] *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs [Ilya O. ] Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009] *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what you're doing. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009] *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789) [Paolo Ganci ] *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591) [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590) [Steve Henson] *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store level. [Steve Henson] *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice to handle some structures. [Steve Henson] *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time for a '\n' [Jeremy Shapiro ] *) New -hex option for openssl rand. [Matthieu Herrb] *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1. [Steve Henson] *) Support NumericString type for name components. [Steve Henson] *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the chosen compiler. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009] *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values (CVE-2008-5077). [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team] *) Enable TLS extensions by default. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.) [Sander Temme ] *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command. [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger] *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in s_client and s_server. [Ben Laurie] *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize(). [Rob Austein ] *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client. [Philip Paeps ] *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the server's preference list will be accepted. (Note that the option applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008] *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386). [PR #1679] *) Fix a state transitition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...). [Nagendra Modadugu] *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding, addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been doubly unsafe triple-checked locking. So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder] *) Various precautionary measures: - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h). - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c). (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.) - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs outside the expected range. - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG builds. [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller] *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if the load fails. Useful for distros. [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team] *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code. [Huang Ying] *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too. Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: dont set attribute using ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain attribute creation routines such as certifcate requests and PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008] *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672) [Steve Henson, Mark Cox] *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891) [Joe Orton] *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation. [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo] *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs: The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA. Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads. The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than 'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte invalid read after the end of 'db'). [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev: Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation. While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and 32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting. To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport). As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements, namely BN_from_montgomery_word. (To enable this otherwise, e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".) [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)] *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key sets may exist with different names. [Steve Henson] *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles. This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7 behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the 'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an implementation. [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)] *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9 implemention in the following ways: Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be hard coded. Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is ignored for embedded content. CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled with the enable-cms configuration option. [Steve Henson] *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used. [Paul Sheer ] *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and uncompresses any data passed through it. [Steve Henson] *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping. [Steve Henson] *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0(): sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier) data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied data. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set() to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior. [Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Netware support: - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT) - added some more tests to do_tests.pl - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc, netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32 platform - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD) - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply [Guenter Knauf ] *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546. A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples to s_client and s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007] *) Fix various bugs: + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session + Fix ia64 assembler code [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007] *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server. Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off" pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server. This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995. [Andy Polyakov] *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. [Kurt Roeckx , Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson] *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build. [Steve Henson] *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction. [Andy Polyakov] *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0 (which previously caused an internal error). [Bodo Moeller] *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out. [Ben Laurie] *) AES IGE mode speedup. [Dean Gaudet (Google)] *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162: TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA" TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA" To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-seed'. [KISA, Bodo Moeller] *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract information. For detailed background information, see http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron, J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(), respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to remove a conditional branch. BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name remains as a deprecated alias. Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation. Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias. BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)] *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID context matching (which matters if an application uses a single external cache for different purposes). Previously, out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that, with applications using a single external cache for quite different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session in a different context. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007] *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't). [Victor Duchovni] *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters): When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER encoding. (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RFC 3779 support. [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. Improve header file function name parsing. [Steve Henson] *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs. [Goetz Babin-Ebell] Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap. That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites -- namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0. So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions. Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite. Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now. The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning; however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into multiple values to extend the available space. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly. Now special treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias. However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation to avoid potential handshake problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key versions), which is now available for royalty-free use (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html). Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132. To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-camellia'. [NTT] *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by now or any which still have the bug do not support compression. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006] *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is. [Steve Henson] *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed. [Austin Ziegler ] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9 branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch). [Douglas Stebila] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32 to conform with the standards mentioned here: http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library can't be loaded. [Steve Henson] *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries under VC++ build system. [Steve Henson] *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO. Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags. [Steve Henson] *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Nils Larsch] *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman. [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions for well-known primes. [Nick Mathewson] *) Extended Windows CE support. [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov] *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to smime utility. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them. [Richard Levitte] *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private key into the same file any more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'. [Stefan and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code: - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after a fixed number of uses (currently 32) - add new function for parameter creation - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the BN_BLINDING parameters - hide BN_BLINDING structure Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve performance when a single RSA object is shared among several threads. [Nils Larsch] *) Add support for DTLS. [Nagendra Modadugu and Ben Laurie] *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() [Walter Goulet] *) Remove buggy and incompletet DH cert support from ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c [Nils Larsch] *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for the apps/openssl applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set. [Ben Laurie] *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default. The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx". The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified. (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented. This is because IDEA is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license fee for non-commercial use. As before, "no-idea" can be used to avoid this algorithm.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820). This work was sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-science in Europe). [Richard Levitte] *) RC4 performance overhaul on modern architectures/implementations, such as Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. [Andy Polyakov] *) New utility extract-section.pl. This can be used specify an alternative section number in a pod file instead of having to treat each file as a separate case in Makefile. This can be done by adding two lines to the pod file: =for comment openssl_section:XXX The blank line is mandatory. [Steve Henson] *) New arguments -certform, -keyform and -pass for s_client and s_server to allow alternative format key and certificate files and passphrase sources. [Steve Henson] *) New structure X509_VERIFY_PARAM which combines current verify parameters, update associated structures and add various utility functions. Add new policy related verify parameters, include policy checking in standard verify code. Enhance 'smime' application with extra parameters to support policy checking and print out. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new engine to support VIA PadLock ACE extensions in the VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. These extensions support AES encryption in hardware as well as RNG (though RNG support is currently disabled). [Michal Ludvig , with help from Andy Polyakov] *) Deprecate BN_[get|set]_params() functions (they were ignored internally). [Geoff Thorpe] *) New FIPS 180-2 algorithms, SHA-224/-256/-384/-512 are implemented. [Andy Polyakov and a number of other people] *) Improved PowerPC platform support. Most notably BIGNUM assembler implementation contributed by IBM. [Suresh Chari, Peter Waltenberg, Andy Polyakov] *) The new 'RSA_generate_key_ex' function now takes a BIGNUM for the public exponent rather than 'unsigned long'. There is a corresponding change to the new 'rsa_keygen' element of the RSA_METHOD structure. [Jelte Jansen, Geoff Thorpe] *) Functionality for creating the initial serial number file is now moved from CA.pl to the 'ca' utility with a new option -create_serial. (Before OpenSSL 0.9.7e, CA.pl used to initialize the serial number file to 1, which is bound to cause problems. To avoid the problems while respecting compatibility between different 0.9.7 patchlevels, 0.9.7e employed 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl for serial number initialization. With the new release 0.9.8, we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.) [Steve Henson] *) Reduced header interdepencies by declaring more opaque objects in ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always, developers should define this symbol when building and using openssl to ensure they track the recommended behaviour, interfaces, [etc], but backwards-compatible behaviour prevails when this isn't defined. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function X509_POLICY_NODE_print() which prints out policy nodes. [Steve Henson] *) Add new EVP function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key and associated functionality. This will generate a random key of the appropriate length based on the cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation routine to support keys of a specific form. This is used in the des and 3des routines to generate a key of the correct parity. Update S/MIME code to use new functions and hence generate correct parity DES keys. Add EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY #define to return an error if the key is not valid (weak or incorrect parity). [Steve Henson] *) Add a local set of CRLs that can be used by X509_verify_cert() as well as looking them up. This is useful when the verified structure may contain CRLs, for example PKCS#7 signedData. Modify PKCS7_verify() to use any CRLs present unless the new PKCS7_NO_CRL flag is asserted. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 oid configuration module. It now additionally accepts the syntax: shortName = some long name, 1.2.3.4 [Steve Henson] *) Reimplemented the BN_CTX implementation. There is now no more static limitation on the number of variables it can handle nor the depth of the "stack" handling for BN_CTX_start()/BN_CTX_end() pairs. The stack information can now expand as required, and rather than having a single static array of bignums, BN_CTX now uses a linked-list of such arrays allowing it to expand on demand whilst maintaining the usefulness of BN_CTX's "bundling". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07. [Steve Henson] *) bn_dup_expand() has been deprecated, it was introduced in 0.9.7 and remained unused and not that useful. A variety of other little bignum tweaks and fixes have also been made continuing on from the audit (see below). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Constify all or almost all d2i, c2i, s2i and r2i functions, along with associated ASN1, EVP and SSL functions and old ASN1 macros. [Richard Levitte] *) BN_zero() only needs to set 'top' and 'neg' to zero for correct results, and this should never fail. So the return value from the use of BN_set_word() (which can fail due to needless expansion) is now deprecated; if OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined, BN_zero() is a void macro. [Geoff Thorpe] *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same initialised value as BN_new(). [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller] *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) An audit of the BIGNUM code is underway, for which debugging code is enabled when BN_DEBUG is defined. This makes stricter enforcements on what is considered valid when processing BIGNUMs, and causes execution to assert() when a problem is discovered. If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined, further steps are taken to deliberately pollute unused data in BIGNUM structures to try and expose faulty code further on. For now, openssl will (in its default mode of operation) continue to tolerate the inconsistent forms that it has tolerated in the past, but authors and packagers should consider trying openssl and their own applications when compiled with these debugging symbols defined. It will help highlight potential bugs in their own code, and will improve the test coverage for OpenSSL itself. At some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details. [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller] *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly initialises it). The presence of this function only made it possible to overwrite an existing structure (and cause memory leaks). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Because of the callback-based approach for implementing LHASH as a template type, lh_insert() adds opaque objects to hash-tables and lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() are typically used with a destructor callback to clean up those corresponding objects before destroying the hash table (and losing the object pointers). So some over-zealous constifications in LHASH have been relaxed so that lh_insert() does not take (nor store) the objects as "const" and the lh_doall[_arg] callback wrappers are not prototyped to have "const" restrictions on the object pointers they are given (and so aren't required to cast them away any more). [Geoff Thorpe] *) The tmdiff.h API was so ugly and minimal that our own timing utility (speed) prefers to use its own implementation. The two implementations haven't been consolidated as yet (volunteers?) but the tmdiff API has had its object type properly exposed (MS_TM) instead of casting to/from "char *". This may still change yet if someone realises MS_TM and "ms_time_***" aren't necessarily the greatest nomenclatures - but this is what was used internally to the implementation so I've used that for now. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Ensure that deprecated functions do not get compiled when OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined. Some "openssl" subcommands and a few of the self-tests were still using deprecated key-generation functions so these have been updated also. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Reorganise PKCS#7 code to separate the digest location functionality into PKCS7_find_digest(), digest addtion into PKCS7_bio_add_digest(). New function PKCS7_set_digest() to set the digest type for PKCS#7 digestedData type. Add additional code to correctly generate the digestedData type and add support for this type in PKCS7 initialization functions. [Steve Henson] *) New function PKCS7_set0_type_other() this initializes a PKCS7 structure of type "other". [Steve Henson] *) Fix prime generation loop in crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl by making sure the loop does correctly stop and breaking ("division by zero") modulus operations are not performed. The (pre-generated) prime table crypto/bn/bn_prime.h was already correct, but it could not be re-generated on some platforms because of the "division by zero" situation in the script. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt: the KDF1 key derivation function with SHA-1 now is only used for "small" curves (where the representation of a field element takes up to 24 bytes); for larger curves, the field element resulting from ECDH is directly used as premaster secret. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add code for kP+lQ timings to crypto/ec/ectest.c, and add SEC2 curve secp160r1 to the tests. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO. [Götz Babin-Ebell via Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better control of the error stack. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for STORE in ENGINE. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the STORE type. The intention is to provide a common interface to certificate and key stores, be they simple file-based stores, or HSM-type store, or LDAP stores, or... NOTE: The code is currently UNTESTED and isn't really used anywhere. [Richard Levitte] *) Add a generic structure called OPENSSL_ITEM. This can be used to pass a list of arguments to any function as well as provide a way for a function to pass data back to the caller. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions BUF_strndup() and BUF_memdup(). BUF_strndup() works like BUF_strdup() but can be used to duplicate a portion of a string. The copy gets NUL-terminated. BUF_memdup() duplicates a memory area. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function sk_find_ex() which works like sk_find(), but will return an index to an element even if an exact match couldn't be found. The index is guaranteed to point at the element where the searched-for key would be inserted to preserve sorting order. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality. Currently, the following flags are defined: OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero number. OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns zero. This is useful if there are more than one element where the comparing function returns zero. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca' in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation as all other certificate signing. The new flag '-selfsign' enables this functionality. Adapt CA.sh and CA.pl.in. [Richard Levitte] *) Add functionality to check the public key of a certificate request against a given private. This is useful to check that a certificate request can be signed by that key (self-signing). [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) Generate muti valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for req and dirName. [Steve Henson] *) Support for nameConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyMappings certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure the default DSA_METHOD implementation only uses its dsa_mod_exp() and/or bn_mod_exp() handlers if they are non-NULL, and change its own handlers to be NULL so as to remove unnecessary indirection. This lets alternative implementations fallback to the default implementation more easily. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support for directoryName in GeneralName related extensions in config files. [Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to link applications using Makefile.shared. Make that possible even when linking against static libraries! [Richard Levitte] *) Support for single pass processing for S/MIME signing. This now means that S/MIME signing can be done from a pipe, in addition cleartext signing (multipart/signed type) is effectively streaming and the signed data does not need to be all held in memory. This is done with a new flag PKCS7_STREAM. When this flag is set PKCS7_sign() only initializes the PKCS7 structure and the actual signing is done after the data is output (and digests calculated) in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). [Steve Henson] *) Add full support for -rpath/-R, both in shared libraries and applications, at least on the platforms where it's known how to do it. [Richard Levitte] *) In crypto/ec/ec_mult.c, implement fast point multiplication with precomputation, based on wNAF splitting: EC_GROUP_precompute_mult() will now compute a table of multiples of the generator that makes subsequent invocations of EC_POINTs_mul() or EC_POINT_mul() faster (notably in the case of a single point multiplication, scalar * generator). [Nils Larsch, Bodo Moeller] *) IPv6 support for certificate extensions. The various extensions which use the IP:a.b.c.d can now take IPv6 addresses using the formats of RFC1884 2.2 . IPv6 addresses are now also displayed correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Added an ENGINE that implements RSA by performing private key exponentiations with the GMP library. The conversions to and from GMP's mpz_t format aren't optimised nor are any montgomery forms cached, and on x86 it appears OpenSSL's own performance has caught up. However there are likely to be other architectures where GMP could provide a boost. This ENGINE is not built in by default, but it can be specified at Configure time and should be accompanied by the necessary linker additions, eg; ./config -DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp [Geoff Thorpe] *) "openssl engine" will not display ENGINE/DSO load failure errors when testing availability of engines with "-t" - the old behaviour is produced by increasing the feature's verbosity with "-tt". [Geoff Thorpe] *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can also be overriden by providing the appropriate method callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and primality testing to functions that take a new BN_GENCB pointer in place of callback/argument pairs. The new API functions have "_ex" postfixes and the older functions are reimplemented as wrappers for the new ones. The OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol can be used to hide declarations of the old functions to help (graceful) attempts to migrate to the new functions. Also, the new key-generation API functions operate on a caller-supplied key-structure and return success/failure rather than returning a key or NULL - this is to help make "keygen" another member function of RSA_METHOD etc. Example for using the new callback interface: int (*my_callback)(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) = ...; void *my_arg = ...; BN_GENCB my_cb; BN_GENCB_set(&my_cb, my_callback, my_arg); return BN_is_prime_ex(some_bignum, BN_prime_checks, NULL, &cb); /* For the meaning of a, b in calls to my_callback(), see the * documentation of the function that calls the callback. * cb will point to my_cb; my_arg can be retrieved as cb->arg. * my_callback should return 1 if it wants BN_is_prime_ex() * to continue, or 0 to stop. */ [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the ZLIB compression method to be stateful, and make it available to TLS with the number defined in draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ASN.1 structures and functions for CertificatePair, which is defined as follows (according to X.509_4thEditionDraftV6.pdf): CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE { forward [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, reverse [1] Certificate OPTIONAL, -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- } Also implement the PEM functions to read and write certificate pairs, and defined the PEM tag as "CERTIFICATE PAIR". This needed to be defined, mostly for the sake of the LDAP attribute crossCertificatePair, but may prove useful elsewhere as well. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to inhibit symlinking of shared libraries in Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake. [Richard Levitte] *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg); and a macro that behave like int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a); to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c). EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() will now automatically use this if applicable. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add new lock type (CRYPTO_LOCK_BN). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the ENGINE framework to automatically load engines dynamically from specific directories unless they could be found to already be built in or loaded. Move all the current engines except for the cryptodev one to a new directory engines/. The engines in engines/ are built as shared libraries if the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config. Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a. /usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic engines, but that can be overriden at configure time through the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES. [Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte] *) Add Makefile.shared, a helper makefile to build shared libraries. Addapt Makefile.org. [Richard Levitte] *) Add version info to Win32 DLLs. [Peter 'Luna' Runestig" ] *) Add new 'medium level' PKCS#12 API. Certificates and keys can be added using this API to created arbitrary PKCS#12 files while avoiding the low level API. New options to PKCS12_create(), key or cert can be NULL and will then be omitted from the output file. The encryption algorithm NIDs can be set to -1 for no encryption, the mac iteration count can be set to 0 to omit the mac. Enhance pkcs12 utility by making the -nokeys and -nocerts options work when creating a PKCS#12 file. New option -nomac to omit the mac, NONE can be set for an encryption algorithm. New code is modified to use the enhanced PKCS12_create() instead of the low level API. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 encoder to support indefinite length constructed encoding. This can output sequences tags and octet strings in this form. Modify pk7_asn1.c to support indefinite length encoding. This is experimental and needs additional code to be useful, such as an ASN1 bio and some enhanced streaming PKCS#7 code. Extend template encode functionality so that tagging is passed down to the template encoder. [Steve Henson] *) Let 'openssl req' fail if an argument to '-newkey' is not recognized instead of using RSA as a default. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for ECC-based ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt. As these are not official, they are not included in "ALL"; the "ECCdraft" ciphersuite group alias can be used to select them. [Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH engine support. [Nils Gura and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH in new directory crypto/ecdh/. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Let BN_rand_range() abort with an error after 100 iterations without success (which indicates a broken PRNG). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_sqrt() so that it verifies that the input value is really the square of the return value. (Previously, BN_mod_sqrt would show GIGO behaviour.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add named elliptic curves over binary fields from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS; add OIDs that were still missing. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Extend the EC library for elliptic curves over binary fields (new files ec2_smpl.c, ec2_smpt.c, ec2_mult.c in crypto/ec/). New EC_METHOD: EC_GF2m_simple_method New API functions: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m Point compression for binary fields is disabled by default for patent reasons (compile with OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP defined to enable it). As binary polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs, various members of the EC_GROUP and EC_POINT data structures can be shared between the implementations for prime fields and binary fields; the above ..._GF2m functions (except for EX_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m) are essentially identical to their ..._GFp counterparts. (For simplicity, the '..._GFp' prefix has been dropped from various internal method names.) An internal 'field_div' method (similar to 'field_mul' and 'field_sqr') has been added; this is used only for binary fields. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Optionally dispatch EC_POINT_mul(), EC_POINT_precompute_mult() through methods ('mul', 'precompute_mult'). The generic implementations (now internally called 'ec_wNAF_mul' and 'ec_wNAF_precomputed_mult') remain the default if these methods are undefined. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New function EC_GROUP_get_degree, which is defined through EC_METHOD. For curves over prime fields, this returns the bit length of the modulus. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New functions EC_GROUP_dup, EC_POINT_dup. (These simply call ..._new and ..._copy). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add binary polynomial arithmetic software in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c. Polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs (where the sign bit is not used) in the following functions [macros]: BN_GF2m_add BN_GF2m_sub [= BN_GF2m_add] BN_GF2m_mod [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_mul [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_inv BN_GF2m_mod_exp [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr] BN_GF2m_cmp [= BN_ucmp] (Note that only the 'mod' functions are actually for fields GF(2^m). BN_GF2m_add() is misnomer, but this is for the sake of consistency.) For some functions, an the irreducible polynomial defining a field can be given as an 'unsigned int[]' with strictly decreasing elements giving the indices of those bits that are set; i.e., p[] represents the polynomial f(t) = t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] where p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. This applies to the following functions: BN_GF2m_mod_arr BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv] BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_div] BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly Conversion can be performed by the following functions: BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly bntest.c has additional tests for binary polynomial arithmetic. Two implementations for BN_GF2m_mod_div() are available. The default algorithm simply uses BN_GF2m_mod_inv() and BN_GF2m_mod_mul(). The alternative algorithm is compiled in only if OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV is defined (patent pending; read the copyright notice in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c before enabling it). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add new error code 'ERR_R_DISABLED' that can be used when some functionality is disabled at compile-time. [Douglas Stebila ] *) Change default behaviour of 'openssl asn1parse' so that more information is visible when viewing, e.g., a certificate: Modify asn1_parse2 (crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c) so that in non-'dump' mode the content of non-printable OCTET STRINGs is output in a style similar to INTEGERs, but with '[HEX DUMP]' prepended to avoid the appearance of a printable string. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'asn1_flag' and 'asn1_form' member to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form() EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form() These control ASN1 encoding details: - Curves (i.e., groups) are encoded explicitly unless asn1_flag has been set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE. - Points are encoded in uncompressed form by default; options for asn1_for are as for point2oct, namely POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID Also add 'seed' and 'seed_len' members to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_seed() EC_GROUP_get0_seed() EC_GROUP_get_seed_len() This is used only for ASN1 purposes (so far). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'field_type' member to EC_METHOD, which holds the NID of the appropriate field type OID. The new function EC_METHOD_get_field_type() returns this value. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add functions EC_POINT_point2bn() EC_POINT_bn2point() EC_POINT_point2hex() EC_POINT_hex2point() providing useful interfaces to EC_POINT_point2oct() and EC_POINT_oct2point(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Change internals of the EC library so that the functions EC_GROUP_set_generator() EC_GROUP_get_generator() EC_GROUP_get_order() EC_GROUP_get_cofactor() are implemented directly in crypto/ec/ec_lib.c and not dispatched to methods, which would lead to unnecessary code duplication when adding different types of curves. [Nils Larsch with input by Bodo Moeller] *) Implement compute_wNAF (crypto/ec/ec_mult.c) without BIGNUM arithmetic, and such that modified wNAFs are generated (which avoid length expansion in many cases). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant() (defined via EC_METHOD) that verifies that the curve discriminant is non-zero. Add a function EC_GROUP_check() that makes some sanity tests on a EC_GROUP, its generator and order. This includes EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add ECDSA in new directory crypto/ecdsa/. Add applications 'openssl ecparam' and 'openssl ecdsa' (these are based on 'openssl dsaparam' and 'openssl dsa'). ECDSA support is also included in various other files across the library. Most notably, - 'openssl req' now has a '-newkey ecdsa:file' option; - EVP_PKCS82PKEY (crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c) now can handle ECDSA; - X509_PUBKEY_get (crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c) and d2i_PublicKey (crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c) have been modified to make them suitable for ECDSA where domain parameters must be extracted before the specific public key; - ECDSA engine support has been added. [Nils Larsch ] *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS. Each curve can be obtained from the new function EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(), and the list of available named curves can be obtained with EC_get_builtin_curves(). Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be accessed via EC_GROUP_set_curve_name() EC_GROUP_get_curve_name() [Nils Larsch ] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't. [Victor Duchovni] *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module. [Steve Henson] *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature. [Steve Henson] *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to run algorithm test programs. [Steve Henson] *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace. [Steve Henson] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA" will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j [04 May 2006] *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows. [Steve Henson] *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++ build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005] *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS. The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not. BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of the difference induced by this change. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage. [Steve Henson] *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise, the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with biased k.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are independent of the particular secret key. This will mitigate cache-timing and potential related attacks. BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation, and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller] *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set. (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some clients need. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before). [Steve Henson] *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code structures constant. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++ complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up some needed definitions. [Steve Henson] *) Undo Cygwin change. [Ulf Möller] *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820. Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications, they must be explicitely allowed in run-time. See docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005] *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating server and client random values. Previously (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms). This change has negligible security impact because: 1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random data. 2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial handshake. 3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random values. The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue to our attention. [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC] *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed prematurely by EGD/PRNGD. [Darren Tucker via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014] *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format. [Steve Henson] *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs. [Nauticus Networks SSL Team , Steve Henson] *) Add new -passin argument to dgst. [Steve Henson] *) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp: this is needed for some certificates that reencode DNs into UTF8Strings (in violation of RFC3280) and can't or wont issue name rollover certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct. As a side effect always do the following basic checks on extensions, not just when there's an associated purpose to the check: - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user has chosen to ignore this fault) - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all) - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has been given) [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7d and 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004] *) Avoid a race condition when CRLs are checked in a multi threaded environment. This would happen due to the reordering of the revoked entries during signature checking and serial number lookup. Now the encoding is cached and the serial number sort performed under a lock. Add new STACK function sk_is_sorted(). [Steve Henson] *) Add Delta CRL to the extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to s3_pkt.c so alerts are sent properly. [David Holmes ] *) Reduce the chances of duplicate issuer name and serial numbers (in violation of RFC3280) using the OpenSSL certificate creation utilities. This is done by creating a random 64 bit value for the initial serial number when a serial number file is created or when a self signed certificate is created using 'openssl req -x509'. The initial serial number file is created using 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl rather than being initialized to 1. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites (CVE-2004-0112) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) X509 verify fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds when X509_V_FLAGS_X509_STRICT is set. Check CRL issuer has cRLSign set if keyUsage extension present. Don't accept CRLs with unhandled critical extensions: since verify currently doesn't process CRL extensions this rejects a CRL with *any* critical extensions. Add new verify error codes for these cases. [Steve Henson] *) When creating an OCSP nonce use an OCTET STRING inside the extnValue. A clarification of RFC2560 will require the use of OCTET STRINGs and some implementations cannot handle the current raw format. Since OpenSSL copies and compares OCSP nonces as opaque blobs without any attempt at parsing them this should not create any compatibility issues. [Steve Henson] *) New md flag EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE this allows md_data to be reused when calling EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() to avoid calling OPENSSL_malloc(). Without this HMAC (and other) operations are several times slower than OpenSSL < 0.9.7. [Steve Henson] *) Print out GeneralizedTime and UTCTime in ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). [Peter Sylvester ] *) Use the correct content when signing type "other". [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server exiting on the first error in a request. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] *) Change AES_cbc_encrypt() so it outputs exact multiple of blocks during encryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Various fixes to base64 BIO and non blocking I/O. On write flushes were not handled properly if the BIO retried. On read data was not being buffered properly and had various logic bugs. This also affects blocking I/O when the data being decoded is a certain size. [Steve Henson] *) Various S/MIME bugfixes and compatibility changes: output correct application/pkcs7 MIME type if PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE is set. Tolerate some broken signatures. Output CR+LF for EOL if PKCS7_CRLFEOL is set (this makes opening of files as .eml work). Correctly handle very long lines in MIME parser. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications should make sure they are passing it correctly. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Target "mingw" now allows native Windows code to be generated in the Cygwin environment as well as with the MinGW compiler. [Ulf Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] *) Make the no-err option work as intended. The intention with no-err is not to have the whole error stack handling routines removed from libcrypto, it's only intended to remove all the function name and reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway. NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have it's own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not used by default when no-err is given. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for FreeBSD on IA64. [dirk.meyer@dinoex.sub.org via Richard Levitte, resolves #454] *) Adjust DES_cbc_cksum() so it returns the same value as the MIT Kerberos function mit_des_cbc_cksum(). Before this change, the value returned by DES_cbc_cksum() was like the one from mit_des_cbc_cksum(), except the bytes were swapped. [Kevin Greaney and Richard Levitte] *) Allow an application to disable the automatic SSL chain building. Before this a rather primitive chain build was always performed in ssl3_output_cert_chain(): an application had no way to send the correct chain if the automatic operation produced an incorrect result. Now the chain builder is disabled if either: 1. Extra certificates are added via SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). 2. The mode flag SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN is set. The reasoning behind this is that an application would not want the auto chain building to take place if extra chain certificates are present and it might also want a means of sending no additional certificates (for example the chain has two certificates and the root is omitted). [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to build without the ENGINE framework. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Under Win32 gmtime() can return NULL: check return value in OPENSSL_gmtime(). Add error code for case where gmtime() fails. [Steve Henson] *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode , Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This behaviour is masked when SSL_OP_ALL is used due to SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG being set. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as followup to PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) IA-32 assembler support enhancements: unified ELF targets, support for SCO/Caldera platforms, fix for Cygwin shared build. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for FreeBSD on sparc64. As a consequence, support for FreeBSD on non-x86 processors is separate from x86 processors on the config script, much like the NetBSD support. [Richard Levitte & Kris Kennaway ] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7 [31 Dec 2002] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.6i and later 0.9.6 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.7.] *) Fix session ID handling in SSLv2 client code: the SERVER FINISHED code (06) was taken as the first octet of the session ID and the last octet was ignored consequently. As a result SSLv2 client side session caching could not have worked due to the session ID mismatch between client and server. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the declaration of needed Kerberos libraries to use EX_LIBS instead of the special (and badly supported) LIBKRB5. LIBKRB5 is removed entirely. [Richard Levitte] *) The hw_ncipher.c engine requires dynamic locks. Unfortunately, it seems that in spite of existing for more than a year, many application author have done nothing to provide the necessary callbacks, which means that this particular engine will not work properly anywhere. This is a very unfortunate situation which forces us, in the name of usability, to give the hw_ncipher.c a static lock, which is part of libcrypto. NOTE: This is for the 0.9.7 series ONLY. This hack will never appear in 0.9.8 or later. We EXPECT application authors to have dealt properly with this when 0.9.8 is released (unless we actually make such changes in the libcrypto locking code that changes will have to be made anyway). [Richard Levitte] *) In asn1_d2i_read_bio() repeatedly call BIO_read() until all content octets have been read, EOF or an error occurs. Without this change some truncated ASN1 structures will not produce an error. [Steve Henson] *) Disable Heimdal support, since it hasn't been fully implemented. Still give the possibility to force the use of Heimdal, but with warnings and a request that patches get sent to openssl-dev. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the VC-CE target, introduce the WINCE sysname, and add INSTALL.WCE and appropriate conditionals to make it build. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Change the DLL names for Cygwin to cygcrypto-x.y.z.dll and cygssl-x.y.z.dll, where x, y and z are the major, minor and edit numbers of the version. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Introduce safe string copy and catenation functions (BUF_strlcpy() and BUF_strlcat()). [Ben Laurie (CHATS) and Richard Levitte] *) Avoid using fixed-size buffers for one-line DNs. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BUF_MEM_grow_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid using fixed size buffers for configuration file location. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation for various CA files. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Use sizeof in preference to magic numbers. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation in cert requests. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to check for (supposedly impossible) buffer overflows. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Don't cache truncated DNS entries in the local cache (this could potentially lead to a spoofing attack). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix various buffers to be large enough for hex/decimal representations in a platform independent manner. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add CRYPTO_realloc_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BIO_indent() to avoid much slightly worrying code to do indents. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Convert sprintf()/BIO_puts() to BIO_printf(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) buffer_gets() could terminate with the buffer only half full. Fixed. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to prevent user-supplied crypto functions from overflowing internal buffers by having large block sizes, etc. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) New OPENSSL_assert() macro (similar to assert(), but enabled unconditionally). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused copy of key in RC4. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized buffers for IV in pem.h. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix off-by-one error in EGD path. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) If RANDFILE path is too long, ignore instead of truncating. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized X.509 structure CBCParameter. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous function knumber(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous structure, KSSL_ERR. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Protect against overlong session ID context length in an encoded session object. Since these are local, this does not appear to be exploitable. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect the 0.9.6 release series: Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions. (CVE-2002-0657) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712. [Richard Levitte] *) Make -nameopt work fully for req and add -reqopt switch. [Michael Bell , Steve Henson] *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1. [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen ] *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms have been removed entirely. This was also the last step to make OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions. [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman ] *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers, which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher. (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption. "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.) [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build directories. The recommended way to make a platform-dependent build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with some local tweaks: # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree. In # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory. mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f) | while read F; do mkdir -p `dirname $F` ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F done To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean" is a good thing. If it isn't successfull, don't worry about it, it probably means the source directory is very clean. [Richard Levitte] *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values. [Götz Babin-Ebell ] *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests. [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer ] *) Add AES modes CFB and OFB to the object database. Correct an error in AES-CFB decryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove most calls to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() in evp_enc.c, this allows existing EVP_CIPHER_CTX structures to be reused after calling EVP_*Final(). This behaviour is used by encryption BIOs and some applications. This has the side effect that applications must explicitly clean up cipher contexts with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() or they will leak memory. [Steve Henson] *) Check the values of dna and dnb in bn_mul_recursive before calling bn_mul_comba (a non zero value means the a or b arrays do not contain n2 elements) and fallback to bn_mul_normal if either is not zero. [Steve Henson] *) Fix escaping of non-ASCII characters when using the -subj option of the "openssl req" command line tool. (Robert Joop ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Make object definitions compliant to LDAP (RFC2256): SN is the short form for "surname", serialNumber has no short form. Use "mail" as the short name for "rfc822Mailbox" according to RFC2798; therefore remove "mail" short name for "internet 7". The OID for unique identifiers in X509 certificates is x500UniqueIdentifier, not uniqueIdentifier. Some more OID additions. (Michael Bell ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the ENGINE is initailized at that point (ctrls before that point are run on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If init=0 then the ENGINE will not be iniatialized at all. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined argument is actually passed to the callback: In the SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() prototype, the callback declaration has been changed from int (*cb)() into int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *); in ssl_verify_cert_chain (ssl/ssl_cert.c), the call i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx) has been changed into i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg). To update applications using SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(), a dummy argument can be added to their callback functions. [D. K. Smetters ] *) Added the '4758cca' ENGINE to support IBM 4758 cards. [Maurice Gittens , touchups by Geoff Thorpe] *) Add and OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF define which will cause OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() to load the openssl.cnf config file. This allows older applications to transparently support certain OpenSSL features: such as crypto acceleration and dynamic ENGINE loading. Two new functions OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() which will never load the config file and OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() which will always load it have also been added. [Steve Henson] *) Add the OFB, CFB and CTR (all with 128 bit feedback) to AES. Adjust NIDs and EVP layer. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) Config modules support in openssl utility. Most commands now load modules from the config file, though in a few (such as version) this isn't done because it couldn't be used for anything. In the case of ca and req the config file used is the same as the utility itself: that is the -config command line option can be used to specify an alternative file. [Steve Henson] *) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative config section name. Add a new flag to tolerate a missing config file and move code to CONF_modules_load_file(). [Steve Henson] *) Support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted/corrected to work with the new engine framework. [AEP Inc. and Richard Levitte] *) Support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted to work with the new engine framework. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the CHIL engine fork-safe (as defined by nCipher) and actually make the newer ENGINE framework commands for the CHIL engine work. [Toomas Kiisk and Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to produce shared libraries on ReliantUNIX. [Robert Dahlem via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target debug-linux-ppro. Make 'openssl rsa' use the general key loading routines implemented in apps.c, and make those routines able to handle the key format FORMAT_NETSCAPE and the variant FORMAT_IISSGC. [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add -keyform to rsautl, and document -engine. [Richard Levitte, inspired by Toomas Kiisk ] *) Change BIO_new_file (crypto/bio/bss_file.c) to use new BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE error code rather than the generic ERR_R_SYS_LIB error code if fopen() fails with ENOENT. [Ben Laurie] *) Add new functions ERR_peek_last_error ERR_peek_last_error_line ERR_peek_last_error_line_data. These are similar to ERR_peek_error ERR_peek_error_line ERR_peek_error_line_data, but report on the latest error recorded rather than the first one still in the error queue. [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller] *) default_algorithms option in ENGINE config module. This allows things like: default_algorithms = ALL default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS [Steve Henson] *) Prelminary ENGINE config module. [Steve Henson] *) New experimental application configuration code. [Steve Henson] *) Change the AES code to follow the same name structure as all other symmetric ciphers, and behave the same way. Move everything to the directory crypto/aes, thereby obsoleting crypto/rijndael. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) SECURITY: remove unsafe setjmp/signal interaction from ui_openssl.c. [Ben Laurie and Theo de Raadt] *) Add option to output public keys in req command. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Use wNAFs in EC_POINTs_mul() for improved efficiency (up to about 10% better than before for P-192 and P-224). [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions/macros SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, cb) SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) to request calling a callback function void cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) whenever a protocol message has been completely received (write_p == 0) or sent (write_p == 1). Here 'version' is the protocol version according to which the SSL library interprets the current protocol message (SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, or TLS1_VERSION). 'content_type' is 0 in the case of SSL 2.0, or the content type as defined in the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol specification (change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22)). 'buf' and 'len' point to the actual message, 'ssl' to the SSL object, and 'arg' is the application-defined value set by SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg(). 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server' have new '-msg' options to enable a callback that displays all protocol messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the shared library support so shared libraries are built as soon as the corresponding static library is finished, and thereby get openssl and the test programs linked against the shared library. This still only happens when the keyword "shard" has been given to the configuration scripts. NOTE: shared library support is still an experimental thing, and backward binary compatibility is still not guaranteed. ["Maciej W. Rozycki" and Richard Levitte] *) Add support for Subject Information Access extension. [Peter Sylvester ] *) Make BUF_MEM_grow() behaviour more consistent: Initialise to zero additional bytes when new memory had to be allocated, not just when reusing an existing buffer. [Bodo Moeller] *) New command line and configuration option 'utf8' for the req command. This allows field values to be specified as UTF8 strings. [Steve Henson] *) Add -multi and -mr options to "openssl speed" - giving multiple parallel runs for the former and machine-readable output for the latter. [Ben Laurie] *) Add '-noemailDN' option to 'openssl ca'. This prevents inclusion of the e-mail address in the DN (i.e., it will go into a certificate extension only). The new configuration file option 'email_in_dn = no' has the same effect. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Change all functions with names starting with des_ to be starting with DES_ instead. Add wrappers that are compatible with libdes, but are named _ossl_old_des_*. Finally, add macros that map the des_* symbols to the corresponding _ossl_old_des_* if libdes compatibility is desired. If OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility is desired, the des_* symbols will be mapped to DES_*, with one exception. Since we provide two compatibility mappings, the user needs to define the macro OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY if libdes compatibility is desired. The default (i.e., when that macro isn't defined) is OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility. There are also macros that enable and disable the support of old des functions altogether. Those are OPENSSL_ENABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT and OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT. If none or both of those are defined, the default will apply: to support the old des routines. In either case, one must include openssl/des.h to get the correct definitions. Do not try to just include openssl/des_old.h, that won't work. NOTE: This is a major break of an old API into a new one. Software authors are encouraged to switch to the DES_ style functions. Some time in the future, des_old.h and the libdes compatibility functions will be disable (i.e. OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT will be the default), and then completely removed. [Richard Levitte] *) Test for certificates which contain unsupported critical extensions. If such a certificate is found during a verify operation it is rejected by default: this behaviour can be overridden by either handling the new error X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION or by setting the verify flag X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL. A new function X509_supported_extension() has also been added which returns 1 if a particular extension is supported. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP cipher functions in similar way to digests to retain compatibility with existing code. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP_DigestInit() and EVP_DigestFinal() to retain compatibility with existing code. In particular the 'ctx' parameter does not have to be to be initialized before the call to EVP_DigestInit() and it is tidied up after a call to EVP_DigestFinal(). New function EVP_DigestFinal_ex() which does not tidy up the ctx. Similarly function EVP_MD_CTX_copy() changed to not require the destination to be initialized valid and new function EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() added which requires the destination to be valid. Modify all the OpenSSL digest calls to use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(). [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) and the functions using it so that complete 'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory instead of overwriting 'msg_type' and 'length' with 'body' data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add an implementation of SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack for Win32. [Massimo Santin via Richard Levitte] *) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation (initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations of specific crypto iterfaces. This change also introduces integrated support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README as it couldn't be adequately described here. However, there are a few API changes worth noting - some RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that were changed in the original introduction of ENGINE code have now reverted back - the hooking from this code to ENGINE is now a good deal more passive and at run-time, operations deal directly with RSA_METHODs, DSA_METHODs (etc) as they did before, rather than dereferencing through an ENGINE pointer any more. Also, the ENGINE functions dealing with BN_MOD_EXP[_CRT] handlers have been removed - they were not being used by the framework as there is no concept of a BIGNUM_METHOD and they could not be generalised to the new 'ENGINE_TABLE' mechanism that underlies the new code. Similarly, ENGINE_cpy() has been removed as it cannot be consistently defined in the new code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() to allow fractional seconds. [Steve Henson] *) Change mkdef.pl to sort symbols that get the same entry number, and make sure the automatically generated functions ERR_load_* become part of libeay.num as well. [Richard Levitte] *) New function SSL_renegotiate_pending(). This returns true once renegotiation has been requested (either SSL_renegotiate() call or HelloRequest/ClientHello receveived from the peer) and becomes false once a handshake has been completed. (For servers, SSL_renegotiate() followed by SSL_do_handshake() sends a HelloRequest, but does not ensure that a handshake takes place. SSL_renegotiate_pending() is useful for checking if the client has followed the request.) [Bodo Moeller] *) New SSL option SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION. By default, clients may request session resumption even during renegotiation (if session ID contexts permit); with this option, session resumption is possible only in the first handshake. SSL_OP_ALL is now 0x00000FFFL instead of 0x000FFFFFL. This makes more bits available for options that should not be part of SSL_OP_ALL (such as SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add some demos for certificate and certificate request creation. [Steve Henson] *) Make maximum certificate chain size accepted from the peer application settable (SSL*_get/set_max_cert_list()), as proposed by "Douglas E. Engert" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add support for shared libraries for Unixware-7 (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and "openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This makes them more flexible to be built both as statically-linked ENGINEs and self-contained shared-libraries loadable via the "dynamic" ENGINE. Also, add stub code to each that makes building them as self-contained shared-libraries easier (see README.ENGINE). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a "dynamic" ENGINE that provides a mechanism for binding ENGINE implementations into applications that are completely implemented in self-contained shared-libraries. The "dynamic" ENGINE exposes control commands that can be used to configure what shared-library to load and to control aspects of the way it is handled. Also, made an update to the README.ENGINE file that brings its information up-to-date and provides some information and instructions on the "dynamic" ENGINE (ie. how to use it, how to build "dynamic"-loadable ENGINEs, etc). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to unload ranges of ERR strings with a new "ERR_unload_strings" function. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a copy() function to EVP_MD. [Ben Laurie] *) Make EVP_MD routines take a context pointer instead of just the md_data void pointer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add flags to EVP_MD and EVP_MD_CTX. EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the digest can only process a single chunk of data (typically because it is provided by a piece of hardware). EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the application is only going to provide a single chunk of data, and hence the framework needn't accumulate the data for oneshot drivers. [Ben Laurie] *) As with "ERR", make it possible to replace the underlying "ex_data" functions. This change also alters the storage and management of global ex_data state - it's now all inside ex_data.c and all "class" code (eg. RSA, BIO, SSL_CTX, etc) no longer stores its own STACKS and per-class index counters. The API functions that use this state have been changed to take a "class_index" rather than pointers to the class's local STACK and counter, and there is now an API function to dynamically create new classes. This centralisation allows us to (a) plug a lot of the thread-safety problems that existed, and (b) makes it possible to clean up all allocated state using "CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data()". W.r.t. (b) such data would previously have always leaked in application code and workarounds were in place to make the memory debugging turn a blind eye to it. Application code that doesn't use this new function will still leak as before, but their memory debugging output will announce it now rather than letting it slide. Besides the addition of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), another API change induced by the "ex_data" overhaul is that X509_STORE_CTX_init() now has a return value to indicate success or failure. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to replace the underlying "ERR" functions such that the global state (2 LHASH tables and 2 locks) is only used by the "default" implementation. This change also adds two functions to "get" and "set" the implementation prior to it being automatically set the first time any other ERR function takes place. Ie. an application can call "get", pass the return value to a module it has just loaded, and that module can call its own "set" function using that value. This means the module's "ERR" operations will use (and modify) the error state in the application and not in its own statically linked copy of OpenSSL code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Give DH, DSA, and RSA types their own "**_up_ref()" function to increment reference counts. This performs normal REF_PRINT/REF_CHECK macros on the operation, and provides a more encapsulated way for external code (crypto/evp/ and ssl/) to do this. Also changed the evp and ssl code to use these functions rather than manually incrementing the counts. Also rename "DSO_up()" function to more descriptive "DSO_up_ref()". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add EVP test program. [Ben Laurie] *) Add symmetric cipher support to ENGINE. Expect the API to change! [Ben Laurie] *) New CRL functions: X509_CRL_set_version(), X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(), X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(), X509_CRL_sort(), X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), and X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(). These allow a CRL to be built without having to access X509_CRL fields directly. Modify 'ca' application to use new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Move SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG out of the SSL_OP_ALL list of recommended bug workarounds. Rollback attack detection is a security feature. The problem will only arise on OpenSSL servers when TLSv1 is not available (sslv3_server_method() or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1). Software authors not wanting to support TLSv1 will have special reasons for their choice and can explicitly enable this option. [Bodo Moeller, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rationalise EVP so it can be extended: don't include a union of cipher/digest structures, add init/cleanup functions for EVP_MD_CTX (similar to those existing for EVP_CIPHER_CTX). Usage example: EVP_MD_CTX md; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md); /* new function call */ EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_sha1()); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, in, len); EVP_DigestFinal(&md, out, NULL); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md); /* new function call */ [Ben Laurie] *) Make DES key schedule conform to the usual scheme, as well as correcting its structure. This means that calls to DES functions now have to pass a pointer to a des_key_schedule instead of a plain des_key_schedule (which was actually always a pointer anyway): E.g., des_key_schedule ks; des_set_key_checked(..., &ks); des_ncbc_encrypt(..., &ks, ...); (Note that a later change renames 'des_...' into 'DES_...'.) [Ben Laurie] *) Initial reduction of linker bloat: the use of some functions, such as PEM causes large amounts of unused functions to be linked in due to poor organisation. For example pem_all.c contains every PEM function which has a knock on effect of linking in large amounts of (unused) ASN1 code. Grouping together similar functions and splitting unrelated functions prevents this. [Steve Henson] *) Cleanup of EVP macros. [Ben Laurie] *) Change historical references to {NID,SN,LN}_des_ede and ede3 to add the correct _ecb suffix. [Ben Laurie] *) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The revocation information is handled using the text based index use by the ca application. The responder can either handle requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server. [Steve Henson] *) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS. [Richard Levitte] *) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance: 1. Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using KRB5 AP_REQ message. [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ] 2. Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper. Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req, and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/. Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries. [Vern Staats , Jeffrey Altman via Richard Levitte] *) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key' values for each of the key sizes rather than having just parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Speed up EVP routines. Before: encrypt type 8 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes des-cbc 4408.85k 5560.51k 5778.46k 5862.20k 5825.16k des-cbc 4389.55k 5571.17k 5792.23k 5846.91k 5832.11k des-cbc 4394.32k 5575.92k 5807.44k 5848.37k 5841.30k decrypt des-cbc 3482.66k 5069.49k 5496.39k 5614.16k 5639.28k des-cbc 3480.74k 5068.76k 5510.34k 5609.87k 5635.52k des-cbc 3483.72k 5067.62k 5504.60k 5708.01k 5724.80k After: encrypt des-cbc 4660.16k 5650.19k 5807.19k 5827.13k 5783.32k decrypt des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k [Ben Laurie] *) Added the OS2-EMX target. ["Brian Havard" and Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite apps to use NCONF routines instead of the old CONF. New functions to support NCONF routines in extension code. New function CONF_set_nconf() to allow functions which take an NCONF to also handle the old LHASH structure: this means that the old CONF compatible routines can be retained (in particular wrt extensions) without having to duplicate the code. New function X509V3_add_ext_nconf_sk to add extensions to a stack. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms for inner control and with possibilities to have yes/no kind of prompts. [Richard Levitte] *) Change all calls to low level digest routines in the library and applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy(). [Verdon Walker , Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to control engines through control names but with arbitrary arguments instead of just a string. Change the key loaders to take a UI_METHOD instead of a callback function pointer. NOTE: this breaks binary compatibility with earlier versions of OpenSSL [engine]. Adapt the nCipher code for these new conditions and add a card insertion callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms to better support dialog box interfaces, application-defined prompts, the possibility to use defaults (for example default passwords from somewhere else) and interrupts/cancellations. [Richard Levitte] *) Tidy up PKCS#12 attribute handling. Add support for the CSP name attribute in PKCS#12 files, add new -CSP option to pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a memory leak in 'sk_dup()' in the case reallocation fails. (Also tidy up some unnecessarily weird code in 'sk_new()'). [Geoff, reported by Diego Tartara ] *) Change the key loading routines for ENGINEs to use the same kind callback (pem_password_cb) as all other routines that need this kind of callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Increase ENTROPY_NEEDED to 32 bytes, as Rijndael can operate with 256 bit (=32 byte) keys. Of course seeding with more entropy bytes than this minimum value is recommended. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) New random seeder for OpenVMS, using the system process statistics that are easily reachable. [Richard Levitte] *) Windows apparently can't transparently handle global variables defined in DLLs. Initialisations such as: const ASN1_ITEM *it = &ASN1_INTEGER_it; wont compile. This is used by the any applications that need to declare their own ASN1 modules. This was fixed by adding the option EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN to all Win32 platforms, although this isn't strictly needed for static libraries under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) New functions X509_PURPOSE_set() and X509_TRUST_set() to handle setting of purpose and trust fields. New X509_STORE trust and purpose functions and tidy up setting in other SSL functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add copies of X509_STORE_CTX fields and callbacks to X509_STORE structure. These are inherited by X509_STORE_CTX when it is initialised. This allows various defaults to be set in the X509_STORE structure (such as flags for CRL checking and custom purpose or trust settings) for functions which only use X509_STORE_CTX internally such as S/MIME. Modify X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() so it only sets purposes and trust settings if they are not set in X509_STORE. This allows X509_STORE purposes and trust (in S/MIME for example) to override any set by default. Add command line options for CRL checking to smime, s_client and s_server applications. [Steve Henson] *) Initial CRL based revocation checking. If the CRL checking flag(s) are set then the CRL is looked up in the X509_STORE structure and its validity and signature checked, then if the certificate is found in the CRL the verify fails with a revoked error. Various new CRL related callbacks added to X509_STORE_CTX structure. Command line options added to 'verify' application to support this. This needs some additional work, such as being able to handle multiple CRLs with different times, extension based lookup (rather than just by subject name) and ultimately more complete V2 CRL extension handling. [Steve Henson] *) Add a general user interface API (crypto/ui/). This is designed to replace things like des_read_password and friends (backward compatibility functions using this new API are provided). The purpose is to remove prompting functions from the DES code section as well as provide for prompting through dialog boxes in a window system and the like. [Richard Levitte] *) Add "ex_data" support to ENGINE so implementations can add state at a per-structure level rather than having to store it globally. [Geoff] *) Make it possible for ENGINE structures to be copied when retrieved by ENGINE_by_id() if the ENGINE specifies a new flag: ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY. This causes the "original" ENGINE structure to act like a template, analogous to the RSA vs. RSA_METHOD type of separation. Because of this operational state can be localised to each ENGINE structure, despite the fact they all share the same "methods". New ENGINE structures returned in this case have no functional references and the return value is the single structural reference. This matches the single structural reference returned by ENGINE_by_id() normally, when it is incremented on the pre-existing ENGINE structure. [Geoff] *) Fix ASN1 decoder when decoding type ANY and V_ASN1_OTHER: since this needs to match any other type at all we need to manually clear the tag cache. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to the "openssl engine" utility to include; - verbosity levels ('-v', '-vv', and '-vvv') that provide information about an ENGINE's available control commands. - executing control commands from command line arguments using the '-pre' and '-post' switches. '-post' is only used if '-t' is specified and the ENGINE is successfully initialised. The syntax for the individual commands are colon-separated, for example; openssl engine chil -pre FORK_CHECK:0 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/test.so [Geoff] *) New dynamic control command support for ENGINEs. ENGINEs can now declare their own commands (numbers), names (strings), descriptions, and input types for run-time discovery by calling applications. A subset of these commands are implicitly classed as "executable" depending on their input type, and only these can be invoked through the new string-based API function ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). (Eg. this can be based on user input, config files, etc). The distinction is that "executable" commands cannot return anything other than a boolean result and can only support numeric or string input, whereas some discoverable commands may only be for direct use through ENGINE_ctrl(), eg. supporting the exchange of binary data, function pointers, or other custom uses. The "executable" commands are to support parameterisations of ENGINE behaviour that can be unambiguously defined by ENGINEs and used consistently across any OpenSSL-based application. Commands have been added to all the existing hardware-supporting ENGINEs, noticeably "SO_PATH" to allow control over shared-library paths without source code alterations. [Geoff] *) Changed all ENGINE implementations to dynamically allocate their ENGINEs rather than declaring them statically. Apart from this being necessary with the removal of the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED distinction, this also allows the implementations to compile without using the internal engine_int.h header. [Geoff] *) Minor adjustment to "rand" code. RAND_get_rand_method() now returns a 'const' value. Any code that should be able to modify a RAND_METHOD should already have non-const pointers to it (ie. they should only modify their own ones). [Geoff] *) Made a variety of little tweaks to the ENGINE code. - "atalla" and "ubsec" string definitions were moved from header files to C code. "nuron" string definitions were placed in variables rather than hard-coded - allowing parameterisation of these values later on via ctrl() commands. - Removed unused "#if 0"'d code. - Fixed engine list iteration code so it uses ENGINE_free() to release structural references. - Constified the RAND_METHOD element of ENGINE structures. - Constified various get/set functions as appropriate and added missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state). - Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set value. Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code. - Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for flags from engine_int.h to engine.h. - Changed prototypes for ENGINE handler functions (init(), finish(), ctrl(), key-load functions, etc) to take an (ENGINE*) parameter. [Geoff] *) Implement binary inversion algorithm for BN_mod_inverse in addition to the algorithm using long division. The binary algorithm can be used only if the modulus is odd. On 32-bit systems, it is faster only for relatively small moduli (roughly 20-30% for 128-bit moduli, roughly 5-15% for 256-bit moduli), so we use it only for moduli up to 450 bits. In 64-bit environments, the binary algorithm appears to be advantageous for much longer moduli; here we use it for moduli up to 2048 bits. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite CHOICE field setting in ASN1_item_ex_d2i(). The old code could not support the combine flag in choice fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add a 'copy_extensions' option to the 'ca' utility. This copies extensions from a certificate request to the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple 'certopt' and 'nameopt' options to be separated by commas. Add 'namopt' and 'certopt' options to the 'ca' config file: this allows the display of the certificate about to be signed to be customised, to allow certain fields to be included or excluded and extension details. The old system didn't display multicharacter strings properly, omitted fields not in the policy and couldn't display additional details such as extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Function EC_POINTs_mul for multiple scalar multiplication of an arbitrary number of elliptic curve points \sum scalars[i]*points[i], optionally including the generator defined for the EC_GROUP: scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i]. EC_POINT_mul is a simple wrapper function for the typical case that the point list has just one item (besides the optional generator). [Bodo Moeller] *) First EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p): EC_GFp_simple_method() uses the basic BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_sqr operations and provides various method functions that can also operate with faster implementations of modular arithmetic. EC_GFp_mont_method() reuses most functions that are part of EC_GFp_simple_method, but uses Montgomery arithmetic. [Bodo Moeller; point addition and point doubling implementation directly derived from source code provided by Lenka Fibikova ] *) Framework for elliptic curves (crypto/ec/ec.h, crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h, crypto/ec/ec_lib.c): Curves are EC_GROUP objects (with an optional group generator) based on EC_METHODs that are built into the library. Points are EC_POINT objects based on EC_GROUP objects. Most of the framework would be able to handle curves over arbitrary finite fields, but as there are no obvious types for fields other than GF(p), some functions are limited to that for now. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the -HTTP option to s_server. It is similar to -WWW, but requires that the file contains a complete HTTP response. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ec directory to mkdef.pl and mkfiles.pl. In mkdef.pl change the def and num file printf format specifier from "%-40sXXX" to "%-39s XXX". The latter will always guarantee a space after the field while the former will cause them to run together if the field is 40 of more characters long. [Steve Henson] *) Constify the cipher and digest 'method' functions and structures and modify related functions to take constant EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER pointers. [Steve Henson] *) Hide BN_CTX structure details in bn_lcl.h instead of publishing them in . Also further increase BN_CTX_NUM to 32. [Bodo Moeller] *) Modify EVP_Digest*() routines so they now return values. Although the internal software routines can never fail additional hardware versions might. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up crypto/err/err.h and change some error codes to avoid conflicts: Previously ERR_R_FATAL was too small and coincided with ERR_LIB_PKCS7 (= ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB); it is now 64 instead of 32. ASN1 error codes ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR ... ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS were 4 .. 9, conflicting with ERR_LIB_RSA (= ERR_R_RSA_LIB) ... ERR_LIB_PEM (= ERR_R_PEM_LIB). They are now 58 .. 63 (i.e., just below ERR_R_FATAL). Add new error code 'ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't overuse locks in crypto/err/err.c: For data retrieval, CRYPTO_r_lock suffices. [Bodo Moeller] *) New option '-subj arg' for 'openssl req' and 'openssl ca'. This sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the subject name in a given request. Formats that can be parsed are 'CN=Some Name, OU=myOU, C=IT' and 'CN=Some Name/OU=myOU/C=IT'. Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) Introduce the possibility to access global variables through functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting global variables in shared libraries. To enable this functionality, one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro "OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter is normally done by Configure or something similar). To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL in the source file (foo.c) like this: OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1; OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar); To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this: OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo); #define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo) OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar); #define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar) The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the header file everywhere where the defined globals are used. The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bit different. The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites). [Richard Levitte] *) In BN_div() keep a copy of the sign of 'num' before writing the result to 'rm' because if rm==num the value will be overwritten and produce the wrong result if 'num' is negative: this caused problems with BN_mod() and BN_nnmod(). [Steve Henson] *) Function OCSP_request_verify(). This checks the signature on an OCSP request and verifies the signer certificate. The signer certificate is just checked for a generic purpose and OCSP request trust settings. [Steve Henson] *) Add OCSP_check_validity() function to check the validity of OCSP responses. OCSP responses are prepared in real time and may only be a few seconds old. Simply checking that the current time lies between thisUpdate and nextUpdate max reject otherwise valid responses caused by either OCSP responder or client clock inaccuracy. Instead we allow thisUpdate and nextUpdate to fall within a certain period of the current time. The age of the response can also optionally be checked. Two new options -validity_period and -status_age added to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) If signature or public key algorithm is unrecognized print out its OID rather that just UNKNOWN. [Steve Henson] *) Change OCSP_cert_to_id() to tolerate a NULL subject certificate and OCSP_cert_id_new() a NULL serialNumber. This allows a partial certificate ID to be generated from the issuer certificate alone which can then be passed to OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(). [Steve Henson] *) New compilation option ASN1_ITEM_FUNCTIONS. This causes the new ASN1 modules to export functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers instead of the ASN1_ITEM structures themselves. This adds several new macros which allow the underlying ASN1 function/structure to be accessed transparently. As a result code should not use ASN1_ITEM references directly (such as &X509_it) but instead use the relevant macros (such as ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)). This option is to allow use of the new ASN1 code on platforms where exporting structures is problematical (for example in shared libraries) but exporting functions returning pointers to structures is not. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for overriding the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs. These callbacks can be registered either in an SSL_CTX or per SSL. The purpose of this is to allow applications to control, if they wish, the arbitrary values chosen for use as session IDs, particularly as it can be useful for session caching in multiple-server environments. A command-line switch for testing this (and any client code that wishes to use such a feature) has been added to "s_server". [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Modify mkdef.pl to recognise and parse preprocessor conditionals of the form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and '#if !defined(...) && !defined(...) && ...'. This also avoids the growing number of special cases it was previously handling. [Richard Levitte] *) Make all configuration macros available for application by making sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with opensslconf.h. Additionally, it is now possible to define configuration/platform- specific names (called "system identities"). In the C code, these are prefixed with "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_". e_os2.h will create another macro with the name beginning with "OPENSSL_SYS_", which is determined from "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_*" or compiler-specific macros depending on what is available. [Richard Levitte] *) New option -set_serial to 'req' and 'x509' this allows the serial number to use to be specified on the command line. Previously self signed certificates were hard coded with serial number 0 and the CA options of 'x509' had to use a serial number in a file which was auto incremented. [Steve Henson] *) New options to 'ca' utility to support V2 CRL entry extensions. Currently CRL reason, invalidity date and hold instruction are supported. Add new CRL extensions to V3 code and some new objects. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() this is used to disable standard block padding (aka PKCS#5 padding) in the EVP API, which was previously mandatory. This means that the data is not padded in any way and so the total length much be a multiple of the block size, otherwise an error occurs. [Steve Henson] *) Initial (incomplete) OCSP SSL support. [Steve Henson] *) New function OCSP_parse_url(). This splits up a URL into its host, port and path components: primarily to parse OCSP URLs. New -url option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) New nonce behavior. The return value of OCSP_check_nonce() now reflects the various checks performed. Applications can decide whether to tolerate certain situations such as an absent nonce in a response when one was present in a request: the ocsp application just prints out a warning. New function OCSP_add1_basic_nonce() this is to allow responders to include a nonce in a response even if the request is nonce-less. [Steve Henson] *) Disable stdin buffering in load_cert (apps/apps.c) so that no certs are skipped when using openssl x509 multiple times on a single input file, e.g. "(openssl x509 -out cert1; openssl x509 -out cert2) ] *) New OCSP verify flag OCSP_TRUSTOTHER. When set the "other" certificates passed by the function are trusted implicitly. If any of them signed the response then it is assumed to be valid and is not verified. [Steve Henson] *) In PKCS7_set_type() initialise content_type in PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT to data. This was previously part of the PKCS7 ASN1 code. This was causing problems with OpenSSL created PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 structures. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Add CRYPTO_push_info() and CRYPTO_pop_info() calls to new ASN1 routines: without these tracing memory leaks is very painful. Fix leaks in PKCS12 and PKCS7 routines. [Steve Henson] *) Make X509_time_adj() cope with the new behaviour of ASN1_TIME_new(). Previously it initialised the 'type' argument to V_ASN1_UTCTIME which effectively meant GeneralizedTime would never be used. Now it is initialised to -1 but X509_time_adj() now has to check the value and use ASN1_TIME_set() if the value is not V_ASN1_UTCTIME or V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, without this it always uses GeneralizedTime. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Fixes to BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER when bn is zero. This would previously result in a zero length in the ASN1_INTEGER structure which was not consistent with the structure when d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() was used and would cause ASN1_INTEGER_cmp() to fail. Enhance s2i_ASN1_INTEGER() to cope with hex and negative integers. Fix bug in i2a_ASN1_INTEGER() where it did not print out a minus for negative ASN1_INTEGER. [Steve Henson] *) Add summary printout to ocsp utility. The various functions which convert status values to strings have been renamed to: OCSP_response_status_str(), OCSP_cert_status_str() and OCSP_crl_reason_str() and are no longer static. New options to verify nonce values and to disable verification. OCSP response printout format cleaned up. [Steve Henson] *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response. [Steve Henson] *) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify() and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and to obtain the certificate chain. Then additional checks will be performed on the chain. Currently the root CA is checked to see if it is explicitly trusted for OCSP signing. This is used to set a root CA as a global signing root: that is any certificate that chains to that CA is an acceptable OCSP signing certificate. [Steve Henson] *) New '-extfile ...' option to 'openssl ca' for reading X.509v3 extensions from a separate configuration file. As when reading extensions from the main configuration file, the '-extensions ...' option may be used for specifying the section to use. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet: still needs to check the OCSP response validity. [Steve Henson] *) New subcommands for 'openssl ca': 'openssl ca -status ' prints the status of the cert with the given serial number (according to the index file). 'openssl ca -updatedb' updates the expiry status of certificates in the index file. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New '-newreq-nodes' command option to CA.pl. This is like '-newreq', but calls 'openssl req' with the '-nodes' option so that the resulting key is not encrypted. [Damien Miller ] *) New configuration for the GNU Hurd. [Jonathan Bartlett via Richard Levitte] *) Initial code to implement OCSP basic response verify. This is currently incomplete. Currently just finds the signer's certificate and verifies the signature on the response. [Steve Henson] *) New SSLeay_version code SSLEAY_DIR to determine the compiled-in value of OPENSSLDIR. This is available via the new '-d' option to 'openssl version', and is also included in 'openssl version -a'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allowing defining memory allocation callbacks that will be given file name and line number information in additional arguments (a const char* and an int). The basic functionality remains, as well as the original possibility to just replace malloc(), realloc() and free() by functions that do not know about these additional arguments. To register and find out the current settings for extended allocation functions, the following functions are provided: CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions These work the same way as CRYPTO_set_mem_functions and friends. CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_functions now writes 0 where such an extended allocation function is enabled. Similarly, CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_ex_functions writes 0 where a conventional allocation function is enabled. [Richard Levitte, Bodo Moeller] *) Finish off removing the remaining LHASH function pointer casts. There should no longer be any prototype-casting required when using the LHASH abstraction, and any casts that remain are "bugs". See the callback types and macros at the head of lhash.h for details (and "OBJ_cleanup" in crypto/objects/obj_dat.c as an example). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add automatic query of EGD sockets in RAND_poll() for the unix variant. If /dev/[u]random devices are not available or do not return enough entropy, EGD style sockets (served by EGD or PRNGD) will automatically be queried. The locations /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool, and /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, quering stops when enough entropy was collected without querying more sockets. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the Unix RAND_poll() variant to be able to poll several random devices, as specified by DEVRANDOM, until a sufficient amount of data has been collected. We spend at most 10 ms on each file (select timeout) and read in non-blocking mode. DEVRANDOM now defaults to the list "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/srandom" (previously it was just the string "/dev/urandom"), so on typical platforms the 10 ms delay will never occur. Also separate out the Unix variant to its own file, rand_unix.c. For VMS, there's a currently-empty rand_vms.c. [Richard Levitte] *) Move OCSP client related routines to ocsp_cl.c. These provide utility functions which an application needing to issue a request to an OCSP responder and analyse the response will typically need: as opposed to those which an OCSP responder itself would need which will be added later. OCSP_request_sign() signs an OCSP request with an API similar to PKCS7_sign(). OCSP_response_status() returns status of OCSP response. OCSP_response_get1_basic() extracts basic response from response. OCSP_resp_find_status(): finds and extracts status information from an OCSP_CERTID structure (which will be created when the request structure is built). These are built from lower level functions which work on OCSP_SINGLERESP structures but wont normally be used unless the application wishes to examine extensions in the OCSP response for example. Replace nonce routines with a pair of functions. OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce value and optionally generates a random value. OCSP_check_nonce() checks the validity of the nonce in an OCSP response. [Steve Henson] *) Change function OCSP_request_add() to OCSP_request_add0_id(). This doesn't copy the supplied OCSP_CERTID and avoids the need to free up the newly created id. Change return type to OCSP_ONEREQ to return the internal OCSP_ONEREQ structure. This can then be used to add extensions to the request. Deleted OCSP_request_new(), since most of its functionality is now in OCSP_REQUEST_new() (and the case insensitive name clash) apart from the ability to set the request name which will be added elsewhere. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP API. Remove obsolete extensions argument from various functions. Extensions are now handled using the new OCSP extension code. New simple OCSP HTTP function which can be used to send requests and parse the response. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code to work with new ASN1. Two new ASN1_ITEM structures help with sign and verify. PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN uses the special reorder version of SET OF to sort the attributes and reorder them to match the encoded order. This resolves a long standing problem: a verify on a PKCS7 structure just after signing it used to fail because the attribute order did not match the encoded order. PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY does not reorder the attributes: it uses the received order. This is necessary to tolerate some broken software that does not order SET OF. This is handled by encoding as a SEQUENCE OF but using implicit tagging (with UNIVERSAL class) to produce the required SET OF. [Steve Henson] *) Have mk1mf.pl generate the macros OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO and OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL and use them appropriately in the header files to get correct declarations of the ASN.1 item variables. [Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite of PKCS#12 code to use new ASN1 functionality. Replace many PKCS#12 macros with real functions. Fix two unrelated ASN1 bugs: asn1_check_tlen() would sometimes attempt to use 'ctx' when it was NULL and ASN1_TYPE was not dereferenced properly in asn1_ex_c2i(). New ASN1 macro: DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM() which just declares the relevant ASN1_ITEM and no wrapper functions. [Steve Henson] *) New functions or ASN1_item_d2i_fp() and ASN1_item_d2i_bio(). These replace the old function pointer based I/O routines. Change most of the *_d2i_bio() and *_d2i_fp() functions to use these. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor lines, recognice more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised. [Richard Levitte] *) New ASN1 functions to handle dup, sign, verify, digest, pack and unpack operations in terms of ASN1_ITEM. Modify existing wrappers to use new functions. Add NO_ASN1_OLD which can be set to remove some old style ASN1 functions: this can be used to determine if old code will still work when these eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) New extension functions for OCSP structures, these follow the same conventions as certificates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for certifcates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when an extension cannot be parsed. Correct a typo in the OCSP_SERVICELOC extension. Tidy up print OCSP format. [Steve Henson] *) Make mkdef.pl parse some of the ASN1 macros and add apropriate entries for variables. [Steve Henson] *) Add functionality to apps/openssl.c for detecting locking problems: As the program is single-threaded, all we have to do is register a locking callback using an array for storing which locks are currently held by the program. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use a lock around the call to CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() in SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_idx(), which is used in ssl_verify_cert_chain() and thus can be called at any time during TLS/SSL handshakes so that thread-safety is essential. Unfortunately, the ex_data design is not at all suited for multi-threaded use, so it probably should be abolished. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added Broadcom "ubsec" ENGINE to OpenSSL. [Broadcom, tweaked and integrated by Geoff Thorpe] *) Move common extension printing code to new function X509V3_print_extensions(). Reorganise OCSP print routines and implement some needed OCSP ASN1 functions. Add OCSP extensions. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_signature_print() to remove duplication in some print routines. [Steve Henson] *) Add a special meaning when SET OF and SEQUENCE OF flags are both set (this was treated exactly the same as SET OF previously). This is used to reorder the STACK representing the structure to match the encoding. This will be used to get round a problem where a PKCS7 structure which was signed could not be verified because the STACK order did not reflect the encoded order. [Steve Henson] *) Reimplement the OCSP ASN1 module using the new code. [Steve Henson] *) Update the X509V3 code to permit the use of an ASN1_ITEM structure for its ASN1 operations. The old style function pointers still exist for now but they will eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) Merge in replacement ASN1 code from the ASN1 branch. This almost completely replaces the old ASN1 functionality with a table driven encoder and decoder which interprets an ASN1_ITEM structure describing the ASN1 module. Compatibility with the existing ASN1 API (i2d,d2i) is largely maintained. Almost all of the old asn1_mac.h macro based ASN1 has also been converted to the new form. [Steve Henson] *) Change BN_mod_exp_recp so that negative moduli are tolerated (the sign is ignored). Similarly, ignore the sign in BN_MONT_CTX_set so that BN_mod_exp_mont and BN_mod_exp_mont_word work for negative moduli. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_uadd and BN_usub: Always return non-negative results instead of not touching the result's sign bit. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_div bugfix: If the result is 0, the sign (res->neg) must not be set. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changed the LHASH code to use prototypes for callbacks, and created macros to declare and implement thin (optionally static) functions that provide type-safety and avoid function pointer casting for the type-specific callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added Kerberos Cipher Suites to be used with TLS, as written in RFC 2712. [Veers Staats , Jeffrey Altman , via Richard Levitte] *) Reformat the FAQ so the different questions and answers can be divided in sections depending on the subject. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the zlib compression code load ZLIB.DLL dynamically under Windows. [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_sqrt for computing square roots modulo a prime (using the probabilistic Tonelli-Shanks algorithm unless p == 3 (mod 4) or p == 5 (mod 8), which are cases that can be handled deterministically). [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] *) Make BN_mod_inverse faster by explicitly handling small quotients in the Euclid loop. (Speed gain about 20% for small moduli [256 or 512 bits], about 30% for larger ones [1024 or 2048 bits].) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_kronecker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_gcd so that it works on negative inputs; the result is positive unless both parameters are zero. Previously something reasonably close to an infinite loop was possible because numbers could be growing instead of shrinking in the implementation of Euclid's algorithm. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_is_word() and BN_is_one() macros to take into account the sign of the number in question. Fix BN_is_word(a,w) to work correctly for w == 0. The old BN_is_word(a,w) macro is now called BN_abs_is_word(a,w) because its test if the absolute value of 'a' equals 'w'. Note that BN_abs_is_word does *not* handle w == 0 reliably; it exists mostly for use in the implementations of BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), and BN_is_word(). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_swap. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use BN_nnmod instead of BN_mod in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c so that the exponentiation functions are more likely to produce reasonable results on negative inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_mul so that the result is always non-negative. Previously, it could be negative if one of the factors was negative; I don't think anyone really wanted that behaviour. [Bodo Moeller] *) Move BN_mod_... functions into new file crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (except for exponentiation, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c, and BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_recp.c) and add new functions: BN_nnmod BN_mod_sqr BN_mod_add BN_mod_add_quick BN_mod_sub BN_mod_sub_quick BN_mod_lshift1 BN_mod_lshift1_quick BN_mod_lshift BN_mod_lshift_quick These functions always generate non-negative results. BN_nnmod otherwise is like BN_mod (if BN_mod computes a remainder r such that |m| < r < 0, BN_nnmod will output rem + |m| instead). BN_mod_XXX_quick(r, a, [b,] m) generates the same result as BN_mod_XXX(r, a, [b,] m, ctx), but requires that a [and b] be reduced modulo m. [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] #if 0 The following entry accidentily appeared in the CHANGES file distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7. The modifications described in it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7. *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul() required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(), bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with differing sizes. [Richard Levitte] #endif *) In 'openssl passwd', verify passwords read from the terminal unless the '-salt' option is used (which usually means that verification would just waste user's time since the resulting hash is going to be compared with some given password hash) or the new '-noverify' option is used. This is an incompatible change, but it does not affect non-interactive use of 'openssl passwd' (passwords on the command line, '-stdin' option, '-in ...' option) and thus should not cause any problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove all references to RSAref, since there's no more need for it. [Richard Levitte] *) Make DSO load along a path given through an environment variable (SHLIB_PATH) with shl_load(). [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the ENGINE code as a result of BIGNUM constification. Also constify the RSA code and most things related to it. In a few places, most notable in the depth of the ASN.1 code, ugly casts back to non-const were required (to be solved at a later time) [Richard Levitte] *) Make it so the openssl application has all engines loaded by default. [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the BIGNUM routines a little more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the following functions: ENGINE_load_cswift() ENGINE_load_chil() ENGINE_load_atalla() ENGINE_load_nuron() ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() That way, an application can itself choose if external engines that are built-in in OpenSSL shall ever be used or not. The benefit is that applications won't have to be linked with libdl or other dso libraries unless it's really needed. Changed 'openssl engine' to load all engines on demand. Changed the engine header files to avoid the duplication of some declarations (they differed!). [Richard Levitte] *) 'openssl engine' can now list capabilities. [Richard Levitte] *) Better error reporting in 'openssl engine'. [Richard Levitte] *) Never call load_dh_param(NULL) in s_server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add engine application. It can currently list engines by name and identity, and test if they are actually available. [Richard Levitte] *) Improve RPM specification file by forcing symbolic linking and making sure the installed documentation is also owned by root.root. [Damien Miller ] *) Give the OpenSSL applications more possibilities to make use of keys (public as well as private) handled by engines. [Richard Levitte] *) Add OCSP code that comes from CertCo. [Richard Levitte] *) Add VMS support for the Rijndael code. [Richard Levitte] *) Added untested support for Nuron crypto accelerator. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for external cryptographic devices. This code was previously distributed separately as the "engine" branch. [Geoff Thorpe, Richard Levitte] *) Rework the filename-translation in the DSO code. It is now possible to have far greater control over how a "name" is turned into a filename depending on the operating environment and any oddities about the different shared library filenames on each system. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support threads on FreeBSD-elf in Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for SHA1 assembly problem with MASM: it produces warnings about corrupt line number information when assembling with debugging information. This is caused by the overlapping of two sections. [Bernd Matthes , Steve Henson] *) NCONF changes. NCONF_get_number() has no error checking at all. As a replacement, NCONF_get_number_e() is defined (_e for "error checking") and is promoted strongly. The old NCONF_get_number is kept around for binary backward compatibility. Make it possible for methods to load from something other than a BIO, by providing a function pointer that is given a name instead of a BIO. For example, this could be used to load configuration data from an LDAP server. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for non blocking accept BIOs. Added new I/O special reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT to cover this case. Previously use of accept BIOs with non blocking I/O was not possible because no retry code was implemented. Also added new SSL code SSL_WANT_ACCEPT to cover this case. [Steve Henson] *) Added the beginnings of Rijndael support. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for bug in DirectoryString mask setting. Add support for X509_NAME_print_ex() in 'req' and X509_print_ex() function to allow certificate printing to more controllable, additional 'certopt' option to 'x509' to allow new printing options to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003] *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite: Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851) [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002] *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of memory from it's contents. This is done with a counter that will place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching, because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading from the external cache. This problem was masked, when SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set. (Found by Steve Haslam .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33. [Zeev Lieber ] *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling EVP_cleanup(). [Richard Levitte] *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not being properly terminated. [Richard Levitte] *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String. [stefank@valicert.com via Richard Levitte] *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural change. [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El] *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix initialization code race conditions in SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_client_method(), SSLv2_server_method(), SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_client_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_client_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(), ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(). [Patrick McCormick , Bodo Moeller] *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik (see [openssl.org #212]). [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6f and 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002] *) [In 0.9.6g-engine release:] Fix crypto/engine/vendor_defns/cswift.h for WIN32 (use '_stdcall'). [Lynn Gazis ] Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002] *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer , Alon Kantor (and others), Steve Henson] *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the assertions could call abort()). [Arne Ansper , Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly by the selection routines (PR #130). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix EVP_dsa_sha macro. [Nils Larsch] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659) [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not encoded as NULL) with id-dsa-with-sha1. [Nils Larsch ; problem pointed out by Bodo Moeller] *) Check various X509_...() return values in apps/req.c. [Nils Larsch ] *) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines: an end-of-file condition would erronously be flagged, when the CRLF was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov and Nedelcho Stanev. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello(). [Bodo Moeller] *) TLS/SSL library bugfix: use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently to prevent ssl3_read_internal() from incorrectly assuming that ssl3_read_bytes() found application data while handshake processing was enabled when in fact s->s3->in_read_app_data was merely automatically cleared during the initial handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix object definitions for Private and Enterprise: they were not recognized in their shortname (=lowercase) representation. Extend obj_dat.pl to issue an error when using undefined keywords instead of silently ignoring the problem (Svenning Sorensen ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix DH_generate_parameters() so that it works for 'non-standard' generators, i.e. generators other than 2 and 5. (Previously, the code did not properly initialise the 'add' and 'rem' values to BN_generate_prime().) In the new general case, we do not insist that 'generator' is actually a primitive root: This requirement is rather pointless; a generator of the order-q subgroup is just as good, if not better. [Bodo Moeller] *) Map new X509 verification errors to alerts. Discovered and submitted by Tom Wu . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending() (ssl/s3_lib.c) to prevent SSL_pending() from returning non-zero before the data has been completely received when using non-blocking I/O. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by John Hughes] *) Some of the ciphers missed the strength entry (SSL_LOW etc). [Ben Laurie, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix bug in SSL_clear(): bad sessions were not removed (found by Yoram Zahavi ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add information about CygWin 1.3 and on, and preserve proper configuration for the versions before that. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Make removal from session cache (SSL_CTX_remove_session()) more robust: check whether we deal with a copy of a session and do not delete from the cache in this case. Problem reported by "Izhar Shoshani Levi" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Do not store session data into the internal session cache, if it is never intended to be looked up (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP flag is set). Proposed by Aslam . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Have ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() really clear a bit when the requested value is 0. [Richard Levitte] *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:] Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x. [Neale Ferguson via Richard Levitte] *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been received. As the flag value will be lost between multiple invocations of ssl3_accept when using non-blocking I/O, the function may not be aware that a handshake has actually taken place, thus preventing a new session from being added to the session cache. To avoid this problem, we now set s->new_session to 2 instead of using a local variable. [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: Return -1 from ssl3_get_server_done (ssl3/s3_clnt.c) if the SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH error is detected. [Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) New 'shared_ldflag' column in Configure platform table. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix EVP_CIPHER_mode macro. ["Dan S. Camper" ] *) Fix ssl3_read_bytes (ssl/s3_pkt.c): To ignore messages of unknown type, we must throw them away by setting rr->length to 0. [D P Chang ] Changes between 0.9.6b and 0.9.6c [21 dec 2001] *) Fix BN_rand_range bug pointed out by Dominikus Scherkl . (The previous implementation worked incorrectly for those cases where range = 10..._2 and 3*range is two bits longer than range.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Only add signing time to PKCS7 structures if it is not already present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix crypto/objects/objects.h: "ld-ce" should be "id-ce", OBJ_ld_ce should be OBJ_id_ce. Also some ip-pda OIDs in crypto/objects/objects.txt were incorrect (cf. RFC 3039). [Matt Cooper, Frederic Giudicelli, Bodo Moeller] *) Release CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK when CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid() returns early because it has nothing to do. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Fix mutex callback return values in crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver technology. (Use engine 'keyclient') [Cryptographic Appliances and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a configuration entry for OS/390 Unix. The C compiler 'c89' is called via tools/c89.sh because arguments have to be rearranged (all '-L' options must appear before the first object modules). [Richard Shapiro ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Broadcom crypto accelerator cards, backported from 0.9.7. [Broadcom, Nalin Dahyabhai , Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') [Baltimore Technologies and Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') [AEP Inc. and Mark Cox] *) Add a configuration entry for gcc on UnixWare. [Gary Benson ] *) Change ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s2_srvr.c so that received handshake messages are stored in a single piece (fixed-length part and variable-length part combined) and fix various bugs found on the way. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable caching in BIO_gethostbyname(), directly use gethostbyname() instead. BIO_gethostbyname() does not know what timeouts are appropriate, so entries would stay in cache even when they have become invalid. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Rich Salz *) Change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) behaviour when faced with a pathologically small ClientHello fragment that does not contain client_version: Instead of aborting with an error, simply choose the highest available protocol version (i.e., TLS 1.0 unless it is disabled). In practice, ClientHello messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear() never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within one of the SSL handshake functions. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Niko Baric] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert (sent using the client's version number) if client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use. Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the client will at least see that alert. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) to handle message fragmentation correctly. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid infinite loop in ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) if a client receives HelloRequest while in a handshake. [Bodo Moeller; bug noticed by Andy Schneider ] *) Bugfix in ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c): Case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C should end in 'break', not 'goto end' which circuments various cleanups done in state SSL_ST_OK. But session related stuff must be disabled for SSL_ST_OK in the case that we just sent a HelloRequest. Also avoid some overhead by not calling ssl_init_wbio_buffer() before just sending a HelloRequest. [Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla ] *) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC verification error occured. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information may leak via logfiles.) Similar changes are not required for the SSL 2.0 implementation because the number of padding bytes is sent in clear for SSL 2.0, and the extra bytes are just ignored. However ssl/s2_pkt.c failed to verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in the legal range. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OpenUNIX-8 support including shared libraries (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid 'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf. James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_sqr() bug fix. [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis ] *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses, so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand() followed by modular reduction. [Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young ] *) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range() equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand(). [Bodo Moeller] *) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB). This function was broken, as the check for a new client hello message to handle SGC did not allow these large messages. (Tracked down by "Douglas E. Engert" .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add alert descriptions for TLSv1 to SSL_alert_desc_string[_long](). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix buggy behaviour of BIO_get_num_renegotiates() and BIO_ctrl() for BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE ("Stephen Hinton" ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rework the configuration and shared library support for Tru64 Unix. The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions of the OS. The shared library support part includes a variant that uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected automatically. [Tim Mooney via Richard Levitte] *) In ssl3_get_key_exchange (ssl/s3_clnt.c), call ssl3_get_message() with the same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request(). Otherwise, if no ServerKeyExchange message occurs, CertificateRequest messages might inadvertently be reject as too long. [Petr Lampa ] *) Enhanced support for IA-64 Unix platforms (well, Linux and HP-UX). [Andy Polyakov] *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced to allow the necessary settings. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) In OpenSSL 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b, crypto/dh/dh_key.c ignored dh->length and always used BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p). BN_rand_range() is not necessary for Diffie-Hellman, and this specific range makes Diffie-Hellman unnecessarily inefficient if dh->length (recommended exponent length) is much smaller than the length of dh->p. We could use BN_rand_range() if the order of the subgroup was stored in the DH structure, but we only have dh->length. So switch back to BN_rand(priv_key, l, ...) where 'l' is dh->length if this is defined, or BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1 otherwise. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RSA_eay_public_encrypt RSA_eay_private_decrypt RSA_eay_private_encrypt (signing) RSA_eay_public_decrypt (signature verification) (default implementations for RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt), always reject numbers >= n. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'. This is necessary on systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long' variable) is not atomic. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID *before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag. The previous code had a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID. [Travis Vitek ] *) Add support for shared libraries under Irix. [Albert Chin-A-Young ] *) Add configuration option to build on Linux on both big-endian and little-endian MIPS. [Ralf Baechle ] *) Add the possibility to create shared libraries on HP-UX. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen : PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s. [Andy Polyakov] *) When only the key is given to "enc", the IV is undefined. Print out an error message in this case. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Handle special case when X509_NAME is empty in X509 printing routines. [Steve Henson] *) In dsa_do_verify (crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c), verify that r and s are positive and less than q. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't change *pointer in CRYPTO_add_lock() is add_lock_callback is used: it isn't thread safe and the add_lock_callback should handle that itself. [Paul Rose ] *) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix OAEP check. [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096 (previously it was 1024). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings unless some valid trust or reject settings are present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the DSA routines if parameters are absent. [Steve Henson] *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd" in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set. RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case. This has caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME. Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set. For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require environment variables. *) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND. This is not strictly necessary, but avoids having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, replace 'add_do_not_lock' flag by a combination of a flag and a thread ID variable. Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change bctest again: '-x' expressions are not available in all versions of 'test'. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] *) Fix a couple of memory leaks in PKCS7_dataDecode() [Steve Henson, reported by Heyun Zheng ] *) Change Configure and Makefiles to provide EXE_EXT, which will contain the default extension for executables, if any. Also, make the perl scripts that use symlink() to test if it really exists and use "cp" if it doesn't. All this made OpenSSL compilable and installable in CygWin. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for asn1_GetSequence() for indefinite length constructed data. If SEQUENCE is length is indefinite just set c->slen to the total amount of data available. [Steve Henson, reported by shige@FreeBSD.org] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Change bctest to avoid here-documents inside command substitution (workaround for FreeBSD /bin/sh bug). For compatibility with Ultrix, avoid shell functions (introduced in the bctest version that searches along $PATH). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Check the result of RSA-CRT (see D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton: On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic Computations, J. Cryptology 14 (2001) 2, 101-119, http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz). [Ulf Moeller] *) MIPS assembler BIGNUM division bug fix. [Andy Polyakov] *) Disabled incorrect Alpha assembler code. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix PKCS#7 decode routines so they correctly update the length after reading an EOC for the EXPLICIT tag. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old (but broken) behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print it when found. [Tim Rice via Richard Levitte] *) Fix memory leaks in err.c: free err_data string if necessary; don't write to the wrong index in ERR_set_error_data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Implement ssl23_peek (analogous to ssl23_read), which previously did not exist. [Bodo Moeller] *) Replace rdtsc with _emit statements for VC++ version 5. [Jeremy Cooper ] *) Make it possible to reuse SSLv2 sessions. [Richard Levitte] *) In copy_email() check for >= 0 as a return value for X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() since 0 is a valid index. [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala ] *) Avoid coredump with unsupported or invalid public keys by checking if X509_get_pubkey() fails in PKCS7_verify(). Fix memory leak when PKCS7_verify() fails with non detached data. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Avoid false positives in memory leak detection code (crypto/mem_dbg.c) due to incorrect handling of multi-threading: 1. Fix timing glitch in the MemCheck_off() portion of CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(). 2. Fix logical glitch in is_MemCheck_on() aka CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on(). 3. Count how many times MemCheck_off() has been called so that nested use can be treated correctly. This also avoids inband-signalling in the previous code (which relied on the assumption that thread ID 0 is impossible). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add "-rand" option also to s_client and s_server. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix CPU detection on Irix 6.x. [Kurt Hockenbury and "Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) Fix X509_NAME bug which produced incorrect encoding if X509_NAME was empty. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Use the cached encoding of an X509_NAME structure rather than copying it. This is apparently the reason for the libsafe "errors" but the code is actually correct. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. Extend BN_[pseudo_]rand: As before, top=1 forces the highest two bits to be set and top=0 forces the highest bit to be set; top=-1 is new and leaves the highest bit random. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) In the NCONF_...-based implementations for CONF_... queries (crypto/conf/conf_lib.c), if the input LHASH is NULL, avoid using a temporary CONF structure with the data component set to NULL (which gives segmentation faults in lh_retrieve). Instead, use NULL for the CONF pointer in CONF_get_string and CONF_get_number (which may use environment variables) and directly return NULL from CONF_get_section. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix potential buffer overrun for EBCDIC. [Ulf Moeller] *) Tolerate nonRepudiation as being valid for S/MIME signing and certSign keyUsage if basicConstraints absent for a CA. [Steve Henson] *) Make SMIME_write_PKCS7() write mail header values with a format that is more generally accepted (no spaces before the semicolon), since some programs can't parse those values properly otherwise. Also make sure BIO's that break lines after each write do not create invalid headers. [Richard Levitte] *) Make the CRL encoding routines work with empty SEQUENCE OF. The macros previously used would not encode an empty SEQUENCE OF and break the signature. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. [Steve Henson] *) Add some EVP_add_digest_alias registrations (as found in OpenSSL_add_all_digests()) to SSL_library_init() aka OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(). This provides improved compatibility with peers using X.509 certificates with unconventional AlgorithmIdentifier OIDs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for Irix with NO_ASM. ["Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) ./config script fixes. [Ulf Moeller, Richard Levitte] *) Fix 'openssl passwd -1'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change PKCS12_key_gen_asc() so it can cope with non null terminated strings whose length is passed in the passlen parameter, for example from PEM callbacks. This was done by adding an extra length parameter to asc2uni(). [Steve Henson, reported by ] *) Fix C code generated by 'openssl dsaparam -C': If a BN_bin2bn call failed, free the DSA structure. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix to uni2asc() to cope with zero length Unicode strings. These are present in some PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Increase s2->wbuf allocation by one byte in ssl2_new (ssl/s2_lib.c). Otherwise do_ssl_write (ssl/s2_pkt.c) will write beyond buffer limits when writing a 32767 byte record. [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Eric Day ] *) In RSA_eay_public_{en,ed}crypt and RSA_eay_mod_exp (rsa_eay.c), obtain lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA before setting rsa->_method_mod_{n,p,q}. (RSA objects have a reference count access to which is protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA [see rsa_lib.c, s3_srvr.c, ssl_cert.c, ssl_rsa.c], so they are meant to be shared between threads.) [Bodo Moeller, Geoff Thorpe; original patch submitted by "Reddie, Steven" ] *) Fix a deadlock in CRYPTO_mem_leaks(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Use better test patterns in bntest. [Ulf Möller] *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C. [Ulf Möller] *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a 'bctest' script that checks for some known 'bc' bugs so that 'make test' does not abort just because 'bc' is broken. [Bodo Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending: If the record in s->s3->rrec is not of type SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, return 0. Similarly, change ssl2_pending to return 0 if SSL_in_init(s) is true. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL_peek: Both ssl2_peek and ssl3_peek, which were totally broken in earlier releases, have been re-implemented by renaming the previous implementations of ssl2_read and ssl3_read to ssl2_read_internal and ssl3_read_internal, respectively, and adding 'peek' parameters to them. The new ssl[23]_{read,peek} functions are calls to ssl[23]_read_internal with the 'peek' flag set appropriately. A 'peek' parameter has also been added to ssl3_read_bytes, which does the actual work for ssl3_read_internal. [Bodo Moeller] *) Initialise "ex_data" member of RSA/DSA/DH structures prior to calling the method-specific "init()" handler. Also clean up ex_data after calling the method-specific "finish()" handler. Previously, this was happening the other way round. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Increase BN_CTX_NUM (the number of BIGNUMs in a BN_CTX) to 16. The previous value, 12, was not always sufficient for BN_mod_exp(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix typo in get_cert_by_subject() in by_dir.c [Jean-Marc Desperrier ] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead macro to actually use its argument. Copy SSL_CTX's read_ahead flag to SSL object directly in SSL_new and not in SSL_clear because the latter is also used by the accept/connect functions; previously, the settings made by SSL_set_read_ahead would be lost during the handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problems reported by Anders Gertz ] *) Correct util/mkdef.pl to be selective about disabled algorithms. Previously, it would create entries for disableed algorithms no matter what. [Richard Levitte] *) Added several new manual pages for SSL_* function. [Lutz Jaenicke] Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6 [24 Sep 2000] *) In ssl23_get_client_hello, generate an error message when faced with an initial SSL 3.0/TLS record that is too small to contain the first two bytes of the ClientHello message, i.e. client_version. (Note that this is a pathologic case that probably has never happened in real life.) The previous approach was to use the version number from the record header as a substitute; but our protocol choice should not depend on that one because it is not authenticated by the Finished messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) More robust randomness gathering functions for Windows. [Jeffrey Altman ] *) For compatibility reasons if the flag X509_V_FLAG_ISSUER_CHECK is not set then we don't setup the error code for issuer check errors to avoid possibly overwriting other errors which the callback does handle. If an application does set the flag then we assume it knows what it is doing and can handle the new informational codes appropriately. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for a nasty bug in ASN1_TYPE handling. ASN1_TYPE is used for a general "ANY" type, as such it should be able to decode anything including tagged types. However it didn't check the class so it would wrongly interpret tagged types in the same way as their universal counterpart and unknown types were just rejected. Changed so that the tagged and unknown types are handled in the same way as a SEQUENCE: that is the encoding is stored intact. There is also a new type "V_ASN1_OTHER" which is used when the class is not universal, in this case we have no idea what the actual type is so we just lump them all together. [Steve Henson] *) On VMS, stdout may very well lead to a file that is written to in a record-oriented fashion. That means that every write() will write a separate record, which will be read separately by the programs trying to read from it. This can be very confusing. The solution is to put a BIO filter in the way that will buffer text until a linefeed is reached, and then write everything a line at a time, so every record written will be an actual line, not chunks of lines and not (usually doesn't happen, but I've seen it once) several lines in one record. BIO_f_linebuffer() is the answer. Currently, it's a VMS-only method, because that's where it has been tested well enough. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove 'optimized' squaring variant in BN_mod_mul_montgomery, it can return incorrect results. (Note: The buggy variant was not enabled in OpenSSL 0.9.5a, but it was in 0.9.6-beta[12].) [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable the check for content being present when verifying detached signatures in pk7_smime.c. Some versions of Netscape (wrongly) include zero length content when signing messages. [Steve Henson] *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs). [Bodo Möller] *) Add DSO method for VMS. [Richard Levitte] *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the wrong sign. [Ulf Möller] *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three packages. The default package contains applications, application documentation and run-time libraries. The devel package contains include files, static libraries and function documentation. The doc package contains the contents of the doc directory. The original openssl.spec was provided by Damien Miller . [Richard Levitte] *) Add a large number of documentation files for many SSL routines. [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Add a configuration entry for Sony News 4. [NAKAJI Hiroyuki ] *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a random number < q in the DSA library. [Ulf Möller] *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if the underlying transport is blocking) if a handshake took place. (The default behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client and s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read; but for applications that know in advance when to expect data, it just makes things more complicated.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RAND_egd_bytes(), which gives control over the number of bytes read from EGD. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a few more EBCDIC conditionals that make `req' and `x509' work better on such systems. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Add two demo programs for PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create(). Update PKCS12_parse() so it copies the friendlyName and the keyid to the certificates aux info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in PKCS7_verify() which caused an infinite loop if there was more than one signature. [Sven Uszpelkat ] *) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information about each symbol, as well as presentig variables as well as functions. This change means that there's n more need to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded. [Richard Levitte] *) Allow the verify time to be set by an application, rather than always using the current time. [Steve Henson] *) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a number of criteria: subject name, authority key id and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates by the same criteria. The main comparison function is X509_check_issued() which performs these checks. Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this without completely rewriting the lookup code. Authority and subject key identifier are now cached. The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with the same hash value. As a result various functions (which were all internal use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE structure. This will break anything that messed round with X509_STORE internally. The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an exact match, rather than just subject name. The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however this can be worked round by performing a lookup first (which will fill the cache with candidate certificates) and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP entirely (maybe later...). The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably. All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer() callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques in future. A very simple version which uses a simple STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(). The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents in the X509_STORE_CTX structure. X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used to customise the verify behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which excludes S/MIME capabilities. [Steve Henson] *) When a certificate request is read in keep a copy of the original encoding of the signed data and use it when outputing again. Signatures then use the original encoding rather than a decoded, encoded version which may cause problems if the request is improperly encoded. [Steve Henson] *) For consistency with other BIO_puts implementations, call buffer_write(b, ...) directly in buffer_puts instead of calling BIO_write(b, ...). In BIO_puts, increment b->num_write as in BIO_write. [Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr] *) Fix BN_mul_word for the case where the word is 0. (We have to use BN_zero, we may not return a BIGNUM with an array consisting of words set to zero.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid calling abort() from within the library when problems are detected, except if preprocessor symbols have been defined (such as REF_CHECK, BN_DEBUG etc.). [Bodo Moeller] *) New openssl application 'rsautl'. This utility can be used for low level RSA operations. DER public key BIO/fp routines also added. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure entry and patches for compiling on QNX 4. [Andreas Schneider ] *) A demo state-machine implementation was sponsored by Nuron (http://www.nuron.com/) and is now available in demos/state_machine. [Ben Laurie] *) New options added to the 'dgst' utility for signature generation and verification. [Steve Henson] *) Unrecognized PKCS#7 content types are now handled via a catch all ASN1_TYPE structure. This allows unsupported types to be stored as a "blob" and an application can encode and decode it manually. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various signed/unsigned issues to make a_strex.c compile under VC++. [Oscar Jacobsson ] *) ASN1 fixes. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was not returning the correct length if passed a buffer. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN failed if passed a NULL BN and its argument was negative. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Sven Heiberg ] *) Modification to PKCS#7 encoding routines to output definite length encoding. Since currently the whole structures are in memory there's not real point in using indefinite length constructed encoding. However if OpenSSL is compiled with the flag PKCS7_INDEFINITE_ENCODING the old form is used. [Steve Henson] *) Added BIO_vprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf(). [Richard Levitte] *) Added more prefixes to parse for in the the strings written through a logging bio, to cover all the levels that are available through syslog. The prefixes are now: PANIC, EMERG, EMR => LOG_EMERG ALERT, ALR => LOG_ALERT CRIT, CRI => LOG_CRIT ERROR, ERR => LOG_ERR WARNING, WARN, WAR => LOG_WARNING NOTICE, NOTE, NOT => LOG_NOTICE INFO, INF => LOG_INFO DEBUG, DBG => LOG_DEBUG and as before, if none of those prefixes are present at the beginning of the string, LOG_ERR is chosen. On Win32, the LOG_* levels are mapped according to this: LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR => EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE LOG_WARNING => EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, LOG_DEBUG => EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE [Richard Levitte] *) Made it possible to reconfigure with just the configuration argument "reconf" or "reconfigure". The command line arguments are stored in Makefile.ssl in the variable CONFIGURE_ARGS, and are retrieved from there when reconfiguring. [Richard Levitte] *) MD4 implemented. [Assar Westerlund , Richard Levitte] *) Add the arguments -CAfile and -CApath to the pkcs12 utility. [Richard Levitte] *) The obj_dat.pl script was messing up the sorting of object names. The reason was that it compared the quoted version of strings as a result "OCSP" > "OCSP Signing" because " > SPACE. Changed script to store unquoted versions of names and add quotes on output. It was also omitting some names from the lookup table if they were given a default value (that is if SN is missing it is given the same value as LN and vice versa), these are now added on the grounds that if an object has a name we should be able to look it up. Finally added warning output when duplicate short or long names are found. [Steve Henson] *) Changes needed for Tandem NSK. [Scott Uroff ] *) Fix SSL 2.0 rollback checking: Due to an off-by-one error in RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), special padding was never detected and thus the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 countermeasure against protocol version rollback attacks was not effective. In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Make it possible to get hexdumps of unprintable data with 'openssl asn1parse'. By implication, the functions ASN1_parse_dump() and BIO_dump_indent() are added. [Richard Levitte] *) New functions ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex() these print out strings and name structures based on various flags including RFC2253 support and proper handling of multibyte characters. Added options to the 'x509' utility to allow the various flags to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to use ASN1_TIME instead of ASN1_UTCTIME. Also change the functions X509_cmp_current_time() and X509_gmtime_adj() work with an ASN1_TIME structure, this will enable certificates using GeneralizedTime in validity dates to be checked. [Steve Henson] *) Make the NEG_PUBKEY_BUG code (which tolerates invalid negative public key encodings) on by default, NO_NEG_PUBKEY_BUG can be set to disable it. [Steve Henson] *) New function c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() which acts on ASN1_OBJECT content octets. An i2c_ASN1_OBJECT is unnecessary because the encoding can be trivially obtained from the structure. [Steve Henson] *) crypto/err.c locking bugfix: Use write locks (CRYPTO_w_[un]lock), not read locks (CRYPTO_r_[un]lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) A first attempt at creating official support for shared libraries through configuration. I've kept it so the default is static libraries only, and the OpenSSL programs are always statically linked for now, but there are preparations for dynamic linking in place. This has been tested on Linux and Tru64. [Richard Levitte] *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in: Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing DSA key. [Steve Henson] *) New options to smime application. -inform and -outform allow alternative formats for the S/MIME message including PEM and DER. The -content option allows the content to be specified separately. This should allow things like Netscape form signing output easier to verify. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the ASN1 encoding of tags using the 'long form'. [Steve Henson] *) New ASN1 functions, i2c_* and c2i_* for INTEGER and BIT STRING types. These convert content octets to and from the underlying type. The actual tag and length octets are already assumed to have been read in and checked. These are needed because all other string types have virtually identical handling apart from the tag. By having versions of the ASN1 functions that just operate on content octets IMPLICIT tagging can be handled properly. It also allows the ASN1_ENUMERATED code to be cut down because ASN1_ENUMERATED and ASN1_INTEGER are identical apart from the tag. [Steve Henson] *) Change the handling of OID objects as follows: - New object identifiers are inserted in objects.txt, following the syntax given in objects.README. - objects.pl is used to process obj_mac.num and create a new obj_mac.h. - obj_dat.pl is used to create a new obj_dat.h, using the data in obj_mac.h. This is currently kind of a hack, and the perl code in objects.pl isn't very elegant, but it works as I intended. The simplest way to check that it worked correctly is to look in obj_dat.h and check the array nid_objs and make sure the objects haven't moved around (this is important!). Additions are OK, as well as consistent name changes. [Richard Levitte] *) Add BSD-style MD5-based passwords to 'openssl passwd' (option '-1'). [Bodo Moeller] *) Addition of the command line parameter '-rand file' to 'openssl req'. The given file adds to whatever has already been seeded into the random pool through the RANDFILE configuration file option or environment variable, or the default random state file. [Richard Levitte] *) mkstack.pl now sorts each macro group into lexical order. Previously the output order depended on the order the files appeared in the directory, resulting in needless rewriting of safestack.h . [Steve Henson] *) Patches to make OpenSSL compile under Win32 again. Mostly work arounds for the VC++ problem that it treats func() as func(void). Also stripped out the parts of mkdef.pl that added extra typesafe functions: these no longer exist. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganisation of the stack code. The macros are now all collected in safestack.h . Each macro is defined in terms of a "stack macro" of the form SKM_(type, a, b). The DEBUG_SAFESTACK is now handled in terms of function casts, this has the advantage of retaining type safety without the use of additional functions. If DEBUG_SAFESTACK is not defined then the non typesafe macros are used instead. Also modified the mkstack.pl script to handle the new form. Needs testing to see if which (if any) compilers it chokes and maybe make DEBUG_SAFESTACK the default if no major problems. Similar behaviour for ASN1_SET_OF and PKCS12_STACK_OF. [Steve Henson] *) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used insted. Added some new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional 'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added an -sgckey command line option to the rsa utility. Thanks to Adrian Peck for posting details of the modified algorithm to openssl-dev. [Steve Henson] *) The evp_local.h macros were using 'c.##kname' which resulted in invalid expansion on some systems (SCO 5.0.5 for example). Corrected to 'c.kname'. [Phillip Porch ] *) New X509_get1_email() and X509_REQ_get1_email() functions that return a STACK of email addresses from a certificate or request, these look in the subject name and the subject alternative name extensions and omit any duplicate addresses. [Steve Henson] *) Re-implement BN_mod_exp2_mont using independent (and larger) windows. This makes DSA verification about 2 % faster. [Bodo Moeller] *) Increase maximum window size in BN_mod_exp_... to 6 bits instead of 5 (meaning that now 2^5 values will be precomputed, which is only 4 KB plus overhead for 1024 bit moduli). This makes exponentiations about 0.5 % faster for 1024 bit exponents (as measured by "openssl speed rsa2048"). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename memory handling macros to avoid conflicts with other software: Malloc => OPENSSL_malloc Malloc_locked => OPENSSL_malloc_locked Realloc => OPENSSL_realloc Free => OPENSSL_free [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_exp_mont_word for small bases (roughly 15% faster than BN_mod_exp_mont, i.e. 7% for a full DH exchange). [Bodo Moeller] *) CygWin32 support. [John Jarvie ] *) The type-safe stack code has been rejigged. It is now only compiled in when OpenSSL is configured with the DEBUG_SAFESTACK option and by default all type-specific stack functions are "#define"d back to standard stack functions. This results in more streamlined output but retains the type-safety checking possibilities of the original approach. [Geoff Thorpe] *) The STACK code has been cleaned up, and certain type declarations that didn't make a lot of sense have been brought in line. This has also involved a cleanup of sorts in safestack.h to more correctly map type-safe stack functions onto their plain stack counterparts. This work has also resulted in a variety of "const"ifications of lots of the code, especially "_cmp" operations which should normally be prototyped with "const" parameters anyway. [Geoff Thorpe] *) When generating bytes for the first time in md_rand.c, 'stir the pool' by seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes (with zero entropy count). (The PRNG state consists of two parts, the large pool 'state' and 'md', where all of 'md' is used each time the PRNG is used, but 'state' is used only indexed by a cyclic counter. As entropy may not be well distributed from the beginning, 'md' is important as a chaining variable. However, the output function chains only half of 'md', i.e. 80 bits. ssleay_rand_add, on the other hand, chains all of 'md', and seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes will result in all of 'state' being rewritten, with the new values depending on virtually all of 'md'. This overcomes the 80 bit limitation.) [Bodo Moeller] *) In ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s3_clnt.c, call ERR_clear_error() when the handshake is continued after ssl_verify_cert_chain(); otherwise, if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is set, remaining error codes can lead to 'unexplainable' connection aborts later. [Bodo Moeller; problem tracked down by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Major EVP API cipher revision. Add hooks for extra EVP features. This allows various cipher parameters to be set in the EVP interface. Support added for variable key length ciphers via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function and setting of RC2 and RC5 parameters. Modify EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() to cope with variable key length ciphers. Remove lots of duplicated code from the EVP library. For example *every* cipher init() function handles the 'iv' in the same way according to the cipher mode. They also all do nothing if the 'key' parameter is NULL and for CFB and OFB modes they zero ctx->num. New functionality allows removal of S/MIME code RC2 hack. Most of the routines have the same form and so can be declared in terms of macros. By shifting this to the top level EVP_CipherInit() it can be removed from all individual ciphers. If the cipher wants to handle IVs or keys differently it can set the EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV or EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT flags. Change lots of functions like EVP_EncryptUpdate() to now return a value: although software versions of the algorithms cannot fail any installed hardware versions can. [Steve Henson] *) Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG: In ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, if this option is set, tolerate broken clients that send the negotiated protocol version number instead of the requested protocol version number. [Bodo Moeller] *) Call dh_tmp_cb (set by ..._TMP_DH_CB) with correct 'is_export' flag; i.e. non-zero for export ciphersuites, zero otherwise. Previous versions had this flag inverted, inconsistent with rsa_tmp_cb (..._TMP_RSA_CB). [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Amit Chopra] *) Add missing DSA library text string. Work around for some IIS key files with invalid SEQUENCE encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Add a document (doc/standards.txt) that list all kinds of standards and so on that are implemented in OpenSSL. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance c_rehash script. Old version would mishandle certificates with the same subject name hash and wouldn't handle CRLs at all. Added -fingerprint option to crl utility, to support new c_rehash features. [Steve Henson] *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present but no ssl client purpose. [Steve Henson, reported by Rene Grosser ] *) Make PKCS#12 code work with no password. The PKCS#12 spec is a little unclear about how a blank password is handled. Since the password in encoded as a BMPString with terminating double NULL a zero length password would end up as just the double NULL. However no password at all is different and is handled differently in the PKCS#12 key generation code. NS treats a blank password as zero length. MSIE treats it as no password on export: but it will try both on import. We now do the same: PKCS12_parse() tries zero length and no password if the password is set to "" or NULL (NULL is now a valid password: it wasn't before) as does the pkcs12 application. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfixes in apps/x509.c: Avoid a memory leak; and don't use perror when PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ fails, the error message must be obtained from the error queue. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid 'thread_hash' memory leak in crypto/err/err.c by freeing it in ERR_remove_state if appropriate, and change ERR_get_state accordingly to avoid race conditions (this is necessary because thread_hash is no longer constant once set). [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one. [Ulf Möller] *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already. Previously this was only set during a call to RSA_new() or RSA_new_method(NULL) meaning it was possible for RSA_get_default_method() to return NULL. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added native name translation to the existing DSO code that will convert (if the flag to do so is set) filenames that are sufficiently small and have no path information into a canonical native form. Eg. "blah" converted to "libblah.so" or "blah.dll" etc. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function ERR_error_string_n(e, buf, len) which is like ERR_error_string(e, buf), but writes at most 'len' bytes including the 0 terminator. For ERR_error_string_n, 'buf' may not be NULL. [Damien Miller , Bodo Moeller] *) CONF library reworked to become more general. A new CONF configuration file reader "class" is implemented as well as a new functions (NCONF_*, for "New CONF") to handle it. The now old CONF_* functions are still there, but are reimplemented to work in terms of the new functions. Also, a set of functions to handle the internal storage of the configuration data is provided to make it easier to write new configuration file reader "classes" (I can definitely see something reading a configuration file in XML format, for example), called _CONF_*, or "the configuration storage API"... The new configuration file reading functions are: NCONF_new, NCONF_free, NCONF_load, NCONF_load_fp, NCONF_load_bio, NCONF_get_section, NCONF_get_string, NCONF_get_numbre NCONF_default, NCONF_WIN32 NCONF_dump_fp, NCONF_dump_bio NCONF_default and NCONF_WIN32 are method (or "class") choosers, NCONF_new creates a new CONF object. This works in the same way as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface. NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file, which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'. To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions, the function CONF_set_default_method is provided. [Richard Levitte] *) Add '-tls1' option to 'openssl ciphers', which was already mentioned in the documentation but had not been implemented. (This option is not yet really useful because even the additional experimental TLS 1.0 ciphers are currently treated as SSL 3.0 ciphers.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial DSO code added into libcrypto for letting OpenSSL (and OpenSSL-based applications) load shared libraries and bind to them in a portable way. [Geoff Thorpe, with contributions from Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.5 and 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000] *) Make sure _lrotl and _lrotr are only used with MSVC. *) Use lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND correctly in ssleay_rand_status (the default implementation of RAND_status). *) Rename openssl x509 option '-crlext', which was added in 0.9.5, to '-clrext' (= clear extensions), as intended and documented. [Bodo Moeller; inconsistency pointed out by Michael Attili ] *) Fix for HMAC. It wasn't zeroing the rest of the block if the key length was larger than the MD block size. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Yost William ] *) Modernise PKCS12_parse() so it uses STACK_OF(X509) for its ca argument fix a leak when the ca argument was passed as NULL. Stop X509_PUBKEY_set() using the passed key: if the passed key was a private key the result of X509_print(), for example, would be to print out all the private key components. [Steve Henson] *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix. [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear ] *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly discouraged. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Brian Korver ] *) For easily testing in shell scripts whether some command 'openssl XXX' exists, the new pseudo-command 'openssl no-XXX' returns with exit code 0 iff no command of the given name is available. 'no-XXX' is printed in this case, 'XXX' otherwise. In both cases, the output goes to stdout and nothing is printed to stderr. Additional arguments are always ignored. Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name, the 'no-cipher' compilation switches can be tested this way. ('openssl no-XXX' is not able to detect pseudo-commands such as 'quit', 'list-XXX-commands', or 'no-XXX' itself.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Update test suite so that 'make test' succeeds in 'no-rsa' configuration. [Bodo Moeller] *) For SSL_[CTX_]set_tmp_dh, don't create a DH key if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set; it will be thrown away anyway because each handshake creates its own key. ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meanining you effectivly got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and 'Q' and 'R' lose their special meanings (quit/renegotiate). This is part of what -quiet does; unlike -quiet, -ign_eof does not suppress any output. [Richard Levitte] *) Add compatibility options to the purpose and trust code. The purpose X509_PURPOSE_ANY is "any purpose" which automatically accepts a certificate or CA, this was the previous behaviour, with all the associated security issues. X509_TRUST_COMPAT is the old trust behaviour: only and automatically trust self signed roots in certificate store. A new trust setting X509_TRUST_DEFAULT is used to specify that a purpose has no associated trust setting and it should instead use the value in the default purpose. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#8 DSA private key code so it decodes keys again and fix a memory leak. [Steve Henson] *) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) In ERR_load_ERR_strings(), build an ERR_LIB_SYS error reason table using strerror. Previously, ERR_reason_error_string() returned library names as reason strings for SYSerr; but SYSerr is a special case where small numbers are errno values, not library numbers. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add '-dsaparam' option to 'openssl dhparam' application. This converts DSA parameters into DH parameters. (When creating parameters, DSA_generate_parameters is used.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Include 'length' (recommended exponent length) in C code generated by 'openssl dhparam -C'. [Bodo Moeller] *) The second argument to set_label in perlasm was already being used so couldn't be used as a "file scope" flag. Moved to third argument which was free. [Steve Henson] *) In PEM_ASN1_write_bio and some other functions, use RAND_pseudo_bytes instead of RAND_bytes for encryption IVs and salts. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include RAND_status() into RAND_METHOD instead of implementing it only for md_rand.c Otherwise replacing the PRNG by calling RAND_set_rand_method would be impossible. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't let DSA_generate_key() enter an infinite loop if the random number generation fails. [Bodo Moeller] *) New 'rand' application for creating pseudo-random output. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added configuration support for Linux/IA64 [Rolf Haberrecker ] *) Assembler module support for Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/). [Lutz Jaenicke and Anonymous] *) Shared library support for Solaris gcc. [Lutz Behnke ] Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [28 Feb 2000] *) PKCS7_encrypt() was adding text MIME headers twice because they were added manually and by SMIME_crlf_copy(). [Steve Henson] *) In bntest.c don't call BN_rand with zero bits argument. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Andrew W. Gray ] *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n] case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally. [Ulf Möller] *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set to 1 it signals that the assembler should use a symbol whose scope is the entire file, not just the current function. This is needed with MASM which uses the format label:: for this scope. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Peter Runestig ] *) Change the ASN1 types so they are typedefs by default. Before almost all types were #define'd to ASN1_STRING which was causing STACK_OF() problems: you couldn't declare STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) for example. [Steve Henson] *) Change names of new functions to the new get1/get0 naming convention: After 'get1', the caller owns a reference count and has to call ..._free; 'get0' returns a pointer to some data structure without incrementing reference counters. (Some of the existing 'get' functions increment a reference counter, some don't.) Similarly, 'set1' and 'add1' functions increase reference counters or duplicate objects. [Steve Henson] *) Allow for the possibility of temp RSA key generation failure: the code used to assume it always worked and crashed on failure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf(). [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem pointed out by David Sacerdote ] *) Support EGD . New functions RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application, the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE or -rand. [Ulf Möller] *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures. Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the SSL_ALLOW_ADH compile option and set the default cipher list to exclude them. This means that no special compilation option is needed to use anonymous DH: it just needs to be included in the cipher list. [Steve Henson] *) Change the EVP_MD_CTX_type macro so its meaning consistent with EVP_MD_type. The old functionality is available in a new macro called EVP_MD_md(). Change code that uses it and update docs. [Steve Henson] *) ..._ctrl functions now have corresponding ..._callback_ctrl functions where the 'void *' argument is replaced by a function pointer argument. Previously 'void *' was abused to point to functions, which works on many platforms, but is not correct. As these functions are usually called by macros defined in OpenSSL header files, most source code should work without changes. [Richard Levitte] *) (which is created by Configure) now contains sections with information on -D... compiler switches used for compiling the library so that applications can see them. To enable one of these sections, a pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_..._DEFINES must be defined. E.g., #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES #include defines all pertinent NO_ symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc. [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller] *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS record layer. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the 'other' type in certificate aux info to a STACK_OF X509_ALGOR. Although not an AlgorithmIdentifier as such it has the required ASN1 format: arbitrary types determined by an OID. [Steve Henson] *) Add some PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW() functions and a command line argument to 'req'. This is not because the function is newer or better than others it just uses the work 'NEW' in the certificate request header lines. Some software needs this. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganise password command line arguments: now passwords can be obtained from various sources. Delete the PEM_cb function and make it the default behaviour: i.e. if the callback is NULL and the usrdata argument is not NULL interpret it as a null terminated pass phrase. If usrdata and the callback are NULL then the pass phrase is prompted for as usual. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the Compaq Atalla crypto accelerator. If it is installed, the support is automatically enabled. The resulting binaries will autodetect the card and use it if present. [Ben Laurie and Compaq Inc.] *) Work around for Netscape hang bug. This sends certificate request and server done in one record. Since this is perfectly legal in the SSL/TLS protocol it isn't a "bug" option and is on by default. See the bugs/SSLv3 entry for more info. [Steve Henson] *) HP-UX tune-up: new unified configs, HP C compiler bug workaround. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -rand argument to smime and pkcs12 applications and read/write of seed file. [Steve Henson] *) New 'passwd' tool for crypt(3) and apr1 password hashes. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add command line password options to the remaining applications. [Steve Henson] *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of bits. [Ulf Möller] *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output. [Ulf Möller] *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now. [Andy Polyakov] *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0). [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line options to produce them. [Steve Henson] *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX. [Ulf Möller] *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont() for p == 0. [Ulf Möller] *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent was that statically linked binaries could for example just call SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not link with digests. This never worked becayse SSLeay_add_all_digests() and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new -notext option to 'ca' and a -pubkey option to 'spkac'. [Steve Henson] *) Use a less unusual form of the Miller-Rabin primality test (it used a binary algorithm for exponentiation integrated into the Miller-Rabin loop, our standard modexp algorithms are faster). [Bodo Moeller] *) Support for the EBCDIC character set completed. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts, use void * instead of char * in lhash. [Ulf Möller] *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of this the server could overwrite ephemeral keys that the client has already seen). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn DSA_is_prime into a macro that calls BN_is_prime, using 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test. DSA_generate_parameters now uses BN_is_prime_fasttest (with 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test as required by the appendix to FIPS PUB 186[-1]) instead of DSA_is_prime. As BN_is_prime_fasttest includes trial division, DSA parameter generation becomes much faster. This implies a change for the callback functions in DSA_is_prime and DSA_generate_parameters: The callback function is called once for each positive witness in the Rabin-Miller test, not just occasionally in the inner loop; and the parameters to the callback function now provide an iteration count for the outer loop rather than for the current invocation of the inner loop. DSA_generate_parameters additionally can call the callback function with an 'iteration count' of -1, meaning that a candidate has passed the trial division test (when q is generated from an application-provided seed, trial division is skipped). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_is_prime_fasttest that optionally does trial division before starting the Rabin-Miller test and has an additional BN_CTX * argument (whereas BN_is_prime always has to allocate at least one BN_CTX). 'callback(1, -1, cb_arg)' is called when a number has passed the trial division stage. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for bug in CRL encoding. The validity dates weren't being handled as ASN1_TIME. [Steve Henson] *) New -pkcs12 option to CA.pl script to write out a PKCS#12 file. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_pseudo_rand(). [Ulf Möller] *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable) bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up the comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in SSL2 clients in multiple threads. [Bodo Moeller] *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required). [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place. [Steve Henson] *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL. [Ulf Möller] *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro: BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of Rabin-Miller iterations. [Ulf Möller] *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME. (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".) [Ulf Möller] *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys (instead of parameters) in future. [Steve Henson] *) Make the ciphers, s_server and s_client programs check the return values when a new cipher list is set. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the SSL/TLS cipher mechanism to correctly handle the TLS 56bit ciphers. Before when the 56bit ciphers were enabled the sorting was wrong. The syntax for the cipher sorting has been extended to support sorting by cipher-strength (using the strength_bits hard coded in the tables). The new command is "@STRENGTH" (see also doc/apps/ciphers.pod). Fix a bug in the cipher-command parser: when supplying a cipher command string with an "undefined" symbol (neither command nor alphanumeric [A-Za-z0-9], ssl_set_cipher_list used to hang in an endless loop. Now an error is flagged. Due to the strength-sorting extension, the code of the ssl_create_cipher_list() function was completely rearranged. I hope that the readability was also increased :-) [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Minor change to 'x509' utility. The -CAcreateserial option now uses 1 for the first serial number and places 2 in the serial number file. This avoids problems when the root CA is created with serial number zero and the first user certificate has the same issuer name and serial number as the root CA. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities, change the 'req' program so it uses the new code. Add documentation for this stuff. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509 structures and behave in an analagous way to the X509v3 functions: they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used instead. So we also now have some wrapper functions that call the X509at functions when passed certificate requests. (TO DO: similar things can be done with PKCS#7 signed and unsigned attributes, PKCS#12 attributes and a few other things. Some of these need some d2i or i2d and print functionality because they handle more complex structures.) [Steve Henson] *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. [Kris Kennaway , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). Also an error is recorded on the thread's error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy). [Ulf Möller] *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically, 3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes instead of only 2 for all lengths; see BN_prime_checks_for_size definition in crypto/bn/bn_prime.c for the complete table). This guarantees a false-positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite ssl3_read_n (ssl/s3_pkt.c) avoiding a couple of bugs. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509_CTX_rget_chain() (renamed to X509_CTX_get1_chain in the 0.9.5 release), this returns the chain from an X509_CTX structure with a dup of the stack and all the X509 reference counts upped: so the stack will exist after X509_CTX_cleanup() has been called. Modify pkcs12.c to use this. Also make SSL_SESSION_print() print out the verify return code. [Steve Henson] *) Add manpage for the pkcs12 command. Also change the default behaviour so MAC iteration counts are used unless the new -nomaciter option is used. This improves file security and only older versions of MSIE (4.0 for example) need it. [Steve Henson] *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files. [Ulf Möller] *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from draft PKCS#9 v2.0 but are compatible with v1.2 provided no international characters are used. More changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE code: allow the setting of types based on strings. Remove the 'loc' parameter when adding attributes because these will be a SET OF encoding which is sorted in ASN1 order. [Steve Henson] *) Initial changes to the 'req' utility to allow request generation automation. This will allow an application to just generate a template file containing all the field values and have req construct the request. Initial support for X509_ATTRIBUTE handling. Stacks of these are used all over the place including certificate requests and PKCS#7 structures. They are currently handled manually where necessary with some primitive wrappers for PKCS#7. The new functions behave in a manner analogous to the X509 extension functions: they allow attributes to be looked up by NID and added. Later something similar to the X509V3 code would be desirable to automatically handle the encoding, decoding and printing of the more complex types. The string types like challengePassword can be handled by the string table functions. Also modified the multi byte string table handling. Now there is a 'global mask' which masks out certain types. The table itself can use the flag STABLE_NO_MASK to ignore the mask setting: this is useful when for example there is only one permissible type (as in countryName) and using the mask might result in no valid types at all. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up 'Finished' handling, and add functions SSL_get_finished and SSL_get_peer_finished to allow applications to obtain the latest Finished messages sent to the peer or expected from the peer, respectively. (SSL_get_peer_finished is usually the Finished message actually received from the peer, otherwise the protocol will be aborted.) As the Finished message are message digests of the complete handshake (with a total of 192 bits for TLS 1.0 and more for SSL 3.0), they can be used for external authentication procedures when the authentication provided by SSL/TLS is not desired or is not enough. [Bodo Moeller] *) Enhanced support for Alpha Linux is added. Now ./config checks if the host supports BWX extension and if Compaq C is present on the $PATH. Just exploiting of the BWX extension results in 20-30% performance kick for some algorithms, e.g. DES and RC4 to mention a couple. Compaq C in turn generates ~20% faster code for MD5 and SHA1. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for MS "fast SGC". This is arguably a violation of the SSL3/TLS protocol. Netscape SGC does two handshakes: the first with weak crypto and after checking the certificate is SGC a second one with strong crypto. MS SGC stops the first handshake after receiving the server certificate message and sends a second client hello. Since a server will typically do all the time consuming operations before expecting any further messages from the client (server key exchange is the most expensive) there is little difference between the two. To get OpenSSL to support MS SGC we have to permit a second client hello message after we have sent server done. In addition we have to reset the MAC if we do get this second client hello. [Steve Henson] *) Add a function 'd2i_AutoPrivateKey()' this will automatically decide if a DER encoded private key is RSA or DSA traditional format. Changed d2i_PrivateKey_bio() to use it. This is only needed for the "traditional" format DER encoded private key. Newer code should use PKCS#8 format which has the key type encoded in the ASN1 structure. Added DER private key support to pkcs8 application. [Steve Henson] *) SSL 3/TLS 1 servers now don't request certificates when an anonymous ciphersuites has been selected (as required by the SSL 3/TLS 1 specifications). Exception: When SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT is set, we interpret this as a request to violate the specification (the worst that can happen is a handshake failure, and 'correct' behaviour would result in a handshake failure anyway). [Bodo Moeller] *) In SSL_CTX_add_session, take into account that there might be multiple SSL_SESSION structures with the same session ID (e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain them from an external cache). The internal cache can handle only one SSL_SESSION with a given ID, so if there's a conflict, we now throw out the old one to achieve consistency. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OIDs for idea and blowfish in CBC mode. This will allow both to be used in PKCS#5 v2.0 and S/MIME. Also add checking to some routines that use cipher OIDs: some ciphers do not have OIDs defined and so they cannot be used for S/MIME and PKCS#5 v2.0 for example. [Steve Henson] *) Simplify the trust setting structure and code. Now we just have two sequences of OIDs for trusted and rejected settings. These will typically have values the same as the extended key usage extension and any application specific purposes. The trust checking code now has a default behaviour: it will just check for an object with the same NID as the passed id. Functions can be provided to override either the default behaviour or the behaviour for a given id. SSL client, server and email already have functions in place for compatibility: they check the NID and also return "trusted" if the certificate is self signed. [Steve Henson] *) Add d2i,i2d bio/fp functions for PrivateKey: these convert the traditional format into an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Add a password callback function PEM_cb() which either prompts for a password if usr_data is NULL or otherwise assumes it is a null terminated password. Allow passwords to be passed on command line environment or config files in a few more utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of DER and PEM functions to handle PKCS#8 format private keys. Add some short names for PKCS#8 PBE algorithms and allow them to be specified on the command line for the pkcs8 and pkcs12 utilities. Update documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Support for ASN1 "NULL" type. This could be handled before by using ASN1_TYPE but there wasn't any function that would try to read a NULL and produce an error if it couldn't. For compatibility we also have ASN1_NULL_new() and ASN1_NULL_free() functions but these are faked and don't allocate anything because they don't need to. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for MacOS is now provided. Examine INSTALL.MacOS for details. [Andy Polyakov, Roy Woods ] *) Rebuild of the memory allocation routines used by OpenSSL code and possibly others as well. The purpose is to make an interface that provide hooks so anyone can build a separate set of allocation and deallocation routines to be used by OpenSSL, for example memory pool implementations, or something else, which was previously hard since Malloc(), Realloc() and Free() were defined as macros having the values malloc, realloc and free, respectively (except for Win32 compilations). The same is provided for memory debugging code. OpenSSL already comes with functionality to find memory leaks, but this gives people a chance to debug other memory problems. With these changes, a new set of functions and macros have appeared: CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_set_options() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_get_options() [F] CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() [M] The memory debug functions are NULL by default, unless the library is compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG or friends is defined. If someone wants to debug memory anyway, CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() (which gives the standard debugging functions that come with OpenSSL) or CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() (tells OpenSSL to use functions provided by the library user) must be used. When the standard debugging functions are used, CRYPTO_dbg_set_options can be used to request additional information: CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CYRPTO_MDEBUG_xxx) corresponds to setting the CRYPTO_MDEBUG_xxx macro when compiling the library. Also, things like CRYPTO_set_mem_functions will always give the expected result (the new set of functions is used for allocation and deallocation) at all times, regardless of platform and compiler options. To finish it up, some functions that were never use in any other way than through macros have a new API and new semantic: CRYPTO_dbg_malloc() CRYPTO_dbg_realloc() CRYPTO_dbg_free() All macros of value have retained their old syntax. [Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Some S/MIME fixes. The OID for SMIMECapabilities was wrong, the ordering of SMIMECapabilities wasn't in "strength order" and there was a missing NULL in the AlgorithmIdentifier for the SHA1 signature algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Some ASN1 types with illegal zero length encoding (INTEGER, ENUMERATED and OBJECT IDENTIFIER) choked the ASN1 routines. [Frans Heymans , modified by Steve Henson] *) Merge in my S/MIME library for OpenSSL. This provides a simple S/MIME API on top of the PKCS#7 code, a MIME parser (with enough functionality to handle multipart/signed properly) and a utility called 'smime' to call all this stuff. This is based on code I originally wrote for Celo who have kindly allowed it to be included in OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add variants des_set_key_checked and des_set_key_unchecked of des_set_key (aka des_key_sched). Global variable des_check_key decides which of these is called by des_set_key; this way des_check_key behaves as it always did, but applications and the library itself, which was buggy for des_check_key == 1, have a cleaner way to pick the version they need. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function PKCS12_newpass() which changes the password of a PKCS12 structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify X509_TRUST and X509_PURPOSE so it also uses a static and dynamic mix. In both cases the ids can be used as an index into the table. Also modified the X509_TRUST_add() and X509_PURPOSE_add() functions so they accept a list of the field values and the application doesn't need to directly manipulate the X509_TRUST structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the ASN1_STRING_TABLE stuff so it also uses bsearch and doesn't need initialising. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the way the V3 extension code looks up extensions. This now works in a similar way to the object code: we have some "standard" extensions in a static table which is searched with OBJ_bsearch() and the application can add dynamic ones if needed. The file crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h now has the info: this file needs to be updated whenever a new extension is added to the core code and kept in ext_nid order. There is a simple program 'tabtest.c' which checks this. New extensions are not added too often so this file can readily be maintained manually. There are two big advantages in doing things this way. The extensions can be looked up immediately and no longer need to be "added" using X509V3_add_standard_extensions(): this function now does nothing. [Side note: I get *lots* of email saying the extension code doesn't work because people forget to call this function] Also no dynamic allocation is done unless new extensions are added: so if we don't add custom extensions there is no need to call X509V3_EXT_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) Modify enc utility's salting as follows: make salting the default. Add a magic header, so unsalted files fail gracefully instead of just decrypting to garbage. This is because not salting is a big security hole, so people should be discouraged from doing it. [Ben Laurie] *) Fixes and enhancements to the 'x509' utility. It allowed a message digest to be passed on the command line but it only used this parameter when signing a certificate. Modified so all relevant operations are affected by the digest parameter including the -fingerprint and -x509toreq options. Also -x509toreq choked if a DSA key was used because it didn't fix the digest. [Steve Henson] *) Initial certificate chain verify code. Currently tests the untrusted certificates for consistency with the verify purpose (which is set when the X509_STORE_CTX structure is set up) and checks the pathlength. There is a NO_CHAIN_VERIFY compilation option to keep the old behaviour: this is because it will reject chains with invalid extensions whereas every previous version of OpenSSL and SSLeay made no checks at all. Trust code: checks the root CA for the relevant trust settings. Trust settings have an initial value consistent with the verify purpose: e.g. if the verify purpose is for SSL client use it expects the CA to be trusted for SSL client use. However the default value can be changed to permit custom trust settings: one example of this would be to only trust certificates from a specific "secure" set of CAs. Also added X509_STORE_CTX_new() and X509_STORE_CTX_free() functions which should be used for version portability: especially since the verify structure is likely to change more often now. SSL integration. Add purpose and trust to SSL_CTX and SSL and functions to set them. If not set then assume SSL clients will verify SSL servers and vice versa. Two new options to the verify program: -untrusted allows a set of untrusted certificates to be passed in and -purpose which sets the intended purpose of the certificate. If a purpose is set then the new chain verify code is used to check extension consistency. [Steve Henson] *) Support for the authority information access extension. [Steve Henson] *) Modify RSA and DSA PEM read routines to transparently handle PKCS#8 format private keys. New *_PUBKEY_* functions that handle public keys in a format compatible with certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures. Unfortunately there were already functions called *_PublicKey_* which used various odd formats so these are retained for compatibility: however the DSA variants were never in a public release so they have been deleted. Changed dsa/rsa utilities to handle the new format: note no releases ever handled public keys so we should be OK. The primary motivation for this change is to avoid the same fiasco that dogs private keys: there are several incompatible private key formats some of which are standard and some OpenSSL specific and require various evil hacks to allow partial transparent handling and even then it doesn't work with DER formats. Given the option anything other than PKCS#8 should be dumped: but the other formats have to stay in the name of compatibility. With public keys and the benefit of hindsight one standard format is used which works with EVP_PKEY, RSA or DSA structures: though it clearly returns an error if you try to read the wrong kind of key. Added a -pubkey option to the 'x509' utility to output the public key. Also rename the EVP_PKEY_get_*() to EVP_PKEY_rget_*() (renamed to EVP_PKEY_get1_*() in the OpenSSL 0.9.5 release) and add EVP_PKEY_rset_*() functions (renamed to EVP_PKEY_set1_*()) that do the same as the EVP_PKEY_assign_*() except they up the reference count of the added key (they don't "swallow" the supplied key). [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to crypto/x509/by_file.c the code to read in certificates and CRLs would fail if the file contained no certificates or no CRLs: added a new function to read in both types and return the number read: this means that if none are read it will be an error. The DER versions of the certificate and CRL reader would always fail because it isn't possible to mix certificates and CRLs in DER format without choking one or the other routine. Changed this to just read a certificate: this is the best we can do. Also modified the code in apps/verify.c to take notice of return codes: it was previously attempting to read in certificates from NULL pointers and ignoring any errors: this is one reason why the cert and CRL reader seemed to work. It doesn't check return codes from the default certificate routines: these may well fail if the certificates aren't installed. [Steve Henson] *) Code to support otherName option in GeneralName. [Steve Henson] *) First update to verify code. Change the verify utility so it warns if it is passed a self signed certificate: for consistency with the normal behaviour. X509_verify has been modified to it will now verify a self signed certificate if *exactly* the same certificate appears in the store: it was previously impossible to trust a single self signed certificate. This means that: openssl verify ss.pem now gives a warning about a self signed certificate but openssl verify -CAfile ss.pem ss.pem is OK. [Steve Henson] *) For servers, store verify_result in SSL_SESSION data structure (and add it to external session representation). This is needed when client certificate verifications fails, but an application-provided verification callback (set by SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback) allows accepting the session anyway (i.e. leaves x509_store_ctx->error != X509_V_OK but returns 1): When the session is reused, we have to set ssl->verify_result to the appropriate error code to avoid security holes. [Bodo Moeller, problem pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix a bug in the new PKCS#7 code: it didn't consider the case in PKCS7_dataInit() where the signed PKCS7 structure didn't contain any existing data because it was being created. [Po-Cheng Chen , slightly modified by Steve Henson] *) Add a salt to the key derivation routines in enc.c. This forms the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file. Also add a -S option to allow a salt to be input on the command line. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_cmp(). Oddly enough there wasn't a function to compare two certificates. We do this by working out the SHA1 hash and comparing that. X509_cmp() will be needed by the trust code. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_get1_session() is like SSL_get_session(), but increments the reference count in the SSL_SESSION returned. [Geoff Thorpe ] *) Fix for 'req': it was adding a null to request attributes. Also change the X509_LOOKUP and X509_INFO code to handle certificate auxiliary information. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for 40 and 64 bit RC2 and RC4 algorithms: document the 'enc' command. [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to add extra information to the memory leak detecting output, to form tracebacks, showing from where each allocation was originated: CRYPTO_push_info("constant string") adds the string plus current file name and line number to a per-thread stack, CRYPTO_pop_info() does the obvious, CRYPTO_remove_all_info() is like calling CYRPTO_pop_info() until the stack is empty. Also updated memory leak detection code to be multi-thread-safe. [Richard Levitte] *) Add options -text and -noout to pkcs7 utility and delete the encryption options which never did anything. Update docs. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to some of the utilities to allow the pass phrase to be included on either the command line (not recommended on OSes like Unix) or read from the environment. Update the manpages and fix a few bugs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a few manpages for some of the openssl commands. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the -revoke option in ca. It was freeing up memory twice, leaking and not finding already revoked certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive changes to support certificate auxiliary information. This involves the use of X509_CERT_AUX structure and X509_AUX functions. An X509_AUX function such as PEM_read_X509_AUX() can still read in a certificate file in the usual way but it will also read in any additional "auxiliary information". By doing things this way a fair degree of compatibility can be retained: existing certificates can have this information added using the new 'x509' options. Current auxiliary information includes an "alias" and some trust settings. The trust settings will ultimately be used in enhanced certificate chain verification routines: currently a certificate can only be trusted if it is self signed and then it is trusted for all purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Fix assembler for Alpha (tested only on DEC OSF not Linux or *BSD). The problem was that one of the replacement routines had not been working since SSLeay releases. For now the offending routine has been replaced with non-optimised assembler. Even so, this now gives around 95% performance improvement for 1024 bit RSA signs. [Mark Cox] *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2 handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key. A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine the effective key length. In this case the effective key length can still be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes the key length and effective key length are equal. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0); and have it automatically work out the correct field type and fill in the structures. The more adventurous can try: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, field, MBSTRING_UTF8, str, -1, -1, 0); and it will (hopefully) work out the correct multibyte encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Change the 'req' utility to use the new field handling and multibyte copy routines. Before the DN field creation was handled in an ad hoc way in req, ca, and x509 which was rather broken and didn't support BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. Since some software doesn't implement BMPStrings or UTF8Strings yet, they can be enabled using the config file using the dirstring_type option. See the new comment in the default openssl.cnf for more info. [Steve Henson] *) Make crypto/rand/md_rand.c more robust: - Assure unique random numbers after fork(). - Make sure that concurrent threads access the global counter and md serializably so that we never lose entropy in them or use exactly the same state in multiple threads. Access to the large state is not always serializable because the additional locking could be a performance killer, and md should be large enough anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New file apps/app_rand.c with commonly needed functionality for handling the random seed file. Use the random seed file in some applications that previously did not: ca, dsaparam -genkey (which also ignored its '-rand' option), s_client, s_server, x509 (when signing). Except on systems with /dev/urandom, it is crucial to have a random seed file at least for key creation, DSA signing, and for DH exchanges; for RSA signatures we could do without one. gendh and gendsa (unlike genrsa) used to read only the first byte of each file listed in the '-rand' option. The function as previously found in genrsa is now in app_rand.c and is used by all programs that support '-rand'. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RAND_write_file, use mode 0600 for creating files; don't just chmod when it may be too late. [Bodo Moeller] *) Report an error from X509_STORE_load_locations when X509_LOOKUP_load_file or X509_LOOKUP_add_dir failed. [Bill Perry] *) New function ASN1_mbstring_copy() this copies a string in either ASCII, Unicode, Universal (4 bytes per character) or UTF8 format into an ASN1_STRING type. A mask of permissible types is passed and it chooses the "minimal" type to use or an error if not type is suitable. [Steve Henson] *) Add function equivalents to the various macros in asn1.h. The old macros are retained with an M_ prefix. Code inside the library can use the M_ macros. External code (including the openssl utility) should *NOT* in order to be "shared library friendly". [Steve Henson] *) Add various functions that can check a certificate's extensions to see if it usable for various purposes such as SSL client, server or S/MIME and CAs of these types. This is currently VERY EXPERIMENTAL but will ultimately be used for certificate chain verification. Also added a -purpose flag to x509 utility to print out all the purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Add a CRYPTO_EX_DATA to X509 certificate structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) New X509V3_{X509,CRL,REVOKED}_get_d2i() functions. These will search for, obtain and decode and extension and obtain its critical flag. This allows all the necessary extension code to be handled in a single function call. [Steve Henson] *) RC4 tune-up featuring 30-40% performance improvement on most RISC platforms. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. [Andy Polyakov] *) New -noout option to asn1parse. This causes no output to be produced its main use is when combined with -strparse and -out to extract data from a file (which may not be in ASN.1 format). [Steve Henson] *) Fix for pkcs12 program. It was hashing an invalid certificate pointer when producing the local key id. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -dhparam in s_server. This allows a DH parameter file to be stated explicitly. If it is not stated then it tries the first server certificate file. The previous behaviour hard coded the filename "server.pem". [Steve Henson] *) Add -pubin and -pubout options to the rsa and dsa commands. These allow a public key to be input or output. For example: openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem Also added necessary DSA public key functions to handle this. [Steve Henson] *) Fix so PKCS7_dataVerify() doesn't crash if no certificates are contained in the message. This was handled by allowing X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial() to tolerate a NULL passed to it. [Steve Henson, reported by Sampo Kellomaki ] *) Fix for bug in d2i_ASN1_bytes(): other ASN1 functions add an extra null to the end of the strings whereas this didn't. This would cause problems if strings read with d2i_ASN1_bytes() were later modified. [Steve Henson, reported by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix for base64 decode bug. When a base64 bio reads only one line of data and it contains EOF it will end up returning an error. This is caused by input 46 bytes long. The cause is due to the way base64 BIOs find the start of base64 encoded data. They do this by trying a trial decode on each line until they find one that works. When they do a flag is set and it starts again knowing it can pass all the data directly through the decoder. Unfortunately it doesn't reset the context it uses. This means that if EOF is reached an attempt is made to pass two EOFs through the context and this causes the resulting error. This can also cause other problems as well. As is usual with these problems it takes *ages* to find and the fix is trivial: move one line. [Steve Henson, reported by ian@uns.ns.ac.yu (Ivan Nejgebauer) ] *) Ugly workaround to get s_client and s_server working under Windows. The old code wouldn't work because it needed to select() on sockets and the tty (for keypresses and to see if data could be written). Win32 only supports select() on sockets so we select() with a 1s timeout on the sockets and then see if any characters are waiting to be read, if none are present then we retry, we also assume we can always write data to the tty. This isn't nice because the code then blocks until we've received a complete line of data and it is effectively polling the keyboard at 1s intervals: however it's quite a bit better than not working at all :-) A dedicated Windows application might handle this with an event loop for example. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available. For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead. This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1 for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt(). [Steve Henson] *) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it no longer accesses structures directly. Make the ASN1 CRL parsing a bit less strict. It will now permit CRL extensions even if it is not a V2 CRL: this will allow it to tolerate some broken CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Initialize all non-automatic variables each time one of the openssl sub-programs is started (this is necessary as they may be started multiple times from the "OpenSSL>" prompt). [Lennart Bang, Bodo Moeller] *) Preliminary compilation option RSA_NULL which disables RSA crypto without removing all other RSA functionality (this is what NO_RSA does). This is so (for example) those in the US can disable those operations covered by the RSA patent while allowing storage and parsing of RSA keys and RSA key generation. [Steve Henson] *) Non-copying interface to BIO pairs. (still largely untested) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function ANS1_tag2str() to convert an ASN1 tag to a descriptive ASCII string. This was handled independently in various places before. [Steve Henson] *) New functions UTF8_getc() and UTF8_putc() that parse and generate UTF8 strings a character at a time. [Steve Henson] *) Use client_version from client hello to select the protocol (s23_srvr.c) and for RSA client key exchange verification (s3_srvr.c), as required by the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 specifications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add various utility functions to handle SPKACs, these were previously handled by poking round in the structure internals. Added new function NETSCAPE_SPKI_print() to print out SPKAC and a new utility 'spkac' to print, verify and generate SPKACs. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala but extensively modified. [Steve Henson] *) RIPEMD160 is operational on all platforms and is back in 'make test'. [Andy Polyakov] *) Allow the config file extension section to be overwritten on the command line. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala . The new option is called -extensions and can be applied to ca, req and x509. Also -reqexts to override the request extensions in req and -crlexts to override the crl extensions in ca. [Steve Henson] *) Add new feature to the SPKAC handling in ca. Now you can include the same field multiple times by preceding it by "XXXX." for example: 1.OU="Unit name 1" 2.OU="Unit name 2" this is the same syntax as used in the req config file. [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate extensions to be added to certificate requests. These are specified in a 'req_extensions' option of the req section of the config file. They can be printed out with the -text option to req but are otherwise ignored at present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a horrible bug in enc_read() in crypto/evp/bio_enc.c: if the first data read consists of only the final block it would not decrypted because EVP_CipherUpdate() would correctly report zero bytes had been decrypted. A misplaced 'break' also meant the decrypted final block might not be copied until the next read. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DH_METHOD. Again based on RSA_METHOD. Also added a few extra parameters to the DH structure: these will be useful if for example we want the value of 'q' or implement X9.42 DH. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DSA_METHOD. This is based on the RSA_METHOD and provides hooks that allow the default DSA functions or functions on a "per key" basis to be replaced. This allows hardware acceleration and hardware key storage to be handled without major modification to the library. Also added low level modexp hooks and CRYPTO_EX structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new flag to memory BIOs, BIO_FLAG_MEM_RDONLY. This marks the BIO as "read only": it can't be written to and the buffer it points to will not be freed. Reading from a read only BIO is much more efficient than a normal memory BIO. This was added because there are several times when an area of memory needs to be read from a BIO. The previous method was to create a memory BIO and write the data to it, this results in two copies of the data and an O(n^2) reading algorithm. There is a new function BIO_new_mem_buf() which creates a read only memory BIO from an area of memory. Also modified the PKCS#7 routines to use read only memory BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read, but a retry condition occured while trying to read the rest. [Bodo Moeller] *) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as NID_pkcs7_encrypted by default: this was wrong since this should almost always be NID_pkcs7_data. Also modified the PKCS7_set_type() to handle the encrypted data type: this is a more sensible place to put it and it allows the PKCS#12 code to be tidied up that duplicated this functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Changed obj_dat.pl script so it takes its input and output files on the command line. This should avoid shell escape redirection problems under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included in things like Xenroll certificate requests. Included functions to allow extensions to be obtained and added. [Steve Henson] *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as CRLF (as required by many protocols). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3a and 0.9.4 [09 Aug 1999] *) Install libRSAglue.a when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) A few more ``#ifndef NO_FP_API / #endif'' pairs for consistency. [Andrija Antonijevic ] *) Fix -startdate and -enddate (which was missing) arguments to 'ca' program. [Steve Henson] *) New function DSA_dup_DH, which duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys (q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters contain its length). For 1024-bit p, DSA_generate_parameters followed by DSA_dup_DH is much faster than DH_generate_parameters (which creates parameters where p = 2*q + 1), and also the smaller q makes DH computations much more efficient (160-bit exponentiation instead of 1024-bit exponentiation); so this provides a convenient way to support DHE ciphersuites in SSL/TLS servers (see ssl/ssltest.c). It is of utter importance to use SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); or SSL_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); when such DH parameters are used, because otherwise small subgroup attacks may become possible! [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid memory leak in i2d_DHparams. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allow the -k option to be used more than once in the enc program: this allows the same encrypted message to be read by multiple recipients. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, no_name), this converts an ASN1_OBJECT to a text string. If the "no_name" parameter is set then it will always use the numerical form of the OID, even if it has a short or long name. [Steve Henson] *) Added an extra RSA flag: RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY. Previously the rsa_mod_exp method only got called if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp components were present, otherwise bn_mod_exp was called. In the case of hardware keys for example no private key components need be present and it might store extra data in the RSA structure, which cannot be accessed from bn_mod_exp. By setting RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY rsa_mod_exp will always be called for private key operations. [Steve Henson] *) Added support for SPARC Linux. [Andy Polyakov] *) pem_password_cb function type incompatibly changed from typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag); to ....(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata); so that applications can pass data to their callbacks: The PEM[_ASN1]_{read,write}... functions and macros now take an additional void * argument, which is just handed through whenever the password callback is called. [Damien Miller ; tiny changes by Bodo Moeller] New function SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata. Compatibility note: As many C implementations push function arguments onto the stack in reverse order, the new library version is likely to interoperate with programs that have been compiled with the old pem_password_cb definition (PEM_whatever takes some data that happens to be on the stack as its last argument, and the callback just ignores this garbage); but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this will work. *) The -DPLATFORM="\"$(PLATFORM)\"" definition and the similar -DCFLAGS=... (both in crypto/Makefile.ssl for use by crypto/cversion.c) caused problems not only on Windows, but also on some Unix platforms. To avoid problematic command lines, these definitions are now in an auto-generated file crypto/buildinf.h (created by crypto/Makefile.ssl for standard "make" builds, by util/mk1mf.pl for "mk1mf" builds). [Bodo Moeller] *) MIPS III/IV assembler module is reimplemented. [Andy Polyakov] *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and delete an unused file. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32, since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain. This is currently experimental but it seems to work OK and pass all the tests. Check out INSTALL.W32 for info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in s3_clnt.c: All non-anonymous SSL3/TLS1 connections without temporary keys kept an extra copy of the server key, and connections with temporary keys did not free everything in case of an error. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function RSA_check_key and new openssl rsa option -check for verifying the consistency of RSA keys. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) Various changes to make Win32 compile work: 1. Casts to avoid "loss of data" warnings in p5_crpt2.c 2. Change unsigned int to int in b_dump.c to avoid "signed/unsigned comparison" warnings. 3. Add sk__sort to DEF file generator and do make update. [Steve Henson] *) Add a debugging option to PKCS#5 v2 key generation function: when you #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 passwords, salts, iteration counts and derived keys are printed to stderr. [Steve Henson] *) Copy the flags in ASN1_STRING_dup(). [Roman E. Pavlov ] *) The x509 application mishandled signing requests containing DSA keys when the signing key was also DSA and the parameters didn't match. It was supposed to omit the parameters when they matched the signing key: the verifying software was then supposed to automatically use the CA's parameters if they were absent from the end user certificate. Omitting parameters is no longer recommended. The test was also the wrong way round! This was probably due to unusual behaviour in EVP_cmp_parameters() which returns 1 if the parameters match. This meant that parameters were omitted when they *didn't* match and the certificate was useless. Certificates signed with 'ca' didn't have this bug. [Steve Henson, reported by Doug Erickson ] *) Memory leak checking (-DCRYPTO_MDEBUG) had some problems. The interface is as follows: Applications can use CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) aka MemCheck_start(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) aka MemCheck_stop(); "off" is now the default. The library internally uses CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE) aka MemCheck_off(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) aka MemCheck_on() to disable memory-checking temporarily. Some inconsistent states that previously were possible (and were even the default) are now avoided. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME is new and additionally stores the current time with each memory chunk allocated; this is occasionally more helpful than just having a counter. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD is also new and adds the thread ID. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL enables all of the above, plus any future extensions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce "mode" for SSL structures (with defaults in SSL_CTX), which largely parallels "options", but is for changing API behaviour, whereas "options" are about protocol behaviour. Initial "mode" flags are: SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE Allow SSL_write to report success when a single record has been written. SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER Don't insist that SSL_write retries use the same buffer location. (But all of the contents must be copied!) [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options worked. *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc. [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington ] *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having to mess around with the internals of an RSA structure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in DSA_do_sign and DSA_is_prime. Also really enable memory leak checks in openssl.c and in some test programs. [Chad C. Mulligan, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() which can mess up the length of negative integers. This has now been simplified to just store the length when it is first determined and use it later, rather than trying to keep track of where data is copied and updating it to point to the end. [Steve Henson, reported by Brien Wheeler ] *) Add a new function PKCS7_signatureVerify. This allows the verification of a PKCS#7 signature but with the signing certificate passed to the function itself. This contrasts with PKCS7_dataVerify which assumes the certificate is present in the PKCS#7 structure. This isn't always the case: certificates can be omitted from a PKCS#7 structure and be distributed by "out of band" means (such as a certificate database). [Steve Henson] *) Complete the PEM_* macros with DECLARE_PEM versions to replace the function prototypes in pem.h, also change util/mkdef.pl to add the necessary function names. [Steve Henson] *) mk1mf.pl (used by Windows builds) did not properly read the options set by Configure in the top level Makefile, and Configure was not even able to write more than one option correctly. Fixed, now "no-idea no-rc5 -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG" etc. works as intended. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions CONF_load_bio() and CONF_load_fp() to allow a config file to be loaded from a BIO or FILE pointer. The BIO version will for example allow memory BIOs to contain config info. [Steve Henson] *) New function "CRYPTO_num_locks" that returns CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS. Whoever hopes to achieve shared-library compatibility across versions must use this, not the compile-time macro. (Exercise 0.9.4: Which is the minimum library version required by such programs?) Note: All this applies only to multi-threaded programs, others don't need locks. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add missing case to s3_clnt.c state machine -- one of the new SSL tests through a BIO pair triggered the default case, i.e. SSLerr(...,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE). [Bodo Moeller] *) New "BIO pair" concept (crypto/bio/bss_bio.c) so that applications can use the SSL library even if none of the specific BIOs is appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in i2d_DSAPublicKey() which meant it returned the wrong value for the encoded length. [Jeon KyoungHo ] *) Add initial documentation of the X509V3 functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new pair of functions PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() that are equivalent to PEM_write_PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() but use the more secure PKCS#8 private key format with a high iteration count. [Steve Henson] *) Fix determination of Perl interpreter: A perl or perl5 _directory_ in $PATH was also accepted as the interpreter. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix demos/sign/sign.c: well there wasn't anything strictly speaking wrong with it but it was very old and did things like calling PEM_ASN1_read() directly and used MD5 for the hash not to mention some unusual formatting. [Steve Henson] *) Fix demos/selfsign.c: it used obsolete and deleted functions, changed to use the new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the PEM_read/PEM_write functions in crypto/pem/pem_all.c with macros. This should make it easier to change their form, add extra arguments etc. Fix a few PEM prototypes which didn't have cipher as a constant. [Steve Henson] *) Add to configuration table a new entry that can specify an alternative name for unistd.h (for pre-POSIX systems); we need this for NeXTstep, according to Mark Crispin . [Bodo Moeller] #if 0 *) DES CBC did not update the IV. Weird. [Ben Laurie] #else des_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV, but des_ncbc_encrypt does. Changing the behaviour of the former might break existing programs -- where IV updating is needed, des_ncbc_encrypt can be used. #endif *) When bntest is run from "make test" it drives bc to check its calculations, as well as internally checking them. If an internal check fails, it needs to cause bc to give a non-zero result or make test carries on without noticing the failure. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) DES library cleanups. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit ciphers. NOTE: although the key derivation function has been verified against some published test vectors it has not been extensively tested yet. Added a -v2 "cipher" option to pkcs8 application to allow the use of v2.0. [Steve Henson] *) Instead of "mkdir -p", which is not fully portable, use new Perl script "util/mkdir-p.pl". [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite the way password based encryption (PBE) is handled. It used to assume that the ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier parameter was a PBEParameter structure. This was true for the PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 PBE algorithms but doesn't apply to PKCS#5 v2.0 where it can be something else. Now the 'parameter' field of the AlgorithmIdentifier is passed to the underlying key generation function so it must do its own ASN1 parsing. This has also changed the EVP_PBE_CipherInit() function which now has a 'parameter' argument instead of literal salt and iteration count values and the function EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit() has been deleted. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#5 v1.5 compatible password based encryption algorithms and PKCS#8 functionality. New 'pkcs8' application linked to openssl. Needed to change the PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY value which was just "PRIVATE KEY" because this clashed with PKCS#8 unencrypted string. Since this value was just used as a "magic string" and not used directly its value doesn't matter. [Steve Henson] *) Introduce some semblance of const correctness to BN. Shame C doesn't support mutable. [Ben Laurie] *) "linux-sparc64" configuration (ultrapenguin). [Ray Miller ] "linux-sparc" configuration. [Christian Forster ] *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers. [Ulf Möller] *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress). File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Support BS2000/OSD-POSIX. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Make callbacks for key generation use void * instead of char *. [Ben Laurie] *) Make S/MIME samples compile (not yet tested). [Ben Laurie] *) Additional typesafe stacks. [Ben Laurie] *) New configuration variants "bsdi-elf-gcc" (BSD/OS 4.x). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3 and 0.9.3a [29 May 1999] *) New configuration variant "sco5-gcc". *) Updated some demos. [Sean O Riordain, Wade Scholine] *) Add missing BIO_free at exit of pkcs12 application. [Wu Zhigang] *) Fix memory leak in conf.c. [Steve Henson] *) Updates for Win32 to assembler version of MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Set #! path to perl in apps/der_chop to where we found it instead of using a fixed path. [Bodo Moeller] *) SHA library changes for irix64-mips4-cc. [Andy Polyakov] *) Improvements for VMS support. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3 [24 May 1999] *) Bignum library bug fix. IRIX 6 passes "make test" now! This also avoids the problems with SC4.2 and unpatched SC5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) New functions sk_num, sk_value and sk_set to replace the previous macros. These are required because of the typesafe stack would otherwise break existing code. If old code used a structure member which used to be STACK and is now STACK_OF (for example cert in a PKCS7_SIGNED structure) with sk_num or sk_value it would produce an error because the num, data members are not present in STACK_OF. Now it just produces a warning. sk_set replaces the old method of assigning a value to sk_value (e.g. sk_value(x, i) = y) which the library used in a few cases. Any code that does this will no longer work (and should use sk_set instead) but this could be regarded as a "questionable" behaviour anyway. [Steve Henson] *) Fix most of the other PKCS#7 bugs. The "experimental" code can now correctly handle encrypted S/MIME data. [Steve Henson] *) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock (which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char) to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements), which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts. Introduce new type const_des_cblock. [Bodo Moeller] *) Reorganise the PKCS#7 library and get rid of some of the more obvious problems: find RecipientInfo structure that matches recipient certificate and initialise the ASN1 structures properly based on passed cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Belatedly make the BN tests actually check the results. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the encoding and decoding of negative ASN1 INTEGERS and conversion to and from BNs: it was completely broken. New compilation option NEG_PUBKEY_BUG to allow for some broken certificates that encode public key elements as negative integers. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganize and speed up MD5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) VMS support. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -out to asn1parse to allow the parsed structure to be output to a file. This is most useful when combined with the -strparse option to examine the output of things like OCTET STRINGS. [Steve Henson] *) Make SSL library a little more fool-proof by not requiring any longer that SSL_set_{accept,connect}_state be called before SSL_{accept,connect} may be used (SSL_set_..._state is omitted in many applications because usually everything *appeared* to work as intended anyway -- now it really works as intended). [Bodo Moeller] *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline'' with EGCS 1.1.2+ [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Various fixes to the EVP and PKCS#7 code. It may now be able to handle PKCS#7 enveloped data properly. [Sebastian Akerman , modified by Steve] *) Create a duplicate of the SSL_CTX's CERT in SSL_new instead of copying pointers. The cert_st handling is changed by this in various ways (and thus what used to be known as ctx->default_cert is now called ctx->cert, since we don't resort to s->ctx->[default_]cert any longer when s->cert does not give us what we need). ssl_cert_instantiate becomes obsolete by this change. As soon as we've got the new code right (possibly it already is?), we have solved a couple of bugs of the earlier code where s->cert was used as if it could not have been shared with other SSL structures. Note that using the SSL API in certain dirty ways now will result in different behaviour than observed with earlier library versions: Changing settings for an SSL_CTX *ctx after having done s = SSL_new(ctx) does not influence s as it used to. In order to clean up things more thoroughly, inside SSL_SESSION we don't use CERT any longer, but a new structure SESS_CERT that holds per-session data (if available); currently, this is the peer's certificate chain and, for clients, the server's certificate and temporary key. CERT holds only those values that can have meaningful defaults in an SSL_CTX. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509V3_EXT_i2d() to create an X509_EXTENSION structure from the internal representation. Various PKCS#7 fixes: remove some evil casts and set the enc_dig_alg field properly based on the signing key type. [Steve Henson] *) Allow PKCS#12 password to be set from the command line or the environment. Let 'ca' get its config file name from the environment variables "OPENSSL_CONF" or "SSLEAY_CONF" (for consistency with 'req' and 'x509'). [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate policies extension to use an IA5STRING for the organization field. This is contrary to the PKIX definition but VeriSign uses it and IE5 only recognises this form. Document 'x509' extension option. [Steve Henson] *) Add PEDANTIC compiler flag to allow compilation with gcc -pedantic, without disallowing inline assembler and the like for non-pedantic builds. [Ben Laurie] *) Support Borland C++ builder. [Janez Jere , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Support Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Sparc v8plus assembler for the bignum library. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) Update HPUX configuration. [Anonymous] *) Add missing sk__unshift() function to safestack.h [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) New function SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file that sets the "extra_cert"s in addition to the certificate. (This makes sense only for "PEM" format files, as chains as a whole are not DER-encoded.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Support verify_depth from the SSL API. x509_vfy.c had what can be considered an off-by-one-error: Its depth (which was not part of the external interface) was actually counting the number of certificates in a chain; now it really counts the depth. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix in crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c: The SSLerr macro was used instead of X509err, which often resulted in confusing error messages since the error codes are not globally unique (e.g. an alleged error in ssl3_accept when a certificate didn't match the private key). *) New function SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context that allows to set a default value (so that you don't need SSL_set_session_id_context for each connection using the SSL_CTX). [Bodo Moeller] *) OAEP decoding bug fix. [Ulf Möller] *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by David Harris. [Bodo Moeller] *) New Configure options "threads" and "no-threads". For systems where the proper compiler options are known (currently Solaris and Linux), "threads" is the default. [Bodo Moeller] *) New script util/mklink.pl as a faster substitute for util/mklink.sh. [Bodo Moeller] *) Install various scripts to $(OPENSSLDIR)/misc, not to $(INSTALLTOP)/bin -- they shouldn't clutter directories such as /usr/local/bin. [Bodo Moeller] *) "make linux-shared" to build shared libraries. [Niels Poppe ] *) New Configure option no- (rsa, idea, rc5, ...). [Ulf Möller] *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for extension adding in x509 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI prototypes. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR. [Ulf Möller] *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering, header rewriting and C source file generation. It should be much better than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all on one line (which resulted in some large lines...). [Steve Henson] *) Change #include filenames from to . [Bodo Moeller] *) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return 0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix some race conditions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for CRL distribution points extension. Add Certificate Policies and CRL distribution points documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of 8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix between OpenSSL and Baltimore C/SSL 2.0 and J/SSL 2.0. [Merlin Hughes ] *) Fix lots of warnings. [Richard Levitte ] *) In add_cert_dir() in crypto/x509/by_dir.c, break out of the loop if the directory spec didn't end with a LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix problems with sizeof(long) == 8. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Change functions to ANSI C. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix typos in error codes. [Martin Kraemer , Ulf Möller] *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Support for Certificate Policies extension: both print and set. Various additions to support the r2i method this uses. [Steve Henson] *) A lot of constification, and fix a bug in X509_NAME_oneline() that could return a const string when you are expecting an allocated buffer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for ASN1 types UTF8String and VISIBLESTRING, also the CHOICE types DirectoryString and DisplayText. [Steve Henson] *) Add code to allow r2i extensions to access the configuration database, add an LHASH database driver and add several ctx helper functions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix an evil bug in bn_expand2() which caused various BN functions to fail when they extended the size of a BIGNUM. [Steve Henson] *) Various utility functions to handle SXNet extension. Modify mkdef.pl to support typesafe stack. [Steve Henson] *) Fix typo in SSL_[gs]et_options(). [Nils Frostberg ] *) Delete various functions and files that belonged to the (now obsolete) old X509V3 handling code. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure option "rsaref". [Ulf Möller] *) Don't auto-generate pem.h. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce type-safe ASN.1 SETs. [Ben Laurie] *) Convert various additional casted stacks to type-safe STACK_OF() variants. [Ben Laurie, Ralf S. Engelschall, Steve Henson] *) Introduce type-safe STACKs. This will almost certainly break lots of code that links with OpenSSL (well at least cause lots of warnings), but fear not: the conversion is trivial, and it eliminates loads of evil casts. A few STACKed things have been converted already. Feel free to convert more. In the fullness of time, I'll do away with the STACK type altogether. [Ben Laurie] *) Add `openssl ca -revoke ' facility which revokes a certificate specified in by updating the entry in the index.txt file. This way one no longer has to edit the index.txt file manually for revoking a certificate. The -revoke option does the gory details now. [Massimiliano Pala , Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix `openssl crl -noout -text' combination where `-noout' killed the `-text' option at all and this way the `-noout -text' combination was inconsistent in `openssl crl' with the friends in `openssl x509|rsa|dsa'. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make sure a corresponding plain text error message exists for the X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED/23 error number which can occur when a verify callback function determined that a certificate was revoked. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl " for ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA. Also, test all available cipers including rc5, which was forgotten until now. In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command "openssl list-cipher-commands" is used. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: s_client occasionally would sleep in select() when it should have checked SSL_pending() first. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding. [Ulf Möller] *) Tweaks to Configure [Niels Poppe ] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 ASN1 PBES2 structures. No other support, yet... [Steve Henson] *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles. [Ulf Möller] *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386. The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486. [Ulf Möller] *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the same as SSL2_VERSION anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New "-showcerts" option for s_client. [Bodo Moeller] *) Still more PKCS#12 integration. Add pkcs12 application to openssl application. Various cleanups and fixes. [Steve Henson] *) More PKCS#12 integration. Add new pkcs12 directory with Makefile.ssl and modify error routines to work internally. Add error codes and PBE init to library startup routines. [Steve Henson] *) Further PKCS#12 integration. Added password based encryption, PKCS#8 and packing functions to asn1 and evp. Changed function names and error codes along the way. [Steve Henson] *) PKCS12 integration: and so it begins... First of several patches to slowly integrate PKCS#12 functionality into OpenSSL. Add PKCS#12 objects to objects.h [Steve Henson] *) Add a new 'indent' option to some X509V3 extension code. Initial ASN1 and display support for Thawte strong extranet extension. [Steve Henson] *) Add LinuxPPC support. [Jeff Dubrule ] *) Get rid of redundant BN file bn_mulw.c, and rename bn_div64 to bn_div_words in alpha.s. [Hannes Reinecke and Ben Laurie] *) Make sure the RSA OAEP test is skipped under -DRSAref because OAEP isn't supported when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Move definitions of IS_SET/IS_SEQUENCE inside crypto/asn1/asn1.h so they no longer are missing under -DNOPROTO. [Soren S. Jorvang ] Changes between 0.9.1c and 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999] *) Make SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() work in servers. Unfortunately, it still doesn't work when the session is reused. Coming soon! [Ben Laurie] *) Fix a security hole, that allows sessions to be reused in the wrong context thus bypassing client cert protection! All software that uses client certs and session caches in multiple contexts NEEDS PATCHING to allow session reuse! A fuller solution is in the works. [Ben Laurie, problem pointed out by Holger Reif, Bodo Moeller (and ???)] *) Some more source tree cleanups (removed obsolete files crypto/bf/asm/bf586.pl, test/test.txt and crypto/sha/asm/f.s; changed permission on "config" script to be executable) and a fix for the INSTALL document. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Remove some legacy and erroneous uses of malloc, free instead of Malloc, Free. [Lennart Bang , with minor changes by Steve] *) Make rsa_oaep_test return non-zero on error. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Add support for native Solaris shared libraries. Configure solaris-sparc-sc4-pic, make, then run shlib/solaris-sc4.sh. It'd be nice if someone would make that last step automatic. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) ctx_size was not built with the right compiler during "make links". Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the meaning of 'ALL' in the cipher list. It now means "everything except NULL ciphers". This means the default cipher list will no longer enable NULL ciphers. They need to be specifically enabled e.g. with the string "DEFAULT:eNULL". [Steve Henson] *) Fix to RSA private encryption routines: if p < q then it would occasionally produce an invalid result. This will only happen with externally generated keys because OpenSSL (and SSLeay) ensure p > q. [Steve Henson] *) Be less restrictive and allow also `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin/perl' in addition to `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin', because this way one can also use an interpreter named `perl5' (which is usually the name of Perl 5.xxx on platforms where an Perl 4.x is still installed as `perl'). [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Let util/clean-depend.pl work also with older Perl 5.00x versions. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparision to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener for the suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c. [Steve Henson] *) DES quad checksum was broken on big-endian architectures. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Comment out two functions in bio.h that aren't implemented. Fix up the Win32 test batch file so it (might) work again. The Win32 test batch file is horrible: I feel ill.... [Steve Henson] *) Move various #ifdefs around so NO_SYSLOG, NO_DIRENT etc are now selected in e_os.h. Audit of header files to check ANSI and non ANSI sections: 10 functions were absent from non ANSI section and not exported from Windows DLLs. Fixed up libeay.num for new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Make `openssl version' output lines consistent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix Win32 symbol export lists for BIO functions: Added BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_get_ex_num, BIO_get_ex_data and BIO_set_ex_data to ms/libeay{16,32}.def. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Second round of fixing the OpenSSL perl/ stuff. It now at least compiled fine under Unix and passes some trivial tests I've now added. But the whole stuff is horribly incomplete, so a README.1ST with a disclaimer was added to make sure no one expects that this stuff really works in the OpenSSL 0.9.2 release. Additionally I've started to clean the XS sources up and fixed a few little bugs and inconsistencies in OpenSSL.{pm,xs} and openssl_bio.xs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the generation of two part addresses in perl. [Kenji Miyake , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add config entry for Linux on MIPS. [John Tobey ] *) Make links whenever Configure is run, unless we are on Windoze. [Ben Laurie] *) Permit extensions to be added to CRLs using crl_section in openssl.cnf. Currently only issuerAltName and AuthorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure :
'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended to them (seperated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key with value
and ``perl Configure '' is called. So, when you want to perform a quick test-compile under FreeBSD 3.1 with pgcc and without assembler stuff you can use ``perl Configure "FreeBSD-elf:pgcc:-O6:::"'' now, which overrides the FreeBSD-elf entry on-the-fly. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Disable new TLS1 ciphersuites by default: they aren't official yet. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow DSO flags like -fpic, -fPIC, -KPIC etc. to be specified on the `perl Configure ...' command line. This way one can compile OpenSSL libraries with Position Independent Code (PIC) which is needed for linking it into DSOs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remarkably, export ciphers were totally broken and no-one had noticed! Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Cleaned up the LICENSE document: The official contact for any license questions now is the OpenSSL core team under openssl-core@openssl.org. And add a paragraph about the dual-license situation to make sure people recognize that _BOTH_ the OpenSSL license _AND_ the SSLeay license apply to the OpenSSL toolkit. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...' display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'. Additonally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Permit null encryption ciphersuites, used for authentication only. It used to be necessary to set the preprocessor define SSL_ALLOW_ENULL to do this. It is now necessary to set SSL_FORBID_ENULL to prevent the use of null encryption. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a bunch of fixes to the PKCS#7 stuff. It used to sometimes reorder signed attributes when verifying signatures (this would break them), the detached data encoding was wrong and public keys obtained using X509_get_pubkey() weren't freed. [Steve Henson] *) Add text documentation for the BUFFER functions. Also added a work around to a Win95 console bug. This was triggered by the password read stuff: the last character typed gets carried over to the next fread(). If you were generating a new cert request using 'req' for example then the last character of the passphrase would be CR which would then enter the first field as blank. [Steve Henson] *) Added the new `Includes OpenSSL Cryptography Software' button as doc/openssl_button.{gif,html} which is similar in style to the old SSLeay button and can be used by applications based on OpenSSL to show the relationship to the OpenSSL project. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remove confusing variables in function signatures in files ssl/ssl_lib.c and ssl/ssl.h. [Lennart Bong ] *) Don't install bss_file.c under PREFIX/include/ [Lennart Bong ] *) Get the Win32 compile working again. Modify mkdef.pl so it can handle functions that return function pointers and has support for NT specific stuff. Fix mk1mf.pl and VC-32.pl to support NT differences also. Various #ifdef WIN32 and WINNTs sprinkled about the place and some changes from unsigned to signed types: this was killing the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Add new certificate file to stack functions, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() and SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(). These largely supplant SSL_load_client_CA_file(), and can be used to add multiple certs easily to a stack (usually this is then handed to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list()). This means that Apache-SSL and similar packages don't have to mess around to add as many CAs as they want to the preferred list. [Ben Laurie] *) Experiment with doxygen documentation. Currently only partially applied to ssl/ssl_lib.c. See http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html, and run doxygen with openssl.doxy as the configuration file. [Ben Laurie] *) Get rid of remaining C++-style comments which strict C compilers hate. [Ralf S. Engelschall, pointed out by Carlos Amengual] *) Changed BN_RECURSION in bn_mont.c to BN_RECURSION_MONT so it is not compiled in by default: it has problems with large keys. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of SSL_xxx() functions for configuring the temporary RSA and DH private keys and/or callback functions which directly correspond to their SSL_CTX_xxx() counterparts but work on a per-connection basis. This is needed for applications which have to configure certificates on a per-connection basis (e.g. Apache+mod_ssl) instead of a per-context basis (e.g. s_server). For the RSA certificate situation is makes no difference, but for the DSA certificate situation this fixes the "no shared cipher" problem where the OpenSSL cipher selection procedure failed because the temporary keys were not overtaken from the context and the API provided no way to reconfigure them. The new functions now let applications reconfigure the stuff and they are in detail: SSL_need_tmp_RSA, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback. Additionally a new non-public-API function ssl_cert_instantiate() is used as a helper function and also to reduce code redundancy inside ssl_rsa.c. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Move s_server -dcert and -dkey options out of the undocumented feature area because they are useful for the DSA situation and should be recognized by the users. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the cipher decision scheme for export ciphers: the export bits are *not* within SSL_MKEY_MASK or SSL_AUTH_MASK, they are within SSL_EXP_MASK. So, the original variable has to be used instead of the already masked variable. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix 'port' variable from `int' to `unsigned int' in crypto/bio/b_sock.c [Richard Levitte ] *) Change type of another md_len variable in pk7_doit.c:PKCS7_dataFinal() from `int' to `unsigned int' because it's a length and initialized by EVP_DigestFinal() which expects an `unsigned int *'. [Richard Levitte ] *) Don't hard-code path to Perl interpreter on shebang line of Configure script. Instead use the usual Shell->Perl transition trick. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make `openssl x509 -noout -modulus' functional also for DSA certificates (in addition to RSA certificates) to match the behaviour of `openssl dsa -noout -modulus' as it's already the case for `openssl rsa -noout -modulus'. For RSA the -modulus is the real "modulus" while for DSA currently the public key is printed (a decision which was already done by `openssl dsa -modulus' in the past) which serves a similar purpose. Additionally the NO_RSA no longer completely removes the whole -modulus option; it now only avoids using the RSA stuff. Same applies to NO_DSA now, too. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Add Arne Ansper's reliable BIO - this is an encrypted, block-digested BIO. See the source (crypto/evp/bio_ok.c) for more info. [Arne Ansper ] *) Dump the old yucky req code that tried (and failed) to allow raw OIDs to be added. Now both 'req' and 'ca' can use new objects defined in the config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add cool BIO that does syslog (or event log on NT). [Arne Ansper , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add support for new TLS ciphersuites, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC4_56_MD5, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 and TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, as specified in "56-bit Export Cipher Suites For TLS", draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt. [Ben Laurie] *) Add preliminary config info for new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Make RSA_NO_PADDING really use no padding. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Generate errors when private/public key check is done. [Ben Laurie] *) Overhaul for 'crl' utility. New function X509_CRL_print. Partial support for some CRL extensions and new objects added. [Steve Henson] *) Really fix the ASN1 IMPLICIT bug this time... Partial support for private key usage extension and fuller support for authority key id. [Steve Henson] *) Add OAEP encryption for the OpenSSL crypto library. OAEP is the improved padding method for RSA, which is recommended for new applications in PKCS #1 v2.0 (RFC 2437, October 1998). OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) has better theoretical foundations than the ad-hoc padding used in PKCS #1 v1.5. It is secure against Bleichbacher's attack on RSA. [Ulf Moeller , reformatted, corrected and integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Updates to the new SSL compression code [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3 (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00 [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Run extensive memory leak checks on SSL apps. Fixed *lots* of memory leaks in ssl/ relating to new X509_get_pubkey() behaviour. Also fixes in apps/ and an unrelated leak in crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c [Steve Henson] *) Support for RAW extensions where an arbitrary extension can be created by including its DER encoding. See apps/openssl.cnf for an example. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure latest Perl versions don't interpret some generated C array code as Perl array code in the crypto/err/err_genc.pl script. [Lars Weber <3weber@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Modify ms/do_ms.bat to not generate assembly language makefiles since not many people have the assembler. Various Win32 compilation fixes and update to the INSTALL.W32 file with (hopefully) more accurate Win32 build instructions. [Steve Henson] *) Modify configure script 'Configure' to automatically create crypto/date.h file under Win32 and also build pem.h from pem.org. New script util/mkfiles.pl to create the MINFO file on environments that can't do a 'make files': perl util/mkfiles.pl >MINFO should work. [Steve Henson] *) Major rework of DES function declarations, in the pursuit of correctness and purity. As a result, many evil casts evaporated, and some weirdness, too. You may find this causes warnings in your code. Zapping your evil casts will probably fix them. Mostly. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for a typo in asn1.h. Bug fix to object creation script obj_dat.pl. It considered a zero in an object definition to mean "end of object": none of the objects in objects.h have any zeros so it wasn't spotted. [Steve Henson, reported by Erwann ABALEA ] *) Add support for Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output Feedback Masking (CBCM). In the absence of test vectors, the best I have been able to do is check that the decrypt undoes the encrypt, so far. Send me test vectors if you have them. [Ben Laurie] *) Correct calculation of key length for export ciphers (too much space was allocated for null ciphers). This has not been tested! [Ben Laurie] *) Modifications to the mkdef.pl for Win32 DEF file creation. The usage message is now correct (it understands "crypto" and "ssl" on its command line). There is also now an "update" option. This will update the util/ssleay.num and util/libeay.num files with any new functions. If you do a: perl util/mkdef.pl crypto ssl update it will update them. [Steve Henson] *) Overhauled the Perl interface (perl/*): - ported BN stuff to OpenSSL's different BN library - made the perl/ source tree CVS-aware - renamed the package from SSLeay to OpenSSL (the files still contain their history because I've copied them in the repository) - removed obsolete files (the test scripts will be replaced by better Test::Harness variants in the future) [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) First cut for a very conservative source tree cleanup: 1. merge various obsolete readme texts into doc/ssleay.txt where we collect the old documents and readme texts. 2. remove the first part of files where I'm already sure that we no longer need them because of three reasons: either they are just temporary files which were left by Eric or they are preserved original files where I've verified that the diff is also available in the CVS via "cvs diff -rSSLeay_0_8_1b" or they were renamed (as it was definitely the case for the crypto/md/ stuff). [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) More extension code. Incomplete support for subject and issuer alt name, issuer and authority key id. Change the i2v function parameters and add an extra 'crl' parameter in the X509V3_CTX structure: guess what that's for :-) Fix to ASN1 macro which messed up IMPLICIT tag and add f_enum.c which adds a2i, i2a for ENUMERATED. [Steve Henson] *) Preliminary support for ENUMERATED type. This is largely copied from the INTEGER code. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function, EVP_MD_CTX_copy() to replace frequent use of memcpy. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Make sure `make rehash' target really finds the `openssl' program. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Matthias Loepfe ] *) Squeeze another 7% of speed out of MD5 assembler, at least on a P2. I'd like to hear about it if this slows down other processors. [Ben Laurie] *) Add CygWin32 platform information to Configure script. [Alan Batie ] *) Fixed ms/32all.bat script: `no_asm' -> `no-asm' [Rainer W. Gerling ] *) New program nseq to manipulate netscape certificate sequences [Steve Henson] *) Modify crl2pkcs7 so it supports multiple -certfile arguments. Fix a few typos. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to BN code. Previously the default was to define BN_RECURSION but the BN code had some problems that would cause failures when doing certificate verification and some other functions. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add several PKIX and private extended key usage OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the 'ca' program to handle the new extension code. Modify openssl.cnf for new extension format, add comments. [Steve Henson] *) More X509 V3 changes. Fix typo in v3_bitstr.c. Add support to 'req' and add a sample to openssl.cnf so req -x509 now adds appropriate CA extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Continued X509 V3 changes. Add to other makefiles, integrate with the error code, add initial support to X509_print() and x509 application. [Steve Henson] *) Takes a deep breath and start addding X509 V3 extension support code. Add files in crypto/x509v3. Move original stuff to crypto/x509v3/old. All this stuff is currently isolated and isn't even compiled yet. [Steve Henson] *) Continuing patches for GeneralizedTime. Fix up certificate and CRL ASN1 to use ASN1_TIME and modify print routines to use ASN1_TIME_print. Removed the versions check from X509 routines when loading extensions: this allows certain broken certificates that don't set the version properly to be processed. [Steve Henson] *) Deal with irritating shit to do with dependencies, in YAAHW (Yet Another Ad Hoc Way) - Makefile.ssls now all contain local dependencies, which can still be regenerated with "make depend". [Ben Laurie] *) Spelling mistake in C version of CAST-128. [Ben Laurie, reported by Jeremy Hylton ] *) Changes to the error generation code. The perl script err-code.pl now reads in the old error codes and retains the old numbers, only adding new ones if necessary. It also only changes the .err files if new codes are added. The makefiles have been modified to only insert errors when needed (to avoid needlessly modifying header files). This is done by only inserting errors if the .err file is newer than the auto generated C file. To rebuild all the error codes from scratch (the old behaviour) either modify crypto/Makefile.ssl to pass the -regen flag to err_code.pl or delete all the .err files. [Steve Henson] *) CAST-128 was incorrectly implemented for short keys. The C version has been fixed, but is untested. The assembler versions are also fixed, but new assembler HAS NOT BEEN GENERATED FOR WIN32 - the Makefile needs fixing to regenerate it if needed. [Ben Laurie, reported (with fix for C version) by Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino ] *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c. [Ulf Möller ] *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. ASN1_TIME is the proper type used in certificates et al: it's just almost always a UTCTime. Note this patch adds new error codes so do a "make errors" if there are problems. [Steve Henson] *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config. [Ulf Möller ] *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca. [Anonymous ] *) Generate an error if given an empty string as a cert directory. Also generate an error if handed NULL (previously returned 0 to indicate an error, but didn't set one). [Ben Laurie, reported by Anonymous ] *) Add prototypes to SSL methods. Make SSL_write's buffer const, at last. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the dummy function BN_ref_mod_exp() in rsaref.c to have the correct parameters. This was causing a warning which killed off the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Remove C++ style comments from crypto/bn/bn_local.h. [Neil Costigan ] *) The function OBJ_txt2nid was broken. It was supposed to return a nid based on a text string, looking up short and long names and finally "dot" format. The "dot" format stuff didn't work. Added new function OBJ_txt2obj to do the same but return an ASN1_OBJECT and rewrote OBJ_txt2nid to use it. OBJ_txt2obj can also return objects even if the OID is not part of the table. [Steve Henson] *) Add prototypes to X509 lookup/verify methods, fixing a bug in X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(). [Ben Laurie] *) Sort openssl functions by name. [Ben Laurie] *) Get the gendsa program working (hopefully) and add it to app list. Remove encryption from sample DSA keys (in case anyone is interested the password was "1234"). [Steve Henson] *) Make _all_ *_free functions accept a NULL pointer. [Frans Heymans ] *) If a DH key is generated in s3_srvr.c, don't blow it by trying to use NULL pointers. [Anonymous ] *) s_server should send the CAfile as acceptable CAs, not its own cert. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Don't blow it for numeric -newkey arguments to apps/req. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Temp key "for export" tests were wrong in s3_srvr.c. [Anonymous ] *) Add prototype for temp key callback functions SSL_CTX_set_tmp_{rsa,dh}_callback(). [Ben Laurie] *) Make DH_free() tolerate being passed a NULL pointer (like RSA_free() and DSA_free()). Make X509_PUBKEY_set() check for errors in d2i_PublicKey(). [Steve Henson] *) X509_name_add_entry() freed the wrong thing after an error. [Arne Ansper ] *) rsa_eay.c would attempt to free a NULL context. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_s_socket() had a broken should_retry() on Windoze. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_f_buffer() didn't pass on BIO_CTRL_FLUSH. [Arne Ansper ] *) Make sure the already existing X509_STORE->depth variable is initialized in X509_STORE_new(), but document the fact that this variable is still unused in the certificate verification process. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the various library and apps files to free up pkeys obtained from X509_PUBKEY_get() et al. Also allow x509.c to handle netscape extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix reference counting in X509_PUBKEY_get(). This makes demos/maurice/example2.c work, amongst others, probably. [Steve Henson and Ben Laurie] *) First cut of a cleanup for apps/. First the `ssleay' program is now named `openssl' and second, the shortcut symlinks for the `openssl ' are no longer created. This way we have a single and consistent command line interface `openssl ', similar to `cvs '. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Paul Sutton and Ben Laurie] *) ca.c: move test for DSA keys inside #ifndef NO_DSA. Make pubkey BIT STRING wrapper always have zero unused bits. [Steve Henson] *) Add CA.pl, perl version of CA.sh, add extended key usage OID. [Steve Henson] *) Make the top-level INSTALL documentation easier to understand. [Paul Sutton] *) Makefiles updated to exit if an error occurs in a sub-directory make (including if user presses ^C) [Paul Sutton] *) Make Montgomery context stuff explicit in RSA data structure. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix build order of pem and err to allow for generated pem.h. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix renumbering bug in X509_NAME_delete_entry(). [Ben Laurie] *) Enhanced the err-ins.pl script so it makes the error library number global and can add a library name. This is needed for external ASN1 and other error libraries. [Steve Henson] *) Fixed sk_insert which never worked properly. [Steve Henson] *) Fix ASN1 macros so they can handle indefinite length construted EXPLICIT tags. Some non standard certificates use these: they can now be read in. [Steve Henson] *) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc) into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for the new set of documenation files. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they shared code with SEQUENCEs, which aren't coded the same. This means that almost everything to do with SETs or SEQUENCEs has either changed name or number of arguments. [Ben Laurie, based on a partial fix by GP Jayan ] *) Fix test data to work with the above. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems. [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller ] *) Autodetect FreeBSD3. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix various bugs in Configure. This affects the following platforms: nextstep ncr-scde unixware-2.0 unixware-2.0-pentium sco5-cc. [Ben Laurie] *) Eliminate generated files from CVS. Reorder tests to regenerate files before they are needed. [Ben Laurie] *) Generate Makefile.ssl from Makefile.org (to keep CVS happy). [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.1b and 0.9.1c [23-Dec-1998] *) Added OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to crypto/crypto.h and changed SSLeay to OpenSSL in version strings. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Some fixups to the top-level documents. [Paul Sutton] *) Fixed the nasty bug where rsaref.h was not found under compile-time because the symlink to include/ was missing. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay. [Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fixed nasty rehash problem under `make -f Makefile.ssl links' when "ssleay" is still not found. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added more platforms to Configure: Cray T3E, HPUX 11, [Ralf S. Engelschall, Beckmann ] *) Updated the README file. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various .cvsignore files in the CVS repository subdirs to make a "cvs update" really silent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Recompiled the error-definition header files and added missing symbols to the Win32 linker tables. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Cleaned up the top-level documents; o new files: CHANGES and LICENSE o merged VERSION, HISTORY* and README* files a CHANGES.SSLeay o merged COPYRIGHT into LICENSE o removed obsolete TODO file o renamed MICROSOFT to INSTALL.W32 [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Removed dummy files from the 0.9.1b source tree: crypto/asn1/x crypto/bio/cd crypto/bio/fg crypto/bio/grep crypto/bio/vi crypto/bn/asm/......add.c crypto/bn/asm/a.out crypto/dsa/f crypto/md5/f crypto/pem/gmon.out crypto/perlasm/f crypto/pkcs7/build crypto/rsa/f crypto/sha/asm/f crypto/threads/f ms/zzz ssl/f ssl/f.mak test/f util/f.mak util/pl/f util/pl/f.mak crypto/bf/bf_locl.old apps/f [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various platform portability fixes. [Mark J. Cox] *) The Genesis of the OpenSSL rpject: We start with the latest (unreleased) SSLeay version 0.9.1b which Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson created while they were working for C2Net until summer 1998. [The OpenSSL Project] Changes between 0.9.0b and 0.9.1b [not released] *) Updated a few CA certificates under certs/ [Eric A. Young] *) Changed some BIGNUM api stuff. [Eric A. Young] *) Various platform ports: OpenBSD, Ultrix, IRIX 64bit, NetBSD, DGUX x86, Linux Alpha, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) New COMP library [crypto/comp/] for SSL Record Layer Compression: RLE (dummy implemented) and ZLIB (really implemented when ZLIB is available). [Eric A. Young] *) Add -strparse option to asn1pars program which parses nested binary structures [Dr Stephen Henson ] *) Added "oid_file" to ssleay.cnf for "ca" and "req" programs. [Eric A. Young] *) DSA fix for "ca" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added "-genkey" option to "dsaparam" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added RIPE MD160 (rmd160) message digest. [Eric A. Young] *) Added -a (all) option to "ssleay version" command. [Eric A. Young] *) Added PLATFORM define which is the id given to Configure. [Eric A. Young] *) Added MemCheck_XXXX functions to crypto/mem.c for memory checking. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended the ASN.1 parser routines. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended BIO routines to support REUSEADDR, seek, tell, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) Added a BN_CTX to the BN library. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed the weak key values in DES library [Eric A. Young] *) Changed API in EVP library for cipher aliases. [Eric A. Young] *) Added support for RC2/64bit cipher. [Eric A. Young] *) Converted the lhash library to the crypto/mem.c functions. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more recognized ASN.1 object ids. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more RSA padding checks for SSL/TLS. [Eric A. Young] *) Added BIO proxy/filter functionality. [Eric A. Young] *) Added extra_certs to SSL_CTX which can be used send extra CA certificates to the client in the CA cert chain sending process. It can be configured with SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). [Eric A. Young] *) Now Fortezza is denied in the authentication phase because this is key exchange mechanism is not supported by SSLeay at all. [Eric A. Young] *) Additional PKCS1 checks. [Eric A. Young] *) Support the string "TLSv1" for all TLS v1 ciphers. [Eric A. Young] *) Added function SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() which gives the ex_data index of the SSL context in the X509_STORE_CTX ex_data. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed a few memory leaks. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed various code and comment typos. [Eric A. Young] *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0 bytes sent in the client random. [Edward Bishop ] Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/CONTRIBUTING =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/CONTRIBUTING (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/CONTRIBUTING (revision 337764) @@ -1,54 +1,54 @@ -HOW TO CONTRIBUTE PATCHES TO OpenSSL ------------------------------------- +HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL +---------------------------- (Please visit https://www.openssl.org/community/getting-started.html for other ideas about how to contribute.) -Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see the -above link or https://mta.openssl.org for information on subscribing). -If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general -OpenSSL community you might want to discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing -list first. Someone may be already working on the same thing or there -may be a good reason as to why that feature isn't implemented. +Development is done on GitHub, https://github.com/openssl/openssl. -To submit a patch, make a pull request on GitHub. If you think the patch -could use feedback from the community, please start a thread on openssl-dev -to discuss it. +To request new features or report bugs, please open an issue on GitHub -Having addressed the following items before the PR will help make the -acceptance and review process faster: +To submit a patch, please open a pull request on GitHub. If you are thinking +of making a large contribution, open an issue for it before starting work, +to get comments from the community. Someone may be already working on +the same thing or there may be reasons why that feature isn't implemented. - 1. Anything other than trivial contributions will require a contributor - licensing agreement, giving us permission to use your code. See - https://www.openssl.org/policies/cla.html for details. +To make it easier to review and accept your pull request, please follow these +guidelines: + 1. Anything other than a trivial contribution requires a Contributor + License Agreement (CLA), giving us permission to use your code. See + https://www.openssl.org/policies/cla.html for details. If your + contribution is too small to require a CLA, put "CLA: trivial" on a + line by itself in your commit message body. + 2. All source files should start with the following text (with appropriate comment characters at the start of each line and the year(s) updated): Copyright 20xx-20yy The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 3. Patches should be as current as possible; expect to have to rebase - often. We do not accept merge commits; You will be asked to remove - them before a patch is considered acceptable. + often. We do not accept merge commits, you will have to remove them + (usually by rebasing) before it will be acceptable. 4. Patches should follow our coding style (see - https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without - warnings. Where gcc or clang is availble you should use the + https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile + without warnings. Where gcc or clang is available you should use the --strict-warnings Configure option. OpenSSL compiles on many varied - platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features. - Clean builds via Travis and AppVeyor are expected, and done whenever - a PR is created or updated. + platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features. Clean builds + via Travis and AppVeyor are required, and they are started automatically + whenever a PR is created or updated. 5. When at all possible, patches should include tests. These can either be added to an existing test, or completely new. Please see test/README for information on the test framework. 6. New features or changed functionality must include - documentation. Please look at the "pod" files in doc/apps, doc/crypto - and doc/ssl for examples of our style. + documentation. Please look at the "pod" files in doc for + examples of our style. Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/Configure =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/Configure (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/Configure (revision 337764) @@ -1,2318 +1,2326 @@ : eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}' if $running_under_some_shell; ## ## Configure -- OpenSSL source tree configuration script ## require 5.000; use strict; use File::Compare; # see INSTALL for instructions. my $usage="Usage: Configure [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; # Options: # # --openssldir install OpenSSL in OPENSSLDIR (Default: DIR/ssl if the # --prefix option is given; /usr/local/ssl otherwise) # --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories # (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory) # # --install_prefix Additional prefix for package builders (empty by # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". # # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in # include/. A value is required. # --with-krb5-lib Declare where the Kerberos 5 libraries live. A value is # required. # (Default: KRB5_DIR/lib) # --with-krb5-include Declare where the Kerberos 5 header files live. A # value is required. # (Default: KRB5_DIR/include) # --with-krb5-flavor Declare what flavor of Kerberos 5 is used. Currently # supported values are "MIT" and "Heimdal". A value is required. # # --test-sanity Make a number of sanity checks on the data in this file. # This is a debugging tool for OpenSSL developers. # # --cross-compile-prefix Add specified prefix to binutils components. # # no-hw-xxx do not compile support for specific crypto hardware. # Generic OpenSSL-style methods relating to this support # are always compiled but return NULL if the hardware # support isn't compiled. # no-hw do not compile support for any crypto hardware. # [no-]threads [don't] try to create a library that is suitable for # multithreaded applications (default is "threads" if we # know how to do it) # [no-]shared [don't] try to create shared libraries when supported. # no-asm do not use assembler # no-dso do not compile in any native shared-library methods. This # will ensure that all methods just return NULL. # no-krb5 do not compile in any KRB5 library or code. # [no-]zlib [don't] compile support for zlib compression. # zlib-dynamic Like "zlib", but the zlib library is expected to be a shared # library and will be loaded in run-time by the OpenSSL library. # sctp include SCTP support # enable-weak-ssl-ciphers # Enable EXPORT and LOW SSLv3 ciphers that are disabled by # default. Note, weak SSLv2 ciphers are unconditionally # disabled. # 386 generate 80386 code in assembly modules # no-sse2 disables IA-32 SSE2 code in assembly modules, the above # mentioned '386' option implies this one # no- build without specified algorithm (rsa, idea, rc5, ...) # - + compiler options are passed through # # DEBUG_SAFESTACK use type-safe stacks to enforce type-safety on stack items # provided to stack calls. Generates unique stack functions for # each possible stack type. # DES_PTR use pointer lookup vs arrays in the DES in crypto/des/des_locl.h # DES_RISC1 use different DES_ENCRYPT macro that helps reduce register # dependancies but needs to more registers, good for RISC CPU's # DES_RISC2 A different RISC variant. # DES_UNROLL unroll the inner DES loop, sometimes helps, somtimes hinders. # DES_INT use 'int' instead of 'long' for DES_LONG in crypto/des/des.h # This is used on the DEC Alpha where long is 8 bytes # and int is 4 # BN_LLONG use the type 'long long' in crypto/bn/bn.h # MD2_CHAR use 'char' instead of 'int' for MD2_INT in crypto/md2/md2.h # MD2_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for MD2_INT in crypto/md2/md2.h # IDEA_SHORT use 'short' instead of 'int' for IDEA_INT in crypto/idea/idea.h # IDEA_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for IDEA_INT in crypto/idea/idea.h # RC2_SHORT use 'short' instead of 'int' for RC2_INT in crypto/rc2/rc2.h # RC2_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for RC2_INT in crypto/rc2/rc2.h # RC4_CHAR use 'char' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h # RC4_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h # RC4_INDEX define RC4_INDEX in crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h. This turns on # array lookups instead of pointer use. # RC4_CHUNK enables code that handles data aligned at long (natural CPU # word) boundary. # RC4_CHUNK_LL enables code that handles data aligned at long long boundary # (intended for 64-bit CPUs running 32-bit OS). # BF_PTR use 'pointer arithmatic' for Blowfish (unsafe on Alpha). # BF_PTR2 intel specific version (generic version is more efficient). # # Following are set automatically by this script # # MD5_ASM use some extra md5 assember, # SHA1_ASM use some extra sha1 assember, must define L_ENDIAN for x86 # RMD160_ASM use some extra ripemd160 assember, # SHA256_ASM sha256_block is implemented in assembler # SHA512_ASM sha512_block is implemented in assembler # AES_ASM ASE_[en|de]crypt is implemented in assembler # Minimum warning options... any contributions to OpenSSL should at least get # past these. my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Wundef -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED"; # TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the following # warnings can also be enabled: # -Wconditional-uninitialized, -Wswitch-enum, -Wunused-macros, # -Wmissing-field-initializers, -Wmissing-variable-declarations, # -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align, # -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token # -Wextended-offsetof my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof"; # These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang. # TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the # following warnings can also be enabled: -Wconditional-uninitialized, # -Wswitch-enum, -Wunused-macros, -Wmissing-field-initializers, # -Wmissing-variable-declarations, # -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align, # -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token # -Wextended-offsetof my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments"; # Warn that "make depend" should be run? my $warn_make_depend = 0; my $strict_warnings = 0; my $x86_gcc_des="DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL"; # MD2_CHAR slags pentium pros my $x86_gcc_opts="RC4_INDEX MD2_INT"; # MODIFY THESE PARAMETERS IF YOU ARE GOING TO USE THE 'util/speed.sh SCRIPT # Don't worry about these normally my $tcc="cc"; my $tflags="-fast -Xa"; my $tbn_mul=""; my $tlib="-lnsl -lsocket"; #$bits1="SIXTEEN_BIT "; #$bits2="THIRTY_TWO_BIT "; my $bits1="THIRTY_TWO_BIT "; my $bits2="SIXTY_FOUR_BIT "; my $x86_asm="x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o x86-gf2m.o::des-586.o crypt586.o:aes-586.o vpaes-x86.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o:cmll-x86.o:ghash-x86.o:"; my $x86_elf_asm="$x86_asm:elf"; my $x86_64_asm="x86_64cpuid.o:x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o rsaz_exp.o rsaz-x86_64.o rsaz-avx2.o:ecp_nistz256.o ecp_nistz256-x86_64.o::aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o aesni-sha256-x86_64.o aesni-mb-x86_64.o::md5-x86_64.o:sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o sha1-mb-x86_64.o sha256-mb-x86_64.o::rc4-x86_64.o rc4-md5-x86_64.o:::wp-x86_64.o:cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o:ghash-x86_64.o aesni-gcm-x86_64.o:"; my $ia64_asm="ia64cpuid.o:bn-ia64.o ia64-mont.o:::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o::rc4-ia64.o rc4_skey.o:::::ghash-ia64.o::void"; my $sparcv9_asm="sparcv9cap.o sparccpuid.o:bn-sparcv9.o sparcv9-mont.o sparcv9a-mont.o vis3-mont.o sparct4-mont.o sparcv9-gf2m.o::des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o dest4-sparcv9.o:aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-sparcv9.o aest4-sparcv9.o::md5-sparcv9.o:sha1-sparcv9.o sha256-sparcv9.o sha512-sparcv9.o::::::camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o cmllt4-sparcv9.o:ghash-sparcv9.o::void"; my $sparcv8_asm=":sparcv8.o::des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:::::::::::::void"; my $alpha_asm="alphacpuid.o:bn_asm.o alpha-mont.o::::::sha1-alpha.o:::::::ghash-alpha.o::void"; my $mips64_asm=":bn-mips.o mips-mont.o:::aes_cbc.o aes-mips.o:::sha1-mips.o sha256-mips.o sha512-mips.o::::::::"; my $mips32_asm=$mips64_asm; $mips32_asm =~ s/\s*sha512\-mips\.o//; my $s390x_asm="s390xcap.o s390xcpuid.o:bn-s390x.o s390x-mont.o s390x-gf2m.o:::aes-s390x.o aes-ctr.o aes-xts.o:::sha1-s390x.o sha256-s390x.o sha512-s390x.o::rc4-s390x.o:::::ghash-s390x.o:"; my $armv4_asm="armcap.o armv4cpuid.o:bn_asm.o armv4-mont.o armv4-gf2m.o:::aes_cbc.o aes-armv4.o bsaes-armv7.o aesv8-armx.o:::sha1-armv4-large.o sha256-armv4.o sha512-armv4.o:::::::ghash-armv4.o ghashv8-armx.o::void"; my $aarch64_asm="armcap.o arm64cpuid.o mem_clr.o::::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aesv8-armx.o:::sha1-armv8.o sha256-armv8.o sha512-armv8.o:::::::ghashv8-armx.o:"; my $parisc11_asm="pariscid.o:bn_asm.o parisc-mont.o:::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o:::sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o::rc4-parisc.o:::::ghash-parisc.o::32"; my $parisc20_asm="pariscid.o:pa-risc2W.o parisc-mont.o:::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o:::sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o::rc4-parisc.o:::::ghash-parisc.o::64"; my $ppc64_asm="ppccpuid.o ppccap.o:bn-ppc.o ppc-mont.o ppc64-mont.o:::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ppc.o vpaes-ppc.o aesp8-ppc.o:::sha1-ppc.o sha256-ppc.o sha512-ppc.o sha256p8-ppc.o sha512p8-ppc.o:::::::ghashp8-ppc.o:"; my $ppc32_asm=$ppc64_asm; my $no_asm="::::::::::::::::void"; # As for $BSDthreads. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of flags, # which would cover all BSD flavors. -pthread applies to them all, # but is treated differently. OpenBSD expands is as -D_POSIX_THREAD # -lc_r, which is sufficient. FreeBSD 4.x expands it as -lc_r, # which has to be accompanied by explicit -D_THREAD_SAFE and # sometimes -D_REENTRANT. FreeBSD 5.x expands it as -lc_r, which # seems to be sufficient? my $BSDthreads="-pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT"; #config-string $cc : $cflags : $unistd : $thread_cflag : $sys_id : $lflags : $bn_ops : $cpuid_obj : $bn_obj : $ec_obj : $des_obj : $aes_obj : $bf_obj : $md5_obj : $sha1_obj : $cast_obj : $rc4_obj : $rmd160_obj : $rc5_obj : $wp_obj : $cmll_obj : $modes_obj : $engines_obj : $dso_scheme : $shared_target : $shared_cflag : $shared_ldflag : $shared_extension : $ranlib : $arflags : $multilib my %table=( # File 'TABLE' (created by 'make TABLE') contains the data from this list, # formatted for better readability. #"b", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits1}:${tbn_mul}::", #"bl-4c-2c", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits1}BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR MD2_CHAR:${tbn_mul}::", #"bl-4c-ri", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits1}BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_INDEX:${tbn_mul}::", #"b2-is-ri-dp", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits2}IDEA_SHORT RC4_INDEX DES_PTR:${tbn_mul}::", # Our development configs "purify", "purify gcc:-g -DPURIFY -Wall::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl::::", "debug", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -ggdb -g2 -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror::(unknown)::-lefence::::", "debug-ben", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -O2 -pipe::(unknown):::::", "debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::", "debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::", "debug-ben-debug", "gcc44:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::", "debug-ben-debug-64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-ben-macos", "cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -arch i386 -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::-Wl,-search_paths_first::::", "debug-ben-macos-gcc46", "gcc-mp-4.6:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wconversion -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::", "debug-ben-darwin64","cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -g -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "debug-ben-debug-64-clang", "clang:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -Wno-error=extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-ben-no-opt", "gcc: -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -Werror -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -Wall -g3::(unknown)::::::", "debug-ben-strict", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::", "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}", "debug-bodo", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", "debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-geoff32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-geoff64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", "debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn", "debug-linux-elf","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lefence -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-linux-elf-noefence","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-linux-ia32-aes", "gcc:-DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o::des-586.o crypt586.o:aes_x86core.o aes_cbc.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o::ghash-x86.o::elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-linux-generic64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", "dist", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::", # Basic configs that should work on any (32 and less bit) box "gcc", "gcc:-O3::(unknown):::BN_LLONG:::", "cc", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::", ####VOS Configurations "vos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:", "debug-vos-gcc","gcc:-O0 -g -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:", #### Solaris x86 with GNU C setups # -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM switches off inline assembler. We have to do it # here because whenever GNU C instantiates an assembler template it # surrounds it with #APP #NO_APP comment pair which (at least Solaris # 7_x86) /usr/ccs/bin/as fails to assemble with "Illegal mnemonic" # error message. "solaris-x86-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=pentium -Wall -DL_ENDIAN -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # -shared -static-libgcc might appear controversial, but modules taken # from static libgcc do not have relocations and linking them into our # shared objects doesn't have any negative side-effects. On the contrary, # doing so makes it possible to use gcc shared build with Sun C. Given # that gcc generates faster code [thanks to inline assembler], I would # actually recommend to consider using gcc shared build even with vendor # compiler:-) # "solaris64-x86_64-gcc","gcc:-m64 -O3 -Wall -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared -static-libgcc:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64", #### Solaris x86 with Sun C setups "solaris-x86-cc","cc:-fast -xarch=generic -O -Xa::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "solaris64-x86_64-cc","cc:-fast -xarch=amd64 -xstrconst -Xa -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=amd64 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64", #### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups "solaris-sparcv7-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # -m32 should be safe to add as long as driver recognizes -mcpu=ultrasparc "solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "solaris64-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64", #### "debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mcpu=v8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -O -g -mcpu=ultrasparc -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wno-long-long -D__EXTENSIONS__ -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### SPARC Solaris with Sun C setups # SC4.0 doesn't pass 'make test', upgrade to SC5.0 or SC4.2. # SC4.2 is ok, better than gcc even on bn as long as you tell it -xarch=v8 # SC5.0 note: Compiler common patch 107357-01 or later is required! "solaris-sparcv7-cc","cc:-xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-xarch=v8 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "solaris64-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v9 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64", #### "debug-solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xarch=v8 -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### SunOS configs, assuming sparc for the gcc one. #"sunos-cc", "cc:-O4 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST::(unknown):SUNOS::DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}::", "sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mcpu=v8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::", #### IRIX 5.x configs # -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate. "irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "irix-cc", "cc:-O2 -use_readonly_const -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### IRIX 6.x configs # Only N32 and N64 ABIs are supported. If you need O32 ABI build, invoke # './Configure irix-cc -o32' manually. "irix-mips3-gcc","gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", "irix-mips3-cc", "cc:-n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::DES_PTR RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", # N64 ABI builds. "irix64-mips4-gcc","gcc:-mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", "irix64-mips4-cc", "cc:-64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", #### Unified HP-UX ANSI C configs. # Special notes: # - Originally we were optimizing at +O4 level. It should be noted # that the only difference between +O3 and +O4 is global inter- # procedural analysis. As it has to be performed during the link # stage the compiler leaves behind certain pseudo-code in lib*.a # which might be release or even patch level specific. Generating # the machine code for and analyzing the *whole* program appears # to be *extremely* memory demanding while the performance gain is # actually questionable. The situation is intensified by the default # HP-UX data set size limit (infamous 'maxdsiz' tunable) of 64MB # which is way too low for +O4. In other words, doesn't +O3 make # more sense? # - Keep in mind that the HP compiler by default generates code # suitable for execution on the host you're currently compiling at. # If the toolkit is ment to be used on various PA-RISC processors # consider './config +DAportable'. # - +DD64 is chosen in favour of +DA2.0W because it's meant to be # compatible with *future* releases. # - If you run ./Configure hpux-parisc-[g]cc manually don't forget to # pass -D_REENTRANT on HP-UX 10 and later. # - -DMD32_XARRAY triggers workaround for compiler bug we ran into in # 32-bit message digests. (For the moment of this writing) HP C # doesn't seem to "digest" too many local variables (they make "him" # chew forever:-). For more details look-up MD32_XARRAY comment in # crypto/sha/sha_lcl.h. # # # Since there is mention of this in shlib/hpux10-cc.sh "hpux-parisc-cc-o4","cc:-Ae +O4 +ESlit -z -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "hpux-parisc-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "hpux-parisc1_1-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${parisc11_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa1.1", "hpux-parisc2-gcc","gcc:-march=2.0 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:".eval{my $asm=$parisc20_asm;$asm=~s/2W\./2\./;$asm=~s/:64/:32/;$asm}.":dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_32", "hpux64-parisc2-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT::pa-risc2W.o:::::::::::::::void:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_64", # More attempts at unified 10.X and 11.X targets for HP C compiler. # # Chris Ruemmler # Kevin Steves "hpux-parisc-cc","cc:+O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "hpux-parisc1_1-cc","cc:+DA1.1 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${parisc11_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa1.1", "hpux-parisc2-cc","cc:+DA2.0 +DS2.0 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:".eval{my $asm=$parisc20_asm;$asm=~s/2W\./2\./;$asm=~s/:64/:32/;$asm}.":dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_32", "hpux64-parisc2-cc","cc:+DD64 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${parisc20_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD64 -b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_64", # HP/UX IA-64 targets "hpux-ia64-cc","cc:-Ae +DD32 +O2 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD32 -b:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux32", # Frank Geurts has patiently assisted with # with debugging of the following config. "hpux64-ia64-cc","cc:-Ae +DD64 +O3 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD64 -b:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux64", # GCC builds... "hpux-ia64-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux32", "hpux64-ia64-gcc","gcc:-mlp64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-mlp64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux64", # Legacy HPUX 9.X configs... "hpux-cc", "cc:-DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY -Ae +ESlit +O2 -z::(unknown)::-Wl,+s -ldld:DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "hpux-gcc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -O3::(unknown)::-Wl,+s -ldld:DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### HP MPE/iX http://jazz.external.hp.com/src/openssl/ "MPE/iX-gcc", "gcc:-DBN_DIV2W -O3 -D_POSIX_SOURCE -D_SOCKET_SOURCE -I/SYSLOG/PUB::(unknown):MPE:-L/SYSLOG/PUB -lsyslog -lsocket -lcurses:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:::", # DEC Alpha OSF/1/Tru64 targets. # # "What's in a name? That which we call a rose # By any other word would smell as sweet." # # - William Shakespeare, "Romeo & Juliet", Act II, scene II. # # For gcc, the following gave a %50 speedup on a 164 over the 'DES_INT' version # "osf1-alpha-gcc", "gcc:-O3::(unknown):::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:alpha-osf1-shared:::.so", "osf1-alpha-cc", "cc:-std1 -tune host -O4 -readonly_strings::(unknown):::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:alpha-osf1-shared:::.so", "tru64-alpha-cc", "cc:-std1 -tune host -fast -readonly_strings::-pthread:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:alpha-osf1-shared::-msym:.so", #### #### Variety of LINUX:-) #### # *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate... "linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ####################################################################### # Note that -march is not among compiler options in below linux-armv4 # target line. Not specifying one is intentional to give you choice to: # # a) rely on your compiler default by not specifying one; # b) specify your target platform explicitly for optimal performance, # e.g. -march=armv6 or -march=armv7-a; # c) build "universal" binary that targets *range* of platforms by # specifying minimum and maximum supported architecture; # # As for c) option. It actually makes no sense to specify maximum to be # less than ARMv7, because it's the least requirement for run-time # switch between platform-specific code paths. And without run-time # switch performance would be equivalent to one for minimum. Secondly, # there are some natural limitations that you'd have to accept and # respect. Most notably you can *not* build "universal" binary for # big-endian platform. This is because ARMv7 processor always picks # instructions in little-endian order. Another similar limitation is # that -mthumb can't "cross" -march=armv6t2 boundary, because that's # where it became Thumb-2. Well, this limitation is a bit artificial, # because it's not really impossible, but it's deemed too tricky to # support. And of course you have to be sure that your binutils are # actually up to the task of handling maximum target platform. With all # this in mind here is an example of how to configure "universal" build: # # ./Configure linux-armv4 -march=armv6 -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8 # "linux-armv4", "gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-aarch64","gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly support, # if no -march was specified at command line. mips32 and mips64 below # refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture specifications, MIPS32 and # MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness. "linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32", "linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", #### IA-32 targets... "linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", #### "linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", "linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::", "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", "linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", "debug-linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", "linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", "linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32", "linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of # general purpose registers not only upon 32-bit process context # switch, but even on asynchronous signal delivery to such process. # This makes it possible to deploy 64-bit instructions even in legacy # application context and achieve better [or should we say adequate] # performance. The build is binary compatible with linux-generic32, # and the idea is to be able to install the resulting libcrypto.so # alongside generic one, e.g. as /lib/highgprs/libcrypto.so.x.y, for # ldconfig and run-time linker to autodiscover. Unfortunately it # doesn't work just yet, because of couple of bugs in glibc # sysdeps/s390/dl-procinfo.c affecting ldconfig and ld.so.1... "linux32-s390x", "gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs", #### SPARC Linux setups # Ray Miller has patiently # assisted with debugging of following two configs. "linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but # -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what. "linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # GCC 3.1 is a requirement "linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", #### Alpha Linux with GNU C and Compaq C setups # Special notes: # - linux-alpha+bwx-gcc is ment to be used from ./config only. If you # ought to run './Configure linux-alpha+bwx-gcc' manually, do # complement the command line with -mcpu=ev56, -mcpu=ev6 or whatever # which is appropriate. # - If you use ccc keep in mind that -fast implies -arch host and the # compiler is free to issue instructions which gonna make elder CPU # choke. If you wish to build "blended" toolkit, add -arch generic # *after* -fast and invoke './Configure linux-alpha-ccc' manually. # # # "linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}", "linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}", # Android: linux-* but without pointers to headers and libs. "android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "android-mips","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!] "BSD-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "BSD-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it # simply *happens* to work around a compiler bug in gcc 3.3.3, # triggered by RIPEMD160 code. "BSD-sparc64", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "BSD-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "BSD-x86_64", "cc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "bsdi-elf-gcc", "gcc:-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown)::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "nextstep", "cc:-O -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::", "nextstep3.3", "cc:-O3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::", # NCR MP-RAS UNIX ver 02.03.01 "ncr-scde","cc:-O6 -Xa -Hoff=BEHAVED -686 -Hwide -Hiw::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl -lc89:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::", # QNX "qnx4", "cc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::(unknown):::${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:", "QNX6", "gcc:::::-lsocket::${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "QNX6-i386", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::::-lsocket:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # BeOS "beos-x86-r5", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:BEOS:-lbe -lnet:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:beos:beos-shared:-fPIC -DPIC:-shared:.so", "beos-x86-bone", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:BEOS:-lbe -lbind -lsocket:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:beos:beos-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so", #### SCO/Caldera targets. # # Originally we had like unixware-*, unixware-*-pentium, unixware-*-p6, etc. # Now we only have blended unixware-* as it's the only one used by ./config. # If you want to optimize for particular microarchitecture, bypass ./config # and './Configure unixware-7 -Kpentium_pro' or whatever appropriate. # Note that not all targets include assembler support. Mostly because of # lack of motivation to support out-of-date platforms with out-of-date # compiler drivers and assemblers. Tim Rice has # patiently assisted to debug most of it. # # UnixWare 2.0x fails destest with -O. "unixware-2.0","cc:-DFILIO_H -DNO_STRINGS_H::-Kthread::-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::", "unixware-2.1","cc:-O -DFILIO_H::-Kthread::-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::", "unixware-7","cc:-O -DFILIO_H -Kalloca::-Kthread::-lsocket -lnsl:BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX ${x86_gcc_des}:${x86_elf_asm}-1:dlfcn:svr5-shared:-Kpic::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "unixware-7-gcc","gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DFILIO_H -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}-1:dlfcn:gnu-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # SCO 5 - Ben Laurie says the -O breaks the SCO cc. "sco5-cc", "cc:-belf::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}-1:dlfcn:svr3-shared:-Kpic::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "sco5-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}-1:dlfcn:svr3-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### IBM's AIX. "aix3-cc", "cc:-O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384::(unknown):AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:::", "aix-gcc", "gcc:-O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X32", "aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64", # Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE # at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage! "aix-cc", "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32", "aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64", # # Cray T90 and similar (SDSC) # It's Big-endian, but the algorithms work properly when B_ENDIAN is NOT # defined. The T90 ints and longs are 8 bytes long, and apparently the # B_ENDIAN code assumes 4 byte ints. Fortunately, the non-B_ENDIAN and # non L_ENDIAN code aligns the bytes in each word correctly. # # The BIT_FIELD_LIMITS define is to avoid two fatal compiler errors: #'Taking the address of a bit field is not allowed. ' #'An expression with bit field exists as the operand of "sizeof" ' # (written by Wayne Schroeder ) # # j90 is considered the base machine type for unicos machines, # so this configuration is now called "cray-j90" ... "cray-j90", "cc: -DBIT_FIELD_LIMITS -DTERMIOS::(unknown):CRAY::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG DES_INT:::", # # Cray T3E (Research Center Juelich, beckman@acl.lanl.gov) # # The BIT_FIELD_LIMITS define was written for the C90 (it seems). I added # another use. Basically, the problem is that the T3E uses some bit fields # for some st_addr stuff, and then sizeof and address-of fails # I could not use the ams/alpha.o option because the Cray assembler, 'cam' # did not like it. "cray-t3e", "cc: -DBIT_FIELD_LIMITS -DTERMIOS::(unknown):CRAY::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:::", # DGUX, 88100. "dgux-R3-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer::(unknown):::RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL:::", "dgux-R4-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer::(unknown)::-lnsl -lsocket:RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL:::", "dgux-R4-x86-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown)::-lnsl -lsocket:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}", # Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400 # NOTE: The CDS++ Compiler up to V2.0Bsomething has the IRIX_CC_BUG optimizer problem. Better use -g */ "ReliantUNIX","cc:-KPIC -g -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::-Kthread:SNI:-lsocket -lnsl -lc -L/usr/ucblib -lucb:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:reliantunix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", "SINIX","cc:-O::(unknown):SNI:-lsocket -lnsl -lc -L/usr/ucblib -lucb:RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR:::", "SINIX-N","/usr/ucb/cc:-O2 -misaligned::(unknown)::-lucb:RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR:::", # SIEMENS BS2000/OSD: an EBCDIC-based mainframe "BS2000-OSD","c89:-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::", # OS/390 Unix an EBCDIC-based Unix system on IBM mainframe # You need to compile using the c89.sh wrapper in the tools directory, because the # IBM compiler does not like the -L switch after any object modules. # "OS390-Unix","c89.sh:-O -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC -DNO_SYS_PARAM_H -D_ALL_SOURCE::(unknown):::THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::", # Visual C targets # # Win64 targets, WIN64I denotes IA-64 and WIN64A - AMD64 "VC-WIN64I","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64I::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:ia64cpuid.o:ia64.o ia64-mont.o:::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o:::::::ghash-ia64.o::ias:win32", "VC-WIN64A","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64A::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/x86_64-gcc\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":auto:win32", "debug-VC-WIN64I","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64I::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:ia64cpuid.o:ia64.o:::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o:::::::ghash-ia64.o::ias:win32", "debug-VC-WIN64A","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64A::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/x86_64-gcc\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":auto:win32", # x86 Win32 target defaults to ANSI API, if you want UNICODE, complement # 'perl Configure VC-WIN32' with '-DUNICODE -D_UNICODE' "VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE -D_WINSOCK_DEPRECATED_NO_WARNINGS:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32", # Unified CE target "debug-VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE -D_WINSOCK_DEPRECATED_NO_WARNINGS:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32", "VC-CE","cl::::WINCE::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32", # Borland C++ 4.5 "BC-32","bcc32::::WIN32::BN_LLONG DES_PTR RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:${no_asm}:win32", # MinGW "mingw", "gcc:-mno-cygwin -DL_ENDIAN -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::-D_MT:MINGW32:-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts} EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:${x86_asm}:coff:win32:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK:-mno-cygwin:.dll.a", # As for OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK. Applink makes it possible to use .dll # compiled with one compiler with application compiled with another # compiler. It's possible to engage Applink support in mingw64 build, # but it's not done, because till mingw64 supports structured exception # handling, one can't seriously consider its binaries for using with # non-mingw64 run-time environment. And as mingw64 is always consistent # with itself, Applink is never engaged and can as well be omitted. "mingw64", "gcc:-mno-cygwin -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE::-D_MT:MINGW64:-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:${x86_64_asm}:mingw64:win32:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-mno-cygwin:.dll.a", # UWIN "UWIN", "cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -O -Wall:::UWIN::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32", # Cygwin "Cygwin", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall:::CYGWIN::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:coff:dlfcn:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-shared:.dll.a", "Cygwin-x86_64", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall:::CYGWIN::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:mingw64:dlfcn:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-shared:.dll.a", # NetWare from David Ward (dsward@novell.com) # requires either MetroWerks NLM development tools, or gcc / nlmconv # NetWare defaults socket bio to WinSock sockets. However, # the builds can be configured to use BSD sockets instead. # netware-clib => legacy CLib c-runtime support "netware-clib", "mwccnlm::::::${x86_gcc_opts}::", "netware-clib-bsdsock", "mwccnlm::::::${x86_gcc_opts}::", "netware-clib-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/nwsdk/include/nlm -I/ndk/ws295sdk/include -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_CLIB -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -O2 -Wall:::::${x86_gcc_opts}::", "netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/nwsdk/include/nlm -DNETWARE_BSDSOCK -DNETDB_USE_INTERNET -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_CLIB -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -O2 -Wall:::::${x86_gcc_opts}::", # netware-libc => LibC/NKS support "netware-libc", "mwccnlm::::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::", "netware-libc-bsdsock", "mwccnlm::::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::", "netware-libc-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/libc/include -I/ndk/libc/include/winsock -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_LIBC -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall:::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::", "netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/libc/include -DNETWARE_BSDSOCK -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_LIBC -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall:::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::", # DJGPP "DJGPP", "gcc:-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIO -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall:::MSDOS:-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:", # Ultrix from Bernhard Simon "ultrix-cc","cc:-std1 -O -Olimit 2500 -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::::::", "ultrix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG::::", # K&R C is no longer supported; you need gcc on old Ultrix installations ##"ultrix","cc:-O2 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::::::", ##### MacOS X (a.k.a. Rhapsody or Darwin) setup "rhapsody-ppc-cc","cc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):MACOSX_RHAPSODY::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}::", "darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -Wa,-force_cpusubtype_ALL::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "darwin64-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc64_asm}:osx64:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:".eval{my $asm=$x86_asm;$asm=~s/cast\-586\.o//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "debug-darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -g3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "debug-darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -ggdb -g2 -O0 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "debug-darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DB_ENDIAN -g -Wall -O::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", # iPhoneOS/iOS "iphoneos-cross","llvm-gcc:-O3 -isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-common::-D_REENTRANT:iOS:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", ##### A/UX "aux3-gcc","gcc:-O2 -DTERMIO::(unknown):AUX:-lbsd:RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:::", ##### Sony NEWS-OS 4.x "newsos4-gcc","gcc:-O -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):NEWS4:-lmld -liberty:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::", ##### GNU Hurd "hurd-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC", ##### OS/2 EMX "OS2-EMX", "gcc::::::::", ##### VxWorks for various targets "vxworks-ppc60x","ccppc:-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -mhard-float -mstrict-align -fno-implicit-fp -DPPC32_fp60x -O2 -fstrength-reduce -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip:::VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/common:::::", "vxworks-ppcgen","ccppc:-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -msoft-float -mstrict-align -O1 -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip:::VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/sfcommon:::::", "vxworks-ppc405","ccppc:-g -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC405 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h:::VXWORKS:-r:::::", "vxworks-ppc750","ccppc:-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h \$(DEBUG_FLAG):::VXWORKS:-r:::::", "vxworks-ppc750-debug","ccppc:-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG -g:::VXWORKS:-r:::::", "vxworks-ppc860","ccppc:-nostdinc -msoft-float -DCPU=PPC860 -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h:::VXWORKS:-r:::::", "vxworks-simlinux","ccpentium:-B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DL_ENDIAN -DCPU=SIMLINUX -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK:::VXWORKS:-r::${no_asm}::::::ranlibpentium:", "vxworks-mips","ccmips:-mrtp -mips2 -O -G 0 -B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DCPU=MIPS32 -msoft-float -mno-branch-likely -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip::-D_REENTRANT:VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/mips/MIPSI32/sfcommon::${mips32_asm}:o32::::::ranlibmips:", ##### Compaq Non-Stop Kernel (Tandem) "tandem-c89","c89:-Ww -D__TANDEM -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1 -D_TANDEM_SOURCE -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::THIRTY_TWO_BIT:::", # uClinux "uClinux-dist","$ENV{'CC'}:\$(CFLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::\$(LDFLAGS) \$(LDLIBS):BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}:linux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):$ENV{'RANLIB'}::", "uClinux-dist64","$ENV{'CC'}:\$(CFLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::\$(LDFLAGS) \$(LDLIBS):SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${no_asm}:$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}:linux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):$ENV{'RANLIB'}::", ); my @MK1MF_Builds=qw(VC-WIN64I VC-WIN64A debug-VC-WIN64I debug-VC-WIN64A VC-NT VC-CE VC-WIN32 debug-VC-WIN32 BC-32 netware-clib netware-clib-bsdsock netware-libc netware-libc-bsdsock); my $idx = 0; my $idx_cc = $idx++; my $idx_cflags = $idx++; my $idx_unistd = $idx++; my $idx_thread_cflag = $idx++; my $idx_sys_id = $idx++; my $idx_lflags = $idx++; my $idx_bn_ops = $idx++; my $idx_cpuid_obj = $idx++; my $idx_bn_obj = $idx++; my $idx_ec_obj = $idx++; my $idx_des_obj = $idx++; my $idx_aes_obj = $idx++; my $idx_bf_obj = $idx++; my $idx_md5_obj = $idx++; my $idx_sha1_obj = $idx++; my $idx_cast_obj = $idx++; my $idx_rc4_obj = $idx++; my $idx_rmd160_obj = $idx++; my $idx_rc5_obj = $idx++; my $idx_wp_obj = $idx++; my $idx_cmll_obj = $idx++; my $idx_modes_obj = $idx++; my $idx_engines_obj = $idx++; my $idx_perlasm_scheme = $idx++; my $idx_dso_scheme = $idx++; my $idx_shared_target = $idx++; my $idx_shared_cflag = $idx++; my $idx_shared_ldflag = $idx++; my $idx_shared_extension = $idx++; my $idx_ranlib = $idx++; my $idx_arflags = $idx++; my $idx_multilib = $idx++; my $prefix=""; my $libdir=""; my $openssldir=""; my $exe_ext=""; my $install_prefix= "$ENV{'INSTALL_PREFIX'}"; my $cross_compile_prefix=""; my $fipsdir="/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0"; my $fipslibdir=""; my $baseaddr="0xFB00000"; my $no_threads=0; my $threads=0; my $no_shared=0; # but "no-shared" is default my $zlib=1; # but "no-zlib" is default my $no_krb5=0; # but "no-krb5" is implied unless "--with-krb5-..." is used my $no_rfc3779=1; # but "no-rfc3779" is default my $no_asm=0; my $no_dso=0; my $no_gmp=0; my @skip=(); my $Makefile="Makefile"; my $des_locl="crypto/des/des_locl.h"; my $des ="crypto/des/des.h"; my $bn ="crypto/bn/bn.h"; my $md2 ="crypto/md2/md2.h"; my $rc4 ="crypto/rc4/rc4.h"; my $rc4_locl="crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h"; my $idea ="crypto/idea/idea.h"; my $rc2 ="crypto/rc2/rc2.h"; my $bf ="crypto/bf/bf_locl.h"; my $bn_asm ="bn_asm.o"; my $des_enc="des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o"; my $aes_enc="aes_core.o aes_cbc.o"; my $bf_enc ="bf_enc.o"; my $cast_enc="c_enc.o"; my $rc4_enc="rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o"; my $rc5_enc="rc5_enc.o"; my $md5_obj=""; my $sha1_obj=""; my $rmd160_obj=""; my $cmll_enc="camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o"; my $processor=""; my $default_ranlib; my $perl; my $fips=0; if (exists $ENV{FIPSDIR}) { $fipsdir = $ENV{FIPSDIR}; $fipsdir =~ s/\/$//; } # All of the following is disabled by default (RC5 was enabled before 0.9.8): my %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" [or special keyword "experimental"] "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => "default", "gmp" => "default", "jpake" => "experimental", "libunbound" => "experimental", "md2" => "default", "rc5" => "default", "rfc3779" => "default", "sctp" => "default", "shared" => "default", "ssl-trace" => "default", "ssl2" => "default", "store" => "experimental", "unit-test" => "default", "weak-ssl-ciphers" => "default", "zlib" => "default", "zlib-dynamic" => "default" ); my @experimental = (); # This is what $depflags will look like with the above defaults # (we need this to see if we should advise the user to run "make depend"): my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS"; # Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults. # To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo" (unless it's experimental). # For symmetry, "disable-foo" is a synonym for "no-foo". # For features called "experimental" here, a more explicit "experimental-foo" is needed to enable. # We will collect such requests in @experimental. # To avoid accidental use of experimental features, applications will have to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_FOO. my $no_sse2=0; &usage if ($#ARGV < 0); my $flags; my $depflags; my $openssl_experimental_defines; my $openssl_algorithm_defines; my $openssl_thread_defines; my $openssl_sys_defines=""; my $openssl_other_defines; my $libs; my $libkrb5=""; my $target; my $options; my $symlink; my $make_depend=0; my %withargs=(); my @argvcopy=@ARGV; my $argvstring=""; my $argv_unprocessed=1; while($argv_unprocessed) { $flags=""; $depflags=""; $openssl_experimental_defines=""; $openssl_algorithm_defines=""; $openssl_thread_defines=""; $openssl_sys_defines=""; $openssl_other_defines=""; $libs=""; $target=""; $options=""; $symlink=1; $argv_unprocessed=0; $argvstring=join(' ',@argvcopy); PROCESS_ARGS: foreach (@argvcopy) { s /^-no-/no-/; # some people just can't read the instructions # rewrite some options in "enable-..." form s /^-?-?shared$/enable-shared/; s /^sctp$/enable-sctp/; s /^threads$/enable-threads/; s /^zlib$/enable-zlib/; s /^zlib-dynamic$/enable-zlib-dynamic/; if (/^no-(.+)$/ || /^disable-(.+)$/) { if (!($disabled{$1} eq "experimental")) { if ($1 eq "ssl") { $disabled{"ssl2"} = "option(ssl)"; $disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)"; } elsif ($1 eq "tls") { $disabled{"tls1"} = "option(tls)" } elsif ($1 eq "ssl3-method") { $disabled{"ssl3-method"} = "option(ssl)"; $disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)"; } else { $disabled{$1} = "option"; } } } elsif (/^enable-(.+)$/ || /^experimental-(.+)$/) { my $algo = $1; if ($disabled{$algo} eq "experimental") { die "You are requesting an experimental feature; please say 'experimental-$algo' if you are sure\n" unless (/^experimental-/); push @experimental, $algo; } delete $disabled{$algo}; $threads = 1 if ($algo eq "threads"); } elsif (/^--test-sanity$/) { exit(&test_sanity()); } elsif (/^--strict-warnings/) { $strict_warnings = 1; } elsif (/^reconfigure/ || /^reconf/) { if (open(IN,"<$Makefile")) { while () { chomp; if (/^CONFIGURE_ARGS=(.*)/) { $argvstring=$1; @argvcopy=split(' ',$argvstring); die "Incorrect data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n" if (grep(/^reconf/,@argvcopy)); print "Reconfiguring with: $argvstring\n"; $argv_unprocessed=1; close(IN); last PROCESS_ARGS; } } close(IN); } die "Insufficient data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n"; } elsif (/^386$/) { $processor=386; } elsif (/^fips$/) { $fips=1; } elsif (/^rsaref$/) { # No RSAref support any more since it's not needed. # The check for the option is there so scripts aren't # broken } elsif (/^[-+]/) { if (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) { $prefix=$1; } elsif (/^--libdir=(.*)$/) { $libdir=$1; } elsif (/^--openssldir=(.*)$/) { $openssldir=$1; } elsif (/^--install.prefix=(.*)$/) { $install_prefix=$1; } elsif (/^--with-krb5-(dir|lib|include|flavor)=(.*)$/) { $withargs{"krb5-".$1}=$2; } elsif (/^--with-zlib-lib=(.*)$/) { $withargs{"zlib-lib"}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-zlib-include=(.*)$/) { $withargs{"zlib-include"}="-I$1"; } elsif (/^--with-fipsdir=(.*)$/) { $fipsdir="$1"; } elsif (/^--with-fipslibdir=(.*)$/) { $fipslibdir="$1"; } elsif (/^--with-baseaddr=(.*)$/) { $baseaddr="$1"; } elsif (/^--cross-compile-prefix=(.*)$/) { $cross_compile_prefix=$1; } elsif (/^-[lL](.*)$/ or /^-Wl,/) { $libs.=$_." "; } else # common if (/^[-+]/), just pass down... { $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei; $flags.=$_." "; } } elsif ($_ =~ /^([^:]+):(.+)$/) { eval "\$table{\$1} = \"$2\""; # allow $xxx constructs in the string $target=$1; } else { die "target already defined - $target (offending arg: $_)\n" if ($target ne ""); $target=$_; } unless ($_ eq $target || /^no-/ || /^disable-/) { # "no-..." follows later after implied disactivations # have been derived. (Don't take this too seroiusly, # we really only write OPTIONS to the Makefile out of # nostalgia.) if ($options eq "") { $options = $_; } else { $options .= " ".$_; } } } } if ($processor eq "386") { $disabled{"sse2"} = "forced"; } if (!defined($withargs{"krb5-flavor"}) || $withargs{"krb5-flavor"} eq "") { $disabled{"krb5"} = "krb5-flavor not specified"; } if (!defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"})) { # "zlib-dynamic" was specifically enabled, so enable "zlib" delete $disabled{"zlib"}; } if (defined($disabled{"rijndael"})) { $disabled{"aes"} = "forced"; } if (defined($disabled{"des"})) { $disabled{"mdc2"} = "forced"; } if (defined($disabled{"ec"})) { $disabled{"ecdsa"} = "forced"; $disabled{"ecdh"} = "forced"; } # SSL 2.0 requires MD5 and RSA if (defined($disabled{"md5"}) || defined($disabled{"rsa"})) { $disabled{"ssl2"} = "forced"; } if ($fips && $fipslibdir eq "") { $fipslibdir = $fipsdir . "/lib/"; } # RSAX ENGINE sets default non-FIPS RSA method. if ($fips) { $disabled{"rsax"} = "forced"; } # SSL 3.0 and TLS requires MD5 and SHA and either RSA or DSA+DH if (defined($disabled{"md5"}) || defined($disabled{"sha"}) || (defined($disabled{"rsa"}) && (defined($disabled{"dsa"}) || defined($disabled{"dh"})))) { $disabled{"ssl3"} = "forced"; $disabled{"tls1"} = "forced"; } if (defined($disabled{"ec"}) || defined($disabled{"dsa"}) || defined($disabled{"dh"})) { $disabled{"gost"} = "forced"; } # SRP and HEARTBEATS require TLSEXT if (defined($disabled{"tlsext"})) { $disabled{"srp"} = "forced"; $disabled{"heartbeats"} = "forced"; } if ($target eq "TABLE") { foreach $target (sort keys %table) { print_table_entry($target); } exit 0; } if ($target eq "LIST") { foreach (sort keys %table) { print; print "\n"; } exit 0; } if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { $target = "Cygwin".$1; } print "Configuring for $target\n"; &usage if (!defined($table{$target})); foreach (sort (keys %disabled)) { $options .= " no-$_"; printf " no-%-12s %-10s", $_, "[$disabled{$_}]"; if (/^dso$/) { $no_dso = 1; } elsif (/^threads$/) { $no_threads = 1; } elsif (/^shared$/) { $no_shared = 1; } elsif (/^zlib$/) { $zlib = 0; } elsif (/^static-engine$/) { } elsif (/^zlib-dynamic$/) { } elsif (/^symlinks$/) { $symlink = 0; } elsif (/^sse2$/) { $no_sse2 = 1; } else { my ($ALGO, $algo); ($ALGO = $algo = $_) =~ tr/[\-a-z]/[_A-Z]/; if (/^asm$/ || /^err$/ || /^hw$/ || /^hw-/) { $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO\n"; print " OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO"; if (/^err$/) { $flags .= "-DOPENSSL_NO_ERR "; } elsif (/^asm$/) { $no_asm = 1; } } else { $openssl_algorithm_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO\n"; print " OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO"; if (/^krb5$/) { $no_krb5 = 1; } else { push @skip, $algo; # fix-up crypto/directory name(s) @skip[$#skip]="whrlpool" if $algo eq "whirlpool"; print " (skip dir)"; $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_$ALGO"; } } + if (/^comp$/) { $zlib = 0; } } print "\n"; } my $exp_cflags = ""; foreach (sort @experimental) { my $ALGO; ($ALGO = $_) =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/; # opensslconf.h will set OPENSSL_NO_... unless OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_... is defined $openssl_experimental_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO\n"; $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO"; } my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds; $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/); $exe_ext=".nlm" if ($target =~ /netware/); $exe_ext=".pm" if ($target =~ /vos/); $openssldir="/usr/local/ssl" if ($openssldir eq "" and $prefix eq ""); $prefix=$openssldir if $prefix eq ""; $default_ranlib= &which("ranlib") or $default_ranlib="true"; $perl=$ENV{'PERL'} or $perl=&which("perl5") or $perl=&which("perl") or $perl="perl"; my $make = $ENV{'MAKE'} || "make"; $cross_compile_prefix=$ENV{'CROSS_COMPILE'} if $cross_compile_prefix eq ""; chop $openssldir if $openssldir =~ /\/$/; chop $prefix if $prefix =~ /.\/$/; $openssldir=$prefix . "/ssl" if $openssldir eq ""; $openssldir=$prefix . "/" . $openssldir if $openssldir !~ /(^\/|^[a-zA-Z]:[\\\/])/; print "IsMK1MF=$IsMK1MF\n"; my @fields = split(/\s*:\s*/,$table{$target} . ":" x 30 , -1); my $cc = $fields[$idx_cc]; # Allow environment CC to override compiler... if($ENV{CC}) { $cc = $ENV{CC}; } my $cflags = $fields[$idx_cflags]; my $unistd = $fields[$idx_unistd]; my $thread_cflag = $fields[$idx_thread_cflag]; my $sys_id = $fields[$idx_sys_id]; my $lflags = $fields[$idx_lflags]; my $bn_ops = $fields[$idx_bn_ops]; my $cpuid_obj = $fields[$idx_cpuid_obj]; my $bn_obj = $fields[$idx_bn_obj]; my $ec_obj = $fields[$idx_ec_obj]; my $des_obj = $fields[$idx_des_obj]; my $aes_obj = $fields[$idx_aes_obj]; my $bf_obj = $fields[$idx_bf_obj]; my $md5_obj = $fields[$idx_md5_obj]; my $sha1_obj = $fields[$idx_sha1_obj]; my $cast_obj = $fields[$idx_cast_obj]; my $rc4_obj = $fields[$idx_rc4_obj]; my $rmd160_obj = $fields[$idx_rmd160_obj]; my $rc5_obj = $fields[$idx_rc5_obj]; my $wp_obj = $fields[$idx_wp_obj]; my $cmll_obj = $fields[$idx_cmll_obj]; my $modes_obj = $fields[$idx_modes_obj]; my $engines_obj = $fields[$idx_engines_obj]; my $perlasm_scheme = $fields[$idx_perlasm_scheme]; my $dso_scheme = $fields[$idx_dso_scheme]; my $shared_target = $fields[$idx_shared_target]; my $shared_cflag = $fields[$idx_shared_cflag]; my $shared_ldflag = $fields[$idx_shared_ldflag]; my $shared_extension = $fields[$idx_shared_extension]; my $ranlib = $ENV{'RANLIB'} || $fields[$idx_ranlib]; my $ar = $ENV{'AR'} || "ar"; my $arflags = $fields[$idx_arflags]; my $windres = $ENV{'RC'} || $ENV{'WINDRES'} || "windres"; my $multilib = $fields[$idx_multilib]; # if $prefix/lib$multilib is not an existing directory, then # assume that it's not searched by linker automatically, in # which case adding $multilib suffix causes more grief than # we're ready to tolerate, so don't... $multilib="" if !-d "$prefix/lib$multilib"; $libdir="lib$multilib" if $libdir eq ""; $cflags = "$cflags$exp_cflags"; # '%' in $lflags is used to split flags to "pre-" and post-flags my ($prelflags,$postlflags)=split('%',$lflags); if (defined($postlflags)) { $lflags=$postlflags; } else { $lflags=$prelflags; undef $prelflags; } if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$cross_compile_prefix$cc --target-help 2>&1` !~ m/\-mno\-cygwin/m) { $cflags =~ s/\-mno\-cygwin\s*//; $shared_ldflag =~ s/\-mno\-cygwin\s*//; } if ($target =~ /linux.*\-mips/ && !$no_asm && $flags !~ /\-m(ips|arch=)/) { # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules $cflags="-mips2 $cflags" if ($target =~ /mips32/); $cflags="-mips3 $cflags" if ($target =~ /mips64/); } my $no_shared_warn=0; my $no_user_cflags=0; if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } else { $no_user_cflags=1; } # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through # the script "config" or manually. if (!$no_krb5) { my ($lresolv, $lpath, $lext); if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^[Hh]eimdal$/) { die "Sorry, Heimdal is currently not supported\n"; } ##### HACK to force use of Heimdal. ##### WARNING: Since we don't really have adequate support for Heimdal, ##### using this will break the build. You'll have to make ##### changes to the source, and if you do, please send ##### patches to openssl-dev@openssl.org if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^force-[Hh]eimdal$/) { warn "Heimdal isn't really supported. Your build WILL break\n"; warn "If you fix the problems, please send a patch to openssl-dev\@openssl.org\n"; $withargs{"krb5-dir"} = "/usr/heimdal" if $withargs{"krb5-dir"} eq ""; $withargs{"krb5-lib"} = "-L".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}. "/lib -lgssapi -lkrb5 -lcom_err" if $withargs{"krb5-lib"} eq "" && !$IsMK1MF; $cflags="-DKRB5_HEIMDAL $cflags"; } if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^[Mm][Ii][Tt]/) { $withargs{"krb5-dir"} = "/usr/kerberos" if $withargs{"krb5-dir"} eq ""; $withargs{"krb5-lib"} = "-L".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}. "/lib -lgssapi_krb5 -lkrb5 -lcom_err -lk5crypto" if $withargs{"krb5-lib"} eq "" && !$IsMK1MF; $cflags="-DKRB5_MIT $cflags"; $withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ s/^[Mm][Ii][Tt][._-]*//; if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^1[._-]*[01]/) { $cflags="-DKRB5_MIT_OLD11 $cflags"; } } LRESOLV: foreach $lpath ("/lib", "/usr/lib") { foreach $lext ("a", "so") { $lresolv = "$lpath/libresolv.$lext"; last LRESOLV if (-r "$lresolv"); $lresolv = ""; } } $withargs{"krb5-lib"} .= " -lresolv" if ("$lresolv" ne ""); $withargs{"krb5-include"} = "-I".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}."/include" if $withargs{"krb5-include"} eq "" && $withargs{"krb5-dir"} ne ""; } # The DSO code currently always implements all functions so that no # applications will have to worry about that from a compilation point # of view. However, the "method"s may return zero unless that platform # has support compiled in for them. Currently each method is enabled # by a define "DSO_" ... we translate the "dso_scheme" config # string entry into using the following logic; my $dso_cflags; if (!$no_dso && $dso_scheme ne "") { $dso_scheme =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/; if ($dso_scheme eq "DLFCN") { $dso_cflags = "-DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H"; } elsif ($dso_scheme eq "DLFCN_NO_H") { $dso_cflags = "-DDSO_DLFCN"; } else { $dso_cflags = "-DDSO_$dso_scheme"; } $cflags = "$dso_cflags $cflags"; } my $thread_cflags; my $thread_defines; if ($thread_cflag ne "(unknown)" && !$no_threads) { # If we know how to do it, support threads by default. $threads = 1; } if ($thread_cflag eq "(unknown)" && $threads) { # If the user asked for "threads", [s]he is also expected to # provide any system-dependent compiler options that are # necessary. if ($no_user_cflags) { print "You asked for multi-threading support, but didn't\n"; print "provide any system-specific compiler options\n"; exit(1); } $thread_cflags="-DOPENSSL_THREADS $cflags" ; $thread_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_THREADS\n"; } else { $thread_cflags="-DOPENSSL_THREADS $thread_cflag $cflags"; $thread_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_THREADS\n"; # my $def; # foreach $def (split ' ',$thread_cflag) # { # if ($def =~ s/^-D// && $def !~ /^_/) # { # $thread_defines .= "#define $def\n"; # } # } } $lflags="$libs$lflags" if ($libs ne ""); if ($no_asm) { $cpuid_obj=$bn_obj=$ec_obj= $des_obj=$aes_obj=$bf_obj=$cast_obj=$rc4_obj=$rc5_obj=$cmll_obj= $modes_obj=$sha1_obj=$md5_obj=$rmd160_obj=$wp_obj=$engines_obj=""; } if (!$no_shared) { $cast_obj=""; # CAST assembler is not PIC } if ($threads) { $cflags=$thread_cflags; $openssl_thread_defines .= $thread_defines; } if ($zlib) { $cflags = "-DZLIB $cflags"; if (defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"})) { if (defined($withargs{"zlib-lib"})) { $lflags = "$lflags -L" . $withargs{"zlib-lib"} . " -lz"; } else { $lflags = "$lflags -lz"; } } else { $cflags = "-DZLIB_SHARED $cflags"; } } # You will find shlib_mark1 and shlib_mark2 explained in Makefile.org my $shared_mark = ""; if ($shared_target eq "") { $no_shared_warn = 1 if !$no_shared; $no_shared = 1; } if (!$no_shared) { if ($shared_cflag ne "") { $cflags = "$shared_cflag -DOPENSSL_PIC $cflags"; } } if (!$IsMK1MF) { # add {no-}static-engine to options to allow mkdef.pl to work without extra arguments if ($no_shared) { $openssl_other_defines.="#define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE\n"; $options.=" static-engine"; } else { $openssl_other_defines.="#define OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE\n"; $options.=" no-static-engine"; } } $cpuid_obj.=" uplink.o uplink-x86.o" if ($cflags =~ /\-DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK/); # # Platform fix-ups # if ($target =~ /\-icc$/) # Intel C compiler { my $iccver=0; if (open(FD,"$cc -V 2>&1 |")) { while() { $iccver=$1 if (/Version ([0-9]+)\./); } close(FD); } if ($iccver>=8) { $cflags=~s/\-KPIC/-fPIC/; # Eliminate unnecessary dependency from libirc.a. This is # essential for shared library support, as otherwise # apps/openssl can end up in endless loop upon startup... $cflags.=" -Dmemcpy=__builtin_memcpy -Dmemset=__builtin_memset"; } if ($iccver>=9) { $lflags.=" -i-static"; $lflags=~s/\-no_cpprt/-no-cpprt/; } if ($iccver>=10) { $lflags=~s/\-i\-static/-static-intel/; } if ($iccver>=11) { $cflags.=" -no-intel-extensions"; # disable Cilk $lflags=~s/\-no\-cpprt/-no-cxxlib/; } } # Unlike other OSes (like Solaris, Linux, Tru64, IRIX) BSD run-time # linkers (tested OpenBSD, NetBSD and FreeBSD) "demand" RPATH set on # .so objects. Apparently application RPATH is not global and does # not apply to .so linked with other .so. Problem manifests itself # when libssl.so fails to load libcrypto.so. One can argue that we # should engrave this into Makefile.shared rules or into BSD-* config # lines above. Meanwhile let's try to be cautious and pass -rpath to # linker only when --prefix is not /usr. if ($target =~ /^BSD\-/) { $shared_ldflag.=" -Wl,-rpath,\$\$(LIBRPATH)" if ($prefix !~ m|^/usr[/]*$|); } if ($sys_id ne "") { #$cflags="-DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_$sys_id $cflags"; $openssl_sys_defines="#define OPENSSL_SYSNAME_$sys_id\n"; } if ($ranlib eq "") { $ranlib = $default_ranlib; } #my ($bn1)=split(/\s+/,$bn_obj); #$bn1 = "" unless defined $bn1; #$bn1=$bn_asm unless ($bn1 =~ /\.o$/); #$bn_obj="$bn1"; $cpuid_obj="" if ($processor eq "386"); $bn_obj = $bn_asm unless $bn_obj ne ""; # bn-586 is the only one implementing bn_*_part_words $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS" if ($bn_obj =~ /bn-586/); $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2" if (!$no_sse2 && $bn_obj =~ /86/); $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT" if ($bn_obj =~ /-mont/); $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5" if ($bn_obj =~ /-mont5/); $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m" if ($bn_obj =~ /-gf2m/); if ($fips) { $openssl_other_defines.="#define OPENSSL_FIPS\n"; $cflags .= " -I\$(FIPSDIR)/include"; } $cpuid_obj="mem_clr.o" unless ($cpuid_obj =~ /\.o$/); $des_obj=$des_enc unless ($des_obj =~ /\.o$/); $bf_obj=$bf_enc unless ($bf_obj =~ /\.o$/); $cast_obj=$cast_enc unless ($cast_obj =~ /\.o$/); $rc5_obj=$rc5_enc unless ($rc5_obj =~ /\.o$/); if ($rc4_obj =~ /\.o$/) { $cflags.=" -DRC4_ASM"; } else { $rc4_obj=$rc4_enc; } if ($sha1_obj =~ /\.o$/) { # $sha1_obj=$sha1_enc; $cflags.=" -DSHA1_ASM" if ($sha1_obj =~ /sx86/ || $sha1_obj =~ /sha1/); $cflags.=" -DSHA256_ASM" if ($sha1_obj =~ /sha256/); $cflags.=" -DSHA512_ASM" if ($sha1_obj =~ /sha512/); if ($sha1_obj =~ /sse2/) { if ($no_sse2) { $sha1_obj =~ s/\S*sse2\S+//; } elsif ($cflags !~ /OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/) { $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2"; } } } if ($md5_obj =~ /\.o$/) { # $md5_obj=$md5_enc; $cflags.=" -DMD5_ASM"; } if ($rmd160_obj =~ /\.o$/) { # $rmd160_obj=$rmd160_enc; $cflags.=" -DRMD160_ASM"; } if ($aes_obj =~ /\.o$/) { $cflags.=" -DAES_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ m/\baes\-/);; # aes-ctr.o is not a real file, only indication that assembler # module implements AES_ctr32_encrypt... $cflags.=" -DAES_CTR_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ s/\s*aes\-ctr\.o//); # aes-xts.o indicates presense of AES_xts_[en|de]crypt... $cflags.=" -DAES_XTS_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ s/\s*aes\-xts\.o//); $aes_obj =~ s/\s*(vpaes|aesni)\-x86\.o//g if ($no_sse2); $cflags.=" -DVPAES_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ m/vpaes/); $cflags.=" -DBSAES_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ m/bsaes/); } else { $aes_obj=$aes_enc; } $wp_obj="" if ($wp_obj =~ /mmx/ && $processor eq "386"); if ($wp_obj =~ /\.o$/ && !$disabled{"whirlpool"}) { $cflags.=" -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM"; } else { $wp_obj="wp_block.o"; } $cmll_obj=$cmll_enc unless ($cmll_obj =~ /.o$/); if ($modes_obj =~ /ghash\-/) { $cflags.=" -DGHASH_ASM"; } if ($ec_obj =~ /ecp_nistz256/) { $cflags.=" -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM"; } # "Stringify" the C flags string. This permits it to be made part of a string # and works as well on command lines. $cflags =~ s/([\\\"])/\\\1/g; my $version = "unknown"; my $version_num = "unknown"; my $major = "unknown"; my $minor = "unknown"; my $shlib_version_number = "unknown"; my $shlib_version_history = "unknown"; my $shlib_major = "unknown"; my $shlib_minor = "unknown"; open(IN,') { $version=$1 if /OPENSSL.VERSION.TEXT.*OpenSSL (\S+) /; $version_num=$1 if /OPENSSL.VERSION.NUMBER.*0x(\S+)/; $shlib_version_number=$1 if /SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER *"([^"]+)"/; $shlib_version_history=$1 if /SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY *"([^"]*)"/; } close(IN); if ($shlib_version_history ne "") { $shlib_version_history .= ":"; } if ($version =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/) { $major=$1; $minor=$2; } if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/) { $shlib_major=$1; $shlib_minor=$2; } my %predefined; # collect compiler pre-defines from gcc or gcc-alike... open(PIPE, "$cross_compile_prefix$cc -dM -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 |"); while () { m/^#define\s+(\w+(?:\(\w+\))?)(?:\s+(.+))?/ or last; $predefined{$1} = defined($2) ? $2 : ""; } close(PIPE); +# Xcode did not handle $cc -M before clang support +my $cc_as_makedepend = 0; +if ($predefined{__GNUC__} >= 3 && !(defined($predefined{__APPLE_CC__}) + && !defined($predefined{__clang__}))) { + $cc_as_makedepend = 1; +} + if ($strict_warnings) { my $wopt; die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless defined($predefined{__GNUC__}); foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn) { $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/) } if (defined($predefined{__clang__})) { foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn) { $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/) } } } open(IN,'$Makefile.new") || die "unable to create $Makefile.new:$!\n"; print OUT "### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure.\n\n"; my $sdirs=0; while () { chomp; $sdirs = 1 if /^SDIRS=/; if ($sdirs) { my $dir; foreach $dir (@skip) { s/(\s)$dir /$1/; s/\s$dir$//; } } $sdirs = 0 unless /\\$/; s/engines // if (/^DIRS=/ && $disabled{"engine"}); s/ccgost// if (/^ENGDIRS=/ && $disabled{"gost"}); s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; s/^SHLIB_MINOR=.*/SHLIB_MINOR=$shlib_minor/; s/^SHLIB_EXT=.*/SHLIB_EXT=$shared_extension/; s/^INSTALLTOP=.*$/INSTALLTOP=$prefix/; s/^MULTILIB=.*$/MULTILIB=$multilib/; s/^OPENSSLDIR=.*$/OPENSSLDIR=$openssldir/; s/^LIBDIR=.*$/LIBDIR=$libdir/; s/^INSTALL_PREFIX=.*$/INSTALL_PREFIX=$install_prefix/; s/^PLATFORM=.*$/PLATFORM=$target/; s/^OPTIONS=.*$/OPTIONS=$options/; s/^CONFIGURE_ARGS=.*$/CONFIGURE_ARGS=$argvstring/; if ($cross_compile_prefix) { s/^CC=.*$/CROSS_COMPILE= $cross_compile_prefix\nCC= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/; s/^AR=\s*/AR= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/; s/^NM=\s*/NM= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/; s/^RANLIB=\s*/RANLIB= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/; s/^RC=\s*/RC= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/; - s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/ if $predefined{__GNUC__} >= 3; + s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/ if $cc_as_makedepend; } else { s/^CC=.*$/CC= $cc/; s/^AR=\s*ar/AR= $ar/; s/^RANLIB=.*/RANLIB= $ranlib/; s/^RC=.*/RC= $windres/; - s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $predefined{__GNUC__} >= 3; + s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $cc_as_makedepend; } s/^CFLAG=.*$/CFLAG= $cflags/; s/^DEPFLAG=.*$/DEPFLAG=$depflags/; s/^PEX_LIBS=.*$/PEX_LIBS= $prelflags/; s/^EX_LIBS=.*$/EX_LIBS= $lflags/; s/^EXE_EXT=.*$/EXE_EXT= $exe_ext/; s/^CPUID_OBJ=.*$/CPUID_OBJ= $cpuid_obj/; s/^BN_ASM=.*$/BN_ASM= $bn_obj/; s/^EC_ASM=.*$/EC_ASM= $ec_obj/; s/^DES_ENC=.*$/DES_ENC= $des_obj/; s/^AES_ENC=.*$/AES_ENC= $aes_obj/; s/^BF_ENC=.*$/BF_ENC= $bf_obj/; s/^CAST_ENC=.*$/CAST_ENC= $cast_obj/; s/^RC4_ENC=.*$/RC4_ENC= $rc4_obj/; s/^RC5_ENC=.*$/RC5_ENC= $rc5_obj/; s/^MD5_ASM_OBJ=.*$/MD5_ASM_OBJ= $md5_obj/; s/^SHA1_ASM_OBJ=.*$/SHA1_ASM_OBJ= $sha1_obj/; s/^RMD160_ASM_OBJ=.*$/RMD160_ASM_OBJ= $rmd160_obj/; s/^WP_ASM_OBJ=.*$/WP_ASM_OBJ= $wp_obj/; s/^CMLL_ENC=.*$/CMLL_ENC= $cmll_obj/; s/^MODES_ASM_OBJ.=*$/MODES_ASM_OBJ= $modes_obj/; s/^ENGINES_ASM_OBJ.=*$/ENGINES_ASM_OBJ= $engines_obj/; s/^PERLASM_SCHEME=.*$/PERLASM_SCHEME= $perlasm_scheme/; s/^PROCESSOR=.*/PROCESSOR= $processor/; s/^ARFLAGS=.*/ARFLAGS= $arflags/; s/^PERL=.*/PERL= $perl/; s/^KRB5_INCLUDES=.*/KRB5_INCLUDES=$withargs{"krb5-include"}/; s/^LIBKRB5=.*/LIBKRB5=$withargs{"krb5-lib"}/; s/^LIBZLIB=.*/LIBZLIB=$withargs{"zlib-lib"}/; s/^ZLIB_INCLUDE=.*/ZLIB_INCLUDE=$withargs{"zlib-include"}/; s/^FIPSDIR=.*/FIPSDIR=$fipsdir/; s/^FIPSLIBDIR=.*/FIPSLIBDIR=$fipslibdir/; s/^FIPSCANLIB=.*/FIPSCANLIB=libcrypto/ if $fips; s/^BASEADDR=.*/BASEADDR=$baseaddr/; s/^SHLIB_TARGET=.*/SHLIB_TARGET=$shared_target/; s/^SHLIB_MARK=.*/SHLIB_MARK=$shared_mark/; s/^SHARED_LIBS=.*/SHARED_LIBS=\$(SHARED_CRYPTO) \$(SHARED_SSL)/ if (!$no_shared); if ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.s([ol])\.[^\.]*$/) { my $sotmp = $1; s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp/; } elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.[^\.]*\.dylib$/) { s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.dylib/; } elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.s([ol])\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*$/) { my $sotmp = $1; s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR) .s$sotmp/; } elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*\.dylib$/) { s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).dylib .dylib/; } s/^SHARED_LDFLAGS=.*/SHARED_LDFLAGS=$shared_ldflag/; print OUT $_."\n"; } close(IN); close(OUT); if ((compare($Makefile, "$Makefile.new")) or file_newer('Configure', $Makefile) or file_newer('config', $Makefile) or file_newer('Makefile.org', $Makefile)) { rename($Makefile,"$Makefile.bak") || die "unable to rename $Makefile\n" if -e $Makefile; rename("$Makefile.new",$Makefile) || die "unable to rename $Makefile.new\n"; } else { unlink("$Makefile.new"); } print "CC =$cc\n"; print "CFLAG =$cflags\n"; print "EX_LIBS =$lflags\n"; print "CPUID_OBJ =$cpuid_obj\n"; print "BN_ASM =$bn_obj\n"; print "EC_ASM =$ec_obj\n"; print "DES_ENC =$des_obj\n"; print "AES_ENC =$aes_obj\n"; print "BF_ENC =$bf_obj\n"; print "CAST_ENC =$cast_obj\n"; print "RC4_ENC =$rc4_obj\n"; print "RC5_ENC =$rc5_obj\n"; print "MD5_OBJ_ASM =$md5_obj\n"; print "SHA1_OBJ_ASM =$sha1_obj\n"; print "RMD160_OBJ_ASM=$rmd160_obj\n"; print "CMLL_ENC =$cmll_obj\n"; print "MODES_OBJ =$modes_obj\n"; print "ENGINES_OBJ =$engines_obj\n"; print "PROCESSOR =$processor\n"; print "RANLIB =$ranlib\n"; print "ARFLAGS =$arflags\n"; print "PERL =$perl\n"; print "KRB5_INCLUDES =",$withargs{"krb5-include"},"\n" if $withargs{"krb5-include"} ne ""; my $des_ptr=0; my $des_risc1=0; my $des_risc2=0; my $des_unroll=0; my $bn_ll=0; my $def_int=2; my $rc4_int=$def_int; my $md2_int=$def_int; my $idea_int=$def_int; my $rc2_int=$def_int; my $rc4_idx=0; my $rc4_chunk=0; my $bf_ptr=0; my @type=("char","short","int","long"); my ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,1,0,0); my $export_var_as_fn=0; my $des_int; foreach (sort split(/\s+/,$bn_ops)) { $des_ptr=1 if /DES_PTR/; $des_risc1=1 if /DES_RISC1/; $des_risc2=1 if /DES_RISC2/; $des_unroll=1 if /DES_UNROLL/; $des_int=1 if /DES_INT/; $bn_ll=1 if /BN_LLONG/; $rc4_int=0 if /RC4_CHAR/; $rc4_int=3 if /RC4_LONG/; $rc4_idx=1 if /RC4_INDEX/; $rc4_chunk=1 if /RC4_CHUNK/; $rc4_chunk=2 if /RC4_CHUNK_LL/; $md2_int=0 if /MD2_CHAR/; $md2_int=3 if /MD2_LONG/; $idea_int=1 if /IDEA_SHORT/; $idea_int=3 if /IDEA_LONG/; $rc2_int=1 if /RC2_SHORT/; $rc2_int=3 if /RC2_LONG/; $bf_ptr=1 if $_ eq "BF_PTR"; $bf_ptr=2 if $_ eq "BF_PTR2"; ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,1,0,0,0) if /SIXTY_FOUR_BIT/; ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(1,0,0,0,0) if /SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG/; ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,1,0,0) if /THIRTY_TWO_BIT/; ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,0,1,0) if /SIXTEEN_BIT/; ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,0,0,1) if /EIGHT_BIT/; $export_var_as_fn=1 if /EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN/; } open(IN,'crypto/opensslconf.h.new') || die "unable to create crypto/opensslconf.h.new:$!\n"; print OUT "/* opensslconf.h */\n"; print OUT "/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */\n\n"; print OUT "#ifdef __cplusplus\n"; print OUT "extern \"C\" {\n"; print OUT "#endif\n"; print OUT "/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */\n"; my $openssl_algorithm_defines_trans = $openssl_algorithm_defines; $openssl_experimental_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+OPENSSL_NO_(.*)/#ifndef OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$1\n# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_$1\n# define OPENSSL_NO_$1\n# endif\n#endif/mg; $openssl_algorithm_defines_trans =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+OPENSSL_(.*)/# if defined(OPENSSL_$1) \&\& !defined($1)\n# define $1\n# endif/mg; $openssl_algorithm_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg; $openssl_algorithm_defines = " /* no ciphers excluded */\n" if $openssl_algorithm_defines eq ""; $openssl_thread_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg; $openssl_sys_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg; $openssl_other_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg; print OUT $openssl_sys_defines; print OUT "#ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND\n\n"; print OUT $openssl_experimental_defines; print OUT "\n"; print OUT $openssl_algorithm_defines; print OUT "\n#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */\n\n"; print OUT $openssl_thread_defines; print OUT $openssl_other_defines,"\n"; print OUT "/* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application\n"; print OUT " asks for it. This is a transient feature that is provided for those\n"; print OUT " who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their\n"; print OUT " applications. */\n"; print OUT "#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES\n"; print OUT $openssl_algorithm_defines_trans; print OUT "#endif\n\n"; print OUT "#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ\n\n" if ($cpuid_obj ne "mem_clr.o"); while () { if (/^#define\s+OPENSSLDIR/) { my $foo = $openssldir; $foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g; print OUT "#define OPENSSLDIR \"$foo\"\n"; } elsif (/^#define\s+ENGINESDIR/) { my $foo = "$prefix/$libdir/engines"; $foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g; print OUT "#define ENGINESDIR \"$foo\"\n"; } elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION/) { printf OUT "#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION\n" if $export_var_as_fn; printf OUT "#%s OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION\n", ($export_var_as_fn)?"define":"undef"; } elsif (/^#define\s+OPENSSL_UNISTD/) { $unistd = "" if $unistd eq ""; print OUT "#define OPENSSL_UNISTD $unistd\n"; } elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG/) { printf OUT "#%s SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG\n",($b64l)?"define":"undef"; } elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+SIXTY_FOUR_BIT/) { printf OUT "#%s SIXTY_FOUR_BIT\n",($b64)?"define":"undef"; } elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+THIRTY_TWO_BIT/) { printf OUT "#%s THIRTY_TWO_BIT\n",($b32)?"define":"undef"; } elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+SIXTEEN_BIT/) { printf OUT "#%s SIXTEEN_BIT\n",($b16)?"define":"undef"; } elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+EIGHT_BIT/) { printf OUT "#%s EIGHT_BIT\n",($b8)?"define":"undef"; } elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+BN_LLONG\s*$/) { printf OUT "#%s BN_LLONG\n",($bn_ll)?"define":"undef"; } elsif (/^\#define\s+DES_LONG\s+.*/) { printf OUT "#define DES_LONG unsigned %s\n", ($des_int)?'int':'long'; } elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_PTR/) { printf OUT "#%s DES_PTR\n",($des_ptr)?'define':'undef'; } elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_RISC1/) { printf OUT "#%s DES_RISC1\n",($des_risc1)?'define':'undef'; } elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_RISC2/) { printf OUT "#%s DES_RISC2\n",($des_risc2)?'define':'undef'; } elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_UNROLL/) { printf OUT "#%s DES_UNROLL\n",($des_unroll)?'define':'undef'; } elsif (/^#define\s+RC4_INT\s/) { printf OUT "#define RC4_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$rc4_int]; } elsif (/^#undef\s+RC4_CHUNK/) { printf OUT "#undef RC4_CHUNK\n" if $rc4_chunk==0; printf OUT "#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long\n" if $rc4_chunk==1; printf OUT "#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long long\n" if $rc4_chunk==2; } elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+RC4_INDEX/) { printf OUT "#%s RC4_INDEX\n",($rc4_idx)?"define":"undef"; } elsif (/^#(define|undef)\s+I386_ONLY/) { printf OUT "#%s I386_ONLY\n", ($processor eq "386")? "define":"undef"; } elsif (/^#define\s+MD2_INT\s/) { printf OUT "#define MD2_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$md2_int]; } elsif (/^#define\s+IDEA_INT\s/) {printf OUT "#define IDEA_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$idea_int];} elsif (/^#define\s+RC2_INT\s/) {printf OUT "#define RC2_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$rc2_int];} elsif (/^#(define|undef)\s+BF_PTR/) { printf OUT "#undef BF_PTR\n" if $bf_ptr == 0; printf OUT "#define BF_PTR\n" if $bf_ptr == 1; printf OUT "#define BF_PTR2\n" if $bf_ptr == 2; } else { print OUT $_; } } close(IN); print OUT "#ifdef __cplusplus\n"; print OUT "}\n"; print OUT "#endif\n"; close(OUT); if (compare("crypto/opensslconf.h.new","crypto/opensslconf.h")) { rename("crypto/opensslconf.h","crypto/opensslconf.h.bak") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h\n" if -e "crypto/opensslconf.h"; rename("crypto/opensslconf.h.new","crypto/opensslconf.h") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h.new\n"; } else { unlink("crypto/opensslconf.h.new"); } # Fix the date print "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG mode\n" if $b64l; print "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT mode\n" if $b64; print "THIRTY_TWO_BIT mode\n" if $b32; print "SIXTEEN_BIT mode\n" if $b16; print "EIGHT_BIT mode\n" if $b8; print "DES_PTR used\n" if $des_ptr; print "DES_RISC1 used\n" if $des_risc1; print "DES_RISC2 used\n" if $des_risc2; print "DES_UNROLL used\n" if $des_unroll; print "DES_INT used\n" if $des_int; print "BN_LLONG mode\n" if $bn_ll; print "RC4 uses u$type[$rc4_int]\n" if $rc4_int != $def_int; print "RC4_INDEX mode\n" if $rc4_idx; print "RC4_CHUNK is undefined\n" if $rc4_chunk==0; print "RC4_CHUNK is unsigned long\n" if $rc4_chunk==1; print "RC4_CHUNK is unsigned long long\n" if $rc4_chunk==2; print "MD2 uses u$type[$md2_int]\n" if $md2_int != $def_int; print "IDEA uses u$type[$idea_int]\n" if $idea_int != $def_int; print "RC2 uses u$type[$rc2_int]\n" if $rc2_int != $def_int; print "BF_PTR used\n" if $bf_ptr == 1; print "BF_PTR2 used\n" if $bf_ptr == 2; if($IsMK1MF) { open (OUT,">crypto/buildinf.h") || die "Can't open buildinf.h"; printf OUT <ms/version32.rc") || die "Can't open ms/version32.rc"; print OUT < LANGUAGE 0x09,0x01 1 VERSIONINFO FILEVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4 PRODUCTVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4 FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL #ifdef _DEBUG FILEFLAGS 0x01L #else FILEFLAGS 0x00L #endif FILEOS VOS__WINDOWS32 FILETYPE VFT_DLL FILESUBTYPE 0x0L BEGIN BLOCK "StringFileInfo" BEGIN BLOCK "040904b0" BEGIN // Required: VALUE "CompanyName", "The OpenSSL Project, http://www.openssl.org/\\0" VALUE "FileDescription", "OpenSSL Shared Library\\0" VALUE "FileVersion", "$version\\0" #if defined(CRYPTO) VALUE "InternalName", "libeay32\\0" VALUE "OriginalFilename", "libeay32.dll\\0" #elif defined(SSL) VALUE "InternalName", "ssleay32\\0" VALUE "OriginalFilename", "ssleay32.dll\\0" #endif VALUE "ProductName", "The OpenSSL Toolkit\\0" VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0" // Optional: //VALUE "Comments", "\\0" VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright © 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0" //VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0" //VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0" //VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0" END END BLOCK "VarFileInfo" BEGIN VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 0x4b0 END END EOF close(OUT); } print < 78) { print STDERR "\n"; $k=length($i); } print STDERR $i . " "; } foreach $i (sort keys %table) { next if $i !~ /^debug/; $k += length($i) + 1; if ($k > 78) { print STDERR "\n"; $k=length($i); } print STDERR $i . " "; } print STDERR "\n\nNOTE: If in doubt, on Unix-ish systems use './config'.\n"; exit(1); } sub which { my($name)=@_; my $path; foreach $path (split /:/, $ENV{PATH}) { if (-f "$path/$name$exe_ext" and -x _) { return "$path/$name$exe_ext" unless ($name eq "perl" and system("$path/$name$exe_ext -e " . '\'exit($]<5.0);\'')); } } } sub dofile { my $f; my $p; my %m; my @a; my $k; my $ff; ($f,$p,%m)=@_; open(IN,"<$f.in") || open(IN,"<$f") || die "unable to open $f:$!\n"; @a=; close(IN); foreach $k (keys %m) { grep(/$k/ && ($_=sprintf($m{$k}."\n",$p)),@a); } open(OUT,">$f.new") || die "unable to open $f.new:$!\n"; print OUT @a; close(OUT); rename($f,"$f.bak") || die "unable to rename $f\n" if -e $f; rename("$f.new",$f) || die "unable to rename $f.new\n"; } sub print_table_entry { my $target = shift; my ($cc, $cflags, $unistd, $thread_cflag, $sys_id, $lflags, $bn_ops, $cpuid_obj, $bn_obj, $ec_obj, $des_obj, $aes_obj, $bf_obj, $md5_obj, $sha1_obj, $cast_obj, $rc4_obj, $rmd160_obj, $rc5_obj, $wp_obj, $cmll_obj, $modes_obj, $engines_obj, $perlasm_scheme, $dso_scheme, $shared_target, $shared_cflag, $shared_ldflag, $shared_extension, $ranlib, $arflags, $multilib)= split(/\s*:\s*/,$table{$target} . ":" x 30 , -1); print < (stat($file2))[9] } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/FREEBSD-upgrade =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/FREEBSD-upgrade (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/FREEBSD-upgrade (revision 337764) @@ -1,83 +1,83 @@ This contains various notes used to import a new OpenSSL version into the FreeBSD base system. It is not expected to be complete but just to contain some hints for imports. Note that this doesn't actually deal with getting OpenSSL to compile... XXX This file currently partly contain CVS and SVN instructions. First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports # Xlist setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://repo.freebsd.org/base" -setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2o -# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2o +setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2p +# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2p ###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _` cd /FreeBSD/work/openssl/merge fetch http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz \ http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz.asc gpg --verify openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz.asc openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz -svn co $FSVN/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist dist +svn co $FSVN/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2 dist-1.0.2 tar -x -X $XLIST -f openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz -cd dist +cd dist-1.0.2 svn list -R | egrep -v -e '/$' -e '^FREEBSD-(Xlist|upgrade)$' | sort >../old cd ../openssl-${OSSLVER} find . -type f -or -type l | cut -c 3- | sort >../new cd .. # See that files to remove makes sense comm -23 old new # See that files to add makes sense comm -13 old new -tar -cf - -C openssl-${OSSLVER} . | tar -xf - -C dist -cd dist +tar -cf - -C openssl-${OSSLVER} . | tar -xf - -C dist-1.0.2 +cd dist-1.0.2 comm -23 ../old ../new | xargs svn rm # Make sure to remove empty directories comm -13 ../old ../new | xargs svn --parents add svn stat svn ci -svn cp ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/$OSSLVER +svn cp ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2 ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/$OSSLVER # Merge to head mkdir ../head cd ../head svn co $FSVN/head/crypto/openssl crypto/openssl -svn merge ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist crypto/openssl +svn merge ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2 crypto/openssl # Resolve conflicts manually svn co $FSVN/head/secure/lib/libcrypto secure/lib/libcrypto svn co $FSVN/head/secure/lib/libssl secure/lib/libssl svn co $FSVN/head/secure/usr.bin/openssl secure/usr.bin/openssl cd secure/lib/libcrypto # Update version number and release date in Makefile.inc # Update all opensslconf-${MACHINE_CPUARCH}.h # Regen assembly files if necessary make -f Makefile.asm all mv *.[Ss] ${MACHINE_CPUARCH} make -f Makefile.asm clean # Regen manual pages make man-makefile-update && make man-update cd ../libssl make man-makefile-update && make man-update cd ../../usr.bin/openssl make man-makefile-update && make man-update cd ../../.. # Commit! svn ci crypto/openssl secure/lib/libcrypto secure/lib/libssl secure/usr.bin/openssl -- simon@, jkim@ $FreeBSD$ Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/Makefile (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/Makefile (revision 337764) @@ -1,692 +1,692 @@ ### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure. ## ## Makefile for OpenSSL ## -VERSION=1.0.2o +VERSION=1.0.2p MAJOR=1 MINOR=0.2 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0 SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY= SHLIB_MAJOR=1 SHLIB_MINOR=0.0 SHLIB_EXT= PLATFORM=dist OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-libunbound no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-ssl-trace no-ssl2 no-store no-unit-test no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine CONFIGURE_ARGS=dist SHLIB_TARGET= # HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate # where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage, # and should probably not be bothered with at all. HERE=. # INSTALL_PREFIX is for package builders so that they can configure # for, say, /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/. # Normally it is left empty. INSTALL_PREFIX= INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl # NO_IDEA - Define to build without the IDEA algorithm # NO_RC4 - Define to build without the RC4 algorithm # NO_RC2 - Define to build without the RC2 algorithm # THREADS - Define when building with threads, you will probably also need any # system defines as well, i.e. _REENTERANT for Solaris 2.[34] # TERMIO - Define the termio terminal subsystem, needed if sgtty is missing. # TERMIOS - Define the termios terminal subsystem, Silicon Graphics. # LONGCRYPT - Define to use HPUX 10.x's long password modification to crypt(3). # DEVRANDOM - Give this the value of the 'random device' if your OS supports # one. 32 bytes will be read from this when the random # number generator is initalised. # SSL_FORBID_ENULL - define if you want the server to be not able to use the # NULL encryption ciphers. # # LOCK_DEBUG - turns on lots of lock debug output :-) # REF_CHECK - turn on some xyz_free() assertions. # REF_PRINT - prints some stuff on structure free. # CRYPTO_MDEBUG - turns on my 'memory leak' detecting stuff # MFUNC - Make all Malloc/Free/Realloc calls call # CRYPTO_malloc/CRYPTO_free/CRYPTO_realloc which can be setup to # call application defined callbacks via CRYPTO_set_mem_functions() # MD5_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for MD5 # SHA1_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for SHA1 # RMD160_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for RIPEMD160 # Do not define B_ENDIAN or L_ENDIAN if 'unsigned long' == 8. It must # equal 4. # PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests. CC= cc CFLAG= -O DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS PEX_LIBS= EX_LIBS= EXE_EXT= ARFLAGS= AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r RANLIB= /usr/bin/ranlib RC= windres NM= nm PERL= /usr/bin/perl TAR= tar TARFLAGS= --no-recursion MAKEDEPPROG= cc LIBDIR=lib # We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in # order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture # dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC # gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus # and pass it down to assembler. AS=$(CC) -c ASFLAG=$(CFLAG) # For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support # the 80386. PROCESSOR= # CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets CPUID_OBJ= mem_clr.o BN_ASM= bn_asm.o EC_ASM= DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o BF_ENC= bf_enc.o CAST_ENC= c_enc.o RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o MD5_ASM_OBJ= SHA1_ASM_OBJ= RMD160_ASM_OBJ= WP_ASM_OBJ= wp_block.o CMLL_ENC= camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o MODES_ASM_OBJ= ENGINES_ASM_OBJ= PERLASM_SCHEME= # KRB5 stuff KRB5_INCLUDES= LIBKRB5= # Zlib stuff ZLIB_INCLUDE= LIBZLIB= # TOP level FIPS install directory. FIPSDIR=/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0 # This is the location of fipscanister.o and friends. # The FIPS module build will place it $(INSTALLTOP)/lib # but since $(INSTALLTOP) can only take the default value # when the module is built it will be in /usr/local/ssl/lib # $(INSTALLTOP) for this build may be different so hard # code the path. FIPSLIBDIR= # The location of the library which contains fipscanister.o # normally it will be libcrypto unless fipsdso is set in which # case it will be libfips. If not compiling in FIPS mode at all # this is empty making it a useful test for a FIPS compile. FIPSCANLIB= # Shared library base address. Currently only used on Windows. # BASEADDR=0xFB00000 DIRS= crypto ssl engines apps test tools ENGDIRS= ccgost SHLIBDIRS= crypto ssl # dirs in crypto to build SDIRS= \ objects \ md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool \ des aes rc2 rc4 idea bf cast camellia seed modes \ bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \ buffer bio stack lhash rand err \ evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \ cms pqueue ts srp cmac # keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure # according to no-xxx arguments... # tests to perform. "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests # should be performed. TESTS = alltests MAKEFILE= Makefile MANDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/man MAN1=1 MAN3=3 MANSUFFIX= HTMLSUFFIX=html HTMLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/html SHELL=/bin/sh TOP= . 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\ if [ "$(INSTALLTOP)" != "/usr" ]; then \ echo 'OpenSSL shared libraries have been installed in:'; \ echo ' $(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo ''; \ sed -e '1,/^$$/d' doc/openssl-shared.txt; \ fi; \ fi cp libcrypto.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc cp libssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc cp openssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc install_html_docs: here="`pwd`"; \ filecase=; \ case "$(PLATFORM)" in DJGPP|Cygwin*|mingw*|darwin*-*-cc) \ filecase=-i; \ esac; \ for subdir in apps crypto ssl; do \ mkdir -p $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \ for i in doc/$$subdir/*.pod; do \ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \ echo "installing html/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX)"; \ cat $$i \ | sed -r 's/L<([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?\|([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?>/L<\1|\3>/g' \ | pod2html --podroot=doc --htmlroot=.. --podpath=apps:crypto:ssl \ | sed -r 's/ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX); \ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \ grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$" | \ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \ while read n; do \ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX) "$$n".$(HTMLSUFFIX); \ done); \ done; \ done install_docs: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man1 \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7 @pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \ here="`pwd`"; \ filecase=; \ case "$(PLATFORM)" in DJGPP|Cygwin*|mingw*|darwin*-*-cc) \ filecase=-i; \ esac; \ set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \ sh -c "$$pod2man \ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \ while read n; do \ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ done); \ done; \ set -e; for i in doc/crypto/*.pod doc/ssl/*.pod; do \ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 3 < $$i`; \ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \ sh -c "$$pod2man \ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \ while read n; do \ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ done); \ done # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/NEWS =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/NEWS (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/NEWS (revision 337764) @@ -1,818 +1,823 @@ NEWS ==== This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2o and OpenSSL 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018] + + o Client DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732) + o Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation (CVE-2018-0737) + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2n and OpenSSL 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018] o Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack (CVE-2018-0739) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2m and OpenSSL 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017] o Read/write after SSL object in error state (CVE-2017-3737) o rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2l and OpenSSL 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017] o bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736) o Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read (CVE-2017-3735) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2k and OpenSSL 1.0.2l [25 May 2017] o config now recognises 64-bit mingw and chooses mingw64 instead of mingw Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2j and OpenSSL 1.0.2k [26 Jan 2017] o Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731) o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3732) o Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2i and OpenSSL 1.0.2j [26 Sep 2016] o Missing CRL sanity check (CVE-2016-7052) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2h and OpenSSL 1.0.2i [22 Sep 2016] o OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304) o SWEET32 Mitigation (CVE-2016-2183) o OOB write in MDC2_Update() (CVE-2016-6303) o Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS (CVE-2016-6302) o OOB write in BN_bn2dec() (CVE-2016-2182) o OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() (CVE-2016-2180) o Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour (CVE-2016-2177) o Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing (CVE-2016-2178) o DTLS buffered message DoS (CVE-2016-2179) o DTLS replay protection DoS (CVE-2016-2181) o Certificate message OOB reads (CVE-2016-6306) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2g and OpenSSL 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107) o Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105) o Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2106) o Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation (CVE-2016-2109) o EBCDIC overread (CVE-2016-2176) o Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. o Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the default. o Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL. o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers (CVE-2016-0800) o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705) o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak (CVE-2016-0798) o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption (CVE-2016-0797) o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799) o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701) o SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193) o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194) o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195) o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793) o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788) o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789) o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790) o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792) o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291) o Multiblock corrupted pointer fix (CVE-2015-0290) o Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix (CVE-2015-0207) o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286) o Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix (CVE-2015-0208) o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287) o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289) o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293) o Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix (CVE-2015-1787) o Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix (CVE-2015-0285) o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209) o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288) o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]: o Suite B support for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 o Support for DTLS 1.2 o TLS automatic EC curve selection. o API to set TLS supported signature algorithms and curves o SSL_CONF configuration API. o TLS Brainpool support. o ALPN support. o CMS support for RSA-PSS, RSA-OAEP, ECDH and X9.42 DH. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1k and OpenSSL 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] o Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1j and OpenSSL 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] o Fix for CVE-2014-3571 o Fix for CVE-2015-0206 o Fix for CVE-2014-3569 o Fix for CVE-2014-3572 o Fix for CVE-2015-0204 o Fix for CVE-2015-0205 o Fix for CVE-2014-8275 o Fix for CVE-2014-3570 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-3513 o Fix for CVE-2014-3567 o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability) o Fix for CVE-2014-3568 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-3512 o Fix for CVE-2014-3511 o Fix for CVE-2014-3510 o Fix for CVE-2014-3507 o Fix for CVE-2014-3506 o Fix for CVE-2014-3505 o Fix for CVE-2014-3509 o Fix for CVE-2014-5139 o Fix for CVE-2014-3508 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-0224 o Fix for CVE-2014-0221 o Fix for CVE-2014-0198 o Fix for CVE-2014-0195 o Fix for CVE-2014-3470 o Fix for CVE-2010-5298 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-0160 o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers. o Fix for CVE-2014-0076 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353 o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449 o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]: o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]: o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version. o Include the fips configuration module. o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166 o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169 o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]: o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333 o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]: o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms. o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode. o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]: o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110 o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos. o Fix SEGV in AES code. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]: o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support. o SCTP support. o RFC 5705 TLS key material exporter. o RFC 5764 DTLS-SRTP negotiation. o Next Protocol Negotiation. o PSS signatures in certificates, requests and CRLs. o Support for password based recipient info for CMS. o Support TLS v1.2 and TLS v1.1. o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module. o SRP support. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]: o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884 o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619 o Various DTLS fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108 o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576 o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619 o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027 o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]: o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207 o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210 o Protection against EC timing attacks. o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms. o Various DTLS fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180 o Fix for CVE-2010-4252 o Fix mishandling of absent EC point format extension. o Fix various platform compilation issues. o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. o Fix for CVE-2010-2939 o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633. o GOST MAC and CFB fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]: o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests. o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs. o Change default private key format to PKCS#8. o CMS support: able to process all examples in RFC4134 o Streaming ASN1 encode support for PKCS#7 and CMS. o Multiple signer and signer add support for PKCS#7 and CMS. o ASN1 printing support. o Whirlpool hash algorithm added. o RFC3161 time stamp support. o New generalised public key API supporting ENGINE based algorithms. o New generalised public key API utilities. o New ENGINE supporting GOST algorithms. o SSL/TLS GOST ciphersuite support. o PKCS#7 and CMS GOST support. o RFC4279 PSK ciphersuite support. o Supported points format extension for ECC ciphersuites. o ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types. o dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256 signature types. o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support. o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]: o CFB cipher definition fixes. o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]: o Cipher definition fixes. o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions. o Remove MD2 from algorithm tables. o SPKAC handling fixes. o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension. o Compression memory leak fixed. o Compression session resumption fixed. o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes. o Many fixes to DTLS handling. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]: o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]: o Fix various build issues. o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]: o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077) o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]: o CryptoAPI ENGINE support. o Various precautionary measures. o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation. o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]: o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8. o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]: o Add gcc 4.2 support. o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization for VC++ build. o Support for RFC4507bis and server name extensions if explicitly selected at compile time. o DTLS improvements. o RFC4507bis support. o TLS Extensions support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]: o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. o RFC3779 support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 o New cipher Camellia Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]: o Cipher string fixes. o Fixes for VC++ 2005. o Updated ECC cipher suite support. o New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(). o Zlib compression usage fixes. o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32. o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Extended Windows CE support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]: o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This is the result of a major audit of the BIGNUM library. o Addition of BIGNUM functions for fields GF(2^m) and NIST curves, to support the Elliptic Crypto functions. o Major work on Elliptic Crypto; ECDH and ECDSA added, including the use through EVP, X509 and ENGINE. o New ASN.1 mini-compiler that's usable through the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for ASN.1 indefinite length constructed encoding. o New PKCS#12 'medium level' API to manipulate PKCS#12 files. o Complete rework of shared library construction and linking programs with shared or static libraries, through a separate Makefile.shared. o Rework of the passing of parameters from one Makefile to another. o Changed ENGINE framework to load dynamic engine modules automatically from specifically given directories. o New structure and ASN.1 functions for CertificatePair. o Changed the ZLIB compression method to be stateful. o Changed the key-generation and primality testing "progress" mechanism to take a structure that contains the ticker function and an argument. o New engine module: GMP (performs private key exponentiation). o New engine module: VIA PadLOck ACE extension in VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. o Added support for IPv6 addresses in certificate extensions. See RFC 1884, section 2.2. o Added support for certificate policy mappings, policy constraints and name constraints. o Added support for multi-valued AVAs in the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for multiple certificates with the same subject in the 'openssl ca' index file. o Make it possible to create self-signed certificates using 'openssl ca -selfsign'. o Make it possible to generate a serial number file with 'openssl ca -create_serial'. o New binary search functions with extended functionality. o New BUF functions. o New STORE structure and library to provide an interface to all sorts of data repositories. Supports storage of public and private keys, certificates, CRLs, numbers and arbitrary blobs. This library is unfortunately unfinished and unused withing OpenSSL. o New control functions for the error stack. o Changed the PKCS#7 library to support one-pass S/MIME processing. o Added the possibility to compile without old deprecated functionality with the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED macro or the 'no-deprecated' argument to the config and Configure scripts. o Constification of all ASN.1 conversion functions, and other affected functions. o Improved platform support for PowerPC. o New FIPS 180-2 algorithms (SHA-224, -256, -384 and -512). o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parametrisation of X.509 path validation. o Major overhaul of RC4 performance on Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. o Changed the Configure script to have some algorithms disabled by default. Those can be explicitely enabled with the new argument form 'enable-xxx'. o Change the default digest in 'openssl' commands from MD5 to SHA-1. o Added support for DTLS. o New BIGNUM blinding. o Added support for the RSA-PSS encryption scheme o Added support for the RSA X.931 padding. o Added support for BSD sockets on NetWare. o Added support for files larger than 2GB. o Added initial support for Win64. o Added alternate pkg-config files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]: o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking. o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]: o Visual C++ 2005 fixes. o Update Windows build system for FIPS. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]: o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]: o More compilation issues fixed. o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API. o Enhanced or corrected configuration for Solaris64, Mingw and Cygwin. o Enhanced x86_64 assembler BIGNUM module. o More constification. o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]: o Several compilation issues fixed. o Many memory allocation failure checks added. o Improved comparison of X509 Name type. o Mandatory basic checks on certificates. o Performance improvements. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]: o Fix race condition in CRL checking code. o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]: o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() o Allow multiple active certificates with same subject in CA index o Multiple X509 verification fixes o Speed up HMAC and other operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility. o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Configuration: Irix fixes, AIX fixes, better mingw support. o Support for new platforms: linux-ia64-ecc. o Build: shared library support fixes. o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly. o Documentation: fixes and additions. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]: o Security: Important security related bugfixes. o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos. o Can be built without the ENGINE framework. o IA32 assembler enhancements. o Support for new platforms: FreeBSD/IA64 and FreeBSD/Sparc64. o Configuration: the no-err option now works properly. o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building. o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]: o New library section OCSP. o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code. o CRL checking in verify code and openssl utility. o Extension copying in 'ca' utility. o Flexible display options in 'ca' utility. o Provisional support for international characters with UTF8. o Support for external crypto devices ('engine') is no longer a separate distribution. o New elliptic curve library section. o New AES (Rijndael) library section. o Support for new platforms: Windows CE, Tandem OSS, A/UX, AIX 64-bit, Linux x86_64, Linux 64-bit on Sparc v9 o Extended support for some platforms: VxWorks o Enhanced support for shared libraries. o Now only builds PIC code when shared library support is requested. o Support for pkg-config. o Lots of new manuals. o Makes symbolic links to or copies of manuals to cover all described functions. o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also against libdes providing similar functions having the same name). Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the future). o Unify handling of cryptographic algorithms (software and engine) to be available via EVP routines for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers. o NCONF: new configuration handling routines. o Change API to use more 'const' modifiers to improve error checking and help optimizers. o Finally remove references to RSAref. o Reworked parts of the BIGNUM code. o Support for new engines: Broadcom ubsec, Accelerated Encryption Processing, IBM 4758. o A few new engines added in the demos area. o Extended and corrected OID (object identifier) table. o PRNG: query at more locations for a random device, automatic query for EGD style random sources at several locations. o SSL/TLS: allow optional cipher choice according to server's preference. o SSL/TLS: allow server to explicitly set new session ids. o SSL/TLS: support Kerberos cipher suites (RFC2712). Only supports MIT Kerberos for now. o SSL/TLS: allow more precise control of renegotiations and sessions. o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages. o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Build: shared library support fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]: o Important security related bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]: o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX. o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes. o Better handling of SSL session caching. o Better comparison of distinguished names. o Better handling of shared libraries in a mixed GNU/non-GNU environment. o Support assembler code with Borland C. o Fixes for length problems. o Fixes for uninitialised variables. o Fixes for memory leaks, some unusual crashes and some race conditions. o Fixes for smaller building problems. o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]: o Important building fixes on Unix. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]: o Various important bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]: o Important security related bugfixes. o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o BIGNUM library fixes. o RSA OAEP and random number generation fixes. o Object identifiers corrected and added. o Add assembler BN routines for IA64. o Add support for OS/390 Unix, UnixWare with gcc, OpenUNIX 8, MIPS Linux; shared library support for Irix, HP-UX. o Add crypto accelerator support for AEP, Baltimore SureWare, Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver [in 0.9.6c-engine release]. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]: o Security fix: PRNG improvements. o Security fix: RSA OAEP check. o Security fix: Reinsert and fix countermeasure to Bleichbacher's attack. o MIPS bug fix in BIGNUM. o Bug fix in "openssl enc". o Bug fix in X.509 printing routine. o Bug fix in DSA verification routine and DSA S/MIME verification. o Bug fix to make PRNG thread-safe. o Bug fix in RAND_file_name(). o Bug fix in compatibility mode trust settings. o Bug fix in blowfish EVP. o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter. o Compatibility fixes in some scripts. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]: o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using environment variables when running as root. o Security fix: check the result of RSA-CRT to reduce the possibility of deducing the private key from an incorrectly calculated signature. o Security fix: prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. o Security fix: Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. o Reimplement SSL_peek(), which had various problems. o Compatibility fix: the function des_encrypt() renamed to des_encrypt1() to avoid clashes with some Unixen libc. o Bug fixes for Win32, HP/UX and Irix. o Bug fixes in BIGNUM, SSL, PKCS#7, PKCS#12, X.509, CONF and memory checking routines. o Bug fixes for RSA operations in threaded environments. o Bug fixes in misc. openssl applications. o Remove a few potential memory leaks. o Add tighter checks of BIGNUM routines. o Shared library support has been reworked for generality. o More documentation. o New function BN_rand_range(). o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]: o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries. o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers. o New sign and verify options to 'dgst' application. o Support for DER and PEM encoded messages in 'smime' application. o New 'rsautl' application, low level RSA utility. o MD4 now included. o Bugfix for SSL rollback padding check. o Support for external crypto devices [1]. o Enhanced EVP interface. [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate distribution. See the file README.ENGINE. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]: o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8 o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc o Support of Linux/IA64 o Assembler support for Mingw32 o New 'rand' application o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]: o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application o Automation of 'req' application o Fixes to make s_client, s_server work under Windows o Support for multiple fieldnames in SPKACs o New SPKAC command line utilty and associated library functions o Options to allow passwords to be obtained from various sources o New public key PEM format and options to handle it o Many other fixes and enhancements to command line utilities o Usable certificate chain verification o Certificate purpose checking o Certificate trust settings o Support of authority information access extension o Extensions in certificate requests o Simplified X509 name and attribute routines o Initial (incomplete) support for international character sets o New DH_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and enhanced RSA_METHOD o Read only memory BIOs and simplified creation function o TLS/SSL protocol bugfixes: Accept TLS 'client hello' in SSL 3.0 record; allow fragmentation and interleaving of handshake and other data o TLS/SSL code now "tolerates" MS SGC o Work around for Netscape client certificate hang bug o RSA_NULL option that removes RSA patent code but keeps other RSA functionality o Memory leak detection now allows applications to add extra information via a per-thread stack o PRNG robustness improved o EGD support o BIGNUM library bug fixes o Faster DSA parameter generation o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux o Experimental MacOS support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]: o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used by several software packages and are more secure than the standard form o PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation o Password callbacks have a new void * argument for application data o Avoid various memory leaks o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O must be handled by the application (BIO pair) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]: o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism o RSA OEAP related fixes o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate o Source cleanups: const correctness, type-safe stacks and ASN.1 SETs o Source tree cleanups: removed lots of obsolete files o Thawte SXNet, certificate policies and CRL distribution points extension support o Preliminary (experimental) S/MIME support o Support for ASN.1 UTF8String and VisibleString o Full integration of PKCS#12 code o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions o Option to disable selected ciphers Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]: o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers" o Support for Triple-DES CBCM cipher o Support of Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for RSA o First support for new TLSv1 ciphers o Added a few new BIOs (syslog BIO, reliable BIO) o Extended support for DSA certificate/keys. o Extended support for Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) o Initial support for X.509v3 extensions o Extended support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Overhauled Win32 builds o Cleanups and fixes to the Big Number (BN) library o Support for ASN.1 GeneralizedTime o Splitted ASN.1 SETs from SEQUENCEs o ASN1 and PEM support for Netscape Certificate Sequences o Overhauled Perl interface o Lots of source tree cleanups. o Lots of memory leak fixes. o Lots of bug fixes. Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]: o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality o Extended Big Number (BN) library o Added RIPE MD160 message digest o Addeed support for RC2/64bit cipher o Extended ASN.1 parser routines o Adjustations of the source tree for CVS o Support for various new platforms Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/README =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/README (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/README (revision 337764) @@ -1,101 +1,101 @@ - OpenSSL 1.0.2o 27 Mar 2018 + OpenSSL 1.0.2p 14 Aug 2018 - Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project + Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson All rights reserved. DESCRIPTION ----------- The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSLv3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptograpic library. The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related documentation. OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses. OVERVIEW -------- The OpenSSL toolkit includes: libssl.a: Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS. libcrypto.a: Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but not logically part of it. openssl: A command line tool that can be used for: Creation of key parameters Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs Calculation of message digests Encryption and decryption SSL/TLS client and server tests Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail And more... INSTALLATION ------------ See the appropriate file: INSTALL Linux, Unix, etc. INSTALL.DJGPP DOS platform with DJGPP INSTALL.NW Netware INSTALL.OS2 OS/2 INSTALL.VMS VMS INSTALL.W32 Windows (32bit) INSTALL.W64 Windows (64bit) INSTALL.WCE Windows CE SUPPORT ------- See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain commercial technical support. If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps first: - Download the latest version from the repository to see if the problem has already been addressed - Configure with no-asm - Remove compiler optimisation flags If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information and create an issue on GitHub: - On Unix systems: Self-test report generated by 'make report' - On other systems: OpenSSL version: output of 'openssl version -a' OS Name, Version, Hardware platform Compiler Details (name, version) - Application Details (name, version) - Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known) - Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core) Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL. HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL ---------------------------- See CONTRIBUTING LEGALITIES ---------- A number of nations restrict the use or export of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to develop or distribute cryptographic code. Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/apps.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/apps.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/apps.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,3283 +1,3284 @@ /* apps/apps.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* * On VMS, you need to define this to get the declaration of fileno(). The * value 2 is to make sure no function defined in POSIX-2 is left undefined. */ # define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2 #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE # include #endif #define NON_MAIN #include "apps.h" #undef NON_MAIN #ifdef _WIN32 static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to); # define rename(from,to) WIN32_rename((from),(to)) # ifdef fileno # undef fileno # endif # define fileno(a) (int)_fileno(a) #endif typedef struct { const char *name; unsigned long flag; unsigned long mask; } NAME_EX_TBL; static UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL; static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl); static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) /* Looks like this stuff is worth moving into separate function */ static EVP_PKEY *load_netscape_key(BIO *err, BIO *key, const char *file, const char *key_descrip, int format); #endif int app_init(long mesgwin); #ifdef undef /* never finished - probably never will be * :-) */ int args_from_file(char *file, int *argc, char **argv[]) { FILE *fp; int num, i; unsigned int len; static char *buf = NULL; static char **arg = NULL; char *p; fp = fopen(file, "r"); if (fp == NULL) return (0); if (fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_END) == 0) len = ftell(fp), rewind(fp); else len = -1; if (len <= 0) { fclose(fp); return (0); } *argc = 0; *argv = NULL; if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf); buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); if (buf == NULL) return (0); len = fread(buf, 1, len, fp); if (len <= 1) return (0); buf[len] = '\0'; i = 0; for (p = buf; *p; p++) if (*p == '\n') i++; if (arg != NULL) OPENSSL_free(arg); arg = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (i * 2)); if (arg == NULL) return 0; *argv = arg; num = 0; p = buf; for (;;) { if (!*p) break; if (*p == '#') { /* comment line */ while (*p && (*p != '\n')) p++; continue; } /* else we have a line */ *(arg++) = p; num++; while (*p && ((*p != ' ') && (*p != '\t') && (*p != '\n'))) p++; if (!*p) break; if (*p == '\n') { *(p++) = '\0'; continue; } /* else it is a tab or space */ p++; while (*p && ((*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t') || (*p == '\n'))) p++; if (!*p) break; if (*p == '\n') { p++; continue; } *(arg++) = p++; num++; while (*p && (*p != '\n')) p++; if (!*p) break; /* else *p == '\n' */ *(p++) = '\0'; } *argc = num; return (1); } #endif int str2fmt(char *s) { if (s == NULL) return FORMAT_UNDEF; if ((*s == 'D') || (*s == 'd')) return (FORMAT_ASN1); else if ((*s == 'T') || (*s == 't')) return (FORMAT_TEXT); else if ((*s == 'N') || (*s == 'n')) return (FORMAT_NETSCAPE); else if ((*s == 'S') || (*s == 's')) return (FORMAT_SMIME); else if ((*s == 'M') || (*s == 'm')) return (FORMAT_MSBLOB); else if ((*s == '1') || (strcmp(s, "PKCS12") == 0) || (strcmp(s, "pkcs12") == 0) || (strcmp(s, "P12") == 0) || (strcmp(s, "p12") == 0)) return (FORMAT_PKCS12); else if ((*s == 'E') || (*s == 'e')) return (FORMAT_ENGINE); else if ((*s == 'H') || (*s == 'h')) return FORMAT_HTTP; else if ((*s == 'P') || (*s == 'p')) { if (s[1] == 'V' || s[1] == 'v') return FORMAT_PVK; else return (FORMAT_PEM); } else return (FORMAT_UNDEF); } #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size) { int i, n; char *p = NULL; n = strlen(in); /* find the last '/', '\' or ':' */ for (i = n - 1; i > 0; i--) { if ((in[i] == '/') || (in[i] == '\\') || (in[i] == ':')) { p = &(in[i + 1]); break; } } if (p == NULL) p = in; n = strlen(p); # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) /* strip off trailing .nlm if present. */ if ((n > 4) && (p[n - 4] == '.') && ((p[n - 3] == 'n') || (p[n - 3] == 'N')) && ((p[n - 2] == 'l') || (p[n - 2] == 'L')) && ((p[n - 1] == 'm') || (p[n - 1] == 'M'))) n -= 4; # else /* strip off trailing .exe if present. */ if ((n > 4) && (p[n - 4] == '.') && ((p[n - 3] == 'e') || (p[n - 3] == 'E')) && ((p[n - 2] == 'x') || (p[n - 2] == 'X')) && ((p[n - 1] == 'e') || (p[n - 1] == 'E'))) n -= 4; # endif if (n > size - 1) n = size - 1; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if ((p[i] >= 'A') && (p[i] <= 'Z')) out[i] = p[i] - 'A' + 'a'; else out[i] = p[i]; } out[n] = '\0'; } #else # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size) { char *p = in, *q; char *chars = ":]>"; while (*chars != '\0') { q = strrchr(p, *chars); if (q > p) p = q + 1; chars++; } q = strrchr(p, '.'); if (q == NULL) q = p + strlen(p); strncpy(out, p, size - 1); if (q - p >= size) { out[size - 1] = '\0'; } else { out[q - p] = '\0'; } } # else void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size) { char *p; p = strrchr(in, '/'); if (p != NULL) p++; else p = in; BUF_strlcpy(out, p, size); } # endif #endif int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf, int *argc, char **argv[]) { int num, i; char *p; *argc = 0; *argv = NULL; i = 0; if (arg->count == 0) { arg->count = 20; arg->data = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * arg->count); if (arg->data == NULL) return 0; } for (i = 0; i < arg->count; i++) arg->data[i] = NULL; num = 0; p = buf; for (;;) { /* first scan over white space */ if (!*p) break; while (*p && ((*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t') || (*p == '\n'))) p++; if (!*p) break; /* The start of something good :-) */ if (num >= arg->count) { char **tmp_p; int tlen = arg->count + 20; tmp_p = (char **)OPENSSL_realloc(arg->data, sizeof(char *) * tlen); if (tmp_p == NULL) return 0; arg->data = tmp_p; arg->count = tlen; /* initialize newly allocated data */ for (i = num; i < arg->count; i++) arg->data[i] = NULL; } arg->data[num++] = p; /* now look for the end of this */ if ((*p == '\'') || (*p == '\"')) { /* scan for closing quote */ i = *(p++); arg->data[num - 1]++; /* jump over quote */ while (*p && (*p != i)) p++; *p = '\0'; } else { while (*p && ((*p != ' ') && (*p != '\t') && (*p != '\n'))) p++; if (*p == '\0') p--; else *p = '\0'; } p++; } *argc = num; *argv = arg->data; return (1); } #ifndef APP_INIT int app_init(long mesgwin) { return (1); } #endif int dump_cert_text(BIO *out, X509 *x) { char *p; p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), NULL, 0); BIO_puts(out, "subject="); BIO_puts(out, p); OPENSSL_free(p); p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), NULL, 0); BIO_puts(out, "\nissuer="); BIO_puts(out, p); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); OPENSSL_free(p); return 0; } static int ui_open(UI *ui) { return UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL())(ui); } static int ui_read(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: { const char *password = ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password; if (password && password[0] != '\0') { UI_set_result(ui, uis, password); return 1; } } default: break; } } return UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis); } static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: { const char *password = ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password; if (password && password[0] != '\0') return 1; } default: break; } } return UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis); } static int ui_close(UI *ui) { return UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui); } int setup_ui_method(void) { ui_method = UI_create_method("OpenSSL application user interface"); UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open); UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ui_read); UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write); UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close); return 0; } void destroy_ui_method(void) { if (ui_method) { UI_destroy_method(ui_method); ui_method = NULL; } } int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp) { UI *ui = NULL; int res = 0; const char *prompt_info = NULL; const char *password = NULL; PW_CB_DATA *cb_data = (PW_CB_DATA *)cb_tmp; if (cb_data) { if (cb_data->password) password = cb_data->password; if (cb_data->prompt_info) prompt_info = cb_data->prompt_info; } if (password) { res = strlen(password); if (res > bufsiz) res = bufsiz; memcpy(buf, password, res); return res; } ui = UI_new_method(ui_method); if (ui) { int ok = 0; char *buff = NULL; int ui_flags = 0; char *prompt = NULL; prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info); if (!prompt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); UI_free(ui); return 0; } ui_flags |= UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD; UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0); if (ok >= 0) ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buf, PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1); if (ok >= 0 && verify) { buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz); if (!buff) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); UI_free(ui); OPENSSL_free(prompt); return 0; } ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buff, PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1, buf); } if (ok >= 0) do { ok = UI_process(ui); } while (ok < 0 && UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, 0, 0, 0)); if (buff) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, (unsigned int)bufsiz); OPENSSL_free(buff); } if (ok >= 0) res = strlen(buf); if (ok == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "User interface error\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz); res = 0; } if (ok == -2) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "aborted!\n"); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz); res = 0; } UI_free(ui); OPENSSL_free(prompt); } return res; } static char *app_get_pass(BIO *err, char *arg, int keepbio); int app_passwd(BIO *err, char *arg1, char *arg2, char **pass1, char **pass2) { int same; if (!arg2 || !arg1 || strcmp(arg1, arg2)) same = 0; else same = 1; if (arg1) { *pass1 = app_get_pass(err, arg1, same); if (!*pass1) return 0; } else if (pass1) *pass1 = NULL; if (arg2) { *pass2 = app_get_pass(err, arg2, same ? 2 : 0); if (!*pass2) return 0; } else if (pass2) *pass2 = NULL; return 1; } static char *app_get_pass(BIO *err, char *arg, int keepbio) { char *tmp, tpass[APP_PASS_LEN]; static BIO *pwdbio = NULL; int i; if (!strncmp(arg, "pass:", 5)) return BUF_strdup(arg + 5); if (!strncmp(arg, "env:", 4)) { tmp = getenv(arg + 4); if (!tmp) { BIO_printf(err, "Can't read environment variable %s\n", arg + 4); return NULL; } return BUF_strdup(tmp); } if (!keepbio || !pwdbio) { if (!strncmp(arg, "file:", 5)) { pwdbio = BIO_new_file(arg + 5, "r"); if (!pwdbio) { BIO_printf(err, "Can't open file %s\n", arg + 5); return NULL; } #if !defined(_WIN32) /* * Under _WIN32, which covers even Win64 and CE, file * descriptors referenced by BIO_s_fd are not inherited * by child process and therefore below is not an option. * It could have been an option if bss_fd.c was operating * on real Windows descriptors, such as those obtained * with CreateFile. */ } else if (!strncmp(arg, "fd:", 3)) { BIO *btmp; i = atoi(arg + 3); if (i >= 0) pwdbio = BIO_new_fd(i, BIO_NOCLOSE); if ((i < 0) || !pwdbio) { BIO_printf(err, "Can't access file descriptor %s\n", arg + 3); return NULL; } /* * Can't do BIO_gets on an fd BIO so add a buffering BIO */ btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); pwdbio = BIO_push(btmp, pwdbio); #endif } else if (!strcmp(arg, "stdin")) { pwdbio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (!pwdbio) { BIO_printf(err, "Can't open BIO for stdin\n"); return NULL; } } else { BIO_printf(err, "Invalid password argument \"%s\"\n", arg); return NULL; } } i = BIO_gets(pwdbio, tpass, APP_PASS_LEN); if (keepbio != 1) { BIO_free_all(pwdbio); pwdbio = NULL; } if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(err, "Error reading password from BIO\n"); return NULL; } tmp = strchr(tpass, '\n'); if (tmp) *tmp = 0; return BUF_strdup(tpass); } int add_oid_section(BIO *err, CONF *conf) { char *p; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp; CONF_VALUE *cnf; int i; if (!(p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_section"))) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } if (!(sktmp = NCONF_get_section(conf, p))) { BIO_printf(err, "problem loading oid section %s\n", p); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i); if (OBJ_create(cnf->value, cnf->name, cnf->name) == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(err, "problem creating object %s=%s\n", cnf->name, cnf->value); return 0; } } return 1; } static int load_pkcs12(BIO *err, BIO *in, const char *desc, pem_password_cb *pem_cb, void *cb_data, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca) { const char *pass; char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE]; int len, ret = 0; PKCS12 *p12; p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL); if (p12 == NULL) { BIO_printf(err, "Error loading PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc); goto die; } /* See if an empty password will do */ if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) || PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = ""; else { if (!pem_cb) pem_cb = (pem_password_cb *)password_callback; len = pem_cb(tpass, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, cb_data); if (len < 0) { BIO_printf(err, "Passpharse callback error for %s\n", desc); goto die; } if (len < PEM_BUFSIZE) tpass[len] = 0; if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, tpass, len)) { BIO_printf(err, "Mac verify error (wrong password?) in PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc); goto die; } pass = tpass; } ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, pkey, cert, ca); die: if (p12) PKCS12_free(p12); return ret; } int load_cert_crl_http(const char *url, BIO *err, X509 **pcert, X509_CRL **pcrl) { char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx = NULL; int use_ssl, rv = 0; if (!OCSP_parse_url(url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) goto err; if (use_ssl) { if (err) BIO_puts(err, "https not supported\n"); goto err; } bio = BIO_new_connect(host); if (!bio || !BIO_set_conn_port(bio, port)) goto err; rctx = OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(bio, 1024); if (!rctx) goto err; if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(rctx, "GET", path)) goto err; if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(rctx, "Host", host)) goto err; if (pcert) { do { rv = X509_http_nbio(rctx, pcert); } while (rv == -1); } else { do { rv = X509_CRL_http_nbio(rctx, pcrl); } while (rv == -1); } err: if (host) OPENSSL_free(host); if (path) OPENSSL_free(path); if (port) OPENSSL_free(port); if (bio) BIO_free_all(bio); if (rctx) OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx); if (rv != 1) { if (bio && err) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading %s from %s\n", pcert ? "certificate" : "CRL", url); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } return rv; } X509 *load_cert(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *cert_descrip) { X509 *x = NULL; BIO *cert; if (format == FORMAT_HTTP) { load_cert_crl_http(file, err, &x, NULL); return x; } if ((cert = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(err); goto end; } if (file == NULL) { #ifdef _IONBF # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0); # endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */ #endif BIO_set_fp(cert, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); } else { if (BIO_read_filename(cert, file) <= 0) { BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", cert_descrip, file); ERR_print_errors(err); goto end; } } if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) x = d2i_X509_bio(cert, NULL); else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE) { NETSCAPE_X509 *nx; nx = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_X509), cert, NULL); if (nx == NULL) goto end; if ((strncmp(NETSCAPE_CERT_HDR, (char *)nx->header->data, nx->header->length) != 0)) { NETSCAPE_X509_free(nx); BIO_printf(err, "Error reading header on certificate\n"); goto end; } x = nx->cert; nx->cert = NULL; NETSCAPE_X509_free(nx); } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, NULL); else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) { if (!load_pkcs12(err, cert, cert_descrip, NULL, NULL, NULL, &x, NULL)) goto end; } else { BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", cert_descrip); goto end; } end: if (x == NULL) { BIO_printf(err, "unable to load certificate\n"); ERR_print_errors(err); } if (cert != NULL) BIO_free(cert); return (x); } X509_CRL *load_crl(const char *infile, int format) { X509_CRL *x = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; if (format == FORMAT_HTTP) { load_cert_crl_http(infile, bio_err, NULL, &x); return x; } in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (infile == NULL) BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); else { if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) { perror(infile); goto end; } } if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) x = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL); else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for input crl\n"); goto end; } if (x == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } end: BIO_free(in); return (x); } EVP_PKEY *load_key(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip) { BIO *key = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; PW_CB_DATA cb_data; cb_data.password = pass; cb_data.prompt_info = file; if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) { BIO_printf(err, "no keyfile specified\n"); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) { if (!e) BIO_printf(err, "no engine specified\n"); else { if (ENGINE_init(e)) { pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data); ENGINE_finish(e); } if (!pkey) { BIO_printf(err, "cannot load %s from engine\n", key_descrip); ERR_print_errors(err); } } goto end; } #endif key = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (key == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(err); goto end; } if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) { #ifdef _IONBF # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0); # endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */ #endif BIO_set_fp(key, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); } else if (BIO_read_filename(key, file) <= 0) { BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", key_descrip, file); ERR_print_errors(err); goto end; } if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) { pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(key, NULL); } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) { pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(key, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE || format == FORMAT_IISSGC) pkey = load_netscape_key(err, key, file, key_descrip, format); #endif else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) { if (!load_pkcs12(err, key, key_descrip, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data, &pkey, NULL, NULL)) goto end; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined (OPENSSL_NO_RC4) else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB) pkey = b2i_PrivateKey_bio(key); else if (format == FORMAT_PVK) pkey = b2i_PVK_bio(key, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); #endif else { BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for key file\n"); goto end; } end: if (key != NULL) BIO_free(key); if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip); ERR_print_errors(err); } return (pkey); } EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip) { BIO *key = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; PW_CB_DATA cb_data; cb_data.password = pass; cb_data.prompt_info = file; if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) { BIO_printf(err, "no keyfile specified\n"); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) { if (!e) BIO_printf(bio_err, "no engine specified\n"); else pkey = ENGINE_load_public_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data); goto end; } #endif key = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (key == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(err); goto end; } if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) { #ifdef _IONBF # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0); # endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */ #endif BIO_set_fp(key, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); } else if (BIO_read_filename(key, file) <= 0) { BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", key_descrip, file); ERR_print_errors(err); goto end; } if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) { pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_bio(key, NULL); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (format == FORMAT_ASN1RSA) { RSA *rsa; rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(key, NULL); if (rsa) { pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkey) EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); } else pkey = NULL; } else if (format == FORMAT_PEMRSA) { RSA *rsa; rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(key, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); if (rsa) { pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkey) EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); } else pkey = NULL; } #endif else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) { pkey = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(key, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE || format == FORMAT_IISSGC) pkey = load_netscape_key(err, key, file, key_descrip, format); #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB) pkey = b2i_PublicKey_bio(key); #endif else { BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for key file\n"); goto end; } end: if (key != NULL) BIO_free(key); if (pkey == NULL) BIO_printf(err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip); return (pkey); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) static EVP_PKEY *load_netscape_key(BIO *err, BIO *key, const char *file, const char *key_descrip, int format) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; BUF_MEM *buf; RSA *rsa; const unsigned char *p; int size, i; buf = BUF_MEM_new(); pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); size = 0; if (buf == NULL || pkey == NULL) goto error; for (;;) { if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, size + 1024 * 10)) goto error; i = BIO_read(key, &(buf->data[size]), 1024 * 10); size += i; if (i == 0) break; if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(err, "Error reading %s %s", key_descrip, file); goto error; } } p = (unsigned char *)buf->data; rsa = d2i_RSA_NET(NULL, &p, (long)size, NULL, (format == FORMAT_IISSGC ? 1 : 0)); if (rsa == NULL) goto error; BUF_MEM_free(buf); EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); return pkey; error: BUF_MEM_free(buf); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return NULL; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 */ static int load_certs_crls(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc, STACK_OF(X509) **pcerts, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **pcrls) { int i; BIO *bio; STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *xis = NULL; X509_INFO *xi; PW_CB_DATA cb_data; int rv = 0; cb_data.password = pass; cb_data.prompt_info = file; if (format != FORMAT_PEM) { BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", desc); return 0; } if (file == NULL) bio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); else bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r"); if (bio == NULL) { BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", desc, file ? file : "stdin"); ERR_print_errors(err); return 0; } xis = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); BIO_free(bio); if (pcerts) { *pcerts = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!*pcerts) goto end; } if (pcrls) { *pcrls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (!*pcrls) goto end; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(xis); i++) { xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(xis, i); if (xi->x509 && pcerts) { if (!sk_X509_push(*pcerts, xi->x509)) goto end; xi->x509 = NULL; } if (xi->crl && pcrls) { if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*pcrls, xi->crl)) goto end; xi->crl = NULL; } } if (pcerts && sk_X509_num(*pcerts) > 0) rv = 1; if (pcrls && sk_X509_CRL_num(*pcrls) > 0) rv = 1; end: if (xis) sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(xis, X509_INFO_free); if (rv == 0) { if (pcerts) { sk_X509_pop_free(*pcerts, X509_free); *pcerts = NULL; } if (pcrls) { sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(*pcrls, X509_CRL_free); *pcrls = NULL; } BIO_printf(err, "unable to load %s\n", pcerts ? "certificates" : "CRLs"); ERR_print_errors(err); } return rv; } STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs; if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, &certs, NULL)) return NULL; return certs; } STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *load_crls(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc) { STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls; if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, NULL, &crls)) return NULL; return crls; } #define X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK (0xfL << 16) /* Return error for unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT 0 /* Print error for unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN (1L << 16) /* ASN1 parse unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN (2L << 16) /* BIO_dump unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN (3L << 16) #define X509_FLAG_CA (X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER | X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY | \ X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER | X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION) int set_cert_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg) { static const NAME_EX_TBL cert_tbl[] = { {"compatible", X509_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffl}, {"ca_default", X509_FLAG_CA, 0xffffffffl}, {"no_header", X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER, 0}, {"no_version", X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION, 0}, {"no_serial", X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL, 0}, {"no_signame", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME, 0}, {"no_validity", X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY, 0}, {"no_subject", X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT, 0}, {"no_issuer", X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER, 0}, {"no_pubkey", X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY, 0}, {"no_extensions", X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS, 0}, {"no_sigdump", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP, 0}, {"no_aux", X509_FLAG_NO_AUX, 0}, {"no_attributes", X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES, 0}, {"ext_default", X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {"ext_error", X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {"ext_parse", X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {"ext_dump", X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {NULL, 0, 0} }; return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, cert_tbl); } int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg) { static const NAME_EX_TBL ex_tbl[] = { {"esc_2253", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253, 0}, {"esc_ctrl", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL, 0}, {"esc_msb", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB, 0}, {"use_quote", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE, 0}, {"utf8", ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT, 0}, {"ignore_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE, 0}, {"show_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE, 0}, {"dump_all", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL, 0}, {"dump_nostr", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN, 0}, {"dump_der", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER, 0}, {"compat", XN_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffL}, {"sep_comma_plus", XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"sep_comma_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"sep_semi_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"sep_multiline", XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"dn_rev", XN_FLAG_DN_REV, 0}, {"nofname", XN_FLAG_FN_NONE, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"sname", XN_FLAG_FN_SN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"lname", XN_FLAG_FN_LN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"align", XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN, 0}, {"oid", XN_FLAG_FN_OID, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"space_eq", XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ, 0}, {"dump_unknown", XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, 0}, {"RFC2253", XN_FLAG_RFC2253, 0xffffffffL}, {"oneline", XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0xffffffffL}, {"multiline", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL}, {"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL}, {NULL, 0, 0} }; if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0) return 0; - if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0) + if (*flags != XN_FLAG_COMPAT + && (*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0) *flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC; return 1; } int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg) { if (!strcasecmp(arg, "none")) *copy_type = EXT_COPY_NONE; else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "copy")) *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ADD; else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "copyall")) *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ALL; else return 0; return 1; } int copy_extensions(X509 *x, X509_REQ *req, int copy_type) { STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = NULL; X509_EXTENSION *ext, *tmpext; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; int i, idx, ret = 0; if (!x || !req || (copy_type == EXT_COPY_NONE)) return 1; exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(req); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext); idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1); /* Does extension exist? */ if (idx != -1) { /* If normal copy don't override existing extension */ if (copy_type == EXT_COPY_ADD) continue; /* Delete all extensions of same type */ do { tmpext = X509_get_ext(x, idx); X509_delete_ext(x, idx); X509_EXTENSION_free(tmpext); idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1); } while (idx != -1); } if (!X509_add_ext(x, ext, -1)) goto end; } ret = 1; end: sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); return ret; } static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals; CONF_VALUE *val; int i, ret = 1; if (!arg) return 0; vals = X509V3_parse_list(arg); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i); if (!set_table_opts(flags, val->name, in_tbl)) ret = 0; } sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free); return ret; } static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl) { char c; const NAME_EX_TBL *ptbl; c = arg[0]; if (c == '-') { c = 0; arg++; } else if (c == '+') { c = 1; arg++; } else c = 1; for (ptbl = in_tbl; ptbl->name; ptbl++) { if (!strcasecmp(arg, ptbl->name)) { *flags &= ~ptbl->mask; if (c) *flags |= ptbl->flag; else *flags &= ~ptbl->flag; return 1; } } return 0; } void print_name(BIO *out, const char *title, X509_NAME *nm, unsigned long lflags) { char *buf; char mline = 0; int indent = 0; if (title) BIO_puts(out, title); if ((lflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) { mline = 1; indent = 4; } if (lflags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) { buf = X509_NAME_oneline(nm, 0, 0); BIO_puts(out, buf); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); OPENSSL_free(buf); } else { if (mline) BIO_puts(out, "\n"); X509_NAME_print_ex(out, nm, indent, lflags); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } } X509_STORE *setup_verify(BIO *bp, char *CAfile, char *CApath) { X509_STORE *store; X509_LOOKUP *lookup; if (!(store = X509_STORE_new())) goto end; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) goto end; if (CAfile) { if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, CAfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) { BIO_printf(bp, "Error loading file %s\n", CAfile); goto end; } } else X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) goto end; if (CApath) { if (!X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) { BIO_printf(bp, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath); goto end; } } else X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); ERR_clear_error(); return store; end: X509_STORE_free(store); return NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* Try to load an engine in a shareable library */ static ENGINE *try_load_engine(BIO *err, const char *engine, int debug) { ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic"); if (e) { if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", engine, 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) { ENGINE_free(e); e = NULL; } } return e; } #endif ENGINE *setup_engine(BIO *err, const char *engine, int debug) { ENGINE *e = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (engine) { if (strcmp(engine, "auto") == 0) { BIO_printf(err, "enabling auto ENGINE support\n"); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); return NULL; } if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(engine)) == NULL && (e = try_load_engine(err, engine, debug)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(err, "invalid engine \"%s\"\n", engine); ERR_print_errors(err); return NULL; } if (debug) { ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM, 0, err, 0); } ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "SET_USER_INTERFACE", 0, ui_method, 0, 1); if (!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL)) { BIO_printf(err, "can't use that engine\n"); ERR_print_errors(err); ENGINE_free(e); return NULL; } BIO_printf(err, "engine \"%s\" set.\n", ENGINE_get_id(e)); } #endif return e; } void release_engine(ENGINE *e) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (e != NULL) /* Free our "structural" reference. */ ENGINE_free(e); #endif } int load_config(BIO *err, CONF *cnf) { static int load_config_called = 0; if (load_config_called) return 1; load_config_called = 1; if (!cnf) cnf = config; if (!cnf) return 1; OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(); if (CONF_modules_load(cnf, NULL, 0) <= 0) { BIO_printf(err, "Error configuring OpenSSL\n"); ERR_print_errors(err); return 0; } return 1; } char *make_config_name() { const char *t = X509_get_default_cert_area(); size_t len; char *p; len = strlen(t) + strlen(OPENSSL_CONF) + 2; p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (p == NULL) return NULL; BUF_strlcpy(p, t, len); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS BUF_strlcat(p, "/", len); #endif BUF_strlcat(p, OPENSSL_CONF, len); return p; } static unsigned long index_serial_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a) { const char *n; n = a[DB_serial]; while (*n == '0') n++; return (lh_strhash(n)); } static int index_serial_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b) { const char *aa, *bb; for (aa = a[DB_serial]; *aa == '0'; aa++) ; for (bb = b[DB_serial]; *bb == '0'; bb++) ; return (strcmp(aa, bb)); } static int index_name_qual(char **a) { return (a[0][0] == 'V'); } static unsigned long index_name_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a) { return (lh_strhash(a[DB_name])); } int index_name_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b) { return (strcmp(a[DB_name], b[DB_name])); } static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING) #undef BSIZE #define BSIZE 256 BIGNUM *load_serial(char *serialfile, int create, ASN1_INTEGER **retai) { BIO *in = NULL; BIGNUM *ret = NULL; MS_STATIC char buf[1024]; ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL; ai = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (ai == NULL) goto err; if ((in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, serialfile) <= 0) { if (!create) { perror(serialfile); goto err; } else { ret = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL || !rand_serial(ret, ai)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); } } else { if (!a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(in, ai, buf, 1024)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load number from %s\n", serialfile); goto err; } ret = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ai, NULL); if (ret == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error converting number from bin to BIGNUM\n"); goto err; } } if (ret && retai) { *retai = ai; ai = NULL; } err: if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); if (ai != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai); return (ret); } int save_serial(char *serialfile, char *suffix, BIGNUM *serial, ASN1_INTEGER **retai) { char buf[1][BSIZE]; BIO *out = NULL; int ret = 0; ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL; int j; if (suffix == NULL) j = strlen(serialfile); else j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(suffix) + 1; if (j >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } if (suffix == NULL) BUF_strlcpy(buf[0], serialfile, BSIZE); else { #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", serialfile, suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", serialfile, suffix); #endif } #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[0]); #endif out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (out == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if (BIO_write_filename(out, buf[0]) <= 0) { perror(serialfile); goto err; } if ((ai = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error converting serial to ASN.1 format\n"); goto err; } i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, ai); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); ret = 1; if (retai) { *retai = ai; ai = NULL; } err: if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out); if (ai != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai); return (ret); } int rotate_serial(char *serialfile, char *new_suffix, char *old_suffix) { char buf[5][BSIZE]; int i, j; i = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(old_suffix); j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(new_suffix); if (i > j) j = i; if (j + 1 >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", serialfile, new_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", serialfile, new_suffix); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.%s", serialfile, old_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-%s", serialfile, old_suffix); #endif #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", serialfile, buf[1]); #endif if (rename(serialfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT #ifdef ENOTDIR && errno != ENOTDIR #endif ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", serialfile, buf[1]); perror("reason"); goto err; } #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[0], serialfile); #endif if (rename(buf[0], serialfile) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], serialfile); perror("reason"); rename(buf[1], serialfile); goto err; } return 1; err: return 0; } int rand_serial(BIGNUM *b, ASN1_INTEGER *ai) { BIGNUM *btmp; int ret = 0; if (b) btmp = b; else btmp = BN_new(); if (!btmp) return 0; if (!BN_pseudo_rand(btmp, SERIAL_RAND_BITS, 0, 0)) goto error; if (ai && !BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(btmp, ai)) goto error; ret = 1; error: if (!b) BN_free(btmp); return ret; } CA_DB *load_index(char *dbfile, DB_ATTR *db_attr) { CA_DB *retdb = NULL; TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL; BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); CONF *dbattr_conf = NULL; char buf[1][BSIZE]; long errorline = -1; if (in == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, dbfile) <= 0) { perror(dbfile); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", dbfile); goto err; } if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.attr", dbfile); #else BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-attr", dbfile); #endif dbattr_conf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (NCONF_load(dbattr_conf, buf[0], &errorline) <= 0) { if (errorline > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of db attribute file '%s'\n", errorline, buf[0]); goto err; } else { NCONF_free(dbattr_conf); dbattr_conf = NULL; } } if ((retdb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CA_DB))) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory\n"); goto err; } retdb->db = tmpdb; tmpdb = NULL; if (db_attr) retdb->attributes = *db_attr; else { retdb->attributes.unique_subject = 1; } if (dbattr_conf) { char *p = NCONF_get_string(dbattr_conf, NULL, "unique_subject"); if (p) { #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG[load_index]: unique_subject = \"%s\"\n", p); #endif retdb->attributes.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1); } } err: if (dbattr_conf) NCONF_free(dbattr_conf); if (tmpdb) TXT_DB_free(tmpdb); if (in) BIO_free_all(in); return retdb; } int index_index(CA_DB *db) { if (!TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_serial, NULL, LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial), LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error creating serial number index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n", db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2); return 0; } if (db->attributes.unique_subject && !TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_name, index_name_qual, LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name), LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error creating name index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n", db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2); return 0; } return 1; } int save_index(const char *dbfile, const char *suffix, CA_DB *db) { char buf[3][BSIZE]; BIO *out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); int j; if (out == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(suffix); if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s.attr", dbfile); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s-attr", dbfile); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, suffix); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", dbfile, suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", dbfile, suffix); #endif #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[0]); #endif if (BIO_write_filename(out, buf[0]) <= 0) { perror(dbfile); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", dbfile); goto err; } j = TXT_DB_write(out, db->db); if (j <= 0) goto err; BIO_free(out); out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[1]); #endif if (BIO_write_filename(out, buf[1]) <= 0) { perror(buf[2]); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", buf[2]); goto err; } BIO_printf(out, "unique_subject = %s\n", db->attributes.unique_subject ? "yes" : "no"); BIO_free(out); return 1; err: return 0; } int rotate_index(const char *dbfile, const char *new_suffix, const char *old_suffix) { char buf[5][BSIZE]; int i, j; i = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(old_suffix); j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(new_suffix); if (i > j) j = i; if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof(buf[4]), "%s.attr", dbfile); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof(buf[4]), "%s-attr", dbfile); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, new_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, new_suffix); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", dbfile, new_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", dbfile, new_suffix); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.%s", dbfile, old_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-%s", dbfile, old_suffix); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof(buf[3]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, old_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof(buf[3]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, old_suffix); #endif #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", dbfile, buf[1]); #endif if (rename(dbfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT #ifdef ENOTDIR && errno != ENOTDIR #endif ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", dbfile, buf[1]); perror("reason"); goto err; } #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[0], dbfile); #endif if (rename(buf[0], dbfile) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], dbfile); perror("reason"); rename(buf[1], dbfile); goto err; } #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[4], buf[3]); #endif if (rename(buf[4], buf[3]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT #ifdef ENOTDIR && errno != ENOTDIR #endif ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[4], buf[3]); perror("reason"); rename(dbfile, buf[0]); rename(buf[1], dbfile); goto err; } #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[2], buf[4]); #endif if (rename(buf[2], buf[4]) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[2], buf[4]); perror("reason"); rename(buf[3], buf[4]); rename(dbfile, buf[0]); rename(buf[1], dbfile); goto err; } return 1; err: return 0; } void free_index(CA_DB *db) { if (db) { if (db->db) TXT_DB_free(db->db); OPENSSL_free(db); } } int parse_yesno(const char *str, int def) { int ret = def; if (str) { switch (*str) { case 'f': /* false */ case 'F': /* FALSE */ case 'n': /* no */ case 'N': /* NO */ case '0': /* 0 */ ret = 0; break; case 't': /* true */ case 'T': /* TRUE */ case 'y': /* yes */ case 'Y': /* YES */ case '1': /* 1 */ ret = 1; break; default: ret = def; break; } } return ret; } /* * subject is expected to be in the format /type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=... * where characters may be escaped by \ */ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn) { size_t buflen = strlen(subject) + 1; /* to copy the types and values * into. due to escaping, the copy * can only become shorter */ char *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen); size_t max_ne = buflen / 2 + 1; /* maximum number of name elements */ char **ne_types = OPENSSL_malloc(max_ne * sizeof(char *)); char **ne_values = OPENSSL_malloc(max_ne * sizeof(char *)); int *mval = OPENSSL_malloc(max_ne * sizeof(int)); char *sp = subject, *bp = buf; int i, ne_num = 0; X509_NAME *n = NULL; int nid; if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n"); goto error; } if (*subject != '/') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject does not start with '/'.\n"); goto error; } sp++; /* skip leading / */ /* no multivalued RDN by default */ mval[ne_num] = 0; while (*sp) { /* collect type */ ne_types[ne_num] = bp; while (*sp) { if (*sp == '\\') { /* is there anything to escape in the * type...? */ if (*++sp) *bp++ = *sp++; else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "escape character at end of string\n"); goto error; } } else if (*sp == '=') { sp++; *bp++ = '\0'; break; } else *bp++ = *sp++; } if (!*sp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "end of string encountered while processing type of subject name element #%d\n", ne_num); goto error; } ne_values[ne_num] = bp; while (*sp) { if (*sp == '\\') { if (*++sp) *bp++ = *sp++; else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "escape character at end of string\n"); goto error; } } else if (*sp == '/') { sp++; /* no multivalued RDN by default */ mval[ne_num + 1] = 0; break; } else if (*sp == '+' && multirdn) { /* * a not escaped + signals a mutlivalued RDN */ sp++; mval[ne_num + 1] = -1; break; } else *bp++ = *sp++; } *bp++ = '\0'; ne_num++; } if (!(n = X509_NAME_new())) goto error; for (i = 0; i < ne_num; i++) { if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(ne_types[i])) == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject Attribute %s has no known NID, skipped\n", ne_types[i]); continue; } if (!*ne_values[i]) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No value provided for Subject Attribute %s, skipped\n", ne_types[i]); continue; } if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID (n, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)ne_values[i], -1, -1, mval[i])) goto error; } OPENSSL_free(ne_values); OPENSSL_free(ne_types); OPENSSL_free(buf); OPENSSL_free(mval); return n; error: X509_NAME_free(n); if (ne_values) OPENSSL_free(ne_values); if (ne_types) OPENSSL_free(ne_types); if (mval) OPENSSL_free(mval); if (buf) OPENSSL_free(buf); return NULL; } int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc, int *badarg, BIO *err, X509_VERIFY_PARAM **pm) { ASN1_OBJECT *otmp = NULL; unsigned long flags = 0; int i; int purpose = 0, depth = -1; char **oldargs = *pargs; char *arg = **pargs, *argn = (*pargs)[1]; time_t at_time = 0; char *hostname = NULL; char *email = NULL; char *ipasc = NULL; if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy")) { if (!argn) *badarg = 1; else { otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(argn, 0); if (!otmp) { BIO_printf(err, "Invalid Policy \"%s\"\n", argn); *badarg = 1; } } (*pargs)++; } else if (strcmp(arg, "-purpose") == 0) { X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; if (!argn) *badarg = 1; else { i = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(argn); if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(err, "unrecognized purpose\n"); *badarg = 1; } else { xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); purpose = X509_PURPOSE_get_id(xptmp); } } (*pargs)++; } else if (strcmp(arg, "-verify_depth") == 0) { if (!argn) *badarg = 1; else { depth = atoi(argn); if (depth < 0) { BIO_printf(err, "invalid depth\n"); *badarg = 1; } } (*pargs)++; } else if (strcmp(arg, "-attime") == 0) { if (!argn) *badarg = 1; else { long timestamp; /* * interpret the -attime argument as seconds since Epoch */ if (sscanf(argn, "%li", ×tamp) != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing timestamp %s\n", argn); *badarg = 1; } /* on some platforms time_t may be a float */ at_time = (time_t)timestamp; } (*pargs)++; } else if (strcmp(arg, "-verify_hostname") == 0) { if (!argn) *badarg = 1; hostname = argn; (*pargs)++; } else if (strcmp(arg, "-verify_email") == 0) { if (!argn) *badarg = 1; email = argn; (*pargs)++; } else if (strcmp(arg, "-verify_ip") == 0) { if (!argn) *badarg = 1; ipasc = argn; (*pargs)++; } else if (!strcmp(arg, "-ignore_critical")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-issuer_checks")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-crl_check")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-crl_check_all")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy_check")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-explicit_policy")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-inhibit_any")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-inhibit_map")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-x509_strict")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-extended_crl")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-use_deltas")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy_print")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-trusted_first")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-suiteB_128_only")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-suiteB_128")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-suiteB_192")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-partial_chain")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS; else if (!strcmp(arg, "-allow_proxy_certs")) flags |= X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS; else return 0; if (*badarg) { if (*pm) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(*pm); *pm = NULL; goto end; } if (!*pm && !(*pm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new())) { *badarg = 1; goto end; } if (otmp) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(*pm, otmp); if (flags) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(*pm, flags); if (purpose) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(*pm, purpose); if (depth >= 0) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(*pm, depth); if (at_time) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(*pm, at_time); if (hostname && !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(*pm, hostname, 0)) *badarg = 1; if (email && !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(*pm, email, 0)) *badarg = 1; if (ipasc && !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(*pm, ipasc)) *badarg = 1; end: (*pargs)++; if (pargc) *pargc -= *pargs - oldargs; return 1; } /* * Read whole contents of a BIO into an allocated memory buffer and return * it. */ int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in) { BIO *mem; int len, ret; unsigned char tbuf[1024]; mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (!mem) return -1; for (;;) { if ((maxlen != -1) && maxlen < 1024) len = maxlen; else len = 1024; len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, len); if (len < 0) { BIO_free(mem); return -1; } if (len == 0) break; if (BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len) { BIO_free(mem); return -1; } maxlen -= len; if (maxlen == 0) break; } ret = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **)out); BIO_set_flags(mem, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); BIO_free(mem); return ret; } int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value) { int rv; char *stmp, *vtmp = NULL; stmp = BUF_strdup(value); if (!stmp) return -1; vtmp = strchr(stmp, ':'); if (vtmp) { *vtmp = 0; vtmp++; } rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ctx, stmp, vtmp); OPENSSL_free(stmp); return rv; } static void nodes_print(BIO *out, const char *name, STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes) { X509_POLICY_NODE *node; int i; BIO_printf(out, "%s Policies:", name); if (nodes) { BIO_puts(out, "\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); X509_POLICY_NODE_print(out, node, 2); } } else BIO_puts(out, " \n"); } void policies_print(BIO *out, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; int explicit_policy; int free_out = 0; if (out == NULL) { out = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); free_out = 1; } tree = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(ctx); explicit_policy = X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(ctx); BIO_printf(out, "Require explicit Policy: %s\n", explicit_policy ? "True" : "False"); nodes_print(out, "Authority", X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(tree)); nodes_print(out, "User", X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree)); if (free_out) BIO_free(out); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK) static JPAKE_CTX *jpake_init(const char *us, const char *them, const char *secret) { BIGNUM *p = NULL; BIGNUM *g = NULL; BIGNUM *q = NULL; BIGNUM *bnsecret = BN_new(); JPAKE_CTX *ctx; /* Use a safe prime for p (that we found earlier) */ BN_hex2bn(&p, "F9E5B365665EA7A05A9C534502780FEE6F1AB5BD4F49947FD036DBD7E905269AF46EF28B0FC07487EE4F5D20FB3C0AF8E700F3A2FA3414970CBED44FEDFF80CE78D800F184BB82435D137AADA2C6C16523247930A63B85661D1FC817A51ACD96168E95898A1F83A79FFB529368AA7833ABD1B0C3AEDDB14D2E1A2F71D99F763F"); g = BN_new(); BN_set_word(g, 2); q = BN_new(); BN_rshift1(q, p); BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char *)secret, strlen(secret), bnsecret); ctx = JPAKE_CTX_new(us, them, p, g, q, bnsecret); BN_free(bnsecret); BN_free(q); BN_free(g); BN_free(p); return ctx; } static void jpake_send_part(BIO *conn, const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p) { BN_print(conn, p->gx); BIO_puts(conn, "\n"); BN_print(conn, p->zkpx.gr); BIO_puts(conn, "\n"); BN_print(conn, p->zkpx.b); BIO_puts(conn, "\n"); } static void jpake_send_step1(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx) { JPAKE_STEP1 s1; JPAKE_STEP1_init(&s1); JPAKE_STEP1_generate(&s1, ctx); jpake_send_part(bconn, &s1.p1); jpake_send_part(bconn, &s1.p2); (void)BIO_flush(bconn); JPAKE_STEP1_release(&s1); } static void jpake_send_step2(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx) { JPAKE_STEP2 s2; JPAKE_STEP2_init(&s2); JPAKE_STEP2_generate(&s2, ctx); jpake_send_part(bconn, &s2); (void)BIO_flush(bconn); JPAKE_STEP2_release(&s2); } static void jpake_send_step3a(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx) { JPAKE_STEP3A s3a; JPAKE_STEP3A_init(&s3a); JPAKE_STEP3A_generate(&s3a, ctx); BIO_write(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof(s3a.hhk)); (void)BIO_flush(bconn); JPAKE_STEP3A_release(&s3a); } static void jpake_send_step3b(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx) { JPAKE_STEP3B s3b; JPAKE_STEP3B_init(&s3b); JPAKE_STEP3B_generate(&s3b, ctx); BIO_write(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof(s3b.hk)); (void)BIO_flush(bconn); JPAKE_STEP3B_release(&s3b); } static void readbn(BIGNUM **bn, BIO *bconn) { char buf[10240]; int l; l = BIO_gets(bconn, buf, sizeof(buf)); assert(l > 0); assert(buf[l - 1] == '\n'); buf[l - 1] = '\0'; BN_hex2bn(bn, buf); } static void jpake_receive_part(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, BIO *bconn) { readbn(&p->gx, bconn); readbn(&p->zkpx.gr, bconn); readbn(&p->zkpx.b, bconn); } static void jpake_receive_step1(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn) { JPAKE_STEP1 s1; JPAKE_STEP1_init(&s1); jpake_receive_part(&s1.p1, bconn); jpake_receive_part(&s1.p2, bconn); if (!JPAKE_STEP1_process(ctx, &s1)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); exit(1); } JPAKE_STEP1_release(&s1); } static void jpake_receive_step2(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn) { JPAKE_STEP2 s2; JPAKE_STEP2_init(&s2); jpake_receive_part(&s2, bconn); if (!JPAKE_STEP2_process(ctx, &s2)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); exit(1); } JPAKE_STEP2_release(&s2); } static void jpake_receive_step3a(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn) { JPAKE_STEP3A s3a; int l; JPAKE_STEP3A_init(&s3a); l = BIO_read(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof(s3a.hhk)); assert(l == sizeof(s3a.hhk)); if (!JPAKE_STEP3A_process(ctx, &s3a)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); exit(1); } JPAKE_STEP3A_release(&s3a); } static void jpake_receive_step3b(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn) { JPAKE_STEP3B s3b; int l; JPAKE_STEP3B_init(&s3b); l = BIO_read(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof(s3b.hk)); assert(l == sizeof(s3b.hk)); if (!JPAKE_STEP3B_process(ctx, &s3b)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); exit(1); } JPAKE_STEP3B_release(&s3b); } void jpake_client_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret) { JPAKE_CTX *ctx; BIO *bconn; BIO_puts(out, "Authenticating with JPAKE\n"); ctx = jpake_init("client", "server", secret); bconn = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(bconn, conn); jpake_send_step1(bconn, ctx); jpake_receive_step1(ctx, bconn); jpake_send_step2(bconn, ctx); jpake_receive_step2(ctx, bconn); jpake_send_step3a(bconn, ctx); jpake_receive_step3b(ctx, bconn); BIO_puts(out, "JPAKE authentication succeeded, setting PSK\n"); if (psk_key) OPENSSL_free(psk_key); psk_key = BN_bn2hex(JPAKE_get_shared_key(ctx)); BIO_pop(bconn); BIO_free(bconn); JPAKE_CTX_free(ctx); } void jpake_server_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret) { JPAKE_CTX *ctx; BIO *bconn; BIO_puts(out, "Authenticating with JPAKE\n"); ctx = jpake_init("server", "client", secret); bconn = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(bconn, conn); jpake_receive_step1(ctx, bconn); jpake_send_step1(bconn, ctx); jpake_receive_step2(ctx, bconn); jpake_send_step2(bconn, ctx); jpake_receive_step3a(ctx, bconn); jpake_send_step3b(bconn, ctx); BIO_puts(out, "JPAKE authentication succeeded, setting PSK\n"); if (psk_key) OPENSSL_free(psk_key); psk_key = BN_bn2hex(JPAKE_get_shared_key(ctx)); BIO_pop(bconn); BIO_free(bconn); JPAKE_CTX_free(ctx); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /*- * next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised. * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success. * err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO. * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi" * * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure. */ unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in) { size_t len; unsigned char *out; size_t i, start = 0; len = strlen(in); if (len >= 65535) return NULL; out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1); if (!out) return NULL; for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) { if (i == len || in[i] == ',') { if (i - start > 255) { OPENSSL_free(out); return NULL; } out[start] = (unsigned char)(i - start); start = i + 1; } else out[i + 1] = in[i]; } *outlen = (unsigned char)(len + 1); return out; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x, const char *checkhost, const char *checkemail, const char *checkip) { if (x == NULL) return; if (checkhost) { BIO_printf(bio, "Hostname %s does%s match certificate\n", checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL) == 1 ? "" : " NOT"); } if (checkemail) { BIO_printf(bio, "Email %s does%s match certificate\n", checkemail, X509_check_email(x, checkemail, 0, 0) ? "" : " NOT"); } if (checkip) { BIO_printf(bio, "IP %s does%s match certificate\n", checkip, X509_check_ip_asc(x, checkip, 0) ? "" : " NOT"); } } /* Get first http URL from a DIST_POINT structure */ static const char *get_dp_url(DIST_POINT *dp) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens; GENERAL_NAME *gen; int i, gtype; ASN1_STRING *uri; if (!dp->distpoint || dp->distpoint->type != 0) return NULL; gens = dp->distpoint->name.fullname; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); uri = GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(gen, >ype); if (gtype == GEN_URI && ASN1_STRING_length(uri) > 6) { char *uptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(uri); if (!strncmp(uptr, "http://", 7)) return uptr; } } return NULL; } /* * Look through a CRLDP structure and attempt to find an http URL to * downloads a CRL from. */ static X509_CRL *load_crl_crldp(STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp) { int i; const char *urlptr = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp); i++) { DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, i); urlptr = get_dp_url(dp); if (urlptr) return load_crl(urlptr, FORMAT_HTTP); } return NULL; } /* * Example of downloading CRLs from CRLDP: not usable for real world as it * always downloads, doesn't support non-blocking I/O and doesn't cache * anything. */ static STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls_http_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; X509_CRL *crl; STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp; x = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp); sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free); if (!crl) return NULL; crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl); /* Try to download delta CRL */ crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_freshest_crl, NULL, NULL); crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp); sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free); if (crl) sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl); return crls; } void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st) { X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(st, crls_http_cb); } /* * Platform-specific sections */ #if defined(_WIN32) # ifdef fileno # undef fileno # define fileno(a) (int)_fileno(a) # endif # include # include static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to) { TCHAR *tfrom = NULL, *tto; DWORD err; int ret = 0; if (sizeof(TCHAR) == 1) { tfrom = (TCHAR *)from; tto = (TCHAR *)to; } else { /* UNICODE path */ size_t i, flen = strlen(from) + 1, tlen = strlen(to) + 1; tfrom = (TCHAR *)malloc(sizeof(TCHAR) * (flen + tlen)); if (tfrom == NULL) goto err; tto = tfrom + flen; # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, from, flen, (WCHAR *)tfrom, flen)) # endif for (i = 0; i < flen; i++) tfrom[i] = (TCHAR)from[i]; # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, to, tlen, (WCHAR *)tto, tlen)) # endif for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) tto[i] = (TCHAR)to[i]; } if (MoveFile(tfrom, tto)) goto ok; err = GetLastError(); if (err == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS || err == ERROR_FILE_EXISTS) { if (DeleteFile(tto) && MoveFile(tfrom, tto)) goto ok; err = GetLastError(); } if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || err == ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND) errno = ENOENT; else if (err == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) errno = EACCES; else errno = EINVAL; /* we could map more codes... */ err: ret = -1; ok: if (tfrom != NULL && tfrom != (TCHAR *)from) free(tfrom); return ret; } #endif /* app_tminterval section */ #if defined(_WIN32) double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { FILETIME now; double ret = 0; static ULARGE_INTEGER tmstart; static int warning = 1; # ifdef _WIN32_WINNT static HANDLE proc = NULL; if (proc == NULL) { if (check_winnt()) proc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, GetCurrentProcessId()); if (proc == NULL) proc = (HANDLE) - 1; } if (usertime && proc != (HANDLE) - 1) { FILETIME junk; GetProcessTimes(proc, &junk, &junk, &junk, &now); } else # endif { SYSTEMTIME systime; if (usertime && warning) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run " "this program on idle system.\n"); warning = 0; } GetSystemTime(&systime); SystemTimeToFileTime(&systime, &now); } if (stop == TM_START) { tmstart.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime; tmstart.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime; } else { ULARGE_INTEGER tmstop; tmstop.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime; tmstop.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime; ret = (__int64)(tmstop.QuadPart - tmstart.QuadPart) * 1e-7; } return (ret); } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; static clock_t tmstart; static int warning = 1; if (usertime && warning) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run " "this program on idle system.\n"); warning = 0; } if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = clock(); else ret = (clock() - tmstart) / (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC; return (ret); } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VXWORKS) # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; # ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME static struct timespec tmstart; struct timespec now; # else static unsigned long tmstart; unsigned long now; # endif static int warning = 1; if (usertime && warning) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run " "this program on idle system.\n"); warning = 0; } # ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now); if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_nsec * 1e-9) - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_nsec * 1e-9)); # else now = tickGet(); if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)sysClkRateGet(); # endif return (ret); } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VMS) # include # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { static clock_t tmstart; double ret = 0; clock_t now; # ifdef __TMS struct tms rus; now = times(&rus); if (usertime) now = rus.tms_utime; # else if (usertime) now = clock(); /* sum of user and kernel times */ else { struct timeval tv; gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); now = (clock_t)((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec * CLK_TCK + (unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec * (1000000 / CLK_TCK) ); } # endif if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)(CLK_TCK); return (ret); } #elif defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) /* by means of unistd.h */ # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; struct tms rus; clock_t now = times(&rus); static clock_t tmstart; if (usertime) now = rus.tms_utime; if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else { long int tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK); ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)tck; } return (ret); } #else # include # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; struct rusage rus; struct timeval now; static struct timeval tmstart; if (usertime) getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rus), now = rus.ru_utime; else gettimeofday(&now, NULL); if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_usec * 1e-6) - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_usec * 1e-6)); return ret; } #endif /* app_isdir section */ #ifdef _WIN32 int app_isdir(const char *name) { HANDLE hList; WIN32_FIND_DATA FileData; # if defined(UNICODE) || defined(_UNICODE) size_t i, len_0 = strlen(name) + 1; if (len_0 > sizeof(FileData.cFileName) / sizeof(FileData.cFileName[0])) return -1; # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar (CP_ACP, 0, name, len_0, FileData.cFileName, len_0)) # endif for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++) FileData.cFileName[i] = (WCHAR)name[i]; hList = FindFirstFile(FileData.cFileName, &FileData); # else hList = FindFirstFile(name, &FileData); # endif if (hList == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return -1; FindClose(hList); return ((FileData.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0); } #else # include # ifndef S_ISDIR # if defined(_S_IFMT) && defined(_S_IFDIR) # define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & _S_IFMT) == _S_IFDIR) # else # define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) # endif # endif int app_isdir(const char *name) { # if defined(S_ISDIR) struct stat st; if (stat(name, &st) == 0) return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); else return -1; # else return -1; # endif } #endif /* raw_read|write section */ #if defined(__VMS) # include "vms_term_sock.h" static int stdin_sock = -1; static void close_stdin_sock(void) { TerminalSocket (TERM_SOCK_DELETE, &stdin_sock); } int fileno_stdin(void) { if (stdin_sock == -1) { TerminalSocket(TERM_SOCK_CREATE, &stdin_sock); atexit(close_stdin_sock); } return stdin_sock; } #else int fileno_stdin(void) { return fileno(stdin); } #endif int fileno_stdout(void) { return fileno(stdout); } #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_INPUT_HANDLE) int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz) { DWORD n; if (ReadFile(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL)) return (n); else return (-1); } #elif defined(__VMS) #include int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz) { return recv(fileno_stdin(), buf, siz, 0); } #else int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz) { return read(fileno_stdin(), buf, siz); } #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE) int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz) { DWORD n; if (WriteFile(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL)) return (n); else return (-1); } #else int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz) { return write(fileno_stdout(), buf, siz); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/asn1pars.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/asn1pars.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/asn1pars.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,430 +1,430 @@ /* apps/asn1pars.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* * A nice addition from Dr Stephen Henson to add the * -strparse option which parses nested binary structures */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include /*- * -inform arg - input format - default PEM (DER or PEM) * -in arg - input file - default stdin * -i - indent the details by depth * -offset - where in the file to start * -length - how many bytes to use * -oid file - extra oid description file */ #undef PROG #define PROG asn1parse_main int MAIN(int, char **); static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf); int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { int i, badops = 0, offset = 0, ret = 1, j; unsigned int length = 0; long num, tmplen; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *b64 = NULL, *derout = NULL; int informat, indent = 0, noout = 0, dump = 0; char *infile = NULL, *str = NULL, *prog, *oidfile = NULL, *derfile = NULL; char *genstr = NULL, *genconf = NULL; unsigned char *tmpbuf; const unsigned char *ctmpbuf; BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *osk = NULL; ASN1_TYPE *at = NULL; informat = FORMAT_PEM; apps_startup(); if (bio_err == NULL) if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL) BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL)) goto end; prog = argv[0]; argc--; argv++; if ((osk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } while (argc >= 1) { if (strcmp(*argv, "-inform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; informat = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-in") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; infile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; derfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-i") == 0) { indent = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noout") == 0) noout = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-oid") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; oidfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-offset") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; offset = atoi(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-length") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; length = atoi(*(++argv)); if (length == 0) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dump") == 0) { dump = -1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dlimit") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; dump = atoi(*(++argv)); if (dump <= 0) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-strparse") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(osk, *(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-genstr") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; genstr = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-genconf") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; genconf = *(++argv); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv); badops = 1; break; } argc--; argv++; } if (badops) { bad: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [options] data[num]), BUFSIZ); if (i <= 0) break; num += i; } } str = buf->data; /* If any structs to parse go through in sequence */ if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk)) { tmpbuf = (unsigned char *)str; tmplen = num; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk); i++) { ASN1_TYPE *atmp; int typ; j = atoi(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i)); - if (j == 0) { + if (j <= 0 || j >= tmplen) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "'%s' is an invalid number\n", sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i)); continue; } tmpbuf += j; tmplen -= j; atmp = at; ctmpbuf = tmpbuf; at = d2i_ASN1_TYPE(NULL, &ctmpbuf, tmplen); ASN1_TYPE_free(atmp); if (!at) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing structure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at); if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT) || (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) || (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ)); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } /* hmm... this is a little evil but it works */ tmpbuf = at->value.asn1_string->data; tmplen = at->value.asn1_string->length; } str = (char *)tmpbuf; num = tmplen; } - if (offset >= num) { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: offset too large\n"); + if (offset < 0 || offset >= num) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: offset out of range\n"); goto end; } num -= offset; - if ((length == 0) || ((long)length > num)) + if (length == 0 || length > (unsigned int)num) length = (unsigned int)num; if (derout) { if (BIO_write(derout, str + offset, length) != (int)length) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing output\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (!noout && !ASN1_parse_dump(out, (unsigned char *)&(str[offset]), length, indent, dump)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ret = 0; end: BIO_free(derout); if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out); if (b64 != NULL) BIO_free(b64); if (ret != 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(buf); if (at != NULL) ASN1_TYPE_free(at); if (osk != NULL) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(osk); OBJ_cleanup(); apps_shutdown(); OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); } static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf) { CONF *cnf = NULL; int len; long errline = 0; unsigned char *p; ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL; if (genconf) { cnf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (!NCONF_load(cnf, genconf, &errline)) goto conferr; if (!genstr) genstr = NCONF_get_string(cnf, "default", "asn1"); if (!genstr) { BIO_printf(bio, "Can't find 'asn1' in '%s'\n", genconf); goto err; } } atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf); NCONF_free(cnf); cnf = NULL; if (!atyp) return -1; len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, NULL); if (len <= 0) goto err; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, len)) goto err; p = (unsigned char *)buf->data; i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, &p); ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp); return len; conferr: if (errline > 0) BIO_printf(bio, "Error on line %ld of config file '%s'\n", errline, genconf); else BIO_printf(bio, "Error loading config file '%s'\n", genconf); err: NCONF_free(cnf); ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp); return -1; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/ca.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/ca.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/ca.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,2938 +1,2941 @@ /* apps/ca.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* The PPKI stuff has been donated by Jeff Barber */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef W_OK # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # if defined(__DECC) # include # else # include # endif # elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # include # endif #endif #include "apps.h" #ifndef W_OK # define F_OK 0 # define X_OK 1 # define W_OK 2 # define R_OK 4 #endif #undef PROG #define PROG ca_main #define BASE_SECTION "ca" #define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf" #define ENV_DEFAULT_CA "default_ca" #define STRING_MASK "string_mask" #define UTF8_IN "utf8" #define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR "new_certs_dir" #define ENV_CERTIFICATE "certificate" #define ENV_SERIAL "serial" #define ENV_CRLNUMBER "crlnumber" #define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY "private_key" #define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS "default_days" #define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE "default_startdate" #define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE "default_enddate" #define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS "default_crl_days" #define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS "default_crl_hours" #define ENV_DEFAULT_MD "default_md" #define ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN "email_in_dn" #define ENV_PRESERVE "preserve" #define ENV_POLICY "policy" #define ENV_EXTENSIONS "x509_extensions" #define ENV_CRLEXT "crl_extensions" #define ENV_MSIE_HACK "msie_hack" #define ENV_NAMEOPT "name_opt" #define ENV_CERTOPT "cert_opt" #define ENV_EXTCOPY "copy_extensions" #define ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT "unique_subject" #define ENV_DATABASE "database" /* Additional revocation information types */ #define REV_NONE 0 /* No addditional information */ #define REV_CRL_REASON 1 /* Value is CRL reason code */ #define REV_HOLD 2 /* Value is hold instruction */ #define REV_KEY_COMPROMISE 3 /* Value is cert key compromise time */ #define REV_CA_COMPROMISE 4 /* Value is CA key compromise time */ static const char *ca_usage[] = { "usage: ca args\n", "\n", " -verbose - Talk alot while doing things\n", " -config file - A config file\n", " -name arg - The particular CA definition to use\n", " -gencrl - Generate a new CRL\n", " -crldays days - Days is when the next CRL is due\n", " -crlhours hours - Hours is when the next CRL is due\n", " -startdate YYMMDDHHMMSSZ - certificate validity notBefore\n", " -enddate YYMMDDHHMMSSZ - certificate validity notAfter (overrides -days)\n", " -days arg - number of days to certify the certificate for\n", " -md arg - md to use, one of md2, md5, sha or sha1\n", " -policy arg - The CA 'policy' to support\n", " -keyfile arg - private key file\n", " -keyform arg - private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)\n", " -key arg - key to decode the private key if it is encrypted\n", " -cert file - The CA certificate\n", " -selfsign - sign a certificate with the key associated with it\n", " -in file - The input PEM encoded certificate request(s)\n", " -out file - Where to put the output file(s)\n", " -outdir dir - Where to put output certificates\n", " -infiles .... - The last argument, requests to process\n", " -spkac file - File contains DN and signed public key and challenge\n", " -ss_cert file - File contains a self signed cert to sign\n", " -preserveDN - Don't re-order the DN\n", " -noemailDN - Don't add the EMAIL field into certificate' subject\n", " -batch - Don't ask questions\n", " -msie_hack - msie modifications to handle all those universal strings\n", " -revoke file - Revoke a certificate (given in file)\n", " -subj arg - Use arg instead of request's subject\n", " -utf8 - input characters are UTF8 (default ASCII)\n", " -multivalue-rdn - enable support for multivalued RDNs\n", " -extensions .. - Extension section (override value in config file)\n", " -extfile file - Configuration file with X509v3 extentions to add\n", " -crlexts .. - CRL extension section (override value in config file)\n", #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE " -engine e - use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n", #endif " -status serial - Shows certificate status given the serial number\n", " -updatedb - Updates db for expired certificates\n", NULL }; #ifdef EFENCE extern int EF_PROTECT_FREE; extern int EF_PROTECT_BELOW; extern int EF_ALIGNMENT; #endif static void lookup_fail(const char *name, const char *tag); static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days, int batch, char *ext_sect, CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign); static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days, int batch, char *ext_sect, CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, ENGINE *e); static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days, char *ext_sect, CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy); static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der, int notext); static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days, int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, char *ext_sect, CONF *conf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign); static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int ext, char *extval); static int get_certificate_status(const char *ser_status, CA_DB *db); static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db); static int check_time_format(const char *str); char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg); int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str); int old_entry_print(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, ASN1_STRING *str); static CONF *conf = NULL; static CONF *extconf = NULL; static char *section = NULL; static int preserve = 0; static int msie_hack = 0; int MAIN(int, char **); int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; char *key = NULL, *passargin = NULL; int create_ser = 0; int free_key = 0; int total = 0; int total_done = 0; int badops = 0; int ret = 1; int email_dn = 1; int req = 0; int verbose = 0; int gencrl = 0; int dorevoke = 0; int doupdatedb = 0; long crldays = 0; long crlhours = 0; long crlsec = 0; long errorline = -1; char *configfile = NULL; char *md = NULL; char *policy = NULL; char *keyfile = NULL; char *certfile = NULL; int keyform = FORMAT_PEM; char *infile = NULL; char *spkac_file = NULL; char *ss_cert_file = NULL; char *ser_status = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int output_der = 0; char *outfile = NULL; char *outdir = NULL; char *serialfile = NULL; char *crlnumberfile = NULL; char *extensions = NULL; char *extfile = NULL; char *subj = NULL; unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC; int multirdn = 0; char *tmp_email_dn = NULL; char *crl_ext = NULL; int rev_type = REV_NONE; char *rev_arg = NULL; BIGNUM *serial = NULL; BIGNUM *crlnumber = NULL; char *startdate = NULL; char *enddate = NULL; long days = 0; int batch = 0; int notext = 0; unsigned long nameopt = 0, certopt = 0; int default_op = 1; int ext_copy = EXT_COPY_NONE; int selfsign = 0; X509 *x509 = NULL, *x509p = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *Sout = NULL, *Cout = NULL; char *dbfile = NULL; CA_DB *db = NULL; X509_CRL *crl = NULL; X509_REVOKED *r = NULL; ASN1_TIME *tmptm; ASN1_INTEGER *tmpser; char *f; const char *p; char *const *pp; int i, j; const EVP_MD *dgst = NULL; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attribs = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *cert_sk = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL; #undef BSIZE #define BSIZE 256 MS_STATIC char buf[3][BSIZE]; char *randfile = NULL; char *engine = NULL; char *tofree = NULL; DB_ATTR db_attr; #ifdef EFENCE EF_PROTECT_FREE = 1; EF_PROTECT_BELOW = 1; EF_ALIGNMENT = 0; #endif apps_startup(); conf = NULL; key = NULL; section = NULL; preserve = 0; msie_hack = 0; if (bio_err == NULL) if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL) BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); argc--; argv++; while (argc >= 1) { if (strcmp(*argv, "-verbose") == 0) verbose = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-config") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; configfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-name") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; section = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-subj") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; subj = *(++argv); /* preserve=1; */ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-utf8") == 0) chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-create_serial") == 0) create_ser = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-multivalue-rdn") == 0) multirdn = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-startdate") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; startdate = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-enddate") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; enddate = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-days") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; days = atoi(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-md") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; md = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-policy") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; policy = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keyfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keyform = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-passin") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; passargin = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; key = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; certfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-selfsign") == 0) selfsign = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-in") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; infile = *(++argv); req = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; outfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-outdir") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; outdir = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sigopt") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; if (!sigopts) sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, *(++argv))) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-notext") == 0) notext = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-batch") == 0) batch = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-preserveDN") == 0) preserve = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noemailDN") == 0) email_dn = 0; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-gencrl") == 0) gencrl = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msie_hack") == 0) msie_hack = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crldays") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; crldays = atol(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlhours") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; crlhours = atol(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlsec") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; crlsec = atol(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-infiles") == 0) { argc--; argv++; req = 1; break; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ss_cert") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; ss_cert_file = *(++argv); req = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-spkac") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; spkac_file = *(++argv); req = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-revoke") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; infile = *(++argv); dorevoke = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-valid") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; infile = *(++argv); dorevoke = 2; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-extensions") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; extensions = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-extfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; extfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; ser_status = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-updatedb") == 0) { doupdatedb = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlexts") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; crl_ext = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_reason") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; rev_arg = *(++argv); rev_type = REV_CRL_REASON; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_hold") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; rev_arg = *(++argv); rev_type = REV_HOLD; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_compromise") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; rev_arg = *(++argv); rev_type = REV_KEY_COMPROMISE; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_CA_compromise") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; rev_arg = *(++argv); rev_type = REV_CA_COMPROMISE; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; engine = *(++argv); } #endif else { bad: BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv); badops = 1; break; } argc--; argv++; } if (badops) { const char **pp2; for (pp2 = ca_usage; (*pp2 != NULL); pp2++) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", *pp2); goto err; } ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /*****************************************************************/ tofree = NULL; if (configfile == NULL) configfile = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF"); if (configfile == NULL) configfile = getenv("SSLEAY_CONF"); if (configfile == NULL) { const char *s = X509_get_default_cert_area(); size_t len; #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE); tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (!tofree) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); goto err; } strcpy(tofree, s); #else len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1; tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (!tofree) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); goto err; } BUF_strlcpy(tofree, s, len); BUF_strlcat(tofree, "/", len); #endif BUF_strlcat(tofree, CONFIG_FILE, len); configfile = tofree; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", configfile); conf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (NCONF_load(conf, configfile, &errorline) <= 0) { if (errorline <= 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "error loading the config file '%s'\n", configfile); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of config file '%s'\n", errorline, configfile); goto err; } if (tofree) { OPENSSL_free(tofree); tofree = NULL; } if (!load_config(bio_err, conf)) goto err; e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0); /* Lets get the config section we are using */ if (section == NULL) { section = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_CA); if (section == NULL) { lookup_fail(BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_CA); goto err; } } if (conf != NULL) { p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_file"); if (p == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if (p != NULL) { BIO *oid_bio; oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r"); if (oid_bio == NULL) { /*- BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); */ ERR_clear_error(); } else { OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio); BIO_free(oid_bio); } } if (!add_oid_section(bio_err, conf)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } } randfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, "RANDFILE"); if (randfile == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); app_RAND_load_file(randfile, bio_err, 0); f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, STRING_MASK); if (!f) ERR_clear_error(); if (f && !ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(f)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid global string mask setting %s\n", f); goto err; } if (chtype != MBSTRING_UTF8) { f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, UTF8_IN); if (!f) ERR_clear_error(); else if (!strcmp(f, "yes")) chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8; } db_attr.unique_subject = 1; p = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT); if (p) { #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: unique_subject = \"%s\"\n", p); #endif db_attr.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1); } else ERR_clear_error(); #ifdef RL_DEBUG if (!p) BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: unique_subject undefined\n"); #endif #ifdef RL_DEBUG BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: configured unique_subject is %d\n", db_attr.unique_subject); #endif in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); Sout = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); Cout = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if ((in == NULL) || (out == NULL) || (Sout == NULL) || (Cout == NULL)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } /*****************************************************************/ /* report status of cert with serial number given on command line */ if (ser_status) { if ((dbfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE)) == NULL) { lookup_fail(section, ENV_DATABASE); goto err; } db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr); if (db == NULL) goto err; if (!index_index(db)) goto err; if (get_certificate_status(ser_status, db) != 1) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error verifying serial %s!\n", ser_status); goto err; } /*****************************************************************/ /* we definitely need a private key, so let's get it */ if ((keyfile == NULL) && ((keyfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_PRIVATE_KEY)) == NULL)) { lookup_fail(section, ENV_PRIVATE_KEY); goto err; } if (!key) { free_key = 1; if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passargin, NULL, &key, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto err; } } pkey = load_key(bio_err, keyfile, keyform, 0, key, e, "CA private key"); if (key) OPENSSL_cleanse(key, strlen(key)); if (pkey == NULL) { /* load_key() has already printed an appropriate message */ goto err; } /*****************************************************************/ /* we need a certificate */ if (!selfsign || spkac_file || ss_cert_file || gencrl) { if ((certfile == NULL) && ((certfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CERTIFICATE)) == NULL)) { lookup_fail(section, ENV_CERTIFICATE); goto err; } x509 = load_cert(bio_err, certfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "CA certificate"); if (x509 == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_check_private_key(x509, pkey)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CA certificate and CA private key do not match\n"); goto err; } } if (!selfsign) x509p = x509; f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_PRESERVE); if (f == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y'))) preserve = 1; f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_MSIE_HACK); if (f == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y'))) msie_hack = 1; f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NAMEOPT); if (f) { if (!set_name_ex(&nameopt, f)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid name options: \"%s\"\n", f); goto err; } default_op = 0; } else ERR_clear_error(); f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CERTOPT); if (f) { if (!set_cert_ex(&certopt, f)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid certificate options: \"%s\"\n", f); goto err; } default_op = 0; } else ERR_clear_error(); f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTCOPY); if (f) { if (!set_ext_copy(&ext_copy, f)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid extension copy option: \"%s\"\n", f); goto err; } } else ERR_clear_error(); /*****************************************************************/ /* lookup where to write new certificates */ if ((outdir == NULL) && (req)) { if ((outdir = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "there needs to be defined a directory for new certificate to be placed in\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* * outdir is a directory spec, but access() for VMS demands a * filename. In any case, stat(), below, will catch the problem if * outdir is not a directory spec, and the fopen() or open() will * catch an error if there is no write access. * * Presumably, this problem could also be solved by using the DEC C * routines to convert the directory syntax to Unixly, and give that * to access(). However, time's too short to do that just now. */ # ifndef _WIN32 if (access(outdir, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) != 0) # else if (_access(outdir, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) != 0) # endif { BIO_printf(bio_err, "I am unable to access the %s directory\n", outdir); perror(outdir); goto err; } if (app_isdir(outdir) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s need to be a directory\n", outdir); perror(outdir); goto err; } #endif } /*****************************************************************/ /* we need to load the database file */ if ((dbfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE)) == NULL) { lookup_fail(section, ENV_DATABASE); goto err; } db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr); if (db == NULL) goto err; /* Lets check some fields */ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if ((pp[DB_type][0] != DB_TYPE_REV) && (pp[DB_rev_date][0] != '\0')) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: not revoked yet, but has a revocation date\n", i + 1); goto err; } if ((pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) && !make_revoked(NULL, pp[DB_rev_date])) { BIO_printf(bio_err, " in entry %d\n", i + 1); goto err; } if (!check_time_format((char *)pp[DB_exp_date])) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: invalid expiry date\n", i + 1); goto err; } p = pp[DB_serial]; j = strlen(p); if (*p == '-') { p++; j--; } if ((j & 1) || (j < 2)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: bad serial number length (%d)\n", i + 1, j); goto err; } while (*p) { if (!(((*p >= '0') && (*p <= '9')) || ((*p >= 'A') && (*p <= 'F')) || ((*p >= 'a') && (*p <= 'f')))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: bad serial number characters, char pos %ld, char is '%c'\n", i + 1, (long)(p - pp[DB_serial]), *p); goto err; } p++; } } if (verbose) { BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); /* cannot fail */ #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS { BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()); out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out); } #endif TXT_DB_write(out, db->db); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%d entries loaded from the database\n", sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "generating index\n"); } if (!index_index(db)) goto err; /*****************************************************************/ /* Update the db file for expired certificates */ if (doupdatedb) { if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Updating %s ...\n", dbfile); i = do_updatedb(db); if (i == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n"); goto err; } else if (i == 0) { if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "No entries found to mark expired\n"); } else { if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db)) goto err; if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old")) goto err; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Done. %d entries marked as expired\n", i); } } /*****************************************************************/ /* Read extentions config file */ if (extfile) { extconf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (NCONF_load(extconf, extfile, &errorline) <= 0) { if (errorline <= 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: loading the config file '%s'\n", extfile); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: on line %ld of config file '%s'\n", errorline, extfile); ret = 1; goto err; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Successfully loaded extensions file %s\n", extfile); /* We can have sections in the ext file */ if (!extensions && !(extensions = NCONF_get_string(extconf, "default", "extensions"))) extensions = "default"; } /*****************************************************************/ if (req || gencrl) { if (outfile != NULL) { if (BIO_write_filename(Sout, outfile) <= 0) { perror(outfile); goto err; } } else { BIO_set_fp(Sout, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS { BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()); Sout = BIO_push(tmpbio, Sout); } #endif } } if ((md == NULL) && ((md = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_MD)) == NULL)) { lookup_fail(section, ENV_DEFAULT_MD); goto err; } if (!strcmp(md, "default")) { int def_nid; if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "no default digest\n"); goto err; } md = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(def_nid); } if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyname(md)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is an unsupported message digest type\n", md); goto err; } if (req) { if ((email_dn == 1) && ((tmp_email_dn = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN)) != NULL)) { if (strcmp(tmp_email_dn, "no") == 0) email_dn = 0; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "message digest is %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(dgst->type)); if ((policy == NULL) && ((policy = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_POLICY)) == NULL)) { lookup_fail(section, ENV_POLICY); goto err; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "policy is %s\n", policy); if ((serialfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SERIAL)) == NULL) { lookup_fail(section, ENV_SERIAL); goto err; } if (!extconf) { /* * no '-extfile' option, so we look for extensions in the main * configuration file */ if (!extensions) { extensions = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTENSIONS); if (!extensions) ERR_clear_error(); } if (extensions) { /* Check syntax of file */ X509V3_CTX ctx; X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, extensions, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n", extensions); ret = 1; goto err; } } } if (startdate == NULL) { startdate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE); if (startdate == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } if (startdate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, startdate)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "start date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n"); goto err; } if (startdate == NULL) startdate = "today"; if (enddate == NULL) { enddate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE); if (enddate == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } if (enddate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, enddate)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "end date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n"); goto err; } if (days == 0) { if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS, &days)) days = 0; } if (!enddate && (days == 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot lookup how many days to certify for\n"); goto err; } if ((serial = load_serial(serialfile, create_ser, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading serial number\n"); goto err; } if (verbose) { if (BN_is_zero(serial)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is 00\n"); else { if ((f = BN_bn2hex(serial)) == NULL) goto err; BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is %s\n", f); OPENSSL_free(f); } } if ((attribs = NCONF_get_section(conf, policy)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to find 'section' for %s\n", policy); goto err; } if ((cert_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } if (spkac_file != NULL) { total++; j = certify_spkac(&x, spkac_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, extensions, conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy); if (j < 0) goto err; if (j > 0) { total_done++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) goto err; if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } if (outfile) { output_der = 1; batch = 1; } } } if (ss_cert_file != NULL) { total++; j = certify_cert(&x, ss_cert_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, e); if (j < 0) goto err; if (j > 0) { total_done++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) goto err; if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } } } if (infile != NULL) { total++; j = certify(&x, infile, pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign); if (j < 0) goto err; if (j > 0) { total_done++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) goto err; if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } } } for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { total++; j = certify(&x, argv[i], pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign); if (j < 0) goto err; if (j > 0) { total_done++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); - if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) + if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) { + X509_free(x); goto err; + } if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); + X509_free(x); goto err; } } } /* * we have a stack of newly certified certificates and a data base * and serial number that need updating */ if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk) > 0) { if (!batch) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n%d out of %d certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]", total_done, total); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); buf[0][0] = '\0'; if (!fgets(buf[0], 10, stdin)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATION CANCELED: I/O error\n"); ret = 0; goto err; } if ((buf[0][0] != 'y') && (buf[0][0] != 'Y')) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATION CANCELED\n"); ret = 0; goto err; } } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Write out database with %d new entries\n", sk_X509_num(cert_sk)); if (!save_serial(serialfile, "new", serial, NULL)) goto err; if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db)) goto err; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new certificates\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cert_sk); i++) { int k; char *n; x = sk_X509_value(cert_sk, i); j = x->cert_info->serialNumber->length; p = (const char *)x->cert_info->serialNumber->data; if (strlen(outdir) >= (size_t)(j ? BSIZE - j * 2 - 6 : BSIZE - 8)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "certificate file name too long\n"); goto err; } strcpy(buf[2], outdir); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS BUF_strlcat(buf[2], "/", sizeof(buf[2])); #endif n = (char *)&(buf[2][strlen(buf[2])]); if (j > 0) { for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { if (n >= &(buf[2][sizeof(buf[2])])) break; BIO_snprintf(n, &buf[2][0] + sizeof(buf[2]) - n, "%02X", (unsigned char)*(p++)); n += 2; } } else { *(n++) = '0'; *(n++) = '0'; } *(n++) = '.'; *(n++) = 'p'; *(n++) = 'e'; *(n++) = 'm'; *n = '\0'; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing %s\n", buf[2]); if (BIO_write_filename(Cout, buf[2]) <= 0) { perror(buf[2]); goto err; } write_new_certificate(Cout, x, 0, notext); write_new_certificate(Sout, x, output_der, notext); } if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk)) { /* Rename the database and the serial file */ if (!rotate_serial(serialfile, "new", "old")) goto err; if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old")) goto err; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n"); } } /*****************************************************************/ if (gencrl) { int crl_v2 = 0; if (!crl_ext) { crl_ext = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLEXT); if (!crl_ext) ERR_clear_error(); } if (crl_ext) { /* Check syntax of file */ X509V3_CTX ctx; X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, crl_ext, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading CRL extension section %s\n", crl_ext); ret = 1; goto err; } } if ((crlnumberfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLNUMBER)) != NULL) if ((crlnumber = load_serial(crlnumberfile, 0, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading CRL number\n"); goto err; } if (!crldays && !crlhours && !crlsec) { if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS, &crldays)) crldays = 0; if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS, &crlhours)) crlhours = 0; ERR_clear_error(); } if ((crldays == 0) && (crlhours == 0) && (crlsec == 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot lookup how long until the next CRL is issued\n"); goto err; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "making CRL\n"); if ((crl = X509_CRL_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_get_subject_name(x509))) goto err; tmptm = ASN1_TIME_new(); if (!tmptm) goto err; X509_gmtime_adj(tmptm, 0); X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, tmptm); if (!X509_time_adj_ex(tmptm, crldays, crlhours * 60 * 60 + crlsec, NULL)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "error setting CRL nextUpdate\n"); goto err; } X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, tmptm); ASN1_TIME_free(tmptm); for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) { if ((r = X509_REVOKED_new()) == NULL) goto err; j = make_revoked(r, pp[DB_rev_date]); if (!j) goto err; if (j == 2) crl_v2 = 1; if (!BN_hex2bn(&serial, pp[DB_serial])) goto err; tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL); BN_free(serial); serial = NULL; if (!tmpser) goto err; X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(r, tmpser); ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser); X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, r); } } /* * sort the data so it will be written in serial number order */ X509_CRL_sort(crl); /* we now have a CRL */ if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "signing CRL\n"); /* Add any extensions asked for */ if (crl_ext || crlnumberfile != NULL) { X509V3_CTX crlctx; X509V3_set_ctx(&crlctx, x509, NULL, NULL, crl, 0); X509V3_set_nconf(&crlctx, conf); if (crl_ext) if (!X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(conf, &crlctx, crl_ext, crl)) goto err; if (crlnumberfile != NULL) { tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(crlnumber, NULL); if (!tmpser) goto err; X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_crl_number, tmpser, 0, 0); ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser); crl_v2 = 1; if (!BN_add_word(crlnumber, 1)) goto err; } } if (crl_ext || crl_v2) { if (!X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) goto err; /* version 2 CRL */ } /* we have a CRL number that need updating */ if (crlnumberfile != NULL) if (!save_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", crlnumber, NULL)) goto err; if (crlnumber) { BN_free(crlnumber); crlnumber = NULL; } if (!do_X509_CRL_sign(bio_err, crl, pkey, dgst, sigopts)) goto err; PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(Sout, crl); if (crlnumberfile != NULL) /* Rename the crlnumber file */ if (!rotate_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", "old")) goto err; } /*****************************************************************/ if (dorevoke) { if (infile == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no input files\n"); goto err; } else { X509 *revcert; revcert = load_cert(bio_err, infile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, infile); if (revcert == NULL) goto err; if (dorevoke == 2) rev_type = -1; j = do_revoke(revcert, db, rev_type, rev_arg); if (j <= 0) goto err; X509_free(revcert); if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db)) goto err; if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old")) goto err; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n"); } } /*****************************************************************/ ret = 0; err: if (tofree) OPENSSL_free(tofree); BIO_free_all(Cout); BIO_free_all(Sout); BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free_all(in); if (cert_sk) sk_X509_pop_free(cert_sk, X509_free); if (ret) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); app_RAND_write_file(randfile, bio_err); if (free_key && key) OPENSSL_free(key); BN_free(serial); BN_free(crlnumber); free_index(db); if (sigopts) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (x509) X509_free(x509); X509_CRL_free(crl); NCONF_free(conf); NCONF_free(extconf); release_engine(e); OBJ_cleanup(); apps_shutdown(); OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); } static void lookup_fail(const char *name, const char *tag) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "variable lookup failed for %s::%s\n", name, tag); } static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days, int batch, char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign) { X509_REQ *req = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL; int ok = -1, i; in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) { perror(infile); goto err; } if ((req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading certificate request in %s\n", infile); goto err; } if (verbose) X509_REQ_print(bio_err, req); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n"); if (selfsign && !X509_REQ_check_private_key(req, pkey)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate request and CA private key do not match\n"); ok = 0; goto err; } if ((pktmp = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n"); goto err; } i = X509_REQ_verify(req, pktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); if (i < 0) { ok = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if (i == 0) { ok = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature did not match the certificate request\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n"); ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign); err: if (req != NULL) X509_REQ_free(req); if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); return (ok); } static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days, int batch, char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, ENGINE *e) { X509 *req = NULL; X509_REQ *rreq = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL; int ok = -1, i; if ((req = load_cert(bio_err, infile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, infile)) == NULL) goto err; if (verbose) X509_print(bio_err, req); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n"); if ((pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(req)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n"); goto err; } i = X509_verify(req, pktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); if (i < 0) { ok = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n"); goto err; } if (i == 0) { ok = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature did not match the certificate\n"); goto err; } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n"); if ((rreq = X509_to_X509_REQ(req, NULL, EVP_md5())) == NULL) goto err; ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, verbose, rreq, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, 0); err: if (rreq != NULL) X509_REQ_free(rreq); if (req != NULL) X509_free(req); return (ok); } static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days, int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign) { X509_NAME *name = NULL, *CAname = NULL, *subject = NULL; ASN1_UTCTIME *tm, *tmptm; ASN1_STRING *str, *str2; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509 *ret = NULL; X509_CINF *ci; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; X509_NAME_ENTRY *tne, *push; EVP_PKEY *pktmp; int ok = -1, i, j, last, nid; const char *p; CONF_VALUE *cv; OPENSSL_STRING row[DB_NUMBER]; OPENSSL_STRING *irow = NULL; OPENSSL_STRING *rrow = NULL; char buf[25]; tmptm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); if (tmptm == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n"); return (0); } for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; if (subj) { X509_NAME *n = parse_name(subj, chtype, multirdn); if (!n) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } X509_REQ_set_subject_name(req, n); req->req_info->enc.modified = 1; X509_NAME_free(n); } if (default_op) BIO_printf(bio_err, "The Subject's Distinguished Name is as follows\n"); name = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req); for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(name); i++) { ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i); str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ne); if (msie_hack) { /* assume all type should be strings */ nid = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object); if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(str); if ((str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) && (nid != NID_pkcs9_emailAddress)) str->type = V_ASN1_T61STRING; if ((nid == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)) str->type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; } /* If no EMAIL is wanted in the subject */ if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (!email_dn)) continue; /* check some things */ if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (str->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nemailAddress type needs to be of type IA5STRING\n"); goto err; } if ((str->type != V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) && (str->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)) { j = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(str->data, str->length); if (((j == V_ASN1_T61STRING) && (str->type != V_ASN1_T61STRING)) || ((j == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) && (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nThe string contains characters that are illegal for the ASN.1 type\n"); goto err; } } if (default_op) old_entry_print(bio_err, obj, str); } /* Ok, now we check the 'policy' stuff. */ if ((subject = X509_NAME_new()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } /* take a copy of the issuer name before we mess with it. */ if (selfsign) CAname = X509_NAME_dup(name); else CAname = X509_NAME_dup(x509->cert_info->subject); if (CAname == NULL) goto err; str = str2 = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(policy); i++) { cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(policy, i); /* get the object id */ if ((j = OBJ_txt2nid(cv->name)) == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:unknown object type in 'policy' configuration\n", cv->name); goto err; } obj = OBJ_nid2obj(j); last = -1; for (;;) { /* lookup the object in the supplied name list */ j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, last); if (j < 0) { if (last != -1) break; tne = NULL; } else { tne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, j); } last = j; /* depending on the 'policy', decide what to do. */ push = NULL; if (strcmp(cv->value, "optional") == 0) { if (tne != NULL) push = tne; } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "supplied") == 0) { if (tne == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The %s field needed to be supplied and was missing\n", cv->name); goto err; } else push = tne; } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "match") == 0) { int last2; if (tne == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The mandatory %s field was missing\n", cv->name); goto err; } last2 = -1; again2: j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(CAname, obj, last2); if ((j < 0) && (last2 == -1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The %s field does not exist in the CA certificate,\nthe 'policy' is misconfigured\n", cv->name); goto err; } if (j >= 0) { push = X509_NAME_get_entry(CAname, j); str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(tne); str2 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(push); last2 = j; if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(str, str2) != 0) goto again2; } if (j < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The %s field needed to be the same in the\nCA certificate (%s) and the request (%s)\n", cv->name, ((str2 == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str2->data), ((str == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str->data)); goto err; } } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:invalid type in 'policy' configuration\n", cv->value); goto err; } if (push != NULL) { if (!X509_NAME_add_entry(subject, push, -1, 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } } if (j < 0) break; } } if (preserve) { X509_NAME_free(subject); /* subject=X509_NAME_dup(X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)); */ subject = X509_NAME_dup(name); if (subject == NULL) goto err; } /* We are now totally happy, lets make and sign the certificate */ if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Everything appears to be ok, creating and signing the certificate\n"); if ((ret = X509_new()) == NULL) goto err; ci = ret->cert_info; #ifdef X509_V3 /* Make it an X509 v3 certificate. */ if (!X509_set_version(ret, 2)) goto err; #endif if (BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, ci->serialNumber) == NULL) goto err; if (selfsign) { if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, subject)) goto err; } else { if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, X509_get_subject_name(x509))) goto err; } if (strcmp(startdate, "today") == 0) X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(ret), 0); else ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_get_notBefore(ret), startdate); if (enddate == NULL) X509_time_adj_ex(X509_get_notAfter(ret), days, 0, NULL); else { int tdays; ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_get_notAfter(ret), enddate); ASN1_TIME_diff(&tdays, NULL, NULL, X509_get_notAfter(ret)); days = tdays; } if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, subject)) goto err; pktmp = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req); i = X509_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); if (!i) goto err; /* Lets add the extensions, if there are any */ if (ext_sect) { X509V3_CTX ctx; /* * Free the current entries if any, there should not be any I believe */ if (ci->extensions != NULL) sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(ci->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free); ci->extensions = NULL; /* Initialize the context structure */ if (selfsign) X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, ret, ret, req, NULL, 0); else X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, x509, ret, req, NULL, 0); if (extconf) { if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra configuration file found\n"); /* Use the extconf configuration db LHASH */ X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, extconf); /* Test the structure (needed?) */ /* X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); */ /* Adds exts contained in the configuration file */ if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(extconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n", ext_sect); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Successfully added extensions from file.\n"); } else if (ext_sect) { /* We found extensions to be set from config file */ X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, lconf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(lconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n", ext_sect); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Successfully added extensions from config\n"); } } /* Copy extensions from request (if any) */ if (!copy_extensions(ret, req, ext_copy)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: adding extensions from request\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } { STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = ci->extensions; if (exts != NULL && sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) > 0) /* Make it an X509 v3 certificate. */ if (!X509_set_version(ret, 2)) goto err; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "The subject name appears to be ok, checking data base for clashes\n"); /* Build the correct Subject if no e-mail is wanted in the subject */ if (!email_dn) { X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpne; X509_NAME *dn_subject; /* * Its best to dup the subject DN and then delete any email addresses * because this retains its structure. */ if (!(dn_subject = X509_NAME_dup(subject))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn_subject, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, -1)) >= 0) { tmpne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn_subject, i); X509_NAME_delete_entry(dn_subject, i); X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpne); } if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, dn_subject)) { X509_NAME_free(dn_subject); goto err; } X509_NAME_free(dn_subject); } row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ret), NULL, 0); if (row[DB_name] == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(serial)) row[DB_serial] = BUF_strdup("00"); else row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(serial); if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } if (row[DB_name][0] == '\0') { /* * An empty subject! We'll use the serial number instead. If * unique_subject is in use then we don't want different entries with * empty subjects matching each other. */ OPENSSL_free(row[DB_name]); row[DB_name] = OPENSSL_strdup(row[DB_serial]); if (row[DB_name] == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } } if (db->attributes.unique_subject) { OPENSSL_STRING *crow = row; rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_name, crow); if (rrow != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:There is already a certificate for %s\n", row[DB_name]); } } if (rrow == NULL) { rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row); if (rrow != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Serial number %s has already been issued,\n", row[DB_serial]); BIO_printf(bio_err, " check the database/serial_file for corruption\n"); } } if (rrow != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The matching entry has the following details\n"); if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E') p = "Expired"; else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') p = "Revoked"; else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') p = "Valid"; else p = "\ninvalid type, Data base error\n"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Type :%s\n", p);; if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') { p = rrow[DB_exp_date]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Was revoked on:%s\n", p); } p = rrow[DB_exp_date]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Expires on :%s\n", p); p = rrow[DB_serial]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial Number :%s\n", p); p = rrow[DB_file]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "File name :%s\n", p); p = rrow[DB_name]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject Name :%s\n", p); ok = -1; /* This is now a 'bad' error. */ goto err; } if (!default_op) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate Details:\n"); /* * Never print signature details because signature not present */ certopt |= X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP | X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME; X509_print_ex(bio_err, ret, nameopt, certopt); } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate is to be certified until "); ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ret)); if (days) BIO_printf(bio_err, " (%ld days)", days); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (!batch) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Sign the certificate? [y/n]:"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); buf[0] = '\0'; if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, stdin)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED: I/O error\n"); ok = 0; goto err; } if (!((buf[0] == 'y') || (buf[0] == 'Y'))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED\n"); ok = 0; goto err; } } pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(ret); if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pktmp) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); if (!do_X509_sign(bio_err, ret, pkey, dgst, sigopts)) goto err; /* We now just add it to the database */ tm = X509_get_notAfter(ret); row[DB_type] = OPENSSL_malloc(2); row[DB_exp_date] = OPENSSL_malloc(tm->length + 1); row[DB_rev_date] = OPENSSL_malloc(1); row[DB_file] = OPENSSL_malloc(8); if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) || (row[DB_rev_date] == NULL) || (row[DB_file] == NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length); row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0'; row[DB_rev_date][0] = '\0'; strcpy(row[DB_file], "unknown"); row[DB_type][0] = 'V'; row[DB_type][1] = '\0'; if ((irow = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (DB_NUMBER + 1))) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) irow[i] = row[i]; irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL; if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error); goto err; } irow = NULL; ok = 1; err: if (ok != 1) { for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) OPENSSL_free(row[i]); } OPENSSL_free(irow); if (CAname != NULL) X509_NAME_free(CAname); if (subject != NULL) X509_NAME_free(subject); if (tmptm != NULL) ASN1_UTCTIME_free(tmptm); if (ok <= 0) { if (ret != NULL) X509_free(ret); ret = NULL; } else *xret = ret; return (ok); } static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der, int notext) { if (output_der) { (void)i2d_X509_bio(bp, x); return; } #if 0 /* ??? Not needed since X509_print prints all this stuff anyway */ f = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), buf, 256); BIO_printf(bp, "issuer :%s\n", f); f = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, 256); BIO_printf(bp, "subject:%s\n", f); BIO_puts(bp, "serial :"); i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, x->cert_info->serialNumber); BIO_puts(bp, "\n\n"); #endif if (!notext) X509_print(bp, x); PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x); } static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days, char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL; LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *parms = NULL; X509_REQ *req = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cv = NULL; NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL; X509_REQ_INFO *ri; char *type, *buf; EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL; X509_NAME *n = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = NULL; int ok = -1, i, j; long errline; int nid; /* * Load input file into a hash table. (This is just an easy * way to read and parse the file, then put it into a convenient * STACK format). */ parms = CONF_load(NULL, infile, &errline); if (parms == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of %s\n", errline, infile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } sk = CONF_get_section(parms, "default"); if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no name/value pairs found in %s\n", infile); goto err; } /* * Now create a dummy X509 request structure. We don't actually * have an X509 request, but we have many of the components * (a public key, various DN components). The idea is that we * put these components into the right X509 request structure * and we can use the same code as if you had a real X509 request. */ req = X509_REQ_new(); if (req == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } /* * Build up the subject name set. */ ri = req->req_info; n = ri->subject; for (i = 0;; i++) { if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) <= i) break; cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk, i); type = cv->name; /* * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances */ for (buf = cv->name; *buf; buf++) if ((*buf == ':') || (*buf == ',') || (*buf == '.')) { buf++; if (*buf) type = buf; break; } buf = cv->value; if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef) { if (strcmp(type, "SPKAC") == 0) { spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(cv->value, -1); if (spki == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load Netscape SPKAC structure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } } continue; } if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)buf, -1, -1, 0)) goto err; } if (spki == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Netscape SPKAC structure not found in %s\n", infile); goto err; } /* * Now extract the key from the SPKI structure. */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the SPKAC request matches the signature\n"); if ((pktmp = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking SPKAC public key\n"); goto err; } j = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pktmp); if (j <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); BIO_printf(bio_err, "signature verification failed on SPKAC public key\n"); goto err; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n"); X509_REQ_set_pubkey(req, pktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, 1, verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, 0); err: if (req != NULL) X509_REQ_free(req); if (parms != NULL) CONF_free(parms); if (spki != NULL) NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki); if (ne != NULL) X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne); return (ok); } static int check_time_format(const char *str) { return ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, str); } static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int type, char *value) { ASN1_UTCTIME *tm = NULL; char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow, **irow; char *rev_str = NULL; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; int ok = -1, i; for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509), NULL, 0); bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), NULL); if (!bn) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(bn)) row[DB_serial] = BUF_strdup("00"); else row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(bn); BN_free(bn); if (row[DB_name] != NULL && row[DB_name][0] == '\0') { /* Entries with empty Subjects actually use the serial number instead */ OPENSSL_free(row[DB_name]); row[DB_name] = OPENSSL_strdup(row[DB_serial]); } if ((row[DB_name] == NULL) || (row[DB_serial] == NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } /* * We have to lookup by serial number because name lookup skips revoked * certs */ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row); if (rrow == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Adding Entry with serial number %s to DB for %s\n", row[DB_serial], row[DB_name]); /* We now just add it to the database */ row[DB_type] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(2); tm = X509_get_notAfter(x509); row[DB_exp_date] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(tm->length + 1); memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length); row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0'; row[DB_rev_date] = NULL; /* row[DB_serial] done already */ row[DB_file] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(8); /* row[DB_name] done already */ if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) || (row[DB_file] == NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } BUF_strlcpy(row[DB_file], "unknown", 8); row[DB_type][0] = 'V'; row[DB_type][1] = '\0'; if ((irow = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (DB_NUMBER + 1))) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) irow[i] = row[i]; irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL; if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error); OPENSSL_free(irow); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; /* Revoke Certificate */ if (type == -1) ok = 1; else ok = do_revoke(x509, db, type, value); goto err; } else if (index_name_cmp_noconst(row, rrow)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:name does not match %s\n", row[DB_name]); goto err; } else if (type == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Already present, serial number %s\n", row[DB_serial]); goto err; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Already revoked, serial number %s\n", row[DB_serial]); goto err; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Revoking Certificate %s.\n", rrow[DB_serial]); rev_str = make_revocation_str(type, value); if (!rev_str) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in revocation arguments\n"); goto err; } rrow[DB_type][0] = 'R'; rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0'; rrow[DB_rev_date] = rev_str; } ok = 1; err: for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) { if (row[i] != NULL) OPENSSL_free(row[i]); } return (ok); } static int get_certificate_status(const char *serial, CA_DB *db) { char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow; int ok = -1, i; /* Free Resources */ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; /* Malloc needed char spaces */ row[DB_serial] = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(serial) + 2); if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n"); goto err; } if (strlen(serial) % 2) { /* * Set the first char to 0 */ ; row[DB_serial][0] = '0'; /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */ memcpy(row[DB_serial] + 1, serial, strlen(serial)); row[DB_serial][strlen(serial) + 1] = '\0'; } else { /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */ memcpy(row[DB_serial], serial, strlen(serial)); row[DB_serial][strlen(serial)] = '\0'; } /* Make it Upper Case */ for (i = 0; row[DB_serial][i] != '\0'; i++) row[DB_serial][i] = toupper((unsigned char)row[DB_serial][i]); ok = 1; /* Search for the certificate */ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row); if (rrow == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial %s not present in db.\n", row[DB_serial]); ok = -1; goto err; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Valid (%c)\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); goto err; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Revoked (%c)\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); goto err; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired (%c)\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); goto err; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'S') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Suspended (%c)\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); goto err; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Unknown (%c).\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); ok = -1; } err: for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) { if (row[i] != NULL) OPENSSL_free(row[i]); } return (ok); } static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db) { ASN1_UTCTIME *a_tm = NULL; int i, cnt = 0; int db_y2k, a_y2k; /* flags = 1 if y >= 2000 */ char **rrow, *a_tm_s; a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); if (a_tm == NULL) return -1; /* get actual time and make a string */ a_tm = X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0); a_tm_s = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(a_tm->length + 1); if (a_tm_s == NULL) { cnt = -1; goto err; } memcpy(a_tm_s, a_tm->data, a_tm->length); a_tm_s[a_tm->length] = '\0'; if (strncmp(a_tm_s, "49", 2) <= 0) a_y2k = 1; else a_y2k = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { rrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') { /* ignore entries that are not valid */ if (strncmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], "49", 2) <= 0) db_y2k = 1; else db_y2k = 0; if (db_y2k == a_y2k) { /* all on the same y2k side */ if (strcmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], a_tm_s) <= 0) { rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E'; rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0'; cnt++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]); } } else if (db_y2k < a_y2k) { rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E'; rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0'; cnt++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]); } } } err: ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a_tm); OPENSSL_free(a_tm_s); return (cnt); } static const char *crl_reasons[] = { /* CRL reason strings */ "unspecified", "keyCompromise", "CACompromise", "affiliationChanged", "superseded", "cessationOfOperation", "certificateHold", "removeFromCRL", /* Additional pseudo reasons */ "holdInstruction", "keyTime", "CAkeyTime" }; #define NUM_REASONS (sizeof(crl_reasons) / sizeof(char *)) /* * Given revocation information convert to a DB string. The format of the * string is: revtime[,reason,extra]. Where 'revtime' is the revocation time * (the current time). 'reason' is the optional CRL reason and 'extra' is any * additional argument */ char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg) { char *other = NULL, *str; const char *reason = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *otmp; ASN1_UTCTIME *revtm = NULL; int i; switch (rev_type) { case REV_NONE: break; case REV_CRL_REASON: for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (!strcasecmp(rev_arg, crl_reasons[i])) { reason = crl_reasons[i]; break; } } if (reason == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown CRL reason %s\n", rev_arg); return NULL; } break; case REV_HOLD: /* Argument is an OID */ otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(rev_arg, 0); ASN1_OBJECT_free(otmp); if (otmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid object identifier %s\n", rev_arg); return NULL; } reason = "holdInstruction"; other = rev_arg; break; case REV_KEY_COMPROMISE: case REV_CA_COMPROMISE: /* Argument is the key compromise time */ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(NULL, rev_arg)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid time format %s. Need YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n", rev_arg); return NULL; } other = rev_arg; if (rev_type == REV_KEY_COMPROMISE) reason = "keyTime"; else reason = "CAkeyTime"; break; } revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0); if (!revtm) return NULL; i = revtm->length + 1; if (reason) i += strlen(reason) + 1; if (other) i += strlen(other) + 1; str = OPENSSL_malloc(i); if (!str) return NULL; BUF_strlcpy(str, (char *)revtm->data, i); if (reason) { BUF_strlcat(str, ",", i); BUF_strlcat(str, reason, i); } if (other) { BUF_strlcat(str, ",", i); BUF_strlcat(str, other, i); } ASN1_UTCTIME_free(revtm); return str; } /*- * Convert revocation field to X509_REVOKED entry * return code: * 0 error * 1 OK * 2 OK and some extensions added (i.e. V2 CRL) */ int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str) { char *tmp = NULL; int reason_code = -1; int i, ret = 0; ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL; ASN1_ENUMERATED *rtmp = NULL; ASN1_TIME *revDate = NULL; i = unpack_revinfo(&revDate, &reason_code, &hold, &comp_time, str); if (i == 0) goto err; if (rev && !X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(rev, revDate)) goto err; if (rev && (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS)) { rtmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new(); if (!rtmp || !ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(rtmp, reason_code)) goto err; if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(rev, NID_crl_reason, rtmp, 0, 0)) goto err; } if (rev && comp_time) { if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d (rev, NID_invalidity_date, comp_time, 0, 0)) goto err; } if (rev && hold) { if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d (rev, NID_hold_instruction_code, hold, 0, 0)) goto err; } if (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) ret = 2; else ret = 1; err: if (tmp) OPENSSL_free(tmp); ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time); ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(rtmp); ASN1_TIME_free(revDate); return ret; } int old_entry_print(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, ASN1_STRING *str) { char buf[25], *pbuf, *p; int j; j = i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, obj); pbuf = buf; for (j = 22 - j; j > 0; j--) *(pbuf++) = ' '; *(pbuf++) = ':'; *(pbuf++) = '\0'; BIO_puts(bp, buf); if (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) BIO_printf(bp, "PRINTABLE:'"); else if (str->type == V_ASN1_T61STRING) BIO_printf(bp, "T61STRING:'"); else if (str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) BIO_printf(bp, "IA5STRING:'"); else if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) BIO_printf(bp, "UNIVERSALSTRING:'"); else BIO_printf(bp, "ASN.1 %2d:'", str->type); p = (char *)str->data; for (j = str->length; j > 0; j--) { if ((*p >= ' ') && (*p <= '~')) BIO_printf(bp, "%c", *p); else if (*p & 0x80) BIO_printf(bp, "\\0x%02X", *p); else if ((unsigned char)*p == 0xf7) BIO_printf(bp, "^?"); else BIO_printf(bp, "^%c", *p + '@'); p++; } BIO_printf(bp, "'\n"); return 1; } int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pinvtm, const char *str) { char *tmp = NULL; char *rtime_str, *reason_str = NULL, *arg_str = NULL, *p; int reason_code = -1; int ret = 0; unsigned int i; ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL; tmp = BUF_strdup(str); if (!tmp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } p = strchr(tmp, ','); rtime_str = tmp; if (p) { *p = '\0'; p++; reason_str = p; p = strchr(p, ','); if (p) { *p = '\0'; arg_str = p + 1; } } if (prevtm) { *prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); if (!*prevtm) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } if (!ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(*prevtm, rtime_str)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid revocation date %s\n", rtime_str); goto err; } } if (reason_str) { for (i = 0; i < NUM_REASONS; i++) { if (!strcasecmp(reason_str, crl_reasons[i])) { reason_code = i; break; } } if (reason_code == OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid reason code %s\n", reason_str); goto err; } if (reason_code == 7) reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL; else if (reason_code == 8) { /* Hold instruction */ if (!arg_str) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing hold instruction\n"); goto err; } reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD; hold = OBJ_txt2obj(arg_str, 0); if (!hold) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid object identifier %s\n", arg_str); goto err; } if (phold) *phold = hold; } else if ((reason_code == 9) || (reason_code == 10)) { if (!arg_str) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing compromised time\n"); goto err; } comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new(); if (!comp_time) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(comp_time, arg_str)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid compromised time %s\n", arg_str); goto err; } if (reason_code == 9) reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE; else reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE; } } if (preason) *preason = reason_code; if (pinvtm) *pinvtm = comp_time; else ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time); ret = 1; err: if (tmp) OPENSSL_free(tmp); if (!phold) ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold); if (!pinvtm) ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time); return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/ocsp.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/ocsp.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/ocsp.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,1367 +1,1366 @@ /* ocsp.c */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED/* So fd_set and friends get properly defined * on OpenVMS */ # endif # define USE_SOCKETS # include # include # include # include # include "apps.h" /* needs to be included before the openssl * headers! */ # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) # ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK # include # include # else # include # endif # elif defined(NETWARE_LIBC) # ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK # include # else # include # endif # endif /* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */ # define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60) static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids); static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids); static int print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec, long maxage); static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req, CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert, EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags, int nmin, int ndays, int badsig); static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser); static BIO *init_responder(const char *port); static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio, const char *port); static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp); static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, const char *path, const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers, OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout); # undef PROG # define PROG ocsp_main int MAIN(int, char **); int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; char **args; char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/"; char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL; char *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL; char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL; char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL; char *rsignfile = NULL, *rkeyfile = NULL; char *outfile = NULL; int add_nonce = 1, noverify = 0, use_ssl = -1; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers = NULL; OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL; X509 *issuer = NULL, *cert = NULL; X509 *signer = NULL, *rsigner = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key = NULL, *rkey = NULL; BIO *acbio = NULL, *cbio = NULL; BIO *derbio = NULL; BIO *out = NULL; int req_timeout = -1; int req_text = 0, resp_text = 0; long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1; char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *sign_other = NULL, *verify_other = NULL, *rother = NULL; char *sign_certfile = NULL, *verify_certfile = NULL, *rcertfile = NULL; unsigned long sign_flags = 0, verify_flags = 0, rflags = 0; int ret = 1; int accept_count = -1; int badarg = 0; int badsig = 0; int i; int ignore_err = 0; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *reqnames = NULL; STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids = NULL; X509 *rca_cert = NULL; char *ridx_filename = NULL; char *rca_filename = NULL; CA_DB *rdb = NULL; int nmin = 0, ndays = -1; const EVP_MD *cert_id_md = NULL, *rsign_md = NULL; if (bio_err == NULL) bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL)) goto end; SSL_load_error_strings(); OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); args = argv + 1; reqnames = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); ids = sk_OCSP_CERTID_new_null(); while (!badarg && *args && *args[0] == '-') { if (!strcmp(*args, "-out")) { if (args[1]) { args++; outfile = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-timeout")) { if (args[1]) { args++; req_timeout = atol(*args); if (req_timeout < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal timeout value %s\n", *args); badarg = 1; } } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-url")) { if (thost) OPENSSL_free(thost); if (tport) OPENSSL_free(tport); if (tpath) OPENSSL_free(tpath); thost = tport = tpath = NULL; if (args[1]) { args++; if (!OCSP_parse_url(*args, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n"); badarg = 1; } thost = host; tport = port; tpath = path; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-host")) { if (args[1]) { args++; host = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-port")) { if (args[1]) { args++; port = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-header")) { if (args[1] && args[2]) { if (!X509V3_add_value(args[1], args[2], &headers)) goto end; args += 2; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-ignore_err")) ignore_err = 1; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-noverify")) noverify = 1; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nonce")) add_nonce = 2; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_nonce")) add_nonce = 0; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-resp_no_certs")) rflags |= OCSP_NOCERTS; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-resp_key_id")) rflags |= OCSP_RESPID_KEY; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_certs")) sign_flags |= OCSP_NOCERTS; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_signature_verify")) verify_flags |= OCSP_NOSIGS; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_cert_verify")) verify_flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_chain")) verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHAIN; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_cert_checks")) verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHECKS; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_explicit")) verify_flags |= OCSP_NOEXPLICIT; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-trust_other")) verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_intern")) verify_flags |= OCSP_NOINTERN; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-badsig")) badsig = 1; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-text")) { req_text = 1; resp_text = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-req_text")) req_text = 1; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-resp_text")) resp_text = 1; else if (!strcmp(*args, "-reqin")) { if (args[1]) { args++; reqin = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-respin")) { if (args[1]) { args++; respin = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-signer")) { if (args[1]) { args++; signfile = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-VAfile")) { if (args[1]) { args++; verify_certfile = *args; verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-sign_other")) { if (args[1]) { args++; sign_certfile = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-verify_other")) { if (args[1]) { args++; verify_certfile = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CAfile")) { if (args[1]) { args++; CAfile = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CApath")) { if (args[1]) { args++; CApath = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (args_verify(&args, NULL, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm)) { if (badarg) goto end; continue; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-validity_period")) { if (args[1]) { args++; nsec = atol(*args); if (nsec < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal validity period %s\n", *args); badarg = 1; } } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-status_age")) { if (args[1]) { args++; maxage = atol(*args); if (maxage < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal validity age %s\n", *args); badarg = 1; } } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-signkey")) { if (args[1]) { args++; keyfile = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-reqout")) { if (args[1]) { args++; reqout = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-respout")) { if (args[1]) { args++; respout = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-path")) { if (args[1]) { args++; path = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-issuer")) { if (args[1]) { args++; X509_free(issuer); issuer = load_cert(bio_err, *args, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "issuer certificate"); if (!issuer) goto end; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-cert")) { if (args[1]) { args++; X509_free(cert); cert = load_cert(bio_err, *args, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "certificate"); if (!cert) goto end; if (!cert_id_md) cert_id_md = EVP_sha1(); if (!add_ocsp_cert(&req, cert, cert_id_md, issuer, ids)) goto end; if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, *args)) goto end; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-serial")) { if (args[1]) { args++; if (!cert_id_md) cert_id_md = EVP_sha1(); if (!add_ocsp_serial(&req, *args, cert_id_md, issuer, ids)) goto end; if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, *args)) goto end; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-index")) { if (args[1]) { args++; ridx_filename = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CA")) { if (args[1]) { args++; rca_filename = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nmin")) { if (args[1]) { args++; nmin = atol(*args); if (nmin < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal update period %s\n", *args); badarg = 1; } } if (ndays == -1) ndays = 0; else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nrequest")) { if (args[1]) { args++; accept_count = atol(*args); if (accept_count < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal accept count %s\n", *args); badarg = 1; } } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-ndays")) { if (args[1]) { args++; ndays = atol(*args); if (ndays < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal update period %s\n", *args); badarg = 1; } } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rsigner")) { if (args[1]) { args++; rsignfile = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rkey")) { if (args[1]) { args++; rkeyfile = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rother")) { if (args[1]) { args++; rcertfile = *args; } else badarg = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rmd")) { if (args[1]) { args++; rsign_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(*args); if (!rsign_md) badarg = 1; } else badarg = 1; } else if ((cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyname((*args) + 1)) == NULL) { badarg = 1; } args++; } /* Have we anything to do? */ if (!req && !reqin && !respin && !(port && ridx_filename)) badarg = 1; if (badarg) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "OCSP utility\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage ocsp [options]\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-out file output filename\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-issuer file issuer certificate\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-cert file certificate to check\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-serial n serial number to check\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-signer file certificate to sign OCSP request with\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-signkey file private key to sign OCSP request with\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-sign_other file additional certificates to include in signed request\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-no_certs don't include any certificates in signed request\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-req_text print text form of request\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-resp_text print text form of response\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-text print text form of request and response\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-reqout file write DER encoded OCSP request to \"file\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-respout file write DER encoded OCSP reponse to \"file\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-reqin file read DER encoded OCSP request from \"file\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-respin file read DER encoded OCSP reponse from \"file\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nonce add OCSP nonce to request\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-no_nonce don't add OCSP nonce to request\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-url URL OCSP responder URL\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-host host:n send OCSP request to host on port n\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-path path to use in OCSP request\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-VAfile file validator certificates file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-status_age n maximum status age in seconds\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-noverify don't verify response at all\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-verify_other file additional certificates to search for signer\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-trust_other don't verify additional certificates\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-no_intern don't search certificates contained in response for signer\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-no_signature_verify don't check signature on response\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-no_cert_verify don't check signing certificate\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-no_chain don't chain verify response\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-no_cert_checks don't do additional checks on signing certificate\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-port num port to run responder on\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-index file certificate status index file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CA file CA certificate\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-rsigner file responder certificate to sign responses with\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-rkey file responder key to sign responses with\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-rother file other certificates to include in response\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-resp_no_certs don't include any certificates in response\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nmin n number of minutes before next update\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-ndays n number of days before next update\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-resp_key_id identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nrequest n number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "- use specified digest in the request\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-timeout n timeout connection to OCSP responder after n seconds\n"); goto end; } if (outfile) out = BIO_new_file(outfile, "w"); else out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (!out) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening output file\n"); goto end; } if (!req && (add_nonce != 2)) add_nonce = 0; if (!req && reqin) { if (!strcmp(reqin, "-")) derbio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); else derbio = BIO_new_file(reqin, "rb"); if (!derbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Opening OCSP request file\n"); goto end; } req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, NULL); BIO_free(derbio); if (!req) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP request\n"); goto end; } } if (!req && port) { acbio = init_responder(port); if (!acbio) goto end; } if (rsignfile && !rdb) { if (!rkeyfile) rkeyfile = rsignfile; rsigner = load_cert(bio_err, rsignfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "responder certificate"); if (!rsigner) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading responder certificate\n"); goto end; } rca_cert = load_cert(bio_err, rca_filename, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "CA certificate"); if (rcertfile) { rother = load_certs(bio_err, rcertfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "responder other certificates"); if (!rother) goto end; } rkey = load_key(bio_err, rkeyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL, "responder private key"); if (!rkey) goto end; } if (acbio) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Waiting for OCSP client connections...\n"); redo_accept: if (acbio) { if (!do_responder(&req, &cbio, acbio, port)) goto end; if (!req) { resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, NULL); send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp); goto done_resp; } } if (!req && (signfile || reqout || host || add_nonce || ridx_filename)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Need an OCSP request for this operation!\n"); goto end; } if (req && add_nonce) OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, -1); if (signfile) { if (!keyfile) keyfile = signfile; signer = load_cert(bio_err, signfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "signer certificate"); if (!signer) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading signer certificate\n"); goto end; } if (sign_certfile) { sign_other = load_certs(bio_err, sign_certfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "signer certificates"); if (!sign_other) goto end; } key = load_key(bio_err, keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL, "signer private key"); if (!key) goto end; if (!OCSP_request_sign (req, signer, key, NULL, sign_other, sign_flags)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error signing OCSP request\n"); goto end; } } if (req_text && req) OCSP_REQUEST_print(out, req, 0); if (reqout) { if (!strcmp(reqout, "-")) derbio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); else derbio = BIO_new_file(reqout, "wb"); if (!derbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening file %s\n", reqout); goto end; } i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, req); BIO_free(derbio); } if (ridx_filename && (!rkey || !rsigner || !rca_cert)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Need a responder certificate, key and CA for this operation!\n"); goto end; } if (ridx_filename && !rdb) { rdb = load_index(ridx_filename, NULL); if (!rdb) goto end; if (!index_index(rdb)) goto end; } if (rdb) { i = make_ocsp_response(&resp, req, rdb, rca_cert, rsigner, rkey, rsign_md, rother, rflags, nmin, ndays, badsig); if (cbio) send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp); } else if (host) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK resp = process_responder(bio_err, req, host, path, port, use_ssl, headers, req_timeout); if (!resp) goto end; # else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating connect BIO - sockets not supported.\n"); goto end; # endif } else if (respin) { if (!strcmp(respin, "-")) derbio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); else derbio = BIO_new_file(respin, "rb"); if (!derbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Opening OCSP response file\n"); goto end; } resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, NULL); BIO_free(derbio); if (!resp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP response\n"); goto end; } } else { ret = 0; goto end; } done_resp: if (respout) { if (!strcmp(respout, "-")) derbio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); else derbio = BIO_new_file(respout, "wb"); if (!derbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening file %s\n", respout); goto end; } i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, resp); BIO_free(derbio); } i = OCSP_response_status(resp); if (i != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) { BIO_printf(out, "Responder Error: %s (%d)\n", OCSP_response_status_str(i), i); if (ignore_err) goto redo_accept; - ret = 0; goto end; } if (resp_text) OCSP_RESPONSE_print(out, resp, 0); /* If running as responder don't verify our own response */ if (cbio) { if (accept_count > 0) accept_count--; /* Redo if more connections needed */ if (accept_count) { BIO_free_all(cbio); cbio = NULL; OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); req = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); resp = NULL; goto redo_accept; } ret = 0; goto end; } else if (ridx_filename) { ret = 0; goto end; } if (!store) store = setup_verify(bio_err, CAfile, CApath); if (!store) goto end; if (vpm) X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm); if (verify_certfile) { verify_other = load_certs(bio_err, verify_certfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "validator certificate"); if (!verify_other) goto end; } bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp); if (!bs) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing response\n"); goto end; } ret = 0; if (!noverify) { if (req && ((i = OCSP_check_nonce(req, bs)) <= 0)) { if (i == -1) BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: no nonce in response\n"); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nonce Verify error\n"); ret = 1; goto end; } } i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, verify_other, store, verify_flags); if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response Verify Failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response verify OK\n"); } if (!print_ocsp_summary(out, bs, req, reqnames, ids, nsec, maxage)) ret = 1; end: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_free(signer); X509_STORE_free(store); if (vpm) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); EVP_PKEY_free(key); EVP_PKEY_free(rkey); X509_free(issuer); X509_free(cert); X509_free(rsigner); X509_free(rca_cert); free_index(rdb); BIO_free_all(cbio); BIO_free_all(acbio); BIO_free(out); OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(reqnames); sk_OCSP_CERTID_free(ids); sk_X509_pop_free(sign_other, X509_free); sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free); sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(headers, X509V3_conf_free); if (thost) OPENSSL_free(thost); if (tport) OPENSSL_free(tport); if (tpath) OPENSSL_free(tpath); OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); } static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids) { OCSP_CERTID *id; if (!issuer) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n"); return 0; } if (!*req) *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); if (!*req) goto err; id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, cert, issuer); if (!id || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id)) goto err; if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id)) goto err; return 1; err: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n"); return 0; } static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids) { OCSP_CERTID *id; X509_NAME *iname; ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey; ASN1_INTEGER *sno; if (!issuer) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n"); return 0; } if (!*req) *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); if (!*req) goto err; iname = X509_get_subject_name(issuer); ikey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(issuer); sno = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, serial); if (!sno) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error converting serial number %s\n", serial); return 0; } id = OCSP_cert_id_new(cert_id_md, iname, ikey, sno); ASN1_INTEGER_free(sno); if (!id || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id)) goto err; if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id)) goto err; return 1; err: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n"); return 0; } static int print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec, long maxage) { OCSP_CERTID *id; char *name; int i; int status, reason; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd; if (!bs || !req || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(names) || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids)) return 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids); i++) { id = sk_OCSP_CERTID_value(ids, i); name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(names, i); BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", name); if (!OCSP_resp_find_status(bs, id, &status, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) { BIO_puts(out, "ERROR: No Status found.\n"); continue; } /* * Check validity: if invalid write to output BIO so we know which * response this refers to. */ if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) { BIO_puts(out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); } BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", OCSP_cert_status_str(status)); BIO_puts(out, "\tThis Update: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, thisupd); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); if (nextupd) { BIO_puts(out, "\tNext Update: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, nextupd); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) continue; if (reason != -1) BIO_printf(out, "\tReason: %s\n", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason)); BIO_puts(out, "\tRevocation Time: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, rev); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } return 1; } static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req, CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert, EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *rmd, STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags, int nmin, int ndays, int badsig) { ASN1_TIME *thisupd = NULL, *nextupd = NULL; OCSP_CERTID *cid, *ca_id = NULL; OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL; int i, id_count, ret = 1; id_count = OCSP_request_onereq_count(req); if (id_count <= 0) { *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, NULL); goto end; } bs = OCSP_BASICRESP_new(); thisupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0); if (ndays != -1) nextupd = X509_time_adj_ex(NULL, ndays, nmin * 60, NULL); /* Examine each certificate id in the request */ for (i = 0; i < id_count; i++) { OCSP_ONEREQ *one; ASN1_INTEGER *serial; char **inf; ASN1_OBJECT *cert_id_md_oid; const EVP_MD *cert_id_md; one = OCSP_request_onereq_get0(req, i); cid = OCSP_onereq_get0_id(one); OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, &cert_id_md_oid, NULL, NULL, cid); cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cert_id_md_oid); if (!cert_id_md) { *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR, NULL); goto end; } if (ca_id) OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id); ca_id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, NULL, ca); /* Is this request about our CA? */ if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(ca_id, cid)) { OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid, V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN, 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd); continue; } OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, &serial, cid); inf = lookup_serial(db, serial); if (!inf) OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid, V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN, 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd); else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_VAL) OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid, V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD, 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd); else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) { ASN1_OBJECT *inst = NULL; ASN1_TIME *revtm = NULL; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *invtm = NULL; OCSP_SINGLERESP *single; int reason = -1; unpack_revinfo(&revtm, &reason, &inst, &invtm, inf[DB_rev_date]); single = OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid, V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED, reason, revtm, thisupd, nextupd); if (invtm) OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single, NID_invalidity_date, invtm, 0, 0); else if (inst) OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single, NID_hold_instruction_code, inst, 0, 0); ASN1_OBJECT_free(inst); ASN1_TIME_free(revtm); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(invtm); } } OCSP_copy_nonce(bs, req); OCSP_basic_sign(bs, rcert, rkey, rmd, rother, flags); if (badsig) bs->signature->data[bs->signature->length - 1] ^= 0x1; *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, bs); end: ASN1_TIME_free(thisupd); ASN1_TIME_free(nextupd); OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id); OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs); return ret; } static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser) { int i; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; char *itmp, *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow; for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ser, NULL); OPENSSL_assert(bn); /* FIXME: should report an error at this * point and abort */ if (BN_is_zero(bn)) itmp = BUF_strdup("00"); else itmp = BN_bn2hex(bn); row[DB_serial] = itmp; BN_free(bn); rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row); OPENSSL_free(itmp); return rrow; } /* Quick and dirty OCSP server: read in and parse input request */ static BIO *init_responder(const char *port) { BIO *acbio = NULL, *bufbio = NULL; bufbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (!bufbio) goto err; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK acbio = BIO_new_accept(port); # else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting up accept BIO - sockets not supported.\n"); # endif if (!acbio) goto err; BIO_set_accept_bios(acbio, bufbio); bufbio = NULL; if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting up accept BIO\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } return acbio; err: BIO_free_all(acbio); BIO_free(bufbio); return NULL; } static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio, const char *port) { int have_post = 0, len; OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL; char inbuf[1024]; BIO *cbio = NULL; if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error accepting connection\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } cbio = BIO_pop(acbio); *pcbio = cbio; for (;;) { len = BIO_gets(cbio, inbuf, sizeof(inbuf)); if (len <= 0) return 1; /* Look for "POST" signalling start of query */ if (!have_post) { if (strncmp(inbuf, "POST", 4)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request\n"); return 1; } have_post = 1; } /* Look for end of headers */ if ((inbuf[0] == '\r') || (inbuf[0] == '\n')) break; } /* Try to read OCSP request */ req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(cbio, NULL); if (!req) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing OCSP request\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } *preq = req; return 1; } static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp) { char http_resp[] = "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: application/ocsp-response\r\n" "Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n"; if (!cbio) return 0; BIO_printf(cbio, http_resp, i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, NULL)); i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(cbio, resp); (void)BIO_flush(cbio); return 1; } static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, const char *path, const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers, OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout) { int fd; int rv; int i; OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL; fd_set confds; struct timeval tv; if (req_timeout != -1) BIO_set_nbio(cbio, 1); rv = BIO_do_connect(cbio); if ((rv <= 0) && ((req_timeout == -1) || !BIO_should_retry(cbio))) { BIO_puts(err, "Error connecting BIO\n"); return NULL; } if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) < 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Can't get connection fd\n"); goto err; } if (req_timeout != -1 && rv <= 0) { FD_ZERO(&confds); openssl_fdset(fd, &confds); tv.tv_usec = 0; tv.tv_sec = req_timeout; rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv); if (rv == 0) { BIO_puts(err, "Timeout on connect\n"); return NULL; } } ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(cbio, path, NULL, -1); if (!ctx) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(headers); i++) { CONF_VALUE *hdr = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(headers, i); if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, hdr->name, hdr->value)) goto err; } if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(ctx, req)) goto err; for (;;) { rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&rsp, ctx); if (rv != -1) break; if (req_timeout == -1) continue; FD_ZERO(&confds); openssl_fdset(fd, &confds); tv.tv_usec = 0; tv.tv_sec = req_timeout; if (BIO_should_read(cbio)) rv = select(fd + 1, (void *)&confds, NULL, NULL, &tv); else if (BIO_should_write(cbio)) rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv); else { BIO_puts(err, "Unexpected retry condition\n"); goto err; } if (rv == 0) { BIO_puts(err, "Timeout on request\n"); break; } if (rv == -1) { BIO_puts(err, "Select error\n"); break; } } err: if (ctx) OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx); return rsp; } OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req, const char *host, const char *path, const char *port, int use_ssl, const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers, int req_timeout) { BIO *cbio = NULL; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; cbio = BIO_new_connect(host); if (!cbio) { BIO_printf(err, "Error creating connect BIO\n"); goto end; } if (port) BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port); if (use_ssl == 1) { BIO *sbio; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method()); if (ctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(err, "Error creating SSL context.\n"); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1); cbio = BIO_push(sbio, cbio); } resp = query_responder(err, cbio, path, headers, req, req_timeout); if (!resp) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responder\n"); end: if (cbio) BIO_free_all(cbio); if (ctx) SSL_CTX_free(ctx); return resp; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/passwd.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/passwd.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/passwd.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,494 +1,494 @@ /* apps/passwd.c */ #if defined OPENSSL_NO_MD5 || defined CHARSET_EBCDIC # define NO_MD5CRYPT_1 #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) || !defined(NO_MD5CRYPT_1) # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include # endif # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 # include # endif # undef PROG # define PROG passwd_main static unsigned const char cov_2char[64] = { /* from crypto/des/fcrypt.c */ 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C, 0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6A, 0x6B, 0x6C, 0x6D, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7A }; static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, char *passwd, BIO *out, int quiet, int table, int reverse, size_t pw_maxlen, int usecrypt, int use1, int useapr1); /*- * -crypt - standard Unix password algorithm (default) * -1 - MD5-based password algorithm * -apr1 - MD5-based password algorithm, Apache variant * -salt string - salt * -in file - read passwords from file * -stdin - read passwords from stdin * -noverify - never verify when reading password from terminal * -quiet - no warnings * -table - format output as table * -reverse - switch table columns */ int MAIN(int, char **); int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { int ret = 1; char *infile = NULL; int in_stdin = 0; int in_noverify = 0; char *salt = NULL, *passwd = NULL, **passwds = NULL; char *salt_malloc = NULL, *passwd_malloc = NULL; size_t passwd_malloc_size = 0; int pw_source_defined = 0; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; int i, badopt, opt_done; int passed_salt = 0, quiet = 0, table = 0, reverse = 0; int usecrypt = 0, use1 = 0, useapr1 = 0; size_t pw_maxlen = 0; apps_startup(); if (bio_err == NULL) if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL) BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL)) goto err; out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (out == NULL) goto err; BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS { BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()); out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out); } # endif badopt = 0, opt_done = 0; i = 0; while (!badopt && !opt_done && argv[++i] != NULL) { if (strcmp(argv[i], "-crypt") == 0) usecrypt = 1; else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-1") == 0) use1 = 1; else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-apr1") == 0) useapr1 = 1; else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-salt") == 0) { if ((argv[i + 1] != NULL) && (salt == NULL)) { passed_salt = 1; salt = argv[++i]; } else badopt = 1; } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-in") == 0) { if ((argv[i + 1] != NULL) && !pw_source_defined) { pw_source_defined = 1; infile = argv[++i]; } else badopt = 1; } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-stdin") == 0) { if (!pw_source_defined) { pw_source_defined = 1; in_stdin = 1; } else badopt = 1; } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-noverify") == 0) in_noverify = 1; else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-quiet") == 0) quiet = 1; else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-table") == 0) table = 1; else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-reverse") == 0) reverse = 1; else if (argv[i][0] == '-') badopt = 1; else if (!pw_source_defined) /* non-option arguments, use as passwords */ { pw_source_defined = 1; passwds = &argv[i]; opt_done = 1; } else badopt = 1; } if (!usecrypt && !use1 && !useapr1) /* use default */ usecrypt = 1; if (usecrypt + use1 + useapr1 > 1) /* conflict */ badopt = 1; /* reject unsupported algorithms */ # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (usecrypt) badopt = 1; # endif # ifdef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 if (use1 || useapr1) badopt = 1; # endif if (badopt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage: passwd [options] [passwords]\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n"); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES BIO_printf(bio_err, "-crypt standard Unix password algorithm (default)\n"); # endif # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 BIO_printf(bio_err, "-1 MD5-based password algorithm\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-apr1 MD5-based password algorithm, Apache variant\n"); # endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "-salt string use provided salt\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-in file read passwords from file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-stdin read passwords from stdin\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-noverify never verify when reading password from terminal\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-quiet no warnings\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-table format output as table\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-reverse switch table columns\n"); goto err; } if ((infile != NULL) || in_stdin) { in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) goto err; if (infile != NULL) { assert(in_stdin == 0); if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) goto err; } else { assert(in_stdin); BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); } } if (usecrypt) pw_maxlen = 8; else if (use1 || useapr1) pw_maxlen = 256; /* arbitrary limit, should be enough for most * passwords */ if (passwds == NULL) { /* no passwords on the command line */ passwd_malloc_size = pw_maxlen + 2; /* * longer than necessary so that we can warn about truncation */ passwd = passwd_malloc = OPENSSL_malloc(passwd_malloc_size); if (passwd_malloc == NULL) goto err; } if ((in == NULL) && (passwds == NULL)) { /* build a null-terminated list */ static char *passwds_static[2] = { NULL, NULL }; passwds = passwds_static; if (in == NULL) if (EVP_read_pw_string (passwd_malloc, passwd_malloc_size, "Password: ", !(passed_salt || in_noverify)) != 0) goto err; passwds[0] = passwd_malloc; } if (in == NULL) { assert(passwds != NULL); assert(*passwds != NULL); do { /* loop over list of passwords */ passwd = *passwds++; if (!do_passwd(passed_salt, &salt, &salt_malloc, passwd, out, quiet, table, reverse, pw_maxlen, usecrypt, use1, useapr1)) goto err; } while (*passwds != NULL); } else /* in != NULL */ { int done; assert(passwd != NULL); do { int r = BIO_gets(in, passwd, pw_maxlen + 1); if (r > 0) { char *c = (strchr(passwd, '\n')); if (c != NULL) *c = 0; /* truncate at newline */ else { /* ignore rest of line */ char trash[BUFSIZ]; do r = BIO_gets(in, trash, sizeof(trash)); while ((r > 0) && (!strchr(trash, '\n'))); } if (!do_passwd(passed_salt, &salt, &salt_malloc, passwd, out, quiet, table, reverse, pw_maxlen, usecrypt, use1, useapr1)) goto err; } done = (r <= 0); } while (!done); } ret = 0; err: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (salt_malloc) OPENSSL_free(salt_malloc); if (passwd_malloc) OPENSSL_free(passwd_malloc); if (in) BIO_free(in); if (out) BIO_free_all(out); apps_shutdown(); OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); } # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 /* * MD5-based password algorithm (should probably be available as a library * function; then the static buffer would not be acceptable). For magic * string "1", this should be compatible to the MD5-based BSD password * algorithm. For 'magic' string "apr1", this is compatible to the MD5-based * Apache password algorithm. (Apparently, the Apache password algorithm is * identical except that the 'magic' string was changed -- the laziest * application of the NIH principle I've ever encountered.) */ static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt) { /* "$apr1$..salt..$.......md5hash..........\0" */ static char out_buf[6 + 9 + 24 + 2]; unsigned char buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; char *salt_out; int n; unsigned int i; EVP_MD_CTX md, md2; size_t passwd_len, salt_len; passwd_len = strlen(passwd); out_buf[0] = '$'; out_buf[1] = 0; assert(strlen(magic) <= 4); /* "1" or "apr1" */ - strncat(out_buf, magic, 4); - strncat(out_buf, "$", 1); - strncat(out_buf, salt, 8); + BUF_strlcat(out_buf, magic, sizeof(out_buf)); + BUF_strlcat(out_buf, "$", sizeof(out_buf)); + BUF_strlcat(out_buf, salt, sizeof(out_buf)); assert(strlen(out_buf) <= 6 + 8); /* "$apr1$..salt.." */ salt_out = out_buf + 2 + strlen(magic); salt_len = strlen(salt_out); assert(salt_len <= 8); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md, EVP_md5(), NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, passwd, passwd_len); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, "$", 1); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, magic, strlen(magic)); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, "$", 1); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, salt_out, salt_len); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md2); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md2, EVP_md5(), NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, passwd, passwd_len); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, salt_out, salt_len); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, passwd, passwd_len); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md2, buf, NULL); for (i = passwd_len; i > sizeof(buf); i -= sizeof(buf)) EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buf, sizeof(buf)); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buf, i); n = passwd_len; while (n) { EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, (n & 1) ? "\0" : passwd, 1); n >>= 1; } EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md, buf, NULL); for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md2, EVP_md5(), NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, (i & 1) ? (unsigned const char *)passwd : buf, (i & 1) ? passwd_len : sizeof(buf)); if (i % 3) EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, salt_out, salt_len); if (i % 7) EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, passwd, passwd_len); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md2, (i & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)passwd, (i & 1) ? sizeof(buf) : passwd_len); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md2, buf, NULL); } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md2); { /* transform buf into output string */ unsigned char buf_perm[sizeof(buf)]; int dest, source; char *output; /* silly output permutation */ for (dest = 0, source = 0; dest < 14; dest++, source = (source + 6) % 17) buf_perm[dest] = buf[source]; buf_perm[14] = buf[5]; buf_perm[15] = buf[11]; # ifndef PEDANTIC /* Unfortunately, this generates a "no * effect" warning */ assert(16 == sizeof(buf_perm)); # endif output = salt_out + salt_len; assert(output == out_buf + strlen(out_buf)); *output++ = '$'; for (i = 0; i < 15; i += 3) { *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i + 2] & 0x3f]; *output++ = cov_2char[((buf_perm[i + 1] & 0xf) << 2) | (buf_perm[i + 2] >> 6)]; *output++ = cov_2char[((buf_perm[i] & 3) << 4) | (buf_perm[i + 1] >> 4)]; *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] >> 2]; } assert(i == 15); *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] & 0x3f]; *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] >> 6]; *output = 0; assert(strlen(out_buf) < sizeof(out_buf)); } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md); return out_buf; } # endif static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, char *passwd, BIO *out, int quiet, int table, int reverse, size_t pw_maxlen, int usecrypt, int use1, int useapr1) { char *hash = NULL; assert(salt_p != NULL); assert(salt_malloc_p != NULL); /* first make sure we have a salt */ if (!passed_salt) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (usecrypt) { if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) { *salt_p = *salt_malloc_p = OPENSSL_malloc(3); if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) goto err; } if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) <= 0) goto err; (*salt_p)[0] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[0] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[1] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[1] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[2] = 0; # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(*salt_p, *salt_p, 2); /* des_crypt will convert back * to ASCII */ # endif } # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DES */ # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 if (use1 || useapr1) { int i; if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) { *salt_p = *salt_malloc_p = OPENSSL_malloc(9); if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) goto err; } if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) (*salt_p)[i] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[i] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[8] = 0; } # endif /* !NO_MD5CRYPT_1 */ } assert(*salt_p != NULL); /* truncate password if necessary */ if ((strlen(passwd) > pw_maxlen)) { if (!quiet) /* * XXX: really we should know how to print a size_t, not cast it */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: truncating password to %u characters\n", (unsigned)pw_maxlen); passwd[pw_maxlen] = 0; } assert(strlen(passwd) <= pw_maxlen); /* now compute password hash */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (usecrypt) hash = DES_crypt(passwd, *salt_p); # endif # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 if (use1 || useapr1) hash = md5crypt(passwd, (use1 ? "1" : "apr1"), *salt_p); # endif assert(hash != NULL); if (table && !reverse) BIO_printf(out, "%s\t%s\n", passwd, hash); else if (table && reverse) BIO_printf(out, "%s\t%s\n", hash, passwd); else BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", hash); return 1; err: return 0; } #else int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { fputs("Program not available.\n", stderr) OPENSSL_EXIT(1); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_apps.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_apps.h (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_apps.h (revision 337764) @@ -1,212 +1,211 @@ /* apps/s_apps.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* conflicts with winsock2 stuff on netware */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # include #endif #include #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # include #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) # define _kbhit kbhit #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(FD_SET) /* * VAX C does not defined fd_set and friends, but it's actually quite simple */ /* These definitions are borrowed from SOCKETSHR. /Richard Levitte */ # define MAX_NOFILE 32 # define NBBY 8 /* number of bits in a byte */ # ifndef FD_SETSIZE # define FD_SETSIZE MAX_NOFILE # endif /* FD_SETSIZE */ /* How many things we'll allow select to use. 0 if unlimited */ # define MAXSELFD MAX_NOFILE typedef int fd_mask; /* int here! VMS prototypes int, not long */ # define NFDBITS (sizeof(fd_mask) * NBBY)/* bits per mask (power of 2!) */ # define NFDSHIFT 5 /* Shift based on above */ typedef fd_mask fd_set; # define FD_SET(n, p) (*(p) |= (1 << ((n) % NFDBITS))) # define FD_CLR(n, p) (*(p) &= ~(1 << ((n) % NFDBITS))) # define FD_ISSET(n, p) (*(p) & (1 << ((n) % NFDBITS))) # define FD_ZERO(p) memset((char *)(p), 0, sizeof(*(p))) #endif #define PORT 4433 #define PORT_STR "4433" #define PROTOCOL "tcp" int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, - int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, int stype, - unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context, - int naccept); + int (*cb) (int s, int stype, unsigned char *context), + unsigned char *context, int naccept); #ifdef HEADER_X509_H int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); #endif #ifdef HEADER_SSL_H int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file); int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int build_chain); int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s); int ssl_print_point_formats(BIO *out, SSL *s); int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared); #endif int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s); int init_client(int *sock, char *server, int port, int type); int should_retry(int i); int extract_port(char *str, short *port_ptr); int extract_host_port(char *str, char **host_ptr, unsigned char *ip, short *p); long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret); #ifdef HEADER_SSL_H void MS_CALLBACK apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret); void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); #endif int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len); int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len); typedef struct ssl_excert_st SSL_EXCERT; void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc); void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc); int args_excert(char ***pargs, int *pargc, int *badarg, BIO *err, SSL_EXCERT **pexc); int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc, BIO *err); void print_ssl_summary(BIO *bio, SSL *s); #ifdef HEADER_SSL_H int args_ssl(char ***pargs, int *pargc, SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, int *badarg, BIO *err, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **pstr, int *no_prot_opt); int args_ssl_call(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO *err, SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str, int no_ecdhe, int no_jpake); int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download); int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *vfyCApath, const char *vfyCAfile, const char *chCApath, const char *chCAfile, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download); #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_client.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_client.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_client.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,2364 +1,2364 @@ /* apps/s_client.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # define APPS_WIN16 #endif /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #define USE_SOCKETS #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include #endif #include "s_apps.h" #include "timeouts.h" #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __VMS_VER < 70000000) /* FIONBIO used as a switch to enable ioctl, and that isn't in VMS < 7.0 */ # undef FIONBIO #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) # include #endif #undef PROG #define PROG s_client_main /* * #define SSL_HOST_NAME "www.netscape.com" */ /* * #define SSL_HOST_NAME "193.118.187.102" */ #define SSL_HOST_NAME "localhost" /* no default cert. */ /* * #define TEST_CERT "client.pem" */ #undef BUFSIZZ #define BUFSIZZ 1024*8 extern int verify_depth; extern int verify_error; extern int verify_return_error; extern int verify_quiet; #ifdef FIONBIO static int c_nbio = 0; #endif static int c_Pause = 0; static int c_debug = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static int c_tlsextdebug = 0; static int c_status_req = 0; #endif static int c_msg = 0; static int c_showcerts = 0; static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL; static int keymatexportlen = 20; static void sc_usage(void); static void print_stuff(BIO *berr, SSL *con, int full); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg); #endif static BIO *bio_c_out = NULL; static BIO *bio_c_msg = NULL; static int c_quiet = 0; static int c_ign_eof = 0; static int c_brief = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* Default PSK identity and key */ static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity"; /* * char *psk_key=NULL; by default PSK is not used */ static unsigned int psk_client_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { int ret; long key_len; unsigned char *key; if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "psk_client_cb\n"); if (!hint) { /* no ServerKeyExchange message */ if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "NULL received PSK identity hint, continuing anyway\n"); } else if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Received PSK identity hint '%s'\n", hint); /* * lookup PSK identity and PSK key based on the given identity hint here */ ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "%s", psk_identity); if (ret < 0 || (unsigned int)ret > max_identity_len) goto out_err; if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity, ret); /* convert the PSK key to binary */ key = string_to_hex(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } if ((unsigned long)key_len > (unsigned long)max_psk_len) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%ld)\n", max_psk_len, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } memcpy(psk, key, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created PSK len=%ld\n", key_len); return key_len; out_err: if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK client callback\n"); return 0; } #endif static void sc_usage(void) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "usage: s_client args\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -host host - use -connect instead\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -port port - use -connect instead\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n", SSL_HOST_NAME, PORT_STR); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify_hostname host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify_email email - check peer certificate matches \"email\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify_ip ipaddr - check peer certificate matches \"ipaddr\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -cert arg - certificate file to use, PEM format assumed\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -certform arg - certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -key arg - Private key file to use, in cert file if\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " not specified but cert file is.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -keyform arg - key format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -pause - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -prexit - print session information even on connection failure\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, - " -showcerts - show all certificates in the chain\n"); + " -showcerts - Show all certificates sent by the server\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -debug - extra output\n"); #ifdef WATT32 BIO_printf(bio_err, " -wdebug - WATT-32 tcp debugging\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -msg - Show protocol messages\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio_test - more ssl protocol testing\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -state - print the 'ssl' states\n"); #ifdef FIONBIO BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio - Run with non-blocking IO\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -crlf - convert LF from terminal into CRLF\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -quiet - no s_client output\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ign_eof - ignore input eof (default when -quiet)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ign_eof - don't ignore input eof\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk_identity arg - PSK identity\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n"); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE BIO_printf(bio_err, " -jpake arg - JPAKE secret to use\n"); # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srpuser user - SRP authentification for 'user'\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srppass arg - password for 'user'\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srp_lateuser - SRP username into second ClientHello message\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srp_moregroups - Tolerate other than the known g N values.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srp_strength int - minimal length in bits for N (default %d).\n", SRP_MINIMAL_N); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl2 - just use SSLv2\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl3 - just use SSLv3\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_2 - just use TLSv1.2\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_1 - just use TLSv1.1\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -cipher - preferred cipher to use, use the 'openssl ciphers'\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " command to see what is available\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -starttls prot - use the STARTTLS command before starting TLS\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " for those protocols that support it, where\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " 'prot' defines which one to assume. Currently,\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " only \"smtp\", \"pop3\", \"imap\", \"ftp\" and \"xmpp\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " are supported.\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE BIO_printf(bio_err, " -engine id - Initialise and use the specified engine\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR, LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -sess_out arg - file to write SSL session to\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -sess_in arg - file to read SSL session from\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT BIO_printf(bio_err, " -servername host - Set TLS extension servername in ClientHello\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -status - request certificate status from server\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -serverinfo types - send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -curves arg - Elliptic curves to advertise (colon-separated list)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -client_sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support for client\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " certificate authentication (colon-separated list)\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -alpn arg - enable ALPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP BIO_printf(bio_err, " -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -keymatexportlen len - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct tlsextctx_st { BIO *biodebug; int ack; } tlsextctx; static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg; const char *hn = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (SSL_get_servername_type(s) != -1) p->ack = !SSL_session_reused(s) && hn != NULL; else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use SSL_get_servername\n"); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */ typedef struct srp_arg_st { char *srppassin; char *srplogin; int msg; /* copy from c_msg */ int debug; /* copy from c_debug */ int amp; /* allow more groups */ int strength /* minimal size for N */ ; } SRP_ARG; # define SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64 static int srp_Verify_N_and_g(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g) { BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); BIGNUM *p = BN_new(); BIGNUM *r = BN_new(); int ret = g != NULL && N != NULL && bn_ctx != NULL && BN_is_odd(N) && BN_is_prime_ex(N, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) && p != NULL && BN_rshift1(p, N) && /* p = (N-1)/2 */ BN_is_prime_ex(p, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) && r != NULL && /* verify g^((N-1)/2) == -1 (mod N) */ BN_mod_exp(r, g, p, N, bn_ctx) && BN_add_word(r, 1) && BN_cmp(r, N) == 0; if (r) BN_free(r); if (p) BN_free(p); if (bn_ctx) BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); return ret; } /*- * This callback is used here for two purposes: * - extended debugging * - making some primality tests for unknown groups * The callback is only called for a non default group. * * An application does not need the call back at all if * only the stanard groups are used. In real life situations, * client and server already share well known groups, * thus there is no need to verify them. * Furthermore, in case that a server actually proposes a group that * is not one of those defined in RFC 5054, it is more appropriate * to add the group to a static list and then compare since * primality tests are rather cpu consuming. */ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_verify_param_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg; BIGNUM *N = NULL, *g = NULL; if (!(N = SSL_get_srp_N(s)) || !(g = SSL_get_srp_g(s))) return 0; if (srp_arg->debug || srp_arg->msg || srp_arg->amp == 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters:\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tN="); BN_print(bio_err, N); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\tg="); BN_print(bio_err, g); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); } if (SRP_check_known_gN_param(g, N)) return 1; if (srp_arg->amp == 1) { if (srp_arg->debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g are not known params, going to check deeper.\n"); /* * The srp_moregroups is a real debugging feature. Implementors * should rather add the value to the known ones. The minimal size * has already been tested. */ if (BN_num_bits(g) <= BN_BITS && srp_Verify_N_and_g(N, g)) return 1; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g rejected.\n"); return 0; } # define PWD_STRLEN 1024 static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg; char *pass = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PWD_STRLEN + 1); PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; int l; if (!pass) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n"); return NULL; } cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin; cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user"; if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n"); OPENSSL_free(pass); return NULL; } *(pass + l) = '\0'; return pass; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP char *srtp_profiles = NULL; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { unsigned char *data; unsigned short len; int status; } tlsextnextprotoctx; static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg; if (!c_quiet) { /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ unsigned i; BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: "); for (i = 0; i < inlen;) { if (i) BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2); BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); i += in[i] + 1; } BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1); } ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } # endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ static int serverinfo_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { char pem_name[100]; unsigned char ext_buf[4 + 65536]; /* Reconstruct the type/len fields prior to extension data */ inlen &= 0xffff; /* for formal memcpy correctness */ ext_buf[0] = (unsigned char)(ext_type >> 8); ext_buf[1] = (unsigned char)(ext_type); ext_buf[2] = (unsigned char)(inlen >> 8); ext_buf[3] = (unsigned char)(inlen); memcpy(ext_buf + 4, in, inlen); BIO_snprintf(pem_name, sizeof(pem_name), "SERVERINFO FOR EXTENSION %d", ext_type); PEM_write_bio(bio_c_out, pem_name, "", ext_buf, 4 + inlen); return 1; } #endif enum { PROTO_OFF = 0, PROTO_SMTP, PROTO_POP3, PROTO_IMAP, PROTO_FTP, PROTO_XMPP }; int MAIN(int, char **); int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { int build_chain = 0; SSL *con = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_CTX *kctx; #endif int s, k, width, state = 0; char *cbuf = NULL, *sbuf = NULL, *mbuf = NULL; int cbuf_len, cbuf_off; int sbuf_len, sbuf_off; fd_set readfds, writefds; short port = PORT; int full_log = 1; char *host = SSL_HOST_NAME; char *cert_file = NULL, *key_file = NULL, *chain_file = NULL; int cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, key_format = FORMAT_PEM; char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL; X509 *cert = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL; char *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL; char *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL; int reconnect = 0, badop = 0, verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; int crlf = 0; int write_tty, read_tty, write_ssl, read_ssl, tty_on, ssl_pending; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; int ret = 1, in_init = 1, i, nbio_test = 0; int starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF; int prexit = 0; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; int badarg = 0; const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL; int socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; BIO *sbio; char *inrand = NULL; int mbuf_len = 0; struct timeval timeout, *timeoutp; char *engine_id = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE char *ssl_client_engine_id = NULL; ENGINE *ssl_client_engine = NULL; #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) struct timeval tv; # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) int stdin_set = 0; # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT char *servername = NULL; tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, 0 }; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; # endif const char *alpn_in = NULL; # define MAX_SI_TYPES 100 unsigned short serverinfo_types[MAX_SI_TYPES]; int serverinfo_types_count = 0; #endif char *sess_in = NULL; char *sess_out = NULL; struct sockaddr peer; int peerlen = sizeof(peer); int fallback_scsv = 0; int enable_timeouts = 0; long socket_mtu = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE static char *jpake_secret = NULL; # define no_jpake !jpake_secret #else # define no_jpake 1 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srppass = NULL; int srp_lateuser = 0; SRP_ARG srp_arg = { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1024 }; #endif SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL; char *crl_file = NULL; int crl_format = FORMAT_PEM; int crl_download = 0; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; int prot_opt = 0, no_prot_opt = 0; meth = SSLv23_client_method(); apps_startup(); c_Pause = 0; c_quiet = 0; c_ign_eof = 0; c_debug = 0; c_msg = 0; c_showcerts = 0; if (bio_err == NULL) bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL)) goto end; cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); if (!cctx) goto end; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE); if (((cbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) || ((sbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) || ((mbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n"); goto end; } verify_depth = 0; verify_error = X509_V_OK; #ifdef FIONBIO c_nbio = 0; #endif argc--; argv++; while (argc >= 1) { if (strcmp(*argv, "-host") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; host = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-port") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; port = atoi(*(++argv)); if (port == 0) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-connect") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; if (!extract_host_port(*(++argv), &host, NULL, &port)) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify") == 0) { verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; if (--argc < 1) goto bad; verify_depth = atoi(*(++argv)); if (!c_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_depth); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; cert_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CRL") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; crl_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_download") == 0) crl_download = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sess_out") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; sess_out = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sess_in") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; sess_in = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-certform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; cert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CRLform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; crl_format = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (args_verify(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm)) { if (badarg) goto bad; continue; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify_return_error") == 0) verify_return_error = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify_quiet") == 0) verify_quiet = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-brief") == 0) { c_brief = 1; verify_quiet = 1; c_quiet = 1; } else if (args_excert(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &exc)) { if (badarg) goto bad; continue; } else if (args_ssl(&argv, &argc, cctx, &badarg, bio_err, &ssl_args, &no_prot_opt)) { if (badarg) goto bad; continue; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-prexit") == 0) prexit = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlf") == 0) crlf = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-quiet") == 0) { c_quiet = 1; c_ign_eof = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ign_eof") == 0) c_ign_eof = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ign_eof") == 0) c_ign_eof = 0; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pause") == 0) c_Pause = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-debug") == 0) c_debug = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tlsextdebug") == 0) c_tlsextdebug = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status") == 0) c_status_req = 1; #endif #ifdef WATT32 else if (strcmp(*argv, "-wdebug") == 0) dbug_init(); #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msg") == 0) c_msg = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msgfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; bio_c_msg = BIO_new_file(*(++argv), "w"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE else if (strcmp(*argv, "-trace") == 0) c_msg = 2; #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-showcerts") == 0) c_showcerts = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio_test") == 0) nbio_test = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-state") == 0) state = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk_identity") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; psk_identity = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) { size_t j; if (--argc < 1) goto bad; psk_key = *(++argv); for (j = 0; j < strlen(psk_key); j++) { if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[j])) continue; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv); goto bad; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuser") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; srp_arg.srplogin = *(++argv); meth = TLSv1_client_method(); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srppass") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; srppass = *(++argv); meth = TLSv1_client_method(); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srp_strength") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; srp_arg.strength = atoi(*(++argv)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP minimal length for N is %d\n", srp_arg.strength); meth = TLSv1_client_method(); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srp_lateuser") == 0) { srp_lateuser = 1; meth = TLSv1_client_method(); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srp_moregroups") == 0) { srp_arg.amp = 1; meth = TLSv1_client_method(); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0) { meth = SSLv2_client_method(); prot_opt++; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0) { meth = SSLv3_client_method(); prot_opt++; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_2") == 0) { meth = TLSv1_2_client_method(); prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_1") == 0) { meth = TLSv1_1_client_method(); prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0) { meth = TLSv1_client_method(); prot_opt++; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls") == 0) { meth = DTLS_client_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) { meth = DTLSv1_client_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1_2") == 0) { meth = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-timeout") == 0) enable_timeouts = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-mtu") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv)); } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-fallback_scsv") == 0) { fallback_scsv = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; key_format = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pass") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; passarg = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert_chain") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; chain_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; key_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reconnect") == 0) { reconnect = 5; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; CApath = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-chainCApath") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; chCApath = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verifyCApath") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; vfyCApath = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-build_chain") == 0) build_chain = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; CAfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-chainCAfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; chCAfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verifyCAfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; vfyCAfile = *(++argv); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nextprotoneg") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); } # endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; alpn_in = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverinfo") == 0) { char *c; int start = 0; int len; if (--argc < 1) goto bad; c = *(++argv); serverinfo_types_count = 0; len = strlen(c); for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) { if (i == len || c[i] == ',') { serverinfo_types[serverinfo_types_count] = atoi(c + start); serverinfo_types_count++; start = i + 1; } if (serverinfo_types_count == MAX_SI_TYPES) break; } } #endif #ifdef FIONBIO else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio") == 0) { c_nbio = 1; } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-starttls") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; ++argv; if (strcmp(*argv, "smtp") == 0) starttls_proto = PROTO_SMTP; else if (strcmp(*argv, "pop3") == 0) starttls_proto = PROTO_POP3; else if (strcmp(*argv, "imap") == 0) starttls_proto = PROTO_IMAP; else if (strcmp(*argv, "ftp") == 0) starttls_proto = PROTO_FTP; else if (strcmp(*argv, "xmpp") == 0) starttls_proto = PROTO_XMPP; else goto bad; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; engine_id = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl_client_engine") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; ssl_client_engine_id = *(++argv); } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rand") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; inrand = *(++argv); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (strcmp(*argv, "-servername") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; servername = *(++argv); /* meth=TLSv1_client_method(); */ } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE else if (strcmp(*argv, "-jpake") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; jpake_secret = *++argv; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (strcmp(*argv, "-use_srtp") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; srtp_profiles = *(++argv); } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexport") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keymatexportlabel = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexportlen") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keymatexportlen = atoi(*(++argv)); if (keymatexportlen == 0) goto bad; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv); badop = 1; break; } argc--; argv++; } if (badop) { bad: sc_usage(); goto end; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK) if (jpake_secret) { if (psk_key) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use JPAKE and PSK together\n"); goto end; } psk_identity = "JPAKE"; } #endif if (prot_opt > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply multiple protocol flags\n"); goto end; } if (prot_opt == 1 && no_prot_opt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply both a protocol flag and " "\"-no_\"\n"); goto end; } OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); SSL_load_error_strings(); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) next_proto.status = -1; if (next_proto_neg_in) { next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); if (next_proto.data == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n"); goto end; } } else next_proto.data = NULL; #endif e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (ssl_client_engine_id) { ssl_client_engine = ENGINE_by_id(ssl_client_engine_id); if (!ssl_client_engine) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting client auth engine\n"); goto end; } } #endif if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (key_file == NULL) key_file = cert_file; if (key_file) { key = load_key(bio_err, key_file, key_format, 0, pass, e, "client certificate private key file"); if (!key) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (cert_file) { cert = load_cert(bio_err, cert_file, cert_format, NULL, e, "client certificate file"); if (!cert) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (chain_file) { chain = load_certs(bio_err, chain_file, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "client certificate chain"); if (!chain) goto end; } if (crl_file) { X509_CRL *crl; crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format); if (!crl) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (!crls || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_CRL_free(crl); goto end; } } if (!load_excert(&exc, bio_err)) goto end; if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, 1) && inrand == NULL && !RAND_status()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n"); } if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); if (bio_c_out == NULL) { if (c_quiet && !c_debug) { bio_c_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); if (c_msg && !bio_c_msg) bio_c_msg = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); } else { if (bio_c_out == NULL) bio_c_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!app_passwd(bio_err, srppass, NULL, &srp_arg.srppassin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } #endif ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (vpm) SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm); if (!args_ssl_call(ctx, bio_err, cctx, ssl_args, 1, no_jpake)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile, crls, crl_download)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (ssl_client_engine) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ctx, ssl_client_engine)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting client auth engine\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine); goto end; } ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE if (psk_key != NULL) # else if (psk_key != NULL || jpake_secret) # endif { if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "PSK key given or JPAKE in use, setting client callback\n"); SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_cb); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (srtp_profiles != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles); #endif if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto.data) SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); # endif if (alpn_in) { unsigned short alpn_len; unsigned char *alpn = next_protos_parse(&alpn_len, alpn_in); if (alpn == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -alpn argument\n"); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx, alpn, alpn_len); OPENSSL_free(alpn); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT for (i = 0; i < serverinfo_types_count; i++) { SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(ctx, serverinfo_types[i], NULL, NULL, NULL, serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL); } #endif if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback); #if 0 else SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, getenv("SSL_CIPHER")); #endif SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback); if ((CAfile || CApath) && !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, crl_download); if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, cert, key, chain, build_chain)) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (servername != NULL) { tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_err; SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp_arg.srplogin) { if (!srp_lateuser && !SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(ctx, srp_arg.srplogin)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n"); goto end; } srp_arg.msg = c_msg; srp_arg.debug = c_debug; SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_arg); SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb); SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(ctx, srp_arg.strength); if (c_msg || c_debug || srp_arg.amp == 0) SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_verify_param_cb); } # endif #endif con = SSL_new(ctx); if (sess_in) { SSL_SESSION *sess; BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_in, "r"); if (!stmp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(stmp); if (!sess) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_set_session(con, sess); SSL_SESSION_free(sess); } if (fallback_scsv) SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (servername != NULL) { if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, servername)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (con && (kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) { SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(con, kctx); kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVER, host); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ /* SSL_set_cipher_list(con,"RC4-MD5"); */ #if 0 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(con, "Test client", 11); # endif #endif re_start: if (init_client(&s, host, port, socket_type) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "connect:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); SHUTDOWN(s); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "CONNECTED(%08X)\n", s); #ifdef FIONBIO if (c_nbio) { unsigned long l = 1; BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "turning on non blocking io\n"); if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &l) < 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #endif if (c_Pause & 0x01) SSL_set_debug(con, 1); if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) { sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (getsockname(s, &peer, (void *)&peerlen) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "getsockname:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); SHUTDOWN(s); goto end; } (void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(sbio, 1, &peer); if (enable_timeouts) { timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); } if (socket_mtu) { if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n", DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)); BIO_free(sbio); goto shut; } SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU); if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n"); BIO_free(sbio); goto shut; } } else /* want to do MTU discovery */ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL); } else sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } if (c_debug) { SSL_set_debug(con, 1); BIO_set_callback(sbio, bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(sbio, (char *)bio_c_out); } if (c_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (c_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_msg ? bio_c_msg : bio_c_out); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (c_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_c_out); } if (c_status_req) { SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(con, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ocsp_resp_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, bio_c_out); # if 0 { STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); OCSP_RESPID *id = OCSP_RESPID_new(); id->value.byKey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); id->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY; ASN1_STRING_set(id->value.byKey, "Hello World", -1); sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(ids, id); SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(con, ids); } # endif } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE if (jpake_secret) jpake_client_auth(bio_c_out, sbio, jpake_secret); #endif SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_connect_state(con); /* ok, lets connect */ if (fileno_stdin() > SSL_get_fd(con)) width = fileno_stdin() + 1; else width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1; read_tty = 1; write_tty = 0; tty_on = 0; read_ssl = 1; write_ssl = 1; cbuf_len = 0; cbuf_off = 0; sbuf_len = 0; sbuf_off = 0; /* This is an ugly hack that does a lot of assumptions */ /* * We do have to handle multi-line responses which may come in a single * packet or not. We therefore have to use BIO_gets() which does need a * buffering BIO. So during the initial chitchat we do push a buffering * BIO into the chain that is removed again later on to not disturb the * rest of the s_client operation. */ if (starttls_proto == PROTO_SMTP) { int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end from SMTP */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); /* STARTTLS command requires EHLO... */ BIO_printf(fbio, "EHLO openssl.client.net\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end EHLO SMTP response */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "didn't found starttls in server response," " try anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_POP3) { BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); BIO_printf(sbio, "STLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_IMAP) { int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); /* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITY... */ BIO_printf(fbio, ". CAPABILITY\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* wait for multi-line CAPABILITY response */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[0] != '.'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "didn't found STARTTLS in server response," " try anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, ". STARTTLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_FTP) { BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end from FTP */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); BIO_printf(sbio, "AUTH TLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } if (starttls_proto == PROTO_XMPP) { int seen = 0; BIO_printf(sbio, "", host); seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); mbuf[seen] = 0; while (!strstr (mbuf, "")) goto shut; seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (seen <= 0) goto shut; mbuf[seen] = 0; } BIO_printf(sbio, ""); seen = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); sbuf[seen] = 0; if (!strstr(sbuf, " 0) full_log--; if (starttls_proto) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", mbuf); /* We don't need to know any more */ starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF; } if (reconnect) { reconnect--; BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "drop connection and then reconnect\n"); SSL_shutdown(con); SSL_set_connect_state(con); SHUTDOWN(SSL_get_fd(con)); goto re_start; } } } ssl_pending = read_ssl && SSL_pending(con); if (!ssl_pending) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined (OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) if (tty_on) { if (read_tty) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdin(), &readfds); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (write_tty) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdout(), &writefds); #endif } if (read_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); if (write_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds); #else if (!tty_on || !write_tty) { if (read_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); if (write_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds); } #endif /*- printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n", tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/ /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler: * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or * (void *). */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) /* * Under Windows/DOS we make the assumption that we can always * write to the tty: therefore if we need to write to the tty we * just fall through. Otherwise we timeout the select every * second and see if there are any keypresses. Note: this is a * hack, in a proper Windows application we wouldn't do this. */ i = 0; if (!write_tty) { if (read_tty) { tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, &tv); # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) if (!i && (!_kbhit() || !read_tty)) continue; # else if (!i && (!((_kbhit()) || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 == WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle (STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0))) || !read_tty)) continue; # endif } else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) if (!write_tty) { if (read_tty) { tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, &tv); } else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) /* Under BeOS-R5 the situation is similar to DOS */ i = 0; stdin_set = 0; (void)fcntl(fileno_stdin(), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); if (!write_tty) { if (read_tty) { tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, &tv); if (read(fileno_stdin(), sbuf, 0) >= 0) stdin_set = 1; if (!i && (stdin_set != 1 || !read_tty)) continue; } else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); } (void)fcntl(fileno_stdin(), F_SETFL, 0); #else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); #endif if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad select %d\n", get_last_socket_error()); goto shut; /* goto end; */ } } if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occured\n"); } if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds)) { k = SSL_write(con, &(cbuf[cbuf_off]), (unsigned int)cbuf_len); switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: cbuf_off += k; cbuf_len -= k; if (k <= 0) goto end; /* we have done a write(con,NULL,0); */ if (cbuf_len <= 0) { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; } else { /* if (cbuf_len > 0) */ read_tty = 0; write_ssl = 1; } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write W BLOCK\n"); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write R BLOCK\n"); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; write_ssl = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write X BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: if (cbuf_len != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "shutdown\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } else { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; break; } case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: if ((k != 0) || (cbuf_len != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "write:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); goto shut; } else { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; } break; case SSL_ERROR_SSL: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; } } #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* Assume Windows/DOS/BeOS can always write */ else if (!ssl_pending && write_tty) #else else if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(fileno_stdout(), &writefds)) #endif { #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), &(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len); #endif i = raw_write_stdout(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len); if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "DONE\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; /* goto end; */ } sbuf_len -= i;; sbuf_off += i; if (sbuf_len <= 0) { read_ssl = 1; write_tty = 0; } } else if (ssl_pending || FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds)) { #ifdef RENEG { static int iiii; if (++iiii == 52) { SSL_renegotiate(con); iiii = 0; } } #endif #if 1 k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 1024 /* BUFSIZZ */ ); #else /* Demo for pending and peek :-) */ k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 16); { char zbuf[10240]; printf("read=%d pending=%d peek=%d\n", k, SSL_pending(con), SSL_peek(con, zbuf, 10240)); } #endif switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: if (k <= 0) goto end; sbuf_off = 0; sbuf_len = k; read_ssl = 0; write_tty = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read W BLOCK\n"); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0)) write_ssl = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read X BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: ret = get_last_socket_error(); if (c_brief) BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED BY SERVER\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "read:errno=%d\n", ret); goto shut; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "closed\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; case SSL_ERROR_SSL: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; /* break; */ } } #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) else if (_kbhit()) # else else if ((_kbhit()) || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 == WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0))) # endif #elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) else if (_kbhit()) #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) else if (stdin_set) #else else if (FD_ISSET(fileno_stdin(), &readfds)) #endif { if (crlf) { int j, lf_num; i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ / 2); lf_num = 0; /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) if (cbuf[j] == '\n') lf_num++; for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { cbuf[j + lf_num] = cbuf[j]; if (cbuf[j] == '\n') { lf_num--; i++; cbuf[j + lf_num] = '\r'; } } assert(lf_num == 0); } else i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ); if ((!c_ign_eof) && ((i <= 0) || (cbuf[0] == 'Q'))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DONE\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'R')) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATING\n"); SSL_renegotiate(con); cbuf_len = 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'B')) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n"); SSL_heartbeat(con); cbuf_len = 0; } #endif else { cbuf_len = i; cbuf_off = 0; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(cbuf, cbuf, i); #endif } write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; } } ret = 0; shut: if (in_init) print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log); SSL_shutdown(con); SHUTDOWN(SSL_get_fd(con)); end: if (con != NULL) { if (prexit != 0) print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, 1); SSL_free(con); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto.data) OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data); #endif if (ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx); if (cert) X509_free(cert); if (crls) sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); if (key) EVP_PKEY_free(key); if (chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); if (pass) OPENSSL_free(pass); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin); #endif if (vpm) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); ssl_excert_free(exc); if (ssl_args) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args); if (cctx) SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE if (jpake_secret && psk_key) OPENSSL_free(psk_key); #endif if (cbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(cbuf, BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(cbuf); } if (sbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(sbuf, BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(sbuf); } if (mbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(mbuf, BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(mbuf); } release_engine(e); if (bio_c_out != NULL) { BIO_free(bio_c_out); bio_c_out = NULL; } if (bio_c_msg != NULL) { BIO_free(bio_c_msg); bio_c_msg = NULL; } SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(); apps_shutdown(); OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); } static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full) { X509 *peer = NULL; char *p; static const char *space = " "; char buf[BUFSIZ]; STACK_OF(X509) *sk; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk2; const SSL_CIPHER *c; X509_NAME *xn; int j, i; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const COMP_METHOD *comp, *expansion; #endif unsigned char *exportedkeymat; if (full) { int got_a_chain = 0; sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(s); if (sk != NULL) { got_a_chain = 1; /* we don't have it for SSL2 (yet) */ BIO_printf(bio, "---\nCertificate chain\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)), buf, sizeof(buf)); BIO_printf(bio, "%2d s:%s\n", i, buf); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)), buf, sizeof(buf)); BIO_printf(bio, " i:%s\n", buf); if (c_showcerts) PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, sk_X509_value(sk, i)); } } BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s); if (peer != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio, "Server certificate\n"); /* Redundant if we showed the whole chain */ if (!(c_showcerts && got_a_chain)) PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, peer); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf)); BIO_printf(bio, "subject=%s\n", buf); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf)); BIO_printf(bio, "issuer=%s\n", buf); } else BIO_printf(bio, "no peer certificate available\n"); sk2 = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); if ((sk2 != NULL) && (sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2) > 0)) { BIO_printf(bio, "---\nAcceptable client certificate CA names\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2); i++) { xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk2, i); X509_NAME_oneline(xn, buf, sizeof(buf)); BIO_write(bio, buf, strlen(buf)); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } } else { BIO_printf(bio, "---\nNo client certificate CA names sent\n"); } p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(s, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (p != NULL) { /* * This works only for SSL 2. In later protocol versions, the * client does not know what other ciphers (in addition to the * one to be used in the current connection) the server supports. */ BIO_printf(bio, "---\nCiphers common between both SSL endpoints:\n"); j = i = 0; while (*p) { if (*p == ':') { BIO_write(bio, space, 15 - j % 25); i++; j = 0; BIO_write(bio, ((i % 3) ? " " : "\n"), 1); } else { BIO_write(bio, p, 1); j++; } p++; } BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } ssl_print_sigalgs(bio, s); ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s); BIO_printf(bio, "---\nSSL handshake has read %ld bytes and written %ld bytes\n", BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)), BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s))); } BIO_printf(bio, (SSL_cache_hit(s) ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, ")); c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s); BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Cipher is %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); if (peer != NULL) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(peer); BIO_printf(bio, "Server public key is %d bit\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(pktmp)); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); } BIO_printf(bio, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n", SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(s) ? "" : " NOT"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP comp = SSL_get_current_compression(s); expansion = SSL_get_current_expansion(s); BIO_printf(bio, "Compression: %s\n", comp ? SSL_COMP_get_name(comp) : "NONE"); BIO_printf(bio, "Expansion: %s\n", expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE"); #endif #ifdef SSL_DEBUG { /* Print out local port of connection: useful for debugging */ int sock; struct sockaddr_in ladd; socklen_t ladd_size = sizeof(ladd); sock = SSL_get_fd(s); getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ladd, &ladd_size); BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "LOCAL PORT is %u\n", ntohs(ladd.sin_port)); } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto.status != -1) { const unsigned char *proto; unsigned int proto_len; SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len); BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status); BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } # endif { const unsigned char *proto; unsigned int proto_len; SSL_get0_alpn_selected(s, &proto, &proto_len); if (proto_len > 0) { BIO_printf(bio, "ALPN protocol: "); BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } else BIO_printf(bio, "No ALPN negotiated\n"); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(s); if (srtp_profile) BIO_printf(bio, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n", srtp_profile->name); } #endif SSL_SESSION_print(bio, SSL_get_session(s)); if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio, "Keying material exporter:\n"); BIO_printf(bio, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel); BIO_printf(bio, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen); exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen); if (exportedkeymat != NULL) { if (!SSL_export_keying_material(s, exportedkeymat, keymatexportlen, keymatexportlabel, strlen(keymatexportlabel), NULL, 0, 0)) { BIO_printf(bio, " Error\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio, " Keying material: "); for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++) BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]); BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); } OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat); } } BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); if (peer != NULL) X509_free(peer); /* flush, or debugging output gets mixed with http response */ (void)BIO_flush(bio); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { const unsigned char *p; int len; OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp; len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p); BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: "); if (!p) { BIO_puts(arg, "no response sent\n"); return 1; } rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len); if (!rsp) { BIO_puts(arg, "response parse error\n"); BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4); return 0; } BIO_puts(arg, "\n======================================\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_print(arg, rsp, 0); BIO_puts(arg, "======================================\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return 1; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_server.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_server.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_server.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,3519 +1,3530 @@ /* apps/s_server.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ /* * Until the key-gen callbacks are modified to use newer prototypes, we allow * deprecated functions for openssl-internal code */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED # undef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # define APPS_WIN16 #endif /* conflicts with winsock2 stuff on netware */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # include #endif /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include #endif #include "s_apps.h" #include "timeouts.h" #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __VMS_VER < 70000000) /* FIONBIO used as a switch to enable ioctl, and that isn't in VMS < 7.0 */ # undef FIONBIO #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength); #endif -static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); -static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); -static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); +static int sv_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); +static int www_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); +static int rev_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); static void close_accept_socket(void); static void sv_usage(void); static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *s); static void print_stats(BIO *bp, SSL_CTX *ctx); static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx); static void free_sessions(void); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile); static DH *get_dh2048(void); #endif #ifdef MONOLITH static void s_server_init(void); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = { 0xF6,0x42,0x57,0xB7,0x08,0x7F,0x08,0x17,0x72,0xA2,0xBA,0xD6, 0xA9,0x42,0xF3,0x05,0xE8,0xF9,0x53,0x11,0x39,0x4F,0xB6,0xF1, 0x6E,0xB9,0x4B,0x38,0x20,0xDA,0x01,0xA7,0x56,0xA3,0x14,0xE9, 0x8F,0x40,0x55,0xF3,0xD0,0x07,0xC6,0xCB,0x43,0xA9,0x94,0xAD, 0xF7,0x4C,0x64,0x86,0x49,0xF8,0x0C,0x83,0xBD,0x65,0xE9,0x17, 0xD4,0xA1,0xD3,0x50,0xF8,0xF5,0x59,0x5F,0xDC,0x76,0x52,0x4F, 0x3D,0x3D,0x8D,0xDB,0xCE,0x99,0xE1,0x57,0x92,0x59,0xCD,0xFD, 0xB8,0xAE,0x74,0x4F,0xC5,0xFC,0x76,0xBC,0x83,0xC5,0x47,0x30, 0x61,0xCE,0x7C,0xC9,0x66,0xFF,0x15,0xF9,0xBB,0xFD,0x91,0x5E, 0xC7,0x01,0xAA,0xD3,0x5B,0x9E,0x8D,0xA0,0xA5,0x72,0x3A,0xD4, 0x1A,0xF0,0xBF,0x46,0x00,0x58,0x2B,0xE5,0xF4,0x88,0xFD,0x58, 0x4E,0x49,0xDB,0xCD,0x20,0xB4,0x9D,0xE4,0x91,0x07,0x36,0x6B, 0x33,0x6C,0x38,0x0D,0x45,0x1D,0x0F,0x7C,0x88,0xB3,0x1C,0x7C, 0x5B,0x2D,0x8E,0xF6,0xF3,0xC9,0x23,0xC0,0x43,0xF0,0xA5,0x5B, 0x18,0x8D,0x8E,0xBB,0x55,0x8C,0xB8,0x5D,0x38,0xD3,0x34,0xFD, 0x7C,0x17,0x57,0x43,0xA3,0x1D,0x18,0x6C,0xDE,0x33,0x21,0x2C, 0xB5,0x2A,0xFF,0x3C,0xE1,0xB1,0x29,0x40,0x18,0x11,0x8D,0x7C, 0x84,0xA7,0x0A,0x72,0xD6,0x86,0xC4,0x03,0x19,0xC8,0x07,0x29, 0x7A,0xCA,0x95,0x0C,0xD9,0x96,0x9F,0xAB,0xD0,0x0A,0x50,0x9B, 0x02,0x46,0xD3,0x08,0x3D,0x66,0xA4,0x5D,0x41,0x9F,0x9C,0x7C, 0xBD,0x89,0x4B,0x22,0x19,0x26,0xBA,0xAB,0xA2,0x5E,0xC3,0x55, 0xE9,0x32,0x0B,0x3B, }; static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = { 0x02, }; DH *get_dh2048() { DH *dh; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL); dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL); if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) { DH_free(dh); return NULL; } return dh; } #endif /* static int load_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file);*/ #undef BUFSIZZ #define BUFSIZZ 16*1024 static int bufsize = BUFSIZZ; static int accept_socket = -1; #define TEST_CERT "server.pem" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # define TEST_CERT2 "server2.pem" #endif #undef PROG #define PROG s_server_main extern int verify_depth, verify_return_error, verify_quiet; static int s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; static int s_server_session_id_context = 1; /* anything will do */ static const char *s_cert_file = TEST_CERT, *s_key_file = NULL, *s_chain_file = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static const char *s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2, *s_key_file2 = NULL; #endif static char *s_dcert_file = NULL, *s_dkey_file = NULL, *s_dchain_file = NULL; #ifdef FIONBIO static int s_nbio = 0; #endif static int s_nbio_test = 0; int s_crlf = 0; static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static SSL_CTX *ctx2 = NULL; #endif static int www = 0; static BIO *bio_s_out = NULL; static BIO *bio_s_msg = NULL; static int s_debug = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static int s_tlsextdebug = 0; static int s_tlsextstatus = 0; static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg); #endif static int no_resume_ephemeral = 0; static int s_msg = 0; static int s_quiet = 0; static int s_ign_eof = 0; static int s_brief = 0; static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL; static int keymatexportlen = 20; static int hack = 0; static char *engine_id = NULL; static const char *session_id_prefix = NULL; static int enable_timeouts = 0; static long socket_mtu; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 static int cert_chain = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static BIO *serverinfo_in = NULL; static const char *s_serverinfo_file = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity"; char *psk_key = NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */ static unsigned int psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { long key_len = 0; unsigned char *key; if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "psk_server_cb\n"); if (!identity) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: client did not send PSK identity\n"); goto out_err; } if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "identity_len=%d identity=%s\n", (int)strlen(identity), identity); /* here we could lookup the given identity e.g. from a database */ if (strcmp(identity, psk_identity) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK error: client identity not found" " (got '%s' expected '%s')\n", identity, psk_identity); goto out_err; } if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK client identity found\n"); /* convert the PSK key to binary */ key = string_to_hex(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } if (key_len > (int)max_psk_len) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%ld)\n", max_psk_len, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } memcpy(psk, key, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "fetched PSK len=%ld\n", key_len); return key_len; out_err: if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK server callback\n"); return 0; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct srpsrvparm_st { char *login; SRP_VBASE *vb; SRP_user_pwd *user; } srpsrvparm; /* * This callback pretends to require some asynchronous logic in order to * obtain a verifier. When the callback is called for a new connection we * return with a negative value. This will provoke the accept etc to return * with an LOOKUP_X509. The main logic of the reinvokes the suspended call * (which would normally occur after a worker has finished) and we set the * user parameters. */ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg; int ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) { p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s); BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login); return (-1); } if (p->user == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login); goto err; } if (SSL_set_srp_server_param (s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v, p->user->info) < 0) { *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n", p->login, p->user->info); ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; err: SRP_user_pwd_free(p->user); p->user = NULL; p->login = NULL; return ret; } #endif #ifdef MONOLITH static void s_server_init(void) { accept_socket = -1; s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; s_dcert_file = NULL; s_dkey_file = NULL; s_dchain_file = NULL; s_cert_file = TEST_CERT; s_key_file = NULL; s_chain_file = NULL; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2; s_key_file2 = NULL; ctx2 = NULL; # endif # ifdef FIONBIO s_nbio = 0; # endif s_nbio_test = 0; ctx = NULL; www = 0; bio_s_out = NULL; s_debug = 0; s_msg = 0; s_quiet = 0; s_brief = 0; hack = 0; engine_id = NULL; } #endif static void sv_usage(void) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "usage: s_server [args ...]\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -accept arg - port to accept on (default is %d)\n", PORT); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify_hostname host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify_email email - check peer certificate matches \"email\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify_ip ipaddr - check peer certificate matches \"ipaddr\"\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -context arg - set session ID context\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -Verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification, must have a cert.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -cert arg - certificate file to use\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " (default is %s)\n", TEST_CERT); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT BIO_printf(bio_err, " -serverinfo arg - PEM serverinfo file for certificate\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -auth - send and receive RFC 5878 TLS auth extensions and supplemental data\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -auth_require_reneg - Do not send TLS auth extensions until renegotiation\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_resumption_on_reneg - set SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION flag\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -crl_check - check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA.\n" " The CRL(s) are appended to the certificate file\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -crl_check_all - check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA\n" " or any other CRL in the CA chain. CRL(s) are appened to the\n" " the certificate file.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -certform arg - certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -key arg - Private Key file to use, in cert file if\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " not specified (default is %s)\n", TEST_CERT); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -keyform arg - key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dcert arg - second certificate file to use (usually for DSA)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dcertform x - second certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dkey arg - second private key file to use (usually for DSA)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dkeyform arg - second key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dpass arg - second private key file pass phrase source\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dhparam arg - DH parameter file to use, in cert file if not specified\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " or a default set of parameters is used\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH BIO_printf(bio_err, " -named_curve arg - Elliptic curve name to use for ephemeral ECDH keys.\n" " Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n" " (default is nistp256).\n"); #endif #ifdef FIONBIO BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio - Run with non-blocking IO\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio_test - test with the non-blocking test bio\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -crlf - convert LF from terminal into CRLF\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -debug - Print more output\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -msg - Show protocol messages\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -state - Print the SSL states\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nocert - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -cipher arg - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -serverpref - Use server's cipher preferences\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -quiet - No server output\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tmp_rsa - Do not generate a tmp RSA key\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk_hint arg - PSK identity hint to use\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n"); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE BIO_printf(bio_err, " -jpake arg - JPAKE secret to use\n"); # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srpvfile file - The verifier file for SRP\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srpuserseed string - A seed string for a default user salt.\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl2 - Just talk SSLv2\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl3 - Just talk SSLv3\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_2 - Just talk TLSv1.2\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_1 - Just talk TLSv1.1\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1 - Just talk TLSv1\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dtls1 - Just talk DTLSv1\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dtls1_2 - Just talk DTLSv1.2\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -timeout - Enable timeouts\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -mtu - Set link layer MTU\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -chain - Read a certificate chain\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ssl2 - Just disable SSLv2\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ssl3 - Just disable SSLv3\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1 - Just disable TLSv1\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1_1 - Just disable TLSv1.1\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1_2 - Just disable TLSv1.2\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_dhe - Disable ephemeral DH\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ecdhe - Disable ephemeral ECDH\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -bugs - Turn on SSL bug compatibility\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -hack - workaround for early Netscape code\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -www - Respond to a 'GET /' with a status page\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -WWW - Respond to a 'GET / HTTP/1.0' with file ./\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -HTTP - Respond to a 'GET / HTTP/1.0' with file ./\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " with the assumption it contains a complete HTTP response.\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE BIO_printf(bio_err, " -engine id - Initialise and use the specified engine\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -id_prefix arg - Generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by 'arg'\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR, LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT BIO_printf(bio_err, " -servername host - servername for HostName TLS extension\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -servername_fatal - on mismatch send fatal alert (default warning alert)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -cert2 arg - certificate file to use for servername\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " (default is %s)\n", TEST_CERT2); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -key2 arg - Private Key file to use for servername, in cert file if\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " not specified (default is %s)\n", TEST_CERT2); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -client_sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support for client \n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " certificate authentication (colon-separated list)\n"); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n"); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP BIO_printf(bio_err, " -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n"); # endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -alpn arg - set the advertised protocols for the ALPN extension (comma-separated list)\n"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -keymatexportlen len - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -status - respond to certificate status requests\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -status_verbose - enable status request verbose printout\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -status_timeout n - status request responder timeout\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " -status_url URL - status request fallback URL\n"); } static int local_argc = 0; static char **local_argv; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi); static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a); static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl); static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl); static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr); static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size); static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str); # define BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER (18|0x0200) static BIO_METHOD methods_ebcdic = { BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER, "EBCDIC/ASCII filter", ebcdic_write, ebcdic_read, ebcdic_puts, ebcdic_gets, ebcdic_ctrl, ebcdic_new, ebcdic_free, }; typedef struct { size_t alloced; char buff[1]; } EBCDIC_OUTBUFF; BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ebcdic_filter() { return (&methods_ebcdic); } static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi) { EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf; wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + 1024); if (!wbuf) return 0; wbuf->alloced = 1024; wbuf->buff[0] = '\0'; bi->ptr = (char *)wbuf; bi->init = 1; bi->flags = 0; return (1); } static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); if (a->ptr != NULL) OPENSSL_free(a->ptr); a->ptr = NULL; a->init = 0; a->flags = 0; return (1); } static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; if (out == NULL || outl == 0) return (0); if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl); if (ret > 0) ascii2ebcdic(out, out, ret); return (ret); } static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf; int ret = 0; int num; unsigned char n; if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return (0); if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) b->ptr; if (inl > (num = wbuf->alloced)) { num = num + num; /* double the size */ if (num < inl) num = inl; wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num); if (!wbuf) return 0; OPENSSL_free(b->ptr); wbuf->alloced = num; wbuf->buff[0] = '\0'; b->ptr = (char *)wbuf; } ebcdic2ascii(wbuf->buff, in, inl); ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, wbuf->buff, inl); return (ret); } static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret; if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 0L; break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return (ret); } static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { int i, ret = 0; if (bp->next_bio == NULL) return (0); /* return(BIO_gets(bp->next_bio,buf,size));*/ for (i = 0; i < size - 1; ++i) { ret = ebcdic_read(bp, &buf[i], 1); if (ret <= 0) break; else if (buf[i] == '\n') { ++i; break; } } if (i < size) buf[i] = '\0'; return (ret < 0 && i == 0) ? ret : i; } static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { if (bp->next_bio == NULL) return (0); return ebcdic_write(bp, str, strlen(str)); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct tlsextctx_st { char *servername; BIO *biodebug; int extension_error; } tlsextctx; static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg; const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (servername && p->biodebug) BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Hostname in TLS extension: \"%s\"\n", servername); if (!p->servername) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; if (servername) { if (strcasecmp(servername, p->servername)) return p->extension_error; if (ctx2) { BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Switching server context.\n"); SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx2); } } return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } /* Structure passed to cert status callback */ typedef struct tlsextstatusctx_st { /* Default responder to use */ char *host, *path, *port; int use_ssl; int timeout; BIO *err; int verbose; } tlsextstatusctx; static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, -1, NULL, 0 }; /* * Certificate Status callback. This is called when a client includes a * certificate status request extension. This is a simplified version. It * examines certificates each time and makes one OCSP responder query for * each request. A full version would store details such as the OCSP * certificate IDs and minimise the number of OCSP responses by caching them * until they were considered "expired". */ static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { tlsextstatusctx *srctx = arg; BIO *err = srctx->err; char *host, *port, *path; int use_ssl; unsigned char *rspder = NULL; int rspderlen; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *aia = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX inctx; X509_OBJECT obj; OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int i; # if 0 STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids; SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(s, &ids); BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received %d ids\n", sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(ids)); # endif if (srctx->verbose) BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: callback called\n"); /* Build up OCSP query from server certificate */ x = SSL_get_certificate(s); aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x); if (aia) { if (!OCSP_parse_url(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0), &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) { BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: can't parse AIA URL\n"); goto err; } if (srctx->verbose) BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: AIA URL: %s\n", sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0)); } else { if (!srctx->host) { BIO_puts(srctx->err, "cert_status: no AIA and no default responder URL\n"); goto done; } host = srctx->host; path = srctx->path; port = srctx->port; use_ssl = srctx->use_ssl; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&inctx, SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s)), NULL, NULL)) goto err; if (X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&inctx, X509_LU_X509, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &obj) <= 0) { BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: Can't retrieve issuer certificate.\n"); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&inctx); goto done; } req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); if (!req) goto err; id = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, x, obj.data.x509); X509_free(obj.data.x509); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&inctx); if (!id) goto err; if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(req, id)) goto err; id = NULL; /* Add any extensions to the request */ SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(s, &exts); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); if (!OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(req, ext, -1)) goto err; } resp = process_responder(err, req, host, path, port, use_ssl, NULL, srctx->timeout); if (!resp) { BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: error querying responder\n"); goto done; } rspderlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &rspder); if (rspderlen <= 0) goto err; SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, rspder, rspderlen); if (srctx->verbose) { BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: ocsp response sent:\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_print(err, resp, 2); } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; done: if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) ERR_print_errors(err); if (aia) { OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(path); OPENSSL_free(port); X509_email_free(aia); } if (id) OCSP_CERTID_free(id); if (req) OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); if (resp) OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); return ret; err: ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; goto done; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { unsigned char *data; unsigned int len; } tlsextnextprotoctx; static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) { tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg; *data = next_proto->data; *len = next_proto->len; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } # endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ /* This the context that we pass to alpn_cb */ typedef struct tlsextalpnctx_st { unsigned char *data; unsigned short len; } tlsextalpnctx; static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { tlsextalpnctx *alpn_ctx = arg; if (!s_quiet) { /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ unsigned i; BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols advertised by the client: "); for (i = 0; i < inlen;) { if (i) BIO_write(bio_s_out, ", ", 2); BIO_write(bio_s_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); i += in[i] + 1; } BIO_write(bio_s_out, "\n", 1); } if (SSL_select_next_proto ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data, alpn_ctx->len, in, inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) { return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } if (!s_quiet) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols selected: "); BIO_write(bio_s_out, *out, *outlen); BIO_write(bio_s_out, "\n", 1); } return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ int MAIN(int, char **); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE static char *jpake_secret = NULL; # define no_jpake !jpake_secret #else # define no_jpake 1 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static srpsrvparm srp_callback_parm; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP static char *srtp_profiles = NULL; #endif int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; int badarg = 0; short port = PORT; char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL; char *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL; char *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL; unsigned char *context = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH char *dhfile = NULL; + int no_dhe = 0; +#endif int badop = 0; int ret = 1; int build_chain = 0; - int no_tmp_rsa = 0, no_dhe = 0, no_ecdhe = 0, nocert = 0; + int no_tmp_rsa = 0, no_ecdhe = 0, nocert = 0; int state = 0; const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL; int socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; ENGINE *e = NULL; char *inrand = NULL; int s_cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_key_format = FORMAT_PEM; char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL; char *dpassarg = NULL, *dpass = NULL; int s_dcert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_dkey_format = FORMAT_PEM; X509 *s_cert = NULL, *s_dcert = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *s_chain = NULL, *s_dchain = NULL; EVP_PKEY *s_key = NULL, *s_dkey = NULL; int no_cache = 0, ext_cache = 0; int rev = 0, naccept = -1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT EVP_PKEY *s_key2 = NULL; X509 *s_cert2 = NULL; tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING }; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto = { NULL, 0 }; # endif const char *alpn_in = NULL; tlsextalpnctx alpn_ctx = { NULL, 0 }; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */ static char *psk_identity_hint = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srpuserseed = NULL; char *srp_verifier_file = NULL; #endif SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL; char *crl_file = NULL; int crl_format = FORMAT_PEM; int crl_download = 0; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; int prot_opt = 0, no_prot_opt = 0; meth = SSLv23_server_method(); local_argc = argc; local_argv = argv; apps_startup(); #ifdef MONOLITH s_server_init(); #endif if (bio_err == NULL) bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL)) goto end; cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); if (!cctx) goto end; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE); verify_depth = 0; #ifdef FIONBIO s_nbio = 0; #endif s_nbio_test = 0; argc--; argv++; while (argc >= 1) { if ((strcmp(*argv, "-port") == 0) || (strcmp(*argv, "-accept") == 0)) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; if (!extract_port(*(++argv), &port)) goto bad; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-naccept") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; naccept = atol(*(++argv)); if (naccept <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad accept value %s\n", *argv); goto bad; } } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify") == 0) { s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; if (--argc < 1) goto bad; verify_depth = atoi(*(++argv)); if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_depth); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-Verify") == 0) { s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; if (--argc < 1) goto bad; verify_depth = atoi(*(++argv)); if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d, must return a certificate\n", verify_depth); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-context") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; context = (unsigned char *)*(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_cert_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CRL") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; crl_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_download") == 0) crl_download = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverinfo") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_serverinfo_file = *(++argv); } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-certform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_cert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_key_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_key_format = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pass") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; passarg = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert_chain") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_chain_file = *(++argv); - } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhparam") == 0) { + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhparam") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; dhfile = *(++argv); - } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcertform") == 0) { + } +#endif + else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcertform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_dcert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcert") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_dcert_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dkeyform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_dkey_format = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dpass") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; dpassarg = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dkey") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_dkey_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcert_chain") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_dchain_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nocert") == 0) { nocert = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; CApath = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-chainCApath") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; chCApath = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verifyCApath") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; vfyCApath = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_cache") == 0) no_cache = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ext_cache") == 0) ext_cache = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CRLform") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; crl_format = str2fmt(*(++argv)); } else if (args_verify(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm)) { if (badarg) goto bad; continue; } else if (args_excert(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &exc)) { if (badarg) goto bad; continue; } else if (args_ssl(&argv, &argc, cctx, &badarg, bio_err, &ssl_args, &no_prot_opt)) { if (badarg) goto bad; continue; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify_return_error") == 0) verify_return_error = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify_quiet") == 0) verify_quiet = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-build_chain") == 0) build_chain = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; CAfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-chainCAfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; chCAfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verifyCAfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; vfyCAfile = *(++argv); } #ifdef FIONBIO else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio") == 0) { s_nbio = 1; } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio_test") == 0) { #ifdef FIONBIO s_nbio = 1; #endif s_nbio_test = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ign_eof") == 0) s_ign_eof = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ign_eof") == 0) s_ign_eof = 0; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-debug") == 0) { s_debug = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tlsextdebug") == 0) s_tlsextdebug = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status") == 0) s_tlsextstatus = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status_verbose") == 0) { s_tlsextstatus = 1; tlscstatp.verbose = 1; } else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-status_timeout")) { s_tlsextstatus = 1; if (--argc < 1) goto bad; tlscstatp.timeout = atoi(*(++argv)); } else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-status_url")) { s_tlsextstatus = 1; if (--argc < 1) goto bad; if (!OCSP_parse_url(*(++argv), &tlscstatp.host, &tlscstatp.port, &tlscstatp.path, &tlscstatp.use_ssl)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n"); goto bad; } } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msg") == 0) { s_msg = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msgfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; bio_s_msg = BIO_new_file(*(++argv), "w"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE else if (strcmp(*argv, "-trace") == 0) { s_msg = 2; } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-hack") == 0) { hack = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-state") == 0) { state = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlf") == 0) { s_crlf = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-quiet") == 0) { s_quiet = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-brief") == 0) { s_quiet = 1; s_brief = 1; verify_quiet = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tmp_rsa") == 0) { no_tmp_rsa = 1; - } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0) { + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0) { no_dhe = 1; - } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0) { + } +#endif + else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0) { no_ecdhe = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_resume_ephemeral") == 0) { no_resume_ephemeral = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk_hint") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; psk_identity_hint = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) { size_t i; if (--argc < 1) goto bad; psk_key = *(++argv); for (i = 0; i < strlen(psk_key); i++) { if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[i])) continue; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv); goto bad; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpvfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; srp_verifier_file = *(++argv); meth = TLSv1_server_method(); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuserseed") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; srpuserseed = *(++argv); meth = TLSv1_server_method(); } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rev") == 0) { rev = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-www") == 0) { www = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-WWW") == 0) { www = 2; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-HTTP") == 0) { www = 3; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0) { no_ecdhe = 1; meth = SSLv2_server_method(); prot_opt++; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0) { meth = SSLv3_server_method(); prot_opt++; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0) { meth = TLSv1_server_method(); prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_1") == 0) { meth = TLSv1_1_server_method(); prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_2") == 0) { meth = TLSv1_2_server_method(); prot_opt++; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls") == 0) { meth = DTLS_server_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) { meth = DTLSv1_server_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1_2") == 0) { meth = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; prot_opt++; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-timeout") == 0) enable_timeouts = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-mtu") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-chain") == 0) cert_chain = 1; #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-id_prefix") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; session_id_prefix = *(++argv); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; engine_id = *(++argv); } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rand") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; inrand = *(++argv); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (strcmp(*argv, "-servername") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; tlsextcbp.servername = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-servername_fatal") == 0) { tlsextcbp.extension_error = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert2") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_cert_file2 = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key2") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; s_key_file2 = *(++argv); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nextprotoneg") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); } # endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; alpn_in = *(++argv); } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK) else if (strcmp(*argv, "-jpake") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; jpake_secret = *(++argv); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (strcmp(*argv, "-use_srtp") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; srtp_profiles = *(++argv); } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexport") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keymatexportlabel = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexportlen") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; keymatexportlen = atoi(*(++argv)); if (keymatexportlen == 0) goto bad; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv); badop = 1; break; } argc--; argv++; } if (badop) { bad: sv_usage(); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n"); goto end; } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK) if (jpake_secret) { if (psk_key) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use JPAKE and PSK together\n"); goto end; } psk_identity = "JPAKE"; } #endif if (prot_opt > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply multiple protocol flags\n"); goto end; } if (prot_opt == 1 && no_prot_opt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply both a protocol flag and " "\"-no_\"\n"); goto end; } SSL_load_error_strings(); OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1); if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passarg, dpassarg, &pass, &dpass)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (s_key_file == NULL) s_key_file = s_cert_file; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s_key_file2 == NULL) s_key_file2 = s_cert_file2; #endif if (!load_excert(&exc, bio_err)) goto end; if (nocert == 0) { s_key = load_key(bio_err, s_key_file, s_key_format, 0, pass, e, "server certificate private key file"); if (!s_key) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } s_cert = load_cert(bio_err, s_cert_file, s_cert_format, NULL, e, "server certificate file"); if (!s_cert) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (s_chain_file) { s_chain = load_certs(bio_err, s_chain_file, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "server certificate chain"); if (!s_chain) goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (tlsextcbp.servername) { s_key2 = load_key(bio_err, s_key_file2, s_key_format, 0, pass, e, "second server certificate private key file"); if (!s_key2) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } s_cert2 = load_cert(bio_err, s_cert_file2, s_cert_format, NULL, e, "second server certificate file"); if (!s_cert2) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto_neg_in) { unsigned short len; next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len, next_proto_neg_in); if (next_proto.data == NULL) goto end; next_proto.len = len; } else { next_proto.data = NULL; } # endif alpn_ctx.data = NULL; if (alpn_in) { unsigned short len; alpn_ctx.data = next_protos_parse(&len, alpn_in); if (alpn_ctx.data == NULL) goto end; alpn_ctx.len = len; } #endif if (crl_file) { X509_CRL *crl; crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format); if (!crl) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (!crls || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_CRL_free(crl); goto end; } } if (s_dcert_file) { if (s_dkey_file == NULL) s_dkey_file = s_dcert_file; s_dkey = load_key(bio_err, s_dkey_file, s_dkey_format, 0, dpass, e, "second certificate private key file"); if (!s_dkey) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } s_dcert = load_cert(bio_err, s_dcert_file, s_dcert_format, NULL, e, "second server certificate file"); if (!s_dcert) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (s_dchain_file) { s_dchain = load_certs(bio_err, s_dchain_file, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "second server certificate chain"); if (!s_dchain) goto end; } } if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, 1) && inrand == NULL && !RAND_status()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n"); } if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); if (bio_s_out == NULL) { if (s_quiet && !s_debug) { bio_s_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); if (s_msg && !bio_s_msg) bio_s_msg = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); } else { if (bio_s_out == NULL) bio_s_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); } } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) if (nocert) #endif { s_cert_file = NULL; s_key_file = NULL; s_dcert_file = NULL; s_dkey_file = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT s_cert_file2 = NULL; s_key_file2 = NULL; #endif } ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (session_id_prefix) { if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32) BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n"); else if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 16) BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: id_prefix is too long if you use SSLv2\n"); if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx, generate_session_id)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix); } SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1); if (hack) SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG); if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc); if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback); if (no_cache) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); else if (ext_cache) init_session_cache_ctx(ctx); else SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 128); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (srtp_profiles != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles); #endif #if 0 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = getenv("SSL_CIPHER"); #endif #if 0 if (s_cert_file == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "You must specify a certificate file for the server to use\n"); goto end; } #endif if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) || (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx))) { /* BIO_printf(bio_err,"X509_load_verify_locations\n"); */ ERR_print_errors(bio_err); /* goto end; */ } if (vpm) SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm); ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, 0); if (!args_ssl_call(ctx, bio_err, cctx, ssl_args, no_ecdhe, no_jpake)) goto end; if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile, crls, crl_download)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s_cert2) { ctx2 = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx2 == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (ctx2) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting secondary ctx parameters\n"); if (session_id_prefix) { if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32) BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n"); else if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 16) BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: id_prefix is too long if you use SSLv2\n"); if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx2, generate_session_id)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix); } SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx2, 1); if (hack) SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG); if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx2, exc); if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2, apps_ssl_info_callback); if (no_cache) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx2, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); else if (ext_cache) init_session_cache_ctx(ctx2); else SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx2, 128); if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx2, CAfile, CApath)) || (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx2))) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } if (vpm) SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm); ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx2, crls, 0); if (!args_ssl_call(ctx2, bio_err, cctx, ssl_args, no_ecdhe, no_jpake)) goto end; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (next_proto.data) SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); # endif if (alpn_ctx.data) SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(ctx, alpn_cb, &alpn_ctx); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (!no_dhe) { DH *dh = NULL; if (dhfile) dh = load_dh_param(dhfile); else if (s_cert_file) dh = load_dh_param(s_cert_file); if (dh != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n"); dh = get_dh2048(); if (dh == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx2) { if (!dhfile) { DH *dh2 = load_dh_param(s_cert_file2); if (dh2 != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); DH_free(dh); dh = dh2; } } SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx2, dh); } # endif DH_free(dh); } #endif if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_cert, s_key, s_chain, build_chain)) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s_serverinfo_file != NULL && !SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(ctx, s_serverinfo_file)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx2 && !set_cert_key_stuff(ctx2, s_cert2, s_key2, NULL, build_chain)) goto end; #endif if (s_dcert != NULL) { if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_dcert, s_dkey, s_dchain, build_chain)) goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # if 1 if (!no_tmp_rsa) { SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, tmp_rsa_cb); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx2) SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx2, tmp_rsa_cb); # endif } # else if (!no_tmp_rsa && SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx)) { RSA *rsa; BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Generating temp (512 bit) RSA key..."); BIO_flush(bio_s_out); rsa = RSA_generate_key(512, RSA_F4, NULL); if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx, rsa)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx2) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx2, rsa)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } # endif RSA_free(rsa); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); } # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE if (psk_key != NULL) # else if (psk_key != NULL || jpake_secret) # endif { if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK key given or JPAKE in use, setting server callback\n"); SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(ctx, psk_server_cb); } if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(ctx, psk_identity_hint)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #endif SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, s_server_verify, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void *)&s_server_session_id_context, sizeof(s_server_session_id_context)); /* Set DTLS cookie generation and verification callbacks */ SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, generate_cookie_callback); SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cookie_callback); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx2) { SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx2, s_server_verify, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx2, (void *)&s_server_session_id_context, sizeof(s_server_session_id_context)); tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_s_out; SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx2, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx2, &tlsextcbp); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp_verifier_file != NULL) { srp_callback_parm.vb = SRP_VBASE_new(srpuserseed); srp_callback_parm.user = NULL; srp_callback_parm.login = NULL; if ((ret = SRP_VBASE_init(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_verifier_file)) != SRP_NO_ERROR) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot initialize SRP verifier file \"%s\":ret=%d\n", srp_verifier_file, ret); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_callback_parm); SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb); } else #endif if (CAfile != NULL) { SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx2) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx2, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); #endif } BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); if (rev) do_server(port, socket_type, &accept_socket, rev_body, context, naccept); else if (www) do_server(port, socket_type, &accept_socket, www_body, context, naccept); else do_server(port, socket_type, &accept_socket, sv_body, context, naccept); print_stats(bio_s_out, ctx); ret = 0; end: if (ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx); if (s_cert) X509_free(s_cert); if (crls) sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); if (s_dcert) X509_free(s_dcert); if (s_key) EVP_PKEY_free(s_key); if (s_dkey) EVP_PKEY_free(s_dkey); if (s_chain) sk_X509_pop_free(s_chain, X509_free); if (s_dchain) sk_X509_pop_free(s_dchain, X509_free); if (pass) OPENSSL_free(pass); if (dpass) OPENSSL_free(dpass); if (vpm) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); free_sessions(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (tlscstatp.host) OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host); if (tlscstatp.port) OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port); if (tlscstatp.path) OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path); if (ctx2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx2); if (s_cert2) X509_free(s_cert2); if (s_key2) EVP_PKEY_free(s_key2); if (serverinfo_in != NULL) BIO_free(serverinfo_in); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (next_proto.data) OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data); # endif if (alpn_ctx.data) OPENSSL_free(alpn_ctx.data); #endif ssl_excert_free(exc); if (ssl_args) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args); if (cctx) SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE if (jpake_secret && psk_key) OPENSSL_free(psk_key); #endif release_engine(e); if (bio_s_out != NULL) { BIO_free(bio_s_out); bio_s_out = NULL; } if (bio_s_msg != NULL) { BIO_free(bio_s_msg); bio_s_msg = NULL; } SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(); apps_shutdown(); OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); } static void print_stats(BIO *bio, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx) { BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld items in the session cache\n", SSL_CTX_sess_number(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects (SSL_connect())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client renegotiates (SSL_connect())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects that finished\n", SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts (SSL_accept())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server renegotiates (SSL_accept())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts that finished\n", SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache misses\n", SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache timeouts\n", SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld callback cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld cache full overflows (%ld allowed)\n", SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ssl_ctx), SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ssl_ctx)); } -static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) +static int sv_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) { char *buf = NULL; fd_set readfds; int ret = 1, width; int k, i; unsigned long l; SSL *con = NULL; BIO *sbio; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_CTX *kctx; #endif struct timeval timeout; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) struct timeval tv; #else struct timeval *timeoutp; #endif if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bufsize)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n"); goto err; } #ifdef FIONBIO if (s_nbio) { unsigned long sl = 1; if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "turning on non blocking io\n"); if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &sl) < 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } #endif if (con == NULL) { con = SSL_new(ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } if (s_tlsextstatus) { SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cert_status_cb); tlscstatp.err = bio_err; SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, &tlscstatp); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if ((kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) { SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(con, kctx); kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC); kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (context) SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context)); } SSL_clear(con); #if 0 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(con, "Test server", 11); # endif #endif if (stype == SOCK_DGRAM) { sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (enable_timeouts) { timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); } if (socket_mtu) { if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n", DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)); ret = -1; BIO_free(sbio); goto err; } SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU); if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n"); ret = -1; BIO_free(sbio); goto err; } } else /* want to do MTU discovery */ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL); /* turn on cookie exchange */ SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE); } else sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (s_nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE if (jpake_secret) jpake_server_auth(bio_s_out, sbio, jpake_secret); #endif SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_accept_state(con); /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */ if (s_debug) { SSL_set_debug(con, 1); BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out); } if (s_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (s_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } #endif if (fileno_stdin() > s) width = fileno_stdin() + 1; else width = s + 1; for (;;) { int read_from_terminal; int read_from_sslcon; read_from_terminal = 0; read_from_sslcon = SSL_pending(con); if (!read_from_sslcon) { FD_ZERO(&readfds); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdin(), &readfds); #endif openssl_fdset(s, &readfds); /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler: * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or * (void *). */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) /* * Under DOS (non-djgpp) and Windows we can't select on stdin: * only on sockets. As a workaround we timeout the select every * second and check for any keypress. In a proper Windows * application we wouldn't do this because it is inefficient. */ tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv); if ((i < 0) || (!i && !_kbhit())) continue; if (_kbhit()) read_from_terminal = 1; #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5) /* Under BeOS-R5 the situation is similar to DOS */ tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; (void)fcntl(fileno_stdin(), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv); if ((i < 0) || (!i && read(fileno_stdin(), buf, 0) < 0)) continue; if (read(fileno_stdin(), buf, 0) >= 0) read_from_terminal = 1; (void)fcntl(fileno_stdin(), F_SETFL, 0); #else if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout)) timeoutp = &timeout; else timeoutp = NULL; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, timeoutp); if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occured\n"); } if (i <= 0) continue; if (FD_ISSET(fileno_stdin(), &readfds)) read_from_terminal = 1; #endif if (FD_ISSET(s, &readfds)) read_from_sslcon = 1; } if (read_from_terminal) { if (s_crlf) { int j, lf_num; i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize / 2); lf_num = 0; /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) if (buf[j] == '\n') lf_num++; for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { buf[j + lf_num] = buf[j]; if (buf[j] == '\n') { lf_num--; i++; buf[j + lf_num] = '\r'; } } assert(lf_num == 0); } else i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize); if (!s_quiet && !s_brief) { if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'Q')) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); SHUTDOWN(s); close_accept_socket(); ret = -11; goto err; } if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'q')) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); if (SSL_version(con) != DTLS1_VERSION) SHUTDOWN(s); /* * close_accept_socket(); ret= -11; */ goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS if ((buf[0] == 'B') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n"); SSL_heartbeat(con); i = 0; continue; } #endif if ((buf[0] == 'r') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { SSL_renegotiate(con); i = SSL_do_handshake(con); printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i); i = 0; /* 13; */ continue; /* * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE\n"); */ } if ((buf[0] == 'R') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { SSL_set_verify(con, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, NULL); SSL_renegotiate(con); i = SSL_do_handshake(con); printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i); i = 0; /* 13; */ continue; /* * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE asking for client * cert\n"); */ } if (buf[0] == 'P') { static const char *str = "Lets print some clear text\n"; BIO_write(SSL_get_wbio(con), str, strlen(str)); } if (buf[0] == 'S') { print_stats(bio_s_out, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con)); } } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i); #endif l = k = 0; for (;;) { /* should do a select for the write */ #ifdef RENEG { static count = 0; if (++count == 100) { count = 0; SSL_renegotiate(con); } } #endif k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i); } #endif switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Write BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; goto err; /* break; */ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); ret = 1; goto err; } if (k > 0) { l += k; i -= k; } if (i <= 0) break; } } if (read_from_sslcon) { if (!SSL_is_init_finished(con)) { i = init_ssl_connection(con); if (i < 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } else if (i == 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } } else { again: i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize); } #endif switch (SSL_get_error(con, i)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(buf, buf, i); #endif raw_write_stdout(buf, (unsigned int)i); if (SSL_pending(con)) goto again; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Read BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; goto err; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); ret = 1; goto err; } } } } err: if (con != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "shutting down SSL\n"); #if 1 SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); #else SSL_shutdown(con); #endif SSL_free(con); } BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n"); if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, bufsize); OPENSSL_free(buf); } if (ret >= 0) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n"); return (ret); } static void close_accept_socket(void) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "shutdown accept socket\n"); if (accept_socket >= 0) { SHUTDOWN2(accept_socket); } } static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) { int i; const char *str; X509 *peer; long verify_error; MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 char *client_princ; #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) const unsigned char *next_proto_neg; unsigned next_proto_neg_len; #endif unsigned char *exportedkeymat; i = SSL_accept(con); #ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY { while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP && SSL_state(con) == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C) { fprintf(stderr, "LOOKUP from certificate callback during accept\n"); i = SSL_accept(con); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n", srp_callback_parm.login); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); i = SSL_accept(con); } #endif if (i <= 0) { if (BIO_sock_should_retry(i)) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DELAY\n"); return (1); } BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n"); verify_error = SSL_get_verify_result(con); if (verify_error != X509_V_OK) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n", X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_error)); } /* Always print any error messages */ ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return (0); } if (s_brief) print_ssl_summary(bio_err, con); PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bio_s_out, SSL_get_session(con)); peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con); if (peer != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Client certificate\n"); PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_s_out, peer); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf)); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "subject=%s\n", buf); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof(buf)); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "issuer=%s\n", buf); X509_free(peer); } if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Shared ciphers:%s\n", buf); str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con)); ssl_print_sigalgs(bio_s_out, con); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ssl_print_point_formats(bio_s_out, con); ssl_print_curves(bio_s_out, con, 0); #endif BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CIPHER is %s\n", (str != NULL) ? str : "(NONE)"); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len); if (next_proto_neg) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "NEXTPROTO is "); BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con); if (srtp_profile) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n", srtp_profile->name); } #endif if (SSL_cache_hit(con)) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Reused session-id\n"); if (SSL_ctrl(con, SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS, 0, NULL) & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Peer has incorrect TLSv1 block padding\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 client_princ = kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(con)); if (client_princ != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Kerberos peer principal is %s\n", client_princ); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n", SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT"); if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n"); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen); exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen); if (exportedkeymat != NULL) { if (!SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat, keymatexportlen, keymatexportlabel, strlen(keymatexportlabel), NULL, 0, 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Error\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Keying material: "); for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); } OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat); } } return (1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile) { DH *ret = NULL; BIO *bio; if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhfile, "r")) == NULL) goto err; ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); err: if (bio != NULL) BIO_free(bio); return (ret); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 char *client_princ; #endif #if 0 static int load_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file) { FILE *in; X509 *x = NULL; if ((in = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) return (0); for (;;) { if (PEM_read_X509(in, &x, NULL) == NULL) break; SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x); } if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); fclose(in); return (1); } #endif -static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) +static int www_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) { char *buf = NULL; int ret = 1; int i, j, k, dot; SSL *con; const SSL_CIPHER *c; BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_CTX *kctx; #endif buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bufsize); if (buf == NULL) return (0); io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL)) goto err; #ifdef FIONBIO if (s_nbio) { unsigned long sl = 1; if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "turning on non blocking io\n"); if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &sl) < 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } #endif /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */ if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize)) goto err; if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if ((kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) { kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC); kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (context) SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context)); sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (s_nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_accept_state(con); /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */ BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE); BIO_push(io, ssl_bio); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io); #endif if (s_debug) { SSL_set_debug(con, 1); BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out); } if (s_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (s_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out); } for (;;) { if (hack) { i = SSL_accept(con); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n", srp_callback_parm.login); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); i = SSL_accept(con); } #endif switch (SSL_get_error(con, i)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: continue; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: ret = 1; goto err; /* break; */ } SSL_renegotiate(con); SSL_write(con, NULL, 0); } i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1); if (i < 0) { /* error */ if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) { if (!s_quiet) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_should_io_special(io) && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); continue; } #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) delay(1000); #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__) sleep(1); #endif continue; } } else if (i == 0) { /* end of input */ ret = 1; goto end; } /* else we have data */ if (((www == 1) && (strncmp("GET ", buf, 4) == 0)) || ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 11) == 0))) { char *p; X509 *peer; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; static const char *space = " "; BIO_puts(io, "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n"); BIO_puts(io, "\n"); BIO_puts(io, "
\n");
 /*                      BIO_puts(io,SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));*/
             BIO_puts(io, "\n");
             for (i = 0; i < local_argc; i++) {
                 BIO_puts(io, local_argv[i]);
                 BIO_write(io, " ", 1);
             }
             BIO_puts(io, "\n");
 
             BIO_printf(io,
                        "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
                        SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ?
                        "" : " NOT");
 
             /*
              * The following is evil and should not really be done
              */
             BIO_printf(io, "Ciphers supported in s_server binary\n");
             sk = SSL_get_ciphers(con);
             j = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk);
             for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
                 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
                 BIO_printf(io, "%-11s:%-25s",
                            SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
                 if ((((i + 1) % 2) == 0) && (i + 1 != j))
                     BIO_puts(io, "\n");
             }
             BIO_puts(io, "\n");
             p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, bufsize);
             if (p != NULL) {
                 BIO_printf(io,
                            "---\nCiphers common between both SSL end points:\n");
                 j = i = 0;
                 while (*p) {
                     if (*p == ':') {
                         BIO_write(io, space, 26 - j);
                         i++;
                         j = 0;
                         BIO_write(io, ((i % 3) ? " " : "\n"), 1);
                     } else {
                         BIO_write(io, p, 1);
                         j++;
                     }
                     p++;
                 }
                 BIO_puts(io, "\n");
             }
             ssl_print_sigalgs(io, con);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
             ssl_print_curves(io, con, 0);
 #endif
             BIO_printf(io, (SSL_cache_hit(con)
                             ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
             c = SSL_get_current_cipher(con);
             BIO_printf(io, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
                        SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
             SSL_SESSION_print(io, SSL_get_session(con));
             BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
             print_stats(io, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con));
             BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
             peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
             if (peer != NULL) {
                 BIO_printf(io, "Client certificate\n");
                 X509_print(io, peer);
                 PEM_write_bio_X509(io, peer);
             } else
                 BIO_puts(io, "no client certificate available\n");
             BIO_puts(io, "
\r\n\r\n"); break; } else if ((www == 2 || www == 3) && (strncmp("GET /", buf, 5) == 0)) { BIO *file; char *p, *e; static const char *text = "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"; /* skip the '/' */ p = &(buf[5]); dot = 1; for (e = p; *e != '\0'; e++) { if (e[0] == ' ') break; switch (dot) { case 1: dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 2 : 0; break; case 2: dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 3 : 0; break; case 3: dot = (e[0] == '/') ? -1 : 0; break; } if (dot == 0) dot = (e[0] == '/') ? 1 : 0; } dot = (dot == 3) || (dot == -1); /* filename contains ".." * component */ if (*e == '\0') { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid file name\r\n", p); break; } *e = '\0'; if (dot) { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' contains '..' reference\r\n", p); break; } if (*p == '/') { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid path\r\n", p); break; } #if 0 /* append if a directory lookup */ if (e[-1] == '/') strcat(p, "index.html"); #endif /* if a directory, do the index thang */ if (app_isdir(p) > 0) { #if 0 /* must check buffer size */ strcat(p, "/index.html"); #else BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is a directory\r\n", p); break; #endif } if ((file = BIO_new_file(p, "r")) == NULL) { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "Error opening '%s'\r\n", p); ERR_print_errors(io); break; } if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "FILE:%s\n", p); if (www == 2) { i = strlen(p); if (((i > 5) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 5]), ".html") == 0)) || ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".php") == 0)) || ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".htm") == 0))) BIO_puts(io, "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n"); else BIO_puts(io, "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"); } /* send the file */ for (;;) { i = BIO_read(file, buf, bufsize); if (i <= 0) break; #ifdef RENEG total_bytes += i; fprintf(stderr, "%d\n", i); if (total_bytes > 3 * 1024) { total_bytes = 0; fprintf(stderr, "RENEGOTIATE\n"); SSL_renegotiate(con); } #endif for (j = 0; j < i;) { #ifdef RENEG { static count = 0; if (++count == 13) { SSL_renegotiate(con); } } #endif k = BIO_write(io, &(buf[j]), i - j); if (k <= 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) goto write_error; else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "rwrite W BLOCK\n"); } } else { j += k; } } } write_error: BIO_free(file); break; } } for (;;) { i = (int)BIO_flush(io); if (i <= 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) break; } else break; } end: #if 1 /* make sure we re-use sessions */ SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); #else /* This kills performance */ /* * SSL_shutdown(con); A shutdown gets sent in the BIO_free_all(io) * procession */ #endif err: if (ret >= 0) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n"); if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf); if (io != NULL) BIO_free_all(io); /* if (ssl_bio != NULL) BIO_free(ssl_bio);*/ return (ret); } -static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) +static int rev_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) { char *buf = NULL; int i; int ret = 1; SSL *con; BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_CTX *kctx; #endif buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bufsize); if (buf == NULL) return (0); io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL)) goto err; /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */ if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize)) goto err; if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if ((kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) { kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC); kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (context) SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context)); sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_accept_state(con); BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE); BIO_push(io, ssl_bio); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io); #endif if (s_debug) { SSL_set_debug(con, 1); BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out); } if (s_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (s_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out); } for (;;) { i = BIO_do_handshake(io); if (i > 0) break; if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION FAILURE\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_should_io_special(io) && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during accept\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); continue; } #endif } BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n"); print_ssl_summary(bio_err, con); for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1); if (i < 0) { /* error */ if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) { if (!s_quiet) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_should_io_special(io) && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); continue; } #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) delay(1000); #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__) sleep(1); #endif continue; } } else if (i == 0) { /* end of input */ ret = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n"); goto end; } else { char *p = buf + i - 1; while (i && (*p == '\n' || *p == '\r')) { p--; i--; } if (!s_ign_eof && i == 5 && !strncmp(buf, "CLOSE", 5)) { ret = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n"); goto end; } BUF_reverse((unsigned char *)buf, NULL, i); buf[i] = '\n'; BIO_write(io, buf, i + 1); for (;;) { i = BIO_flush(io); if (i > 0) break; if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) goto end; } } } end: /* make sure we re-use sessions */ SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); err: if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf); if (io != NULL) BIO_free_all(io); return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength) { BIGNUM *bn = NULL; static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL; if (!rsa_tmp && ((bn = BN_new()) == NULL)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Allocation error in generating RSA key\n"); if (!rsa_tmp && bn) { if (!s_quiet) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating temp (%d bit) RSA key...", keylength); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); } if (!BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4) || ((rsa_tmp = RSA_new()) == NULL) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_tmp, keylength, bn, NULL)) { if (rsa_tmp) RSA_free(rsa_tmp); rsa_tmp = NULL; } if (!s_quiet) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); } BN_free(bn); } return (rsa_tmp); } #endif #define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len) { unsigned int count = 0; do { if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) return 0; /* * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix * is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg. * the server could only possibly create 1 session ID (ie. the * prefix!) so all future session negotiations will fail due to * conflicts. */ memcpy(id, session_id_prefix, (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ? strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len); } while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)); if (count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS) return 0; return 1; } /* * By default s_server uses an in-memory cache which caches SSL_SESSION * structures without any serialisation. This hides some bugs which only * become apparent in deployed servers. By implementing a basic external * session cache some issues can be debugged using s_server. */ typedef struct simple_ssl_session_st { unsigned char *id; unsigned int idlen; unsigned char *der; int derlen; struct simple_ssl_session_st *next; } simple_ssl_session; static simple_ssl_session *first = NULL; static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) { simple_ssl_session *sess; unsigned char *p; sess = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(simple_ssl_session)); if (!sess) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n"); return 0; } SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &sess->idlen); sess->derlen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL); sess->id = BUF_memdup(SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, NULL), sess->idlen); sess->der = OPENSSL_malloc(sess->derlen); if (!sess->id || !sess->der) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n"); if (sess->id) OPENSSL_free(sess->id); if (sess->der) OPENSSL_free(sess->der); OPENSSL_free(sess); return 0; } p = sess->der; i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &p); sess->next = first; first = sess; BIO_printf(bio_err, "New session added to external cache\n"); return 0; } static SSL_SESSION *get_session(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, int idlen, int *do_copy) { simple_ssl_session *sess; *do_copy = 0; for (sess = first; sess; sess = sess->next) { if (idlen == (int)sess->idlen && !memcmp(sess->id, id, idlen)) { const unsigned char *p = sess->der; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Lookup session: cache hit\n"); return d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, sess->derlen); } } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Lookup session: cache miss\n"); return NULL; } static void del_session(SSL_CTX *sctx, SSL_SESSION *session) { simple_ssl_session *sess, *prev = NULL; const unsigned char *id; unsigned int idlen; id = SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen); for (sess = first; sess; sess = sess->next) { if (idlen == sess->idlen && !memcmp(sess->id, id, idlen)) { if (prev) prev->next = sess->next; else first = sess->next; OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); OPENSSL_free(sess); return; } prev = sess; } } static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx) { SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(sctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL | SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(sctx, add_session); SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(sctx, get_session); SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(sctx, del_session); } static void free_sessions(void) { simple_ssl_session *sess, *tsess; for (sess = first; sess;) { OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); tsess = sess; sess = sess->next; OPENSSL_free(tsess); } first = NULL; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_socket.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_socket.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/s_socket.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,613 +1,558 @@ /* * apps/s_socket.c - socket-related functions used by s_client and s_server */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef FLAT_INC # include "e_os2.h" #else # include "../e_os2.h" #endif /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #define USE_SOCKETS #define NON_MAIN #include "apps.h" #undef USE_SOCKETS #undef NON_MAIN #include "s_apps.h" #include #ifdef FLAT_INC # include "e_os.h" #else # include "../e_os.h" #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) # include "netdb.h" # endif static struct hostent *GetHostByName(char *name); # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)) static void ssl_sock_cleanup(void); # endif static int ssl_sock_init(void); static int init_client_ip(int *sock, unsigned char ip[4], int port, int type); static int init_server(int *sock, int port, int type); static int init_server_long(int *sock, int port, char *ip, int type); -static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock, char **host); +static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock); static int host_ip(char *str, unsigned char ip[4]); # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 # define SOCKET_PROTOCOL 0 /* more microsoft stupidity */ # else # define SOCKET_PROTOCOL IPPROTO_TCP # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) static int wsa_init_done = 0; # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS static struct WSAData wsa_state; static int wsa_init_done = 0; # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 static HWND topWnd = 0; static FARPROC lpTopWndProc = NULL; static FARPROC lpTopHookProc = NULL; extern HINSTANCE _hInstance; /* nice global CRT provides */ static LONG FAR PASCAL topHookProc(HWND hwnd, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) { if (hwnd == topWnd) { switch (message) { case WM_DESTROY: case WM_CLOSE: SetWindowLong(topWnd, GWL_WNDPROC, (LONG) lpTopWndProc); ssl_sock_cleanup(); break; } } return CallWindowProc(lpTopWndProc, hwnd, message, wParam, lParam); } static BOOL CALLBACK enumproc(HWND hwnd, LPARAM lParam) { topWnd = hwnd; return (FALSE); } # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS */ # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS static void ssl_sock_cleanup(void) { if (wsa_init_done) { wsa_init_done = 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE WSACancelBlockingCall(); # endif WSACleanup(); } } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) static void sock_cleanup(void) { if (wsa_init_done) { wsa_init_done = 0; WSACleanup(); } } # endif static int ssl_sock_init(void) { # ifdef WATT32 extern int _watt_do_exit; _watt_do_exit = 0; if (sock_init()) return (0); # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) if (!wsa_init_done) { int err; # ifdef SIGINT signal(SIGINT, (void (*)(int))ssl_sock_cleanup); # endif wsa_init_done = 1; memset(&wsa_state, 0, sizeof(wsa_state)); if (WSAStartup(0x0101, &wsa_state) != 0) { err = WSAGetLastError(); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to start WINSOCK, error code=%d\n", err); return (0); } # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 EnumTaskWindows(GetCurrentTask(), enumproc, 0L); lpTopWndProc = (FARPROC) GetWindowLong(topWnd, GWL_WNDPROC); lpTopHookProc = MakeProcInstance((FARPROC) topHookProc, _hInstance); SetWindowLong(topWnd, GWL_WNDPROC, (LONG) lpTopHookProc); # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 */ } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) WORD wVerReq; WSADATA wsaData; int err; if (!wsa_init_done) { # ifdef SIGINT signal(SIGINT, (void (*)(int))sock_cleanup); # endif wsa_init_done = 1; wVerReq = MAKEWORD(2, 0); err = WSAStartup(wVerReq, &wsaData); if (err != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to start WINSOCK2, error code=%d\n", err); return (0); } } # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS */ return (1); } int init_client(int *sock, char *host, int port, int type) { unsigned char ip[4]; memset(ip, '\0', sizeof(ip)); if (!host_ip(host, &(ip[0]))) return 0; return init_client_ip(sock, ip, port, type); } static int init_client_ip(int *sock, unsigned char ip[4], int port, int type) { unsigned long addr; struct sockaddr_in them; int s, i; if (!ssl_sock_init()) return (0); memset((char *)&them, 0, sizeof(them)); them.sin_family = AF_INET; them.sin_port = htons((unsigned short)port); addr = (unsigned long) ((unsigned long)ip[0] << 24L) | ((unsigned long)ip[1] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)ip[2] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)ip[3]); them.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(addr); if (type == SOCK_STREAM) s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, SOCKET_PROTOCOL); else /* ( type == SOCK_DGRAM) */ s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); if (s == INVALID_SOCKET) { perror("socket"); return (0); } # if defined(SO_KEEPALIVE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MPE) if (type == SOCK_STREAM) { i = 0; i = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (char *)&i, sizeof(i)); if (i < 0) { closesocket(s); perror("keepalive"); return (0); } } # endif if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&them, sizeof(them)) == -1) { closesocket(s); perror("connect"); return (0); } *sock = s; return (1); } int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, - int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, int stype, - unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context, - int naccept) + int (*cb) (int s, int stype, unsigned char *context), + unsigned char *context, int naccept) { int sock; - char *name = NULL; int accept_socket = 0; int i; if (!init_server(&accept_socket, port, type)) return (0); if (ret != NULL) { *ret = accept_socket; /* return(1); */ } for (;;) { if (type == SOCK_STREAM) { - if (do_accept(accept_socket, &sock, &name) == 0) { + if (do_accept(accept_socket, &sock) == 0) { SHUTDOWN(accept_socket); return (0); } } else sock = accept_socket; - i = (*cb) (name, sock, type, context); - if (name != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(name); + i = (*cb) (sock, type, context); if (type == SOCK_STREAM) SHUTDOWN2(sock); if (naccept != -1) naccept--; if (i < 0 || naccept == 0) { SHUTDOWN2(accept_socket); return (i); } } } static int init_server_long(int *sock, int port, char *ip, int type) { int ret = 0; struct sockaddr_in server; int s = -1; if (!ssl_sock_init()) return (0); memset((char *)&server, 0, sizeof(server)); server.sin_family = AF_INET; server.sin_port = htons((unsigned short)port); if (ip == NULL) server.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; else /* Added for T3E, address-of fails on bit field (beckman@acl.lanl.gov) */ # ifndef BIT_FIELD_LIMITS memcpy(&server.sin_addr.s_addr, ip, 4); # else memcpy(&server.sin_addr, ip, 4); # endif if (type == SOCK_STREAM) s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, SOCKET_PROTOCOL); else /* type == SOCK_DGRAM */ s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); if (s == INVALID_SOCKET) goto err; # if defined SOL_SOCKET && defined SO_REUSEADDR { int j = 1; setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&j, sizeof(j)); } # endif if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof(server)) == -1) { # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS perror("bind"); # endif goto err; } /* Make it 128 for linux */ if (type == SOCK_STREAM && listen(s, 128) == -1) goto err; *sock = s; ret = 1; err: if ((ret == 0) && (s != -1)) { SHUTDOWN(s); } return (ret); } static int init_server(int *sock, int port, int type) { return (init_server_long(sock, port, NULL, type)); } -static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock, char **host) +static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock) { int ret; - struct hostent *h1, *h2; - static struct sockaddr_in from; - int len; -/* struct linger ling; */ if (!ssl_sock_init()) - return (0); + return 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS redoit: # endif - memset((char *)&from, 0, sizeof(from)); - len = sizeof(from); /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the fourth parameter is currently of * type (int *) whereas under other systems it is (void *) if you don't * have a cast it will choke the compiler: if you do have a cast then you * can either go for (int *) or (void *). */ - ret = accept(acc_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, (void *)&len); + ret = accept(acc_sock, NULL, NULL); if (ret == INVALID_SOCKET) { # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)) int i; i = WSAGetLastError(); BIO_printf(bio_err, "accept error %d\n", i); # else if (errno == EINTR) { /* * check_timeout(); */ goto redoit; } fprintf(stderr, "errno=%d ", errno); perror("accept"); # endif - return (0); + return 0; } -/*- - ling.l_onoff=1; - ling.l_linger=0; - i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_LINGER,(char *)&ling,sizeof(ling)); - if (i < 0) { perror("linger"); return(0); } - i=0; - i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_KEEPALIVE,(char *)&i,sizeof(i)); - if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); } -*/ - - if (host == NULL) - goto end; -# ifndef BIT_FIELD_LIMITS - /* I should use WSAAsyncGetHostByName() under windows */ - h1 = gethostbyaddr((char *)&from.sin_addr.s_addr, - sizeof(from.sin_addr.s_addr), AF_INET); -# else - h1 = gethostbyaddr((char *)&from.sin_addr, - sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET); -# endif - if (h1 == NULL) { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad gethostbyaddr\n"); - *host = NULL; - /* return(0); */ - } else { - if ((*host = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(h1->h_name) + 1)) == NULL) { - perror("OPENSSL_malloc"); - closesocket(ret); - return (0); - } - BUF_strlcpy(*host, h1->h_name, strlen(h1->h_name) + 1); - - h2 = GetHostByName(*host); - if (h2 == NULL) { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "gethostbyname failure\n"); - closesocket(ret); - return (0); - } - if (h2->h_addrtype != AF_INET) { - BIO_printf(bio_err, "gethostbyname addr is not AF_INET\n"); - closesocket(ret); - return (0); - } - } - end: *sock = ret; - return (1); + return 1; } int extract_host_port(char *str, char **host_ptr, unsigned char *ip, short *port_ptr) { char *h, *p; h = str; p = strchr(str, ':'); if (p == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no port defined\n"); return (0); } *(p++) = '\0'; if ((ip != NULL) && !host_ip(str, ip)) goto err; if (host_ptr != NULL) *host_ptr = h; if (!extract_port(p, port_ptr)) goto err; return (1); err: return (0); } static int host_ip(char *str, unsigned char ip[4]) { unsigned int in[4]; int i; if (sscanf(str, "%u.%u.%u.%u", &(in[0]), &(in[1]), &(in[2]), &(in[3])) == 4) { for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) if (in[i] > 255) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid IP address\n"); goto err; } ip[0] = in[0]; ip[1] = in[1]; ip[2] = in[2]; ip[3] = in[3]; } else { /* do a gethostbyname */ struct hostent *he; if (!ssl_sock_init()) return (0); he = GetHostByName(str); if (he == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "gethostbyname failure\n"); goto err; } /* cast to short because of win16 winsock definition */ if ((short)he->h_addrtype != AF_INET) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "gethostbyname addr is not AF_INET\n"); return (0); } ip[0] = he->h_addr_list[0][0]; ip[1] = he->h_addr_list[0][1]; ip[2] = he->h_addr_list[0][2]; ip[3] = he->h_addr_list[0][3]; } return (1); err: return (0); } int extract_port(char *str, short *port_ptr) { int i; struct servent *s; i = atoi(str); if (i != 0) *port_ptr = (unsigned short)i; else { s = getservbyname(str, "tcp"); if (s == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "getservbyname failure for %s\n", str); return (0); } *port_ptr = ntohs((unsigned short)s->s_port); } return (1); } # define GHBN_NUM 4 static struct ghbn_cache_st { char name[128]; struct hostent ent; unsigned long order; } ghbn_cache[GHBN_NUM]; static unsigned long ghbn_hits = 0L; static unsigned long ghbn_miss = 0L; static struct hostent *GetHostByName(char *name) { struct hostent *ret; int i, lowi = 0; unsigned long low = (unsigned long)-1; for (i = 0; i < GHBN_NUM; i++) { if (low > ghbn_cache[i].order) { low = ghbn_cache[i].order; lowi = i; } if (ghbn_cache[i].order > 0) { if (strncmp(name, ghbn_cache[i].name, 128) == 0) break; } } if (i == GHBN_NUM) { /* no hit */ ghbn_miss++; ret = gethostbyname(name); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); /* else add to cache */ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(ghbn_cache[0].name)) { strcpy(ghbn_cache[lowi].name, name); memcpy((char *)&(ghbn_cache[lowi].ent), ret, sizeof(struct hostent)); ghbn_cache[lowi].order = ghbn_miss + ghbn_hits; } return (ret); } else { ghbn_hits++; ret = &(ghbn_cache[i].ent); ghbn_cache[i].order = ghbn_miss + ghbn_hits; return (ret); } } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/verify.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/verify.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/apps/verify.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,350 +1,351 @@ /* apps/verify.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #undef PROG #define PROG verify_main static int MS_CALLBACK cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file, STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, ENGINE *e); static int v_verbose = 0, vflags = 0; int MAIN(int, char **); int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; int i, ret = 1, badarg = 0; char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL; char *untfile = NULL, *trustfile = NULL, *crlfile = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL, *trusted = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; X509_STORE *cert_ctx = NULL; X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; int crl_download = 0; char *engine = NULL; cert_ctx = X509_STORE_new(); if (cert_ctx == NULL) goto end; X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(cert_ctx, cb); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); apps_startup(); if (bio_err == NULL) if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL) BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL)) goto end; argc--; argv++; for (;;) { if (argc >= 1) { if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) { if (argc-- < 1) goto usage; CApath = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) { if (argc-- < 1) goto usage; CAfile = *(++argv); } else if (args_verify(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm)) { if (badarg) goto usage; continue; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-untrusted") == 0) { if (argc-- < 1) goto usage; untfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-trusted") == 0) { if (argc-- < 1) goto usage; trustfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CRLfile") == 0) { if (argc-- < 1) goto usage; crlfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_download") == 0) crl_download = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto usage; engine = *(++argv); } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-help") == 0) goto usage; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verbose") == 0) v_verbose = 1; else if (argv[0][0] == '-') goto usage; else break; argc--; argv++; } else break; } e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0); if (vpm) X509_STORE_set1_param(cert_ctx, vpm); lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) abort(); if (CAfile) { i = X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, CAfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading file %s\n", CAfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) abort(); if (CApath) { i = X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); ERR_clear_error(); if (untfile) { untrusted = load_certs(bio_err, untfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "untrusted certificates"); if (!untrusted) goto end; } if (trustfile) { trusted = load_certs(bio_err, trustfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "trusted certificates"); if (!trusted) goto end; } if (crlfile) { crls = load_crls(bio_err, crlfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "other CRLs"); if (!crls) goto end; } ret = 0; if (crl_download) store_setup_crl_download(cert_ctx); if (argc < 1) { if (1 != check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, e)) ret = -1; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) if (1 != check(cert_ctx, argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, e)) ret = -1; } usage: if (ret == 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]"); BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-no_alt_chains] [-attime timestamp]"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-engine e]"); #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, " cert1 cert2 ...\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "recognized usages:\n"); for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n", X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp), X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp)); } } end: if (vpm) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); if (cert_ctx != NULL) X509_STORE_free(cert_ctx); sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free); sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); release_engine(e); apps_shutdown(); OPENSSL_EXIT(ret < 0 ? 2 : ret); } static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file, STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, ENGINE *e) { X509 *x = NULL; int i = 0, ret = 0; X509_STORE_CTX *csc; x = load_cert(bio_err, file, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "certificate file"); if (x == NULL) goto end; fprintf(stdout, "%s: ", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file); csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (csc == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags); if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc); goto end; } if (tchain) X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(csc, tchain); if (crls) X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls); i = X509_verify_cert(csc); X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc); ret = 0; end: if (i > 0) { fprintf(stdout, "OK\n"); ret = 1; } else ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); return (ret); } static int MS_CALLBACK cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int cert_error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); X509 *current_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); if (!ok) { if (current_cert) { X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout, X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); printf("\n"); } printf("%serror %d at %d depth lookup:%s\n", X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(ctx) ? "[CRL path]" : "", cert_error, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), X509_verify_cert_error_string(cert_error)); switch (cert_error) { case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY: policies_print(NULL, ctx); case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: /* * since we are just checking the certificates, it is ok if they * are self signed. But we should still warn the user. */ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: /* Continue after extension errors too */ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA: case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: ok = 1; } return ok; } if (cert_error == X509_V_OK && ok == 2) policies_print(NULL, ctx); if (!v_verbose) ERR_clear_error(); return (ok); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/Makefile (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/Makefile (revision 337764) @@ -1,221 +1,221 @@ # # OpenSSL/crypto/Makefile # DIR= crypto TOP= .. CC= cc INCLUDE= -I. -I$(TOP) -I../include $(ZLIB_INCLUDE) # INCLUDES targets sudbirs! INCLUDES= -I.. -I../.. -I../modes -I../asn1 -I../evp -I../../include $(ZLIB_INCLUDE) CFLAG= -g MAKEDEPPROG= makedepend MAKEDEPEND= $(TOP)/util/domd $(TOP) -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG) MAKEFILE= Makefile RM= rm -f AR= ar r RECURSIVE_MAKE= [ -n "$(SDIRS)" ] && for i in $(SDIRS) ; do \ (cd $$i && echo "making $$target in $(DIR)/$$i..." && \ $(MAKE) -e TOP=../.. DIR=$$i INCLUDES='$(INCLUDES)' $$target ) || exit 1; \ done; PEX_LIBS= EX_LIBS= CFLAGS= $(INCLUDE) $(CFLAG) ASFLAGS= $(INCLUDE) $(ASFLAG) AFLAGS=$(ASFLAGS) CPUID_OBJ=mem_clr.o LIBS= GENERAL=Makefile README crypto-lib.com install.com TEST=constant_time_test.c LIB= $(TOP)/libcrypto.a SHARED_LIB= libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) LIBSRC= cryptlib.c mem.c mem_clr.c mem_dbg.c cversion.c ex_data.c cpt_err.c \ ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_dir.c o_fips.c o_init.c fips_ers.c LIBOBJ= cryptlib.o mem.o mem_dbg.o cversion.o ex_data.o cpt_err.o ebcdic.o \ uid.o o_time.o o_str.o o_dir.o o_fips.o o_init.o fips_ers.o $(CPUID_OBJ) SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= crypto.h opensslv.h opensslconf.h ebcdic.h symhacks.h \ ossl_typ.h HEADER= cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h \ - constant_time_locl.h $(EXHEADER) + constant_time_locl.h bn_int.h $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: @(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) all) all: shared buildinf.h: ../Makefile $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(CFLAGS)" "$(PLATFORM)" >buildinf.h x86cpuid.s: x86cpuid.pl perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) x86cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ applink.o: $(TOP)/ms/applink.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $(TOP)/ms/applink.c uplink.o: $(TOP)/ms/uplink.c applink.o $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $(TOP)/ms/uplink.c uplink-x86.s: $(TOP)/ms/uplink-x86.pl $(PERL) $(TOP)/ms/uplink-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ x86_64cpuid.s: x86_64cpuid.pl; $(PERL) x86_64cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ ia64cpuid.s: ia64cpuid.S; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E ia64cpuid.S > $@ ppccpuid.s: ppccpuid.pl; $(PERL) ppccpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ pariscid.s: pariscid.pl; $(PERL) pariscid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ alphacpuid.s: alphacpuid.pl (preproc=$$$$.$@.S; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \ $(PERL) alphacpuid.pl > $$preproc && \ $(CC) -E -P $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc) testapps: [ -z "$(THIS)" ] || ( if echo $(SDIRS) | fgrep ' des '; \ then cd des && $(MAKE) -e des; fi ) [ -z "$(THIS)" ] || ( cd pkcs7 && $(MAKE) -e testapps ); @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi subdirs: @target=all; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl "CPUID_OBJ=$(CPUID_OBJ)" Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO @target=files; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../test $(TEST) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../apps $(APPS) @target=links; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) # lib: $(LIB): are splitted to avoid end-less loop lib: $(LIB) @touch lib $(LIB): $(LIBOBJ) $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) test -z "$(FIPSLIBDIR)" || $(AR) $(LIB) $(FIPSLIBDIR)fipscanister.o $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. shared: buildinf.h lib subdirs if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \ (cd ..; $(MAKE) $(SHARED_LIB)); \ fi libs: @target=lib; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ;\ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; @target=install; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) lint: @target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) update: local_depend @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi depend: local_depend @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi local_depend: @[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -f buildinf.h ] || touch buildinf.h # fake buildinf.h if it does not exist @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDE) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) @[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -s buildinf.h ] || rm buildinf.h clean: rm -f buildinf.h *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff @target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) rm -f opensslconf.h @target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cpt_err.c cryptlib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.c cryptlib.o: cryptlib.h cversion.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h buildinf.h cversion.o: cryptlib.h cversion.c ebcdic.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ebcdic.c ex_data.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h ex_data.o: ex_data.c fips_ers.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h fips_ers.c mem.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h mem.o: mem.c mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h mem_clr.c mem_dbg.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h mem_dbg.o: mem_dbg.c o_dir.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_dir.o: LPdir_unix.c o_dir.c o_dir.h o_fips.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h o_fips.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h o_fips.o: o_fips.c o_init.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h o_init.c o_str.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_str.o: o_str.c o_str.h o_time.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_time.c o_time.o: o_time.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h uid.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_bool.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,111 +1,125 @@ /* crypto/asn1/a_bool.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include int i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int a, unsigned char **pp) { int r; - unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL; r = ASN1_object_size(0, 1, V_ASN1_BOOLEAN); if (pp == NULL) return (r); - p = *pp; + if (*pp == NULL) { + if ((p = allocated = OPENSSL_malloc(r)) == NULL) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + } else { + p = *pp; + } + ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, 1, V_ASN1_BOOLEAN, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); - *(p++) = (unsigned char)a; - *pp = p; - return (r); + *p = (unsigned char)a; + + + /* + * If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back. + * If not, return the incremented buffer pointer. + */ + *pp = allocated != NULL ? allocated : p + 1; + return r; } int d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int *a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { int ret = -1; const unsigned char *p; long len; int inf, tag, xclass; int i = 0; p = *pp; inf = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length); if (inf & 0x80) { i = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER; goto err; } if (tag != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) { i = ASN1_R_EXPECTING_A_BOOLEAN; goto err; } if (len != 1) { i = ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH; goto err; } ret = (int)*(p++); if (a != NULL) (*a) = ret; *pp = p; return (ret); err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BOOLEAN, i); return (ret); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_object.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,406 +1,417 @@ /* crypto/asn1/a_object.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp) { - unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL; int objsize; if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return (0); objsize = ASN1_object_size(0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT); if (pp == NULL || objsize == -1) return objsize; - p = *pp; + if (*pp == NULL) { + if ((p = allocated = OPENSSL_malloc(objsize)) == NULL) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + } else { + p = *pp; + } + ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); memcpy(p, a->data, a->length); - p += a->length; - *pp = p; - return (objsize); + /* + * If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back. + * If not, return the incremented buffer pointer. + */ + *pp = allocated != NULL ? allocated : p + a->length; + return objsize; } int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num) { int i, first, len = 0, c, use_bn; char ftmp[24], *tmp = ftmp; int tmpsize = sizeof(ftmp); const char *p; unsigned long l; BIGNUM *bl = NULL; if (num == 0) return (0); else if (num == -1) num = strlen(buf); p = buf; c = *(p++); num--; if ((c >= '0') && (c <= '2')) { first = c - '0'; } else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } if (num <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER); goto err; } c = *(p++); num--; for (;;) { if (num <= 0) break; if ((c != '.') && (c != ' ')) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR); goto err; } l = 0; use_bn = 0; for (;;) { if (num <= 0) break; num--; c = *(p++); if ((c == ' ') || (c == '.')) break; if ((c < '0') || (c > '9')) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT); goto err; } if (!use_bn && l >= ((ULONG_MAX - 80) / 10L)) { use_bn = 1; if (!bl) bl = BN_new(); if (!bl || !BN_set_word(bl, l)) goto err; } if (use_bn) { if (!BN_mul_word(bl, 10L) || !BN_add_word(bl, c - '0')) goto err; } else l = l * 10L + (long)(c - '0'); } if (len == 0) { if ((first < 2) && (l >= 40)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } if (use_bn) { if (!BN_add_word(bl, first * 40)) goto err; } else l += (long)first *40; } i = 0; if (use_bn) { int blsize; blsize = BN_num_bits(bl); blsize = (blsize + 6) / 7; if (blsize > tmpsize) { if (tmp != ftmp) OPENSSL_free(tmp); tmpsize = blsize + 32; tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmpsize); if (!tmp) goto err; } while (blsize--) { BN_ULONG t = BN_div_word(bl, 0x80L); if (t == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)t; } } else { for (;;) { tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)l & 0x7f; l >>= 7L; if (l == 0L) break; } } if (out != NULL) { if (len + i > olen) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } while (--i > 0) out[len++] = tmp[i] | 0x80; out[len++] = tmp[0]; } else len += i; } if (tmp != ftmp) OPENSSL_free(tmp); if (bl) BN_free(bl); return (len); err: if (tmp != ftmp) OPENSSL_free(tmp); if (bl) BN_free(bl); return (0); } int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, ASN1_OBJECT *a) { return OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, 0); } int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *a) { char buf[80], *p = buf; int i; if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return (BIO_write(bp, "NULL", 4)); i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, sizeof(buf), a); if (i > (int)(sizeof(buf) - 1)) { p = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 1); if (!p) return -1; i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(p, i + 1, a); } if (i <= 0) return BIO_write(bp, "", 9); BIO_write(bp, p, i); if (p != buf) OPENSSL_free(p); return (i); } ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { const unsigned char *p; long len; int tag, xclass; int inf, i; ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL; p = *pp; inf = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length); if (inf & 0x80) { i = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER; goto err; } if (tag != V_ASN1_OBJECT) { i = ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT; goto err; } ret = c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(a, &p, len); if (ret) *pp = p; return ret; err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT, i); return (NULL); } ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *data; int i, length; /* * Sanity check OID encoding. Need at least one content octet. MSB must * be clear in the last octet. can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, * see: X.690 8.19.2 */ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL || p[len - 1] & 0x80) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING); return NULL; } /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */ length = (int)len; for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++) { if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80))) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING); return NULL; } } /* * only the ASN1_OBJECTs from the 'table' will have values for ->sn or * ->ln */ if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL) || !((*a)->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)) { if ((ret = ASN1_OBJECT_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); } else ret = (*a); p = *pp; /* detach data from object */ data = (unsigned char *)ret->data; ret->data = NULL; /* once detached we can change it */ if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length)) { ret->length = 0; if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data); data = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length); if (data == NULL) { i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } ret->flags |= ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA; } memcpy(data, p, length); /* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */ ret->data = data; ret->length = length; ret->sn = NULL; ret->ln = NULL; /* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */ p += length; if (a != NULL) (*a) = ret; *pp = p; return (ret); err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT, i); if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))) ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret); return (NULL); } ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void) { ASN1_OBJECT *ret; ret = (ASN1_OBJECT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ASN1_OBJECT)); if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } ret->length = 0; ret->data = NULL; ret->nid = 0; ret->sn = NULL; ret->ln = NULL; ret->flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; return (ret); } void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a) { if (a == NULL) return; if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) { #ifndef CONST_STRICT /* disable purely for compile-time strict * const checking. Doing this on a "real" * compile will cause memory leaks */ if (a->sn != NULL) OPENSSL_free((void *)a->sn); if (a->ln != NULL) OPENSSL_free((void *)a->ln); #endif a->sn = a->ln = NULL; } if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA) { if (a->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free((void *)a->data); a->data = NULL; a->length = 0; } if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC) OPENSSL_free(a); } ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, unsigned char *data, int len, const char *sn, const char *ln) { ASN1_OBJECT o; o.sn = sn; o.ln = ln; o.data = data; o.nid = nid; o.length = len; o.flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA; return (OBJ_dup(&o)); } IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,649 +1,670 @@ /* a_strex.c */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "charmap.h" /* * ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex(). Enhanced string and name * printing routines handling multibyte characters, RFC2253 and a host of * other options. */ #define CHARTYPE_BS_ESC (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253) #define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB) /* * Three IO functions for sending data to memory, a BIO and and a FILE * pointer. */ #if 0 /* never used */ static int send_mem_chars(void *arg, const void *buf, int len) { unsigned char **out = arg; if (!out) return 1; memcpy(*out, buf, len); *out += len; return 1; } #endif static int send_bio_chars(void *arg, const void *buf, int len) { if (!arg) return 1; if (BIO_write(arg, buf, len) != len) return 0; return 1; } static int send_fp_chars(void *arg, const void *buf, int len) { if (!arg) return 1; if (fwrite(buf, 1, len, arg) != (unsigned int)len) return 0; return 1; } typedef int char_io (void *arg, const void *buf, int len); /* * This function handles display of strings, one character at a time. It is * passed an unsigned long for each character because it could come from 2 or * even 4 byte forms. */ static int do_esc_char(unsigned long c, unsigned char flags, char *do_quotes, char_io *io_ch, void *arg) { unsigned char chflgs, chtmp; char tmphex[HEX_SIZE(long) + 3]; if (c > 0xffffffffL) return -1; if (c > 0xffff) { BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof(tmphex), "\\W%08lX", c); if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 10)) return -1; return 10; } if (c > 0xff) { BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof(tmphex), "\\U%04lX", c); if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 6)) return -1; return 6; } chtmp = (unsigned char)c; if (chtmp > 0x7f) chflgs = flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB; else chflgs = char_type[chtmp] & flags; if (chflgs & CHARTYPE_BS_ESC) { /* If we don't escape with quotes, signal we need quotes */ if (chflgs & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE) { if (do_quotes) *do_quotes = 1; if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1; return 1; } if (!io_ch(arg, "\\", 1)) return -1; if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1; return 2; } if (chflgs & (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)) { BIO_snprintf(tmphex, 11, "\\%02X", chtmp); if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 3)) return -1; return 3; } /* * If we get this far and do any escaping at all must escape the escape * character itself: backslash. */ if (chtmp == '\\' && flags & ESC_FLAGS) { if (!io_ch(arg, "\\\\", 2)) return -1; return 2; } if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1; return 1; } #define BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK 0x7 #define BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8 0x8 /* * This function sends each character in a buffer to do_esc_char(). It * interprets the content formats and converts to or from UTF8 as * appropriate. */ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen, int type, unsigned char flags, char *quotes, char_io *io_ch, void *arg) { - int i, outlen, len; + int i, outlen, len, charwidth; unsigned char orflags, *p, *q; unsigned long c; p = buf; q = buf + buflen; outlen = 0; + charwidth = type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK; + + switch (charwidth) { + case 4: + if (buflen & 3) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_BUF, ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + break; + case 2: + if (buflen & 1) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_BUF, ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + while (p != q) { if (p == buf && flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253) orflags = CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253; else orflags = 0; - switch (type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK) { + + switch (charwidth) { case 4: c = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 24; c |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 16; c |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 8; c |= *p++; break; case 2: c = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 8; c |= *p++; break; case 1: c = *p++; break; case 0: i = UTF8_getc(p, buflen, &c); if (i < 0) return -1; /* Invalid UTF8String */ + buflen -= i; p += i; break; default: return -1; /* invalid width */ } if (p == q && flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253) orflags = CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253; if (type & BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8) { unsigned char utfbuf[6]; int utflen; utflen = UTF8_putc(utfbuf, sizeof(utfbuf), c); for (i = 0; i < utflen; i++) { /* * We don't need to worry about setting orflags correctly * because if utflen==1 its value will be correct anyway * otherwise each character will be > 0x7f and so the * character will never be escaped on first and last. */ len = do_esc_char(utfbuf[i], (unsigned char)(flags | orflags), quotes, io_ch, arg); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; } } else { len = do_esc_char(c, (unsigned char)(flags | orflags), quotes, io_ch, arg); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; } } return outlen; } /* This function hex dumps a buffer of characters */ static int do_hex_dump(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) { static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; unsigned char *p, *q; char hextmp[2]; if (arg) { p = buf; q = buf + buflen; while (p != q) { hextmp[0] = hexdig[*p >> 4]; hextmp[1] = hexdig[*p & 0xf]; if (!io_ch(arg, hextmp, 2)) return -1; p++; } } return buflen << 1; } /* * "dump" a string. This is done when the type is unknown, or the flags * request it. We can either dump the content octets or the entire DER * encoding. This uses the RFC2253 #01234 format. */ static int do_dump(unsigned long lflags, char_io *io_ch, void *arg, ASN1_STRING *str) { /* * Placing the ASN1_STRING in a temp ASN1_TYPE allows the DER encoding to * readily obtained */ ASN1_TYPE t; unsigned char *der_buf, *p; int outlen, der_len; if (!io_ch(arg, "#", 1)) return -1; /* If we don't dump DER encoding just dump content octets */ if (!(lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER)) { outlen = do_hex_dump(io_ch, arg, str->data, str->length); if (outlen < 0) return -1; return outlen + 1; } t.type = str->type; t.value.ptr = (char *)str; der_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, NULL); der_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len); if (!der_buf) return -1; p = der_buf; i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, &p); outlen = do_hex_dump(io_ch, arg, der_buf, der_len); OPENSSL_free(der_buf); if (outlen < 0) return -1; return outlen + 1; } /* * Lookup table to convert tags to character widths, 0 = UTF8 encoded, -1 is * used for non string types otherwise it is the number of bytes per * character */ static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 0-4 */ -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 5-9 */ -1, -1, 0, -1, /* 10-13 */ -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 15-17 */ 1, 1, 1, /* 18-20 */ -1, 1, 1, 1, /* 21-24 */ -1, 1, -1, /* 25-27 */ 4, -1, 2 /* 28-30 */ }; /* * This is the main function, print out an ASN1_STRING taking note of various * escape and display options. Returns number of characters written or -1 if * an error occurred. */ static int do_print_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned long lflags, ASN1_STRING *str) { int outlen, len; int type; char quotes; unsigned char flags; quotes = 0; /* Keep a copy of escape flags */ flags = (unsigned char)(lflags & ESC_FLAGS); type = str->type; outlen = 0; if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE) { const char *tagname; tagname = ASN1_tag2str(type); outlen += strlen(tagname); if (!io_ch(arg, tagname, outlen) || !io_ch(arg, ":", 1)) return -1; outlen++; } /* Decide what to do with type, either dump content or display it */ /* Dump everything */ if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL) type = -1; /* Ignore the string type */ else if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE) type = 1; else { /* Else determine width based on type */ if ((type > 0) && (type < 31)) type = tag2nbyte[type]; else type = -1; if ((type == -1) && !(lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN)) type = 1; } if (type == -1) { len = do_dump(lflags, io_ch, arg, str); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; return outlen; } if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT) { /* * Note: if string is UTF8 and we want to convert to UTF8 then we * just interpret it as 1 byte per character to avoid converting * twice. */ if (!type) type = 1; else type |= BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8; } len = do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, "es, io_ch, NULL); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; if (quotes) outlen += 2; if (!arg) return outlen; if (quotes && !io_ch(arg, "\"", 1)) return -1; if (do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, NULL, io_ch, arg) < 0) return -1; if (quotes && !io_ch(arg, "\"", 1)) return -1; return outlen; } /* Used for line indenting: print 'indent' spaces */ static int do_indent(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, int indent) { int i; for (i = 0; i < indent; i++) if (!io_ch(arg, " ", 1)) return 0; return 1; } #define FN_WIDTH_LN 25 #define FN_WIDTH_SN 10 static int do_name_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, X509_NAME *n, int indent, unsigned long flags) { int i, prev = -1, orflags, cnt; int fn_opt, fn_nid; ASN1_OBJECT *fn; ASN1_STRING *val; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ent; char objtmp[80]; const char *objbuf; int outlen, len; char *sep_dn, *sep_mv, *sep_eq; int sep_dn_len, sep_mv_len, sep_eq_len; if (indent < 0) indent = 0; outlen = indent; if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, indent)) return -1; switch (flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) { case XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE: sep_dn = "\n"; sep_dn_len = 1; sep_mv = " + "; sep_mv_len = 3; break; case XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS: sep_dn = ","; sep_dn_len = 1; sep_mv = "+"; sep_mv_len = 1; indent = 0; break; case XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC: sep_dn = ", "; sep_dn_len = 2; sep_mv = " + "; sep_mv_len = 3; indent = 0; break; case XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC: sep_dn = "; "; sep_dn_len = 2; sep_mv = " + "; sep_mv_len = 3; indent = 0; break; default: return -1; } if (flags & XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ) { sep_eq = " = "; sep_eq_len = 3; } else { sep_eq = "="; sep_eq_len = 1; } fn_opt = flags & XN_FLAG_FN_MASK; cnt = X509_NAME_entry_count(n); for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { if (flags & XN_FLAG_DN_REV) ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(n, cnt - i - 1); else ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(n, i); if (prev != -1) { if (prev == ent->set) { if (!io_ch(arg, sep_mv, sep_mv_len)) return -1; outlen += sep_mv_len; } else { if (!io_ch(arg, sep_dn, sep_dn_len)) return -1; outlen += sep_dn_len; if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, indent)) return -1; outlen += indent; } } prev = ent->set; fn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ent); val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ent); fn_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(fn); if (fn_opt != XN_FLAG_FN_NONE) { int objlen, fld_len; if ((fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_OID) || (fn_nid == NID_undef)) { OBJ_obj2txt(objtmp, sizeof(objtmp), fn, 1); fld_len = 0; /* XXX: what should this be? */ objbuf = objtmp; } else { if (fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_SN) { fld_len = FN_WIDTH_SN; objbuf = OBJ_nid2sn(fn_nid); } else if (fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_LN) { fld_len = FN_WIDTH_LN; objbuf = OBJ_nid2ln(fn_nid); } else { fld_len = 0; /* XXX: what should this be? */ objbuf = ""; } } objlen = strlen(objbuf); if (!io_ch(arg, objbuf, objlen)) return -1; if ((objlen < fld_len) && (flags & XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN)) { if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, fld_len - objlen)) return -1; outlen += fld_len - objlen; } if (!io_ch(arg, sep_eq, sep_eq_len)) return -1; outlen += objlen + sep_eq_len; } /* * If the field name is unknown then fix up the DER dump flag. We * might want to limit this further so it will DER dump on anything * other than a few 'standard' fields. */ if ((fn_nid == NID_undef) && (flags & XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS)) orflags = ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL; else orflags = 0; len = do_print_ex(io_ch, arg, flags | orflags, val); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; } return outlen; } /* Wrappers round the main functions */ int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags) { if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) return X509_NAME_print(out, nm, indent); return do_name_ex(send_bio_chars, out, nm, indent, flags); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags) { if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) { BIO *btmp; int ret; btmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (!btmp) return -1; ret = X509_NAME_print(btmp, nm, indent); BIO_free(btmp); return ret; } return do_name_ex(send_fp_chars, fp, nm, indent, flags); } #endif int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags) { return do_print_ex(send_bio_chars, out, flags, str); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags) { return do_print_ex(send_fp_chars, fp, flags, str); } #endif /* * Utility function: convert any string type to UTF8, returns number of bytes * in output string or a negative error code */ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in) { ASN1_STRING stmp, *str = &stmp; int mbflag, type, ret; if (!in) return -1; type = in->type; if ((type < 0) || (type > 30)) return -1; mbflag = tag2nbyte[type]; if (mbflag == -1) return -1; mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG; stmp.data = NULL; stmp.length = 0; stmp.flags = 0; ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING); if (ret < 0) return ret; *out = stmp.data; return stmp.length; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,486 +1,498 @@ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2006. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif #include "asn1_locl.h" extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[]; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[]; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dhx_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD eckey_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD hmac_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD cmac_asn1_meth; /* Keep this sorted in type order !! */ static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *standard_methods[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA &rsa_asn1_meths[0], &rsa_asn1_meths[1], #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH &dh_asn1_meth, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA &dsa_asn1_meths[0], &dsa_asn1_meths[1], &dsa_asn1_meths[2], &dsa_asn1_meths[3], &dsa_asn1_meths[4], #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC &eckey_asn1_meth, #endif &hmac_asn1_meth, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC &cmac_asn1_meth, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH &dhx_asn1_meth #endif }; typedef int sk_cmp_fn_type(const char *const *a, const char *const *b); DECLARE_STACK_OF(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD) static STACK_OF(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD) *app_methods = NULL; #ifdef TEST void main() { int i; for (i = 0; i < sizeof(standard_methods) / sizeof(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *); i++) fprintf(stderr, "Number %d id=%d (%s)\n", i, standard_methods[i]->pkey_id, OBJ_nid2sn(standard_methods[i]->pkey_id)); } #endif DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, ameth); static int ameth_cmp(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *const *a, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *const *b) { return ((*a)->pkey_id - (*b)->pkey_id); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, ameth); int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(void) { int num = sizeof(standard_methods) / sizeof(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *); if (app_methods) num += sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_num(app_methods); return num; } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(int idx) { int num = sizeof(standard_methods) / sizeof(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *); if (idx < 0) return NULL; if (idx < num) return standard_methods[idx]; idx -= num; return sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_value(app_methods, idx); } static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *pkey_asn1_find(int type) { EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD tmp; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *t = &tmp, **ret; tmp.pkey_id = type; if (app_methods) { int idx; idx = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_find(app_methods, &tmp); if (idx >= 0) return sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_value(app_methods, idx); } ret = OBJ_bsearch_ameth(&t, standard_methods, sizeof(standard_methods) / sizeof(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *)); if (!ret || !*ret) return NULL; return *ret; } /* * Find an implementation of an ASN1 algorithm. If 'pe' is not NULL also * search through engines and set *pe to a functional reference to the engine * implementing 'type' or NULL if no engine implements it. */ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(ENGINE **pe, int type) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *t; for (;;) { t = pkey_asn1_find(type); if (!t || !(t->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS)) break; type = t->pkey_base_id; } if (pe) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *e; /* type will contain the final unaliased type */ e = ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(type); if (e) { *pe = e; return ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth(e, type); } #endif *pe = NULL; } return t; } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe, const char *str, int len) { int i; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (len == -1) len = strlen(str); if (pe) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *e; ameth = ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str(&e, str, len); if (ameth) { /* * Convert structural into functional reference */ if (!ENGINE_init(e)) ameth = NULL; ENGINE_free(e); *pe = e; return ameth; } #endif *pe = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) { ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i); if (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) continue; if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == len) && !strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, str, len)) return ameth; } return NULL; } int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth) { if (app_methods == NULL) { app_methods = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_new(ameth_cmp); if (!app_methods) return 0; } if (!sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_push(app_methods, ameth)) return 0; sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_sort(app_methods); return 1; } int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from) { EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(from, ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS, NULL, NULL); if (!ameth) return 0; ameth->pkey_base_id = to; if (!EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(ameth)) { EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(ameth); return 0; } return 1; } int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *ppkey_base_id, int *ppkey_flags, const char **pinfo, const char **ppem_str, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth) { if (!ameth) return 0; if (ppkey_id) *ppkey_id = ameth->pkey_id; if (ppkey_base_id) *ppkey_base_id = ameth->pkey_base_id; if (ppkey_flags) *ppkey_flags = ameth->pkey_flags; if (pinfo) *pinfo = ameth->info; if (ppem_str) *ppem_str = ameth->pem_str; return 1; } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return pkey->ameth; } EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags, const char *pem_str, const char *info) { EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ameth = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD)); if (!ameth) return NULL; memset(ameth, 0, sizeof(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD)); ameth->pkey_id = id; ameth->pkey_base_id = id; ameth->pkey_flags = flags | ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC; if (info) { ameth->info = BUF_strdup(info); if (!ameth->info) goto err; } else ameth->info = NULL; + + /* + * One of the following must be true: + * + * pem_str == NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is set + * pem_str != NULL AND ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS is clear + * + * Anything else is an error and may lead to a corrupt ASN1 method table + */ + if (!((pem_str == NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) != 0) + || (pem_str != NULL && (flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) == 0))) + goto err; if (pem_str) { ameth->pem_str = BUF_strdup(pem_str); if (!ameth->pem_str) goto err; } else ameth->pem_str = NULL; ameth->pub_decode = 0; ameth->pub_encode = 0; ameth->pub_cmp = 0; ameth->pub_print = 0; ameth->priv_decode = 0; ameth->priv_encode = 0; ameth->priv_print = 0; ameth->old_priv_encode = 0; ameth->old_priv_decode = 0; ameth->item_verify = 0; ameth->item_sign = 0; ameth->pkey_size = 0; ameth->pkey_bits = 0; ameth->param_decode = 0; ameth->param_encode = 0; ameth->param_missing = 0; ameth->param_copy = 0; ameth->param_cmp = 0; ameth->param_print = 0; ameth->pkey_free = 0; ameth->pkey_ctrl = 0; return ameth; err: EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(ameth); return NULL; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *dst, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *src) { dst->pub_decode = src->pub_decode; dst->pub_encode = src->pub_encode; dst->pub_cmp = src->pub_cmp; dst->pub_print = src->pub_print; dst->priv_decode = src->priv_decode; dst->priv_encode = src->priv_encode; dst->priv_print = src->priv_print; dst->old_priv_encode = src->old_priv_encode; dst->old_priv_decode = src->old_priv_decode; dst->pkey_size = src->pkey_size; dst->pkey_bits = src->pkey_bits; dst->param_decode = src->param_decode; dst->param_encode = src->param_encode; dst->param_missing = src->param_missing; dst->param_copy = src->param_copy; dst->param_cmp = src->param_cmp; dst->param_print = src->param_print; dst->pkey_free = src->pkey_free; dst->pkey_ctrl = src->pkey_ctrl; dst->item_sign = src->item_sign; dst->item_verify = src->item_verify; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth) { if (ameth && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC)) { if (ameth->pem_str) OPENSSL_free(ameth->pem_str); if (ameth->info) OPENSSL_free(ameth->info); OPENSSL_free(ameth); } } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, X509_PUBKEY *pub), int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b), int (*pub_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx), int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk)) { ameth->pub_decode = pub_decode; ameth->pub_encode = pub_encode; ameth->pub_cmp = pub_cmp; ameth->pub_print = pub_print; ameth->pkey_size = pkey_size; ameth->pkey_bits = pkey_bits; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf), int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*priv_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)) { ameth->priv_decode = priv_decode; ameth->priv_encode = priv_encode; ameth->priv_print = priv_print; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen), int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder), int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from), int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b), int (*param_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)) { ameth->param_decode = param_decode; ameth->param_encode = param_encode; ameth->param_missing = param_missing; ameth->param_copy = param_copy; ameth->param_cmp = param_cmp; ameth->param_print = param_print; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey)) { ameth->pkey_free = pkey_free; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)) { ameth->pkey_ctrl = pkey_ctrl; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey), int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)) { ameth->item_sign = item_sign; ameth->item_verify = item_verify; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/asn1.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/asn1.h (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/asn1.h (revision 337764) @@ -1,1420 +1,1424 @@ /* crypto/asn1/asn1.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #ifndef HEADER_ASN1_H # define HEADER_ASN1_H # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO # include # endif # include # include # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED # include # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL 0x00 # define V_ASN1_APPLICATION 0x40 # define V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 0x80 # define V_ASN1_PRIVATE 0xc0 # define V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED 0x20 # define V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG 0x1f # define V_ASN1_PRIMATIVE_TAG 0x1f # define V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE -2/* let the recipient choose */ # define V_ASN1_OTHER -3/* used in ASN1_TYPE */ # define V_ASN1_ANY -4/* used in ASN1 template code */ # define V_ASN1_NEG 0x100/* negative flag */ # define V_ASN1_UNDEF -1 # define V_ASN1_EOC 0 # define V_ASN1_BOOLEAN 1 /**/ # define V_ASN1_INTEGER 2 # define V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER (2 | V_ASN1_NEG) # define V_ASN1_BIT_STRING 3 # define V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 4 # define V_ASN1_NULL 5 # define V_ASN1_OBJECT 6 # define V_ASN1_OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR 7 # define V_ASN1_EXTERNAL 8 # define V_ASN1_REAL 9 # define V_ASN1_ENUMERATED 10 # define V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED (10 | V_ASN1_NEG) # define V_ASN1_UTF8STRING 12 # define V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 16 # define V_ASN1_SET 17 # define V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING 18 /**/ # define V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING 19 # define V_ASN1_T61STRING 20 # define V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING 20/* alias */ # define V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING 21 /**/ # define V_ASN1_IA5STRING 22 # define V_ASN1_UTCTIME 23 # define V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 24 /**/ # define V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING 25 /**/ # define V_ASN1_ISO64STRING 26 /**/ # define V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING 26/* alias */ # define V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING 27 /**/ # define V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING 28 /**/ # define V_ASN1_BMPSTRING 30 /* For use with d2i_ASN1_type_bytes() */ # define B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING 0x0001 # define B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING 0x0002 # define B_ASN1_T61STRING 0x0004 # define B_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING 0x0004 # define B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING 0x0008 # define B_ASN1_IA5STRING 0x0010 # define B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING 0x0020 # define B_ASN1_ISO64STRING 0x0040 # define B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING 0x0040 # define B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING 0x0080 # define B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING 0x0100 # define B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x0200 # define B_ASN1_BIT_STRING 0x0400 # define B_ASN1_BMPSTRING 0x0800 # define B_ASN1_UNKNOWN 0x1000 # define B_ASN1_UTF8STRING 0x2000 # define B_ASN1_UTCTIME 0x4000 # define B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 0x8000 # define B_ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x10000 /* For use with ASN1_mbstring_copy() */ # define MBSTRING_FLAG 0x1000 # define MBSTRING_UTF8 (MBSTRING_FLAG) # define MBSTRING_ASC (MBSTRING_FLAG|1) # define MBSTRING_BMP (MBSTRING_FLAG|2) # define MBSTRING_UNIV (MBSTRING_FLAG|4) # define SMIME_OLDMIME 0x400 # define SMIME_CRLFEOL 0x800 # define SMIME_STREAM 0x1000 struct X509_algor_st; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) # define DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(type)/* filled in by mkstack.pl */ # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(type)/* nothing, no longer needed */ /* * We MUST make sure that, except for constness, asn1_ctx_st and * asn1_const_ctx are exactly the same. Fortunately, as soon as the old ASN1 * parsing macros are gone, we can throw this away as well... */ typedef struct asn1_ctx_st { unsigned char *p; /* work char pointer */ int eos; /* end of sequence read for indefinite * encoding */ int error; /* error code to use when returning an error */ int inf; /* constructed if 0x20, indefinite is 0x21 */ int tag; /* tag from last 'get object' */ int xclass; /* class from last 'get object' */ long slen; /* length of last 'get object' */ unsigned char *max; /* largest value of p allowed */ unsigned char *q; /* temporary variable */ unsigned char **pp; /* variable */ int line; /* used in error processing */ } ASN1_CTX; typedef struct asn1_const_ctx_st { const unsigned char *p; /* work char pointer */ int eos; /* end of sequence read for indefinite * encoding */ int error; /* error code to use when returning an error */ int inf; /* constructed if 0x20, indefinite is 0x21 */ int tag; /* tag from last 'get object' */ int xclass; /* class from last 'get object' */ long slen; /* length of last 'get object' */ const unsigned char *max; /* largest value of p allowed */ const unsigned char *q; /* temporary variable */ const unsigned char **pp; /* variable */ int line; /* used in error processing */ } ASN1_const_CTX; /* * These are used internally in the ASN1_OBJECT to keep track of whether the * names and data need to be free()ed */ # define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC 0x01/* internal use */ # define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_CRITICAL 0x02/* critical x509v3 object id */ # define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS 0x04/* internal use */ # define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA 0x08/* internal use */ struct asn1_object_st { const char *sn, *ln; int nid; int length; const unsigned char *data; /* data remains const after init */ int flags; /* Should we free this one */ }; # define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT 0x08/* Set if 0x07 has bits left value */ /* * This indicates that the ASN1_STRING is not a real value but just a place * holder for the location where indefinite length constructed data should be * inserted in the memory buffer */ # define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF 0x010 /* * This flag is used by the CMS code to indicate that a string is not * complete and is a place holder for content when it had all been accessed. * The flag will be reset when content has been written to it. */ # define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT 0x020 /* * This flag is used by ASN1 code to indicate an ASN1_STRING is an MSTRING * type. */ # define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING 0x040 /* This is the base type that holds just about everything :-) */ struct asn1_string_st { int length; int type; unsigned char *data; /* * The value of the following field depends on the type being held. It * is mostly being used for BIT_STRING so if the input data has a * non-zero 'unused bits' value, it will be handled correctly */ long flags; }; /* * ASN1_ENCODING structure: this is used to save the received encoding of an * ASN1 type. This is useful to get round problems with invalid encodings * which can break signatures. */ typedef struct ASN1_ENCODING_st { unsigned char *enc; /* DER encoding */ long len; /* Length of encoding */ int modified; /* set to 1 if 'enc' is invalid */ } ASN1_ENCODING; /* Used with ASN1 LONG type: if a long is set to this it is omitted */ # define ASN1_LONG_UNDEF 0x7fffffffL # define STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC 0x01 # define STABLE_NO_MASK 0x02 # define DIRSTRING_TYPE \ (B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING|B_ASN1_T61STRING|B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|B_ASN1_UTF8STRING) # define PKCS9STRING_TYPE (DIRSTRING_TYPE|B_ASN1_IA5STRING) typedef struct asn1_string_table_st { int nid; long minsize; long maxsize; unsigned long mask; unsigned long flags; } ASN1_STRING_TABLE; DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE) /* size limits: this stuff is taken straight from RFC2459 */ # define ub_name 32768 # define ub_common_name 64 # define ub_locality_name 128 # define ub_state_name 128 # define ub_organization_name 64 # define ub_organization_unit_name 64 # define ub_title 64 # define ub_email_address 128 /* * Declarations for template structures: for full definitions see asn1t.h */ typedef struct ASN1_TEMPLATE_st ASN1_TEMPLATE; typedef struct ASN1_TLC_st ASN1_TLC; /* This is just an opaque pointer */ typedef struct ASN1_VALUE_st ASN1_VALUE; /* Declare ASN1 functions: the implement macro in in asn1t.h */ # define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(type) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(type) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type) # define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, name, name) # define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(type, itname, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) \ type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); \ int i2d_##name(type *a, unsigned char **out); \ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(itname) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(type, name) \ type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); \ int i2d_##name(const type *a, unsigned char **out); \ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) # define DECLARE_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(name) \ int i2d_##name##_NDEF(name *a, unsigned char **out); # define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(name, name) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ type *name##_new(void); \ void name##_free(type *a); # define DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(stname) \ DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, stname) # define DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, fname) \ int fname##_print_ctx(BIO *out, stname *x, int indent, \ const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); # define D2I_OF(type) type *(*)(type **,const unsigned char **,long) # define I2D_OF(type) int (*)(type *,unsigned char **) # define I2D_OF_const(type) int (*)(const type *,unsigned char **) # define CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i) \ ((d2i_of_void*) (1 ? d2i : ((D2I_OF(type))0))) # define CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d) \ ((i2d_of_void*) (1 ? i2d : ((I2D_OF(type))0))) # define CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew) \ ((void *(*)(void)) (1 ? xnew : ((type *(*)(void))0))) # define CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, p) \ ((void*) (1 ? p : (type*)0)) # define CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, p) \ ((void**) (1 ? p : (type**)0)) # define TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type) typedef type *d2i_of_##type(type **,const unsigned char **,long) # define TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type) typedef int i2d_of_##type(type *,unsigned char **) # define TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(type) TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type); TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type) TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(void); /*- * The following macros and typedefs allow an ASN1_ITEM * to be embedded in a structure and referenced. Since * the ASN1_ITEM pointers need to be globally accessible * (possibly from shared libraries) they may exist in * different forms. On platforms that support it the * ASN1_ITEM structure itself will be globally exported. * Other platforms will export a function that returns * an ASN1_ITEM pointer. * * To handle both cases transparently the macros below * should be used instead of hard coding an ASN1_ITEM * pointer in a structure. * * The structure will look like this: * * typedef struct SOMETHING_st { * ... * ASN1_ITEM_EXP *iptr; * ... * } SOMETHING; * * It would be initialised as e.g.: * * SOMETHING somevar = {...,ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509),...}; * * and the actual pointer extracted with: * * const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(somevar.iptr); * * Finally an ASN1_ITEM pointer can be extracted from an * appropriate reference with: ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509). This * would be used when a function takes an ASN1_ITEM * argument. * */ # ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION /* ASN1_ITEM pointer exported type */ typedef const ASN1_ITEM ASN1_ITEM_EXP; /* Macro to obtain ASN1_ITEM pointer from exported type */ # define ASN1_ITEM_ptr(iptr) (iptr) /* Macro to include ASN1_ITEM pointer from base type */ # define ASN1_ITEM_ref(iptr) (&(iptr##_it)) # define ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ref) (&(ref##_it)) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) \ OPENSSL_EXTERN const ASN1_ITEM name##_it; # else /* * Platforms that can't easily handle shared global variables are declared as * functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers. */ /* ASN1_ITEM pointer exported type */ typedef const ASN1_ITEM *ASN1_ITEM_EXP (void); /* Macro to obtain ASN1_ITEM pointer from exported type */ # define ASN1_ITEM_ptr(iptr) (iptr()) /* Macro to include ASN1_ITEM pointer from base type */ # define ASN1_ITEM_ref(iptr) (iptr##_it) # define ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ref) (ref##_it()) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) \ const ASN1_ITEM * name##_it(void); # endif /* Parameters used by ASN1_STRING_print_ex() */ /* * These determine which characters to escape: RFC2253 special characters, * control characters and MSB set characters */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 1 # define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL 2 # define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB 4 /* * This flag determines how we do escaping: normally RC2253 backslash only, * set this to use backslash and quote. */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE 8 /* These three flags are internal use only. */ /* Character is a valid PrintableString character */ # define CHARTYPE_PRINTABLESTRING 0x10 /* Character needs escaping if it is the first character */ # define CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 0x20 /* Character needs escaping if it is the last character */ # define CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253 0x40 /* * NB the internal flags are safely reused below by flags handled at the top * level. */ /* * If this is set we convert all character strings to UTF8 first */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT 0x10 /* * If this is set we don't attempt to interpret content: just assume all * strings are 1 byte per character. This will produce some pretty odd * looking output! */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE 0x20 /* If this is set we include the string type in the output */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE 0x40 /* * This determines which strings to display and which to 'dump' (hex dump of * content octets or DER encoding). We can only dump non character strings or * everything. If we don't dump 'unknown' they are interpreted as character * strings with 1 octet per character and are subject to the usual escaping * options. */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL 0x80 # define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN 0x100 /* * These determine what 'dumping' does, we can dump the content octets or the * DER encoding: both use the RFC2253 #XXXXX notation. */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER 0x200 /* * All the string flags consistent with RFC2253, escaping control characters * isn't essential in RFC2253 but it is advisable anyway. */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER) DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_GENERALSTRING) typedef struct asn1_type_st { int type; union { char *ptr; ASN1_BOOLEAN boolean; ASN1_STRING *asn1_string; ASN1_OBJECT *object; ASN1_INTEGER *integer; ASN1_ENUMERATED *enumerated; ASN1_BIT_STRING *bit_string; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet_string; ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING *printablestring; ASN1_T61STRING *t61string; ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5string; ASN1_GENERALSTRING *generalstring; ASN1_BMPSTRING *bmpstring; ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *universalstring; ASN1_UTCTIME *utctime; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *generalizedtime; ASN1_VISIBLESTRING *visiblestring; ASN1_UTF8STRING *utf8string; /* * set and sequence are left complete and still contain the set or * sequence bytes */ ASN1_STRING *set; ASN1_STRING *sequence; ASN1_VALUE *asn1_value; } value; } ASN1_TYPE; DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_TYPE) typedef STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY; DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SET_ANY) typedef struct NETSCAPE_X509_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *header; X509 *cert; } NETSCAPE_X509; /* This is used to contain a list of bit names */ typedef struct BIT_STRING_BITNAME_st { int bitnum; const char *lname; const char *sname; } BIT_STRING_BITNAME; # define M_ASN1_STRING_length(x) ((x)->length) # define M_ASN1_STRING_length_set(x, n) ((x)->length = (n)) # define M_ASN1_STRING_type(x) ((x)->type) # define M_ASN1_STRING_data(x) ((x)->data) /* Macros for string operations */ # define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new() (ASN1_BIT_STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_BIT_STRING) # define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_dup(a) (ASN1_BIT_STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_dup((const ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_cmp(a,b) ASN1_STRING_cmp(\ (const ASN1_STRING *)a,(const ASN1_STRING *)b) # define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(a,b,c) ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)a,b,c) # define M_ASN1_INTEGER_new() (ASN1_INTEGER *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_INTEGER) # define M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(a) (ASN1_INTEGER *)\ ASN1_STRING_dup((const ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a,b) ASN1_STRING_cmp(\ (const ASN1_STRING *)a,(const ASN1_STRING *)b) # define M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_new() (ASN1_ENUMERATED *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) # define M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_dup(a) (ASN1_ENUMERATED *)\ ASN1_STRING_dup((const ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_cmp(a,b) ASN1_STRING_cmp(\ (const ASN1_STRING *)a,(const ASN1_STRING *)b) # define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new() (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) # define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(a) (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_dup((const ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a,b) ASN1_STRING_cmp(\ (const ASN1_STRING *)a,(const ASN1_STRING *)b) # define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(a,b,c) ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)a,b,c) # define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_print(a,b) ASN1_STRING_print(a,(ASN1_STRING *)b) # define M_i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define B_ASN1_TIME \ B_ASN1_UTCTIME | \ B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME # define B_ASN1_PRINTABLE \ B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING| \ B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING| \ B_ASN1_T61STRING| \ B_ASN1_IA5STRING| \ B_ASN1_BIT_STRING| \ B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING|\ B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING|\ B_ASN1_SEQUENCE|\ B_ASN1_UNKNOWN # define B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING \ B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING| \ B_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING|\ B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING # define B_ASN1_DISPLAYTEXT \ B_ASN1_IA5STRING| \ B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING| \ B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING # define M_ASN1_PRINTABLE_new() ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_T61STRING) # define M_ASN1_PRINTABLE_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLE(a,pp) i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,\ pp,a->type,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLE(a,pp,l) \ d2i_ASN1_type_bytes((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l, \ B_ASN1_PRINTABLE) # define M_DIRECTORYSTRING_new() ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) # define M_DIRECTORYSTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_DIRECTORYSTRING(a,pp) i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,\ pp,a->type,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_DIRECTORYSTRING(a,pp,l) \ d2i_ASN1_type_bytes((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l, \ B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING) # define M_DISPLAYTEXT_new() ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) # define M_DISPLAYTEXT_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_DISPLAYTEXT(a,pp) i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,\ pp,a->type,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_DISPLAYTEXT(a,pp,l) \ d2i_ASN1_type_bytes((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l, \ B_ASN1_DISPLAYTEXT) # define M_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_new() (ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) # define M_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) # define M_ASN1_T61STRING_new() (ASN1_T61STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_T61STRING) # define M_ASN1_T61STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_ASN1_T61STRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_T61STRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_ASN1_T61STRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_T61STRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_T61STRING) # define M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new() (ASN1_IA5STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_IA5STRING) # define M_ASN1_IA5STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_IA5STRING_dup(a) \ (ASN1_IA5STRING *)ASN1_STRING_dup((const ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_ASN1_IA5STRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_IA5STRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_ASN1_IA5STRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_IA5STRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,\ B_ASN1_IA5STRING) # define M_ASN1_UTCTIME_new() (ASN1_UTCTIME *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_UTCTIME) # define M_ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_UTCTIME_dup(a) (ASN1_UTCTIME *)\ ASN1_STRING_dup((const ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new() (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) # define M_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_dup(a) (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *)ASN1_STRING_dup(\ (const ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_TIME_new() (ASN1_TIME *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_UTCTIME) # define M_ASN1_TIME_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_TIME_dup(a) (ASN1_TIME *)\ ASN1_STRING_dup((const ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_new() (ASN1_GENERALSTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING) # define M_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_ASN1_GENERALSTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_ASN1_GENERALSTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_GENERALSTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING) # define M_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_new() (ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) # define M_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) # define M_ASN1_BMPSTRING_new() (ASN1_BMPSTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) # define M_ASN1_BMPSTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_ASN1_BMPSTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_BMPSTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_ASN1_BMPSTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_BMPSTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_BMPSTRING) # define M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new() (ASN1_VISIBLESTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) # define M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_VISIBLESTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) # define M_ASN1_UTF8STRING_new() (ASN1_UTF8STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) # define M_ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) # define M_i2d_ASN1_UTF8STRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_UTF8STRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) # define M_d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_UTF8STRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_UTF8STRING) /* for the is_set parameter to i2d_ASN1_SET */ # define IS_SEQUENCE 0 # define IS_SET 1 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE, ASN1_ANY, ASN1_TYPE) int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a); void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value); int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value); int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b); ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void); void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a); int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp); ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_OBJECT) DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void); void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a); void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a); int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *a); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type); int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b); /* * Since this is used to store all sorts of things, via macros, for now, * make its data void * */ int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *data, int len); void ASN1_STRING_set0(ASN1_STRING *str, void *data, int len); int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *x); void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int n); int ASN1_STRING_type(ASN1_STRING *x); unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BIT_STRING) int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp); ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char *d, int length); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char *flags, int flags_len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int ASN1_BIT_STRING_name_print(BIO *out, ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl, int indent); # endif int ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc(char *name, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_asc(ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, char *name, int value, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl); int i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int a, unsigned char **pp); int d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int *a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_INTEGER) int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp); ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); ASN1_INTEGER *ASN1_INTEGER_dup(const ASN1_INTEGER *x); int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_ENUMERATED) int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(const ASN1_UTCTIME *a); ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_set(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t); ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec); int ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, const char *str); int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t); # if 0 time_t ASN1_UTCTIME_get(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s); # endif int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, time_t t); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec); int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, const char *str); int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec, const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_OCTET_STRING) ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a); int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b); int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *str, const unsigned char *data, int len); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTF8STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_NULL) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BMPSTRING) int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long *val); int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long value); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, ASN1_PRINTABLE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DIRECTORYSTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DISPLAYTEXT) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_T61STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_IA5STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALSTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTCTIME) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_TIME) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF) ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t); ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec); int ASN1_TIME_check(ASN1_TIME *t); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(ASN1_TIME *t, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **out); int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str); int i2d_ASN1_SET(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) *a, unsigned char **pp, i2d_of_void *i2d, int ex_tag, int ex_class, int is_set); STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) *d2i_ASN1_SET(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length, d2i_of_void *d2i, void (*free_func) (OPENSSL_BLOCK), int ex_tag, int ex_class); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *a); int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *bs, char *buf, int size); int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *a); int a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs, char *buf, int size); int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *a); int a2i_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *bs, char *buf, int size); int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *a, int type); # endif int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, ASN1_OBJECT *a); int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num); ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, unsigned char *data, int len, const char *sn, const char *ln); int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v); long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a); ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai); BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(const ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn); int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v); long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a); ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai); BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn); /* General */ /* given a string, return the correct type, max is the maximum length */ int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(const unsigned char *s, int max); int i2d_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp, int tag, int xclass); ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length, int Ptag, int Pclass); unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag); /* type is one or more of the B_ASN1_ values. */ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_type_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length, int type); /* PARSING */ int asn1_Finish(ASN1_CTX *c); int asn1_const_Finish(ASN1_const_CTX *c); /* SPECIALS */ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag, int *pclass, long omax); int ASN1_check_infinite_end(unsigned char **p, long len); int ASN1_const_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p, long len); void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag, int xclass); int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp); int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag); /* Used to implement other functions */ void *ASN1_dup(i2d_of_void *i2d, d2i_of_void *d2i, void *x); # define ASN1_dup_of(type,i2d,d2i,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) # define ASN1_dup_of_const(type,i2d,d2i,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) void *ASN1_item_dup(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *x); /* ASN1 alloc/free macros for when a type is only used internally */ # define M_ASN1_new_of(type) (type *)ASN1_item_new(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(type)) # define M_ASN1_free_of(x, type) \ ASN1_item_free(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x), ASN1_ITEM_rptr(type)) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API void *ASN1_d2i_fp(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, FILE *in, void **x); # define ASN1_d2i_fp_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_d2i_fp(CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ in, \ CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x))) void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x); int ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_of_void *i2d, FILE *out, void *x); # define ASN1_i2d_fp_of(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) # define ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) int ASN1_item_i2d_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *out, void *x); int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); # endif int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO void *ASN1_d2i_bio(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, BIO *in, void **x); # define ASN1_d2i_bio_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_d2i_bio( CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ in, \ CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x))) void *ASN1_item_d2i_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *in, void *x); int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, unsigned char *x); # define ASN1_i2d_bio_of(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) # define ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) int ASN1_item_i2d_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *out, void *x); int ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *fp, const ASN1_UTCTIME *a); int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(BIO *fp, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a); int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *fp, const ASN1_TIME *a); int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *v); int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); int ASN1_bn_print(BIO *bp, const char *number, const BIGNUM *num, unsigned char *buf, int off); int ASN1_parse(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent); int ASN1_parse_dump(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent, int dump); # endif const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag); /* Used to load and write netscape format cert */ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_X509) int ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *s); int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len); int ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int max_len); int ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, long num, unsigned char *data, int len); int ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, long *num, unsigned char *data, int max_len); STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) *ASN1_seq_unpack(const unsigned char *buf, int len, d2i_of_void *d2i, void (*free_func) (OPENSSL_BLOCK)); unsigned char *ASN1_seq_pack(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) *safes, i2d_of_void *i2d, unsigned char **buf, int *len); void *ASN1_unpack_string(ASN1_STRING *oct, d2i_of_void *d2i); void *ASN1_item_unpack(ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct); # define ASN1_pack_string_of(type,obj,i2d,oct) \ (ASN1_pack_string(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, obj), \ CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ oct)) ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct); void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask); int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p); unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void); int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len, int inform, unsigned long mask); int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len, int inform, unsigned long mask, long minsize, long maxsize); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int inlen, int inform, int nid); ASN1_STRING_TABLE *ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(int nid); int ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(int, long, long, unsigned long, unsigned long); void ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup(void); /* ASN1 template functions */ /* Old API compatible functions */ ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_new(const ASN1_ITEM *it); void ASN1_item_free(ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it); void ASN1_add_oid_module(void); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf); /* ASN1 Print flags */ /* Indicate missing OPTIONAL fields */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT 0x001 /* Mark start and end of SEQUENCE */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE 0x002 /* Mark start and end of SEQUENCE/SET OF */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SSOF 0x004 /* Show the ASN1 type of primitives */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_TYPE 0x008 /* Don't show ASN1 type of ANY */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_ANY_TYPE 0x010 /* Don't show ASN1 type of MSTRINGs */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_MSTRING_TYPE 0x020 /* Don't show field names in SEQUENCE */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_FIELD_NAME 0x040 /* Show structure names of each SEQUENCE field */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_FIELD_STRUCT_NAME 0x080 /* Don't show structure name even at top level */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_STRUCT_NAME 0x100 int ASN1_item_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *ifld, int indent, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); ASN1_PCTX *ASN1_PCTX_new(void); void ASN1_PCTX_free(ASN1_PCTX *p); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_nm_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_nm_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_cert_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_cert_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_oid_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_oid_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_str_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_str_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_asn1(void); BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags, const char *hdr, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags, int ctype_nid, int econt_nid, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int SMIME_crlf_copy(BIO *in, BIO *out, int flags); int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ + void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void); /* Error codes for the ASN1 functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT 100 # define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_ENUMERATED 101 # define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER 102 # define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING 103 # define ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP 176 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT 183 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_CB 177 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN 104 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLATE_PRIMITIVE 105 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT 106 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE 108 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP 109 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO 107 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST 184 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB 110 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP 111 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_SET 112 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TO_BN 113 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I 204 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END 190 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_ADJ 216 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_SET 185 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3 178 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT 114 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_HEADER_NEW 115 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO 116 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP 117 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_SET 118 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_TO_BN 119 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP 206 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP 191 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW 121 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I 120 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO 192 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP 193 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK 198 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN 195 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX 220 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK 199 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY 197 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY 122 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW 123 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA 214 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING 124 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW 205 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_PKCS5_PBE_SET 125 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_SEQ_PACK 126 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_SEQ_UNPACK 127 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN 128 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE 179 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET 186 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD 129 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW 130 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I 132 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW 133 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I 131 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_ADJ 217 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_SET 175 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING 134 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING 135 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_UNPACK_STRING 136 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ 218 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_SET 187 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY 137 # define ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1 209 # define ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1 210 # define ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF 208 # define ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB 180 # define ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_ENUMERATED 138 # define ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER 139 # define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING 189 # define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER 194 # define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT 196 # define ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA 140 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING 141 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BOOLEAN 142 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BYTES 143 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 144 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_HEADER 145 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_INTEGER 146 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT 147 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_SET 148 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_TYPE_BYTES 149 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER 150 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UTCTIME 151 # define ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY 207 # define ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA 152 # define ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA_2 153 # define ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY 154 # define ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY 155 # define ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET 200 # define ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET_2 201 # define ASN1_F_D2I_X509 156 # define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF 157 # define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY 159 +# define ASN1_F_DO_BUF 221 # define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM 211 +# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN 223 +# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT 222 # define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_SET 188 # define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_TIME 160 # define ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY 161 # define ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY 181 # define ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY 163 # define ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY 164 # define ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET 162 # define ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY 165 # define ASN1_F_LONG_C2I 166 # define ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT 174 # define ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING 182 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV 167 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET 202 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR 215 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SET 219 # define ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1 212 # define ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT 213 # define ASN1_F_X509_CINF_NEW 168 # define ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED 169 # define ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW 170 # define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE 203 # define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I 158 # define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW 171 # define ASN1_F_X509_NEW 172 # define ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW 173 /* Reason codes. */ # define ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT 171 # define ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR 203 # define ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR 204 # define ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR 100 # define ASN1_R_BAD_CLASS 101 # define ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER 102 # define ASN1_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ 103 # define ASN1_R_BAD_TAG 104 # define ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 214 # define ASN1_R_BN_LIB 105 # define ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 106 # define ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 107 # define ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER 108 # define ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED 217 # define ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG 109 # define ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR 110 # define ASN1_R_DECODING_ERROR 111 # define ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED 174 # define ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED 198 # define ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR 112 # define ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME 173 # define ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION 172 # define ASN1_R_ERROR_PARSING_SET_ELEMENT 113 # define ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS 114 # define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER 115 # define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT 116 # define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_A_BOOLEAN 117 # define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_A_TIME 118 # define ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 119 # define ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 120 # define ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING 121 # define ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE 122 # define ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG 123 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT 175 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN 176 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS 124 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT 177 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX 178 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG 179 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER 180 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING 181 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL 125 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE 182 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT 183 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY 126 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE 170 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY 127 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE 184 # define ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 185 # define ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG 128 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT 220 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH 129 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT 130 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE 205 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER 186 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER 187 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING 216 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR 131 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_TIME_FORMAT 132 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH 133 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING 134 # define ASN1_R_IV_TOO_LARGE 135 # define ASN1_R_LENGTH_ERROR 136 # define ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR 188 # define ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE 206 # define ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR 207 # define ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR 208 # define ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC 137 # define ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER 138 # define ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE 189 # define ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL 139 # define ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG 140 # define ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING 197 # define ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP 219 # define ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS 141 # define ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 190 # define ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA 142 # define ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE 209 # define ASN1_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST 201 # define ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE 143 # define ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE 210 # define ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY 211 # define ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE 212 # define ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 144 # define ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 191 # define ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS 145 # define ASN1_R_PRIVATE_KEY_HEADER_MISSING 146 # define ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE 147 # define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH 148 # define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 149 # define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG 192 # define ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE 150 # define ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE 213 # define ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED 202 # define ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG 151 # define ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT 152 # define ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH 153 # define ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD 154 # define ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 193 # define ASN1_R_TOO_LONG 155 # define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 156 # define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE 218 # define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY 157 # define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY 158 # define ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC 159 # define ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 215 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT 160 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM 161 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE 162 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 163 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 199 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG 194 # define ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT 195 # define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE 164 # define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 165 # define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM 166 # define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 167 # define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE 196 # define ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 200 # define ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG 168 # define ASN1_R_WRONG_TYPE 169 -#ifdef __cplusplus +# ifdef __cplusplus } -#endif +# endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,355 +1,358 @@ /* crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file, * only reason strings will be preserved. */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT), "a2d_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_ENUMERATED), "a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "a2i_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING), "a2i_ASN1_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP), "APPEND_EXP"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT), "ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB), "ASN1_CB"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN), "ASN1_CHECK_TLEN"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLATE_PRIMITIVE), "ASN1_COLLATE_PRIMITIVE"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT), "ASN1_COLLECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE), "ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP), "ASN1_d2i_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO), "ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST), "ASN1_digest"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB), "ASN1_DO_ADB"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP), "ASN1_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_SET), "ASN1_ENUMERATED_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TO_BN), "ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I), "ASN1_EX_C2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END), "ASN1_FIND_END"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_ADJ), "ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_SET), "ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3), "ASN1_generate_v3"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT), "ASN1_get_object"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_HEADER_NEW), "ASN1_HEADER_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO), "ASN1_i2d_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP), "ASN1_i2d_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_SET), "ASN1_INTEGER_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_TO_BN), "ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP), "ASN1_item_d2i_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP), "ASN1_item_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW), "ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I), "ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO), "ASN1_item_i2d_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP), "ASN1_item_i2d_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK), "ASN1_item_pack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN), "ASN1_item_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX), "ASN1_item_sign_ctx"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK), "ASN1_item_unpack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY), "ASN1_item_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY), "ASN1_mbstring_ncopy"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW), "ASN1_OBJECT_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA), "ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING), "ASN1_pack_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW), "ASN1_PCTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_PKCS5_PBE_SET), "ASN1_PKCS5_PBE_SET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SEQ_PACK), "ASN1_seq_pack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SEQ_UNPACK), "ASN1_seq_unpack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN), "ASN1_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE), "ASN1_STR2TYPE"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET), "ASN1_STRING_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD), "ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW), "ASN1_STRING_type_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I), "ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW), "ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I), "ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_ADJ), "ASN1_TIME_adj"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_SET), "ASN1_TIME_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING), "ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING), "ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_UNPACK_STRING), "ASN1_unpack_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ), "ASN1_UTCTIME_adj"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_SET), "ASN1_UTCTIME_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY), "ASN1_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1), "B64_READ_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1), "B64_WRITE_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF), "BIO_new_NDEF"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB), "BITSTR_CB"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_ENUMERATED), "BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER), "BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING), "c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "c2i_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT), "c2i_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA), "COLLECT_DATA"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING), "D2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BOOLEAN), "d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BYTES), "d2i_ASN1_bytes"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), "D2I_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_HEADER), "D2I_ASN1_HEADER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "D2I_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT), "d2i_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_SET), "d2i_ASN1_SET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_TYPE_BYTES), "d2i_ASN1_type_bytes"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER), "d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UTCTIME), "D2I_ASN1_UTCTIME"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY), "d2i_AutoPrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA), "d2i_Netscape_RSA"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA_2), "D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA_2"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY), "d2i_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY), "d2i_PublicKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET), "d2i_RSA_NET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET_2), "D2I_RSA_NET_2"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509), "D2I_X509"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF), "D2I_X509_CINF"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY), "d2i_X509_PKEY"}, + {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_DO_BUF), "DO_BUF"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM), "i2d_ASN1_bio_stream"}, + {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BOOLEAN), "i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN"}, + {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT), "i2d_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_SET), "i2d_ASN1_SET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_TIME), "I2D_ASN1_TIME"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_DSA_PUBKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY), "i2d_EC_PUBKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY), "i2d_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY), "i2d_PublicKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET), "i2d_RSA_NET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_RSA_PUBKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I), "LONG_C2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT), "OID_MODULE_INIT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING), "PARSE_TAGGING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV), "PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET), "PKCS5_pbe_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR), "PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SET), "PKCS5_pbkdf2_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1), "SMIME_read_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT), "SMIME_text"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_CINF_NEW), "X509_CINF_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED), "X509_CRL_add0_revoked"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW), "X509_INFO_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE), "X509_NAME_ENCODE"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I), "X509_NAME_EX_D2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW), "X509_NAME_EX_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NEW), "X509_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW), "X509_PKEY_new"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT), "adding object"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR), "asn1 parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR), "asn1 sig parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR), "aux error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_CLASS), "bad class"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER), "bad object header"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ), "bad password read"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_TAG), "bad tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "bmpstring is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "boolean is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL), "buffer too small"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER), "cipher has no object identifier"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED), "context not initialised"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG), "data is wrong"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DECODING_ERROR), "decoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED), "depth exceeded"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED), "digest and key type not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR), "encode error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME), "error getting time"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION), "error loading section"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_PARSING_SET_ELEMENT), "error parsing set element"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS), "error setting cipher params"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER), "expecting an integer"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT), "expecting an object"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_A_BOOLEAN), "expecting a boolean"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_A_TIME), "expecting a time"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "explicit length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), "explicit tag not constructed"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING), "field missing"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE), "first num too large"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG), "header too long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT), "illegal bitstring format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN), "illegal boolean"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS), "illegal characters"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT), "illegal format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX), "illegal hex"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG), "illegal implicit tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER), "illegal integer"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING), "illegal nested tagging"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL), "illegal null"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE), "illegal null value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT), "illegal object"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY), "illegal optional any"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE), "illegal options on item template"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY), "illegal tagged any"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE), "illegal time value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "integer not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG), "integer too large for long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT), "invalid bit string bits left"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH), "invalid bmpstring length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT), "invalid digit"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE), "invalid mime type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER), "invalid modifier"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER), "invalid number"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING), "invalid object encoding"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR), "invalid separator"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_TIME_FORMAT), "invalid time format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH), "invalid universalstring length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING), "invalid utf8string"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_IV_TOO_LARGE), "iv too large"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_LENGTH_ERROR), "length error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR), "list error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE), "mime no content type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR), "mime parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR), "mime sig parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC), "missing eoc"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER), "missing second number"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE), "missing value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL), "mstring not universal"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG), "mstring wrong tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING), "nested asn1 string"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP), "nested too deep"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS), "non hex characters"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA), "not enough data"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE), "no content type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST), "no default digest"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE), "no matching choice type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE), "no multipart body failure"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY), "no multipart boundary"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE), "no sig content type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "null is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "object not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS), "odd number of chars"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_PRIVATE_KEY_HEADER_MISSING), "private key header missing"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE), "second number too large"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "sequence length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), "sequence not constructed"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG), "sequence or set needs config"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE), "short line"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE), "sig invalid mime type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED), "streaming not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG), "string too long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT), "string too short"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH), "tag value too high"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD), "the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "time not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_LONG), "too long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), "type not constructed"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE), "type not primitive"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY), "unable to decode rsa key"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY), "unable to decode rsa private key"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC), "unexpected eoc"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "universalstring is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT), "unknown format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM), "unknown message digest algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE), "unknown object type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE), "unknown public key type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM), "unknown signature algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG), "unknown tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT), "unknown format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE), "unsupported any defined by type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER), "unsupported cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM), "unsupported encryption algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE), "unsupported public key type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE), "unsupported type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE), "wrong public key type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG), "wrong tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_TYPE), "wrong type"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(ASN1_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, ASN1_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, ASN1_str_reasons); } #endif } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,667 +1,669 @@ /* tasn_enc.c */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass); static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out, int skcontlen, const ASN1_ITEM *item, int do_sort, int iclass); static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int aclass); static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags); /* * Top level i2d equivalents: the 'ndef' variant instructs the encoder to use * indefinite length constructed encoding, where appropriate */ int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF); } int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, 0); } /* * Encode an ASN1 item, this is use by the standard 'i2d' function. 'out' * points to a buffer to output the data to. The new i2d has one additional * feature. If the output buffer is NULL (i.e. *out == NULL) then a buffer is * allocated and populated with the encoding. */ static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags) { if (out && !*out) { unsigned char *p, *buf; int len; len = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, NULL, it, -1, flags); if (len <= 0) return len; buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (!buf) return -1; p = buf; ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, &p, it, -1, flags); *out = buf; return len; } return ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, out, it, -1, flags); } /* * Encode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging (if any). This function * performs the normal item handling: it can be used in external types. */ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL; unsigned char *p = NULL; int i, seqcontlen, seqlen, ndef = 1; const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb = 0; if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) && !*pval) return 0; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb; switch (it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) return asn1_template_ex_i2d(pval, out, it->templates, tag, aclass); return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, tag, aclass); break; case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass); case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) return 0; i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) { ASN1_VALUE **pchval; const ASN1_TEMPLATE *chtt; chtt = it->templates + i; pchval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, chtt); return asn1_template_ex_i2d(pchval, out, chtt, -1, aclass); } /* Fixme: error condition if selector out of range */ if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL)) return 0; break; case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: /* If new style i2d it does all the work */ ef = it->funcs; return ef->asn1_ex_i2d(pval, out, it, tag, aclass); case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT: /* old style hackery... */ cf = it->funcs; if (out) p = *out; i = cf->asn1_i2d(*pval, out); /* * Fixup for IMPLICIT tag: note this messes up for tags > 30, but so * did the old code. Tags > 30 are very rare anyway. */ if (out && (tag != -1)) *p = aclass | tag | (*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED); return i; case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: /* Use indefinite length constructed if requested */ if (aclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) ndef = 2; /* fall through */ case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: i = asn1_enc_restore(&seqcontlen, out, pval, it); /* An error occurred */ if (i < 0) return 0; /* We have a valid cached encoding... */ if (i > 0) return seqcontlen; /* Otherwise carry on */ seqcontlen = 0; /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */ if (tag == -1) { tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; /* Retain any other flags in aclass */ aclass = (aclass & ~ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS) | V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; } if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) return 0; /* First work out sequence content length */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; int tmplen; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) return 0; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); tmplen = asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, NULL, seqtt, -1, aclass); if (tmplen == -1 || (tmplen > INT_MAX - seqcontlen)) return -1; seqcontlen += tmplen; } seqlen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, seqcontlen, tag); if (!out || seqlen == -1) return seqlen; /* Output SEQUENCE header */ ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, seqcontlen, tag, aclass); for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) return 0; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); /* FIXME: check for errors in enhanced version */ asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, out, seqtt, -1, aclass); } if (ndef == 2) ASN1_put_eoc(out); if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL)) return 0; return seqlen; default: return 0; } return 0; } int ASN1_template_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt) { return asn1_template_ex_i2d(pval, out, tt, -1, 0); } static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int iclass) { int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass, ndef; flags = tt->flags; /* * Work out tag and class to use: tagging may come either from the * template or the arguments, not both because this would create * ambiguity. Additionally the iclass argument may contain some * additional flags which should be noted and passed down to other * levels. */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_MASK) { /* Error if argument and template tagging */ if (tag != -1) /* FIXME: error code here */ return -1; /* Get tagging from template */ ttag = tt->tag; tclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; } else if (tag != -1) { /* No template tagging, get from arguments */ ttag = tag; tclass = iclass & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; } else { ttag = -1; tclass = 0; } /* * Remove any class mask from iflag. */ iclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; /* * At this point 'ttag' contains the outer tag to use, 'tclass' is the * class and iclass is any flags passed to this function. */ /* if template and arguments require ndef, use it */ if ((flags & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) && (iclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)) ndef = 2; else ndef = 1; if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) { /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */ STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*pval; int isset, sktag, skaclass; int skcontlen, sklen; ASN1_VALUE *skitem; if (!*pval) return 0; if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) { isset = 1; /* 2 means we reorder */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF) isset = 2; } else isset = 0; /* * Work out inner tag value: if EXPLICIT or no tagging use underlying * type. */ if ((ttag != -1) && !(flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)) { sktag = ttag; skaclass = tclass; } else { skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; if (isset) sktag = V_ASN1_SET; else sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; } /* Determine total length of items */ skcontlen = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) { int tmplen; skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i); tmplen = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass); if (tmplen == -1 || (skcontlen > INT_MAX - tmplen)) return -1; skcontlen += tmplen; } sklen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, skcontlen, sktag); if (sklen == -1) return -1; /* If EXPLICIT need length of surrounding tag */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, sklen, ttag); else ret = sklen; if (!out || ret == -1) return ret; /* Now encode this lot... */ /* EXPLICIT tag */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, sklen, ttag, tclass); /* SET or SEQUENCE and IMPLICIT tag */ ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass); /* And the stuff itself */ asn1_set_seq_out(sk, out, skcontlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), isset, iclass); if (ndef == 2) { ASN1_put_eoc(out); if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) ASN1_put_eoc(out); } return ret; } if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) { /* EXPLICIT tagging */ /* Find length of tagged item */ i = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass); if (!i) return 0; /* Find length of EXPLICIT tag */ ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, i, ttag); if (out && ret != -1) { /* Output tag and item */ ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, i, ttag, tclass); ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass); if (ndef == 2) ASN1_put_eoc(out); } return ret; } /* Either normal or IMPLICIT tagging: combine class and flags */ return ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), ttag, tclass | iclass); } /* Temporary structure used to hold DER encoding of items for SET OF */ typedef struct { unsigned char *data; int length; ASN1_VALUE *field; } DER_ENC; static int der_cmp(const void *a, const void *b) { const DER_ENC *d1 = a, *d2 = b; int cmplen, i; cmplen = (d1->length < d2->length) ? d1->length : d2->length; i = memcmp(d1->data, d2->data, cmplen); if (i) return i; return d1->length - d2->length; } /* Output the content octets of SET OF or SEQUENCE OF */ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out, int skcontlen, const ASN1_ITEM *item, int do_sort, int iclass) { int i; ASN1_VALUE *skitem; unsigned char *tmpdat = NULL, *p = NULL; DER_ENC *derlst = NULL, *tder; if (do_sort) { /* Don't need to sort less than 2 items */ if (sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk) < 2) do_sort = 0; else { derlst = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk) * sizeof(*derlst)); if (!derlst) return 0; tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen); if (!tmpdat) { OPENSSL_free(derlst); return 0; } } } /* If not sorting just output each item */ if (!do_sort) { for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) { skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i); ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, out, item, -1, iclass); } return 1; } p = tmpdat; /* Doing sort: build up a list of each member's DER encoding */ for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++) { skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i); tder->data = p; tder->length = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, &p, item, -1, iclass); tder->field = skitem; } /* Now sort them */ qsort(derlst, sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk), sizeof(*derlst), der_cmp); /* Output sorted DER encoding */ p = *out; for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++) { memcpy(p, tder->data, tder->length); p += tder->length; } *out = p; /* If do_sort is 2 then reorder the STACK */ if (do_sort == 2) { for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++) (void)sk_ASN1_VALUE_set(sk, i, tder->field); } OPENSSL_free(derlst); OPENSSL_free(tmpdat); return 1; } static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass) { int len; int utype; int usetag; int ndef = 0; utype = it->utype; /* * Get length of content octets and maybe find out the underlying type. */ len = asn1_ex_i2c(pval, NULL, &utype, it); /* * If SEQUENCE, SET or OTHER then header is included in pseudo content * octets so don't include tag+length. We need to check here because the * call to asn1_ex_i2c() could change utype. */ if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) usetag = 0; else usetag = 1; /* -1 means omit type */ if (len == -1) return 0; /* -2 return is special meaning use ndef */ if (len == -2) { ndef = 2; len = 0; } /* If not implicitly tagged get tag from underlying type */ if (tag == -1) tag = utype; /* Output tag+length followed by content octets */ if (out) { if (usetag) ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, len, tag, aclass); asn1_ex_i2c(pval, *out, &utype, it); if (ndef) ASN1_put_eoc(out); else *out += len; } if (usetag) return ASN1_object_size(ndef, len, tag); return len; } /* Produce content octets from a structure */ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool = NULL; ASN1_STRING *strtmp; ASN1_OBJECT *otmp; int utype; const unsigned char *cont; unsigned char c; int len; const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf; pf = it->funcs; if (pf && pf->prim_i2c) return pf->prim_i2c(pval, cout, putype, it); /* Should type be omitted? */ if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) || (it->utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) { if (!*pval) return -1; } if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) { /* If MSTRING type set the underlying type */ strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval; utype = strtmp->type; *putype = utype; } else if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) { /* If ANY set type and pointer to value */ ASN1_TYPE *typ; typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval; utype = typ->type; *putype = utype; pval = &typ->value.asn1_value; } else utype = *putype; switch (utype) { case V_ASN1_OBJECT: otmp = (ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval; cont = otmp->data; len = otmp->length; + if (cont == NULL || len == 0) + return -1; break; case V_ASN1_NULL: cont = NULL; len = 0; break; case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval; if (*tbool == -1) return -1; if (it->utype != V_ASN1_ANY) { /* * Default handling if value == size field then omit */ if (*tbool && (it->size > 0)) return -1; if (!*tbool && !it->size) return -1; } c = (unsigned char)*tbool; cont = &c; len = 1; break; case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: return i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING *)*pval, cout ? &cout : NULL); break; case V_ASN1_INTEGER: case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED: /* * These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER */ return i2c_ASN1_INTEGER((ASN1_INTEGER *)*pval, cout ? &cout : NULL); break; case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING: case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING: case V_ASN1_T61STRING: case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING: case V_ASN1_IA5STRING: case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING: case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING: case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING: case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING: case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING: case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING: case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE: case V_ASN1_SET: default: /* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */ strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval; /* Special handling for NDEF */ if ((it->size == ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) && (strtmp->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) { if (cout) { strtmp->data = cout; strtmp->length = 0; } /* Special return code */ return -2; } cont = strtmp->data; len = strtmp->length; break; } if (cout && len) memcpy(cout, cont, len); return len; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bio/bss_log.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bio/bss_log.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bio/bss_log.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,453 +1,453 @@ /* crypto/bio/bss_log.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* * Why BIO_s_log? * * BIO_s_log is useful for system daemons (or services under NT). It is * one-way BIO, it sends all stuff to syslogd (on system that commonly use * that), or event log (on NT), or OPCOM (on OpenVMS). * */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # include # include # include # include /* Some compiler options may mask the declaration of "_malloc32". */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined _ANSI_C_SOURCE # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 void *_malloc32(__size_t); # pragma pointer_size restore # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined * _ANSI_C_SOURCE */ #elif defined(__ultrix) # include #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # define NO_SYSLOG #elif (!defined(MSDOS) || defined(WATT32)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) && !defined(NO_SYSLOG) # include #endif #include #include #ifndef NO_SYSLOG # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # define LOG_EMERG 0 # define LOG_ALERT 1 # define LOG_CRIT 2 # define LOG_ERR 3 # define LOG_WARNING 4 # define LOG_NOTICE 5 # define LOG_INFO 6 # define LOG_DEBUG 7 # define LOG_DAEMON (3<<3) # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* On VMS, we don't really care about these, but we need them to compile */ # define LOG_EMERG 0 # define LOG_ALERT 1 # define LOG_CRIT 2 # define LOG_ERR 3 # define LOG_WARNING 4 # define LOG_NOTICE 5 # define LOG_INFO 6 # define LOG_DEBUG 7 # define LOG_DAEMON OPC$M_NM_NTWORK # endif static int MS_CALLBACK slg_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int MS_CALLBACK slg_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long MS_CALLBACK slg_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int MS_CALLBACK slg_new(BIO *h); static int MS_CALLBACK slg_free(BIO *data); static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level); static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string); static void xcloselog(BIO *bp); static BIO_METHOD methods_slg = { BIO_TYPE_MEM, "syslog", slg_write, NULL, slg_puts, NULL, slg_ctrl, slg_new, slg_free, NULL, }; BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_log(void) { return (&methods_slg); } static int MS_CALLBACK slg_new(BIO *bi) { bi->init = 1; bi->num = 0; bi->ptr = NULL; xopenlog(bi, "application", LOG_DAEMON); return (1); } static int MS_CALLBACK slg_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); xcloselog(a); return (1); } static int MS_CALLBACK slg_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = inl; char *buf; char *pp; int priority, i; static const struct { int strl; char str[10]; int log_level; } mapping[] = { { 6, "PANIC ", LOG_EMERG }, { 6, "EMERG ", LOG_EMERG }, { 4, "EMR ", LOG_EMERG }, { 6, "ALERT ", LOG_ALERT }, { 4, "ALR ", LOG_ALERT }, { 5, "CRIT ", LOG_CRIT }, { 4, "CRI ", LOG_CRIT }, { 6, "ERROR ", LOG_ERR }, { 4, "ERR ", LOG_ERR }, { 8, "WARNING ", LOG_WARNING }, { 5, "WARN ", LOG_WARNING }, { 4, "WAR ", LOG_WARNING }, { 7, "NOTICE ", LOG_NOTICE }, { 5, "NOTE ", LOG_NOTICE }, { 4, "NOT ", LOG_NOTICE }, { 5, "INFO ", LOG_INFO }, { 4, "INF ", LOG_INFO }, { 6, "DEBUG ", LOG_DEBUG }, { 4, "DBG ", LOG_DEBUG }, { 0, "", LOG_ERR } /* The default */ }; if ((buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(inl + 1)) == NULL) { return (0); } - strncpy(buf, in, inl); + memcpy(buf, in, inl); buf[inl] = '\0'; i = 0; while (strncmp(buf, mapping[i].str, mapping[i].strl) != 0) i++; priority = mapping[i].log_level; pp = buf + mapping[i].strl; xsyslog(b, priority, pp); OPENSSL_free(buf); return (ret); } static long MS_CALLBACK slg_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_SET: xcloselog(b); xopenlog(b, ptr, num); break; default: break; } return (0); } static int MS_CALLBACK slg_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = slg_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level) { if (check_winnt()) bp->ptr = RegisterEventSourceA(NULL, name); else bp->ptr = NULL; } static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string) { LPCSTR lpszStrings[2]; WORD evtype = EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE; char pidbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(DWORD) + 4]; if (bp->ptr == NULL) return; switch (priority) { case LOG_EMERG: case LOG_ALERT: case LOG_CRIT: case LOG_ERR: evtype = EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE; break; case LOG_WARNING: evtype = EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE; break; case LOG_NOTICE: case LOG_INFO: case LOG_DEBUG: evtype = EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE; break; default: /* * Should never happen, but set it * as error anyway. */ evtype = EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE; break; } sprintf(pidbuf, "[%u] ", GetCurrentProcessId()); lpszStrings[0] = pidbuf; lpszStrings[1] = string; ReportEventA(bp->ptr, evtype, 0, 1024, NULL, 2, 0, lpszStrings, NULL); } static void xcloselog(BIO *bp) { if (bp->ptr) DeregisterEventSource((HANDLE) (bp->ptr)); bp->ptr = NULL; } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) static int VMS_OPC_target = LOG_DAEMON; static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level) { VMS_OPC_target = level; } static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string) { struct dsc$descriptor_s opc_dsc; /* Arrange 32-bit pointer to opcdef buffer and malloc(), if needed. */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 # define OPCDEF_TYPE __char_ptr32 # define OPCDEF_MALLOC _malloc32 # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define OPCDEF_TYPE char * # define OPCDEF_MALLOC OPENSSL_malloc # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ struct opcdef *opcdef_p; # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size restore # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ char buf[10240]; unsigned int len; struct dsc$descriptor_s buf_dsc; $DESCRIPTOR(fao_cmd, "!AZ: !AZ"); char *priority_tag; switch (priority) { case LOG_EMERG: priority_tag = "Emergency"; break; case LOG_ALERT: priority_tag = "Alert"; break; case LOG_CRIT: priority_tag = "Critical"; break; case LOG_ERR: priority_tag = "Error"; break; case LOG_WARNING: priority_tag = "Warning"; break; case LOG_NOTICE: priority_tag = "Notice"; break; case LOG_INFO: priority_tag = "Info"; break; case LOG_DEBUG: priority_tag = "DEBUG"; break; } buf_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; buf_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; buf_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = buf; buf_dsc.dsc$w_length = sizeof(buf) - 1; lib$sys_fao(&fao_cmd, &len, &buf_dsc, priority_tag, string); /* We know there's an 8-byte header. That's documented. */ opcdef_p = OPCDEF_MALLOC(8 + len); opcdef_p->opc$b_ms_type = OPC$_RQ_RQST; memcpy(opcdef_p->opc$z_ms_target_classes, &VMS_OPC_target, 3); opcdef_p->opc$l_ms_rqstid = 0; memcpy(&opcdef_p->opc$l_ms_text, buf, len); opc_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; opc_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; opc_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = (OPCDEF_TYPE) opcdef_p; opc_dsc.dsc$w_length = len + 8; sys$sndopr(opc_dsc, 0); OPENSSL_free(opcdef_p); } static void xcloselog(BIO *bp) { } # else /* Unix/Watt32 */ static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level) { # ifdef WATT32 /* djgpp/DOS */ openlog(name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NDELAY, level); # else openlog(name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, level); # endif } static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string) { syslog(priority, "%s", string); } static void xcloselog(BIO *bp) { closelog(); } # endif /* Unix */ #endif /* NO_SYSLOG */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,313 +1,315 @@ /* crypto/bio/bss_mem.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include static int mem_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int mem_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int mem_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int mem_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long mem_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int mem_new(BIO *h); static int mem_free(BIO *data); static BIO_METHOD mem_method = { BIO_TYPE_MEM, "memory buffer", mem_write, mem_read, mem_puts, mem_gets, mem_ctrl, mem_new, mem_free, NULL, }; /* * bio->num is used to hold the value to return on 'empty', if it is 0, * should_retry is not set */ BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void) { return (&mem_method); } BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len) { BIO *ret; BUF_MEM *b; size_t sz; if (!buf) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF, BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } sz = (len < 0) ? strlen(buf) : (size_t)len; if (!(ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) return NULL; b = (BUF_MEM *)ret->ptr; /* Cast away const and trust in the MEM_RDONLY flag. */ b->data = (void *)buf; b->length = sz; b->max = sz; ret->flags |= BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY; /* Since this is static data retrying wont help */ ret->num = 0; return ret; } static int mem_new(BIO *bi) { BUF_MEM *b; if ((b = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) return (0); bi->shutdown = 1; bi->init = 1; bi->num = -1; bi->ptr = (char *)b; return (1); } static int mem_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); if (a->shutdown) { if ((a->init) && (a->ptr != NULL)) { BUF_MEM *b; b = (BUF_MEM *)a->ptr; if (a->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) b->data = NULL; BUF_MEM_free(b); a->ptr = NULL; } } return (1); } static int mem_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = -1; BUF_MEM *bm; bm = (BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = (outl >= 0 && (size_t)outl > bm->length) ? (int)bm->length : outl; if ((out != NULL) && (ret > 0)) { memcpy(out, bm->data, ret); bm->length -= ret; if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) bm->data += ret; else { memmove(&(bm->data[0]), &(bm->data[ret]), bm->length); } } else if (bm->length == 0) { ret = b->num; if (ret != 0) BIO_set_retry_read(b); } return (ret); } static int mem_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = -1; int blen; BUF_MEM *bm; bm = (BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; if (in == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE, BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER); goto end; } if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) { BIOerr(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE, BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO); goto end; } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); + if (inl == 0) + return 0; blen = bm->length; if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(bm, blen + inl) != (blen + inl)) goto end; memcpy(&(bm->data[blen]), in, inl); ret = inl; end: return (ret); } static long mem_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; char **pptr; BUF_MEM *bm = (BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: if (bm->data != NULL) { /* For read only case reset to the start again */ if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) { bm->data -= bm->max - bm->length; bm->length = bm->max; } else { memset(bm->data, 0, bm->max); bm->length = 0; } } break; case BIO_CTRL_EOF: ret = (long)(bm->length == 0); break; case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN: b->num = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = (long)bm->length; if (ptr != NULL) { pptr = (char **)ptr; *pptr = (char *)&(bm->data[0]); } break; case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM: mem_free(b); b->shutdown = (int)num; b->ptr = ptr; break; case BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR: if (ptr != NULL) { pptr = (char **)ptr; *pptr = (char *)bm; } break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = (long)b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = 0L; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: ret = (long)bm->length; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_PUSH: case BIO_CTRL_POP: default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static int mem_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { int i, j; int ret = -1; char *p; BUF_MEM *bm = (BUF_MEM *)bp->ptr; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bp); j = bm->length; if ((size - 1) < j) j = size - 1; if (j <= 0) { *buf = '\0'; return 0; } p = bm->data; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (p[i] == '\n') { i++; break; } } /* * i is now the max num of bytes to copy, either j or up to * and including the first newline */ i = mem_read(bp, buf, i); if (i > 0) buf[i] = '\0'; ret = i; return (ret); } static int mem_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = mem_write(bp, str, n); /* memory semantics is that it will always work */ return (ret); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/Makefile (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/Makefile (revision 337764) @@ -1,389 +1,410 @@ # # OpenSSL/crypto/bn/Makefile # DIR= bn TOP= ../.. CC= cc CPP= $(CC) -E INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include CFLAG=-g MAKEFILE= Makefile AR= ar r BN_ASM= bn_asm.o CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) ASFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(ASFLAG) AFLAGS= $(ASFLAGS) GENERAL=Makefile TEST=bntest.c exptest.c APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a LIBSRC= bn_add.c bn_div.c bn_exp.c bn_lib.c bn_ctx.c bn_mul.c bn_mod.c \ bn_print.c bn_rand.c bn_shift.c bn_word.c bn_blind.c \ bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_err.c bn_sqr.c bn_asm.c \ bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \ bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c LIBOBJ= bn_add.o bn_div.o bn_exp.o bn_lib.o bn_ctx.o bn_mul.o bn_mod.o \ bn_print.o bn_rand.o bn_shift.o bn_word.o bn_blind.o \ bn_kron.o bn_sqrt.o bn_gcd.o bn_prime.o bn_err.o bn_sqr.o $(BN_ASM) \ bn_recp.o bn_mont.o bn_mpi.o bn_exp2.o bn_gf2m.o bn_nist.o \ bn_depr.o bn_const.o bn_x931p.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= bn.h HEADER= bn_lcl.h bn_prime.h $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all) all: lib bn_prime.h: bn_prime.pl $(PERL) bn_prime.pl >bn_prime.h divtest: divtest.c ../../libcrypto.a cc -I../../include divtest.c -o divtest ../../libcrypto.a bnbug: bnbug.c ../../libcrypto.a top cc -g -I../../include bnbug.c -o bnbug ../../libcrypto.a lib: $(LIBOBJ) $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. @touch lib bn-586.s: asm/bn-586.pl ../perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) asm/bn-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ co-586.s: asm/co-586.pl ../perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) asm/co-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ x86-mont.s: asm/x86-mont.pl ../perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) asm/x86-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ x86-gf2m.s: asm/x86-gf2m.pl ../perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) asm/x86-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ sparcv8.o: asm/sparcv8.S $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c asm/sparcv8.S bn-sparcv9.o: asm/sparcv8plus.S $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ asm/sparcv8plus.S sparcv9a-mont.s: asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl $(PERL) asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@ sparcv9-mont.s: asm/sparcv9-mont.pl $(PERL) asm/sparcv9-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@ vis3-mont.s: asm/vis3-mont.pl $(PERL) asm/vis3-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@ sparct4-mont.S: asm/sparct4-mont.pl $(PERL) asm/sparct4-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@ sparcv9-gf2m.S: asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl $(PERL) asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@ bn-mips3.o: asm/mips3.s @if [ "$(CC)" = "gcc" ]; then \ ABI=`expr "$(CFLAGS)" : ".*-mabi=\([n3264]*\)"` && \ as -$$ABI -O -o $@ asm/mips3.s; \ else $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -o $@ asm/mips3.s; fi bn-mips.s: asm/mips.pl $(PERL) asm/mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ mips-mont.s: asm/mips-mont.pl $(PERL) asm/mips-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ bn-s390x.o: asm/s390x.S $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ asm/s390x.S s390x-gf2m.s: asm/s390x-gf2m.pl $(PERL) asm/s390x-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ x86_64-gcc.o: asm/x86_64-gcc.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ asm/x86_64-gcc.c x86_64-mont.s: asm/x86_64-mont.pl $(PERL) asm/x86_64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ x86_64-mont5.s: asm/x86_64-mont5.pl $(PERL) asm/x86_64-mont5.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ x86_64-gf2m.s: asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERL) asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ rsaz-x86_64.s: asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERL) asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ rsaz-avx2.s: asm/rsaz-avx2.pl $(PERL) asm/rsaz-avx2.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@ bn-ia64.s: asm/ia64.S $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E asm/ia64.S > $@ ia64-mont.s: asm/ia64-mont.pl $(PERL) asm/ia64-mont.pl $@ $(CFLAGS) # GNU assembler fails to compile PA-RISC2 modules, insist on calling # vendor assembler... pa-risc2W.o: asm/pa-risc2W.s /usr/ccs/bin/as -o pa-risc2W.o asm/pa-risc2W.s pa-risc2.o: asm/pa-risc2.s /usr/ccs/bin/as -o pa-risc2.o asm/pa-risc2.s parisc-mont.s: asm/parisc-mont.pl $(PERL) asm/parisc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ # ppc - AIX, Linux, MacOS X... bn-ppc.s: asm/ppc.pl; $(PERL) asm/ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ ppc-mont.s: asm/ppc-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ ppc64-mont.s: asm/ppc64-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ alpha-mont.s: asm/alpha-mont.pl (preproc=$$$$.$@.S; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \ $(PERL) asm/alpha-mont.pl > $$preproc && \ $(CC) -E -P $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc) # GNU make "catch all" %-mont.S: asm/%-mont.pl; $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ %-gf2m.S: asm/%-gf2m.pl; $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ armv4-mont.o: armv4-mont.S armv4-gf2m.o: armv4-gf2m.S files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; exptest: rm -f exptest gcc -I../../include -g2 -ggdb -o exptest exptest.c ../../libcrypto.a div: rm -f a.out gcc -I.. -g div.c ../../libcrypto.a tags: ctags $(SRC) tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff update: bn_prime.h depend depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) clean: rm -f *.s *.S *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. bn_add.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_add.c bn_lcl.h +bn_add.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_add.c +bn_add.o: bn_lcl.h bn_asm.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_asm.c bn_lcl.h +bn_asm.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_asm.c +bn_asm.o: bn_lcl.h bn_blind.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_blind.c bn_lcl.h +bn_blind.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h +bn_blind.o: bn_blind.c bn_lcl.h bn_const.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h bn_const.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_const.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_const.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h bn_const.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h bn.h bn_const.c bn_ctx.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_ctx.c bn_lcl.h +bn_ctx.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_ctx.c +bn_ctx.o: bn_lcl.h bn_depr.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h bn_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -bn_depr.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_depr.c bn_lcl.h +bn_depr.o: ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_depr.c bn_lcl.h bn_div.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_div.c bn_lcl.h +bn_div.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_div.c +bn_div.o: bn_lcl.h bn_err.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h bn_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h bn_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h bn_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h bn_err.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h bn_err.o: bn_err.c bn_exp.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h +bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../constant_time_locl.h bn_exp.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h rsaz_exp.h bn_exp2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_exp2.c bn_lcl.h +bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_exp2.c +bn_exp2.o: bn_lcl.h bn_gcd.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_gcd.c bn_lcl.h +bn_gcd.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_gcd.c +bn_gcd.o: bn_lcl.h bn_gf2m.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_gf2m.c bn_lcl.h +bn_gf2m.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_gf2m.c +bn_gf2m.o: bn_lcl.h bn_kron.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_kron.c bn_lcl.h +bn_kron.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_kron.c +bn_kron.o: bn_lcl.h bn_lib.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_lib.c +bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_lib.o: bn_lib.c bn_mod.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_mod.c +bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_mod.o: bn_mod.c bn_mont.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_mont.c +bn_mont.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_mont.o: bn_mont.c bn_mpi.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_mpi.c +bn_mpi.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_mpi.o: bn_mpi.c bn_mul.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_mul.c +bn_mul.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_mul.o: bn_mul.c bn_nist.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_nist.c +bn_nist.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_nist.o: bn_nist.c bn_prime.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h bn_prime.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -bn_prime.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_prime.c bn_prime.h +bn_prime.o: ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_prime.c bn_prime.h bn_print.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_print.c +bn_print.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_print.o: bn_print.c bn_rand.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h bn_rand.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h -bn_rand.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_rand.c +bn_rand.o: ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_rand.c bn_recp.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_recp.c +bn_recp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_recp.o: bn_recp.c bn_shift.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_shift.c +bn_shift.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_shift.o: bn_shift.c bn_sqr.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_sqr.c +bn_sqr.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_sqr.o: bn_sqr.c bn_sqrt.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_sqrt.c +bn_sqrt.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_sqrt.o: bn_sqrt.c bn_word.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_word.c +bn_word.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h +bn_word.o: bn_word.c bn_x931p.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bn_x931p.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bn_x931p.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bn_x931p.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h bn_x931p.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h bn_x931p.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,676 +1,677 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # January 2007. # Montgomery multiplication for ARMv4. # # Performance improvement naturally varies among CPU implementations # and compilers. The code was observed to provide +65-35% improvement # [depending on key length, less for longer keys] on ARM920T, and # +115-80% on Intel IXP425. This is compared to pre-bn_mul_mont code # base and compiler generated code with in-lined umull and even umlal # instructions. The latter means that this code didn't really have an # "advantage" of utilizing some "secret" instruction. # # The code is interoperable with Thumb ISA and is rather compact, less # than 1/2KB. Windows CE port would be trivial, as it's exclusively # about decorations, ABI and instruction syntax are identical. # November 2013 # # Add NEON code path, which handles lengths divisible by 8. RSA/DSA # performance improvement on Cortex-A8 is ~45-100% depending on key # length, more for longer keys. On Cortex-A15 the span is ~10-105%. # On Snapdragon S4 improvement was measured to vary from ~70% to # incredible ~380%, yes, 4.8x faster, for RSA4096 sign. But this is # rather because original integer-only code seems to perform # suboptimally on S4. Situation on Cortex-A9 is unfortunately # different. It's being looked into, but the trouble is that # performance for vectors longer than 256 bits is actually couple # of percent worse than for integer-only code. The code is chosen # for execution on all NEON-capable processors, because gain on # others outweighs the marginal loss on Cortex-A9. while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $num="r0"; # starts as num argument, but holds &tp[num-1] $ap="r1"; $bp="r2"; $bi="r2"; $rp="r2"; $np="r3"; $tp="r4"; $aj="r5"; $nj="r6"; $tj="r7"; $n0="r8"; ########### # r9 is reserved by ELF as platform specific, e.g. TLS pointer $alo="r10"; # sl, gcc uses it to keep @GOT $ahi="r11"; # fp $nlo="r12"; # ip ########### # r13 is stack pointer $nhi="r14"; # lr ########### # r15 is program counter #### argument block layout relative to &tp[num-1], a.k.a. $num $_rp="$num,#12*4"; # ap permanently resides in r1 $_bp="$num,#13*4"; # np permanently resides in r3 $_n0="$num,#14*4"; $_num="$num,#15*4"; $_bpend=$_num; $code=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text .code 32 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .align 5 .LOPENSSL_armcap: .word OPENSSL_armcap_P-bn_mul_mont #endif .global bn_mul_mont .type bn_mul_mont,%function .align 5 bn_mul_mont: ldr ip,[sp,#4] @ load num stmdb sp!,{r0,r2} @ sp points at argument block #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 tst ip,#7 bne .Lialu adr r0,bn_mul_mont ldr r2,.LOPENSSL_armcap ldr r0,[r0,r2] tst r0,#1 @ NEON available? ldmia sp, {r0,r2} beq .Lialu add sp,sp,#8 b bn_mul8x_mont_neon .align 4 .Lialu: #endif cmp ip,#2 mov $num,ip @ load num movlt r0,#0 addlt sp,sp,#2*4 blt .Labrt stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} @ save 10 registers mov $num,$num,lsl#2 @ rescale $num for byte count sub sp,sp,$num @ alloca(4*num) sub sp,sp,#4 @ +extra dword sub $num,$num,#4 @ "num=num-1" add $tp,$bp,$num @ &bp[num-1] add $num,sp,$num @ $num to point at &tp[num-1] ldr $n0,[$_n0] @ &n0 ldr $bi,[$bp] @ bp[0] ldr $aj,[$ap],#4 @ ap[0],ap++ ldr $nj,[$np],#4 @ np[0],np++ ldr $n0,[$n0] @ *n0 str $tp,[$_bpend] @ save &bp[num] umull $alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi @ ap[0]*bp[0] str $n0,[$_n0] @ save n0 value mul $n0,$alo,$n0 @ "tp[0]"*n0 mov $nlo,#0 umlal $alo,$nlo,$nj,$n0 @ np[0]*n0+"t[0]" mov $tp,sp .L1st: ldr $aj,[$ap],#4 @ ap[j],ap++ mov $alo,$ahi ldr $nj,[$np],#4 @ np[j],np++ mov $ahi,#0 umlal $alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi @ ap[j]*bp[0] mov $nhi,#0 umlal $nlo,$nhi,$nj,$n0 @ np[j]*n0 adds $nlo,$nlo,$alo str $nlo,[$tp],#4 @ tp[j-1]=,tp++ adc $nlo,$nhi,#0 cmp $tp,$num bne .L1st adds $nlo,$nlo,$ahi ldr $tp,[$_bp] @ restore bp mov $nhi,#0 ldr $n0,[$_n0] @ restore n0 adc $nhi,$nhi,#0 str $nlo,[$num] @ tp[num-1]= str $nhi,[$num,#4] @ tp[num]= .Louter: sub $tj,$num,sp @ "original" $num-1 value sub $ap,$ap,$tj @ "rewind" ap to &ap[1] ldr $bi,[$tp,#4]! @ *(++bp) sub $np,$np,$tj @ "rewind" np to &np[1] ldr $aj,[$ap,#-4] @ ap[0] ldr $alo,[sp] @ tp[0] ldr $nj,[$np,#-4] @ np[0] ldr $tj,[sp,#4] @ tp[1] mov $ahi,#0 umlal $alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi @ ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] str $tp,[$_bp] @ save bp mul $n0,$alo,$n0 mov $nlo,#0 umlal $alo,$nlo,$nj,$n0 @ np[0]*n0+"tp[0]" mov $tp,sp .Linner: ldr $aj,[$ap],#4 @ ap[j],ap++ adds $alo,$ahi,$tj @ +=tp[j] ldr $nj,[$np],#4 @ np[j],np++ mov $ahi,#0 umlal $alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi @ ap[j]*bp[i] mov $nhi,#0 umlal $nlo,$nhi,$nj,$n0 @ np[j]*n0 adc $ahi,$ahi,#0 ldr $tj,[$tp,#8] @ tp[j+1] adds $nlo,$nlo,$alo str $nlo,[$tp],#4 @ tp[j-1]=,tp++ adc $nlo,$nhi,#0 cmp $tp,$num bne .Linner adds $nlo,$nlo,$ahi mov $nhi,#0 ldr $tp,[$_bp] @ restore bp adc $nhi,$nhi,#0 ldr $n0,[$_n0] @ restore n0 adds $nlo,$nlo,$tj ldr $tj,[$_bpend] @ restore &bp[num] adc $nhi,$nhi,#0 str $nlo,[$num] @ tp[num-1]= str $nhi,[$num,#4] @ tp[num]= cmp $tp,$tj bne .Louter ldr $rp,[$_rp] @ pull rp add $num,$num,#4 @ $num to point at &tp[num] sub $aj,$num,sp @ "original" num value mov $tp,sp @ "rewind" $tp mov $ap,$tp @ "borrow" $ap sub $np,$np,$aj @ "rewind" $np to &np[0] subs $tj,$tj,$tj @ "clear" carry flag .Lsub: ldr $tj,[$tp],#4 ldr $nj,[$np],#4 sbcs $tj,$tj,$nj @ tp[j]-np[j] str $tj,[$rp],#4 @ rp[j]= teq $tp,$num @ preserve carry bne .Lsub sbcs $nhi,$nhi,#0 @ upmost carry mov $tp,sp @ "rewind" $tp sub $rp,$rp,$aj @ "rewind" $rp - and $ap,$tp,$nhi - bic $np,$rp,$nhi - orr $ap,$ap,$np @ ap=borrow?tp:rp - -.Lcopy: ldr $tj,[$ap],#4 @ copy or in-place refresh +.Lcopy: ldr $tj,[$tp] @ conditional copy + ldr $aj,[$rp] str sp,[$tp],#4 @ zap tp - str $tj,[$rp],#4 - cmp $tp,$num +#ifdef __thumb2__ + it cc +#endif + movcc $aj,$tj + str $aj,[$rp],#4 + teq $tp,$num @ preserve carry bne .Lcopy add sp,$num,#4 @ skip over tp[num+1] ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} @ restore registers add sp,sp,#2*4 @ skip over {r0,r2} mov r0,#1 .Labrt: #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ret @ bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont ___ { sub Dlo() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):""; } sub Dhi() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):""; } my ($A0,$A1,$A2,$A3)=map("d$_",(0..3)); my ($N0,$N1,$N2,$N3)=map("d$_",(4..7)); my ($Z,$Temp)=("q4","q5"); my ($A0xB,$A1xB,$A2xB,$A3xB,$A4xB,$A5xB,$A6xB,$A7xB)=map("q$_",(6..13)); my ($Bi,$Ni,$M0)=map("d$_",(28..31)); my $zero=&Dlo($Z); my $temp=&Dlo($Temp); my ($rptr,$aptr,$bptr,$nptr,$n0,$num)=map("r$_",(0..5)); my ($tinptr,$toutptr,$inner,$outer)=map("r$_",(6..9)); $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .type bn_mul8x_mont_neon,%function .align 5 bn_mul8x_mont_neon: mov ip,sp stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so ldmia ip,{r4-r5} @ load rest of parameter block sub $toutptr,sp,#16 vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]! sub $toutptr,$toutptr,$num,lsl#4 vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]! @ can't specify :32 :-( and $toutptr,$toutptr,#-64 vld1.32 {${M0}[0]}, [$n0,:32] mov sp,$toutptr @ alloca veor $zero,$zero,$zero subs $inner,$num,#8 vzip.16 $Bi,$zero vmull.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0] vmull.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1] vmull.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0] vshl.i64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16 vmull.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1] vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")` veor $zero,$zero,$zero vmul.u32 $Ni,$temp,$M0 vmull.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0] vld1.32 {$N0-$N3}, [$nptr]! vmull.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1] vmull.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0] vzip.16 $Ni,$zero vmull.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1] bne .LNEON_1st @ special case for num=8, everything is in register bank... vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0] sub $outer,$num,#1 vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1] vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0] vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1] vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0] vmov $Temp,$A0xB vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1] vmov $A0xB,$A1xB vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0] vmov $A1xB,$A2xB vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1] vmov $A2xB,$A3xB vmov $A3xB,$A4xB vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 vmov $A4xB,$A5xB vmov $A5xB,$A6xB vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dhi("$Temp")` vmov $A6xB,$A7xB veor $A7xB,$A7xB vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 b .LNEON_outer8 .align 4 .LNEON_outer8: vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]! veor $zero,$zero,$zero vzip.16 $Bi,$zero vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,$temp vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0] vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1] vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0] vshl.i64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16 vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1] vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")` veor $zero,$zero,$zero subs $outer,$outer,#1 vmul.u32 $Ni,$temp,$M0 vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0] vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1] vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0] vzip.16 $Ni,$zero vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1] vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0] vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1] vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0] vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1] vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0] vmov $Temp,$A0xB vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1] vmov $A0xB,$A1xB vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0] vmov $A1xB,$A2xB vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1] vmov $A2xB,$A3xB vmov $A3xB,$A4xB vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 vmov $A4xB,$A5xB vmov $A5xB,$A6xB vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dhi("$Temp")` vmov $A6xB,$A7xB veor $A7xB,$A7xB vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 bne .LNEON_outer8 vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,$temp mov $toutptr,sp vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,#16 mov $inner,$num vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A0xB")`,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,$temp add $tinptr,sp,#16 vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16 vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dhi("$A0xB")` b .LNEON_tail2 .align 4 .LNEON_1st: vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0] vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]! vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1] subs $inner,$inner,#8 vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0] vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1] vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0] vld1.32 {$N0-$N1}, [$nptr]! vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1] vst1.64 {$A0xB-$A1xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0] vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1] vst1.64 {$A2xB-$A3xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmull.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0] vld1.32 {$N2-$N3}, [$nptr]! vmull.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1] vst1.64 {$A4xB-$A5xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmull.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0] vmull.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1] vst1.64 {$A6xB-$A7xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmull.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0] vmull.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1] vmull.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0] vmull.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1] bne .LNEON_1st vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0] add $tinptr,sp,#16 vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1] sub $aptr,$aptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind $aptr vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0] vld1.64 {$Temp}, [sp,:128] vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1] sub $outer,$num,#1 vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0] vst1.64 {$A0xB-$A1xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1] vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 vld1.64 {$A0xB}, [$tinptr, :128]! vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0] vst1.64 {$A2xB-$A3xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1] vst1.64 {$A4xB-$A5xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dhi("$Temp")` veor $Z,$Z,$Z vst1.64 {$A6xB-$A7xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vld1.64 {$A1xB-$A2xB}, [$tinptr, :256]! vst1.64 {$Z}, [$toutptr,:128] vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 b .LNEON_outer .align 4 .LNEON_outer: vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]! sub $nptr,$nptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind $nptr vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]! veor $zero,$zero,$zero mov $toutptr,sp vzip.16 $Bi,$zero sub $inner,$num,#8 vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,$temp vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0] vld1.64 {$A3xB-$A4xB},[$tinptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1] vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0] vld1.64 {$A5xB-$A6xB},[$tinptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1] vshl.i64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16 veor $zero,$zero,$zero vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")` vld1.64 {$A7xB},[$tinptr,:128]! vmul.u32 $Ni,$temp,$M0 vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0] vld1.32 {$N0-$N3}, [$nptr]! vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1] vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0] vzip.16 $Ni,$zero vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1] .LNEON_inner: vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0] vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]! vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1] subs $inner,$inner,#8 vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0] vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1] vst1.64 {$A0xB-$A1xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0] vld1.64 {$A0xB}, [$tinptr, :128]! vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1] vst1.64 {$A2xB-$A3xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0] vld1.64 {$A1xB-$A2xB}, [$tinptr, :256]! vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1] vst1.64 {$A4xB-$A5xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0] vld1.64 {$A3xB-$A4xB}, [$tinptr, :256]! vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1] vst1.64 {$A6xB-$A7xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0] vld1.64 {$A5xB-$A6xB}, [$tinptr, :256]! vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1] vld1.32 {$N0-$N3}, [$nptr]! vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0] vld1.64 {$A7xB}, [$tinptr, :128]! vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1] vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0] vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1] bne .LNEON_inner vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0] add $tinptr,sp,#16 vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1] sub $aptr,$aptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind $aptr vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0] vld1.64 {$Temp}, [sp,:128] vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1] subs $outer,$outer,#1 vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0] vst1.64 {$A0xB-$A1xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1] vld1.64 {$A0xB}, [$tinptr, :128]! vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 vst1.64 {$A2xB-$A3xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0] vld1.64 {$A1xB-$A2xB}, [$tinptr, :256]! vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1] vst1.64 {$A4xB-$A5xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dhi("$Temp")` vst1.64 {$A6xB-$A7xB}, [$toutptr,:256]! vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 bne .LNEON_outer mov $toutptr,sp mov $inner,$num .LNEON_tail: vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,$temp vld1.64 {$A3xB-$A4xB}, [$tinptr, :256]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,#16 vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A0xB")`,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,$temp vld1.64 {$A5xB-$A6xB}, [$tinptr, :256]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16 vld1.64 {$A7xB}, [$tinptr, :128]! vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dhi("$A0xB")` .LNEON_tail2: vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A1xB")`,`&Dlo("$A1xB")`,$temp vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A0xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A1xB")`,#16 vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A1xB")`,`&Dhi("$A1xB")`,$temp vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A1xB")`,#16 vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A1xB")`,`&Dhi("$A1xB")` vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A2xB")`,`&Dlo("$A2xB")`,$temp vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A1xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A2xB")`,#16 vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A2xB")`,`&Dhi("$A2xB")`,$temp vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A2xB")`,#16 vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A2xB")`,`&Dhi("$A2xB")` vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A3xB")`,`&Dlo("$A3xB")`,$temp vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A2xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A3xB")`,#16 vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A3xB")`,`&Dhi("$A3xB")`,$temp vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A3xB")`,#16 vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A3xB")`,`&Dhi("$A3xB")` vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A4xB")`,`&Dlo("$A4xB")`,$temp vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A3xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A4xB")`,#16 vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A4xB")`,`&Dhi("$A4xB")`,$temp vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A4xB")`,#16 vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A4xB")`,`&Dhi("$A4xB")` vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A5xB")`,`&Dlo("$A5xB")`,$temp vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A4xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A5xB")`,#16 vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A5xB")`,`&Dhi("$A5xB")`,$temp vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A5xB")`,#16 vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A5xB")`,`&Dhi("$A5xB")` vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A6xB")`,`&Dlo("$A6xB")`,$temp vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A5xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A6xB")`,#16 vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A6xB")`,`&Dhi("$A6xB")`,$temp vld1.64 {$A0xB}, [$tinptr, :128]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A6xB")`,#16 vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A6xB")`,`&Dhi("$A6xB")` vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A7xB")`,`&Dlo("$A7xB")`,$temp vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A6xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A7xB")`,#16 vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A7xB")`,`&Dhi("$A7xB")`,$temp vld1.64 {$A1xB-$A2xB}, [$tinptr, :256]! vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A7xB")`,#16 vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A7xB")`,`&Dhi("$A7xB")` subs $inner,$inner,#8 vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A7xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! bne .LNEON_tail vst1.32 {${temp}[0]}, [$toutptr, :32] @ top-most bit sub $nptr,$nptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind $nptr subs $aptr,sp,#0 @ clear carry flag add $bptr,sp,$num,lsl#2 .LNEON_sub: ldmia $aptr!, {r4-r7} ldmia $nptr!, {r8-r11} sbcs r8, r4,r8 sbcs r9, r5,r9 sbcs r10,r6,r10 sbcs r11,r7,r11 teq $aptr,$bptr @ preserves carry stmia $rptr!, {r8-r11} bne .LNEON_sub ldr r10, [$aptr] @ load top-most bit veor q0,q0,q0 sub r11,$bptr,sp @ this is num*4 veor q1,q1,q1 mov $aptr,sp sub $rptr,$rptr,r11 @ rewind $rptr mov $nptr,$bptr @ second 3/4th of frame sbcs r10,r10,#0 @ result is carry flag .LNEON_copy_n_zap: ldmia $aptr!, {r4-r7} ldmia $rptr, {r8-r11} movcc r8, r4 vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]! @ wipe movcc r9, r5 movcc r10,r6 vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]! @ wipe movcc r11,r7 ldmia $aptr, {r4-r7} stmia $rptr!, {r8-r11} sub $aptr,$aptr,#16 ldmia $rptr, {r8-r11} movcc r8, r4 vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$aptr,:256]! @ wipe movcc r9, r5 movcc r10,r6 vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]! @ wipe movcc r11,r7 teq $aptr,$bptr @ preserves carry stmia $rptr!, {r8-r11} bne .LNEON_copy_n_zap sub sp,ip,#96 vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ldmia sp!,{r4-r11} ret @ bx lr .size bn_mul8x_mont_neon,.-bn_mul8x_mont_neon #endif ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "Montgomery multiplication for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 #endif ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4 $code =~ s/\bret\b/bx lr/gm; print $code; close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,851 +1,851 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # January 2010 # # "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for IA-64. There are # several possibilities for improvement: # # - modulo-scheduling outer loop would eliminate quite a number of # stalls after ldf8, xma and getf.sig outside inner loop and # improve shorter key performance; # - shorter vector support [with input vectors being fetched only # once] should be added; # - 2x unroll with help of n0[1] would make the code scalable on # "wider" IA-64, "wider" than Itanium 2 that is, which is not of # acute interest, because upcoming Tukwila's individual cores are # reportedly based on Itanium 2 design; # - dedicated squaring procedure(?); # # January 2010 # # Shorter vector support is implemented by zero-padding ap and np # vectors up to 8 elements, or 512 bits. This means that 256-bit # inputs will be processed only 2 times faster than 512-bit inputs, # not 4 [as one would expect, because algorithm complexity is n^2]. # The reason for padding is that inputs shorter than 512 bits won't # be processed faster anyway, because minimal critical path of the # core loop happens to match 512-bit timing. Either way, it resulted # in >100% improvement of 512-bit RSA sign benchmark and 50% - of # 1024-bit one [in comparison to original version of *this* module]. # # So far 'openssl speed rsa dsa' output on 900MHz Itanium 2 *with* # this module is: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 512 bits 0.000290s 0.000024s 3452.8 42031.4 # rsa 1024 bits 0.000793s 0.000058s 1261.7 17172.0 # rsa 2048 bits 0.005908s 0.000148s 169.3 6754.0 # rsa 4096 bits 0.033456s 0.000469s 29.9 2133.6 # dsa 512 bits 0.000253s 0.000198s 3949.9 5057.0 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000585s 0.000607s 1708.4 1647.4 # dsa 2048 bits 0.001453s 0.001703s 688.1 587.4 # # ... and *without* (but still with ia64.S): # # rsa 512 bits 0.000670s 0.000041s 1491.8 24145.5 # rsa 1024 bits 0.001988s 0.000080s 502.9 12499.3 # rsa 2048 bits 0.008702s 0.000189s 114.9 5293.9 # rsa 4096 bits 0.043860s 0.000533s 22.8 1875.9 # dsa 512 bits 0.000441s 0.000427s 2265.3 2340.6 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000823s 0.000867s 1215.6 1153.2 # dsa 2048 bits 0.001894s 0.002179s 528.1 458.9 # # As it can be seen, RSA sign performance improves by 130-30%, # hereafter less for longer keys, while verify - by 74-13%. # DSA performance improves by 115-30%. if ($^O eq "hpux") { $ADDP="addp4"; for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); } } else { $ADDP="add"; } $code=<<___; .explicit .text // int bn_mul_mont (BN_ULONG *rp,const BN_ULONG *ap, // const BN_ULONG *bp,const BN_ULONG *np, // const BN_ULONG *n0p,int num); .align 64 .global bn_mul_mont# .proc bn_mul_mont# bn_mul_mont: .prologue .body { .mmi; cmp4.le p6,p7=2,r37;; (p6) cmp4.lt.unc p8,p9=8,r37 mov ret0=r0 };; { .bbb; (p9) br.cond.dptk.many bn_mul_mont_8 (p8) br.cond.dpnt.many bn_mul_mont_general (p7) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };; .endp bn_mul_mont# prevfs=r2; prevpr=r3; prevlc=r10; prevsp=r11; rptr=r8; aptr=r9; bptr=r14; nptr=r15; tptr=r16; // &tp[0] tp_1=r17; // &tp[-1] num=r18; len=r19; lc=r20; topbit=r21; // carry bit from tmp[num] n0=f6; m0=f7; bi=f8; .align 64 .local bn_mul_mont_general# .proc bn_mul_mont_general# bn_mul_mont_general: .prologue { .mmi; .save ar.pfs,prevfs alloc prevfs=ar.pfs,6,2,0,8 $ADDP aptr=0,in1 .save ar.lc,prevlc mov prevlc=ar.lc } { .mmi; .vframe prevsp mov prevsp=sp $ADDP bptr=0,in2 .save pr,prevpr mov prevpr=pr };; .body .rotf alo[6],nlo[4],ahi[8],nhi[6] .rotr a[3],n[3],t[2] { .mmi; ldf8 bi=[bptr],8 // (*bp++) ldf8 alo[4]=[aptr],16 // ap[0] $ADDP r30=8,in1 };; { .mmi; ldf8 alo[3]=[r30],16 // ap[1] ldf8 alo[2]=[aptr],16 // ap[2] $ADDP in4=0,in4 };; { .mmi; ldf8 alo[1]=[r30] // ap[3] ldf8 n0=[in4] // n0 $ADDP rptr=0,in0 } { .mmi; $ADDP nptr=0,in3 mov r31=16 zxt4 num=in5 };; { .mmi; ldf8 nlo[2]=[nptr],8 // np[0] shladd len=num,3,r0 shladd r31=num,3,r31 };; { .mmi; ldf8 nlo[1]=[nptr],8 // np[1] add lc=-5,num sub r31=sp,r31 };; { .mfb; and sp=-16,r31 // alloca xmpy.hu ahi[2]=alo[4],bi // ap[0]*bp[0] nop.b 0 } { .mfb; nop.m 0 xmpy.lu alo[4]=alo[4],bi brp.loop.imp .L1st_ctop,.L1st_cend-16 };; { .mfi; nop.m 0 xma.hu ahi[1]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2] // ap[1]*bp[0] add tp_1=8,sp } { .mfi; nop.m 0 xma.lu alo[3]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2] mov pr.rot=0x20001f<<16 // ------^----- (p40) at first (p23) // ----------^^ p[16:20]=1 };; { .mfi; nop.m 0 xmpy.lu m0=alo[4],n0 // (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 mov ar.lc=lc } { .mfi; nop.m 0 fcvt.fxu.s1 nhi[1]=f0 mov ar.ec=8 };; .align 32 .L1st_ctop: .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 { .mfi; (p16) ldf8 alo[0]=[aptr],8 // *(aptr++) (p18) xma.hu ahi[0]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1] (p40) add n[2]=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) } { .mfi; (p18) ldf8 nlo[0]=[nptr],8 // *(nptr++)(p16) (p18) xma.lu alo[2]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1] (p42) add n[2]=n[2],a[2],1 };; // (p23) { .mfi; (p21) getf.sig a[0]=alo[5] (p20) xma.hu nhi[0]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1] (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) { .mfi; (p23) st8 [tp_1]=n[2],8 (p20) xma.lu nlo[2]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1] (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) { .mmb; (p21) getf.sig n[0]=nlo[3] (p16) nop.m 0 br.ctop.sptk .L1st_ctop };; .L1st_cend: { .mmi; getf.sig a[0]=ahi[6] // (p24) getf.sig n[0]=nhi[4] add num=-1,num };; // num-- { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 (p40) add n[0]=n[0],a[0] (p42) add n[0]=n[0],a[0],1 sub aptr=aptr,len };; // rewind { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=n[0],a[0] (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=n[0],a[0] sub nptr=nptr,len };; { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p39,p41 (p39) add topbit=r0,r0 (p41) add topbit=r0,r0,1 nop.i 0 } { .mmi; st8 [tp_1]=n[0] add tptr=16,sp add tp_1=8,sp };; .Louter: { .mmi; ldf8 bi=[bptr],8 // (*bp++) ldf8 ahi[3]=[tptr] // tp[0] add r30=8,aptr };; { .mmi; ldf8 alo[4]=[aptr],16 // ap[0] ldf8 alo[3]=[r30],16 // ap[1] add r31=8,nptr };; { .mfb; ldf8 alo[2]=[aptr],16 // ap[2] xma.hu ahi[2]=alo[4],bi,ahi[3] // ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] brp.loop.imp .Linner_ctop,.Linner_cend-16 } { .mfb; ldf8 alo[1]=[r30] // ap[3] xma.lu alo[4]=alo[4],bi,ahi[3] clrrrb.pr };; { .mfi; ldf8 nlo[2]=[nptr],16 // np[0] xma.hu ahi[1]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2] // ap[1]*bp[i] nop.i 0 } { .mfi; ldf8 nlo[1]=[r31] // np[1] xma.lu alo[3]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2] mov pr.rot=0x20101f<<16 // ------^----- (p40) at first (p23) // --------^--- (p30) at first (p22) // ----------^^ p[16:20]=1 };; { .mfi; st8 [tptr]=r0 // tp[0] is already accounted xmpy.lu m0=alo[4],n0 // (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 mov ar.lc=lc } { .mfi; fcvt.fxu.s1 nhi[1]=f0 mov ar.ec=8 };; // This loop spins in 4*(n+7) ticks on Itanium 2 and should spin in // 7*(n+7) ticks on Itanium (the one codenamed Merced). Factor of 7 // in latter case accounts for two-tick pipeline stall, which means // that its performance would be ~20% lower than optimal one. No // attempt was made to address this, because original Itanium is // hardly represented out in the wild... .align 32 .Linner_ctop: .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p30,p32 { .mfi; (p16) ldf8 alo[0]=[aptr],8 // *(aptr++) (p18) xma.hu ahi[0]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1] (p40) add n[2]=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 (p18) xma.lu alo[2]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1] (p42) add n[2]=n[2],a[2],1 };; // (p23) { .mfi; (p21) getf.sig a[0]=alo[5] (p16) nop.f 0 (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) { .mfi; (p21) ld8 t[0]=[tptr],8 (p16) nop.f 0 (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=n[2],a[2] };; // (p23) { .mfi; (p18) ldf8 nlo[0]=[nptr],8 // *(nptr++) (p20) xma.hu nhi[0]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1] (p30) add a[1]=a[1],t[1] } // (p22) { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 (p20) xma.lu nlo[2]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1] (p32) add a[1]=a[1],t[1],1 };; // (p22) { .mmi; (p21) getf.sig n[0]=nlo[3] (p16) nop.m 0 (p30) cmp.ltu p31,p29=a[1],t[1] } // (p22) { .mmb; (p23) st8 [tp_1]=n[2],8 (p32) cmp.leu p31,p29=a[1],t[1] // (p22) br.ctop.sptk .Linner_ctop };; .Linner_cend: { .mmi; getf.sig a[0]=ahi[6] // (p24) getf.sig n[0]=nhi[4] nop.i 0 };; { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p31,p33 (p31) add a[0]=a[0],topbit (p33) add a[0]=a[0],topbit,1 mov topbit=r0 };; { .mfi; .pred.rel "mutex",p31,p33 (p31) cmp.ltu p32,p30=a[0],topbit (p33) cmp.leu p32,p30=a[0],topbit } { .mfi; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 (p40) add n[0]=n[0],a[0] (p42) add n[0]=n[0],a[0],1 };; { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p44,p46 (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=n[0],a[0] (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=n[0],a[0] (p32) add topbit=r0,r0,1 } { .mmi; st8 [tp_1]=n[0],8 cmp4.ne p6,p0=1,num sub aptr=aptr,len };; // rewind { .mmi; sub nptr=nptr,len (p41) add topbit=r0,r0,1 add tptr=16,sp } { .mmb; add tp_1=8,sp add num=-1,num // num-- (p6) br.cond.sptk.many .Louter };; { .mbb; add lc=4,lc brp.loop.imp .Lsub_ctop,.Lsub_cend-16 clrrrb.pr };; { .mii; nop.m 0 mov pr.rot=0x10001<<16 // ------^---- (p33) at first (p17) mov ar.lc=lc } { .mii; nop.m 0 mov ar.ec=3 nop.i 0 };; .Lsub_ctop: .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 { .mfi; (p16) ld8 t[0]=[tptr],8 // t=*(tp++) (p16) nop.f 0 (p33) sub n[1]=t[1],n[1] } // (p17) { .mfi; (p16) ld8 n[0]=[nptr],8 // n=*(np++) (p16) nop.f 0 (p35) sub n[1]=t[1],n[1],1 };; // (p17) { .mib; (p18) st8 [rptr]=n[2],8 // *(rp++)=r (p33) cmp.gtu p34,p32=n[1],t[1] // (p17) (p18) nop.b 0 } { .mib; (p18) nop.m 0 (p35) cmp.geu p34,p32=n[1],t[1] // (p17) br.ctop.sptk .Lsub_ctop };; .Lsub_cend: { .mmb; .pred.rel "mutex",p34,p36 (p34) sub topbit=topbit,r0 // (p19) (p36) sub topbit=topbit,r0,1 brp.loop.imp .Lcopy_ctop,.Lcopy_cend-16 } { .mmb; sub rptr=rptr,len // rewind sub tptr=tptr,len clrrrb.pr };; -{ .mmi; and aptr=tptr,topbit - andcm bptr=rptr,topbit +{ .mmi; mov aptr=rptr + mov bptr=tptr mov pr.rot=1<<16 };; -{ .mii; or nptr=aptr,bptr +{ .mii; cmp.eq p0,p6=topbit,r0 mov ar.lc=lc - mov ar.ec=3 };; + mov ar.ec=2 };; .Lcopy_ctop: -{ .mmb; (p16) ld8 n[0]=[nptr],8 - (p18) st8 [tptr]=r0,8 - (p16) nop.b 0 } -{ .mmb; (p16) nop.m 0 - (p18) st8 [rptr]=n[2],8 +{ .mmi; (p16) ld8 a[0]=[aptr],8 + (p16) ld8 t[0]=[bptr],8 + (p6) mov a[1]=t[1] };; // (p17) +{ .mmb; (p17) st8 [rptr]=a[1],8 + (p17) st8 [tptr]=r0,8 br.ctop.sptk .Lcopy_ctop };; .Lcopy_cend: { .mmi; mov ret0=1 // signal "handled" rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh mov ar.lc=prevlc } { .mib; .restore sp mov sp=prevsp mov pr=prevpr,0x1ffff br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp bn_mul_mont_general# a1=r16; a2=r17; a3=r18; a4=r19; a5=r20; a6=r21; a7=r22; a8=r23; n1=r24; n2=r25; n3=r26; n4=r27; n5=r28; n6=r29; n7=r30; n8=r31; t0=r15; ai0=f8; ai1=f9; ai2=f10; ai3=f11; ai4=f12; ai5=f13; ai6=f14; ai7=f15; ni0=f16; ni1=f17; ni2=f18; ni3=f19; ni4=f20; ni5=f21; ni6=f22; ni7=f23; .align 64 .skip 48 // aligns loop body .local bn_mul_mont_8# .proc bn_mul_mont_8# bn_mul_mont_8: .prologue { .mmi; .save ar.pfs,prevfs alloc prevfs=ar.pfs,6,2,0,8 .vframe prevsp mov prevsp=sp .save ar.lc,prevlc mov prevlc=ar.lc } { .mmi; add r17=-6*16,sp add sp=-7*16,sp .save pr,prevpr mov prevpr=pr };; { .mmi; .save.gf 0,0x10 stf.spill [sp]=f16,-16 .save.gf 0,0x20 stf.spill [r17]=f17,32 add r16=-5*16,prevsp};; { .mmi; .save.gf 0,0x40 stf.spill [r16]=f18,32 .save.gf 0,0x80 stf.spill [r17]=f19,32 $ADDP aptr=0,in1 };; { .mmi; .save.gf 0,0x100 stf.spill [r16]=f20,32 .save.gf 0,0x200 stf.spill [r17]=f21,32 $ADDP r29=8,in1 };; { .mmi; .save.gf 0,0x400 stf.spill [r16]=f22 .save.gf 0,0x800 stf.spill [r17]=f23 $ADDP rptr=0,in0 };; .body .rotf bj[8],mj[2],tf[2],alo[10],ahi[10],nlo[10],nhi[10] .rotr t[8] // load input vectors padding them to 8 elements { .mmi; ldf8 ai0=[aptr],16 // ap[0] ldf8 ai1=[r29],16 // ap[1] $ADDP bptr=0,in2 } { .mmi; $ADDP r30=8,in2 $ADDP nptr=0,in3 $ADDP r31=8,in3 };; { .mmi; ldf8 bj[7]=[bptr],16 // bp[0] ldf8 bj[6]=[r30],16 // bp[1] cmp4.le p4,p5=3,in5 } { .mmi; ldf8 ni0=[nptr],16 // np[0] ldf8 ni1=[r31],16 // np[1] cmp4.le p6,p7=4,in5 };; { .mfi; (p4)ldf8 ai2=[aptr],16 // ap[2] (p5)fcvt.fxu ai2=f0 cmp4.le p8,p9=5,in5 } { .mfi; (p6)ldf8 ai3=[r29],16 // ap[3] (p7)fcvt.fxu ai3=f0 cmp4.le p10,p11=6,in5 } { .mfi; (p4)ldf8 bj[5]=[bptr],16 // bp[2] (p5)fcvt.fxu bj[5]=f0 cmp4.le p12,p13=7,in5 } { .mfi; (p6)ldf8 bj[4]=[r30],16 // bp[3] (p7)fcvt.fxu bj[4]=f0 cmp4.le p14,p15=8,in5 } { .mfi; (p4)ldf8 ni2=[nptr],16 // np[2] (p5)fcvt.fxu ni2=f0 addp4 r28=-1,in5 } { .mfi; (p6)ldf8 ni3=[r31],16 // np[3] (p7)fcvt.fxu ni3=f0 $ADDP in4=0,in4 };; { .mfi; ldf8 n0=[in4] fcvt.fxu tf[1]=f0 nop.i 0 } { .mfi; (p8)ldf8 ai4=[aptr],16 // ap[4] (p9)fcvt.fxu ai4=f0 mov t[0]=r0 } { .mfi; (p10)ldf8 ai5=[r29],16 // ap[5] (p11)fcvt.fxu ai5=f0 mov t[1]=r0 } { .mfi; (p8)ldf8 bj[3]=[bptr],16 // bp[4] (p9)fcvt.fxu bj[3]=f0 mov t[2]=r0 } { .mfi; (p10)ldf8 bj[2]=[r30],16 // bp[5] (p11)fcvt.fxu bj[2]=f0 mov t[3]=r0 } { .mfi; (p8)ldf8 ni4=[nptr],16 // np[4] (p9)fcvt.fxu ni4=f0 mov t[4]=r0 } { .mfi; (p10)ldf8 ni5=[r31],16 // np[5] (p11)fcvt.fxu ni5=f0 mov t[5]=r0 };; { .mfi; (p12)ldf8 ai6=[aptr],16 // ap[6] (p13)fcvt.fxu ai6=f0 mov t[6]=r0 } { .mfi; (p14)ldf8 ai7=[r29],16 // ap[7] (p15)fcvt.fxu ai7=f0 mov t[7]=r0 } { .mfi; (p12)ldf8 bj[1]=[bptr],16 // bp[6] (p13)fcvt.fxu bj[1]=f0 mov ar.lc=r28 } { .mfi; (p14)ldf8 bj[0]=[r30],16 // bp[7] (p15)fcvt.fxu bj[0]=f0 mov ar.ec=1 } { .mfi; (p12)ldf8 ni6=[nptr],16 // np[6] (p13)fcvt.fxu ni6=f0 mov pr.rot=1<<16 } { .mfb; (p14)ldf8 ni7=[r31],16 // np[7] (p15)fcvt.fxu ni7=f0 brp.loop.imp .Louter_8_ctop,.Louter_8_cend-16 };; // The loop is scheduled for 32*n ticks on Itanium 2. Actual attempt // to measure with help of Interval Time Counter indicated that the // factor is a tad higher: 33 or 34, if not 35. Exact measurement and // addressing the issue is problematic, because I don't have access // to platform-specific instruction-level profiler. On Itanium it // should run in 56*n ticks, because of higher xma latency... .Louter_8_ctop: .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 0: (p16) xma.hu ahi[0]=ai0,bj[7],tf[1] // ap[0]*b[i]+t[0] (p40) add a3=a3,n3 } // (p17) a3+=n3 { .mfi; (p42) add a3=a3,n3,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[0]=ai0,bj[7],tf[1] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig a7=alo[8] // 1: (p48) add t[6]=t[6],a3 // (p17) t[6]+=a3 (p50) add t[6]=t[6],a3,1 };; { .mfi; (p17) getf.sig a8=ahi[8] // 2: (p17) xma.hu nhi[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6] // np[6]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a3,n3 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a3,n3 (p17) xma.lu nlo[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n5=nlo[6] // 3: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[6],a3 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[6],a3 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 4: (p16) xma.hu ahi[1]=ai1,bj[7],ahi[0] // ap[1]*b[i] (p41) add a4=a4,n4 } // (p17) a4+=n4 { .mfi; (p43) add a4=a4,n4,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[1]=ai1,bj[7],ahi[0] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mfi; (p49) add t[5]=t[5],a4 // 5: (p17) t[5]+=a4 (p16) xmpy.lu mj[0]=alo[0],n0 // (ap[0]*b[i]+t[0])*n0 (p51) add t[5]=t[5],a4,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 6: (p17) xma.hu nhi[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7] // np[7]*m0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a4,n4 } { .mfi; (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a4,n4 (p17) xma.lu nlo[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n6=nlo[7] // 7: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[5],a4 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[5],a4 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 8: (p16) xma.hu ahi[2]=ai2,bj[7],ahi[1] // ap[2]*b[i] (p40) add a5=a5,n5 } // (p17) a5+=n5 { .mfi; (p42) add a5=a5,n5,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[2]=ai2,bj[7],ahi[1] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a1=alo[1] // 9: (p48) add t[4]=t[4],a5 // p(17) t[4]+=a5 (p50) add t[4]=t[4],a5,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 10: (p16) xma.hu nhi[0]=ni0,mj[0],alo[0] // np[0]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a5,n5 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a5,n5 (p16) xma.lu nlo[0]=ni0,mj[0],alo[0] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n7=nlo[8] // 11: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[4],a5 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[4],a5 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mfi; (p17) getf.sig n8=nhi[8] // 12: (p16) xma.hu ahi[3]=ai3,bj[7],ahi[2] // ap[3]*b[i] (p41) add a6=a6,n6 } // (p17) a6+=n6 { .mfi; (p43) add a6=a6,n6,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[3]=ai3,bj[7],ahi[2] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a2=alo[2] // 13: (p49) add t[3]=t[3],a6 // (p17) t[3]+=a6 (p51) add t[3]=t[3],a6,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 14: (p16) xma.hu nhi[1]=ni1,mj[0],nhi[0] // np[1]*m0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a6,n6 } { .mfi; (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a6,n6 (p16) xma.lu nlo[1]=ni1,mj[0],nhi[0] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) nop.m 0 // 15: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[3],a6 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[3],a6 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 16: (p16) xma.hu ahi[4]=ai4,bj[7],ahi[3] // ap[4]*b[i] (p40) add a7=a7,n7 } // (p17) a7+=n7 { .mfi; (p42) add a7=a7,n7,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[4]=ai4,bj[7],ahi[3] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a3=alo[3] // 17: (p48) add t[2]=t[2],a7 // (p17) t[2]+=a7 (p50) add t[2]=t[2],a7,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 18: (p16) xma.hu nhi[2]=ni2,mj[0],nhi[1] // np[2]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a7,n7 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a7,n7 (p16) xma.lu nlo[2]=ni2,mj[0],nhi[1] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig n1=nlo[1] // 19: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[2],a7 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[2],a7 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 20: (p16) xma.hu ahi[5]=ai5,bj[7],ahi[4] // ap[5]*b[i] (p41) add a8=a8,n8 } // (p17) a8+=n8 { .mfi; (p43) add a8=a8,n8,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[5]=ai5,bj[7],ahi[4] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a4=alo[4] // 21: (p49) add t[1]=t[1],a8 // (p17) t[1]+=a8 (p51) add t[1]=t[1],a8,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 22: (p16) xma.hu nhi[3]=ni3,mj[0],nhi[2] // np[3]*m0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a8,n8 } { .mfi; (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a8,n8 (p16) xma.lu nlo[3]=ni3,mj[0],nhi[2] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig n2=nlo[2] // 23: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[1],a8 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[1],a8 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 24: (p16) xma.hu ahi[6]=ai6,bj[7],ahi[5] // ap[6]*b[i] (p16) add a1=a1,n1 } // (p16) a1+=n1 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 (p16) xma.lu alo[6]=ai6,bj[7],ahi[5] (p17) mov t[0]=r0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a5=alo[5] // 25: (p16) add t0=t[7],a1 // (p16) t[7]+=a1 (p42) add t[0]=t[0],r0,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) setf.sig tf[0]=t0 // 26: (p16) xma.hu nhi[4]=ni4,mj[0],nhi[3] // np[4]*m0 (p50) add t[0]=t[0],r0,1 } { .mfi; (p16) cmp.ltu.unc p42,p40=a1,n1 (p16) xma.lu nlo[4]=ni4,mj[0],nhi[3] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig n3=nlo[3] // 27: (p16) cmp.ltu.unc p50,p48=t0,a1 (p16) nop.i 0 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 28: (p16) xma.hu ahi[7]=ai7,bj[7],ahi[6] // ap[7]*b[i] (p40) add a2=a2,n2 } // (p16) a2+=n2 { .mfi; (p42) add a2=a2,n2,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[7]=ai7,bj[7],ahi[6] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a6=alo[6] // 29: (p48) add t[6]=t[6],a2 // (p16) t[6]+=a2 (p50) add t[6]=t[6],a2,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 30: (p16) xma.hu nhi[5]=ni5,mj[0],nhi[4] // np[5]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=a2,n2 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=a2,n2 (p16) xma.lu nlo[5]=ni5,mj[0],nhi[4] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mfi; (p16) getf.sig n4=nlo[4] // 31: (p16) nop.f 0 (p48) cmp.ltu p49,p47=t[6],a2 } { .mfb; (p50) cmp.leu p49,p47=t[6],a2 (p16) nop.f 0 br.ctop.sptk.many .Louter_8_ctop };; .Louter_8_cend: // above loop has to execute one more time, without (p16), which is // replaced with merged move of np[8] to GPR bank .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mmi; (p0) getf.sig n1=ni0 // 0: (p40) add a3=a3,n3 // (p17) a3+=n3 (p42) add a3=a3,n3,1 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig a7=alo[8] // 1: (p48) add t[6]=t[6],a3 // (p17) t[6]+=a3 (p50) add t[6]=t[6],a3,1 };; { .mfi; (p17) getf.sig a8=ahi[8] // 2: (p17) xma.hu nhi[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6] // np[6]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a3,n3 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a3,n3 (p17) xma.lu nlo[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6] (p0) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n5=nlo[6] // 3: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[6],a3 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[6],a3 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mmi; (p0) getf.sig n2=ni1 // 4: (p41) add a4=a4,n4 // (p17) a4+=n4 (p43) add a4=a4,n4,1 };; { .mfi; (p49) add t[5]=t[5],a4 // 5: (p17) t[5]+=a4 (p0) nop.f 0 (p51) add t[5]=t[5],a4,1 };; { .mfi; (p0) getf.sig n3=ni2 // 6: (p17) xma.hu nhi[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7] // np[7]*m0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a4,n4 } { .mfi; (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a4,n4 (p17) xma.lu nlo[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7] (p0) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n6=nlo[7] // 7: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[5],a4 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[5],a4 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mii; (p0) getf.sig n4=ni3 // 8: (p40) add a5=a5,n5 // (p17) a5+=n5 (p42) add a5=a5,n5,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 9: (p48) add t[4]=t[4],a5 // p(17) t[4]+=a5 (p50) add t[4]=t[4],a5,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 10: (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a5,n5 (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a5,n5 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n7=nlo[8] // 11: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[4],a5 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[4],a5 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n8=nhi[8] // 12: (p41) add a6=a6,n6 // (p17) a6+=n6 (p43) add a6=a6,n6,1 };; { .mii; (p0) getf.sig n5=ni4 // 13: (p49) add t[3]=t[3],a6 // (p17) t[3]+=a6 (p51) add t[3]=t[3],a6,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 14: (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a6,n6 (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a6,n6 };; { .mii; (p0) getf.sig n6=ni5 // 15: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[3],a6 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[3],a6 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 16: (p40) add a7=a7,n7 // (p17) a7+=n7 (p42) add a7=a7,n7,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 17: (p48) add t[2]=t[2],a7 // (p17) t[2]+=a7 (p50) add t[2]=t[2],a7,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 18: (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a7,n7 (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a7,n7 };; { .mii; (p0) getf.sig n7=ni6 // 19: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[2],a7 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[2],a7 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 20: (p41) add a8=a8,n8 // (p17) a8+=n8 (p43) add a8=a8,n8,1 };; { .mmi; (p0) nop.m 0 // 21: (p49) add t[1]=t[1],a8 // (p17) t[1]+=a8 (p51) add t[1]=t[1],a8,1 } { .mmi; (p17) mov t[0]=r0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a8,n8 (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a8,n8 };; { .mmi; (p0) getf.sig n8=ni7 // 22: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[1],a8 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[1],a8 } { .mmi; (p42) add t[0]=t[0],r0,1 (p0) add r16=-7*16,prevsp (p0) add r17=-6*16,prevsp };; // subtract np[8] from carrybit|tmp[8] // carrybit|tmp[8] layout upon exit from above loop is: // t[0]|t[1]|t[2]|t[3]|t[4]|t[5]|t[6]|t[7]|t0 (least significant) { .mmi; (p50)add t[0]=t[0],r0,1 add r18=-5*16,prevsp sub n1=t0,n1 };; { .mmi; cmp.gtu p34,p32=n1,t0;; .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 (p32)sub n2=t[7],n2 (p34)sub n2=t[7],n2,1 };; { .mii; (p32)cmp.gtu p35,p33=n2,t[7] (p34)cmp.geu p35,p33=n2,t[7];; .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 (p33)sub n3=t[6],n3 } { .mmi; (p35)sub n3=t[6],n3,1;; (p33)cmp.gtu p34,p32=n3,t[6] (p35)cmp.geu p34,p32=n3,t[6] };; .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 { .mii; (p32)sub n4=t[5],n4 (p34)sub n4=t[5],n4,1;; (p32)cmp.gtu p35,p33=n4,t[5] } { .mmi; (p34)cmp.geu p35,p33=n4,t[5];; .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 (p33)sub n5=t[4],n5 (p35)sub n5=t[4],n5,1 };; { .mii; (p33)cmp.gtu p34,p32=n5,t[4] (p35)cmp.geu p34,p32=n5,t[4];; .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 (p32)sub n6=t[3],n6 } { .mmi; (p34)sub n6=t[3],n6,1;; (p32)cmp.gtu p35,p33=n6,t[3] (p34)cmp.geu p35,p33=n6,t[3] };; .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 { .mii; (p33)sub n7=t[2],n7 (p35)sub n7=t[2],n7,1;; (p33)cmp.gtu p34,p32=n7,t[2] } { .mmi; (p35)cmp.geu p34,p32=n7,t[2];; .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 (p32)sub n8=t[1],n8 (p34)sub n8=t[1],n8,1 };; { .mii; (p32)cmp.gtu p35,p33=n8,t[1] (p34)cmp.geu p35,p33=n8,t[1];; .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 (p33)sub a8=t[0],r0 } { .mmi; (p35)sub a8=t[0],r0,1;; (p33)cmp.gtu p34,p32=a8,t[0] (p35)cmp.geu p34,p32=a8,t[0] };; // save the result, either tmp[num] or tmp[num]-np[num] .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 { .mmi; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n1,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t0,8 add r19=-4*16,prevsp};; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n2,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[7],8 (p5)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n3,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[6],8 (p7)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n4,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[5],8 (p9)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n5,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[4],8 (p11)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n6,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[3],8 (p13)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n7,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[2],8 (p15)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n8,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[1],8 nop.b 0 };; .Ldone: // epilogue { .mmi; ldf.fill f16=[r16],64 ldf.fill f17=[r17],64 nop.i 0 } { .mmi; ldf.fill f18=[r18],64 ldf.fill f19=[r19],64 mov pr=prevpr,0x1ffff };; { .mmi; ldf.fill f20=[r16] ldf.fill f21=[r17] mov ar.lc=prevlc } { .mmi; ldf.fill f22=[r18] ldf.fill f23=[r19] mov ret0=1 } // signal "handled" { .mib; rum 1<<5 .restore sp mov sp=prevsp br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp bn_mul_mont_8# .type copyright#,\@object copyright: stringz "Montgomery multiplication for IA-64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $output=shift and open STDOUT,">$output"; print $code; close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,426 +1,424 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # This module doesn't present direct interest for OpenSSL, because it # doesn't provide better performance for longer keys, at least not on # in-order-execution cores. While 512-bit RSA sign operations can be # 65% faster in 64-bit mode, 1024-bit ones are only 15% faster, and # 4096-bit ones are up to 15% slower. In 32-bit mode it varies from # 16% improvement for 512-bit RSA sign to -33% for 4096-bit RSA # verify:-( All comparisons are against bn_mul_mont-free assembler. # The module might be of interest to embedded system developers, as # the code is smaller than 1KB, yet offers >3x improvement on MIPS64 # and 75-30% [less for longer keys] on MIPS32 over compiler-generated # code. ###################################################################### # There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most # widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if # one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral # manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout: # ($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23)); ($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31)); # # The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate # interoperability: # # - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp; # - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting # old code]; # - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary; # # For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs: # # ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3)); # ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); # ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25)); # ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23)); # ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31)); # $flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64 if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) { $PTR_ADD="dadd"; # incidentally works even on n32 $PTR_SUB="dsub"; # incidentally works even on n32 $REG_S="sd"; $REG_L="ld"; $SZREG=8; } else { $PTR_ADD="add"; $PTR_SUB="sub"; $REG_S="sw"; $REG_L="lw"; $SZREG=4; } $SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? 0x00fff000 : 0x00ff0000; # # # ###################################################################### while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) { $LD="ld"; $ST="sd"; $MULTU="dmultu"; $ADDU="daddu"; $SUBU="dsubu"; $BNSZ=8; } else { $LD="lw"; $ST="sw"; $MULTU="multu"; $ADDU="addu"; $SUBU="subu"; $BNSZ=4; } # int bn_mul_mont( $rp=$a0; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap=$a1; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp=$a2; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np=$a3; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0=$a4; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num=$a5; # int num); $lo0=$a6; $hi0=$a7; $lo1=$t1; $hi1=$t2; $aj=$s0; $bi=$s1; $nj=$s2; $tp=$s3; $alo=$s4; $ahi=$s5; $nlo=$s6; $nhi=$s7; $tj=$s8; $i=$s9; $j=$s10; $m1=$s11; $FRAMESIZE=14; $code=<<___; .text .set noat .set noreorder .align 5 .globl bn_mul_mont .ent bn_mul_mont bn_mul_mont: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i); lw $n0,16($sp) lw $num,20($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; slt $at,$num,4 bnez $at,1f li $t0,0 slt $at,$num,17 # on in-order CPU bnez $at,bn_mul_mont_internal nop 1: jr $ra li $a0,0 .end bn_mul_mont .align 5 .ent bn_mul_mont_internal bn_mul_mont_internal: .frame $fp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x40000000|$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG $PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG $REG_S $fp,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s11,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s10,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s9,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s8,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s7,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s6,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s5,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_S $s3,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; move $fp,$sp .set reorder $LD $n0,0($n0) $LD $bi,0($bp) # bp[0] $LD $aj,0($ap) # ap[0] $LD $nj,0($np) # np[0] $PTR_SUB $sp,2*$BNSZ # place for two extra words sll $num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)` li $at,-4096 $PTR_SUB $sp,$num and $sp,$at $MULTU $aj,$bi $LD $alo,$BNSZ($ap) $LD $nlo,$BNSZ($np) mflo $lo0 mfhi $hi0 $MULTU $lo0,$n0 mflo $m1 $MULTU $alo,$bi mflo $alo mfhi $ahi $MULTU $nj,$m1 mflo $lo1 mfhi $hi1 $MULTU $nlo,$m1 $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi1,$at mflo $nlo mfhi $nhi move $tp,$sp li $j,2*$BNSZ .align 4 .L1st: .set noreorder $PTR_ADD $aj,$ap,$j $PTR_ADD $nj,$np,$j $LD $aj,($aj) $LD $nj,($nj) $MULTU $aj,$bi $ADDU $lo0,$alo,$hi0 $ADDU $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sltu $at,$lo0,$hi0 sltu $t0,$lo1,$hi1 $ADDU $hi0,$ahi,$at $ADDU $hi1,$nhi,$t0 mflo $alo mfhi $ahi $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $MULTU $nj,$m1 $ADDU $hi1,$at addu $j,$BNSZ $ST $lo1,($tp) sltu $t0,$j,$num mflo $nlo mfhi $nhi bnez $t0,.L1st $PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ .set reorder $ADDU $lo0,$alo,$hi0 sltu $at,$lo0,$hi0 $ADDU $hi0,$ahi,$at $ADDU $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sltu $t0,$lo1,$hi1 $ADDU $hi1,$nhi,$t0 $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi1,$at $ST $lo1,($tp) $ADDU $hi1,$hi0 sltu $at,$hi1,$hi0 $ST $hi1,$BNSZ($tp) $ST $at,2*$BNSZ($tp) li $i,$BNSZ .align 4 .Louter: $PTR_ADD $bi,$bp,$i $LD $bi,($bi) $LD $aj,($ap) $LD $alo,$BNSZ($ap) $LD $tj,($sp) $MULTU $aj,$bi $LD $nj,($np) $LD $nlo,$BNSZ($np) mflo $lo0 mfhi $hi0 $ADDU $lo0,$tj $MULTU $lo0,$n0 sltu $at,$lo0,$tj $ADDU $hi0,$at mflo $m1 $MULTU $alo,$bi mflo $alo mfhi $ahi $MULTU $nj,$m1 mflo $lo1 mfhi $hi1 $MULTU $nlo,$m1 $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi1,$at mflo $nlo mfhi $nhi move $tp,$sp li $j,2*$BNSZ $LD $tj,$BNSZ($tp) .align 4 .Linner: .set noreorder $PTR_ADD $aj,$ap,$j $PTR_ADD $nj,$np,$j $LD $aj,($aj) $LD $nj,($nj) $MULTU $aj,$bi $ADDU $lo0,$alo,$hi0 $ADDU $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sltu $at,$lo0,$hi0 sltu $t0,$lo1,$hi1 $ADDU $hi0,$ahi,$at $ADDU $hi1,$nhi,$t0 mflo $alo mfhi $ahi $ADDU $lo0,$tj addu $j,$BNSZ $MULTU $nj,$m1 sltu $at,$lo0,$tj $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi0,$at sltu $t0,$lo1,$lo0 $LD $tj,2*$BNSZ($tp) $ADDU $hi1,$t0 sltu $at,$j,$num mflo $nlo mfhi $nhi $ST $lo1,($tp) bnez $at,.Linner $PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ .set reorder $ADDU $lo0,$alo,$hi0 sltu $at,$lo0,$hi0 $ADDU $hi0,$ahi,$at $ADDU $lo0,$tj sltu $t0,$lo0,$tj $ADDU $hi0,$t0 $LD $tj,2*$BNSZ($tp) $ADDU $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sltu $at,$lo1,$hi1 $ADDU $hi1,$nhi,$at $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $t0,$lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi1,$t0 $ST $lo1,($tp) $ADDU $lo1,$hi1,$hi0 sltu $hi1,$lo1,$hi0 $ADDU $lo1,$tj sltu $at,$lo1,$tj $ADDU $hi1,$at $ST $lo1,$BNSZ($tp) $ST $hi1,2*$BNSZ($tp) addu $i,$BNSZ sltu $t0,$i,$num bnez $t0,.Louter .set noreorder $PTR_ADD $tj,$sp,$num # &tp[num] move $tp,$sp move $ap,$sp li $hi0,0 # clear borrow bit .align 4 .Lsub: $LD $lo0,($tp) $LD $lo1,($np) $PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ $PTR_ADD $np,$BNSZ $SUBU $lo1,$lo0,$lo1 # tp[i]-np[i] sgtu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $SUBU $lo0,$lo1,$hi0 sgtu $hi0,$lo0,$lo1 $ST $lo0,($rp) or $hi0,$at sltu $at,$tp,$tj bnez $at,.Lsub $PTR_ADD $rp,$BNSZ $SUBU $hi0,$hi1,$hi0 # handle upmost overflow bit move $tp,$sp $PTR_SUB $rp,$num # restore rp not $hi1,$hi0 - and $ap,$hi0,$sp - and $bp,$hi1,$rp - or $ap,$ap,$bp # ap=borrow?tp:rp - -.align 4 -.Lcopy: $LD $aj,($ap) - $PTR_ADD $ap,$BNSZ +.Lcopy: $LD $nj,($tp) # conditional move + $LD $aj,($rp) $ST $zero,($tp) $PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ + and $nj,$hi0 + and $aj,$hi1 + or $aj,$nj sltu $at,$tp,$tj $ST $aj,($rp) bnez $at,.Lcopy $PTR_ADD $rp,$BNSZ li $a0,1 li $t0,1 .set noreorder move $sp,$fp $REG_L $fp,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s11,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s10,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s9,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s8,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s7,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s6,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s5,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s3,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG .end bn_mul_mont_internal .rdata .asciiz "Montgomery Multiplication for MIPS, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,995 +1,991 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # On PA-7100LC this module performs ~90-50% better, less for longer # keys, than code generated by gcc 3.2 for PA-RISC 1.1. Latter means # that compiler utilized xmpyu instruction to perform 32x32=64-bit # multiplication, which in turn means that "baseline" performance was # optimal in respect to instruction set capabilities. Fair comparison # with vendor compiler is problematic, because OpenSSL doesn't define # BN_LLONG [presumably] for historical reasons, which drives compiler # toward 4 times 16x16=32-bit multiplicatons [plus complementary # shifts and additions] instead. This means that you should observe # several times improvement over code generated by vendor compiler # for PA-RISC 1.1, but the "baseline" is far from optimal. The actual # improvement coefficient was never collected on PA-7100LC, or any # other 1.1 CPU, because I don't have access to such machine with # vendor compiler. But to give you a taste, PA-RISC 1.1 code path # reportedly outperformed code generated by cc +DA1.1 +O3 by factor # of ~5x on PA-8600. # # On PA-RISC 2.0 it has to compete with pa-risc2[W].s, which is # reportedly ~2x faster than vendor compiler generated code [according # to comment in pa-risc2[W].s]. Here comes a catch. Execution core of # this implementation is actually 32-bit one, in the sense that it # operates on 32-bit values. But pa-risc2[W].s operates on arrays of # 64-bit BN_LONGs... How do they interoperate then? No problem. This # module picks halves of 64-bit values in reverse order and pretends # they were 32-bit BN_LONGs. But can 32-bit core compete with "pure" # 64-bit code such as pa-risc2[W].s then? Well, the thing is that # 32x32=64-bit multiplication is the best even PA-RISC 2.0 can do, # i.e. there is no "wider" multiplication like on most other 64-bit # platforms. This means that even being effectively 32-bit, this # implementation performs "64-bit" computational task in same amount # of arithmetic operations, most notably multiplications. It requires # more memory references, most notably to tp[num], but this doesn't # seem to exhaust memory port capacity. And indeed, dedicated PA-RISC # 2.0 code path provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s: # it's ~10% better for shortest key length and ~10% worse for longest # one. # # In case it wasn't clear. The module has two distinct code paths: # PA-RISC 1.1 and PA-RISC 2.0 ones. Latter features carry-free 64-bit # additions and 64-bit integer loads, not to mention specific # instruction scheduling. In 64-bit build naturally only 2.0 code path # is assembled. In 32-bit application context both code paths are # assembled, PA-RISC 2.0 CPU is detected at run-time and proper path # is taken automatically. Also, in 32-bit build the module imposes # couple of limitations: vector lengths has to be even and vector # addresses has to be 64-bit aligned. Normally neither is a problem: # most common key lengths are even and vectors are commonly malloc-ed, # which ensures alignment. # # Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account on # PA-RISC 1.1 machine, and to correspondent who chose to remain # anonymous for testing the code on PA-RISC 2.0 machine. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $LEVEL ="2.0W"; $SIZE_T =8; $FRAME_MARKER =80; $SAVED_RP =16; $PUSH ="std"; $PUSHMA ="std,ma"; $POP ="ldd"; $POPMB ="ldd,mb"; $BN_SZ =$SIZE_T; } else { $LEVEL ="1.1"; #$LEVEL.="\n\t.ALLOW\t2.0"; $SIZE_T =4; $FRAME_MARKER =48; $SAVED_RP =20; $PUSH ="stw"; $PUSHMA ="stwm"; $POP ="ldw"; $POPMB ="ldwm"; $BN_SZ =$SIZE_T; if (open CONF,"<${dir}../../opensslconf.h") { while() { if (m/#\s*define\s+SIXTY_FOUR_BIT/) { $BN_SZ=8; $LEVEL="2.0"; last; } } close CONF; } } $FRAME=8*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER; # 8 saved regs + frame marker # [+ argument transfer] $LOCALS=$FRAME-$FRAME_MARKER; $FRAME+=32; # local variables $tp="%r31"; $ti1="%r29"; $ti0="%r28"; $rp="%r26"; $ap="%r25"; $bp="%r24"; $np="%r23"; $n0="%r22"; # passed through stack in 32-bit $num="%r21"; # passed through stack in 32-bit $idx="%r20"; $arrsz="%r19"; $nm1="%r7"; $nm0="%r6"; $ab1="%r5"; $ab0="%r4"; $fp="%r3"; $hi1="%r2"; $hi0="%r1"; $xfer=$n0; # accomodates [-16..15] offset in fld[dw]s $fm0="%fr4"; $fti=$fm0; $fbi="%fr5L"; $fn0="%fr5R"; $fai="%fr6"; $fab0="%fr7"; $fab1="%fr8"; $fni="%fr9"; $fnm0="%fr10"; $fnm1="%fr11"; $code=<<___; .LEVEL $LEVEL .SPACE \$TEXT\$ .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY .EXPORT bn_mul_mont,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,ARGW3=GR .ALIGN 64 bn_mul_mont .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-8*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,SAVE_SP,ENTRY_GR=6 .ENTRY $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp) $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ldo -$FRAME(%sp),$fp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); ldw `-$FRAME_MARKER-4`($fp),$n0 ldw `-$FRAME_MARKER-8`($fp),$num nop nop ; alignment ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); comiclr,<= 6,$num,%r0 ; are vectors long enough? b L\$abort ldi 0,%r28 ; signal "unhandled" add,ev %r0,$num,$num ; is $num even? b L\$abort nop or $ap,$np,$ti1 extru,= $ti1,31,3,%r0 ; are ap and np 64-bit aligned? b L\$abort nop nop ; alignment nop fldws 0($n0),${fn0} fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[0] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8); comib,> 3,$num,L\$abort ; are vectors long enough? ldi 0,%r28 ; signal "unhandled" addl $num,$num,$num ; I operate on 32-bit values fldws 4($n0),${fn0} ; only low part of n0 fldws 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[0] in flipped word order ___ $code.=<<___; fldds 0($ap),${fai} ; ap[0,1] fldds 0($np),${fni} ; np[0,1] sh2addl $num,%r0,$arrsz ldi 31,$hi0 ldo 36($arrsz),$hi1 ; space for tp[num+1] andcm $hi1,$hi0,$hi1 ; align addl $hi1,%sp,%sp $PUSH $fp,-$SIZE_T(%sp) ldo `$LOCALS+16`($fp),$xfer ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} addl $arrsz,$ap,$ap ; point at the end addl $arrsz,$np,$np subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[0]*m xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[1]*m fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[2,3] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[2,3] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); mtctl $hi0,%cr11 ; $hi0 still holds 31 extrd,u,*= $hi0,%sar,1,$hi0 ; executes on PA-RISC 1.0 b L\$parisc11 nop ___ $code.=<<___; # PA-RISC 2.0 code-path xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 ; low part is discarded extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 L\$1st xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j+1]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j+1]*m ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 ldd 8($xfer),$nm1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[j,j+1] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[j,j+1] addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) addl $hi0,$ab0,$ab0 extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 addl $hi1,$nm0,$nm0 stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 stw,ma $nm0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$1st ; j++++ extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j]*m ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 ldd 8($xfer),$nm1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 addl $hi0,$ab0,$ab0 extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 addl $hi1,$nm0,$nm0 ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 ldd,mb 8($xfer),$nm1 extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 stw,ma $nm0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] ldo -1($num),$num ; i-- subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8); fldws 0($bp),${fbi} ; bp[1] in flipped word order ___ $code.=<<___; flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[0,1] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[0,1] fldws 8($xfer),${fti}R ; tp[0] addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[1] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[1] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 fstws,mb ${fab0}L,-8($xfer) ; save high part stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fti}L ; zero high part fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fab0}L addl $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 extrd,u $hi0,31,32,$hi1 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fti},${fti} ; 32-bit unsigned int -> double fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) fadd,dbl ${fti},${fab0},${fab0} ; add tp[0] fcnvfx,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} ; double -> 33-bit unsigned int xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp L\$outer xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[0]*m xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[1]*m fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) ; 33-bit value fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[2] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[2] ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 ; 33-bit value ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 ldw 0($xfer),$hi0 ; high part xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$ti0 ; carry bit extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 ; account carry bit fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 ; low part is discarded ldw 0($tp),$ti1 ; tp[1] extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) L\$inner xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j+1]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j+1]*m ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $hi0,$ti1,$ti1 addl $ti1,$ab1,$ab1 ldd 8($xfer),$nm1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[j,j+1] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[j,j+1] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) addl $hi0,$ti0,$ti0 addl $ti0,$ab0,$ab0 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 ldw 8($tp),$ti1 ; tp[j] extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 addl $hi1,$nm0,$nm0 addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 stw,ma $nm0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$inner ; j++++ extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j]*m ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $hi0,$ti1,$ti1 addl $ti1,$ab1,$ab1 ldd 8($xfer),$nm1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 addl $hi0,$ab0,$ab0 addl $ti0,$ab0,$ab0 stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 ldw 8($tp),$ti1 ; tp[j] extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 addl $hi1,$nm0,$nm0 ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 ldd,mb 8($xfer),$nm1 extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 stw,ma $nm0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,= -1,$num,L\$outerdone ; i-- subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[i] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8); ldi 12,$ti0 ; bp[i] in flipped word order addl,ev %r0,$num,$num ldi -4,$ti0 addl $ti0,$bp,$bp fldws 0($bp),${fbi} ___ $code.=<<___; flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[0] addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[0] fldws 8($xfer),${fti}R ; tp[0] addl $ti1,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[i] ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 fstws,mb ${fab0}L,-8($xfer) ; save high part addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fti}L ; zero high part fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fab0}L stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fti},${fti} ; 32-bit unsigned int -> double fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} addl $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 fadd,dbl ${fti},${fab0},${fab0} ; add tp[0] addl $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 extrd,u $hi0,31,32,$hi1 fcnvfx,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} ; double -> 33-bit unsigned int stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} b L\$outer ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp L\$outerdone addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 addl $ti1,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addl $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 addl $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 extrd,u $hi0,31,32,$hi1 stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp sub %r0,%r0,%r0 ; clear borrow ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); ldws,ma 4($tp),$ti0 extru,= $rp,31,3,%r0 ; is rp 64-bit aligned? b L\$sub_pa11 addl $tp,$arrsz,$tp L\$sub ldwx $idx($np),$hi0 subb $ti0,$hi0,$hi1 ldwx $idx($tp),$ti0 addib,<> 4,$idx,L\$sub stws,ma $hi1,4($rp) subb $ti0,%r0,$hi1 - ldo -4($tp),$tp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8); ldd,ma 8($tp),$ti0 L\$sub ldd $idx($np),$hi0 shrpd $ti0,$ti0,32,$ti0 ; flip word order std $ti0,-8($tp) ; save flipped value sub,db $ti0,$hi0,$hi1 ldd,ma 8($tp),$ti0 addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$sub std,ma $hi1,8($rp) extrd,u $ti0,31,32,$ti0 ; carry in flipped word order sub,db $ti0,%r0,$hi1 - ldo -8($tp),$tp ___ $code.=<<___; - and $tp,$hi1,$ap - andcm $rp,$hi1,$bp - or $ap,$bp,$np - + ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp sub $rp,$arrsz,$rp ; rewind rp subi 0,$arrsz,$idx - ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp L\$copy - ldd $idx($np),$hi0 + ldd 0($tp),$ti0 + ldd 0($rp),$hi0 std,ma %r0,8($tp) - addib,<> 8,$idx,.-8 ; L\$copy - std,ma $hi0,8($rp) + comiclr,= 0,$hi1,%r0 + copy $ti0,$hi0 + addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$copy + std,ma $hi0,8($rp) ___ if ($BN_SZ==4) { # PA-RISC 1.1 code-path $ablo=$ab0; $abhi=$ab1; $nmlo0=$nm0; $nmhi0=$nm1; $nmlo1="%r9"; $nmhi1="%r8"; $code.=<<___; b L\$done nop .ALIGN 8 L\$parisc11 xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldw -12($xfer),$ablo ldw -16($xfer),$hi0 ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ; discarded addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo ldw 0($xfer),$abhi nop L\$1st_pa11 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j+1]*bp[0] flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[j,j+1] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j+1]*m flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[j,j+1] add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo ldw 12($xfer),$nmlo1 addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw 8($xfer),$nmhi1 add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -12($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 ldw -16($xfer),$abhi xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[0] ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) addc %r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0 ldw 0($xfer),$abhi add $hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo stws,ma $nmlo0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$1st_pa11 ; j++++ addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 ldw 8($xfer),$nmhi1 ldw 12($xfer),$nmlo1 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j]*m add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -16($xfer),$abhi addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 ldw -12($xfer),$ablo add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw 0($xfer),$abhi add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0 ldws,mb 8($xfer),$nmhi1 add $hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 stws,ma $nmlo0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] ldo -1($num),$num ; i-- subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[1] flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[0,1] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[0,1] fldws 8($xfer),${fti}R ; tp[0] add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[1] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[1] add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 fstws,mb ${fab0}L,-8($xfer) ; save high part stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fti}L ; zero high part fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fab0}L add $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,%r0,$hi1 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fti},${fti} ; 32-bit unsigned int -> double fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) fadd,dbl ${fti},${fab0},${fab0} ; add tp[0] fcnvfx,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} ; double -> 33-bit unsigned int xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp L\$outer_pa11 xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[0]*m xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[1]*m fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) ; 33-bit value fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[2,3] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[2,3] ldw -16($xfer),$abhi ; carry bit actually ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ ldw -12($xfer),$ablo ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 ldw 0($xfer),$hi0 ; high part xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $abhi,$hi0,$hi0 ; account carry bit fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ; discarded ldw 0($tp),$ti1 ; tp[1] addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) ldw 4($xfer),$ablo ldw 0($xfer),$abhi L\$inner_pa11 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j+1]*bp[i] flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[j,j+1] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j+1]*m flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[j,j+1] add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi ldw 12($xfer),$nmlo1 add $ti1,$ablo,$ablo ldw 8($xfer),$nmhi1 addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 ldw -12($xfer),$ablo add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -16($xfer),$abhi addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[i] ldw 8($tp),$ti1 ; tp[j] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] add $ti0,$ablo,$ablo fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0 ldw 0($xfer),$abhi add $hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 stws,ma $nmlo0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$inner_pa11 ; j++++ addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j]*bp[i] ldw 12($xfer),$nmlo1 xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j]*m ldw 8($xfer),$nmhi1 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) add $ti1,$ablo,$ablo fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw -16($xfer),$abhi add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -12($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi add $ti0,$ablo,$ablo ldw 8($tp),$ti1 ; tp[j] addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw 0($xfer),$abhi add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0 ldws,mb 8($xfer),$nmhi1 add $hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 stws,ma $nmlo0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,= -1,$num,L\$outerdone_pa11; i-- subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[i] flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[0] add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[0] fldws 8($xfer),${fti}R ; tp[0] add $ti1,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[i] ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 fstws,mb ${fab0}L,-8($xfer) ; save high part add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fti}L ; zero high part fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fab0}L stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fti},${fti} ; 32-bit unsigned int -> double fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} add $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,%r0,$hi1 fadd,dbl ${fti},${fab0},${fab0} ; add tp[0] add $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,$hi1,$hi1 fcnvfx,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} ; double -> 33-bit unsigned int stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} b L\$outer_pa11 ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp L\$outerdone_pa11 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi add $ti1,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] add $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,%r0,$hi1 add $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,$hi1,$hi1 stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp sub %r0,%r0,%r0 ; clear borrow ldw -4($tp),$ti0 addl $tp,$arrsz,$tp L\$sub_pa11 ldwx $idx($np),$hi0 subb $ti0,$hi0,$hi1 ldwx $idx($tp),$ti0 addib,<> 4,$idx,L\$sub_pa11 stws,ma $hi1,4($rp) subb $ti0,%r0,$hi1 - ldo -4($tp),$tp - and $tp,$hi1,$ap - andcm $rp,$hi1,$bp - or $ap,$bp,$np + ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp sub $rp,$arrsz,$rp ; rewind rp subi 0,$arrsz,$idx - ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp L\$copy_pa11 - ldwx $idx($np),$hi0 + ldw 0($tp),$ti0 + ldw 0($rp),$hi0 stws,ma %r0,4($tp) + comiclr,= 0,$hi1,%r0 + copy $ti0,$hi0 addib,<> 4,$idx,L\$copy_pa11 stws,ma $hi0,4($rp) nop ; alignment L\$done ___ } $code.=<<___; ldi 1,%r28 ; signal "handled" ldo $FRAME($fp),%sp ; destroy tp[num+1] $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4 $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5 $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6 $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7 $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8 $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9 $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10 L\$abort bv (%r2) .EXIT $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND .STRINGZ "Montgomery Multiplication for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ # Explicitly encode PA-RISC 2.0 instructions used in this module, so # that it can be compiled with .LEVEL 1.0. It should be noted that I # wouldn't have to do this, if GNU assembler understood .ALLOW 2.0 # directive... my $ldd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "ldd$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 4 { my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(3<<6)|$3; sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } elsif ($args =~ /(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 5 { my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|(1<<12)|(3<<6)|$3; $opcode|=(($1&0xF)<<17)|(($1&0x10)<<12); # encode offset $opcode|=(1<<5) if ($mod =~ /^,m/); $opcode|=(1<<13) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $std = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "std$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\)/) # format 6 { my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($3<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<12)|(0xB<<6); $opcode|=(($2&0xF)<<1)|(($2&0x10)>>4); # encode offset $opcode|=(1<<5) if ($mod =~ /^,m/); $opcode|=(1<<13) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $extrd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "extrd$mod\t$args"; # I only have ",u" completer, it's implicitly encoded... if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 15 { my $opcode=(0x36<<26)|($1<<21)|($4<<16); my $len=32-$3; $opcode |= (($2&0x20)<<6)|(($2&0x1f)<<5); # encode pos $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f); # encode len sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%sar,([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 12 { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($1<<21)|($3<<16)|(2<<11)|(1<<9); my $len=32-$2; $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<3)|($len&0x1f); # encode len $opcode |= (1<<13) if ($mod =~ /,\**=/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $shrpd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "shrpd$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 14 { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<10)|$4; my $cpos=63-$3; $opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5); # encode sa sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $sub = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "sub$mod\t$args"; if ($mod eq ",db" && $args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) { my $opcode=(0x02<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|$3; $opcode|=(1<<10); # e1 $opcode|=(1<<8); # e2 $opcode|=(1<<5); # d sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig } else { "\t".$orig; } }; sub assemble { my ($mnemonic,$mod,$args)=@_; my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic"); ref($opcode) eq 'CODE' ? &$opcode($mod,$args) : "\t$mnemonic$mod\t$args"; } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; # flip word order in 64-bit mode... s/(xmpyu\s+)($fai|$fni)([LR])/$1.$2.($3 eq "L"?"R":"L")/e if ($BN_SZ==8); # assemble 2.0 instructions in 32-bit mode... s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($BN_SZ==4); s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8); print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,335 +1,336 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # April 2006 # "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for PowerPC. It's possible # to gain a bit more by modulo-scheduling outer loop, then dedicated # squaring procedure should give further 20% and code can be adapted # for 32-bit application running on 64-bit CPU. As for the latter. # It won't be able to achieve "native" 64-bit performance, because in # 32-bit application context every addc instruction will have to be # expanded as addc, twice right shift by 32 and finally adde, etc. # So far RSA *sign* performance improvement over pre-bn_mul_mont asm # for 64-bit application running on PPC970/G5 is: # # 512-bit +65% # 1024-bit +35% # 2048-bit +18% # 4096-bit +4% $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /32/) { $BITS= 32; $BNSZ= $BITS/8; $SIZE_T=4; $RZONE= 224; $LD= "lwz"; # load $LDU= "lwzu"; # load and update $LDX= "lwzx"; # load indexed $ST= "stw"; # store $STU= "stwu"; # store and update $STX= "stwx"; # store indexed $STUX= "stwux"; # store indexed and update $UMULL= "mullw"; # unsigned multiply low $UMULH= "mulhwu"; # unsigned multiply high $UCMP= "cmplw"; # unsigned compare $SHRI= "srwi"; # unsigned shift right by immediate $PUSH= $ST; $POP= $LD; } elsif ($flavour =~ /64/) { $BITS= 64; $BNSZ= $BITS/8; $SIZE_T=8; $RZONE= 288; # same as above, but 64-bit mnemonics... $LD= "ld"; # load $LDU= "ldu"; # load and update $LDX= "ldx"; # load indexed $ST= "std"; # store $STU= "stdu"; # store and update $STX= "stdx"; # store indexed $STUX= "stdux"; # store indexed and update $UMULL= "mulld"; # unsigned multiply low $UMULH= "mulhdu"; # unsigned multiply high $UCMP= "cmpld"; # unsigned compare $SHRI= "srdi"; # unsigned shift right by immediate $PUSH= $ST; $POP= $LD; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $FRAME=8*$SIZE_T+$RZONE; $LOCALS=8*$SIZE_T; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $sp="r1"; $toc="r2"; $rp="r3"; $ovf="r3"; $ap="r4"; $bp="r5"; $np="r6"; $n0="r7"; $num="r8"; $rp="r9"; # $rp is reassigned $aj="r10"; $nj="r11"; $tj="r12"; # non-volatile registers $i="r20"; $j="r21"; $tp="r22"; $m0="r23"; $m1="r24"; $lo0="r25"; $hi0="r26"; $lo1="r27"; $hi1="r28"; $alo="r29"; $ahi="r30"; $nlo="r31"; # $nhi="r0"; $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .bn_mul_mont_int .align 4 .bn_mul_mont_int: cmpwi $num,4 mr $rp,r3 ; $rp is reassigned li r3,0 bltlr ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BNSZ==4); cmpwi $num,32 ; longer key performance is not better bgelr ___ $code.=<<___; slwi $num,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)` li $tj,-4096 addi $ovf,$num,$FRAME subf $ovf,$ovf,$sp ; $sp-$ovf and $ovf,$ovf,$tj ; minimize TLB usage subf $ovf,$sp,$ovf ; $ovf-$sp mr $tj,$sp srwi $num,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)` $STUX $sp,$sp,$ovf $PUSH r20,`-12*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r21,`-11*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r22,`-10*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r23,`-9*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r24,`-8*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r25,`-7*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r26,`-6*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r27,`-5*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r28,`-4*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r29,`-3*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r30,`-2*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r31,`-1*$SIZE_T`($tj) $LD $n0,0($n0) ; pull n0[0] value addi $num,$num,-2 ; adjust $num for counter register $LD $m0,0($bp) ; m0=bp[0] $LD $aj,0($ap) ; ap[0] addi $tp,$sp,$LOCALS $UMULL $lo0,$aj,$m0 ; ap[0]*bp[0] $UMULH $hi0,$aj,$m0 $LD $aj,$BNSZ($ap) ; ap[1] $LD $nj,0($np) ; np[0] $UMULL $m1,$lo0,$n0 ; "tp[0]"*n0 $UMULL $alo,$aj,$m0 ; ap[1]*bp[0] $UMULH $ahi,$aj,$m0 $UMULL $lo1,$nj,$m1 ; np[0]*m1 $UMULH $hi1,$nj,$m1 $LD $nj,$BNSZ($np) ; np[1] addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 addze $hi1,$hi1 $UMULL $nlo,$nj,$m1 ; np[1]*m1 $UMULH $nhi,$nj,$m1 mtctr $num li $j,`2*$BNSZ` .align 4 L1st: $LDX $aj,$ap,$j ; ap[j] addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0 $LDX $nj,$np,$j ; np[j] addze $hi0,$ahi $UMULL $alo,$aj,$m0 ; ap[j]*bp[0] addc $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 $UMULH $ahi,$aj,$m0 addze $hi1,$nhi $UMULL $nlo,$nj,$m1 ; np[j]*m1 addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 ; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] $UMULH $nhi,$nj,$m1 addze $hi1,$hi1 $ST $lo1,0($tp) ; tp[j-1] addi $j,$j,$BNSZ ; j++ addi $tp,$tp,$BNSZ ; tp++ bdnz L1st ;L1st addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0 addze $hi0,$ahi addc $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 addze $hi1,$nhi addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 ; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] addze $hi1,$hi1 $ST $lo1,0($tp) ; tp[j-1] li $ovf,0 addc $hi1,$hi1,$hi0 addze $ovf,$ovf ; upmost overflow bit $ST $hi1,$BNSZ($tp) li $i,$BNSZ .align 4 Louter: $LDX $m0,$bp,$i ; m0=bp[i] $LD $aj,0($ap) ; ap[0] addi $tp,$sp,$LOCALS $LD $tj,$LOCALS($sp); tp[0] $UMULL $lo0,$aj,$m0 ; ap[0]*bp[i] $UMULH $hi0,$aj,$m0 $LD $aj,$BNSZ($ap) ; ap[1] $LD $nj,0($np) ; np[0] addc $lo0,$lo0,$tj ; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] $UMULL $alo,$aj,$m0 ; ap[j]*bp[i] addze $hi0,$hi0 $UMULL $m1,$lo0,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0 $UMULH $ahi,$aj,$m0 $UMULL $lo1,$nj,$m1 ; np[0]*m1 $UMULH $hi1,$nj,$m1 $LD $nj,$BNSZ($np) ; np[1] addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 $UMULL $nlo,$nj,$m1 ; np[1]*m1 addze $hi1,$hi1 $UMULH $nhi,$nj,$m1 mtctr $num li $j,`2*$BNSZ` .align 4 Linner: $LDX $aj,$ap,$j ; ap[j] addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0 $LD $tj,$BNSZ($tp) ; tp[j] addze $hi0,$ahi $LDX $nj,$np,$j ; np[j] addc $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 $UMULL $alo,$aj,$m0 ; ap[j]*bp[i] addze $hi1,$nhi $UMULH $ahi,$aj,$m0 addc $lo0,$lo0,$tj ; ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] $UMULL $nlo,$nj,$m1 ; np[j]*m1 addze $hi0,$hi0 $UMULH $nhi,$nj,$m1 addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 ; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addi $j,$j,$BNSZ ; j++ addze $hi1,$hi1 $ST $lo1,0($tp) ; tp[j-1] addi $tp,$tp,$BNSZ ; tp++ bdnz Linner ;Linner $LD $tj,$BNSZ($tp) ; tp[j] addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0 addze $hi0,$ahi addc $lo0,$lo0,$tj ; ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addze $hi0,$hi0 addc $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 addze $hi1,$nhi addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 ; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addze $hi1,$hi1 $ST $lo1,0($tp) ; tp[j-1] addic $ovf,$ovf,-1 ; move upmost overflow to XER[CA] li $ovf,0 adde $hi1,$hi1,$hi0 addze $ovf,$ovf $ST $hi1,$BNSZ($tp) ; slwi $tj,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)` $UCMP $i,$tj addi $i,$i,$BNSZ ble Louter addi $num,$num,2 ; restore $num subfc $j,$j,$j ; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA] addi $tp,$sp,$LOCALS mtctr $num .align 4 Lsub: $LDX $tj,$tp,$j $LDX $nj,$np,$j subfe $aj,$nj,$tj ; tp[j]-np[j] $STX $aj,$rp,$j addi $j,$j,$BNSZ bdnz Lsub li $j,0 mtctr $num subfe $ovf,$j,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit - and $ap,$tp,$ovf - andc $np,$rp,$ovf - or $ap,$ap,$np ; ap=borrow?tp:rp .align 4 -Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh - $LDX $tj,$ap,$j - $STX $tj,$rp,$j +Lcopy: ; conditional copy + $LDX $tj,$tp,$j + $LDX $aj,$rp,$j + and $tj,$tj,$ovf + andc $aj,$aj,$ovf $STX $j,$tp,$j ; zap at once + or $aj,$aj,$tj + $STX $aj,$rp,$j addi $j,$j,$BNSZ bdnz Lcopy $POP $tj,0($sp) li r3,1 $POP r20,`-12*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r21,`-11*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r22,`-10*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r23,`-9*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r24,`-8*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r25,`-7*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r26,`-6*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r27,`-5*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r28,`-4*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r29,`-3*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r30,`-2*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r31,`-1*$SIZE_T`($tj) mr $sp,$tj blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,0,0x80,12,6,0 .long 0 .size .bn_mul_mont_int,.-.bn_mul_mont_int .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,1628 +1,1645 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # December 2007 # The reason for undertaken effort is basically following. Even though # Power 6 CPU operates at incredible 4.7GHz clock frequency, its PKI # performance was observed to be less than impressive, essentially as # fast as 1.8GHz PPC970, or 2.6 times(!) slower than one would hope. # Well, it's not surprising that IBM had to make some sacrifices to # boost the clock frequency that much, but no overall improvement? # Having observed how much difference did switching to FPU make on # UltraSPARC, playing same stunt on Power 6 appeared appropriate... # Unfortunately the resulting performance improvement is not as # impressive, ~30%, and in absolute terms is still very far from what # one would expect from 4.7GHz CPU. There is a chance that I'm doing # something wrong, but in the lack of assembler level micro-profiling # data or at least decent platform guide I can't tell... Or better # results might be achieved with VMX... Anyway, this module provides # *worse* performance on other PowerPC implementations, ~40-15% slower # on PPC970 depending on key length and ~40% slower on Power 5 for all # key lengths. As it's obviously inappropriate as "best all-round" # alternative, it has to be complemented with run-time CPU family # detection. Oh! It should also be noted that unlike other PowerPC # implementation IALU ppc-mont.pl module performs *suboptimaly* on # >=1024-bit key lengths on Power 6. It should also be noted that # *everything* said so far applies to 64-bit builds! As far as 32-bit # application executed on 64-bit CPU goes, this module is likely to # become preferred choice, because it's easy to adapt it for such # case and *is* faster than 32-bit ppc-mont.pl on *all* processors. # February 2008 # Micro-profiling assisted optimization results in ~15% improvement # over original ppc64-mont.pl version, or overall ~50% improvement # over ppc.pl module on Power 6. If compared to ppc-mont.pl on same # Power 6 CPU, this module is 5-150% faster depending on key length, # [hereafter] more for longer keys. But if compared to ppc-mont.pl # on 1.8GHz PPC970, it's only 5-55% faster. Still far from impressive # in absolute terms, but it's apparently the way Power 6 is... # December 2009 # Adapted for 32-bit build this module delivers 25-120%, yes, more # than *twice* for longer keys, performance improvement over 32-bit # ppc-mont.pl on 1.8GHz PPC970. However! This implementation utilizes # even 64-bit integer operations and the trouble is that most PPC # operating systems don't preserve upper halves of general purpose # registers upon 32-bit signal delivery. They do preserve them upon # context switch, but not signalling:-( This means that asynchronous # signals have to be blocked upon entry to this subroutine. Signal # masking (and of course complementary unmasking) has quite an impact # on performance, naturally larger for shorter keys. It's so severe # that 512-bit key performance can be as low as 1/3 of expected one. # This is why this routine can be engaged for longer key operations # only on these OSes, see crypto/ppccap.c for further details. MacOS X # is an exception from this and doesn't require signal masking, and # that's where above improvement coefficients were collected. For # others alternative would be to break dependence on upper halves of # GPRs by sticking to 32-bit integer operations... # December 2012 # Remove above mentioned dependence on GPRs' upper halves in 32-bit # build. No signal masking overhead, but integer instructions are # *more* numerous... It's still "universally" faster than 32-bit # ppc-mont.pl, but improvement coefficient is not as impressive # for longer keys... $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T=4; $RZONE= 224; $fname= "bn_mul_mont_fpu64"; $STUX= "stwux"; # store indexed and update $PUSH= "stw"; $POP= "lwz"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T=8; $RZONE= 288; $fname= "bn_mul_mont_fpu64"; # same as above, but 64-bit mnemonics... $STUX= "stdux"; # store indexed and update $PUSH= "std"; $POP= "ld"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 4 : 0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $FRAME=64; # padded frame header $TRANSFER=16*8; $carry="r0"; $sp="r1"; $toc="r2"; $rp="r3"; $ovf="r3"; $ap="r4"; $bp="r5"; $np="r6"; $n0="r7"; $num="r8"; $rp="r9"; # $rp is reassigned $tp="r10"; $j="r11"; $i="r12"; # non-volatile registers $c1="r19"; $n1="r20"; $a1="r21"; $nap_d="r22"; # interleaved ap and np in double format $a0="r23"; # ap[0] $t0="r24"; # temporary registers $t1="r25"; $t2="r26"; $t3="r27"; $t4="r28"; $t5="r29"; $t6="r30"; $t7="r31"; # PPC offers enough register bank capacity to unroll inner loops twice # # ..A3A2A1A0 # dcba # ----------- # A0a # A0b # A0c # A0d # A1a # A1b # A1c # A1d # A2a # A2b # A2c # A2d # A3a # A3b # A3c # A3d # ..a # ..b # $ba="f0"; $bb="f1"; $bc="f2"; $bd="f3"; $na="f4"; $nb="f5"; $nc="f6"; $nd="f7"; $dota="f8"; $dotb="f9"; $A0="f10"; $A1="f11"; $A2="f12"; $A3="f13"; $N0="f20"; $N1="f21"; $N2="f22"; $N3="f23"; $T0a="f24"; $T0b="f25"; $T1a="f26"; $T1b="f27"; $T2a="f28"; $T2b="f29"; $T3a="f30"; $T3b="f31"; # sp----------->+-------------------------------+ # | saved sp | # +-------------------------------+ # . . # +64 +-------------------------------+ # | 16 gpr<->fpr transfer zone | # . . # . . # +16*8 +-------------------------------+ # | __int64 tmp[-1] | # +-------------------------------+ # | __int64 tmp[num] | # . . # . . # . . # +(num+1)*8 +-------------------------------+ # | padding to 64 byte boundary | # . . # +X +-------------------------------+ # | double nap_d[4*num] | # . . # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+ # . . # -13*size_t +-------------------------------+ # | 13 saved gpr, r19-r31 | # . . # . . # -12*8 +-------------------------------+ # | 12 saved fpr, f20-f31 | # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+ $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .$fname .align 5 .$fname: cmpwi $num,`3*8/$SIZE_T` mr $rp,r3 ; $rp is reassigned li r3,0 ; possible "not handled" return code bltlr- andi. r0,$num,`16/$SIZE_T-1` ; $num has to be "even" bnelr- slwi $num,$num,`log($SIZE_T)/log(2)` ; num*=sizeof(BN_LONG) li $i,-4096 slwi $tp,$num,2 ; place for {an}p_{lh}[num], i.e. 4*num add $tp,$tp,$num ; place for tp[num+1] addi $tp,$tp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+64+$RZONE` subf $tp,$tp,$sp ; $sp-$tp and $tp,$tp,$i ; minimize TLB usage subf $tp,$sp,$tp ; $tp-$sp mr $i,$sp $STUX $sp,$sp,$tp ; alloca $PUSH r19,`-12*8-13*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r20,`-12*8-12*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r21,`-12*8-11*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r22,`-12*8-10*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r23,`-12*8-9*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r24,`-12*8-8*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r25,`-12*8-7*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r26,`-12*8-6*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r27,`-12*8-5*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r28,`-12*8-4*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r29,`-12*8-3*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r30,`-12*8-2*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r31,`-12*8-1*$SIZE_T`($i) stfd f20,`-12*8`($i) stfd f21,`-11*8`($i) stfd f22,`-10*8`($i) stfd f23,`-9*8`($i) stfd f24,`-8*8`($i) stfd f25,`-7*8`($i) stfd f26,`-6*8`($i) stfd f27,`-5*8`($i) stfd f28,`-4*8`($i) stfd f29,`-3*8`($i) stfd f30,`-2*8`($i) stfd f31,`-1*8`($i) addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+64` li $i,-64 add $nap_d,$tp,$num and $nap_d,$nap_d,$i ; align to 64 bytes ; nap_d is off by 1, because it's used with stfdu/lfdu addi $nap_d,$nap_d,-8 srwi $j,$num,`3+1` ; counter register, num/2 addi $j,$j,-1 addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER-8` li $carry,0 mtctr $j ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); ld $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0] value ld $t3,0($bp) ; bp[0] ld $n0,0($n0) ; pull n0[0] value mulld $t7,$a0,$t3 ; ap[0]*bp[0] ; transfer bp[0] to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrdi $t0,$t3,16,48 extrdi $t1,$t3,16,32 extrdi $t2,$t3,16,16 extrdi $t3,$t3,16,0 std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) mulld $t7,$t7,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0 ; transfer (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrdi $t4,$t7,16,48 extrdi $t5,$t7,16,32 extrdi $t6,$t7,16,16 extrdi $t7,$t7,16,0 std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) extrdi $t0,$a0,32,32 ; lwz $t0,4($ap) extrdi $t1,$a0,32,0 ; lwz $t1,0($ap) lwz $t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) lwz $t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) lwz $t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); lwz $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0,1] value mr $n1,$n0 lwz $a1,4($ap) li $c1,0 lwz $t1,0($bp) ; bp[0,1] lwz $t3,4($bp) lwz $n0,0($n1) ; pull n0[0,1] value lwz $n1,4($n1) mullw $t4,$a0,$t1 ; mulld ap[0]*bp[0] mulhwu $t5,$a0,$t1 mullw $t6,$a1,$t1 mullw $t7,$a0,$t3 add $t5,$t5,$t6 add $t5,$t5,$t7 ; transfer bp[0] to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrwi $t0,$t1,16,16 extrwi $t1,$t1,16,0 extrwi $t2,$t3,16,16 extrwi $t3,$t3,16,0 std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) mullw $t0,$t4,$n0 ; mulld tp[0]*n0 mulhwu $t1,$t4,$n0 mullw $t2,$t5,$n0 mullw $t3,$t4,$n1 add $t1,$t1,$t2 add $t1,$t1,$t3 ; transfer (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrwi $t4,$t0,16,16 extrwi $t5,$t0,16,0 extrwi $t6,$t1,16,16 extrwi $t7,$t1,16,0 std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) mr $t0,$a0 ; lwz $t0,0($ap) mr $t1,$a1 ; lwz $t1,4($ap) lwz $t2,8($ap) ; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs lwz $t3,12($ap) lwz $t4,0($np) ; load n[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs lwz $t5,4($np) lwz $t6,8($np) lwz $t7,12($np) ___ $code.=<<___; lfd $ba,`$FRAME+0`($sp) lfd $bb,`$FRAME+8`($sp) lfd $bc,`$FRAME+16`($sp) lfd $bd,`$FRAME+24`($sp) lfd $na,`$FRAME+32`($sp) lfd $nb,`$FRAME+40`($sp) lfd $nc,`$FRAME+48`($sp) lfd $nd,`$FRAME+56`($sp) std $t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ; yes, std even in 32-bit build std $t1,`$FRAME+72`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+80`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+88`($sp) std $t4,`$FRAME+96`($sp) std $t5,`$FRAME+104`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+112`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+120`($sp) fcfid $ba,$ba fcfid $bb,$bb fcfid $bc,$bc fcfid $bd,$bd fcfid $na,$na fcfid $nb,$nb fcfid $nc,$nc fcfid $nd,$nd lfd $A0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) lfd $A1,`$FRAME+72`($sp) lfd $A2,`$FRAME+80`($sp) lfd $A3,`$FRAME+88`($sp) lfd $N0,`$FRAME+96`($sp) lfd $N1,`$FRAME+104`($sp) lfd $N2,`$FRAME+112`($sp) lfd $N3,`$FRAME+120`($sp) fcfid $A0,$A0 fcfid $A1,$A1 fcfid $A2,$A2 fcfid $A3,$A3 fcfid $N0,$N0 fcfid $N1,$N1 fcfid $N2,$N2 fcfid $N3,$N3 addi $ap,$ap,16 addi $np,$np,16 fmul $T1a,$A1,$ba fmul $T1b,$A1,$bb stfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; save a[j] in double format stfd $A1,16($nap_d) fmul $T2a,$A2,$ba fmul $T2b,$A2,$bb stfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; save a[j+1] in double format stfd $A3,32($nap_d) fmul $T3a,$A3,$ba fmul $T3b,$A3,$bb stfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; save n[j] in double format stfd $N1,48($nap_d) fmul $T0a,$A0,$ba fmul $T0b,$A0,$bb stfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; save n[j+1] in double format stfdu $N3,64($nap_d) fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) .align 5 L1st: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); lwz $t0,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t1,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) lwz $t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) lwz $t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) lwz $t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); lwz $t0,0($ap) ; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs lwz $t1,4($ap) lwz $t2,8($ap) lwz $t3,12($ap) lwz $t4,0($np) ; load n[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs lwz $t5,4($np) lwz $t6,8($np) lwz $t7,12($np) ___ $code.=<<___; std $t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ; yes, std even in 32-bit build std $t1,`$FRAME+72`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+80`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+88`($sp) std $t4,`$FRAME+96`($sp) std $t5,`$FRAME+104`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+112`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+120`($sp) ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) ld $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) ld $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ld $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ld $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ___ } else { $code.=<<___; lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ___ } $code.=<<___; lfd $A0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) lfd $A1,`$FRAME+72`($sp) lfd $A2,`$FRAME+80`($sp) lfd $A3,`$FRAME+88`($sp) lfd $N0,`$FRAME+96`($sp) lfd $N1,`$FRAME+104`($sp) lfd $N2,`$FRAME+112`($sp) lfd $N3,`$FRAME+120`($sp) fcfid $A0,$A0 fcfid $A1,$A1 fcfid $A2,$A2 fcfid $A3,$A3 fcfid $N0,$N0 fcfid $N1,$N1 fcfid $N2,$N2 fcfid $N3,$N3 addi $ap,$ap,16 addi $np,$np,16 fmul $T1a,$A1,$ba fmul $T1b,$A1,$bb fmul $T2a,$A2,$ba fmul $T2b,$A2,$bb stfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; save a[j] in double format stfd $A1,16($nap_d) fmul $T3a,$A3,$ba fmul $T3b,$A3,$bb fmadd $T0a,$A0,$ba,$dota fmadd $T0b,$A0,$bb,$dotb stfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; save a[j+1] in double format stfd $A3,32($nap_d) ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b stfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; save n[j] in double format stfd $N1,48($nap_d) fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b add $t0,$t0,$carry ; can not overflow fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd stfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; save n[j+1] in double format stfdu $N3,64($nap_d) srdi $carry,$t0,16 add $t1,$t1,$carry srdi $carry,$t1,16 fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b insrdi $t0,$t1,16,32 fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b add $t2,$t2,$carry fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b srdi $carry,$t2,16 fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b insrdi $t0,$t2,16,16 add $t3,$t3,$carry srdi $carry,$t3,16 fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b insrdi $t0,$t3,16,0 ; 0..63 bits fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b add $t4,$t4,$carry fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b srdi $carry,$t4,16 fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb add $t5,$t5,$carry srdi $carry,$t5,16 insrdi $t4,$t5,16,32 fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b add $t6,$t6,$carry fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b srdi $carry,$t6,16 fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b insrdi $t4,$t6,16,16 fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t4,$t7,16,0 ; 64..127 bits srdi $carry,$t7,16 ; upper 33 bits stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) std $t0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] stdu $t4,16($tp) ; tp[j] ___ } else { $code.=<<___; fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b stfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; save n[j] in double format stfd $N1,48($nap_d) srwi $c1,$t1,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd stfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; save n[j+1] in double format stfdu $N3,64($nap_d) insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits srwi $c1,$t3,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b srwi $c1,$t5,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits srwi $c1,$t7,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3 lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b stw $t0,12($tp) ; tp[j-1] stw $t4,8($tp) srwi $c1,$t3,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5 lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits srwi $c1,$t7,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7 lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6 addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b srwi $c1,$t1,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits srwi $c1,$t5,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) stw $t2,20($tp) ; tp[j] stwu $t0,16($tp) ___ } $code.=<<___; bdnz L1st fctid $dota,$dota fctid $dotb,$dotb ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) ld $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) ld $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ld $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ld $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp) stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp) add $t0,$t0,$carry ; can not overflow srdi $carry,$t0,16 add $t1,$t1,$carry srdi $carry,$t1,16 insrdi $t0,$t1,16,32 add $t2,$t2,$carry srdi $carry,$t2,16 insrdi $t0,$t2,16,16 add $t3,$t3,$carry srdi $carry,$t3,16 insrdi $t0,$t3,16,0 ; 0..63 bits add $t4,$t4,$carry srdi $carry,$t4,16 add $t5,$t5,$carry srdi $carry,$t5,16 insrdi $t4,$t5,16,32 add $t6,$t6,$carry srdi $carry,$t6,16 insrdi $t4,$t6,16,16 add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t4,$t7,16,0 ; 64..127 bits srdi $carry,$t7,16 ; upper 33 bits ld $t6,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+72`($sp) std $t0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] stdu $t4,16($tp) ; tp[j] add $t6,$t6,$carry ; can not overflow srdi $carry,$t6,16 add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t6,$t7,48,0 srdi $ovf,$t7,48 std $t6,8($tp) ; tp[num-1] ___ } else { $code.=<<___; lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp) stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 srwi $c1,$t3,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 stw $t0,12($tp) ; tp[j-1] stw $t4,8($tp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0 lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3 lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2 lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5 lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4 lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7 lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 srwi $c1,$t3,16 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 stw $t2,20($tp) ; tp[j] stwu $t0,16($tp) lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 insrwi $t6,$t4,16,0 srwi $t4,$t4,16 insrwi $t4,$t5,16,0 srwi $ovf,$t5,16 stw $t6,12($tp) ; tp[num-1] stw $t4,8($tp) ___ } $code.=<<___; slwi $t7,$num,2 subf $nap_d,$t7,$nap_d ; rewind pointer li $i,8 ; i=1 .align 5 Louter: addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER` li $carry,0 mtctr $j ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); ldx $t3,$bp,$i ; bp[i] ld $t6,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8`($sp) ; tp[0] mulld $t7,$a0,$t3 ; ap[0]*bp[i] add $t7,$t7,$t6 ; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] ; transfer bp[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrdi $t0,$t3,16,48 extrdi $t1,$t3,16,32 extrdi $t2,$t3,16,16 extrdi $t3,$t3,16,0 std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) mulld $t7,$t7,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0 ; transfer (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrdi $t4,$t7,16,48 extrdi $t5,$t7,16,32 extrdi $t6,$t7,16,16 extrdi $t7,$t7,16,0 std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); add $t0,$bp,$i li $c1,0 lwz $t1,0($t0) ; bp[i,i+1] lwz $t3,4($t0) mullw $t4,$a0,$t1 ; ap[0]*bp[i] lwz $t0,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+4`($sp) ; tp[0] mulhwu $t5,$a0,$t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8`($sp) ; tp[0] mullw $t6,$a1,$t1 mullw $t7,$a0,$t3 add $t5,$t5,$t6 add $t5,$t5,$t7 addc $t4,$t4,$t0 ; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] adde $t5,$t5,$t2 ; transfer bp[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrwi $t0,$t1,16,16 extrwi $t1,$t1,16,0 extrwi $t2,$t3,16,16 extrwi $t3,$t3,16,0 std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) mullw $t0,$t4,$n0 ; mulld tp[0]*n0 mulhwu $t1,$t4,$n0 mullw $t2,$t5,$n0 mullw $t3,$t4,$n1 add $t1,$t1,$t2 add $t1,$t1,$t3 ; transfer (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrwi $t4,$t0,16,16 extrwi $t5,$t0,16,0 extrwi $t6,$t1,16,16 extrwi $t7,$t1,16,0 std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; lfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; load a[j] in double format lfd $A1,16($nap_d) lfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; load a[j+1] in double format lfd $A3,32($nap_d) lfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; load n[j] in double format lfd $N1,48($nap_d) lfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; load n[j+1] in double format lfdu $N3,64($nap_d) lfd $ba,`$FRAME+0`($sp) lfd $bb,`$FRAME+8`($sp) lfd $bc,`$FRAME+16`($sp) lfd $bd,`$FRAME+24`($sp) lfd $na,`$FRAME+32`($sp) lfd $nb,`$FRAME+40`($sp) lfd $nc,`$FRAME+48`($sp) lfd $nd,`$FRAME+56`($sp) fcfid $ba,$ba fcfid $bb,$bb fcfid $bc,$bc fcfid $bd,$bd fcfid $na,$na fcfid $nb,$nb fcfid $nc,$nc fcfid $nd,$nd fmul $T1a,$A1,$ba fmul $T1b,$A1,$bb fmul $T2a,$A2,$ba fmul $T2b,$A2,$bb fmul $T3a,$A3,$ba fmul $T3b,$A3,$bb fmul $T0a,$A0,$ba fmul $T0b,$A0,$bb fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b lfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; load a[j] in double format lfd $A1,16($nap_d) fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b lfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; load a[j+1] in double format lfd $A3,32($nap_d) fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) .align 5 Linner: fmul $T1a,$A1,$ba fmul $T1b,$A1,$bb fmul $T2a,$A2,$ba fmul $T2b,$A2,$bb lfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; load n[j] in double format lfd $N1,48($nap_d) fmul $T3a,$A3,$ba fmul $T3b,$A3,$bb fmadd $T0a,$A0,$ba,$dota fmadd $T0b,$A0,$bb,$dotb lfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; load n[j+1] in double format lfdu $N3,64($nap_d) fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b lfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; load a[j] in double format lfd $A1,16($nap_d) fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd lfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; load a[j+1] in double format lfd $A3,32($nap_d) ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) ld $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b add $t0,$t0,$carry ; can not overflow ld $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ld $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b srdi $carry,$t0,16 add $t1,$t1,$carry srdi $carry,$t1,16 ld $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b insrdi $t0,$t1,16,32 ld $t1,8($tp) ; tp[j] fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b add $t2,$t2,$carry fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b srdi $carry,$t2,16 insrdi $t0,$t2,16,16 fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb add $t3,$t3,$carry ldu $t2,16($tp) ; tp[j+1] srdi $carry,$t3,16 insrdi $t0,$t3,16,0 ; 0..63 bits add $t4,$t4,$carry fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b srdi $carry,$t4,16 fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b add $t5,$t5,$carry fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b srdi $carry,$t5,16 insrdi $t4,$t5,16,32 fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b add $t6,$t6,$carry srdi $carry,$t6,16 insrdi $t4,$t6,16,16 stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) add $t7,$t7,$carry addc $t3,$t0,$t1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); # adjust XER[CA] extrdi $t0,$t0,32,0 extrdi $t1,$t1,32,0 adde $t0,$t0,$t1 ___ $code.=<<___; stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) insrdi $t4,$t7,16,0 ; 64..127 bits srdi $carry,$t7,16 ; upper 33 bits stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) adde $t5,$t4,$t2 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); # adjust XER[CA] extrdi $t4,$t4,32,0 extrdi $t2,$t2,32,0 adde $t4,$t4,$t2 ___ $code.=<<___; stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) addze $carry,$carry std $t3,-16($tp) ; tp[j-1] std $t5,-8($tp) ; tp[j] ___ } else { $code.=<<___; fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) srwi $c1,$t1,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits srwi $c1,$t3,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b lwz $t2,12($tp) ; tp[j] lwz $t3,8($tp) addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb srwi $c1,$t5,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 fctid $T0a,$T0a addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 fctid $T0b,$T0b insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits srwi $c1,$t7,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 fctid $T1a,$T1a addc $t0,$t0,$t2 adde $t4,$t4,$t3 lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0 fctid $T1b,$T1b addze $carry,$carry addze $c1,$c1 stw $t0,4($tp) ; tp[j-1] stw $t4,0($tp) fctid $T2a,$T2a addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3 lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2 fctid $T2b,$T2b srwi $c1,$t3,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5 lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4 fctid $T3a,$T3a addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7 lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6 fctid $T3b,$T3b insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 lwz $t6,20($tp) lwzu $t7,16($tp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 addc $t2,$t2,$t6 stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) adde $t0,$t0,$t7 stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) addze $carry,$carry stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) addze $c1,$c1 stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) stw $t2,-4($tp) ; tp[j] stw $t0,-8($tp) ___ } $code.=<<___; bdnz Linner fctid $dota,$dota fctid $dotb,$dotb ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) ld $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) ld $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ld $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ld $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp) stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp) add $t0,$t0,$carry ; can not overflow srdi $carry,$t0,16 add $t1,$t1,$carry srdi $carry,$t1,16 insrdi $t0,$t1,16,32 add $t2,$t2,$carry ld $t1,8($tp) ; tp[j] srdi $carry,$t2,16 insrdi $t0,$t2,16,16 add $t3,$t3,$carry ldu $t2,16($tp) ; tp[j+1] srdi $carry,$t3,16 insrdi $t0,$t3,16,0 ; 0..63 bits add $t4,$t4,$carry srdi $carry,$t4,16 add $t5,$t5,$carry srdi $carry,$t5,16 insrdi $t4,$t5,16,32 add $t6,$t6,$carry srdi $carry,$t6,16 insrdi $t4,$t6,16,16 add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t4,$t7,16,0 ; 64..127 bits srdi $carry,$t7,16 ; upper 33 bits ld $t6,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+72`($sp) addc $t3,$t0,$t1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); # adjust XER[CA] extrdi $t0,$t0,32,0 extrdi $t1,$t1,32,0 adde $t0,$t0,$t1 ___ $code.=<<___; adde $t5,$t4,$t2 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); # adjust XER[CA] extrdi $t4,$t4,32,0 extrdi $t2,$t2,32,0 adde $t4,$t4,$t2 ___ $code.=<<___; addze $carry,$carry std $t3,-16($tp) ; tp[j-1] std $t5,-8($tp) ; tp[j] add $carry,$carry,$ovf ; comsume upmost overflow add $t6,$t6,$carry ; can not overflow srdi $carry,$t6,16 add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t6,$t7,48,0 srdi $ovf,$t7,48 std $t6,0($tp) ; tp[num-1] ___ } else { $code.=<<___; lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp) stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits lwz $t2,12($tp) ; tp[j] insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 srwi $c1,$t3,16 lwz $t3,8($tp) addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 addc $t0,$t0,$t2 adde $t4,$t4,$t3 addze $carry,$carry addze $c1,$c1 stw $t0,4($tp) ; tp[j-1] stw $t4,0($tp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0 lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3 lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2 lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5 lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4 lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7 lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 srwi $c1,$t3,16 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits lwz $t6,20($tp) insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 lwzu $t7,16($tp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 addc $t2,$t2,$t6 adde $t0,$t0,$t7 lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) addze $carry,$carry addze $c1,$c1 lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 stw $t2,-4($tp) ; tp[j] stw $t0,-8($tp) addc $t6,$t6,$ovf addze $t7,$t7 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 insrwi $t6,$t4,16,0 srwi $t4,$t4,16 insrwi $t4,$t5,16,0 srwi $ovf,$t5,16 stw $t6,4($tp) ; tp[num-1] stw $t4,0($tp) ___ } $code.=<<___; slwi $t7,$num,2 addi $i,$i,8 subf $nap_d,$t7,$nap_d ; rewind pointer cmpw $i,$num blt- Louter ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); subf $np,$num,$np ; rewind np addi $j,$j,1 ; restore counter subfc $i,$i,$i ; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA] addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8` addi $t4,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+16` addi $t5,$np,8 addi $t6,$rp,8 mtctr $j .align 4 Lsub: ldx $t0,$tp,$i ldx $t1,$np,$i ldx $t2,$t4,$i ldx $t3,$t5,$i subfe $t0,$t1,$t0 ; tp[j]-np[j] subfe $t2,$t3,$t2 ; tp[j+1]-np[j+1] stdx $t0,$rp,$i stdx $t2,$t6,$i addi $i,$i,16 bdnz Lsub li $i,0 subfe $ovf,$i,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit - and $ap,$tp,$ovf - andc $np,$rp,$ovf - or $ap,$ap,$np ; ap=borrow?tp:rp - addi $t7,$ap,8 mtctr $j .align 4 -Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh - ldx $t0,$ap,$i - ldx $t1,$t7,$i +Lcopy: ; conditional copy + ldx $t0,$tp,$i + ldx $t1,$t4,$i + ldx $t2,$rp,$i + ldx $t3,$t6,$i std $i,8($nap_d) ; zap nap_d std $i,16($nap_d) std $i,24($nap_d) std $i,32($nap_d) std $i,40($nap_d) std $i,48($nap_d) std $i,56($nap_d) stdu $i,64($nap_d) + and $t0,$t0,$ovf + and $t1,$t1,$ovf + andc $t2,$t2,$ovf + andc $t3,$t3,$ovf + or $t0,$t0,$t2 + or $t1,$t1,$t3 stdx $t0,$rp,$i stdx $t1,$t6,$i stdx $i,$tp,$i ; zap tp at once stdx $i,$t4,$i addi $i,$i,16 bdnz Lcopy ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); subf $np,$num,$np ; rewind np addi $j,$j,1 ; restore counter subfc $i,$i,$i ; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA] addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER` addi $np,$np,-4 addi $rp,$rp,-4 addi $ap,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+4` mtctr $j .align 4 Lsub: lwz $t0,12($tp) ; load tp[j..j+3] in 64-bit word order lwz $t1,8($tp) lwz $t2,20($tp) lwzu $t3,16($tp) lwz $t4,4($np) ; load np[j..j+3] in 32-bit word order lwz $t5,8($np) lwz $t6,12($np) lwzu $t7,16($np) subfe $t4,$t4,$t0 ; tp[j]-np[j] stw $t0,4($ap) ; save tp[j..j+3] in 32-bit word order subfe $t5,$t5,$t1 ; tp[j+1]-np[j+1] stw $t1,8($ap) subfe $t6,$t6,$t2 ; tp[j+2]-np[j+2] stw $t2,12($ap) subfe $t7,$t7,$t3 ; tp[j+3]-np[j+3] stwu $t3,16($ap) stw $t4,4($rp) stw $t5,8($rp) stw $t6,12($rp) stwu $t7,16($rp) bdnz Lsub li $i,0 subfe $ovf,$i,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit - addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+4` + addi $ap,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+4` subf $rp,$num,$rp ; rewind rp - and $ap,$tp,$ovf - andc $np,$rp,$ovf - or $ap,$ap,$np ; ap=borrow?tp:rp addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER` mtctr $j .align 4 -Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh +Lcopy: ; conditional copy lwz $t0,4($ap) lwz $t1,8($ap) lwz $t2,12($ap) lwzu $t3,16($ap) + lwz $t4,4($rp) + lwz $t5,8($rp) + lwz $t6,12($rp) + lwz $t7,16($rp) std $i,8($nap_d) ; zap nap_d std $i,16($nap_d) std $i,24($nap_d) std $i,32($nap_d) std $i,40($nap_d) std $i,48($nap_d) std $i,56($nap_d) stdu $i,64($nap_d) + and $t0,$t0,$ovf + and $t1,$t1,$ovf + and $t2,$t2,$ovf + and $t3,$t3,$ovf + andc $t4,$t4,$ovf + andc $t5,$t5,$ovf + andc $t6,$t6,$ovf + andc $t7,$t7,$ovf + or $t0,$t0,$t4 + or $t1,$t1,$t5 + or $t2,$t2,$t6 + or $t3,$t3,$t7 stw $t0,4($rp) stw $t1,8($rp) stw $t2,12($rp) stwu $t3,16($rp) std $i,8($tp) ; zap tp at once stdu $i,16($tp) bdnz Lcopy ___ $code.=<<___; $POP $i,0($sp) li r3,1 ; signal "handled" $POP r19,`-12*8-13*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r20,`-12*8-12*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r21,`-12*8-11*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r22,`-12*8-10*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r23,`-12*8-9*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r24,`-12*8-8*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r25,`-12*8-7*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r26,`-12*8-6*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r27,`-12*8-5*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r28,`-12*8-4*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r29,`-12*8-3*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r30,`-12*8-2*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r31,`-12*8-1*$SIZE_T`($i) lfd f20,`-12*8`($i) lfd f21,`-11*8`($i) lfd f22,`-10*8`($i) lfd f23,`-9*8`($i) lfd f24,`-8*8`($i) lfd f25,`-7*8`($i) lfd f26,`-6*8`($i) lfd f27,`-5*8`($i) lfd f28,`-4*8`($i) lfd f29,`-3*8`($i) lfd f30,`-2*8`($i) lfd f31,`-1*8`($i) mr $sp,$i blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,0,0x8c,13,6,0 .long 0 .size .$fname,.-.$fname .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,1960 +1,1960 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl ############################################################################## # # # Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation # # # # All rights reserved. # # # # Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without # # modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are # # met: # # # # * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # # # * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the # # documentation and/or other materials provided with the # # distribution. # # # # * Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its # # contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from # # this software without specific prior written permission. # # # # # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY # # EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE # # IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR # # PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR # # CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, # # EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, # # PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR # # PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF # # LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING # # NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS # # SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # # ############################################################################## # Developers and authors: # # Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) # # (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel # # (2) University of Haifa, Israel # ############################################################################## # Reference: # # [1] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "Software Implementation of Modular # # Exponentiation, Using Advanced Vector Instructions Architectures", # # F. Ozbudak and F. Rodriguez-Henriquez (Eds.): WAIFI 2012, LNCS 7369, # # pp. 119?135, 2012. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 # # [2] S. Gueron: "Efficient Software Implementations of Modular # # Exponentiation", Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 2:31-43 (2012). # # [3] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "Speeding up Big-numbers Squaring",IEEE # # Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Information Technology: # # New Generations (ITNG 2012), pp.821-823 (2012) # # [4] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "[PATCH] Efficient and side channel analysis # # resistant 1024-bit modular exponentiation, for optimizing RSA2048 # # on AVX2 capable x86_64 platforms", # # http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2850&user=guest&pass=guest# ############################################################################## # # +13% improvement over original submission by # # rsa2048 sign/sec OpenSSL 1.0.1 scalar(*) this # 2.3GHz Haswell 621 765/+23% 1113/+79% # 2.3GHz Broadwell(**) 688 1200(***)/+74% 1120/+63% # # (*) if system doesn't support AVX2, for reference purposes; # (**) scaled to 2.3GHz to simplify comparison; # (***) scalar AD*X code is faster than AVX2 and is preferred code # path for Broadwell; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); $addx = ($1>=2.23); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); $addx = ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); $addx = ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01); $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT = *OUT; if ($avx>1) {{{ { # void AMS_WW( my $rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp, my $ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, my $np="%rdx"; # const BN_ULONG *np, my $n0="%ecx"; # const BN_ULONG n0, my $rep="%r8d"; # int repeat); # The registers that hold the accumulated redundant result # The AMM works on 1024 bit operands, and redundant word size is 29 # Therefore: ceil(1024/29)/4 = 9 my $ACC0="%ymm0"; my $ACC1="%ymm1"; my $ACC2="%ymm2"; my $ACC3="%ymm3"; my $ACC4="%ymm4"; my $ACC5="%ymm5"; my $ACC6="%ymm6"; my $ACC7="%ymm7"; my $ACC8="%ymm8"; my $ACC9="%ymm9"; # Registers that hold the broadcasted words of bp, currently used my $B1="%ymm10"; my $B2="%ymm11"; # Registers that hold the broadcasted words of Y, currently used my $Y1="%ymm12"; my $Y2="%ymm13"; # Helper registers my $TEMP1="%ymm14"; my $AND_MASK="%ymm15"; # alu registers that hold the first words of the ACC my $r0="%r9"; my $r1="%r10"; my $r2="%r11"; my $r3="%r12"; my $i="%r14d"; # loop counter my $tmp = "%r15"; my $FrameSize=32*18+32*8; # place for A^2 and 2*A my $aap=$r0; my $tp0="%rbx"; my $tp1=$r3; my $tpa=$tmp; $np="%r13"; # reassigned argument $code.=<<___; .text .globl rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,\@function,5 .align 64 rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2: # 702 cycles, 14% faster than rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 lea (%rsp), %rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp vmovaps %xmm6,-0xd8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7,-0xc8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8,-0xb8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9,-0xa8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10,-0x98(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11,-0x88(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) .Lsqr_1024_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rax,%rbp mov %rdx, $np # reassigned argument sub \$$FrameSize, %rsp mov $np, $tmp sub \$-128, $rp # size optimization sub \$-128, $ap sub \$-128, $np and \$4095, $tmp # see if $np crosses page add \$32*10, $tmp shr \$12, $tmp vpxor $ACC9,$ACC9,$ACC9 jz .Lsqr_1024_no_n_copy # unaligned 256-bit load that crosses page boundary can # cause >2x performance degradation here, so if $np does # cross page boundary, copy it to stack and make sure stack # frame doesn't... sub \$32*10,%rsp vmovdqu 32*0-128($np), $ACC0 and \$-2048, %rsp vmovdqu 32*1-128($np), $ACC1 vmovdqu 32*2-128($np), $ACC2 vmovdqu 32*3-128($np), $ACC3 vmovdqu 32*4-128($np), $ACC4 vmovdqu 32*5-128($np), $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*6-128($np), $ACC6 vmovdqu 32*7-128($np), $ACC7 vmovdqu 32*8-128($np), $ACC8 lea $FrameSize+128(%rsp),$np vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*0-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*1-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*2-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*3-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*4-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*5-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*6-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*7-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC8, 32*8-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*9-128($np) # $ACC9 is zero .Lsqr_1024_no_n_copy: and \$-1024, %rsp vmovdqu 32*1-128($ap), $ACC1 vmovdqu 32*2-128($ap), $ACC2 vmovdqu 32*3-128($ap), $ACC3 vmovdqu 32*4-128($ap), $ACC4 vmovdqu 32*5-128($ap), $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*6-128($ap), $ACC6 vmovdqu 32*7-128($ap), $ACC7 vmovdqu 32*8-128($ap), $ACC8 lea 192(%rsp), $tp0 # 64+128=192 vmovdqu .Land_mask(%rip), $AND_MASK jmp .LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024 .align 32 .LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024: lea 32*18+128(%rsp), $aap # size optimization lea 448(%rsp), $tp1 # 64+128+256=448 # the squaring is performed as described in Variant B of # "Speeding up Big-Number Squaring", so start by calculating # the A*2=A+A vector vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpbroadcastq 32*0-128($ap), $B1 vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC1, 32*0-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqa $ACC2, 32*1-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqa $ACC3, 32*2-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqa $ACC4, 32*3-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqa $ACC5, 32*4-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqa $ACC6, 32*5-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqa $ACC7, 32*6-128($aap) vpxor $ACC9, $ACC9, $ACC9 vmovdqa $ACC8, 32*7-128($aap) vpmuludq 32*0-128($ap), $B1, $ACC0 vpbroadcastq 32*1-128($ap), $B2 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*9-192($tp0) # zero upper half vpmuludq $B1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*10-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*11-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*12-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*13-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*14-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*15-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*16-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpbroadcastq 32*2-128($ap), $B1 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*17-448($tp1) mov $ap, $tpa mov \$4, $i jmp .Lsqr_entry_1024 ___ $TEMP0=$Y1; $TEMP2=$Y2; $code.=<<___; .align 32 .LOOP_SQR_1024: vpbroadcastq 32*1-128($tpa), $B2 vpmuludq 32*0-128($ap), $B1, $ACC0 vpaddq 32*0-192($tp0), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq 32*0-128($aap), $B1, $ACC1 vpaddq 32*1-192($tp0), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*1-128($aap), $B1, $ACC2 vpaddq 32*2-192($tp0), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*2-128($aap), $B1, $ACC3 vpaddq 32*3-192($tp0), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*3-128($aap), $B1, $ACC4 vpaddq 32*4-192($tp0), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B1, $ACC5 vpaddq 32*5-192($tp0), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B1, $ACC6 vpaddq 32*6-192($tp0), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B1, $ACC7 vpaddq 32*7-192($tp0), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC8 vpbroadcastq 32*2-128($tpa), $B1 vpaddq 32*8-192($tp0), $ACC8, $ACC8 .Lsqr_entry_1024: vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*0-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*1-192($tp0) vpmuludq 32*1-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*1-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*2-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*3-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC0 vpbroadcastq 32*3-128($tpa), $B2 vpaddq 32*9-192($tp0), $ACC0, $ACC0 vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*2-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*3-192($tp0) vpmuludq 32*2-128($ap), $B1, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*2-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*3-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC1 vpbroadcastq 32*4-128($tpa), $B1 vpaddq 32*10-448($tp1), $ACC1, $ACC1 vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*4-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*5-192($tp0) vpmuludq 32*3-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*3-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC2 vpbroadcastq 32*5-128($tpa), $B2 vpaddq 32*11-448($tp1), $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*6-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*7-192($tp0) vpmuludq 32*4-128($ap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC3 vpbroadcastq 32*6-128($tpa), $B1 vpaddq 32*12-448($tp1), $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqu $ACC8, 32*8-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*9-192($tp0) lea 8($tp0), $tp0 vpmuludq 32*5-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC4 vpbroadcastq 32*7-128($tpa), $B2 vpaddq 32*13-448($tp1), $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*10-448($tp1) vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*11-448($tp1) vpmuludq 32*6-128($ap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1 vpbroadcastq 32*8-128($tpa), $ACC0 # borrow $ACC0 for $B1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC5 vpbroadcastq 32*0+8-128($tpa), $B1 # for next iteration vpaddq 32*14-448($tp1), $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*12-448($tp1) vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*13-448($tp1) lea 8($tpa), $tpa vpmuludq 32*7-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC6 vpaddq 32*15-448($tp1), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*8-128($ap), $ACC0, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*14-448($tp1) vpaddq 32*16-448($tp1), $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*15-448($tp1) vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*16-448($tp1) lea 8($tp1), $tp1 dec $i jnz .LOOP_SQR_1024 ___ $ZERO = $ACC9; $TEMP0 = $B1; $TEMP2 = $B2; $TEMP3 = $Y1; $TEMP4 = $Y2; $code.=<<___; # we need to fix indices 32-39 to avoid overflow vmovdqu 32*8(%rsp), $ACC8 # 32*8-192($tp0), vmovdqu 32*9(%rsp), $ACC1 # 32*9-192($tp0) vmovdqu 32*10(%rsp), $ACC2 # 32*10-192($tp0) lea 192(%rsp), $tp0 # 64+128=192 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpxor $ZERO, $ZERO, $ZERO vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $ZERO, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*9-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*10-192($tp0) mov (%rsp), %rax mov 8(%rsp), $r1 mov 16(%rsp), $r2 mov 24(%rsp), $r3 vmovdqu 32*1(%rsp), $ACC1 vmovdqu 32*2-192($tp0), $ACC2 vmovdqu 32*3-192($tp0), $ACC3 vmovdqu 32*4-192($tp0), $ACC4 vmovdqu 32*5-192($tp0), $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*6-192($tp0), $ACC6 vmovdqu 32*7-192($tp0), $ACC7 mov %rax, $r0 imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vmovd %eax, $Y1 mov %rax, %rdx imulq -128($np), %rax vpbroadcastq $Y1, $Y1 add %rax, $r0 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 8-128($np), %rax shr \$29, $r0 add %rax, $r1 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 16-128($np), %rax add $r0, $r1 add %rax, $r2 imulq 24-128($np), %rdx add %rdx, $r3 mov $r1, %rax imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax mov \$9, $i jmp .LOOP_REDUCE_1024 .align 32 .LOOP_REDUCE_1024: vmovd %eax, $Y2 vpbroadcastq $Y2, $Y2 vpmuludq 32*1-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP0 mov %rax, %rdx imulq -128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC1, $ACC1 add %rax, $r1 vpmuludq 32*2-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP1 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 8-128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*3-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP2 .byte 0x67 add %rax, $r2 .byte 0x67 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 16-128($np), %rax shr \$29, $r1 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*4-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP0 add %rax, $r3 add $r1, $r2 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP1 mov $r2, %rax imull $n0, %eax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP2 and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*7-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*8-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP1 vmovd %eax, $Y1 #vmovdqu 32*1-8-128($np), $TEMP2 # moved below vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC8, $ACC8 #vmovdqu 32*2-8-128($np), $TEMP0 # moved below vpbroadcastq $Y1, $Y1 vpmuludq 32*1-8-128($np), $Y2, $TEMP2 # see above vmovdqu 32*3-8-128($np), $TEMP1 mov %rax, %rdx imulq -128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*2-8-128($np), $Y2, $TEMP0 # see above vmovdqu 32*4-8-128($np), $TEMP2 add %rax, $r2 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 8-128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2 add $r3, %rax shr \$29, $r2 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*5-8-128($np), $TEMP0 add $r2, %rax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*6-8-128($np), $TEMP1 .byte 0x67 mov %rax, $r3 imull $n0, %eax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 .byte 0xc4,0x41,0x7e,0x6f,0x9d,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00 # vmovdqu 32*7-8-128($np), $TEMP2 and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*8-8-128($np), $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*9-8-128($np), $ACC9 vmovd %eax, $ACC0 # borrow ACC0 for Y2 imulq -128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vmovdqu 32*1-16-128($np), $TEMP1 vpbroadcastq $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq $Y2, $ACC9, $ACC9 vmovdqu 32*2-16-128($np), $TEMP2 add %rax, $r3 ___ ($ACC0,$Y2)=($Y2,$ACC0); $code.=<<___; vmovdqu 32*1-24-128($np), $ACC0 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*3-16-128($np), $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq $Y2, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 .byte 0xc4,0x41,0x7e,0x6f,0xb5,0xf0,0xff,0xff,0xff # vmovdqu 32*4-16-128($np), $TEMP1 vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vmovdqu 32*5-16-128($np), $TEMP2 .byte 0x67 vmovq $ACC0, %rax vmovdqu $ACC0, (%rsp) # transfer $r0-$r3 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*6-16-128($np), $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*7-16-128($np), $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vmovdqu 32*8-16-128($np), $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 shr \$29, $r3 vmovdqu 32*9-16-128($np), $TEMP0 add $r3, %rax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 #vmovdqu 32*2-24-128($np), $TEMP1 # moved below mov %rax, $r0 imull $n0, %eax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vmovd %eax, $Y1 vmovdqu 32*3-24-128($np), $TEMP2 .byte 0x67 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC9, $ACC9 vpbroadcastq $Y1, $Y1 vpmuludq 32*2-24-128($np), $Y2, $TEMP1 # see above vmovdqu 32*4-24-128($np), $TEMP0 mov %rax, %rdx imulq -128($np), %rax mov 8(%rsp), $r1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*5-24-128($np), $TEMP1 add %rax, $r0 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 8-128($np), %rax .byte 0x67 shr \$29, $r0 mov 16(%rsp), $r2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC3, $ACC2 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vmovdqu 32*6-24-128($np), $TEMP2 add %rax, $r1 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 16-128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC3 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*7-24-128($np), $TEMP0 imulq 24-128($np), %rdx # future $r3 add %rax, $r2 lea ($r0,$r1), %rax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*8-24-128($np), $TEMP1 mov %rax, $r1 imull $n0, %eax vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*9-24-128($np), $TEMP2 and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 add 24(%rsp), %rdx vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC8, $ACC7 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC9, $ACC8 vmovq $r3, $ACC9 mov %rdx, $r3 dec $i jnz .LOOP_REDUCE_1024 ___ ($ACC0,$Y2)=($Y2,$ACC0); $code.=<<___; lea 448(%rsp), $tp1 # size optimization vpaddq $ACC9, $Y2, $ACC0 vpxor $ZERO, $ZERO, $ZERO vpaddq 32*9-192($tp0), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq 32*10-448($tp1), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq 32*11-448($tp1), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq 32*12-448($tp1), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq 32*13-448($tp1), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq 32*14-448($tp1), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq 32*15-448($tp1), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq 32*16-448($tp1), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq 32*17-448($tp1), $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*0-128($rp) vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*1-128($rp) vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*2-128($rp) vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*3-128($rp) ___ $TEMP5=$ACC0; $code.=<<___; vpsrlq \$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*4-128($rp) vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*5-128($rp) vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*6-128($rp) vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*7-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC8, 32*8-128($rp) mov $rp, $ap dec $rep jne .LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024 vzeroall mov %rbp, %rax ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp # restore %rsp .Lsqr_1024_epilogue: ret .size rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 ___ } { # void AMM_WW( my $rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp, my $ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, my $bp="%rdx"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, my $np="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *np, my $n0="%r8d"; # unsigned int n0); # The registers that hold the accumulated redundant result # The AMM works on 1024 bit operands, and redundant word size is 29 # Therefore: ceil(1024/29)/4 = 9 my $ACC0="%ymm0"; my $ACC1="%ymm1"; my $ACC2="%ymm2"; my $ACC3="%ymm3"; my $ACC4="%ymm4"; my $ACC5="%ymm5"; my $ACC6="%ymm6"; my $ACC7="%ymm7"; my $ACC8="%ymm8"; my $ACC9="%ymm9"; # Registers that hold the broadcasted words of multiplier, currently used my $Bi="%ymm10"; my $Yi="%ymm11"; # Helper registers my $TEMP0=$ACC0; my $TEMP1="%ymm12"; my $TEMP2="%ymm13"; my $ZERO="%ymm14"; my $AND_MASK="%ymm15"; # alu registers that hold the first words of the ACC my $r0="%r9"; my $r1="%r10"; my $r2="%r11"; my $r3="%r12"; my $i="%r14d"; my $tmp="%r15"; $bp="%r13"; # reassigned argument $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_mul_avx2,\@function,5 .align 64 rsaz_1024_mul_avx2: lea (%rsp), %rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); vzeroupper lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp vmovaps %xmm6,-0xd8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7,-0xc8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8,-0xb8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9,-0xa8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10,-0x98(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11,-0x88(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) .Lmul_1024_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rax,%rbp vzeroall mov %rdx, $bp # reassigned argument sub \$64,%rsp # unaligned 256-bit load that crosses page boundary can # cause severe performance degradation here, so if $ap does # cross page boundary, swap it with $bp [meaning that caller # is advised to lay down $ap and $bp next to each other, so # that only one can cross page boundary]. .byte 0x67,0x67 mov $ap, $tmp and \$4095, $tmp add \$32*10, $tmp shr \$12, $tmp mov $ap, $tmp cmovnz $bp, $ap cmovnz $tmp, $bp mov $np, $tmp sub \$-128,$ap # size optimization sub \$-128,$np sub \$-128,$rp and \$4095, $tmp # see if $np crosses page add \$32*10, $tmp .byte 0x67,0x67 shr \$12, $tmp jz .Lmul_1024_no_n_copy # unaligned 256-bit load that crosses page boundary can # cause severe performance degradation here, so if $np does # cross page boundary, copy it to stack and make sure stack # frame doesn't... sub \$32*10,%rsp vmovdqu 32*0-128($np), $ACC0 and \$-512, %rsp vmovdqu 32*1-128($np), $ACC1 vmovdqu 32*2-128($np), $ACC2 vmovdqu 32*3-128($np), $ACC3 vmovdqu 32*4-128($np), $ACC4 vmovdqu 32*5-128($np), $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*6-128($np), $ACC6 vmovdqu 32*7-128($np), $ACC7 vmovdqu 32*8-128($np), $ACC8 lea 64+128(%rsp),$np vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*0-128($np) vpxor $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*1-128($np) vpxor $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*2-128($np) vpxor $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*3-128($np) vpxor $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*4-128($np) vpxor $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*5-128($np) vpxor $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*6-128($np) vpxor $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*7-128($np) vpxor $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC8, 32*8-128($np) vmovdqa $ACC0, $ACC8 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*9-128($np) # $ACC9 is zero after vzeroall .Lmul_1024_no_n_copy: and \$-64,%rsp mov ($bp), %rbx vpbroadcastq ($bp), $Bi vmovdqu $ACC0, (%rsp) # clear top of stack xor $r0, $r0 .byte 0x67 xor $r1, $r1 xor $r2, $r2 xor $r3, $r3 vmovdqu .Land_mask(%rip), $AND_MASK mov \$9, $i vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*9-128($rp) # $ACC9 is zero after vzeroall jmp .Loop_mul_1024 .align 32 .Loop_mul_1024: vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $ACC9 # correct $ACC3(*) mov %rbx, %rax imulq -128($ap), %rax add $r0, %rax mov %rbx, $r1 imulq 8-128($ap), $r1 add 8(%rsp), $r1 mov %rax, $r0 imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax mov %rbx, $r2 imulq 16-128($ap), $r2 add 16(%rsp), $r2 mov %rbx, $r3 imulq 24-128($ap), $r3 add 24(%rsp), $r3 vpmuludq 32*1-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP0 vmovd %eax, $Yi vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq 32*2-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP1 vpbroadcastq $Yi, $Yi vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq 32*3-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 # correct $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq 32*4-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq 32*7-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $ACC9, $ACC9 # correct $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq 32*8-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP1 vpbroadcastq 8($bp), $Bi vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 mov %rax,%rdx imulq -128($np),%rax add %rax,$r0 mov %rdx,%rax imulq 8-128($np),%rax add %rax,$r1 mov %rdx,%rax imulq 16-128($np),%rax add %rax,$r2 shr \$29, $r0 imulq 24-128($np),%rdx add %rdx,$r3 add $r0, $r1 vpmuludq 32*1-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2 vmovq $Bi, %rbx vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq 32*2-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq 32*3-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq 32*4-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq 32*7-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $ACC9, $TEMP1 # correct $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq 32*8-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3 # correct $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC8,$ACC8 mov %rbx, %rax imulq -128($ap),%rax add %rax,$r1 vmovdqu -8+32*1-128($ap),$TEMP1 mov %rbx, %rax imulq 8-128($ap),%rax add %rax,$r2 vmovdqu -8+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP2 mov $r1, %rax vpblendd \$0xfc, $ZERO, $ACC9, $ACC9 # correct $ACC3 imull $n0, %eax vpaddq $ACC9,$ACC4,$ACC4 # correct $ACC3 and \$0x1fffffff, %eax imulq 16-128($ap),%rbx add %rbx,$r3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovd %eax, $Yi vmovdqu -8+32*3-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpbroadcastq $Yi, $Yi vmovdqu -8+32*4-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -8+32*5-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -8+32*6-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -8+32*7-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -8+32*8-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -8+32*9-128($ap),$ACC9 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Bi,$ACC9,$ACC9 vpbroadcastq 16($bp), $Bi mov %rax,%rdx imulq -128($np),%rax add %rax,$r1 vmovdqu -8+32*1-128($np),$TEMP0 mov %rdx,%rax imulq 8-128($np),%rax add %rax,$r2 vmovdqu -8+32*2-128($np),$TEMP1 shr \$29, $r1 imulq 16-128($np),%rdx add %rdx,$r3 add $r1, $r2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovq $Bi, %rbx vmovdqu -8+32*3-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -8+32*4-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -8+32*5-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -8+32*6-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -8+32*7-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -8+32*8-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -8+32*9-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9 vmovdqu -16+32*1-128($ap),$TEMP0 mov %rbx,%rax imulq -128($ap),%rax add $r2,%rax vmovdqu -16+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP1 mov %rax,$r2 imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax imulq 8-128($ap),%rbx add %rbx,$r3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovd %eax, $Yi vmovdqu -16+32*3-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpbroadcastq $Yi, $Yi vmovdqu -16+32*4-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -16+32*5-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -16+32*6-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -16+32*7-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -16+32*8-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -16+32*9-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpbroadcastq 24($bp), $Bi vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9 vmovdqu -16+32*1-128($np),$TEMP0 mov %rax,%rdx imulq -128($np),%rax add %rax,$r2 vmovdqu -16+32*2-128($np),$TEMP1 imulq 8-128($np),%rdx add %rdx,$r3 shr \$29, $r2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovq $Bi, %rbx vmovdqu -16+32*3-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -16+32*4-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -16+32*5-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -16+32*6-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -16+32*7-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -16+32*8-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -16+32*9-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -24+32*1-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9 add $r2, $r3 imulq -128($ap),%rbx add %rbx,$r3 mov $r3, %rax imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovd %eax, $Yi vmovdqu -24+32*3-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpbroadcastq $Yi, $Yi vmovdqu -24+32*4-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*5-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -24+32*6-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -24+32*7-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*8-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -24+32*9-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpbroadcastq 32($bp), $Bi vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9 add \$32, $bp # $bp++ vmovdqu -24+32*1-128($np),$TEMP0 imulq -128($np),%rax add %rax,$r3 shr \$29, $r3 vmovdqu -24+32*2-128($np),$TEMP1 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovq $Bi, %rbx vmovdqu -24+32*3-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC0 # $ACC0==$TEMP0 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu $ACC0, (%rsp) # transfer $r0-$r3 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC1 vmovdqu -24+32*4-128($np),$TEMP0 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*5-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -24+32*6-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -24+32*7-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*8-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -24+32*9-128($np),$TEMP2 mov $r3, $r0 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 add (%rsp), $r0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovq $r3, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC8 dec $i jnz .Loop_mul_1024 ___ # (*) Original implementation was correcting ACC1-ACC3 for overflow # after 7 loop runs, or after 28 iterations, or 56 additions. # But as we underutilize resources, it's possible to correct in # each iteration with marginal performance loss. But then, as # we do it in each iteration, we can correct less digits, and # avoid performance penalties completely. $TEMP0 = $ACC9; $TEMP3 = $Bi; $TEMP4 = $Yi; $code.=<<___; vpaddq (%rsp), $TEMP1, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC0, 0-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC1, 32-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC2, 64-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC3, 96-128($rp) ___ $TEMP5=$ACC0; $code.=<<___; vpsrlq \$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqu $ACC4, 128-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC5, 160-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC6, 192-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC7, 224-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC8, 256-128($rp) vzeroupper mov %rbp, %rax ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp # restore %rsp .Lmul_1024_epilogue: ret .size rsaz_1024_mul_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 ___ } { my ($out,$inp) = $win64 ? ("%rcx","%rdx") : ("%rdi","%rsi"); my @T = map("%r$_",(8..11)); $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2: sub \$-128,$inp # size optimization xor %rax,%rax ___ for ($j=0,$i=0; $i<16; $i++) { my $k=0; while (29*$j<64*($i+1)) { # load data till boundary $code.=" mov `8*$j-128`($inp), @T[0]\n"; $j++; $k++; push(@T,shift(@T)); } $l=$k; while ($k>1) { # shift loaded data but last value $code.=" shl \$`29*($j-$k)`,@T[-$k]\n"; $k--; } $code.=<<___; # shift last value mov @T[-1], @T[0] shl \$`29*($j-1)`, @T[-1] shr \$`-29*($j-1)`, @T[0] ___ while ($l) { # accumulate all values $code.=" add @T[-$l], %rax\n"; $l--; } $code.=<<___; adc \$0, @T[0] # consume eventual carry mov %rax, 8*$i($out) mov @T[0], %rax ___ push(@T,shift(@T)); } $code.=<<___; ret .size rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2: sub \$-128,$out # size optimization mov ($inp),@T[0] mov \$0x1fffffff,%eax ___ for ($j=0,$i=0; $i<16; $i++) { $code.=" mov `8*($i+1)`($inp),@T[1]\n" if ($i<15); $code.=" xor @T[1],@T[1]\n" if ($i==15); my $k=1; while (29*($j+1)<64*($i+1)) { $code.=<<___; mov @T[0],@T[-$k] shr \$`29*$j`,@T[-$k] and %rax,@T[-$k] # &0x1fffffff mov @T[-$k],`8*$j-128`($out) ___ $j++; $k++; } $code.=<<___; shrd \$`29*$j`,@T[1],@T[0] and %rax,@T[0] mov @T[0],`8*$j-128`($out) ___ $j++; push(@T,shift(@T)); } $code.=<<___; mov @T[0],`8*$j-128`($out) # zero mov @T[0],`8*($j+1)-128`($out) mov @T[0],`8*($j+2)-128`($out) mov @T[0],`8*($j+3)-128`($out) ret .size rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2 ___ } { my ($out,$inp,$power) = $win64 ? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d") : ("%rdi","%rsi","%edx"); $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2: vzeroupper vmovdqu .Lscatter_permd(%rip),%ymm5 shl \$4,$power lea ($out,$power),$out mov \$9,%eax jmp .Loop_scatter_1024 .align 32 .Loop_scatter_1024: vmovdqu ($inp),%ymm0 lea 32($inp),$inp vpermd %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm0 vmovdqu %xmm0,($out) lea 16*32($out),$out dec %eax jnz .Loop_scatter_1024 vzeroupper ret .size rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2: vzeroupper mov %rsp,%r11 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x88(%rsp),%rax .LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_gather5: # I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-( .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 # lea -0x20(%rax),%rsp .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0 # vmovaps %xmm6,-0x20(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0 # vmovaps %xmm7,-0x10(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00 # vmovaps %xmm8,0(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10 # vmovaps %xmm9,0x10(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20 # vmovaps %xmm10,0x20(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30 # vmovaps %xmm11,0x30(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40 # vmovaps %xmm12,0x40(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50 # vmovaps %xmm13,0x50(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60 # vmovaps %xmm14,0x60(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70 # vmovaps %xmm15,0x70(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; lea -0x100(%rsp),%rsp and \$-32, %rsp lea .Linc(%rip), %r10 lea -128(%rsp),%rax # control u-op density vmovd $power, %xmm4 vmovdqa (%r10),%ymm0 vmovdqa 32(%r10),%ymm1 vmovdqa 64(%r10),%ymm5 vpbroadcastd %xmm4,%ymm4 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1 vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*0+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm0 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2 vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*1+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm1 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3 vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*2+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0 vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*3+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1 vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*4+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm8 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2 vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*5+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm9 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3 vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*6+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm8, %ymm10 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm8, %ymm8 vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*7+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm9, %ymm11 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm9, %ymm9 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm10, %ymm12 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm10, %ymm10 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm11, %ymm13 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm11, %ymm11 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm12, %ymm14 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm12, %ymm12 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm13, %ymm15 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm13, %ymm13 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm14, %ymm14 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm15, %ymm15 vmovdqa -32(%r10),%ymm7 # .Lgather_permd lea 128($inp), $inp mov \$9,$power .Loop_gather_1024: vmovdqa 32*0-128($inp), %ymm0 vmovdqa 32*1-128($inp), %ymm1 vmovdqa 32*2-128($inp), %ymm2 vmovdqa 32*3-128($inp), %ymm3 vpand 32*0+128(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpand 32*1+128(%rax), %ymm1, %ymm1 vpand 32*2+128(%rax), %ymm2, %ymm2 vpor %ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm4 vpand 32*3+128(%rax), %ymm3, %ymm3 vmovdqa 32*4-128($inp), %ymm0 vmovdqa 32*5-128($inp), %ymm1 vpor %ymm2, %ymm3, %ymm5 vmovdqa 32*6-128($inp), %ymm2 vmovdqa 32*7-128($inp), %ymm3 vpand 32*4+128(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpand 32*5+128(%rax), %ymm1, %ymm1 vpand 32*6+128(%rax), %ymm2, %ymm2 vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpand 32*7+128(%rax), %ymm3, %ymm3 vpand 32*8-128($inp), %ymm8, %ymm0 vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpand 32*9-128($inp), %ymm9, %ymm1 vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpand 32*10-128($inp),%ymm10, %ymm2 vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpand 32*11-128($inp),%ymm11, %ymm3 vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpand 32*12-128($inp),%ymm12, %ymm0 vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpand 32*13-128($inp),%ymm13, %ymm1 vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpand 32*14-128($inp),%ymm14, %ymm2 vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpand 32*15-128($inp),%ymm15, %ymm3 lea 32*16($inp), $inp vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpor %ymm5, %ymm4, %ymm4 vextracti128 \$1, %ymm4, %xmm5 # upper half is cleared vpor %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm5 vpermd %ymm5,%ymm7,%ymm5 vmovdqu %ymm5,($out) lea 32($out),$out dec $power jnz .Loop_gather_1024 vpxor %ymm0,%ymm0,%ymm0 vmovdqu %ymm0,($out) vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xa8(%r11),%xmm6 movaps -0x98(%r11),%xmm7 movaps -0x88(%r11),%xmm8 movaps -0x78(%r11),%xmm9 movaps -0x68(%r11),%xmm10 movaps -0x58(%r11),%xmm11 movaps -0x48(%r11),%xmm12 movaps -0x38(%r11),%xmm13 movaps -0x28(%r11),%xmm14 movaps -0x18(%r11),%xmm15 .LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_gather5: ___ $code.=<<___; lea (%r11),%rsp ret .size rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2 ___ } $code.=<<___; .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl rsaz_avx2_eligible .type rsaz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_avx2_eligible: mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov \$`1<<8|1<<19`,%ecx mov \$0,%edx and %eax,%ecx cmp \$`1<<8|1<<19`,%ecx # check for BMI2+AD*X cmove %edx,%eax ___ $code.=<<___; and \$`1<<5`,%eax shr \$5,%eax ret .size rsaz_avx2_eligible,.-rsaz_avx2_eligible .align 64 .Land_mask: .quad 0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff .Lscatter_permd: .long 0,2,4,6,7,7,7,7 .Lgather_permd: .long 0,7,1,7,2,7,3,7 .Linc: .long 0,0,0,0, 1,1,1,1 .long 2,2,2,2, 3,3,3,3 .long 4,4,4,4, 4,4,4,4 .align 64 ___ if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___ .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type rsaz_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 rsaz_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 160($context),%rax # pull context->Rbp mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov %r15,240($context) mov %r14,232($context) mov %r13,224($context) mov %r12,216($context) mov %rbp,160($context) mov %rbx,144($context) lea -0xd8(%rax),%rsi # %xmm save area lea 512($context),%rdi # & context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx # 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size rsaz_se_handler,.-rsaz_se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_gather5 .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva rsaz_se_handler .rva .Lsqr_1024_body,.Lsqr_1024_epilogue .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva rsaz_se_handler .rva .Lmul_1024_body,.Lmul_1024_epilogue .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_gather5: .byte 0x01,0x36,0x17,0x0b .byte 0x36,0xf8,0x09,0x00 # vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15 .byte 0x31,0xe8,0x08,0x00 # vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14 .byte 0x2c,0xd8,0x07,0x00 # vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13 .byte 0x27,0xc8,0x06,0x00 # vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12 .byte 0x22,0xb8,0x05,0x00 # vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11 .byte 0x1d,0xa8,0x04,0x00 # vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10 .byte 0x18,0x98,0x03,0x00 # vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9 .byte 0x13,0x88,0x02,0x00 # vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8 .byte 0x0e,0x78,0x01,0x00 # vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7 .byte 0x09,0x68,0x00,0x00 # vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6 .byte 0x04,0x01,0x15,0x00 # sub rsp,0xa8 .byte 0x00,0xb3,0x00,0x00 # set_frame r11 ___ } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge; s/\b(sh[rl]d?\s+\$)(-?[0-9]+)/$1.$2%64/ge or s/\b(vmov[dq])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vmovdqu)\b(.+)%x%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vpinsr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vpextr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vpbroadcast[qd]\s+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1%xmm$2/go; print $_,"\n"; } }}} else {{{ print <<___; # assembler is too old .text .globl rsaz_avx2_eligible .type rsaz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent rsaz_avx2_eligible: xor %eax,%eax ret .size rsaz_avx2_eligible,.-rsaz_avx2_eligible .globl rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2: rsaz_1024_mul_avx2: rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2: rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2: rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2: rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2: .byte 0x0f,0x0b # ud2 ret .size rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 ___ }}} close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,277 +1,277 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # April 2007. # # Performance improvement over vanilla C code varies from 85% to 45% # depending on key length and benchmark. Unfortunately in this context # these are not very impressive results [for code that utilizes "wide" # 64x64=128-bit multiplication, which is not commonly available to C # programmers], at least hand-coded bn_asm.c replacement is known to # provide 30-40% better results for longest keys. Well, on a second # thought it's not very surprising, because z-CPUs are single-issue # and _strictly_ in-order execution, while bn_mul_mont is more or less # dependent on CPU ability to pipe-line instructions and have several # of them "in-flight" at the same time. I mean while other methods, # for example Karatsuba, aim to minimize amount of multiplications at # the cost of other operations increase, bn_mul_mont aim to neatly # "overlap" multiplications and the other operations [and on most # platforms even minimize the amount of the other operations, in # particular references to memory]. But it's possible to improve this # module performance by implementing dedicated squaring code-path and # possibly by unrolling loops... # January 2009. # # Reschedule to minimize/avoid Address Generation Interlock hazard, # make inner loops counter-based. # November 2010. # # Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs" # feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit # instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy # application context. The feature is not specific to any particular # processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code # remains z/Architecture specific. Compatibility with 32-bit BN_ULONG # is achieved by swapping words after 64-bit loads, follow _dswap-s. # On z990 it was measured to perform 2.6-2.2 times better than # compiler-generated code, less for longer keys... $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8; $mn0="%r0"; $num="%r1"; # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%r2"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%r3"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%r4"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%r5"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="%r6"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, #$num="160(%r15)" # int num); $bi="%r2"; # zaps rp $j="%r7"; $ahi="%r8"; $alo="%r9"; $nhi="%r10"; $nlo="%r11"; $AHI="%r12"; $NHI="%r13"; $count="%r14"; $sp="%r15"; $code.=<<___; .text .globl bn_mul_mont .type bn_mul_mont,\@function bn_mul_mont: lgf $num,`$stdframe+$SIZE_T-4`($sp) # pull $num sla $num,`log($SIZE_T)/log(2)` # $num to enumerate bytes la $bp,0($num,$bp) st${g} %r2,2*$SIZE_T($sp) cghi $num,16 # lghi %r2,0 # blr %r14 # if($num<16) return 0; ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/); tmll $num,4 bnzr %r14 # if ($num&1) return 0; ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /3[12]/); cghi $num,96 # bhr %r14 # if($num>96) return 0; ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} %r3,%r15,3*$SIZE_T($sp) lghi $rp,-$stdframe-8 # leave room for carry bit lcgr $j,$num # -$num lgr %r0,$sp la $rp,0($rp,$sp) la $sp,0($j,$rp) # alloca st${g} %r0,0($sp) # back chain sra $num,3 # restore $num la $bp,0($j,$bp) # restore $bp ahi $num,-1 # adjust $num for inner loop lg $n0,0($n0) # pull n0 _dswap $n0 lg $bi,0($bp) _dswap $bi lg $alo,0($ap) _dswap $alo mlgr $ahi,$bi # ap[0]*bp[0] lgr $AHI,$ahi lgr $mn0,$alo # "tp[0]"*n0 msgr $mn0,$n0 lg $nlo,0($np) # _dswap $nlo mlgr $nhi,$mn0 # np[0]*m1 algr $nlo,$alo # +="tp[0]" lghi $NHI,0 alcgr $NHI,$nhi la $j,8(%r0) # j=1 lr $count,$num .align 16 .L1st: lg $alo,0($j,$ap) _dswap $alo mlgr $ahi,$bi # ap[j]*bp[0] algr $alo,$AHI lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $AHI,$ahi lg $nlo,0($j,$np) _dswap $nlo mlgr $nhi,$mn0 # np[j]*m1 algr $nlo,$NHI lghi $NHI,0 alcgr $nhi,$NHI # +="tp[j]" algr $nlo,$alo alcgr $NHI,$nhi stg $nlo,$stdframe-8($j,$sp) # tp[j-1]= la $j,8($j) # j++ brct $count,.L1st algr $NHI,$AHI lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $AHI,$AHI # upmost overflow bit stg $NHI,$stdframe-8($j,$sp) stg $AHI,$stdframe($j,$sp) la $bp,8($bp) # bp++ .Louter: lg $bi,0($bp) # bp[i] _dswap $bi lg $alo,0($ap) _dswap $alo mlgr $ahi,$bi # ap[0]*bp[i] alg $alo,$stdframe($sp) # +=tp[0] lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $AHI,$ahi lgr $mn0,$alo msgr $mn0,$n0 # tp[0]*n0 lg $nlo,0($np) # np[0] _dswap $nlo mlgr $nhi,$mn0 # np[0]*m1 algr $nlo,$alo # +="tp[0]" lghi $NHI,0 alcgr $NHI,$nhi la $j,8(%r0) # j=1 lr $count,$num .align 16 .Linner: lg $alo,0($j,$ap) _dswap $alo mlgr $ahi,$bi # ap[j]*bp[i] algr $alo,$AHI lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $ahi,$AHI alg $alo,$stdframe($j,$sp)# +=tp[j] alcgr $AHI,$ahi lg $nlo,0($j,$np) _dswap $nlo mlgr $nhi,$mn0 # np[j]*m1 algr $nlo,$NHI lghi $NHI,0 alcgr $nhi,$NHI algr $nlo,$alo # +="tp[j]" alcgr $NHI,$nhi stg $nlo,$stdframe-8($j,$sp) # tp[j-1]= la $j,8($j) # j++ brct $count,.Linner algr $NHI,$AHI lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $AHI,$AHI alg $NHI,$stdframe($j,$sp)# accumulate previous upmost overflow bit lghi $ahi,0 alcgr $AHI,$ahi # new upmost overflow bit stg $NHI,$stdframe-8($j,$sp) stg $AHI,$stdframe($j,$sp) la $bp,8($bp) # bp++ cl${g} $bp,`$stdframe+8+4*$SIZE_T`($j,$sp) # compare to &bp[num] jne .Louter l${g} $rp,`$stdframe+8+2*$SIZE_T`($j,$sp) # reincarnate rp la $ap,$stdframe($sp) ahi $num,1 # restore $num, incidentally clears "borrow" la $j,0(%r0) lr $count,$num .Lsub: lg $alo,0($j,$ap) lg $nlo,0($j,$np) _dswap $nlo slbgr $alo,$nlo stg $alo,0($j,$rp) la $j,8($j) brct $count,.Lsub lghi $ahi,0 slbgr $AHI,$ahi # handle upmost carry + lghi $NHI,-1 + xgr $NHI,$AHI - ngr $ap,$AHI - lghi $np,-1 - xgr $np,$AHI - ngr $np,$rp - ogr $ap,$np # ap=borrow?tp:rp - la $j,0(%r0) lgr $count,$num -.Lcopy: lg $alo,0($j,$ap) # copy or in-place refresh +.Lcopy: lg $ahi,$stdframe($j,$sp) # conditional copy + lg $alo,0($j,$rp) + ngr $ahi,$AHI + ngr $alo,$NHI + ogr $alo,$ahi _dswap $alo stg $j,$stdframe($j,$sp) # zap tp stg $alo,0($j,$rp) la $j,8($j) brct $count,.Lcopy la %r1,`$stdframe+8+6*$SIZE_T`($j,$sp) lm${g} %r6,%r15,0(%r1) lghi %r2,1 # signal "processed" br %r14 .size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont .string "Montgomery Multiplication for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/_dswap\s+(%r[0-9]+)/sprintf("rllg\t%s,%s,32",$1,$1) if($SIZE_T==4)/e; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,1222 +1,1218 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by David S. Miller and Andy Polyakov # . The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD # license. November 2012. All rights reserved. # ==================================================================== ###################################################################### # Montgomery squaring-n-multiplication module for SPARC T4. # # The module consists of three parts: # # 1) collection of "single-op" subroutines that perform single # operation, Montgomery squaring or multiplication, on 512-, # 1024-, 1536- and 2048-bit operands; # 2) collection of "multi-op" subroutines that perform 5 squaring and # 1 multiplication operations on operands of above lengths; # 3) fall-back and helper VIS3 subroutines. # # RSA sign is dominated by multi-op subroutine, while RSA verify and # DSA - by single-op. Special note about 4096-bit RSA verify result. # Operands are too long for dedicated hardware and it's handled by # VIS3 code, which is why you don't see any improvement. It's surely # possible to improve it [by deploying 'mpmul' instruction], maybe in # the future... # # Performance improvement. # # 64-bit process, VIS3: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 1024 bits 0.000628s 0.000028s 1592.4 35434.4 # rsa 2048 bits 0.003282s 0.000106s 304.7 9438.3 # rsa 4096 bits 0.025866s 0.000340s 38.7 2940.9 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000301s 0.000332s 3323.7 3013.9 # dsa 2048 bits 0.001056s 0.001233s 946.9 810.8 # # 64-bit process, this module: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s 3904.4 61411.9 # rsa 2048 bits 0.000946s 0.000029s 1056.8 34292.7 # rsa 4096 bits 0.005061s 0.000340s 197.6 2940.5 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000176s 0.000195s 5674.7 5130.5 # dsa 2048 bits 0.000296s 0.000354s 3383.2 2827.6 # ###################################################################### # 32-bit process, VIS3: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 1024 bits 0.000665s 0.000028s 1504.8 35233.3 # rsa 2048 bits 0.003349s 0.000106s 298.6 9433.4 # rsa 4096 bits 0.025959s 0.000341s 38.5 2934.8 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000320s 0.000341s 3123.3 2929.6 # dsa 2048 bits 0.001101s 0.001260s 908.2 793.4 # # 32-bit process, this module: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 1024 bits 0.000301s 0.000017s 3317.1 60240.0 # rsa 2048 bits 0.001034s 0.000030s 966.9 33812.7 # rsa 4096 bits 0.005244s 0.000341s 190.7 2935.4 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000201s 0.000205s 4976.1 4879.2 # dsa 2048 bits 0.000328s 0.000360s 3051.1 2774.2 # # 32-bit code is prone to performance degradation as interrupt rate # dispatched to CPU executing the code grows. This is because in # standard process of handling interrupt in 32-bit process context # upper halves of most integer registers used as input or output are # zeroed. This renders result invalid, and operation has to be re-run. # If CPU is "bothered" with timer interrupts only, the penalty is # hardly measurable. But in order to mitigate this problem for higher # interrupt rates contemporary Linux kernel recognizes biased stack # even in 32-bit process context and preserves full register contents. # See http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=517ffce4e1a03aea979fe3a18a3dd1761a24fafb # for details. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "sparcv9_modes.pl"; $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr #ifdef __PIC__ SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1) #endif ___ ######################################################################## # Register layout for mont[mul|sqr] instructions. # For details see "Oracle SPARC Architecture 2011" manual at # http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/sun-sparc-enterprise/documentation/. # my @R=map("%f".2*$_,(0..11,30,31,12..29)); my @N=(map("%l$_",(0..7)),map("%o$_",(0..5))); @N=(@N,@N,@N[0..3]); my @A=(@N[0..13],@R[14..31]); my @B=(map("%i$_",(0..5)),map("%l$_",(0..7))); @B=(@B,@B,map("%o$_",(0..3))); ######################################################################## # int bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM(u64 *rp,const u64 *ap,const u64 *bp, # const u64 *np,const BN_ULONG *n0); # sub generate_bn_mul_mont_t4() { my $NUM=shift; my ($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$sentinel)=map("%g$_",(1..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM .align 32 bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM: #ifdef __arch64__ mov 0,$sentinel mov -128,%g4 #elif defined(SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK) SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1+0],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9_P[0] mov -2047,%g4 and %g1,SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK,%g1 movrz %g1,0,%g4 mov -1,$sentinel add %g4,-128,%g4 #else mov -1,$sentinel mov -128,%g4 #endif sllx $sentinel,32,$sentinel save %sp,%g4,%sp #ifndef __arch64__ save %sp,-128,%sp ! warm it up save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp restore restore restore restore restore restore #endif and %sp,1,%g4 or $sentinel,%fp,%fp or %g4,$sentinel,$sentinel ! copy arguments to global registers mov %i0,$rp mov %i1,$ap mov %i2,$bp mov %i3,$np ld [%i4+0],%f1 ! load *n0 ld [%i4+4],%f0 fsrc2 %f0,%f60 ___ # load ap[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=$i<13?@A[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$ap+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$ap+$i*8+4],@A[$i] sllx @A[$i],32,@A[$i] or $lo,@A[$i],@A[$i] ___ } for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { my ($hi,$lo)=("%f".2*($i%4),"%f".(2*($i%4)+1)); $code.=<<___; ld [$ap+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$ap+$i*8+4],$hi fsrc2 $hi,@A[$i] ___ } # load np[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=$i<13?@N[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$np+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$np+$i*8+4],@N[$i] sllx @N[$i],32,@N[$i] or $lo,@N[$i],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<28 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=$i<27?@N[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$np+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$np+$i*8+4],@N[$i] sllx @N[$i],32,@N[$i] or $lo,@N[$i],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=($i<$NUM-1)?@N[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$np+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$np+$i*8+4],@N[$i] sllx @N[$i],32,@N[$i] or $lo,@N[$i],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; cmp $ap,$bp be SIZE_T_CC,.Lmsquare_$NUM nop ___ # load bp[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=$i<13?@B[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$bp+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$bp+$i*8+4],@B[$i] sllx @B[$i],32,@B[$i] or $lo,@B[$i],@B[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=($i<$NUM-1)?@B[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$bp+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$bp+$i*8+4],@B[$i] sllx @B[$i],32,@B[$i] or $lo,@B[$i],@B[$i] ___ } # magic ################################################################ $code.=<<___; .word 0x81b02920+$NUM-1 ! montmul $NUM-1 .Lmresume_$NUM: fbu,pn %fcc3,.Lmabort_$NUM #ifndef __arch64__ and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Lmabort_$NUM #endif nop #ifdef __arch64__ restore restore restore restore restore #else restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Lmabort1_$NUM restore #endif ___ # save tp[$NUM] ######################################################## for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; movxtod @A[$i],@R[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; #ifdef __arch64__ restore #else and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore and $sentinel,1,%o7 and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel srl %fp,0,%fp ! just in case? or %o7,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,a,pn $sentinel,.Lmdone_$NUM mov 0,%i0 ! return failure #endif ___ for($i=0; $i<12 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { @R[$i] =~ /%f([0-9]+)/; my $lo = "%f".($1+1); $code.=<<___; st $lo,[$rp+$i*8+0] st @R[$i],[$rp+$i*8+4] ___ } for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { my ($hi,$lo)=("%f".2*($i%4),"%f".(2*($i%4)+1)); $code.=<<___; fsrc2 @R[$i],$hi st $lo,[$rp+$i*8+0] st $hi,[$rp+$i*8+4] ___ } $code.=<<___; mov 1,%i0 ! return success .Lmdone_$NUM: ret restore .Lmabort_$NUM: restore restore restore restore restore .Lmabort1_$NUM: restore mov 0,%i0 ! return failure ret restore .align 32 .Lmsquare_$NUM: save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp .word 0x81b02940+$NUM-1 ! montsqr $NUM-1 ba .Lmresume_$NUM nop .type bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM, #function .size bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM, .-bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM ___ } for ($i=8;$i<=32;$i+=8) { &generate_bn_mul_mont_t4($i); } ######################################################################## # sub load_ccr { my ($ptbl,$pwr,$ccr,$skip_wr)=@_; $code.=<<___; srl $pwr, 2, %o4 and $pwr, 3, %o5 and %o4, 7, %o4 sll %o5, 3, %o5 ! offset within first cache line add %o5, $ptbl, $ptbl ! of the pwrtbl or %g0, 1, %o5 sll %o5, %o4, $ccr ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$skip_wr); wr $ccr, %g0, %ccr ___ } sub load_b_pair { my ($pwrtbl,$B0,$B1)=@_; $code.=<<___; ldx [$pwrtbl+0*32], $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+8*32], $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+1*32], %o4 ldx [$pwrtbl+9*32], %o5 movvs %icc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+2*32], %o4 movvs %icc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+10*32],%o5 move %icc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+3*32], %o4 move %icc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+11*32],%o5 movneg %icc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+4*32], %o4 movneg %icc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+12*32],%o5 movcs %xcc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+5*32],%o4 movcs %xcc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+13*32],%o5 movvs %xcc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+6*32], %o4 movvs %xcc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+14*32],%o5 move %xcc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+7*32], %o4 move %xcc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+15*32],%o5 movneg %xcc, %o4, $B0 add $pwrtbl,16*32, $pwrtbl movneg %xcc, %o5, $B1 ___ } sub load_b { my ($pwrtbl,$Bi)=@_; $code.=<<___; ldx [$pwrtbl+0*32], $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+1*32], %o4 ldx [$pwrtbl+2*32], %o5 movvs %icc, %o4, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+3*32], %o4 move %icc, %o5, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+4*32], %o5 movneg %icc, %o4, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+5*32], %o4 movcs %xcc, %o5, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+6*32], %o5 movvs %xcc, %o4, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+7*32], %o4 move %xcc, %o5, $Bi add $pwrtbl,8*32, $pwrtbl movneg %xcc, %o4, $Bi ___ } ######################################################################## # int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM(u64 *tp,const u64 *np,const BN_ULONG *n0, # const u64 *pwrtbl,int pwr,int stride); # sub generate_bn_pwr5_mont_t4() { my $NUM=shift; my ($tp,$np,$pwrtbl,$pwr,$sentinel)=map("%g$_",(1..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM .align 32 bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM: #ifdef __arch64__ mov 0,$sentinel mov -128,%g4 #elif defined(SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK) SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1+0],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9_P[0] mov -2047,%g4 and %g1,SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK,%g1 movrz %g1,0,%g4 mov -1,$sentinel add %g4,-128,%g4 #else mov -1,$sentinel mov -128,%g4 #endif sllx $sentinel,32,$sentinel save %sp,%g4,%sp #ifndef __arch64__ save %sp,-128,%sp ! warm it up save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp restore restore restore restore restore restore #endif and %sp,1,%g4 or $sentinel,%fp,%fp or %g4,$sentinel,$sentinel ! copy arguments to global registers mov %i0,$tp mov %i1,$np ld [%i2+0],%f1 ! load *n0 ld [%i2+4],%f0 mov %i3,$pwrtbl srl %i4,%g0,%i4 ! pack last arguments sllx %i5,32,$pwr or %i4,$pwr,$pwr fsrc2 %f0,%f60 ___ # load tp[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldx [$tp+$i*8],@A[$i] ___ } for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldd [$tp+$i*8],@A[$i] ___ } # load np[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldx [$np+$i*8],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<28 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldx [$np+$i*8],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldx [$np+$i*8],@N[$i] ___ } # load pwrtbl[pwr] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp srlx $pwr, 32, %o4 ! unpack $pwr srl $pwr, %g0, %o5 sub %o4, 5, %o4 mov $pwrtbl, %o7 sllx %o4, 32, $pwr ! re-pack $pwr or %o5, $pwr, $pwr srl %o5, %o4, %o5 ___ &load_ccr("%o7","%o5","%o4"); $code.=<<___; b .Lstride_$NUM nop .align 16 .Lstride_$NUM: ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i+=2) { &load_b_pair("%o7",@B[$i],@B[$i+1]); } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<$NUM; $i+=2) { &load_b_pair("%i7",@B[$i],@B[$i+1]); } $code.=<<___; srax $pwr, 32, %o4 ! unpack $pwr srl $pwr, %g0, %o5 sub %o4, 5, %o4 mov $pwrtbl, %i7 sllx %o4, 32, $pwr ! re-pack $pwr or %o5, $pwr, $pwr srl %o5, %o4, %o5 ___ &load_ccr("%i7","%o5","%o4",1); # magic ################################################################ for($i=0; $i<5; $i++) { $code.=<<___; .word 0x81b02940+$NUM-1 ! montsqr $NUM-1 fbu,pn %fcc3,.Labort_$NUM #ifndef __arch64__ and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Labort_$NUM #endif nop ___ } $code.=<<___; wr %o4, %g0, %ccr .word 0x81b02920+$NUM-1 ! montmul $NUM-1 fbu,pn %fcc3,.Labort_$NUM #ifndef __arch64__ and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Labort_$NUM #endif srax $pwr, 32, %o4 #ifdef __arch64__ brgez %o4,.Lstride_$NUM restore restore restore restore restore #else brgez %o4,.Lstride_$NUM restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Labort1_$NUM restore #endif ___ # save tp[$NUM] ######################################################## for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; movxtod @A[$i],@R[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; #ifdef __arch64__ restore #else and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore and $sentinel,1,%o7 and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel srl %fp,0,%fp ! just in case? or %o7,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,a,pn $sentinel,.Ldone_$NUM mov 0,%i0 ! return failure #endif ___ for($i=0; $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; std @R[$i],[$tp+$i*8] ___ } $code.=<<___; mov 1,%i0 ! return success .Ldone_$NUM: ret restore .Labort_$NUM: restore restore restore restore restore .Labort1_$NUM: restore mov 0,%i0 ! return failure ret restore .type bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM, #function .size bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM, .-bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM ___ } for ($i=8;$i<=32;$i+=8) { &generate_bn_pwr5_mont_t4($i); } { ######################################################################## # Fall-back subroutines # # copy of bn_mul_mont_vis3 adjusted for vectors of 64-bit values # ($n0,$m0,$m1,$lo0,$hi0, $lo1,$hi1,$aj,$alo,$nj,$nlo,$tj)= (map("%g$_",(1..5)),map("%o$_",(0..5,7))); # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%o0"; # u64 *rp, $ap="%o1"; # const u64 *ap, $bp="%o2"; # const u64 *bp, $np="%o3"; # const u64 *np, $n0p="%o4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%o5"; # int num); # caller ensures that num is >=3 $code.=<<___; .globl bn_mul_mont_t4 .align 32 bn_mul_mont_t4: add %sp, STACK_BIAS, %g4 ! real top of stack sll $num, 3, $num ! size in bytes add $num, 63, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! buffer size rounded up to 64 bytes sub %g4, %g1, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! align at 64 byte sub %g1, STACK_FRAME, %g1 ! new top of stack sub %g1, %g4, %g1 save %sp, %g1, %sp ___ # +-------------------------------+<----- %sp # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # | __int64 tmp[0] | # +-------------------------------+ # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # . . ($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$n0p,$num)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$cnt,$tp,$bufsz)=map("%l$_",(0..7)); ($ovf,$i)=($t0,$t1); $code.=<<___; ld [$n0p+0], $t0 ! pull n0[0..1] value ld [$n0p+4], $t1 add %sp, STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME, $tp ldx [$bp+0], $m0 ! m0=bp[0] sllx $t1, 32, $n0 add $bp, 8, $bp or $t0, $n0, $n0 ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+8], $aj ! ap[1] add $ap, 16, $ap ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[0] mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! "tp[0]"*n0 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$np+8], $nj ! np[1] addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 add $np, 16, $np addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .L1st sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .L1st: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[j] addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 add $ap, 8, $ap addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[j] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[0] add $np, 8, $np umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp ! tp++ brnz,pt $cnt, .L1st sub $cnt, 8, $cnt ! j-- !.L1st addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp addcc $hi0, $hi1, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf ! upmost overflow bit stxa $hi1, [$tp]0xe2 add $tp, 8, $tp ba .Louter sub $num, 16, $i ! i=num-2 .align 16 .Louter: ldx [$bp+0], $m0 ! m0=bp[i] add $bp, 8, $bp sub $ap, $num, $ap ! rewind sub $np, $num, $np sub $tp, $num, $tp ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[0] ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i] ldx [$tp], $tj ! tp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+8], $aj ! ap[1] addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[i] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! tp[0]*n0 umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 add $ap, 16, $ap umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$np+8], $nj ! np[1] add $np, 16, $np addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .Linner sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .Linner: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[j] add $ap, 8, $ap addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[i] addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[j] add $np, 8, $np umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp brnz,pt $cnt, .Linner sub $cnt, 8, $cnt !.Linner ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] subcc %g0, $ovf, %g0 ! move upmost overflow to CCR.xcc addxccc $hi1, $hi0, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf stx $hi1, [$tp+8] add $tp, 16, $tp brnz,pt $i, .Louter sub $i, 8, $i sub $ap, $num, $ap ! rewind sub $np, $num, $np sub $tp, $num, $tp ba .Lsub subcc $num, 8, $cnt ! cnt=num-1 and clear CCR.xcc .align 16 .Lsub: ldx [$tp], $tj add $tp, 8, $tp ldx [$np+0], $nj add $np, 8, $np subccc $tj, $nj, $t2 ! tp[j]-np[j] srlx $tj, 32, $tj srlx $nj, 32, $nj subccc $tj, $nj, $t3 add $rp, 8, $rp st $t2, [$rp-4] ! reverse order st $t3, [$rp-8] brnz,pt $cnt, .Lsub sub $cnt, 8, $cnt sub $np, $num, $np ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $rp, $num, $rp - subc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit - and $tp, $ovf, $ap - andn $rp, $ovf, $np - or $np, $ap, $ap ! ap=borrow?tp:rp + subccc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit ba .Lcopy sub $num, 8, $cnt .align 16 -.Lcopy: ! copy or in-place refresh - ldx [$ap+0], $t2 - add $ap, 8, $ap +.Lcopy: ! conditional copy + ldx [$tp], $tj + ldx [$rp+0], $t2 stx %g0, [$tp] ! zap add $tp, 8, $tp + movcs %icc, $tj, $t2 stx $t2, [$rp+0] add $rp, 8, $rp brnz $cnt, .Lcopy sub $cnt, 8, $cnt mov 1, %o0 ret restore .type bn_mul_mont_t4, #function .size bn_mul_mont_t4, .-bn_mul_mont_t4 ___ # int bn_mul_mont_gather5( $rp="%o0"; # u64 *rp, $ap="%o1"; # const u64 *ap, $bp="%o2"; # const u64 *pwrtbl, $np="%o3"; # const u64 *np, $n0p="%o4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%o5"; # int num, # caller ensures that num is >=3 # int power); $code.=<<___; .globl bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4 .align 32 bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4: add %sp, STACK_BIAS, %g4 ! real top of stack sll $num, 3, $num ! size in bytes add $num, 63, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! buffer size rounded up to 64 bytes sub %g4, %g1, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! align at 64 byte sub %g1, STACK_FRAME, %g1 ! new top of stack sub %g1, %g4, %g1 LDPTR [%sp+STACK_7thARG], %g4 ! load power, 7th argument save %sp, %g1, %sp ___ # +-------------------------------+<----- %sp # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # | __int64 tmp[0] | # +-------------------------------+ # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # . . ($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$n0p,$num)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$cnt,$tp,$bufsz,$ccr)=map("%l$_",(0..7)); ($ovf,$i)=($t0,$t1); &load_ccr($bp,"%g4",$ccr); &load_b($bp,$m0,"%o7"); # m0=bp[0] $code.=<<___; ld [$n0p+0], $t0 ! pull n0[0..1] value ld [$n0p+4], $t1 add %sp, STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME, $tp sllx $t1, 32, $n0 or $t0, $n0, $n0 ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+8], $aj ! ap[1] add $ap, 16, $ap ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[0] mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! "tp[0]"*n0 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$np+8], $nj ! np[1] addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 add $np, 16, $np addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .L1st_g5 sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .L1st_g5: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[j] addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 add $ap, 8, $ap addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[j] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[0] add $np, 8, $np umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp ! tp++ brnz,pt $cnt, .L1st_g5 sub $cnt, 8, $cnt ! j-- !.L1st_g5 addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp addcc $hi0, $hi1, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf ! upmost overflow bit stxa $hi1, [$tp]0xe2 add $tp, 8, $tp ba .Louter_g5 sub $num, 16, $i ! i=num-2 .align 16 .Louter_g5: wr $ccr, %g0, %ccr ___ &load_b($bp,$m0); # m0=bp[i] $code.=<<___; sub $ap, $num, $ap ! rewind sub $np, $num, $np sub $tp, $num, $tp ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[0] ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i] ldx [$tp], $tj ! tp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+8], $aj ! ap[1] addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[i] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! tp[0]*n0 umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 add $ap, 16, $ap umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$np+8], $nj ! np[1] add $np, 16, $np addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .Linner_g5 sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .Linner_g5: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[j] add $ap, 8, $ap addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[i] addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[j] add $np, 8, $np umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp brnz,pt $cnt, .Linner_g5 sub $cnt, 8, $cnt !.Linner_g5 ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] subcc %g0, $ovf, %g0 ! move upmost overflow to CCR.xcc addxccc $hi1, $hi0, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf stx $hi1, [$tp+8] add $tp, 16, $tp brnz,pt $i, .Louter_g5 sub $i, 8, $i sub $ap, $num, $ap ! rewind sub $np, $num, $np sub $tp, $num, $tp ba .Lsub_g5 subcc $num, 8, $cnt ! cnt=num-1 and clear CCR.xcc .align 16 .Lsub_g5: ldx [$tp], $tj add $tp, 8, $tp ldx [$np+0], $nj add $np, 8, $np subccc $tj, $nj, $t2 ! tp[j]-np[j] srlx $tj, 32, $tj srlx $nj, 32, $nj subccc $tj, $nj, $t3 add $rp, 8, $rp st $t2, [$rp-4] ! reverse order st $t3, [$rp-8] brnz,pt $cnt, .Lsub_g5 sub $cnt, 8, $cnt sub $np, $num, $np ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $rp, $num, $rp - subc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit - and $tp, $ovf, $ap - andn $rp, $ovf, $np - or $np, $ap, $ap ! ap=borrow?tp:rp + subccc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit ba .Lcopy_g5 sub $num, 8, $cnt .align 16 -.Lcopy_g5: ! copy or in-place refresh - ldx [$ap+0], $t2 - add $ap, 8, $ap +.Lcopy_g5: ! conditional copy + ldx [$tp], $tj + ldx [$rp+0], $t2 stx %g0, [$tp] ! zap add $tp, 8, $tp + movcs %icc, $tj, $t2 stx $t2, [$rp+0] add $rp, 8, $rp brnz $cnt, .Lcopy_g5 sub $cnt, 8, $cnt mov 1, %o0 ret restore .type bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4, #function .size bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4, .-bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4 ___ } $code.=<<___; .globl bn_flip_t4 .align 32 bn_flip_t4: .Loop_flip: ld [%o1+0], %o4 sub %o2, 1, %o2 ld [%o1+4], %o5 add %o1, 8, %o1 st %o5, [%o0+0] st %o4, [%o0+4] brnz %o2, .Loop_flip add %o0, 8, %o0 retl nop .type bn_flip_t4, #function .size bn_flip_t4, .-bn_flip_t4 .globl bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4 .align 32 bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4: sll %o3, 3, %o3 srl %o1, 1, %o1 add %o3, %o2, %o2 ! &pwrtbl[pwr] sub %o1, 1, %o1 .Loop_flip_n_scatter5: ld [%o0+0], %o4 ! inp[i] ld [%o0+4], %o5 add %o0, 8, %o0 sllx %o5, 32, %o5 or %o4, %o5, %o5 stx %o5, [%o2] add %o2, 32*8, %o2 brnz %o1, .Loop_flip_n_scatter5 sub %o1, 1, %o1 retl nop .type bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4, #function .size bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4, .-bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4 .globl bn_gather5_t4 .align 32 bn_gather5_t4: ___ &load_ccr("%o2","%o3","%g1"); $code.=<<___; sub %o1, 1, %o1 .Loop_gather5: ___ &load_b("%o2","%g1"); $code.=<<___; stx %g1, [%o0] add %o0, 8, %o0 brnz %o1, .Loop_gather5 sub %o1, 1, %o1 retl nop .type bn_gather5_t4, #function .size bn_gather5_t4, .-bn_gather5_t4 .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov" .align 4 ___ &emit_assembler(); close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,609 +1,610 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # December 2005 # # Pure SPARCv9/8+ and IALU-only bn_mul_mont implementation. The reasons # for undertaken effort are multiple. First of all, UltraSPARC is not # the whole SPARCv9 universe and other VIS-free implementations deserve # optimized code as much. Secondly, newly introduced UltraSPARC T1, # a.k.a. Niagara, has shared FPU and concurrent FPU-intensive pathes, # such as sparcv9a-mont, will simply sink it. Yes, T1 is equipped with # several integrated RSA/DSA accelerator circuits accessible through # kernel driver [only(*)], but having decent user-land software # implementation is important too. Finally, reasons like desire to # experiment with dedicated squaring procedure. Yes, this module # implements one, because it was easiest to draft it in SPARCv9 # instructions... # (*) Engine accessing the driver in question is on my TODO list. # For reference, acceleator is estimated to give 6 to 10 times # improvement on single-threaded RSA sign. It should be noted # that 6-10x improvement coefficient does not actually mean # something extraordinary in terms of absolute [single-threaded] # performance, as SPARCv9 instruction set is by all means least # suitable for high performance crypto among other 64 bit # platforms. 6-10x factor simply places T1 in same performance # domain as say AMD64 and IA-64. Improvement of RSA verify don't # appear impressive at all, but it's the sign operation which is # far more critical/interesting. # You might notice that inner loops are modulo-scheduled:-) This has # essentially negligible impact on UltraSPARC performance, it's # Fujitsu SPARC64 V users who should notice and hopefully appreciate # the advantage... Currently this module surpasses sparcv9a-mont.pl # by ~20% on UltraSPARC-III and later cores, but recall that sparcv9a # module still have hidden potential [see TODO list there], which is # estimated to be larger than 20%... # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%i0"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%i1"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%i2"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%i3"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="%i4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%i5"; # int num); $bits=32; for (@ARGV) { $bits=64 if (/\-m64/ || /\-xarch\=v9/); } if ($bits==64) { $bias=2047; $frame=192; } else { $bias=0; $frame=128; } $car0="%o0"; $car1="%o1"; $car2="%o2"; # 1 bit $acc0="%o3"; $acc1="%o4"; $mask="%g1"; # 32 bits, what a waste... $tmp0="%g4"; $tmp1="%g5"; $i="%l0"; $j="%l1"; $mul0="%l2"; $mul1="%l3"; $tp="%l4"; $apj="%l5"; $npj="%l6"; $tpj="%l7"; $fname="bn_mul_mont_int"; $code=<<___; .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr .global $fname .align 32 $fname: cmp %o5,4 ! 128 bits minimum bge,pt %icc,.Lenter sethi %hi(0xffffffff),$mask retl clr %o0 .align 32 .Lenter: save %sp,-$frame,%sp sll $num,2,$num ! num*=4 or $mask,%lo(0xffffffff),$mask ld [$n0],$n0 cmp $ap,$bp and $num,$mask,$num ld [$bp],$mul0 ! bp[0] nop add %sp,$bias,%o7 ! real top of stack ld [$ap],$car0 ! ap[0] ! redundant in squaring context sub %o7,$num,%o7 ld [$ap+4],$apj ! ap[1] and %o7,-1024,%o7 ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] sub %o7,$bias,%sp ! alloca ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] be,pt `$bits==32?"%icc":"%xcc"`,.Lbn_sqr_mont mov 12,$j mulx $car0,$mul0,$car0 ! ap[0]*bp[0] mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !prologue! ap[1]*bp[0] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp ld [$ap+8],$apj !prologue! mulx $n0,$acc0,$mul1 ! "t[0]"*n0 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 ! np[0]*"t[0]"*n0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 !prologue! np[1]*"t[0]"*n0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+8],$npj !prologue! srlx $car1,32,$car1 mov $tmp0,$acc0 !prologue! .L1st: mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 add $j,4,$j ! j++ mov $tmp0,$acc0 st $car1,[$tp] cmp $j,$num mov $tmp1,$acc1 srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.L1st add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ !.L1st mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !epilogue! mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $tmp0,$car0,$car0 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+8] srlx $car1,32,$car2 mov 4,$i ! i++ ld [$bp+4],$mul0 ! bp[1] .Louter: add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp ld [$ap],$car0 ! ap[0] ld [$ap+4],$apj ! ap[1] ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] ld [$tp],$tmp1 ! tp[0] ld [$tp+4],$tpj ! tp[1] mov 12,$j mulx $car0,$mul0,$car0 mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !prologue! add $tmp1,$car0,$car0 ld [$ap+8],$apj !prologue! and $car0,$mask,$acc0 mulx $n0,$acc0,$mul1 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 !prologue! srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+8],$npj !prologue! srlx $car1,32,$car1 mov $tmp0,$acc0 !prologue! .Linner: mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $tpj,$car0,$car0 ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] add $acc0,$car0,$car0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 add $j,4,$j ! j++ mov $tmp0,$acc0 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 mov $tmp1,$acc1 cmp $j,$num bl %icc,.Linner add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ !.Linner mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !epilogue! mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $tpj,$car0,$car0 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $tpj,$car0,$car0 add $tmp0,$car0,$car0 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $i,4,$i ! i++ srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car1,$car1 cmp $i,$num add $car2,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+8] srlx $car1,32,$car2 bl,a %icc,.Louter ld [$bp+$i],$mul0 ! bp[i] !.Louter add $tp,12,$tp .Ltail: add $np,$num,$np add $rp,$num,$rp - mov $tp,$ap sub %g0,$num,%o7 ! k=-num ba .Lsub subcc %g0,%g0,%g0 ! clear %icc.c .align 16 .Lsub: ld [$tp+%o7],%o0 ld [$np+%o7],%o1 subccc %o0,%o1,%o1 ! tp[j]-np[j] add $rp,%o7,$i add %o7,4,%o7 brnz %o7,.Lsub st %o1,[$i] - subc $car2,0,$car2 ! handle upmost overflow bit - and $tp,$car2,$ap - andn $rp,$car2,$np - or $ap,$np,$ap + subccc $car2,0,$car2 ! handle upmost overflow bit sub %g0,$num,%o7 .Lcopy: - ld [$ap+%o7],%o0 ! copy or in-place refresh + ld [$tp+%o7],%o1 ! conditional copy + ld [$rp+%o7],%o0 st %g0,[$tp+%o7] ! zap tp + movcs %icc,%o1,%o0 st %o0,[$rp+%o7] add %o7,4,%o7 brnz %o7,.Lcopy nop mov 1,%i0 ret restore ___ ######## ######## .Lbn_sqr_mont gives up to 20% *overall* improvement over ######## code without following dedicated squaring procedure. ######## $sbit="%o5"; $code.=<<___; .align 32 .Lbn_sqr_mont: mulx $mul0,$mul0,$car0 ! ap[0]*ap[0] mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !prologue! and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp ld [$ap+8],$apj !prologue! mulx $n0,$acc0,$mul1 ! "t[0]"*n0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 ! np[0]*"t[0]"*n0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 !prologue! and $car0,1,$sbit ld [$np+8],$npj !prologue! srlx $car0,1,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 srlx $car1,32,$car1 mov $tmp0,$acc0 !prologue! .Lsqr_1st: mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ! ap[j]*a0+c0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 or $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 mov $tmp1,$acc1 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit add $j,4,$j ! j++ and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 cmp $j,$num add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] mov $tmp0,$acc0 srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.Lsqr_1st add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ !.Lsqr_1st mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 ! epilogue mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ! ap[j]*a0+c0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 or $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $tmp0,$car0,$car0 ! ap[j]*a0+c0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 or $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car0,$car0 or $sbit,$car0,$car0 add $car0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+8] srlx $car1,32,$car2 ld [%sp+$bias+$frame],$tmp0 ! tp[0] ld [%sp+$bias+$frame+4],$tmp1 ! tp[1] ld [%sp+$bias+$frame+8],$tpj ! tp[2] ld [$ap+4],$mul0 ! ap[1] ld [$ap+8],$apj ! ap[2] ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] mulx $n0,$tmp0,$mul1 mulx $mul0,$mul0,$car0 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tmp0,$car1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$np+8],$npj ! np[2] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 and $car0,1,$sbit add $acc1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,1,$car0 mov 12,$j st $car1,[%sp+$bias+$frame] ! tp[0]= srlx $car1,32,$car1 add %sp,$bias+$frame+4,$tp .Lsqr_2nd: mulx $apj,$mul0,$acc0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 add $tpj,$sbit,$sbit ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 add $j,4,$j ! j++ add $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 cmp $j,$num add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.Lsqr_2nd add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ !.Lsqr_2nd mulx $apj,$mul0,$acc0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 add $tpj,$sbit,$sbit and $car0,$mask,$acc0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 add $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car0,$car0 add $sbit,$car0,$car0 add $car0,$car1,$car1 add $car2,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] srlx $car1,32,$car2 ld [%sp+$bias+$frame],$tmp1 ! tp[0] ld [%sp+$bias+$frame+4],$tpj ! tp[1] ld [$ap+8],$mul0 ! ap[2] ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] mulx $n0,$tmp1,$mul1 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mov 8,$i mulx $mul0,$mul0,$car0 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp srlx $car1,32,$car1 and $car0,1,$sbit srlx $car0,1,$car0 mov 4,$j .Lsqr_outer: .Lsqr_inner1: mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tpj,$car1,$car1 add $j,4,$j ld [$tp+8],$tpj cmp $j,$i add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+$j],$npj st $car1,[$tp] srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.Lsqr_inner1 add $tp,4,$tp !.Lsqr_inner1 add $j,4,$j ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tpj,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] + srlx $car1,32,$tmp0 + and $car1,$mask,$car1 + add $tmp0,$sbit,$sbit add $acc0,$car1,$car1 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] add $acc1,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $j,4,$j cmp $j,$num be,pn %icc,.Lsqr_no_inner2 add $tp,4,$tp .Lsqr_inner2: mulx $apj,$mul0,$acc0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tpj,$sbit,$sbit add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] add $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 add $j,4,$j ! j++ srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 cmp $j,$num add $acc0,$car1,$car1 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.Lsqr_inner2 add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ .Lsqr_no_inner2: mulx $apj,$mul0,$acc0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tpj,$sbit,$sbit add $acc0,$car0,$car0 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 add $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car0,$car0 add $sbit,$car0,$car0 add $car0,$car1,$car1 add $car2,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] srlx $car1,32,$car2 add $i,4,$i ! i++ ld [%sp+$bias+$frame],$tmp1 ! tp[0] ld [%sp+$bias+$frame+4],$tpj ! tp[1] ld [$ap+$i],$mul0 ! ap[j] ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] mulx $n0,$tmp1,$mul1 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 add $i,4,$tmp0 mulx $mul0,$mul0,$car0 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp srlx $car1,32,$car1 and $car0,1,$sbit srlx $car0,1,$car0 cmp $tmp0,$num ! i" .align 32 ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,242 +1,239 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # Wrapper around 'rep montmul', VIA-specific instruction accessing # PadLock Montgomery Multiplier. The wrapper is designed as drop-in # replacement for OpenSSL bn_mul_mont [first implemented in 0.9.9]. # # Below are interleaved outputs from 'openssl speed rsa dsa' for 4 # different software configurations on 1.5GHz VIA Esther processor. # Lines marked with "software integer" denote performance of hand- # coded integer-only assembler found in OpenSSL 0.9.7. "Software SSE2" # refers to hand-coded SSE2 Montgomery multiplication procedure found # OpenSSL 0.9.9. "Hardware VIA SDK" refers to padlock_pmm routine from # Padlock SDK 2.0.1 available for download from VIA, which naturally # utilizes the magic 'repz montmul' instruction. And finally "hardware # this" refers to *this* implementation which also uses 'repz montmul' # # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 512 bits 0.001720s 0.000140s 581.4 7149.7 software integer # rsa 512 bits 0.000690s 0.000086s 1450.3 11606.0 software SSE2 # rsa 512 bits 0.006136s 0.000201s 163.0 4974.5 hardware VIA SDK # rsa 512 bits 0.000712s 0.000050s 1404.9 19858.5 hardware this # # rsa 1024 bits 0.008518s 0.000413s 117.4 2420.8 software integer # rsa 1024 bits 0.004275s 0.000277s 233.9 3609.7 software SSE2 # rsa 1024 bits 0.012136s 0.000260s 82.4 3844.5 hardware VIA SDK # rsa 1024 bits 0.002522s 0.000116s 396.5 8650.9 hardware this # # rsa 2048 bits 0.050101s 0.001371s 20.0 729.6 software integer # rsa 2048 bits 0.030273s 0.001008s 33.0 991.9 software SSE2 # rsa 2048 bits 0.030833s 0.000976s 32.4 1025.1 hardware VIA SDK # rsa 2048 bits 0.011879s 0.000342s 84.2 2921.7 hardware this # # rsa 4096 bits 0.327097s 0.004859s 3.1 205.8 software integer # rsa 4096 bits 0.229318s 0.003859s 4.4 259.2 software SSE2 # rsa 4096 bits 0.233953s 0.003274s 4.3 305.4 hardware VIA SDK # rsa 4096 bits 0.070493s 0.001166s 14.2 857.6 hardware this # # dsa 512 bits 0.001342s 0.001651s 745.2 605.7 software integer # dsa 512 bits 0.000844s 0.000987s 1185.3 1013.1 software SSE2 # dsa 512 bits 0.001902s 0.002247s 525.6 444.9 hardware VIA SDK # dsa 512 bits 0.000458s 0.000524s 2182.2 1909.1 hardware this # # dsa 1024 bits 0.003964s 0.004926s 252.3 203.0 software integer # dsa 1024 bits 0.002686s 0.003166s 372.3 315.8 software SSE2 # dsa 1024 bits 0.002397s 0.002823s 417.1 354.3 hardware VIA SDK # dsa 1024 bits 0.000978s 0.001170s 1022.2 855.0 hardware this # # dsa 2048 bits 0.013280s 0.016518s 75.3 60.5 software integer # dsa 2048 bits 0.009911s 0.011522s 100.9 86.8 software SSE2 # dsa 2048 bits 0.009542s 0.011763s 104.8 85.0 hardware VIA SDK # dsa 2048 bits 0.002884s 0.003352s 346.8 298.3 hardware this # # To give you some other reference point here is output for 2.4GHz P4 # running hand-coded SSE2 bn_mul_mont found in 0.9.9, i.e. "software # SSE2" in above terms. # # rsa 512 bits 0.000407s 0.000047s 2454.2 21137.0 # rsa 1024 bits 0.002426s 0.000141s 412.1 7100.0 # rsa 2048 bits 0.015046s 0.000491s 66.5 2034.9 # rsa 4096 bits 0.109770s 0.002379s 9.1 420.3 # dsa 512 bits 0.000438s 0.000525s 2281.1 1904.1 # dsa 1024 bits 0.001346s 0.001595s 742.7 627.0 # dsa 2048 bits 0.004745s 0.005582s 210.7 179.1 # # Conclusions: # - VIA SDK leaves a *lot* of room for improvement (which this # implementation successfully fills:-); # - 'rep montmul' gives up to >3x performance improvement depending on # key length; # - in terms of absolute performance it delivers approximately as much # as modern out-of-order 32-bit cores [again, for longer keys]. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"via-mont.pl"); # int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); $func="bn_mul_mont_padlock"; $pad=16*1; # amount of reserved bytes on top of every vector # stack layout $mZeroPrime=&DWP(0,"esp"); # these are specified by VIA $A=&DWP(4,"esp"); $B=&DWP(8,"esp"); $T=&DWP(12,"esp"); $M=&DWP(16,"esp"); $scratch=&DWP(20,"esp"); $rp=&DWP(24,"esp"); # these are mine $sp=&DWP(28,"esp"); # &DWP(32,"esp") # 32 byte scratch area # &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*0,"esp") # padded tp[num] # &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*1,"esp") # padded copy of ap[num] # &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*2,"esp") # padded copy of bp[num] # &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*3,"esp") # padded copy of np[num] # Note that SDK suggests to unconditionally allocate 2K per vector. This # has quite an impact on performance. It naturally depends on key length, # but to give an example 1024 bit private RSA key operations suffer >30% # penalty. I allocate only as much as actually required... &function_begin($func); &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("ecx",&wparam(5)); # num # meet VIA's limitations for num [note that the specification # expresses them in bits, while we work with amount of 32-bit words] &test ("ecx",3); &jnz (&label("leave")); # num % 4 != 0 &cmp ("ecx",8); &jb (&label("leave")); # num < 8 &cmp ("ecx",1024); &ja (&label("leave")); # num > 1024 &pushf (); &cld (); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); # rp &mov ("eax",&wparam(1)); # ap &mov ("ebx",&wparam(2)); # bp &mov ("edx",&wparam(3)); # np &mov ("esi",&wparam(4)); # n0 &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,"esi")); # *n0 &lea ("ecx",&DWP($pad,"","ecx",4)); # ecx becomes vector size in bytes &lea ("ebp",&DWP(64,"","ecx",4)); # allocate 4 vectors + 64 bytes &neg ("ebp"); &add ("ebp","esp"); &and ("ebp",-64); # align to cache-line &xchg ("ebp","esp"); # alloca &mov ($rp,"edi"); # save rp &mov ($sp,"ebp"); # save esp &mov ($mZeroPrime,"esi"); &lea ("esi",&DWP(64,"esp")); # tp &mov ($T,"esi"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(32,"esp")); # scratch area &mov ($scratch,"edi"); &mov ("esi","eax"); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(-$pad,"ecx")); &shr ("ebp",2); # restore original num value in ebp &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &lea ("ecx",&DWP((32+$pad)/4,"ecx"));# padded tp + scratch &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(64+$pad,"esp","ecx",4));# pointer to ap copy &mov ($A,"edi"); &data_byte(0xf3,0xa5); # rep movsl, memcpy &mov ("ecx",$pad/4); &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero pad # edi points at the end of padded ap copy... &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &mov ("esi","ebx"); &mov ($B,"edi"); &data_byte(0xf3,0xa5); # rep movsl, memcpy &mov ("ecx",$pad/4); &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero pad # edi points at the end of padded bp copy... &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &mov ("esi","edx"); &mov ($M,"edi"); &data_byte(0xf3,0xa5); # rep movsl, memcpy &mov ("ecx",$pad/4); &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero pad # edi points at the end of padded np copy... # let magic happen... &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &mov ("esi","esp"); &shl ("ecx",5); # convert word counter to bit counter &align (4); &data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc0);# rep montmul &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &lea ("esi",&DWP(64,"esp")); # tp # edi still points at the end of padded np copy... &neg ("ebp"); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(-$pad,"edi","ebp",4)); # so just "rewind" &mov ("edi",$rp); # restore rp &xor ("edx","edx"); # i=0 and clear CF &set_label("sub",8); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4)); &sbb ("eax",&DWP(0,"ebp","edx",4)); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi","edx",4),"eax"); # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] &lea ("edx",&DWP(1,"edx")); # i++ &loop (&label("sub")); # doesn't affect CF! &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4)); # upmost overflow bit &sbb ("eax",0); - &and ("esi","eax"); - ¬ ("eax"); - &mov ("ebp","edi"); - &and ("ebp","eax"); - &or ("esi","ebp"); # tp=carry?tp:rp &mov ("ecx","edx"); # num - &xor ("edx","edx"); # i=0 + &mov ("edx",0); # i=0 &set_label("copy",8); - &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4)); - &mov (&DWP(64,"esp","edx",4),"ecx"); # zap tp + &mov ("ebx",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4)); + &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi","edx",4)); + &mov (&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4),"ecx"); # zap tp + &cmovc ("eax","ebx"); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi","edx",4),"eax"); &lea ("edx",&DWP(1,"edx")); # i++ &loop (&label("copy")); &mov ("ebp",$sp); &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("ecx",64/4); &mov ("edi","esp"); # zap frame including scratch area &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero # zap copies of ap, bp and np &lea ("edi",&DWP(64+$pad,"esp","edx",4));# pointer to ap &lea ("ecx",&DWP(3*$pad/4,"edx","edx",2)); &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero &mov ("esp","ebp"); &inc ("eax"); # signal "done" &popf (); &set_label("leave"); &function_end($func); &asciz("Padlock Montgomery Multiplication, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,373 +1,373 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # October 2012. # # SPARCv9 VIS3 Montgomery multiplicaion procedure suitable for T3 and # onward. There are three new instructions used here: umulxhi, # addxc[cc] and initializing store. On T3 RSA private key operations # are 1.54/1.87/2.11/2.26 times faster for 512/1024/2048/4096-bit key # lengths. This is without dedicated squaring procedure. On T4 # corresponding coefficients are 1.47/2.10/2.80/2.90x, which is mostly # for reference purposes, because T4 has dedicated Montgomery # multiplication and squaring *instructions* that deliver even more. $bits=32; for (@ARGV) { $bits=64 if (/\-m64/ || /\-xarch\=v9/); } if ($bits==64) { $bias=2047; $frame=192; } else { $bias=0; $frame=112; } $code.=<<___ if ($bits==64); .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch ___ $code.=<<___; .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr ___ ($n0,$m0,$m1,$lo0,$hi0, $lo1,$hi1,$aj,$alo,$nj,$nlo,$tj)= (map("%g$_",(1..5)),map("%o$_",(0..5,7))); # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%o0"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%o1"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%o2"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%o3"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0p="%o4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%o5"; # int num); # caller ensures that num is even # and >=6 $code.=<<___; .globl bn_mul_mont_vis3 .align 32 bn_mul_mont_vis3: add %sp, $bias, %g4 ! real top of stack sll $num, 2, $num ! size in bytes add $num, 63, %g5 andn %g5, 63, %g5 ! buffer size rounded up to 64 bytes add %g5, %g5, %g1 add %g5, %g1, %g1 ! 3*buffer size sub %g4, %g1, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! align at 64 byte sub %g1, $frame, %g1 ! new top of stack sub %g1, %g4, %g1 save %sp, %g1, %sp ___ # +-------------------------------+<----- %sp # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # | __int64 tmp[0] | # +-------------------------------+ # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # | __int64 ap[1..0] | converted ap[] # +-------------------------------+ # | __int64 np[1..0] | converted np[] # +-------------------------------+ # | __int64 ap[3..2] | # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+ ($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$n0p,$num)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$cnt,$tp,$bufsz,$anp)=map("%l$_",(0..7)); ($ovf,$i)=($t0,$t1); $code.=<<___; ld [$n0p+0], $t0 ! pull n0[0..1] value add %sp, $bias+$frame, $tp ld [$n0p+4], $t1 add $tp, %g5, $anp ld [$bp+0], $t2 ! m0=bp[0] sllx $t1, 32, $n0 ld [$bp+4], $t3 or $t0, $n0, $n0 add $bp, 8, $bp ld [$ap+0], $t0 ! ap[0] sllx $t3, 32, $m0 ld [$ap+4], $t1 or $t2, $m0, $m0 ld [$ap+8], $t2 ! ap[1] sllx $t1, 32, $aj ld [$ap+12], $t3 or $t0, $aj, $aj add $ap, 16, $ap stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ld [$np+0], $t0 ! np[0] sllx $t3, 32, $aj ld [$np+4], $t1 or $t2, $aj, $aj ld [$np+8], $t2 ! np[1] sllx $t1, 32, $nj ld [$np+12], $t3 or $t0, $nj, $nj add $np, 16, $np stx $nj, [$anp+8] ! converted np[0] mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! "tp[0]"*n0 stx $aj, [$anp+16] ! converted ap[1] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 sllx $t3, 32, $nj or $t2, $nj, $nj stx $nj, [$anp+24] ! converted np[1] add $anp, 32, $anp addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .L1st sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .L1st: ld [$ap+0], $t0 ! ap[j] addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 ld [$ap+4], $t1 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 sllx $t1, 32, $aj add $ap, 8, $ap or $t0, $aj, $aj stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[j] ld [$np+0], $t2 ! np[j] addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 ld [$np+4], $t3 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj sllx $t3, 32, $nj add $np, 8, $np mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[0] or $t2, $nj, $nj umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj stx $nj, [$anp+8] ! converted np[j] add $anp, 16, $anp ! anp++ mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp ! tp++ brnz,pt $cnt, .L1st sub $cnt, 8, $cnt ! j-- !.L1st addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp addcc $hi0, $hi1, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf ! upmost overflow bit stx $hi1, [$tp] add $tp, 8, $tp ba .Louter sub $num, 16, $i ! i=num-2 .align 16 .Louter: ld [$bp+0], $t2 ! m0=bp[i] ld [$bp+4], $t3 sub $anp, $num, $anp ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $anp, $num, $anp add $bp, 8, $bp sllx $t3, 32, $m0 ldx [$anp+0], $aj ! ap[0] or $t2, $m0, $m0 ldx [$anp+8], $nj ! np[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i] ldx [$tp], $tj ! tp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$anp+16], $aj ! ap[1] addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[i] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! tp[0]*n0 umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$anp+24], $nj ! np[1] add $anp, 32, $anp addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .Linner sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .Linner: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj ldx [$anp+0], $aj ! ap[j] addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[i] addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$anp+8], $nj ! np[j] add $anp, 16, $anp umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp brnz,pt $cnt, .Linner sub $cnt, 8, $cnt !.Linner ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] subcc %g0, $ovf, %g0 ! move upmost overflow to CCR.xcc addxccc $hi1, $hi0, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf stx $hi1, [$tp+8] add $tp, 16, $tp brnz,pt $i, .Louter sub $i, 8, $i sub $anp, $num, $anp ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $anp, $num, $anp ba .Lsub subcc $num, 8, $cnt ! cnt=num-1 and clear CCR.xcc .align 16 .Lsub: ldx [$tp], $tj add $tp, 8, $tp ldx [$anp+8], $nj add $anp, 16, $anp subccc $tj, $nj, $t2 ! tp[j]-np[j] srlx $tj, 32, $tj srlx $nj, 32, $nj subccc $tj, $nj, $t3 add $rp, 8, $rp st $t2, [$rp-4] ! reverse order st $t3, [$rp-8] brnz,pt $cnt, .Lsub sub $cnt, 8, $cnt sub $anp, $num, $anp ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $anp, $num, $anp sub $rp, $num, $rp - subc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit - and $tp, $ovf, $ap - andn $rp, $ovf, $np - or $np, $ap, $ap ! ap=borrow?tp:rp + subccc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit ba .Lcopy sub $num, 8, $cnt .align 16 -.Lcopy: ! copy or in-place refresh - ld [$ap+0], $t2 - ld [$ap+4], $t3 - add $ap, 8, $ap +.Lcopy: ! conditional copy + ld [$tp+0], $t0 + ld [$tp+4], $t1 + ld [$rp+0], $t2 + ld [$rp+4], $t3 stx %g0, [$tp] ! zap add $tp, 8, $tp stx %g0, [$anp] ! zap stx %g0, [$anp+8] add $anp, 16, $anp + movcs %icc, $t0, $t2 + movcs %icc, $t1, $t3 st $t3, [$rp+0] ! flip order st $t2, [$rp+4] add $rp, 8, $rp brnz $cnt, .Lcopy sub $cnt, 8, $cnt mov 1, %o0 ret restore .type bn_mul_mont_vis3, #function .size bn_mul_mont_vis3, .-bn_mul_mont_vis3 .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for SPARCv9 VIS3, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extentions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis3 { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "addxc" => 0x011, "addxccc" => 0x013, "umulxhi" => 0x016 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/); $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\b(umulxhi|addxc[c]{0,2})\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,615 +1,617 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # October 2005 # # This is a "teaser" code, as it can be improved in several ways... # First of all non-SSE2 path should be implemented (yes, for now it # performs Montgomery multiplication/convolution only on SSE2-capable # CPUs such as P4, others fall down to original code). Then inner loop # can be unrolled and modulo-scheduled to improve ILP and possibly # moved to 128-bit XMM register bank (though it would require input # rearrangement and/or increase bus bandwidth utilization). Dedicated # squaring procedure should give further performance improvement... # Yet, for being draft, the code improves rsa512 *sign* benchmark by # 110%(!), rsa1024 one - by 70% and rsa4096 - by 20%:-) # December 2006 # # Modulo-scheduling SSE2 loops results in further 15-20% improvement. # Integer-only code [being equipped with dedicated squaring procedure] # gives ~40% on rsa512 sign benchmark... $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0); $sse2=0; for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2); &function_begin("bn_mul_mont"); $i="edx"; $j="ecx"; $ap="esi"; $tp="esi"; # overlapping variables!!! $rp="edi"; $bp="edi"; # overlapping variables!!! $np="ebp"; $num="ebx"; $_num=&DWP(4*0,"esp"); # stack top layout $_rp=&DWP(4*1,"esp"); $_ap=&DWP(4*2,"esp"); $_bp=&DWP(4*3,"esp"); $_np=&DWP(4*4,"esp"); $_n0=&DWP(4*5,"esp"); $_n0q=&QWP(4*5,"esp"); $_sp=&DWP(4*6,"esp"); $_bpend=&DWP(4*7,"esp"); $frame=32; # size of above frame rounded up to 16n &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(5)); # int num &cmp ("edi",4); &jl (&label("just_leave")); &lea ("esi",&wparam(0)); # put aside pointer to argument block &lea ("edx",&wparam(1)); # load ap &add ("edi",2); # extra two words on top of tp &neg ("edi"); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(-$frame,"esp","edi",4)); # future alloca($frame+4*(num+2)) &neg ("edi"); # minimize cache contention by arraning 2K window between stack # pointer and ap argument [np is also position sensitive vector, # but it's assumed to be near ap, as it's allocated at ~same # time]. &mov ("eax","ebp"); &sub ("eax","edx"); &and ("eax",2047); &sub ("ebp","eax"); # this aligns sp and ap modulo 2048 &xor ("edx","ebp"); &and ("edx",2048); &xor ("edx",2048); &sub ("ebp","edx"); # this splits them apart modulo 4096 &and ("ebp",-64); # align to cache line # Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to # physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack # allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can # be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on # other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits # the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one... &mov ("eax","esp"); &sub ("eax","ebp"); &and ("eax",-4096); &mov ("edx","esp"); # saved stack pointer! &lea ("esp",&DWP(0,"ebp","eax")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp")); &cmp ("esp","ebp"); &ja (&label("page_walk")); &jmp (&label("page_walk_done")); &set_label("page_walk",16); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-4096,"esp")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp")); &cmp ("esp","ebp"); &ja (&label("page_walk")); &set_label("page_walk_done"); ################################# load argument block... &mov ("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi"));# BN_ULONG *rp &mov ("ebx",&DWP(1*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *ap &mov ("ecx",&DWP(2*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *bp &mov ("ebp",&DWP(3*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *np &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *n0 #&mov ("edi",&DWP(5*4,"esi"));# int num &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,"esi")); # pull n0[0] &mov ($_rp,"eax"); # ... save a copy of argument block &mov ($_ap,"ebx"); &mov ($_bp,"ecx"); &mov ($_np,"ebp"); &mov ($_n0,"esi"); &lea ($num,&DWP(-3,"edi")); # num=num-1 to assist modulo-scheduling #&mov ($_num,$num); # redundant as $num is not reused &mov ($_sp,"edx"); # saved stack pointer! if($sse2) { $acc0="mm0"; # mmx register bank layout $acc1="mm1"; $car0="mm2"; $car1="mm3"; $mul0="mm4"; $mul1="mm5"; $temp="mm6"; $mask="mm7"; &picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt (&DWP(0,"eax"),26); &jnc (&label("non_sse2")); &mov ("eax",-1); &movd ($mask,"eax"); # mask 32 lower bits &mov ($ap,$_ap); # load input pointers &mov ($bp,$_bp); &mov ($np,$_np); &xor ($i,$i); # i=0 &xor ($j,$j); # j=0 &movd ($mul0,&DWP(0,$bp)); # bp[0] &movd ($mul1,&DWP(0,$ap)); # ap[0] &movd ($car1,&DWP(0,$np)); # np[0] &pmuludq($mul1,$mul0); # ap[0]*bp[0] &movq ($car0,$mul1); &movq ($acc0,$mul1); # I wish movd worked for &pand ($acc0,$mask); # inter-register transfers &pmuludq($mul1,$_n0q); # *=n0 &pmuludq($car1,$mul1); # "t[0]"*np[0]*n0 &paddq ($car1,$acc0); &movd ($acc1,&DWP(4,$np)); # np[1] &movd ($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap)); # ap[1] &psrlq ($car0,32); &psrlq ($car1,32); &inc ($j); # j++ &set_label("1st",16); &pmuludq($acc0,$mul0); # ap[j]*bp[0] &pmuludq($acc1,$mul1); # np[j]*m1 &paddq ($car0,$acc0); # +=c0 &paddq ($car1,$acc1); # +=c1 &movq ($acc0,$car0); &pand ($acc0,$mask); &movd ($acc1,&DWP(4,$np,$j,4)); # np[j+1] &paddq ($car1,$acc0); # +=ap[j]*bp[0]; &movd ($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap,$j,4)); # ap[j+1] &psrlq ($car0,32); &movd (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1); # tp[j-1]= &psrlq ($car1,32); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &cmp ($j,$num); &jl (&label("1st")); &pmuludq($acc0,$mul0); # ap[num-1]*bp[0] &pmuludq($acc1,$mul1); # np[num-1]*m1 &paddq ($car0,$acc0); # +=c0 &paddq ($car1,$acc1); # +=c1 &movq ($acc0,$car0); &pand ($acc0,$mask); &paddq ($car1,$acc0); # +=ap[num-1]*bp[0]; &movd (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1); # tp[num-2]= &psrlq ($car0,32); &psrlq ($car1,32); &paddq ($car1,$car0); &movq (&QWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$car1); # tp[num].tp[num-1] &inc ($i); # i++ &set_label("outer"); &xor ($j,$j); # j=0 &movd ($mul0,&DWP(0,$bp,$i,4)); # bp[i] &movd ($mul1,&DWP(0,$ap)); # ap[0] &movd ($temp,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # tp[0] &movd ($car1,&DWP(0,$np)); # np[0] &pmuludq($mul1,$mul0); # ap[0]*bp[i] &paddq ($mul1,$temp); # +=tp[0] &movq ($acc0,$mul1); &movq ($car0,$mul1); &pand ($acc0,$mask); &pmuludq($mul1,$_n0q); # *=n0 &pmuludq($car1,$mul1); &paddq ($car1,$acc0); &movd ($temp,&DWP($frame+4,"esp")); # tp[1] &movd ($acc1,&DWP(4,$np)); # np[1] &movd ($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap)); # ap[1] &psrlq ($car0,32); &psrlq ($car1,32); &paddq ($car0,$temp); # +=tp[1] &inc ($j); # j++ &dec ($num); &set_label("inner"); &pmuludq($acc0,$mul0); # ap[j]*bp[i] &pmuludq($acc1,$mul1); # np[j]*m1 &paddq ($car0,$acc0); # +=c0 &paddq ($car1,$acc1); # +=c1 &movq ($acc0,$car0); &movd ($temp,&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4));# tp[j+1] &pand ($acc0,$mask); &movd ($acc1,&DWP(4,$np,$j,4)); # np[j+1] &paddq ($car1,$acc0); # +=ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] &movd ($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap,$j,4)); # ap[j+1] &psrlq ($car0,32); &movd (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1);# tp[j-1]= &psrlq ($car1,32); &paddq ($car0,$temp); # +=tp[j+1] &dec ($num); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); # j++ &jnz (&label("inner")); &mov ($num,$j); &pmuludq($acc0,$mul0); # ap[num-1]*bp[i] &pmuludq($acc1,$mul1); # np[num-1]*m1 &paddq ($car0,$acc0); # +=c0 &paddq ($car1,$acc1); # +=c1 &movq ($acc0,$car0); &pand ($acc0,$mask); &paddq ($car1,$acc0); # +=ap[num-1]*bp[i]+tp[num-1] &movd (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1); # tp[num-2]= &psrlq ($car0,32); &psrlq ($car1,32); &movd ($temp,&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4)); # += tp[num] &paddq ($car1,$car0); &paddq ($car1,$temp); &movq (&QWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$car1); # tp[num].tp[num-1] &lea ($i,&DWP(1,$i)); # i++ &cmp ($i,$num); &jle (&label("outer")); &emms (); # done with mmx bank &jmp (&label("common_tail")); &set_label("non_sse2",16); } if (0) { &mov ("esp",$_sp); &xor ("eax","eax"); # signal "not fast enough [yet]" &jmp (&label("just_leave")); # While the below code provides competitive performance for # all key lengthes on modern Intel cores, it's still more # than 10% slower for 4096-bit key elsewhere:-( "Competitive" # means compared to the original integer-only assembler. # 512-bit RSA sign is better by ~40%, but that's about all # one can say about all CPUs... } else { $inp="esi"; # integer path uses these registers differently $word="edi"; $carry="ebp"; &mov ($inp,$_ap); &lea ($carry,&DWP(1,$num)); &mov ($word,$_bp); &xor ($j,$j); # j=0 &mov ("edx",$inp); &and ($carry,1); # see if num is even &sub ("edx",$word); # see if ap==bp &lea ("eax",&DWP(4,$word,$num,4)); # &bp[num] &or ($carry,"edx"); &mov ($word,&DWP(0,$word)); # bp[0] &jz (&label("bn_sqr_mont")); &mov ($_bpend,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); &xor ("edx","edx"); &set_label("mull",16); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[j]*bp[0] &add ($carry,"eax"); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[j+1] &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &jl (&label("mull")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[num-1]*bp[0] &mov ($word,$_n0); &add ("eax",$carry); &mov ($inp,$_np); &adc ("edx",0); &imul ($word,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # n0*tp[0] &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),"eax"); # tp[num-1]= &xor ($j,$j); &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"edx"); # tp[num]= &mov (&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4),$j); # tp[num+1]= &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); # np[0] &mul ($word); # np[0]*m &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp")); # +=tp[0] &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp)); # np[1] &adc ("edx",0); &inc ($j); &jmp (&label("2ndmadd")); &set_label("1stmadd",16); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[j]*bp[i] &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j] &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[j+1] &adc ("edx",0); &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &jl (&label("1stmadd")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[num-1]*bp[i] &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num-1] &mov ($word,$_n0); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ($inp,$_np); &add ($carry,"eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &imul ($word,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # n0*tp[0] &xor ($j,$j); &add ("edx",&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4)); # carry+=tp[num] &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$carry); # tp[num-1]= &adc ($j,0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); # np[0] &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"edx"); # tp[num]= &mov (&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4),$j); # tp[num+1]= &mul ($word); # np[0]*m &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp")); # +=tp[0] &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp)); # np[1] &adc ("edx",0); &mov ($j,1); &set_label("2ndmadd",16); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j] &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # np[j+1] &adc ("edx",0); &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame-8,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j-1]= &jl (&label("2ndmadd")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num-1] &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$num,4),$carry); # tp[num-2]= &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ($j,$_bp); # &bp[i] &add ("edx",&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4)); # carry+=tp[num] &adc ("eax",&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num+1] &lea ($j,&DWP(4,$j)); &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),"edx"); # tp[num-1]= &cmp ($j,$_bpend); &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"eax"); # tp[num]= &je (&label("common_tail")); &mov ($word,&DWP(0,$j)); # bp[i+1] &mov ($inp,$_ap); &mov ($_bp,$j); # &bp[++i] &xor ($j,$j); &xor ("edx","edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); &jmp (&label("1stmadd")); &set_label("bn_sqr_mont",16); $sbit=$num; &mov ($_num,$num); &mov ($_bp,$j); # i=0 &mov ("eax",$word); # ap[0] &mul ($word); # ap[0]*ap[0] &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp"),"eax"); # tp[0]= &mov ($sbit,"edx"); &shr ("edx",1); &and ($sbit,1); &inc ($j); &set_label("sqr",16); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[j] &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[j]*ap[0] &add ("eax",$carry); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &lea ($carry,&DWP(0,$sbit,"eax",2)); &shr ("eax",31); &cmp ($j,$_num); &mov ($sbit,"eax"); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &jl (&label("sqr")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[num-1] &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[num-1]*ap[0] &add ("eax",$carry); &mov ($word,$_n0); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ($inp,$_np); &lea ($carry,&DWP(0,$sbit,"eax",2)); &imul ($word,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # n0*tp[0] &shr ("eax",31); &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[num-1]= &lea ($carry,&DWP(0,"eax","edx",2)); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); # np[0] &shr ("edx",31); &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[num]= &mov (&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$j,4),"edx"); # tp[num+1]= &mul ($word); # np[0]*m &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp")); # +=tp[0] &mov ($num,$j); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp)); # np[1] &mov ($j,1); &set_label("3rdmadd",16); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j] &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp,$j,4)); # np[j+1] &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j-1]= &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j+1]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j+1] &lea ($j,&DWP(2,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # np[j+2] &adc ("edx",0); &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame-8,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &jl (&label("3rdmadd")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num-1] &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$num,4),$carry); # tp[num-2]= &mov ($j,$_bp); # i &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ($inp,$_ap); &add ("edx",&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4)); # carry+=tp[num] &adc ("eax",&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num+1] &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),"edx"); # tp[num-1]= &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"eax"); # tp[num]= &je (&label("common_tail")); &mov ($word,&DWP(4,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[i] &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &mov ("eax",$word); &mov ($_bp,$j); # ++i &mul ($word); # ap[i]*ap[i] &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[i] &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4),"eax"); # tp[i]= &xor ($carry,$carry); &cmp ($j,$num); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &je (&label("sqrlast")); &mov ($sbit,"edx"); # zaps $num &shr ("edx",1); &and ($sbit,1); &set_label("sqradd",16); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[j] &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[j]*ap[i] &add ("eax",$carry); &lea ($carry,&DWP(0,"eax","eax")); &adc ("edx",0); &shr ("eax",31); &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j] &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("eax",0); &add ($carry,$sbit); &adc ("eax",0); &cmp ($j,$_num); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &mov ($sbit,"eax"); &jle (&label("sqradd")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &add ("edx","edx"); &shr ($carry,31); &add ("edx",$sbit); &adc ($carry,0); &set_label("sqrlast"); &mov ($word,$_n0); &mov ($inp,$_np); &imul ($word,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # n0*tp[0] &add ("edx",&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[num] &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); # np[0] &adc ($carry,0); &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4),"edx"); # tp[num]= &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[num+1]= &mul ($word); # np[0]*m &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp")); # +=tp[0] &lea ($num,&DWP(-1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ($j,1); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp)); # np[1] &jmp (&label("3rdmadd")); } &set_label("common_tail",16); &mov ($np,$_np); # load modulus pointer &mov ($rp,$_rp); # load result pointer &lea ($tp,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # [$ap and $bp are zapped] &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$tp)); # tp[0] &mov ($j,$num); # j=num-1 &xor ($i,$i); # i=0 and clear CF! &set_label("sub",16); &sbb ("eax",&DWP(0,$np,$i,4)); &mov (&DWP(0,$rp,$i,4),"eax"); # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] &dec ($j); # doesn't affect CF! &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$tp,$i,4)); # tp[i+1] &lea ($i,&DWP(1,$i)); # i++ &jge (&label("sub")); &sbb ("eax",0); # handle upmost overflow bit - &and ($tp,"eax"); - ¬ ("eax"); - &mov ($np,$rp); - &and ($np,"eax"); - &or ($tp,$np); # tp=carry?tp:rp + &mov ("edx",-1); + &xor ("edx","eax"); + &jmp (&label("copy")); -&set_label("copy",16); # copy or in-place refresh - &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$tp,$num,4)); - &mov (&DWP(0,$rp,$num,4),"eax"); # rp[i]=tp[i] +&set_label("copy",16); # conditional copy + &mov ($tp,&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4)); + &mov ($np,&DWP(0,$rp,$num,4)); &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$j); # zap temporary vector + &and ($tp,"eax"); + &and ($np,"edx"); + &or ($np,$tp); + &mov (&DWP(0,$rp,$num,4),$np); &dec ($num); &jge (&label("copy")); &mov ("esp",$_sp); # pull saved stack pointer &mov ("eax",1); &set_label("just_leave"); &function_end("bn_mul_mont"); &asciz("Montgomery Multiplication for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,1512 +1,1511 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # October 2005. # # Montgomery multiplication routine for x86_64. While it gives modest # 9% improvement of rsa4096 sign on Opteron, rsa512 sign runs more # than twice, >2x, as fast. Most common rsa1024 sign is improved by # respectful 50%. It remains to be seen if loop unrolling and # dedicated squaring routine can provide further improvement... # July 2011. # # Add dedicated squaring procedure. Performance improvement varies # from platform to platform, but in average it's ~5%/15%/25%/33% # for 512-/1024-/2048-/4096-bit RSA *sign* benchmarks respectively. # August 2011. # # Unroll and modulo-schedule inner loops in such manner that they # are "fallen through" for input lengths of 8, which is critical for # 1024-bit RSA *sign*. Average performance improvement in comparison # to *initial* version of this module from 2005 is ~0%/30%/40%/45% # for 512-/1024-/2048-/4096-bit RSA *sign* benchmarks respectively. # June 2013. # # Optimize reduction in squaring procedure and improve 1024+-bit RSA # sign performance by 10-16% on Intel Sandy Bridge and later # (virtually same on non-Intel processors). # August 2013. # # Add MULX/ADOX/ADCX code path. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.23); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.10); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $addx = ($1>=12); } if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%rdx"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%r9"; # int num); $lo0="%r10"; $hi0="%r11"; $hi1="%r13"; $i="%r14"; $j="%r15"; $m0="%rbx"; $m1="%rbp"; $code=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl bn_mul_mont .type bn_mul_mont,\@function,6 .align 16 bn_mul_mont: mov ${num}d,${num}d mov %rsp,%rax test \$3,${num}d jnz .Lmul_enter cmp \$8,${num}d jb .Lmul_enter ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d ___ $code.=<<___; cmp $ap,$bp jne .Lmul4x_enter test \$7,${num}d jz .Lsqr8x_enter jmp .Lmul4x_enter .align 16 .Lmul_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 neg $num mov %rsp,%r11 lea -16(%rsp,$num,8),%r10 # future alloca(8*(num+2)) neg $num # restore $num and \$-1024,%r10 # minimize TLB usage # Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to # physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack # allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can # be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on # other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits # the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one... sub %r10,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%r10,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul_page_walk jmp .Lmul_page_walk_done .align 16 .Lmul_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul_page_walk .Lmul_page_walk_done: mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp .Lmul_body: mov $bp,%r12 # reassign $bp ___ $bp="%r12"; $code.=<<___; mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value mov ($bp),$m0 # m0=bp[0] mov ($ap),%rax xor $i,$i # i=0 xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0] mov %rax,$lo0 mov ($np),%rax imulq $lo0,$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0 mov %rdx,$hi0 mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$lo0 # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$hi1 lea 1($j),$j # j++ jmp .L1st_enter .align 16 .L1st: add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] mov $lo0,$hi0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 .L1st_enter: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$hi0 mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx lea 1($j),$j # j++ mov %rdx,$lo0 mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 cmp $num,$j jne .L1st add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 mov $lo0,$hi0 xor %rdx,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8) mov %rdx,(%rsp,$num,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ jmp .Louter .align 16 .Louter: mov ($bp,$i,8),$m0 # m0=bp[i] xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mov (%rsp),$lo0 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i] add %rax,$lo0 # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mov ($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq $lo0,$m1 # tp[0]*n0 mov %rdx,$hi0 mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$lo0 # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov 8(%rsp),$lo0 # tp[1] mov %rdx,$hi1 lea 1($j),$j # j++ jmp .Linner_enter .align 16 .Linner: add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov (%rsp,$j,8),$lo0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 .Linner_enter: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$hi0 mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$lo0 # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov %rdx,$hi0 adc \$0,$hi0 lea 1($j),$j # j++ mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 cmp $num,$j jne .Linner add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov (%rsp,$j,8),$lo0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 xor %rdx,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # pull upmost overflow bit adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8) mov %rdx,(%rsp,$num,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ cmp $num,$i jb .Louter xor $i,$i # i=0 and clear CF! mov (%rsp),%rax # tp[0] - lea (%rsp),$ap # borrow ap for tp mov $num,$j # j=num - jmp .Lsub + .align 16 .Lsub: sbb ($np,$i,8),%rax mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] - mov 8($ap,$i,8),%rax # tp[i+1] + mov 8(%rsp,$i,8),%rax # tp[i+1] lea 1($i),$i # i++ dec $j # doesnn't affect CF! jnz .Lsub sbb \$0,%rax # handle upmost overflow bit + mov \$-1,%rbx + xor %rax,%rbx # not %rax xor $i,$i - and %rax,$ap - not %rax - mov $rp,$np - and %rax,$np mov $num,$j # j=num - or $np,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp -.align 16 -.Lcopy: # copy or in-place refresh - mov ($ap,$i,8),%rax - mov $i,(%rsp,$i,8) # zap temporary vector - mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i] + +.Lcopy: # conditional copy + mov ($rp,$i,8),%rcx + mov (%rsp,$i,8),%rdx + and %rbx,%rcx + and %rax,%rdx + mov $num,(%rsp,$i,8) # zap temporary vector + or %rcx,%rdx + mov %rdx,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i] lea 1($i),$i sub \$1,$j jnz .Lcopy mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmul_epilogue: ret .size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont ___ {{{ my @A=("%r10","%r11"); my @N=("%r13","%rdi"); $code.=<<___; .type bn_mul4x_mont,\@function,6 .align 16 bn_mul4x_mont: mov ${num}d,${num}d mov %rsp,%rax .Lmul4x_enter: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); and \$0x80100,%r11d cmp \$0x80100,%r11d je .Lmulx4x_enter ___ $code.=<<___; push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 neg $num mov %rsp,%r11 lea -32(%rsp,$num,8),%r10 # future alloca(8*(num+4)) neg $num # restore and \$-1024,%r10 # minimize TLB usage sub %r10,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%r10,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul4x_page_walk jmp .Lmul4x_page_walk_done .Lmul4x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul4x_page_walk .Lmul4x_page_walk_done: mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp .Lmul4x_body: mov $rp,16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+2]=$rp mov %rdx,%r12 # reassign $bp ___ $bp="%r12"; $code.=<<___; mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value mov ($bp),$m0 # m0=bp[0] mov ($ap),%rax xor $i,$i # i=0 xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0] mov %rax,$A[0] mov ($np),%rax imulq $A[0],$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0 mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$A[0] # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 add %rax,$A[1] mov 8($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] lea 4($j),$j # j++ adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],(%rsp) mov %rdx,$N[0] jmp .L1st4x .align 16 .L1st4x: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov -16($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov 8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx lea 4($j),$j # j++ mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov -16($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-32(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] cmp $num,$j jb .L1st4x mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov -16($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] xor $N[1],$N[1] add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,$N[1] mov $N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8) mov $N[1],(%rsp,$j,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ .align 4 .Louter4x: mov ($bp,$i,8),$m0 # m0=bp[i] xor $j,$j # j=0 mov (%rsp),$A[0] mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mov ($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq $A[0],$m1 # tp[0]*n0 mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$A[0] # "$N[0]", discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 8(%rsp),$A[1] # +tp[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] lea 4($j),$j # j+=2 adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],(%rsp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] jmp .Linner4x .align 16 .Linner4x: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov -16($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -16(%rsp,$j,8),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -8(%rsp,$j,8),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add (%rsp,$j,8),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov 8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 8(%rsp,$j,8),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx lea 4($j),$j # j++ mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov -16($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-32(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] cmp $num,$j jb .Linner4x mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov -16($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -16(%rsp,$j,8),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -8(%rsp,$j,8),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx lea 1($i),$i # i++ mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] xor $N[1],$N[1] add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,$N[1] add (%rsp,$num,8),$N[0] # pull upmost overflow bit adc \$0,$N[1] mov $N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8) mov $N[1],(%rsp,$j,8) # store upmost overflow bit cmp $num,$i jb .Louter4x ___ { my @ri=("%rax","%rdx",$m0,$m1); $code.=<<___; mov 16(%rsp,$num,8),$rp # restore $rp + lea -4($num),$j mov 0(%rsp),@ri[0] # tp[0] - pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 mov 8(%rsp),@ri[1] # tp[1] - shr \$2,$num # num/=4 + shr \$2,$j # j=num/4-1 lea (%rsp),$ap # borrow ap for tp xor $i,$i # i=0 and clear CF! sub 0($np),@ri[0] mov 16($ap),@ri[2] # tp[2] mov 24($ap),@ri[3] # tp[3] sbb 8($np),@ri[1] - lea -1($num),$j # j=num/4-1 - jmp .Lsub4x -.align 16 + .Lsub4x: mov @ri[0],0($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] mov @ri[1],8($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] sbb 16($np,$i,8),@ri[2] mov 32($ap,$i,8),@ri[0] # tp[i+1] mov 40($ap,$i,8),@ri[1] sbb 24($np,$i,8),@ri[3] mov @ri[2],16($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] mov @ri[3],24($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] sbb 32($np,$i,8),@ri[0] mov 48($ap,$i,8),@ri[2] mov 56($ap,$i,8),@ri[3] sbb 40($np,$i,8),@ri[1] lea 4($i),$i # i++ dec $j # doesnn't affect CF! jnz .Lsub4x mov @ri[0],0($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] mov 32($ap,$i,8),@ri[0] # load overflow bit sbb 16($np,$i,8),@ri[2] mov @ri[1],8($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] sbb 24($np,$i,8),@ri[3] mov @ri[2],16($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] sbb \$0,@ri[0] # handle upmost overflow bit mov @ri[3],24($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] - xor $i,$i # i=0 - and @ri[0],$ap - not @ri[0] - mov $rp,$np - and @ri[0],$np - lea -1($num),$j - or $np,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp + pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 + movq @ri[0],%xmm4 + pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm5 + pshufd \$0,%xmm4,%xmm4 + mov $num,$j + pxor %xmm4,%xmm5 + shr \$2,$j # j=num/4 + xor %eax,%eax # i=0 - movdqu ($ap),%xmm1 - movdqa %xmm0,(%rsp) - movdqu %xmm1,($rp) jmp .Lcopy4x .align 16 -.Lcopy4x: # copy or in-place refresh - movdqu 16($ap,$i),%xmm2 - movdqu 32($ap,$i),%xmm1 - movdqa %xmm0,16(%rsp,$i) - movdqu %xmm2,16($rp,$i) - movdqa %xmm0,32(%rsp,$i) - movdqu %xmm1,32($rp,$i) - lea 32($i),$i +.Lcopy4x: # conditional copy + movdqa (%rsp,%rax),%xmm1 + movdqu ($rp,%rax),%xmm2 + pand %xmm4,%xmm1 + pand %xmm5,%xmm2 + movdqa 16(%rsp,%rax),%xmm3 + movdqa %xmm0,(%rsp,%rax) + por %xmm2,%xmm1 + movdqu 16($rp,%rax),%xmm2 + movdqu %xmm1,($rp,%rax) + pand %xmm4,%xmm3 + pand %xmm5,%xmm2 + movdqa %xmm0,16(%rsp,%rax) + por %xmm2,%xmm3 + movdqu %xmm3,16($rp,%rax) + lea 32(%rax),%rax dec $j jnz .Lcopy4x - - shl \$2,$num - movdqu 16($ap,$i),%xmm2 - movdqa %xmm0,16(%rsp,$i) - movdqu %xmm2,16($rp,$i) ___ } $code.=<<___; mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmul4x_epilogue: ret .size bn_mul4x_mont,.-bn_mul4x_mont ___ }}} {{{ ###################################################################### # void bn_sqr8x_mont( my $rptr="%rdi"; # const BN_ULONG *rptr, my $aptr="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *aptr, my $bptr="%rdx"; # not used my $nptr="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *nptr, my $n0 ="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0); my $num ="%r9"; # int num, has to be divisible by 8 my ($i,$j,$tptr)=("%rbp","%rcx",$rptr); my @A0=("%r10","%r11"); my @A1=("%r12","%r13"); my ($a0,$a1,$ai)=("%r14","%r15","%rbx"); $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .extern bn_sqrx8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module ___ $code.=<<___; .extern bn_sqr8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module .type bn_sqr8x_mont,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_sqr8x_mont: mov %rsp,%rax .Lsqr8x_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lsqr8x_prologue: mov ${num}d,%r10d shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes shl \$3+2,%r10 # 4*$num neg $num ############################################################## # ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $aptr modulo # 4096. this is done to allow memory disambiguation logic # do its job. # lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 sub $aptr,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lsqr8x_sp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -64(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num) jmp .Lsqr8x_sp_done .align 32 .Lsqr8x_sp_alt: lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10 # 4096-frame-2*$num lea -64(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lsqr8x_sp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lsqr8x_page_walk jmp .Lsqr8x_page_walk_done .align 16 .Lsqr8x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lsqr8x_page_walk .Lsqr8x_page_walk_done: mov $num,%r10 neg $num mov $n0, 32(%rsp) mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lsqr8x_body: movq $nptr, %xmm2 # save pointer to modulus pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax and \$0x80100,%eax cmp \$0x80100,%eax jne .Lsqr8x_nox call bn_sqrx8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module # %rax top-most carry # %rbp nptr # %rcx -8*num # %r8 end of tp[2*num] lea (%r8,%rcx),%rbx mov %rcx,$num mov %rcx,%rdx movq %xmm1,$rptr sar \$3+2,%rcx # %cf=0 jmp .Lsqr8x_sub .align 32 .Lsqr8x_nox: ___ $code.=<<___; call bn_sqr8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module # %rax top-most carry # %rbp nptr # %r8 -8*num # %rdi end of tp[2*num] lea (%rdi,$num),%rbx mov $num,%rcx mov $num,%rdx movq %xmm1,$rptr sar \$3+2,%rcx # %cf=0 jmp .Lsqr8x_sub .align 32 .Lsqr8x_sub: mov 8*0(%rbx),%r12 mov 8*1(%rbx),%r13 mov 8*2(%rbx),%r14 mov 8*3(%rbx),%r15 lea 8*4(%rbx),%rbx sbb 8*0(%rbp),%r12 sbb 8*1(%rbp),%r13 sbb 8*2(%rbp),%r14 sbb 8*3(%rbp),%r15 lea 8*4(%rbp),%rbp mov %r12,8*0($rptr) mov %r13,8*1($rptr) mov %r14,8*2($rptr) mov %r15,8*3($rptr) lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr inc %rcx # preserves %cf jnz .Lsqr8x_sub sbb \$0,%rax # top-most carry lea (%rbx,$num),%rbx # rewind lea ($rptr,$num),$rptr # rewind movq %rax,%xmm1 pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 pshufd \$0,%xmm1,%xmm1 mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp jmp .Lsqr8x_cond_copy .align 32 .Lsqr8x_cond_copy: movdqa 16*0(%rbx),%xmm2 movdqa 16*1(%rbx),%xmm3 lea 16*2(%rbx),%rbx movdqu 16*0($rptr),%xmm4 movdqu 16*1($rptr),%xmm5 lea 16*2($rptr),$rptr movdqa %xmm0,-16*2(%rbx) # zero tp movdqa %xmm0,-16*1(%rbx) movdqa %xmm0,-16*2(%rbx,%rdx) movdqa %xmm0,-16*1(%rbx,%rdx) pcmpeqd %xmm1,%xmm0 pand %xmm1,%xmm2 pand %xmm1,%xmm3 pand %xmm0,%xmm4 pand %xmm0,%xmm5 pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 movdqu %xmm4,-16*2($rptr) movdqu %xmm5,-16*1($rptr) add \$32,$num jnz .Lsqr8x_cond_copy mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lsqr8x_epilogue: ret .size bn_sqr8x_mont,.-bn_sqr8x_mont ___ }}} if ($addx) {{{ my $bp="%rdx"; # original value $code.=<<___; .type bn_mulx4x_mont,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_mulx4x_mont: mov %rsp,%rax .Lmulx4x_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lmulx4x_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes xor %r10,%r10 sub $num,%r10 # -$num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 lea -72(%rsp,%r10),%rbp # future alloca(frame+$num+8) and \$-128,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk jmp .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done .align 16 .Lmulx4x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done: lea ($bp,$num),%r10 ############################################################## # Stack layout # +0 num # +8 off-loaded &b[i] # +16 end of b[num] # +24 saved n0 # +32 saved rp # +40 saved %rsp # +48 inner counter # +56 # +64 tmp[num+1] # mov $num,0(%rsp) # save $num shr \$5,$num mov %r10,16(%rsp) # end of b[num] sub \$1,$num mov $n0, 24(%rsp) # save *n0 mov $rp, 32(%rsp) # save $rp mov %rax,40(%rsp) # save original %rsp mov $num,48(%rsp) # inner counter jmp .Lmulx4x_body .align 32 .Lmulx4x_body: ___ my ($aptr, $bptr, $nptr, $tptr, $mi, $bi, $zero, $num)= ("%rsi","%rdi","%rcx","%rbx","%r8","%r9","%rbp","%rax"); my $rptr=$bptr; $code.=<<___; lea 8($bp),$bptr mov ($bp),%rdx # b[0], $bp==%rdx actually lea 64+32(%rsp),$tptr mov %rdx,$bi mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%rax # a[0]*b[0] mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[1]*b[0] add %rax,%r11 mov $bptr,8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i] mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%r13 # ... adc %r14,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 mov $mi,$bptr # borrow $bptr imulq 24(%rsp),$mi # "t[0]"*n0 xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mulx 3*8($aptr),%rax,%r14 mov $mi,%rdx lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr adcx %rax,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,$bptr # discarded adox %r11,%r10 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa1,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12 mov 48(%rsp),$bptr # counter value mov %r10,-4*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r11,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 adox $zero,%r15 # of=0 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r12,-2*8($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_1st .align 32 .Lmulx4x_1st: adcx $zero,%r15 # cf=0, modulo-scheduled mulx 0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # a[4]*b[0] adcx %r14,%r10 mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[5]*b[0] adcx %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax # ... adcx %r14,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 .byte 0x67,0x67 mov $mi,%rdx adcx %rax,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr adox %r15,%r10 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r15,%r11 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r15,%r12 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %r10,-5*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 mov %r11,-4*8($tptr) adox %r15,%r13 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r12,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r13 adox $zero,%r15 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r13,-2*8($tptr) dec $bptr # of=0, pass cf jnz .Lmulx4x_1st mov 0(%rsp),$num # load num mov 8(%rsp),$bptr # re-load &b[i] adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled add %r15,%r14 sbb %r15,%r15 # top-most carry mov %r14,-1*8($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_outer .align 32 .Lmulx4x_outer: mov ($bptr),%rdx # b[i] lea 8($bptr),$bptr # b++ sub $num,$aptr # rewind $aptr mov %r15,($tptr) # save top-most carry lea 64+4*8(%rsp),$tptr sub $num,$nptr # rewind $nptr mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%r11 # a[0]*b[i] xor %ebp,%ebp # xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mov %rdx,$bi mulx 1*8($aptr),%r14,%r12 # a[1]*b[i] adox -4*8($tptr),$mi adcx %r14,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r15,%r13 # ... adox -3*8($tptr),%r11 adcx %r15,%r12 adox -2*8($tptr),%r12 adcx $zero,%r13 adox $zero,%r13 mov $bptr,8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i] mov $mi,%r15 imulq 24(%rsp),$mi # "t[0]"*n0 xor %ebp,%ebp # xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mulx 3*8($aptr),%rax,%r14 mov $mi,%rdx adcx %rax,%r13 adox -1*8($tptr),%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr adox $zero,%r14 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r15 # discarded adox %r11,%r10 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12 mov %r10,-4*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r11,-3*8($tptr) lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr adcx %rax,%r12 adox $zero,%r15 # of=0 mov 48(%rsp),$bptr # counter value mov %r12,-2*8($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_inner .align 32 .Lmulx4x_inner: mulx 0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # a[4]*b[i] adcx $zero,%r15 # cf=0, modulo-scheduled adox %r14,%r10 mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[5]*b[i] adcx 0*8($tptr),%r10 adox %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax # ... adcx 1*8($tptr),%r11 adox %r14,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 mov $mi,%rdx adcx 2*8($tptr),%r12 adox %rax,%r13 adcx 3*8($tptr),%r13 adox $zero,%r14 # of=0 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 adox %r15,%r10 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r15,%r11 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r15,%r12 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %r10,-5*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r15,%r13 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r11,-4*8($tptr) mov %r12,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r13 adox $zero,%r15 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r13,-2*8($tptr) dec $bptr # of=0, pass cf jnz .Lmulx4x_inner mov 0(%rsp),$num # load num mov 8(%rsp),$bptr # re-load &b[i] adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled sub 0*8($tptr),$zero # pull top-most carry adc %r15,%r14 sbb %r15,%r15 # top-most carry mov %r14,-1*8($tptr) cmp 16(%rsp),$bptr jne .Lmulx4x_outer lea 64(%rsp),$tptr sub $num,$nptr # rewind $nptr neg %r15 mov $num,%rdx shr \$3+2,$num # %cf=0 mov 32(%rsp),$rptr # restore rp jmp .Lmulx4x_sub .align 32 .Lmulx4x_sub: mov 8*0($tptr),%r11 mov 8*1($tptr),%r12 mov 8*2($tptr),%r13 mov 8*3($tptr),%r14 lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr sbb 8*0($nptr),%r11 sbb 8*1($nptr),%r12 sbb 8*2($nptr),%r13 sbb 8*3($nptr),%r14 lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr mov %r11,8*0($rptr) mov %r12,8*1($rptr) mov %r13,8*2($rptr) mov %r14,8*3($rptr) lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr dec $num # preserves %cf jnz .Lmulx4x_sub sbb \$0,%r15 # top-most carry lea 64(%rsp),$tptr sub %rdx,$rptr # rewind movq %r15,%xmm1 pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 pshufd \$0,%xmm1,%xmm1 mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp jmp .Lmulx4x_cond_copy .align 32 .Lmulx4x_cond_copy: movdqa 16*0($tptr),%xmm2 movdqa 16*1($tptr),%xmm3 lea 16*2($tptr),$tptr movdqu 16*0($rptr),%xmm4 movdqu 16*1($rptr),%xmm5 lea 16*2($rptr),$rptr movdqa %xmm0,-16*2($tptr) # zero tp movdqa %xmm0,-16*1($tptr) pcmpeqd %xmm1,%xmm0 pand %xmm1,%xmm2 pand %xmm1,%xmm3 pand %xmm0,%xmm4 pand %xmm0,%xmm5 pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 movdqu %xmm4,-16*2($rptr) movdqu %xmm5,-16*1($rptr) sub \$32,%rdx jnz .Lmulx4x_cond_copy mov %rdx,($tptr) mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmulx4x_epilogue: ret .size bn_mulx4x_mont,.-bn_mulx4x_mont ___ }}} $code.=<<___; .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 16 ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type mul_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 mul_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 192($context),%r10 # pull $num mov 8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax # pull saved stack pointer jmp .Lcommon_pop_regs .size mul_handler,.-mul_handler .type sqr_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 sqr_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lsqr_body jb .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # body label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lsqr_epilogue jb .Lcommon_pop_regs mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 8(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[2] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lsqr_epilogue jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 40(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer .Lcommon_pop_regs: mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size sqr_handler,.-sqr_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mul_mont .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mul_mont .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mul4x_mont .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mul4x_mont .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_sqr8x_mont .rva .LSEH_end_bn_sqr8x_mont .rva .LSEH_info_bn_sqr8x_mont ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mulx4x_mont .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mulx4x_mont .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmul4x_body,.Lmul4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_bn_sqr8x_mont: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva sqr_handler .rva .Lsqr8x_prologue,.Lsqr8x_body,.Lsqr8x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva sqr_handler .rva .Lmulx4x_prologue,.Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 ___ } print $code; close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,3826 +1,3827 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # August 2011. # # Companion to x86_64-mont.pl that optimizes cache-timing attack # countermeasures. The subroutines are produced by replacing bp[i] # references in their x86_64-mont.pl counterparts with cache-neutral # references to powers table computed in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime. # In addition subroutine that scatters elements of the powers table # is implemented, so that scatter-/gathering can be tuned without # bn_exp.c modifications. # August 2013. # # Add MULX/AD*X code paths and additional interfaces to optimize for # branch prediction unit. For input lengths that are multiples of 8 # the np argument is not just modulus value, but one interleaved # with 0. This is to optimize post-condition... $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.23); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.10); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $addx = ($1>=12); } if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } # int bn_mul_mont_gather5( $rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%rdx"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%r9"; # int num, # int idx); # 0 to 2^5-1, "index" in $bp holding # pre-computed powers of a', interlaced # in such manner that b[0] is $bp[idx], # b[1] is [2^5+idx], etc. $lo0="%r10"; $hi0="%r11"; $hi1="%r13"; $i="%r14"; $j="%r15"; $m0="%rbx"; $m1="%rbp"; $code=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl bn_mul_mont_gather5 .type bn_mul_mont_gather5,\@function,6 .align 64 bn_mul_mont_gather5: mov ${num}d,${num}d mov %rsp,%rax test \$7,${num}d jnz .Lmul_enter ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d ___ $code.=<<___; jmp .Lmul4x_enter .align 16 .Lmul_enter: movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%xmm5 # load 7th argument push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 neg $num mov %rsp,%r11 lea -280(%rsp,$num,8),%r10 # future alloca(8*(num+2)+256+8) neg $num # restore $num and \$-1024,%r10 # minimize TLB usage # Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to # physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack # allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can # be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on # other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits # the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one... sub %r10,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%r10,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul_page_walk jmp .Lmul_page_walk_done .Lmul_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul_page_walk .Lmul_page_walk_done: lea .Linc(%rip),%r10 mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp .Lmul_body: lea 128($bp),%r12 # reassign $bp (+size optimization) ___ $bp="%r12"; $STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size" $N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size $code.=<<___; movdqa 0(%r10),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 movdqa 16(%r10),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 lea 24-112(%rsp,$num,8),%r10# place the mask after tp[num+3] (+ICache optimization) and \$-16,%r10 pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack # $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0 .byte 0x67 movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0 paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1 paddd %xmm3,%xmm0 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2 paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ } $code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10) paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 .byte 0x67 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10) pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 # while it's still in register pand `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1 pand `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5 movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 pand `16*($k+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 pand `16*($k+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5 por %xmm4,%xmm0 pand `16*($k+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2 por %xmm5,%xmm1 pand `16*($k+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm1,%xmm0 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1 por %xmm1,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[0] mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value mov ($ap),%rax xor $i,$i # i=0 xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0] mov %rax,$lo0 mov ($np),%rax imulq $lo0,$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0 mov %rdx,$hi0 mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$lo0 # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$hi1 lea 1($j),$j # j++ jmp .L1st_enter .align 16 .L1st: add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] mov $lo0,$hi0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 .L1st_enter: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$hi0 mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx lea 1($j),$j # j++ mov %rdx,$lo0 mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 cmp $num,$j jne .L1st # note that upon exit $j==$num, so # they can be used interchangeably add %rax,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 mov $lo0,$hi0 xor %rdx,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8) mov %rdx,(%rsp,$num,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ jmp .Louter .align 16 .Louter: lea 24+128(%rsp,$num,8),%rdx # where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization) and \$-16,%rdx pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16;$k+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1 movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 pand `16*($k+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0 pand `16*($k+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1 por %xmm0,%xmm4 pand `16*($k+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2 por %xmm1,%xmm5 pand `16*($k+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm5,%xmm4 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0 por %xmm4,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[i] xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mov (%rsp),$lo0 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i] add %rax,$lo0 # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mov ($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq $lo0,$m1 # tp[0]*n0 mov %rdx,$hi0 mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$lo0 # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov 8(%rsp),$lo0 # tp[1] mov %rdx,$hi1 lea 1($j),$j # j++ jmp .Linner_enter .align 16 .Linner: add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov (%rsp,$j,8),$lo0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 .Linner_enter: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$hi0 mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$lo0 # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov %rdx,$hi0 adc \$0,$hi0 lea 1($j),$j # j++ mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 cmp $num,$j jne .Linner # note that upon exit $j==$num, so # they can be used interchangeably add %rax,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov (%rsp,$num,8),$lo0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 xor %rdx,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # pull upmost overflow bit adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8) mov %rdx,(%rsp,$num,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ cmp $num,$i jb .Louter xor $i,$i # i=0 and clear CF! mov (%rsp),%rax # tp[0] lea (%rsp),$ap # borrow ap for tp mov $num,$j # j=num jmp .Lsub .align 16 .Lsub: sbb ($np,$i,8),%rax mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] mov 8($ap,$i,8),%rax # tp[i+1] lea 1($i),$i # i++ dec $j # doesnn't affect CF! jnz .Lsub sbb \$0,%rax # handle upmost overflow bit + mov \$-1,%rbx + xor %rax,%rbx xor $i,$i - and %rax,$ap - not %rax - mov $rp,$np - and %rax,$np mov $num,$j # j=num - or $np,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp -.align 16 -.Lcopy: # copy or in-place refresh - mov ($ap,$i,8),%rax + +.Lcopy: # conditional copy + mov ($rp,$i,8),%rcx + mov (%rsp,$i,8),%rdx + and %rbx,%rcx + and %rax,%rdx mov $i,(%rsp,$i,8) # zap temporary vector - mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i] + or %rcx,%rdx + mov %rdx,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i] lea 1($i),$i sub \$1,$j jnz .Lcopy mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmul_epilogue: ret .size bn_mul_mont_gather5,.-bn_mul_mont_gather5 ___ {{{ my @A=("%r10","%r11"); my @N=("%r13","%rdi"); $code.=<<___; .type bn_mul4x_mont_gather5,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_mul4x_mont_gather5: .byte 0x67 mov %rsp,%rax .Lmul4x_enter: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); and \$0x80108,%r11d cmp \$0x80108,%r11d # check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1 je .Lmulx4x_enter ___ $code.=<<___; push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lmul4x_prologue: .byte 0x67 shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes neg $num # -$num ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation # logic do its magic. [Extra [num] is allocated in order # to align with bn_power5's frame, which is cleansed after # completing exponentiation. Extra 256 bytes is for power mask # calculated from 7th argument, the index.] # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rp,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lmul4xsp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $rp lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256) jmp .Lmul4xsp_done .align 32 .Lmul4xsp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lmul4xsp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmul4x_page_walk jmp .Lmul4x_page_walk_done .Lmul4x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmul4x_page_walk .Lmul4x_page_walk_done: neg $num mov %rax,40(%rsp) .Lmul4x_body: call mul4x_internal mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmul4x_epilogue: ret .size bn_mul4x_mont_gather5,.-bn_mul4x_mont_gather5 .type mul4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 mul4x_internal: shl \$5,$num # $num was in bytes movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%xmm5 # load 7th argument, index lea .Linc(%rip),%rax lea 128(%rdx,$num),%r13 # end of powers table (+size optimization) shr \$5,$num # restore $num ___ $bp="%r12"; $STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size" $N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size $tp=$i; $code.=<<___; movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 lea 88-112(%rsp,$num),%r10 # place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimization) lea 128(%rdx),$bp # size optimization pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4 .byte 0x67,0x67 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack # $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0 .byte 0x67 movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0 paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1 paddd %xmm3,%xmm0 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2 paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ } $code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10) paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 .byte 0x67 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10) pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 # while it's still in register pand `16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1 pand `16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 pand `16*($i+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5 por %xmm4,%xmm0 pand `16*($i+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2 por %xmm5,%xmm1 pand `16*($i+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm1,%xmm0 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1 por %xmm1,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[0] mov %r13,16+8(%rsp) # save end of b[num] mov $rp, 56+8(%rsp) # save $rp mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value mov ($ap),%rax lea ($ap,$num),$ap # end of a[num] neg $num mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0] mov %rax,$A[0] mov ($np),%rax imulq $A[0],$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0 lea 64+8(%rsp),$tp mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$A[0] # discarded mov 8($ap,$num),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 add %rax,$A[1] mov 8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap,$num),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] lea 4*8($num),$j # j=4 lea 8*4($np),$np adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],($tp) mov %rdx,$N[0] jmp .L1st4x .align 32 .L1st4x: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov -8*2($np),%rax lea 32($tp),$tp adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov 8*0($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov 8($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-8($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] lea 8*4($np),$np adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] add \$32,$j # j+=4 jnz .L1st4x mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov -8*2($np),%rax lea 32($tp),$tp adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$num),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] lea ($np,$num),$np # rewind $np xor $N[1],$N[1] add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,$N[1] mov $N[0],-8($tp) jmp .Louter4x .align 32 .Louter4x: lea 16+128($tp),%rdx # where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization) pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0 pand `16*($i+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1 por %xmm0,%xmm4 pand `16*($i+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2 por %xmm1,%xmm5 pand `16*($i+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm5,%xmm4 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0 por %xmm4,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[i] mov ($tp,$num),$A[0] mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mov ($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq $A[0],$m1 # tp[0]*n0 mov %rdx,$A[1] mov $N[1],($tp) # store upmost overflow bit lea ($tp,$num),$tp # rewind $tp mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$A[0] # "$N[0]", discarded mov 8($ap,$num),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 8($tp),$A[1] # +tp[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap,$num),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] lea 4*8($num),$j # j=4 lea 8*4($np),$np adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[0] jmp .Linner4x .align 32 .Linner4x: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov -8*2($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 16($tp),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] lea 32($tp),$tp adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-32($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -8($tp),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov 8*0($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add ($tp),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov 8($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 8($tp),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] lea 8*4($np),$np adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-8($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] add \$32,$j # j+=4 jnz .Linner4x mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov -8*2($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 16($tp),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] lea 32($tp),$tp adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-32($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov $m1,%rax mov -8*1($np),$m1 adc \$0,%rdx add -8($tp),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$num),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1] lea ($np,$num),$np # rewind $np xor $N[1],$N[1] add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,$N[1] add ($tp),$N[0] # pull upmost overflow bit adc \$0,$N[1] # upmost overflow bit mov $N[0],-8($tp) cmp 16+8(%rsp),$bp jb .Louter4x ___ if (1) { $code.=<<___; xor %rax,%rax sub $N[0],$m1 # compare top-most words adc $j,$j # $j is zero or $j,$N[1] sub $N[1],%rax # %rax=-$N[1] lea ($tp,$num),%rbx # tptr in .sqr4x_sub mov ($np),%r12 lea ($np),%rbp # nptr in .sqr4x_sub mov %r9,%rcx sar \$3+2,%rcx mov 56+8(%rsp),%rdi # rptr in .sqr4x_sub dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0] xor %r10,%r10 mov 8*1(%rbp),%r13 mov 8*2(%rbp),%r14 mov 8*3(%rbp),%r15 jmp .Lsqr4x_sub_entry ___ } else { my @ri=("%rax",$bp,$m0,$m1); my $rp="%rdx"; $code.=<<___ xor \$1,$N[1] lea ($tp,$num),$tp # rewind $tp sar \$5,$num # cf=0 lea ($np,$N[1],8),$np mov 56+8(%rsp),$rp # restore $rp jmp .Lsub4x .align 32 .Lsub4x: .byte 0x66 mov 8*0($tp),@ri[0] mov 8*1($tp),@ri[1] .byte 0x66 sbb 16*0($np),@ri[0] mov 8*2($tp),@ri[2] sbb 16*1($np),@ri[1] mov 3*8($tp),@ri[3] lea 4*8($tp),$tp sbb 16*2($np),@ri[2] mov @ri[0],8*0($rp) sbb 16*3($np),@ri[3] lea 16*4($np),$np mov @ri[1],8*1($rp) mov @ri[2],8*2($rp) mov @ri[3],8*3($rp) lea 8*4($rp),$rp inc $num jnz .Lsub4x ret ___ } $code.=<<___; .size mul4x_internal,.-mul4x_internal ___ }}} {{{ ###################################################################### # void bn_power5( my $rptr="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rptr, my $aptr="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *aptr, my $bptr="%rdx"; # const void *table, my $nptr="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *nptr, my $n0 ="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0); my $num ="%r9"; # int num, has to be divisible by 8 # int pwr my ($i,$j,$tptr)=("%rbp","%rcx",$rptr); my @A0=("%r10","%r11"); my @A1=("%r12","%r13"); my ($a0,$a1,$ai)=("%r14","%r15","%rbx"); $code.=<<___; .globl bn_power5 .type bn_power5,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_power5: mov %rsp,%rax ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d and \$0x80108,%r11d cmp \$0x80108,%r11d # check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1 je .Lpowerx5_enter ___ $code.=<<___; push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lpower5_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10d # 3*$num neg $num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation # logic do its magic. [Extra 256 bytes is for power mask # calculated from 7th argument, the index.] # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rptr,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lpwr_sp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256) jmp .Lpwr_sp_done .align 32 .Lpwr_sp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lpwr_sp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lpwr_page_walk jmp .Lpwr_page_walk_done .Lpwr_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lpwr_page_walk .Lpwr_page_walk_done: mov $num,%r10 neg $num ############################################################## # Stack layout # # +0 saved $num, used in reduction section # +8 &t[2*$num], used in reduction section # +32 saved *n0 # +40 saved %rsp # +48 t[2*$num] # mov $n0, 32(%rsp) mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lpower5_body: movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr, used in sqr8x movq $nptr,%xmm2 # save $nptr movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num, used in sqr8x movq $bptr,%xmm4 call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal movq %xmm2,$nptr movq %xmm4,$bptr mov $aptr,$rptr mov 40(%rsp),%rax lea 32(%rsp),$n0 call mul4x_internal mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lpower5_epilogue: ret .size bn_power5,.-bn_power5 .globl bn_sqr8x_internal .hidden bn_sqr8x_internal .type bn_sqr8x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 bn_sqr8x_internal: __bn_sqr8x_internal: ############################################################## # Squaring part: # # a) multiply-n-add everything but a[i]*a[i]; # b) shift result of a) by 1 to the left and accumulate # a[i]*a[i] products; # ############################################################## # a[1]a[0] # a[2]a[0] # a[3]a[0] # a[2]a[1] # a[4]a[0] # a[3]a[1] # a[5]a[0] # a[4]a[1] # a[3]a[2] # a[6]a[0] # a[5]a[1] # a[4]a[2] # a[7]a[0] # a[6]a[1] # a[5]a[2] # a[4]a[3] # a[7]a[1] # a[6]a[2] # a[5]a[3] # a[7]a[2] # a[6]a[3] # a[5]a[4] # a[7]a[3] # a[6]a[4] # a[7]a[4] # a[6]a[5] # a[7]a[5] # a[7]a[6] # a[1]a[0] # a[2]a[0] # a[3]a[0] # a[4]a[0] # a[5]a[0] # a[6]a[0] # a[7]a[0] # a[2]a[1] # a[3]a[1] # a[4]a[1] # a[5]a[1] # a[6]a[1] # a[7]a[1] # a[3]a[2] # a[4]a[2] # a[5]a[2] # a[6]a[2] # a[7]a[2] # a[4]a[3] # a[5]a[3] # a[6]a[3] # a[7]a[3] # a[5]a[4] # a[6]a[4] # a[7]a[4] # a[6]a[5] # a[7]a[5] # a[7]a[6] # a[0]a[0] # a[1]a[1] # a[2]a[2] # a[3]a[3] # a[4]a[4] # a[5]a[5] # a[6]a[6] # a[7]a[7] lea 32(%r10),$i # $i=-($num-32) lea ($aptr,$num),$aptr # end of a[] buffer, ($aptr,$i)=&ap[2] mov $num,$j # $j=$num # comments apply to $num==8 case mov -32($aptr,$i),$a0 # a[0] lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr # end of tp[] buffer, &tp[2*$num] mov -24($aptr,$i),%rax # a[1] lea -32($tptr,$i),$tptr # end of tp[] window, &tp[2*$num-"$i"] mov -16($aptr,$i),$ai # a[2] mov %rax,$a1 mul $a0 # a[1]*a[0] mov %rax,$A0[0] # a[1]*a[0] mov $ai,%rax # a[2] mov %rdx,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-24($tptr,$i) # t[1] mul $a0 # a[2]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov $A0[1],-16($tptr,$i) # t[2] mov %rdx,$A0[0] mov -8($aptr,$i),$ai # a[3] mul $a1 # a[2]*a[1] mov %rax,$A1[0] # a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A1[1] lea ($i),$j mul $a0 # a[3]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[3]*a[0]+a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] add $A1[0],$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr,$j) # t[3] jmp .Lsqr4x_1st .align 32 .Lsqr4x_1st: mov ($aptr,$j),$ai # a[4] mul $a1 # a[3]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[1] # a[3]*a[1]+t[4] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A1[0] adc \$0,$A1[0] mul $a0 # a[4]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] # a[4]*a[0]+a[3]*a[1]+t[4] mov $ai,%rax # a[3] mov 8($aptr,$j),$ai # a[5] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] add $A1[1],$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[0] mul $a1 # a[4]*a[3] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[4]*a[3]+t[5] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[1],($tptr,$j) # t[4] mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] mul $a0 # a[5]*a[2] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[5]*a[2]+a[4]*a[3]+t[5] mov $ai,%rax mov 16($aptr,$j),$ai # a[6] mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] add $A1[0],$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[1] mul $a1 # a[5]*a[3] add %rax,$A1[1] # a[5]*a[3]+t[6] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[0],8($tptr,$j) # t[5] mov %rdx,$A1[0] adc \$0,$A1[0] mul $a0 # a[6]*a[2] add %rax,$A0[1] # a[6]*a[2]+a[5]*a[3]+t[6] mov $ai,%rax # a[3] mov 24($aptr,$j),$ai # a[7] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] add $A1[1],$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[0] mul $a1 # a[6]*a[5] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[6]*a[5]+t[7] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[1],16($tptr,$j) # t[6] mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] lea 32($j),$j mul $a0 # a[7]*a[4] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[7]*a[4]+a[6]*a[5]+t[6] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] add $A1[0],$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr,$j) # t[7] cmp \$0,$j jne .Lsqr4x_1st mul $a1 # a[7]*a[5] add %rax,$A1[1] lea 16($i),$i adc \$0,%rdx add $A0[1],$A1[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $A1[1],($tptr) # t[8] mov %rdx,$A1[0] mov %rdx,8($tptr) # t[9] jmp .Lsqr4x_outer .align 32 .Lsqr4x_outer: # comments apply to $num==6 case mov -32($aptr,$i),$a0 # a[0] lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr # end of tp[] buffer, &tp[2*$num] mov -24($aptr,$i),%rax # a[1] lea -32($tptr,$i),$tptr # end of tp[] window, &tp[2*$num-"$i"] mov -16($aptr,$i),$ai # a[2] mov %rax,$a1 mul $a0 # a[1]*a[0] mov -24($tptr,$i),$A0[0] # t[1] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[1]*a[0]+t[1] mov $ai,%rax # a[2] adc \$0,%rdx mov $A0[0],-24($tptr,$i) # t[1] mov %rdx,$A0[1] mul $a0 # a[2]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -16($tptr,$i),$A0[1] # a[2]*a[0]+t[2] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] mov $A0[1],-16($tptr,$i) # t[2] xor $A1[0],$A1[0] mov -8($aptr,$i),$ai # a[3] mul $a1 # a[2]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -8($tptr,$i),$A1[0] mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] mul $a0 # a[3]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[3]*a[0]+a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A1[0],$A0[0] mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr,$i) # t[3] lea ($i),$j jmp .Lsqr4x_inner .align 32 .Lsqr4x_inner: mov ($aptr,$j),$ai # a[4] mul $a1 # a[3]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[1] # a[3]*a[1]+t[4] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A1[0] adc \$0,$A1[0] add ($tptr,$j),$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[0] .byte 0x67 mul $a0 # a[4]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] # a[4]*a[0]+a[3]*a[1]+t[4] mov $ai,%rax # a[3] mov 8($aptr,$j),$ai # a[5] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] add $A1[1],$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[0] mul $a1 # a[4]*a[3] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[4]*a[3]+t[5] mov $A0[1],($tptr,$j) # t[4] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] add 8($tptr,$j),$A1[0] lea 16($j),$j # j++ adc \$0,$A1[1] mul $a0 # a[5]*a[2] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[5]*a[2]+a[4]*a[3]+t[5] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A1[0],$A0[0] mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr,$j) # t[5], "preloaded t[1]" below cmp \$0,$j jne .Lsqr4x_inner .byte 0x67 mul $a1 # a[5]*a[3] add %rax,$A1[1] adc \$0,%rdx add $A0[1],$A1[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $A1[1],($tptr) # t[6], "preloaded t[2]" below mov %rdx,$A1[0] mov %rdx,8($tptr) # t[7], "preloaded t[3]" below add \$16,$i jnz .Lsqr4x_outer # comments apply to $num==4 case mov -32($aptr),$a0 # a[0] lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr # end of tp[] buffer, &tp[2*$num] mov -24($aptr),%rax # a[1] lea -32($tptr,$i),$tptr # end of tp[] window, &tp[2*$num-"$i"] mov -16($aptr),$ai # a[2] mov %rax,$a1 mul $a0 # a[1]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[1]*a[0]+t[1], preloaded t[1] mov $ai,%rax # a[2] mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] mul $a0 # a[2]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[0],-24($tptr) # t[1] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] add $A1[1],$A0[1] # a[2]*a[0]+t[2], preloaded t[2] mov -8($aptr),$ai # a[3] adc \$0,$A0[0] mul $a1 # a[2]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[2]*a[1]+t[3], preloaded t[3] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[1],-16($tptr) # t[2] mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] mul $a0 # a[3]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[3]*a[0]+a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] add $A1[0],$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr) # t[3] mul $a1 # a[3]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[1] mov -16($aptr),%rax # a[2] adc \$0,%rdx add $A0[1],$A1[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $A1[1],($tptr) # t[4] mov %rdx,$A1[0] mov %rdx,8($tptr) # t[5] mul $ai # a[2]*a[3] ___ { my ($shift,$carry)=($a0,$a1); my @S=(@A1,$ai,$n0); $code.=<<___; add \$16,$i xor $shift,$shift sub $num,$i # $i=16-$num xor $carry,$carry add $A1[0],%rax # t[5] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rax,8($tptr) # t[5] mov %rdx,16($tptr) # t[6] mov $carry,24($tptr) # t[7] mov -16($aptr,$i),%rax # a[0] lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr xor $A0[0],$A0[0] # t[0] mov 8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[1] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 16($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 24($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[0] mov -8($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[0],($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift mov $S[1],8($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[3] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 32($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 40($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[2] mov 0($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[2],16($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[3] lea 16($i),$i mov $S[3],24($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry lea 64($tptr),$tptr jmp .Lsqr4x_shift_n_add .align 32 .Lsqr4x_shift_n_add: lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[1] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov -16($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov -8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[0] mov -8($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[0],-32($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift mov $S[1],-24($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[3] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 0($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[2] mov 0($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[2],-16($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[3] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift mov $S[3],-8($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[1] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 16($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 24($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[0] mov 8($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[0],0($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift mov $S[1],8($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[3] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 32($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 40($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[2] mov 16($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[2],16($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[3] mov $S[3],24($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry lea 64($tptr),$tptr add \$32,$i jnz .Lsqr4x_shift_n_add lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift .byte 0x67 shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[1] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov -16($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov -8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[0] mov -8($aptr),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[0],-32($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2] # t[2*i]<<1|shift mov $S[1],-24($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[3] # | t[2*i]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf adc %rax,$S[2] adc %rdx,$S[3] mov $S[2],-16($tptr) mov $S[3],-8($tptr) ___ } ###################################################################### # Montgomery reduction part, "word-by-word" algorithm. # # This new path is inspired by multiple submissions from Intel, by # Shay Gueron, Vlad Krasnov, Erdinc Ozturk, James Guilford, # Vinodh Gopal... { my ($nptr,$tptr,$carry,$m0)=("%rbp","%rdi","%rsi","%rbx"); $code.=<<___; movq %xmm2,$nptr __bn_sqr8x_reduction: xor %rax,%rax lea ($nptr,$num),%rcx # end of n[] lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),%rdx # end of t[] buffer mov %rcx,0+8(%rsp) lea 48+8(%rsp,$num),$tptr # end of initial t[] window mov %rdx,8+8(%rsp) neg $num jmp .L8x_reduction_loop .align 32 .L8x_reduction_loop: lea ($tptr,$num),$tptr # start of current t[] window .byte 0x66 mov 8*0($tptr),$m0 mov 8*1($tptr),%r9 mov 8*2($tptr),%r10 mov 8*3($tptr),%r11 mov 8*4($tptr),%r12 mov 8*5($tptr),%r13 mov 8*6($tptr),%r14 mov 8*7($tptr),%r15 mov %rax,(%rdx) # store top-most carry bit lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr .byte 0x67 mov $m0,%r8 imulq 32+8(%rsp),$m0 # n0*a[0] mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # n[0] mov \$8,%ecx jmp .L8x_reduce .align 32 .L8x_reduce: mulq $m0 mov 8*1($nptr),%rax # n[1] neg %r8 mov %rdx,%r8 adc \$0,%r8 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r9 mov 8*2($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r9,%r8 mov $m0,48-8+8(%rsp,%rcx,8) # put aside n0*a[i] mov %rdx,%r9 adc \$0,%r9 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r10 mov 8*3($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r10,%r9 mov 32+8(%rsp),$carry # pull n0, borrow $carry mov %rdx,%r10 adc \$0,%r10 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r11 mov 8*4($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq %r8,$carry # modulo-scheduled add %r11,%r10 mov %rdx,%r11 adc \$0,%r11 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r12 mov 8*5($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r12,%r11 mov %rdx,%r12 adc \$0,%r12 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r13 mov 8*6($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r13,%r12 mov %rdx,%r13 adc \$0,%r13 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r14 mov 8*7($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r14,%r13 mov %rdx,%r14 adc \$0,%r14 mulq $m0 mov $carry,$m0 # n0*a[i] add %rax,%r15 mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # n[0] adc \$0,%rdx add %r15,%r14 mov %rdx,%r15 adc \$0,%r15 dec %ecx jnz .L8x_reduce lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr xor %rax,%rax mov 8+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull end of t[] cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]? jae .L8x_no_tail .byte 0x66 add 8*0($tptr),%r8 adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 sbb $carry,$carry # top carry mov 48+56+8(%rsp),$m0 # pull n0*a[0] mov \$8,%ecx mov 8*0($nptr),%rax jmp .L8x_tail .align 32 .L8x_tail: mulq $m0 add %rax,%r8 mov 8*1($nptr),%rax mov %r8,($tptr) # save result mov %rdx,%r8 adc \$0,%r8 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r9 mov 8*2($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r9,%r8 lea 8($tptr),$tptr # $tptr++ mov %rdx,%r9 adc \$0,%r9 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r10 mov 8*3($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r10,%r9 mov %rdx,%r10 adc \$0,%r10 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r11 mov 8*4($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r11,%r10 mov %rdx,%r11 adc \$0,%r11 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r12 mov 8*5($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r12,%r11 mov %rdx,%r12 adc \$0,%r12 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r13 mov 8*6($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r13,%r12 mov %rdx,%r13 adc \$0,%r13 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r14 mov 8*7($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r14,%r13 mov %rdx,%r14 adc \$0,%r14 mulq $m0 mov 48-16+8(%rsp,%rcx,8),$m0# pull n0*a[i] add %rax,%r15 adc \$0,%rdx add %r15,%r14 mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # pull n[0] mov %rdx,%r15 adc \$0,%r15 dec %ecx jnz .L8x_tail lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr mov 8+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull end of t[] cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]? jae .L8x_tail_done # break out of loop mov 48+56+8(%rsp),$m0 # pull n0*a[0] neg $carry mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # pull n[0] adc 8*0($tptr),%r8 adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 sbb $carry,$carry # top carry mov \$8,%ecx jmp .L8x_tail .align 32 .L8x_tail_done: xor %rax,%rax add (%rdx),%r8 # can this overflow? adc \$0,%r9 adc \$0,%r10 adc \$0,%r11 adc \$0,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 adc \$0,%r14 adc \$0,%r15 adc \$0,%rax neg $carry .L8x_no_tail: adc 8*0($tptr),%r8 adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 adc \$0,%rax # top-most carry mov -8($nptr),%rcx # np[num-1] xor $carry,$carry movq %xmm2,$nptr # restore $nptr mov %r8,8*0($tptr) # store top 512 bits mov %r9,8*1($tptr) movq %xmm3,$num # $num is %r9, can't be moved upwards mov %r10,8*2($tptr) mov %r11,8*3($tptr) mov %r12,8*4($tptr) mov %r13,8*5($tptr) mov %r14,8*6($tptr) mov %r15,8*7($tptr) lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr cmp %rdx,$tptr # end of t[]? jb .L8x_reduction_loop ret .size bn_sqr8x_internal,.-bn_sqr8x_internal ___ } ############################################################## # Post-condition, 4x unrolled # { my ($tptr,$nptr)=("%rbx","%rbp"); $code.=<<___; .type __bn_post4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __bn_post4x_internal: mov 8*0($nptr),%r12 lea (%rdi,$num),$tptr # %rdi was $tptr above mov $num,%rcx movq %xmm1,$rptr # restore $rptr neg %rax movq %xmm1,$aptr # prepare for back-to-back call sar \$3+2,%rcx dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0] xor %r10,%r10 mov 8*1($nptr),%r13 mov 8*2($nptr),%r14 mov 8*3($nptr),%r15 jmp .Lsqr4x_sub_entry .align 16 .Lsqr4x_sub: mov 8*0($nptr),%r12 mov 8*1($nptr),%r13 mov 8*2($nptr),%r14 mov 8*3($nptr),%r15 .Lsqr4x_sub_entry: lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr not %r12 not %r13 not %r14 not %r15 and %rax,%r12 and %rax,%r13 and %rax,%r14 and %rax,%r15 neg %r10 # mov %r10,%cf adc 8*0($tptr),%r12 adc 8*1($tptr),%r13 adc 8*2($tptr),%r14 adc 8*3($tptr),%r15 mov %r12,8*0($rptr) lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr mov %r13,8*1($rptr) sbb %r10,%r10 # mov %cf,%r10 mov %r14,8*2($rptr) mov %r15,8*3($rptr) lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr inc %rcx # pass %cf jnz .Lsqr4x_sub mov $num,%r10 # prepare for back-to-back call neg $num # restore $num ret .size __bn_post4x_internal,.-__bn_post4x_internal ___ } { $code.=<<___; .globl bn_from_montgomery .type bn_from_montgomery,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 bn_from_montgomery: testl \$7,`($win64?"48(%rsp)":"%r9d")` jz bn_from_mont8x xor %eax,%eax ret .size bn_from_montgomery,.-bn_from_montgomery .type bn_from_mont8x,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_from_mont8x: .byte 0x67 mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lfrom_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes neg $num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). The stack is allocated to aligned with # bn_power5's frame, and as bn_from_montgomery happens to be # last operation, we use the opportunity to cleanse it. # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rptr,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lfrom_sp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) jmp .Lfrom_sp_done .align 32 .Lfrom_sp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lfrom_sp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lfrom_page_walk jmp .Lfrom_page_walk_done .Lfrom_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lfrom_page_walk .Lfrom_page_walk_done: mov $num,%r10 neg $num ############################################################## # Stack layout # # +0 saved $num, used in reduction section # +8 &t[2*$num], used in reduction section # +32 saved *n0 # +40 saved %rsp # +48 t[2*$num] # mov $n0, 32(%rsp) mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lfrom_body: mov $num,%r11 lea 48(%rsp),%rax pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 jmp .Lmul_by_1 .align 32 .Lmul_by_1: movdqu ($aptr),%xmm1 movdqu 16($aptr),%xmm2 movdqu 32($aptr),%xmm3 movdqa %xmm0,(%rax,$num) movdqu 48($aptr),%xmm4 movdqa %xmm0,16(%rax,$num) .byte 0x48,0x8d,0xb6,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00 # lea 64($aptr),$aptr movdqa %xmm1,(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,32(%rax,$num) movdqa %xmm2,16(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,48(%rax,$num) movdqa %xmm3,32(%rax) movdqa %xmm4,48(%rax) lea 64(%rax),%rax sub \$64,%r11 jnz .Lmul_by_1 movq $rptr,%xmm1 movq $nptr,%xmm2 .byte 0x67 mov $nptr,%rbp movq %r10, %xmm3 # -num ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d and \$0x80108,%r11d cmp \$0x80108,%r11d # check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1 jne .Lfrom_mont_nox lea (%rax,$num),$rptr call __bn_sqrx8x_reduction call __bn_postx4x_internal pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 lea 48(%rsp),%rax mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp jmp .Lfrom_mont_zero .align 32 .Lfrom_mont_nox: ___ $code.=<<___; call __bn_sqr8x_reduction call __bn_post4x_internal pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 lea 48(%rsp),%rax mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp jmp .Lfrom_mont_zero .align 32 .Lfrom_mont_zero: movdqa %xmm0,16*0(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,16*1(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,16*2(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,16*3(%rax) lea 16*4(%rax),%rax sub \$32,$num jnz .Lfrom_mont_zero mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lfrom_epilogue: ret .size bn_from_mont8x,.-bn_from_mont8x ___ } }}} if ($addx) {{{ my $bp="%rdx"; # restore original value $code.=<<___; .type bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5: mov %rsp,%rax .Lmulx4x_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lmulx4x_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes neg $num # -$num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation # logic do its magic. [Extra [num] is allocated in order # to align with bn_power5's frame, which is cleansed after # completing exponentiation. Extra 256 bytes is for power mask # calculated from 7th argument, the index.] # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rp,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lmulx4xsp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) jmp .Lmulx4xsp_done .Lmulx4xsp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lmulx4xsp_done: and \$-64,%rbp # ensure alignment mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk jmp .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done .Lmulx4x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done: ############################################################## # Stack layout # +0 -num # +8 off-loaded &b[i] # +16 end of b[num] # +24 inner counter # +32 saved n0 # +40 saved %rsp # +48 # +56 saved rp # +64 tmp[num+1] # mov $n0, 32(%rsp) # save *n0 mov %rax,40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lmulx4x_body: call mulx4x_internal mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmulx4x_epilogue: ret .size bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5,.-bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5 .type mulx4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 mulx4x_internal: mov $num,8(%rsp) # save -$num (it was in bytes) mov $num,%r10 neg $num # restore $num shl \$5,$num neg %r10 # restore $num lea 128($bp,$num),%r13 # end of powers table (+size optimization) shr \$5+5,$num movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%xmm5 # load 7th argument sub \$1,$num lea .Linc(%rip),%rax mov %r13,16+8(%rsp) # end of b[num] mov $num,24+8(%rsp) # inner counter mov $rp, 56+8(%rsp) # save $rp ___ my ($aptr, $bptr, $nptr, $tptr, $mi, $bi, $zero, $num)= ("%rsi","%rdi","%rcx","%rbx","%r8","%r9","%rbp","%rax"); my $rptr=$bptr; my $STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size" my $N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size $code.=<<___; movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 lea 88-112(%rsp,%r10),%r10 # place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimizaton) lea 128($bp),$bptr # size optimization pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4 .byte 0x67 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack # $code.=<<___; .byte 0x67 paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0 movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0 paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1 paddd %xmm3,%xmm0 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2 paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ } $code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized .byte 0x67 paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10) paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10) pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm0 # while it's still in register pand `16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm1 pand `16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm5 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2 pand `16*($i+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5 por %xmm4,%xmm0 pand `16*($i+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2 por %xmm5,%xmm1 pand `16*($i+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ } $code.=<<___; pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1 por %xmm1,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bptr),$bptr movq %xmm0,%rdx # bp[0] lea 64+8*4+8(%rsp),$tptr mov %rdx,$bi mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%rax # a[0]*b[0] mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r12 # a[1]*b[0] add %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%rax,%r13 # ... adc %rax,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 mulx 3*8($aptr),%rax,%r14 mov $mi,%r15 imulq 32+8(%rsp),$mi # "t[0]"*n0 xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mov $mi,%rdx mov $bptr,8+8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i] lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr adcx %rax,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r15 # discarded adox %r11,%r10 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12 mov 24+8(%rsp),$bptr # counter value mov %r10,-8*4($tptr) adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r11,-8*3($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 adox $zero,%r15 # of=0 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r12,-8*2($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_1st .align 32 .Lmulx4x_1st: adcx $zero,%r15 # cf=0, modulo-scheduled mulx 0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # a[4]*b[0] adcx %r14,%r10 mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[5]*b[0] adcx %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax # ... adcx %r14,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 .byte 0x67,0x67 mov $mi,%rdx adcx %rax,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr adox %r15,%r10 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r15,%r11 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r15,%r12 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %r10,-5*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 mov %r11,-4*8($tptr) adox %r15,%r13 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r12,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r13 adox $zero,%r15 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r13,-2*8($tptr) dec $bptr # of=0, pass cf jnz .Lmulx4x_1st mov 8(%rsp),$num # load -num adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled lea ($aptr,$num),$aptr # rewind $aptr add %r15,%r14 mov 8+8(%rsp),$bptr # re-load &b[i] adc $zero,$zero # top-most carry mov %r14,-1*8($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_outer .align 32 .Lmulx4x_outer: lea 16-256($tptr),%r10 # where 256-byte mask is (+density control) pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 .byte 0x67,0x67 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm1 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2 pand `16*($i+0)+256`(%r10),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+1)+256`(%r10),%xmm1 por %xmm0,%xmm4 pand `16*($i+2)+256`(%r10),%xmm2 por %xmm1,%xmm5 pand `16*($i+3)+256`(%r10),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm5,%xmm4 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0 por %xmm4,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bptr),$bptr movq %xmm0,%rdx # m0=bp[i] mov $zero,($tptr) # save top-most carry lea 4*8($tptr,$num),$tptr # rewind $tptr mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%r11 # a[0]*b[i] xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mov %rdx,$bi mulx 1*8($aptr),%r14,%r12 # a[1]*b[i] adox -4*8($tptr),$mi # +t[0] adcx %r14,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r15,%r13 # ... adox -3*8($tptr),%r11 adcx %r15,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%rdx,%r14 adox -2*8($tptr),%r12 adcx %rdx,%r13 lea ($nptr,$num),$nptr # rewind $nptr lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr adox -1*8($tptr),%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 adox $zero,%r14 mov $mi,%r15 imulq 32+8(%rsp),$mi # "t[0]"*n0 mov $mi,%rdx xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mov $bptr,8+8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i] mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r15 # discarded adox %r11,%r10 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov 24+8(%rsp),$bptr # counter value mov %r10,-8*4($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 mov %r11,-8*3($tptr) adox $zero,%r15 # of=0 mov %r12,-8*2($tptr) lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr jmp .Lmulx4x_inner .align 32 .Lmulx4x_inner: mulx 0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # a[4]*b[i] adcx $zero,%r15 # cf=0, modulo-scheduled adox %r14,%r10 mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[5]*b[i] adcx 0*8($tptr),%r10 adox %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax # ... adcx 1*8($tptr),%r11 adox %r14,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 mov $mi,%rdx adcx 2*8($tptr),%r12 adox %rax,%r13 adcx 3*8($tptr),%r13 adox $zero,%r14 # of=0 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 adox %r15,%r10 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r15,%r11 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r15,%r12 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %r10,-5*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r15,%r13 mov %r11,-4*8($tptr) mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r12,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r13 adox $zero,%r15 mov %r13,-2*8($tptr) dec $bptr # of=0, pass cf jnz .Lmulx4x_inner mov 0+8(%rsp),$num # load -num adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled sub 0*8($tptr),$bptr # pull top-most carry to %cf mov 8+8(%rsp),$bptr # re-load &b[i] mov 16+8(%rsp),%r10 adc %r15,%r14 lea ($aptr,$num),$aptr # rewind $aptr adc $zero,$zero # top-most carry mov %r14,-1*8($tptr) cmp %r10,$bptr jb .Lmulx4x_outer mov -8($nptr),%r10 mov $zero,%r8 mov ($nptr,$num),%r12 lea ($nptr,$num),%rbp # rewind $nptr mov $num,%rcx lea ($tptr,$num),%rdi # rewind $tptr xor %eax,%eax xor %r15,%r15 sub %r14,%r10 # compare top-most words adc %r15,%r15 or %r15,%r8 sar \$3+2,%rcx sub %r8,%rax # %rax=-%r8 mov 56+8(%rsp),%rdx # restore rp dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0] mov 8*1(%rbp),%r13 xor %r8,%r8 mov 8*2(%rbp),%r14 mov 8*3(%rbp),%r15 jmp .Lsqrx4x_sub_entry # common post-condition .size mulx4x_internal,.-mulx4x_internal ___ } { ###################################################################### # void bn_power5( my $rptr="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rptr, my $aptr="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *aptr, my $bptr="%rdx"; # const void *table, my $nptr="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *nptr, my $n0 ="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0); my $num ="%r9"; # int num, has to be divisible by 8 # int pwr); my ($i,$j,$tptr)=("%rbp","%rcx",$rptr); my @A0=("%r10","%r11"); my @A1=("%r12","%r13"); my ($a0,$a1,$ai)=("%r14","%r15","%rbx"); $code.=<<___; .type bn_powerx5,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_powerx5: mov %rsp,%rax .Lpowerx5_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lpowerx5_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes neg $num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation # logic do its magic. [Extra 256 bytes is for power mask # calculated from 7th argument, the index.] # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rptr,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lpwrx_sp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) jmp .Lpwrx_sp_done .align 32 .Lpwrx_sp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lpwrx_sp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lpwrx_page_walk jmp .Lpwrx_page_walk_done .Lpwrx_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lpwrx_page_walk .Lpwrx_page_walk_done: mov $num,%r10 neg $num ############################################################## # Stack layout # # +0 saved $num, used in reduction section # +8 &t[2*$num], used in reduction section # +16 intermediate carry bit # +24 top-most carry bit, used in reduction section # +32 saved *n0 # +40 saved %rsp # +48 t[2*$num] # pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr movq $nptr,%xmm2 # save $nptr movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num movq $bptr,%xmm4 mov $n0, 32(%rsp) mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lpowerx5_body: call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal mov %r10,$num # -num mov $aptr,$rptr movq %xmm2,$nptr movq %xmm4,$bptr mov 40(%rsp),%rax call mulx4x_internal mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lpowerx5_epilogue: ret .size bn_powerx5,.-bn_powerx5 .globl bn_sqrx8x_internal .hidden bn_sqrx8x_internal .type bn_sqrx8x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 bn_sqrx8x_internal: __bn_sqrx8x_internal: ################################################################## # Squaring part: # # a) multiply-n-add everything but a[i]*a[i]; # b) shift result of a) by 1 to the left and accumulate # a[i]*a[i] products; # ################################################################## # a[7]a[7]a[6]a[6]a[5]a[5]a[4]a[4]a[3]a[3]a[2]a[2]a[1]a[1]a[0]a[0] # a[1]a[0] # a[2]a[0] # a[3]a[0] # a[2]a[1] # a[3]a[1] # a[3]a[2] # # a[4]a[0] # a[5]a[0] # a[6]a[0] # a[7]a[0] # a[4]a[1] # a[5]a[1] # a[6]a[1] # a[7]a[1] # a[4]a[2] # a[5]a[2] # a[6]a[2] # a[7]a[2] # a[4]a[3] # a[5]a[3] # a[6]a[3] # a[7]a[3] # # a[5]a[4] # a[6]a[4] # a[7]a[4] # a[6]a[5] # a[7]a[5] # a[7]a[6] # a[7]a[7]a[6]a[6]a[5]a[5]a[4]a[4]a[3]a[3]a[2]a[2]a[1]a[1]a[0]a[0] ___ { my ($zero,$carry)=("%rbp","%rcx"); my $aaptr=$zero; $code.=<<___; lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr lea ($aptr,$num),$aaptr mov $num,0+8(%rsp) # save $num mov $aaptr,8+8(%rsp) # save end of $aptr jmp .Lsqr8x_zero_start .align 32 .byte 0x66,0x66,0x66,0x2e,0x0f,0x1f,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 .Lsqrx8x_zero: .byte 0x3e movdqa %xmm0,0*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,2*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,4*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,6*8($tptr) .Lsqr8x_zero_start: # aligned at 32 movdqa %xmm0,8*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,10*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,12*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,14*8($tptr) lea 16*8($tptr),$tptr sub \$64,$num jnz .Lsqrx8x_zero mov 0*8($aptr),%rdx # a[0], modulo-scheduled #xor %r9,%r9 # t[1], ex-$num, zero already xor %r10,%r10 xor %r11,%r11 xor %r12,%r12 xor %r13,%r13 xor %r14,%r14 xor %r15,%r15 lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, cf=0 jmp .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop: mulx 1*8($aptr),%r8,%rax # a[1]*a[0] adcx %r9,%r8 # a[1]*a[0]+=t[1] adox %rax,%r10 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r9,%rax # a[2]*a[0] adcx %r10,%r9 adox %rax,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xab,0xf6,0x86,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 3*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # ... adcx %r11,%r10 adox %rax,%r12 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xa3,0xf6,0x86,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 4*8($aptr),%r11,%rax adcx %r12,%r11 adox %rax,%r13 mulx 5*8($aptr),%r12,%rax adcx %r13,%r12 adox %rax,%r14 mulx 6*8($aptr),%r13,%rax adcx %r14,%r13 adox %r15,%rax mulx 7*8($aptr),%r14,%r15 mov 1*8($aptr),%rdx # a[1] adcx %rax,%r14 adox $zero,%r15 adc 8*8($tptr),%r15 mov %r8,1*8($tptr) # t[1] mov %r9,2*8($tptr) # t[2] sbb $carry,$carry # mov %cf,$carry xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r8,%rbx # a[2]*a[1] mulx 3*8($aptr),%r9,%rax # a[3]*a[1] adcx %r10,%r8 adox %rbx,%r9 mulx 4*8($aptr),%r10,%rbx # ... adcx %r11,%r9 adox %rax,%r10 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xa3,0xf6,0x86,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 5*8($aptr),%r11,%rax adcx %r12,%r10 adox %rbx,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0x9b,0xf6,0x9e,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 6*8($aptr),%r12,%rbx adcx %r13,%r11 adox %r14,%r12 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0x93,0xf6,0xb6,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 7*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 mov 2*8($aptr),%rdx # a[2] adcx %rax,%r12 adox %rbx,%r13 adcx %r15,%r13 adox $zero,%r14 # of=0 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 mov %r8,3*8($tptr) # t[3] mov %r9,4*8($tptr) # t[4] mulx 3*8($aptr),%r8,%rbx # a[3]*a[2] mulx 4*8($aptr),%r9,%rax # a[4]*a[2] adcx %r10,%r8 adox %rbx,%r9 mulx 5*8($aptr),%r10,%rbx # ... adcx %r11,%r9 adox %rax,%r10 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xa3,0xf6,0x86,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 6*8($aptr),%r11,%rax adcx %r12,%r10 adox %r13,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0x9b,0xf6,0xae,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 7*8($aptr),%r12,%r13 .byte 0x3e mov 3*8($aptr),%rdx # a[3] adcx %rbx,%r11 adox %rax,%r12 adcx %r14,%r12 mov %r8,5*8($tptr) # t[5] mov %r9,6*8($tptr) # t[6] mulx 4*8($aptr),%r8,%rax # a[4]*a[3] adox $zero,%r13 # of=0 adcx $zero,%r13 # cf=0 mulx 5*8($aptr),%r9,%rbx # a[5]*a[3] adcx %r10,%r8 adox %rax,%r9 mulx 6*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # ... adcx %r11,%r9 adox %r12,%r10 mulx 7*8($aptr),%r11,%r12 mov 4*8($aptr),%rdx # a[4] mov 5*8($aptr),%r14 # a[5] adcx %rbx,%r10 adox %rax,%r11 mov 6*8($aptr),%r15 # a[6] adcx %r13,%r11 adox $zero,%r12 # of=0 adcx $zero,%r12 # cf=0 mov %r8,7*8($tptr) # t[7] mov %r9,8*8($tptr) # t[8] mulx %r14,%r9,%rax # a[5]*a[4] mov 7*8($aptr),%r8 # a[7] adcx %r10,%r9 mulx %r15,%r10,%rbx # a[6]*a[4] adox %rax,%r10 adcx %r11,%r10 mulx %r8,%r11,%rax # a[7]*a[4] mov %r14,%rdx # a[5] adox %rbx,%r11 adcx %r12,%r11 #adox $zero,%rax # of=0 adcx $zero,%rax # cf=0 mulx %r15,%r14,%rbx # a[6]*a[5] mulx %r8,%r12,%r13 # a[7]*a[5] mov %r15,%rdx # a[6] lea 8*8($aptr),$aptr adcx %r14,%r11 adox %rbx,%r12 adcx %rax,%r12 adox $zero,%r13 .byte 0x67,0x67 mulx %r8,%r8,%r14 # a[7]*a[6] adcx %r8,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 cmp 8+8(%rsp),$aptr je .Lsqrx8x_outer_break neg $carry # mov $carry,%cf mov \$-8,%rcx mov $zero,%r15 mov 8*8($tptr),%r8 adcx 9*8($tptr),%r9 # +=t[9] adcx 10*8($tptr),%r10 # ... adcx 11*8($tptr),%r11 adc 12*8($tptr),%r12 adc 13*8($tptr),%r13 adc 14*8($tptr),%r14 adc 15*8($tptr),%r15 lea ($aptr),$aaptr lea 2*64($tptr),$tptr sbb %rax,%rax # mov %cf,$carry mov -64($aptr),%rdx # a[0] mov %rax,16+8(%rsp) # offload $carry mov $tptr,24+8(%rsp) #lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr # see 2*8*8($tptr) above xor %eax,%eax # cf=0, of=0 jmp .Lsqrx8x_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_loop: mov %r8,%rbx mulx 0*8($aaptr),%rax,%r8 # a[8]*a[i] adcx %rax,%rbx # +=t[8] adox %r9,%r8 mulx 1*8($aaptr),%rax,%r9 # ... adcx %rax,%r8 adox %r10,%r9 mulx 2*8($aaptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r9 adox %r11,%r10 mulx 3*8($aaptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 4*8($aaptr),%rax,%r12 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 5*8($aaptr),%rax,%r13 adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r14,%r13 mulx 6*8($aaptr),%rax,%r14 mov %rbx,($tptr,%rcx,8) # store t[8+i] mov \$0,%ebx adcx %rax,%r13 adox %r15,%r14 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xbd,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 7*8($aaptr),%rax,%r15 mov 8($aptr,%rcx,8),%rdx # a[i] adcx %rax,%r14 adox %rbx,%r15 # %rbx is 0, of=0 adcx %rbx,%r15 # cf=0 .byte 0x67 inc %rcx # of=0 jnz .Lsqrx8x_loop lea 8*8($aaptr),$aaptr mov \$-8,%rcx cmp 8+8(%rsp),$aaptr # done? je .Lsqrx8x_break sub 16+8(%rsp),%rbx # mov 16(%rsp),%cf .byte 0x66 mov -64($aptr),%rdx adcx 0*8($tptr),%r8 adcx 1*8($tptr),%r9 adc 2*8($tptr),%r10 adc 3*8($tptr),%r11 adc 4*8($tptr),%r12 adc 5*8($tptr),%r13 adc 6*8($tptr),%r14 adc 7*8($tptr),%r15 lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr .byte 0x67 sbb %rax,%rax # mov %cf,%rax xor %ebx,%ebx # cf=0, of=0 mov %rax,16+8(%rsp) # offload carry jmp .Lsqrx8x_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_break: xor $zero,$zero sub 16+8(%rsp),%rbx # mov 16(%rsp),%cf adcx $zero,%r8 mov 24+8(%rsp),$carry # initial $tptr, borrow $carry adcx $zero,%r9 mov 0*8($aptr),%rdx # a[8], modulo-scheduled adc \$0,%r10 mov %r8,0*8($tptr) adc \$0,%r11 adc \$0,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 adc \$0,%r14 adc \$0,%r15 cmp $carry,$tptr # cf=0, of=0 je .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop mov %r9,1*8($tptr) mov 1*8($carry),%r9 mov %r10,2*8($tptr) mov 2*8($carry),%r10 mov %r11,3*8($tptr) mov 3*8($carry),%r11 mov %r12,4*8($tptr) mov 4*8($carry),%r12 mov %r13,5*8($tptr) mov 5*8($carry),%r13 mov %r14,6*8($tptr) mov 6*8($carry),%r14 mov %r15,7*8($tptr) mov 7*8($carry),%r15 mov $carry,$tptr jmp .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_outer_break: mov %r9,9*8($tptr) # t[9] movq %xmm3,%rcx # -$num mov %r10,10*8($tptr) # ... mov %r11,11*8($tptr) mov %r12,12*8($tptr) mov %r13,13*8($tptr) mov %r14,14*8($tptr) ___ } { my $i="%rcx"; $code.=<<___; lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr mov ($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[0] mov 8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[1] xor $A0[0],$A0[0] # t[0], of=0, cf=0 mov 0+8(%rsp),$num # restore $num adox $A0[1],$A0[1] mov 16($tptr),$A1[0] # t[2] # prefetch mov 24($tptr),$A1[1] # t[3] # prefetch #jmp .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add # happens to be aligned .align 32 .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add: mulx %rdx,%rax,%rbx adox $A1[0],$A1[0] adcx $A0[0],%rax .byte 0x48,0x8b,0x94,0x0e,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov 8($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[i+1] # prefetch .byte 0x4c,0x8b,0x97,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov 32($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+4] # prefetch adox $A1[1],$A1[1] adcx $A0[1],%rbx mov 40($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+4+1] # prefetch mov %rax,0($tptr) mov %rbx,8($tptr) mulx %rdx,%rax,%rbx adox $A0[0],$A0[0] adcx $A1[0],%rax mov 16($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[i+2] # prefetch mov 48($tptr),$A1[0] # t[2*i+6] # prefetch adox $A0[1],$A0[1] adcx $A1[1],%rbx mov 56($tptr),$A1[1] # t[2*i+6+1] # prefetch mov %rax,16($tptr) mov %rbx,24($tptr) mulx %rdx,%rax,%rbx adox $A1[0],$A1[0] adcx $A0[0],%rax mov 24($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[i+3] # prefetch lea 32($i),$i mov 64($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+8] # prefetch adox $A1[1],$A1[1] adcx $A0[1],%rbx mov 72($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+8+1] # prefetch mov %rax,32($tptr) mov %rbx,40($tptr) mulx %rdx,%rax,%rbx adox $A0[0],$A0[0] adcx $A1[0],%rax jrcxz .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add_break .byte 0x48,0x8b,0x94,0x0e,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov 0($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[i+4] # prefetch adox $A0[1],$A0[1] adcx $A1[1],%rbx mov 80($tptr),$A1[0] # t[2*i+10] # prefetch mov 88($tptr),$A1[1] # t[2*i+10+1] # prefetch mov %rax,48($tptr) mov %rbx,56($tptr) lea 64($tptr),$tptr nop jmp .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add .align 32 .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add_break: adcx $A1[1],%rbx mov %rax,48($tptr) mov %rbx,56($tptr) lea 64($tptr),$tptr # end of t[] buffer ___ } ###################################################################### # Montgomery reduction part, "word-by-word" algorithm. # # This new path is inspired by multiple submissions from Intel, by # Shay Gueron, Vlad Krasnov, Erdinc Ozturk, James Guilford, # Vinodh Gopal... { my ($nptr,$carry,$m0)=("%rbp","%rsi","%rdx"); $code.=<<___; movq %xmm2,$nptr __bn_sqrx8x_reduction: xor %eax,%eax # initial top-most carry bit mov 32+8(%rsp),%rbx # n0 mov 48+8(%rsp),%rdx # "%r8", 8*0($tptr) lea -8*8($nptr,$num),%rcx # end of n[] #lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr # end of t[] buffer mov %rcx, 0+8(%rsp) # save end of n[] mov $tptr,8+8(%rsp) # save end of t[] lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr # initial t[] window jmp .Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop: mov 8*1($tptr),%r9 mov 8*2($tptr),%r10 mov 8*3($tptr),%r11 mov 8*4($tptr),%r12 mov %rdx,%r8 imulq %rbx,%rdx # n0*a[i] mov 8*5($tptr),%r13 mov 8*6($tptr),%r14 mov 8*7($tptr),%r15 mov %rax,24+8(%rsp) # store top-most carry bit lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr xor $carry,$carry # cf=0,of=0 mov \$-8,%rcx jmp .Lsqrx8x_reduce .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_reduce: mov %r8, %rbx mulx 8*0($nptr),%rax,%r8 # n[0] adcx %rbx,%rax # discarded adox %r9,%r8 mulx 8*1($nptr),%rbx,%r9 # n[1] adcx %rbx,%r8 adox %r10,%r9 mulx 8*2($nptr),%rbx,%r10 adcx %rbx,%r9 adox %r11,%r10 mulx 8*3($nptr),%rbx,%r11 adcx %rbx,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xe3,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 8*4($nptr),%rbx,%r12 mov %rdx,%rax mov %r8,%rdx adcx %rbx,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 32+8(%rsp),%rbx,%rdx # %rdx discarded mov %rax,%rdx mov %rax,64+48+8(%rsp,%rcx,8) # put aside n0*a[i] mulx 8*5($nptr),%rax,%r13 adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r14,%r13 mulx 8*6($nptr),%rax,%r14 adcx %rax,%r13 adox %r15,%r14 mulx 8*7($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %rbx,%rdx adcx %rax,%r14 adox $carry,%r15 # $carry is 0 adcx $carry,%r15 # cf=0 .byte 0x67,0x67,0x67 inc %rcx # of=0 jnz .Lsqrx8x_reduce mov $carry,%rax # xor %rax,%rax cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]? jae .Lsqrx8x_no_tail mov 48+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull n0*a[0] add 8*0($tptr),%r8 lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr mov \$-8,%rcx adcx 8*1($tptr),%r9 adcx 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr sbb %rax,%rax # top carry xor $carry,$carry # of=0, cf=0 mov %rax,16+8(%rsp) jmp .Lsqrx8x_tail .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_tail: mov %r8,%rbx mulx 8*0($nptr),%rax,%r8 adcx %rax,%rbx adox %r9,%r8 mulx 8*1($nptr),%rax,%r9 adcx %rax,%r8 adox %r10,%r9 mulx 8*2($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r9 adox %r11,%r10 mulx 8*3($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 8*4($nptr),%rax,%r12 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 8*5($nptr),%rax,%r13 adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r14,%r13 mulx 8*6($nptr),%rax,%r14 adcx %rax,%r13 adox %r15,%r14 mulx 8*7($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov 72+48+8(%rsp,%rcx,8),%rdx # pull n0*a[i] adcx %rax,%r14 adox $carry,%r15 mov %rbx,($tptr,%rcx,8) # save result mov %r8,%rbx adcx $carry,%r15 # cf=0 inc %rcx # of=0 jnz .Lsqrx8x_tail cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]? jae .Lsqrx8x_tail_done # break out of loop sub 16+8(%rsp),$carry # mov 16(%rsp),%cf mov 48+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull n0*a[0] lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr adc 8*0($tptr),%r8 adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr sbb %rax,%rax sub \$8,%rcx # mov \$-8,%rcx xor $carry,$carry # of=0, cf=0 mov %rax,16+8(%rsp) jmp .Lsqrx8x_tail .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_tail_done: xor %rax,%rax add 24+8(%rsp),%r8 # can this overflow? adc \$0,%r9 adc \$0,%r10 adc \$0,%r11 adc \$0,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 adc \$0,%r14 adc \$0,%r15 adc \$0,%rax sub 16+8(%rsp),$carry # mov 16(%rsp),%cf .Lsqrx8x_no_tail: # %cf is 0 if jumped here adc 8*0($tptr),%r8 movq %xmm3,%rcx adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 mov 8*7($nptr),$carry movq %xmm2,$nptr # restore $nptr adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 adc \$0,%rax # top-most carry mov 32+8(%rsp),%rbx # n0 mov 8*8($tptr,%rcx),%rdx # modulo-scheduled "%r8" mov %r8,8*0($tptr) # store top 512 bits lea 8*8($tptr),%r8 # borrow %r8 mov %r9,8*1($tptr) mov %r10,8*2($tptr) mov %r11,8*3($tptr) mov %r12,8*4($tptr) mov %r13,8*5($tptr) mov %r14,8*6($tptr) mov %r15,8*7($tptr) lea 8*8($tptr,%rcx),$tptr # start of current t[] window cmp 8+8(%rsp),%r8 # end of t[]? jb .Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop ret .size bn_sqrx8x_internal,.-bn_sqrx8x_internal ___ } ############################################################## # Post-condition, 4x unrolled # { my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp"); $code.=<<___; .align 32 __bn_postx4x_internal: mov 8*0($nptr),%r12 mov %rcx,%r10 # -$num mov %rcx,%r9 # -$num neg %rax sar \$3+2,%rcx #lea 48+8(%rsp,%r9),$tptr movq %xmm1,$rptr # restore $rptr movq %xmm1,$aptr # prepare for back-to-back call dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0] mov 8*1($nptr),%r13 xor %r8,%r8 mov 8*2($nptr),%r14 mov 8*3($nptr),%r15 jmp .Lsqrx4x_sub_entry .align 16 .Lsqrx4x_sub: mov 8*0($nptr),%r12 mov 8*1($nptr),%r13 mov 8*2($nptr),%r14 mov 8*3($nptr),%r15 .Lsqrx4x_sub_entry: andn %rax,%r12,%r12 lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr andn %rax,%r13,%r13 andn %rax,%r14,%r14 andn %rax,%r15,%r15 neg %r8 # mov %r8,%cf adc 8*0($tptr),%r12 adc 8*1($tptr),%r13 adc 8*2($tptr),%r14 adc 8*3($tptr),%r15 mov %r12,8*0($rptr) lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr mov %r13,8*1($rptr) sbb %r8,%r8 # mov %cf,%r8 mov %r14,8*2($rptr) mov %r15,8*3($rptr) lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr inc %rcx jnz .Lsqrx4x_sub neg %r9 # restore $num ret .size __bn_postx4x_internal,.-__bn_postx4x_internal ___ } }}} { my ($inp,$num,$tbl,$idx)=$win64?("%rcx","%edx","%r8", "%r9d") : # Win64 order ("%rdi","%esi","%rdx","%ecx"); # Unix order my $out=$inp; my $STRIDE=2**5*8; my $N=$STRIDE/4; $code.=<<___; .globl bn_get_bits5 .type bn_get_bits5,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bn_get_bits5: lea 0($inp),%r10 lea 1($inp),%r11 mov $num,%ecx shr \$4,$num and \$15,%ecx lea -8(%ecx),%eax cmp \$11,%ecx cmova %r11,%r10 cmova %eax,%ecx movzw (%r10,$num,2),%eax shrl %cl,%eax and \$31,%eax ret .size bn_get_bits5,.-bn_get_bits5 .globl bn_scatter5 .type bn_scatter5,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bn_scatter5: cmp \$0, $num jz .Lscatter_epilogue lea ($tbl,$idx,8),$tbl .Lscatter: mov ($inp),%rax lea 8($inp),$inp mov %rax,($tbl) lea 32*8($tbl),$tbl sub \$1,$num jnz .Lscatter .Lscatter_epilogue: ret .size bn_scatter5,.-bn_scatter5 .globl bn_gather5 .type bn_gather5,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 bn_gather5: .LSEH_begin_bn_gather5: # Win64 thing, but harmless in other cases # I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-( .byte 0x4c,0x8d,0x14,0x24 #lea (%rsp),%r10 .byte 0x48,0x81,0xec,0x08,0x01,0x00,0x00 #sub $0x108,%rsp lea .Linc(%rip),%rax and \$-16,%rsp # shouldn't be formally required movd $idx,%xmm5 movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 lea 128($tbl),%r11 # size optimization lea 128(%rsp),%rax # size optimization pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast $idx movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to $idx and save result to stack # for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i); movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)-128`(%rax) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0 paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)-128`(%rax) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1 paddd %xmm3,%xmm0 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)-128`(%rax) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2 ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax) jmp .Lgather .align 32 .Lgather: pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`(%r11),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`(%r11),%xmm1 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`(%r11),%xmm2 pand `16*($i+0)-128`(%rax),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`(%r11),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+1)-128`(%rax),%xmm1 por %xmm0,%xmm4 pand `16*($i+2)-128`(%rax),%xmm2 por %xmm1,%xmm5 pand `16*($i+3)-128`(%rax),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm5,%xmm4 lea $STRIDE(%r11),%r11 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0 por %xmm4,%xmm0 movq %xmm0,($out) # m0=bp[0] lea 8($out),$out sub \$1,$num jnz .Lgather lea (%r10),%rsp ret .LSEH_end_bn_gather5: .size bn_gather5,.-bn_gather5 ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 64 .Linc: .long 0,0, 1,1 .long 2,2, 2,2 .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication with scatter/gather for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type mul_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 mul_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRip>=epilogue label jb .Lcommon_pop_regs mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 8(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[2] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail lea .Lmul_epilogue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx ja .Lbody_40 mov 192($context),%r10 # pull $num mov 8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax # pull saved stack pointer jmp .Lcommon_pop_regs .Lbody_40: mov 40(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer .Lcommon_pop_regs: mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size mul_handler,.-mul_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mul_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mul_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_power5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_power5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_power5 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_from_mont8x .rva .LSEH_end_bn_from_mont8x .rva .LSEH_info_bn_from_mont8x ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_powerx5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_powerx5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_powerx5 ___ $code.=<<___; .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_gather5 .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont_gather5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmul_body,.Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmul4x_prologue,.Lmul4x_body,.Lmul4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_power5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lpower5_prologue,.Lpower5_body,.Lpower5_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_from_mont8x: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lfrom_prologue,.Lfrom_body,.Lfrom_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmulx4x_prologue,.Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_powerx5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lpowerx5_prologue,.Lpowerx5_body,.Lpowerx5_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___; .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_gather5: .byte 0x01,0x0b,0x03,0x0a .byte 0x0b,0x01,0x21,0x00 # sub rsp,0x108 .byte 0x04,0xa3,0x00,0x00 # lea r10,(rsp) .align 8 ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn.h (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn.h (revision 337764) @@ -1,951 +1,1015 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the Eric Young open source * license provided above. * * The binary polynomial arithmetic software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #ifndef HEADER_BN_H # define HEADER_BN_H # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API # include /* FILE */ # endif # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * These preprocessor symbols control various aspects of the bignum headers * and library code. They're not defined by any "normal" configuration, as * they are intended for development and testing purposes. NB: defining all * three can be useful for debugging application code as well as openssl * itself. BN_DEBUG - turn on various debugging alterations to the bignum * code BN_DEBUG_RAND - uses random poisoning of unused words to trip up * mismanagement of bignum internals. You must also define BN_DEBUG. */ /* #define BN_DEBUG */ /* #define BN_DEBUG_RAND */ # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT # define BN_MUL_COMBA # define BN_SQR_COMBA # define BN_RECURSION # endif /* * This next option uses the C libraries (2 word)/(1 word) function. If it is * not defined, I use my C version (which is slower). The reason for this * flag is that when the particular C compiler library routine is used, and * the library is linked with a different compiler, the library is missing. * This mostly happens when the library is built with gcc and then linked * using normal cc. This would be a common occurrence because gcc normally * produces code that is 2 times faster than system compilers for the big * number stuff. For machines with only one compiler (or shared libraries), * this should be on. Again this in only really a problem on machines using * "long long's", are 32bit, and are not using my assembler code. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || \ defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(linux) # ifndef BN_DIV2W # define BN_DIV2W # endif # endif /* * assuming long is 64bit - this is the DEC Alpha unsigned long long is only * 64 bits :-(, don't define BN_LLONG for the DEC Alpha */ # ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG # define BN_ULLONG unsigned long long # define BN_ULONG unsigned long # define BN_LONG long # define BN_BITS 128 # define BN_BYTES 8 # define BN_BITS2 64 # define BN_BITS4 32 # define BN_MASK (0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffLL) # define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000L) # define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000L) # define BN_TBIT (0x8000000000000000L) # define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000UL) # define BN_DEC_FMT1 "%lu" # define BN_DEC_FMT2 "%019lu" # define BN_DEC_NUM 19 # define BN_HEX_FMT1 "%lX" # define BN_HEX_FMT2 "%016lX" # endif /* * This is where the long long data type is 64 bits, but long is 32. For * machines where there are 64bit registers, this is the mode to use. IRIX, * on R4000 and above should use this mode, along with the relevant assembler * code :-). Do NOT define BN_LLONG. */ # ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT # undef BN_LLONG # undef BN_ULLONG # define BN_ULONG unsigned long long # define BN_LONG long long # define BN_BITS 128 # define BN_BYTES 8 # define BN_BITS2 64 # define BN_BITS4 32 # define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffLL) # define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000LL) # define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000LL) # define BN_TBIT (0x8000000000000000LL) # define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000ULL) # define BN_DEC_FMT1 "%llu" # define BN_DEC_FMT2 "%019llu" # define BN_DEC_NUM 19 # define BN_HEX_FMT1 "%llX" # define BN_HEX_FMT2 "%016llX" # endif # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT # ifdef BN_LLONG # if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__GNUC__) # define BN_ULLONG unsigned __int64 # define BN_MASK (0xffffffffffffffffI64) # else # define BN_ULLONG unsigned long long # define BN_MASK (0xffffffffffffffffLL) # endif # endif # define BN_ULONG unsigned int # define BN_LONG int # define BN_BITS 64 # define BN_BYTES 4 # define BN_BITS2 32 # define BN_BITS4 16 # define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2l (0xffff) # define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffff8000L) # define BN_MASK2h (0xffff0000L) # define BN_TBIT (0x80000000L) # define BN_DEC_CONV (1000000000L) # define BN_DEC_FMT1 "%u" # define BN_DEC_FMT2 "%09u" # define BN_DEC_NUM 9 # define BN_HEX_FMT1 "%X" # define BN_HEX_FMT2 "%08X" # endif # define BN_DEFAULT_BITS 1280 # define BN_FLG_MALLOCED 0x01 # define BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA 0x02 /* * avoid leaking exponent information through timing, * BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime, * BN_div() will call BN_div_no_branch, * BN_mod_inverse() will call BN_mod_inverse_no_branch. */ # define BN_FLG_CONSTTIME 0x04 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED /* deprecated name for the flag */ # define BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME BN_FLG_CONSTTIME /* * avoid leaking exponent information through timings * (BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime) */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED # define BN_FLG_FREE 0x8000 /* used for debuging */ # endif # define BN_set_flags(b,n) ((b)->flags|=(n)) # define BN_get_flags(b,n) ((b)->flags&(n)) /* * get a clone of a BIGNUM with changed flags, for *temporary* use only (the * two BIGNUMs cannot not be used in parallel!) */ # define BN_with_flags(dest,b,n) ((dest)->d=(b)->d, \ (dest)->top=(b)->top, \ (dest)->dmax=(b)->dmax, \ (dest)->neg=(b)->neg, \ (dest)->flags=(((dest)->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) \ | ((b)->flags & ~BN_FLG_MALLOCED) \ | BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA \ | (n))) /* Already declared in ossl_typ.h */ # if 0 typedef struct bignum_st BIGNUM; /* Used for temp variables (declaration hidden in bn_lcl.h) */ typedef struct bignum_ctx BN_CTX; typedef struct bn_blinding_st BN_BLINDING; typedef struct bn_mont_ctx_st BN_MONT_CTX; typedef struct bn_recp_ctx_st BN_RECP_CTX; typedef struct bn_gencb_st BN_GENCB; # endif struct bignum_st { BN_ULONG *d; /* Pointer to an array of 'BN_BITS2' bit * chunks. */ int top; /* Index of last used d +1. */ /* The next are internal book keeping for bn_expand. */ int dmax; /* Size of the d array. */ int neg; /* one if the number is negative */ int flags; }; /* Used for montgomery multiplication */ struct bn_mont_ctx_st { int ri; /* number of bits in R */ BIGNUM RR; /* used to convert to montgomery form */ BIGNUM N; /* The modulus */ BIGNUM Ni; /* R*(1/R mod N) - N*Ni = 1 (Ni is only * stored for bignum algorithm) */ BN_ULONG n0[2]; /* least significant word(s) of Ni; (type * changed with 0.9.9, was "BN_ULONG n0;" * before) */ int flags; }; /* * Used for reciprocal division/mod functions It cannot be shared between * threads */ struct bn_recp_ctx_st { BIGNUM N; /* the divisor */ BIGNUM Nr; /* the reciprocal */ int num_bits; int shift; int flags; }; /* Used for slow "generation" functions. */ struct bn_gencb_st { unsigned int ver; /* To handle binary (in)compatibility */ void *arg; /* callback-specific data */ union { /* if(ver==1) - handles old style callbacks */ void (*cb_1) (int, int, void *); /* if(ver==2) - new callback style */ int (*cb_2) (int, int, BN_GENCB *); } cb; }; /* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier, */ int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b); /* Macro to populate a BN_GENCB structure with an "old"-style callback */ # define BN_GENCB_set_old(gencb, callback, cb_arg) { \ BN_GENCB *tmp_gencb = (gencb); \ tmp_gencb->ver = 1; \ tmp_gencb->arg = (cb_arg); \ tmp_gencb->cb.cb_1 = (callback); } /* Macro to populate a BN_GENCB structure with a "new"-style callback */ # define BN_GENCB_set(gencb, callback, cb_arg) { \ BN_GENCB *tmp_gencb = (gencb); \ tmp_gencb->ver = 2; \ tmp_gencb->arg = (cb_arg); \ tmp_gencb->cb.cb_2 = (callback); } # define BN_prime_checks 0 /* default: select number of iterations based * on the size of the number */ /* - * number of Miller-Rabin iterations for an error rate of less than 2^-80 for - * random 'b'-bit input, b >= 100 (taken from table 4.4 in the Handbook of - * Applied Cryptography [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone; CRC Press 1996]; - * original paper: Damgaard, Landrock, Pomerance: Average case error - * estimates for the strong probable prime test. -- Math. Comp. 61 (1993) - * 177-194) + * BN_prime_checks_for_size() returns the number of Miller-Rabin iterations + * that will be done for checking that a random number is probably prime. The + * error rate for accepting a composite number as prime depends on the size of + * the prime |b|. The error rates used are for calculating an RSA key with 2 primes, + * and so the level is what you would expect for a key of double the size of the + * prime. + * + * This table is generated using the algorithm of FIPS PUB 186-4 + * Digital Signature Standard (DSS), section F.1, page 117. + * (https://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4) + * + * The following magma script was used to generate the output: + * securitybits:=125; + * k:=1024; + * for t:=1 to 65 do + * for M:=3 to Floor(2*Sqrt(k-1)-1) do + * S:=0; + * // Sum over m + * for m:=3 to M do + * s:=0; + * // Sum over j + * for j:=2 to m do + * s+:=(RealField(32)!2)^-(j+(k-1)/j); + * end for; + * S+:=2^(m-(m-1)*t)*s; + * end for; + * A:=2^(k-2-M*t); + * B:=8*(Pi(RealField(32))^2-6)/3*2^(k-2)*S; + * pkt:=2.00743*Log(2)*k*2^-k*(A+B); + * seclevel:=Floor(-Log(2,pkt)); + * if seclevel ge securitybits then + * printf "k: %5o, security: %o bits (t: %o, M: %o)\n",k,seclevel,t,M; + * break; + * end if; + * end for; + * if seclevel ge securitybits then break; end if; + * end for; + * + * It can be run online at: + * http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/calc + * + * And will output: + * k: 1024, security: 129 bits (t: 6, M: 23) + * + * k is the number of bits of the prime, securitybits is the level we want to + * reach. + * + * prime length | RSA key size | # MR tests | security level + * -------------+--------------|------------+--------------- + * (b) >= 6394 | >= 12788 | 3 | 256 bit + * (b) >= 3747 | >= 7494 | 3 | 192 bit + * (b) >= 1345 | >= 2690 | 4 | 128 bit + * (b) >= 1080 | >= 2160 | 5 | 128 bit + * (b) >= 852 | >= 1704 | 5 | 112 bit + * (b) >= 476 | >= 952 | 5 | 80 bit + * (b) >= 400 | >= 800 | 6 | 80 bit + * (b) >= 347 | >= 694 | 7 | 80 bit + * (b) >= 308 | >= 616 | 8 | 80 bit + * (b) >= 55 | >= 110 | 27 | 64 bit + * (b) >= 6 | >= 12 | 34 | 64 bit */ -# define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ? 2 : \ - (b) >= 850 ? 3 : \ - (b) >= 650 ? 4 : \ - (b) >= 550 ? 5 : \ - (b) >= 450 ? 6 : \ - (b) >= 400 ? 7 : \ - (b) >= 350 ? 8 : \ - (b) >= 300 ? 9 : \ - (b) >= 250 ? 12 : \ - (b) >= 200 ? 15 : \ - (b) >= 150 ? 18 : \ - /* b >= 100 */ 27) +# define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 3747 ? 3 : \ + (b) >= 1345 ? 4 : \ + (b) >= 476 ? 5 : \ + (b) >= 400 ? 6 : \ + (b) >= 347 ? 7 : \ + (b) >= 308 ? 8 : \ + (b) >= 55 ? 27 : \ + /* b >= 6 */ 34) + # define BN_num_bytes(a) ((BN_num_bits(a)+7)/8) /* Note that BN_abs_is_word didn't work reliably for w == 0 until 0.9.8 */ # define BN_abs_is_word(a,w) ((((a)->top == 1) && ((a)->d[0] == (BN_ULONG)(w))) || \ (((w) == 0) && ((a)->top == 0))) # define BN_is_zero(a) ((a)->top == 0) # define BN_is_one(a) (BN_abs_is_word((a),1) && !(a)->neg) # define BN_is_word(a,w) (BN_abs_is_word((a),(w)) && (!(w) || !(a)->neg)) # define BN_is_odd(a) (((a)->top > 0) && ((a)->d[0] & 1)) # define BN_one(a) (BN_set_word((a),1)) # define BN_zero_ex(a) \ do { \ BIGNUM *_tmp_bn = (a); \ _tmp_bn->top = 0; \ _tmp_bn->neg = 0; \ } while(0) # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED # define BN_zero(a) BN_zero_ex(a) # else # define BN_zero(a) (BN_set_word((a),0)) # endif const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void); char *BN_options(void); BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED void BN_CTX_init(BN_CTX *c); # endif void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c); void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx); void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, const BIGNUM *range); int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, const BIGNUM *range); int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG); BIGNUM *BN_new(void); void BN_init(BIGNUM *); void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a); BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_usub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_uadd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); /** BN_set_negative sets sign of a BIGNUM * \param b pointer to the BIGNUM object * \param n 0 if the BIGNUM b should be positive and a value != 0 otherwise */ void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *b, int n); /** BN_is_negative returns 1 if the BIGNUM is negative * \param a pointer to the BIGNUM object * \return 1 if a < 0 and 0 otherwise */ # define BN_is_negative(a) ((a)->neg != 0) int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); # define BN_mod(rem,m,d,ctx) BN_div(NULL,(rem),(m),(d),(ctx)) int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m); int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m); int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m); int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m); BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_cmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); void BN_free(BIGNUM *a); int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a); int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *r, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1, const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a); # endif # ifdef HEADER_BIO_H int BN_print(BIO *fp, const BIGNUM *a); # else int BN_print(void *fp, const BIGNUM *a); # endif int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, int len, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a); void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a); BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a); char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /* returns * -2 for * error */ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx); void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords); /* Deprecated versions */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg); int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg, int do_trial_division); # endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED) */ /* Newer versions */ int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *Xp1, BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void); void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); # define BN_to_montgomery(r,a,mont,ctx) BN_mod_mul_montgomery(\ (r),(a),&((mont)->RR),(mont),(ctx)) int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont); int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx); BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from); BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx); /* BN_BLINDING flags */ # define BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE 0x00000001 # define BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE 0x00000002 BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod); void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b); int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *); int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(const BN_BLINDING *); void BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long); # endif CRYPTO_THREADID *BN_BLINDING_thread_id(BN_BLINDING *); unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *); void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long); BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx), BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED void BN_set_params(int mul, int high, int low, int mont); int BN_get_params(int which); /* 0, mul, 1 high, 2 low, 3 mont */ # endif void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void); void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *rdiv, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* * Functions for arithmetic over binary polynomials represented by BIGNUMs. * The BIGNUM::neg property of BIGNUMs representing binary polynomials is * ignored. Note that input arguments are not const so that their bit arrays * can be expanded to the appropriate size if needed. */ /* * r = a + b */ int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); # define BN_GF2m_sub(r, a, b) BN_GF2m_add(r, a, b) /* * r=a mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p); /* r = (a * b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * a) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (1 / b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a / b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a ^ b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = sqrt(a) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r^2 + r = a mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); # define BN_GF2m_cmp(a, b) BN_ucmp((a), (b)) /*- * Some functions allow for representation of the irreducible polynomials * as an unsigned int[], say p. The irreducible f(t) is then of the form: * t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] * where m = p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. */ /* r = a mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[]); /* r = (a * b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * a) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (1 / b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a / b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a ^ b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = sqrt(a) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r^2 + r = a mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max); int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const int p[], BIGNUM *a); # endif /* * faster mod functions for the 'NIST primes' 0 <= a < p^2 */ int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_192(void); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_224(void); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_256(void); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_384(void); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void); /* library internal functions */ # define bn_expand(a,bits) \ ( \ bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1) ? \ NULL \ : \ (((bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) <= (a)->dmax) ? \ (a) \ : \ bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) \ ) # define bn_wexpand(a,words) (((words) <= (a)->dmax)?(a):bn_expand2((a),(words))) BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED BIGNUM *bn_dup_expand(const BIGNUM *a, int words); /* unused */ # endif /*- * Bignum consistency macros * There is one "API" macro, bn_fix_top(), for stripping leading zeroes from * bignum data after direct manipulations on the data. There is also an * "internal" macro, bn_check_top(), for verifying that there are no leading * zeroes. Unfortunately, some auditing is required due to the fact that * bn_fix_top() has become an overabused duct-tape because bignum data is * occasionally passed around in an inconsistent state. So the following * changes have been made to sort this out; * - bn_fix_top()s implementation has been moved to bn_correct_top() * - if BN_DEBUG isn't defined, bn_fix_top() maps to bn_correct_top(), and * bn_check_top() is as before. * - if BN_DEBUG *is* defined; * - bn_check_top() tries to pollute unused words even if the bignum 'top' is * consistent. (ed: only if BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined) * - bn_fix_top() maps to bn_check_top() rather than "fixing" anything. * The idea is to have debug builds flag up inconsistent bignums when they * occur. If that occurs in a bn_fix_top(), we examine the code in question; if * the use of bn_fix_top() was appropriate (ie. it follows directly after code * that manipulates the bignum) it is converted to bn_correct_top(), and if it * was not appropriate, we convert it permanently to bn_check_top() and track * down the cause of the bug. Eventually, no internal code should be using the * bn_fix_top() macro. External applications and libraries should try this with * their own code too, both in terms of building against the openssl headers * with BN_DEBUG defined *and* linking with a version of OpenSSL built with it * defined. This not only improves external code, it provides more test * coverage for openssl's own code. */ # ifdef BN_DEBUG /* We only need assert() when debugging */ # include +/* + * The new BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP flag marks vectors that were not treated with + * bn_correct_top, in other words such vectors are permitted to have zeros + * in most significant limbs. Such vectors are used internally to achieve + * execution time invariance for critical operations with private keys. + * It's BN_DEBUG-only flag, because user application is not supposed to + * observe it anyway. Moreover, optimizing compiler would actually remove + * all operations manipulating the bit in question in non-BN_DEBUG build. + */ +# define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0x10000 # ifdef BN_DEBUG_RAND /* To avoid "make update" cvs wars due to BN_DEBUG, use some tricks */ # ifndef RAND_pseudo_bytes int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); # define BN_DEBUG_TRIX # endif # define bn_pollute(a) \ do { \ const BIGNUM *_bnum1 = (a); \ if(_bnum1->top < _bnum1->dmax) { \ unsigned char _tmp_char; \ /* We cast away const without the compiler knowing, any \ * *genuinely* constant variables that aren't mutable \ * wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \ BN_ULONG *_not_const; \ memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG*)); \ /* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */ \ RAND_pseudo_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); \ memset((unsigned char *)(_not_const + _bnum1->top), _tmp_char, \ (_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); \ } \ } while(0) # ifdef BN_DEBUG_TRIX # undef RAND_pseudo_bytes # endif # else # define bn_pollute(a) # endif # define bn_check_top(a) \ do { \ const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (a); \ if (_bnum2 != NULL) { \ - assert((_bnum2->top == 0) || \ - (_bnum2->d[_bnum2->top - 1] != 0)); \ + int _top = _bnum2->top; \ + assert((_top == 0) || \ + (_bnum2->flags & BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP) || \ + (_bnum2->d[_top - 1] != 0)); \ bn_pollute(_bnum2); \ } \ } while(0) # define bn_fix_top(a) bn_check_top(a) # define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2) # define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \ do { \ const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \ assert((words) <= (_bnum2)->dmax && (words) >= (_bnum2)->top); \ /* avoid unused variable warning with NDEBUG */ \ (void)(_bnum2); \ } while(0) # else /* !BN_DEBUG */ +# define BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP 0 # define bn_pollute(a) # define bn_check_top(a) # define bn_fix_top(a) bn_correct_top(a) # define bn_check_size(bn, bits) # define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) # endif # define bn_correct_top(a) \ { \ BN_ULONG *ftl; \ int tmp_top = (a)->top; \ if (tmp_top > 0) \ { \ for (ftl= &((a)->d[tmp_top-1]); tmp_top > 0; tmp_top--) \ if (*(ftl--)) break; \ (a)->top = tmp_top; \ } \ if ((a)->top == 0) \ (a)->neg = 0; \ bn_pollute(a); \ } BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w); void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num); BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d); BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int num); BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int num); /* Primes from RFC 2409 */ BIGNUM *get_rfc2409_prime_768(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *get_rfc2409_prime_1024(BIGNUM *bn); /* Primes from RFC 3526 */ BIGNUM *get_rfc3526_prime_1536(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *get_rfc3526_prime_2048(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *get_rfc3526_prime_3072(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *get_rfc3526_prime_4096(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *get_rfc3526_prime_6144(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *get_rfc3526_prime_8192(BIGNUM *bn); int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void); /* Error codes for the BN functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define BN_F_BNRAND 127 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CONVERT_EX 100 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CREATE_PARAM 128 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX 101 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW 102 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_UPDATE 103 # define BN_F_BN_BN2DEC 104 # define BN_F_BN_BN2HEX 105 # define BN_F_BN_CTX_GET 116 # define BN_F_BN_CTX_NEW 106 # define BN_F_BN_CTX_START 129 # define BN_F_BN_DIV 107 # define BN_F_BN_DIV_NO_BRANCH 138 # define BN_F_BN_DIV_RECP 130 # define BN_F_BN_EXP 123 # define BN_F_BN_EXPAND2 108 # define BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL 120 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD 131 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP 132 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL 133 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD 134 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR 135 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR 136 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT 137 # define BN_F_BN_LSHIFT 145 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT 118 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT 109 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME 124 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD 117 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP 125 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE 126 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE 110 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH 139 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_LSHIFT_QUICK 119 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_MUL_RECIPROCAL 111 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT 121 # define BN_F_BN_MPI2BN 112 # define BN_F_BN_NEW 113 # define BN_F_BN_RAND 114 # define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE 122 # define BN_F_BN_RSHIFT 146 # define BN_F_BN_USUB 115 /* Reason codes. */ # define BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3 100 # define BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL 101 # define BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG 114 # define BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL 118 # define BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS 102 # define BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO 103 # define BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR 104 # define BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA 105 # define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED 110 # define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH 106 # define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE 115 # define BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT 119 # define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE 111 # define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 107 # define BN_R_NO_INVERSE 108 # define BN_R_NO_SOLUTION 116 # define BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME 112 # define BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS 113 # define BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES 109 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_div.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_div.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_div.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,477 +1,478 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_div.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /* The old slow way */ #if 0 int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, nm, nd; int ret = 0; BIGNUM *D; bn_check_top(m); bn_check_top(d); if (BN_is_zero(d)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO); return (0); } if (BN_ucmp(m, d) < 0) { if (rem != NULL) { if (BN_copy(rem, m) == NULL) return (0); } if (dv != NULL) BN_zero(dv); return (1); } BN_CTX_start(ctx); D = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (dv == NULL) dv = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (rem == NULL) rem = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (D == NULL || dv == NULL || rem == NULL) goto end; nd = BN_num_bits(d); nm = BN_num_bits(m); if (BN_copy(D, d) == NULL) goto end; if (BN_copy(rem, m) == NULL) goto end; /* * The next 2 are needed so we can do a dv->d[0]|=1 later since * BN_lshift1 will only work once there is a value :-) */ BN_zero(dv); if (bn_wexpand(dv, 1) == NULL) goto end; dv->top = 1; if (!BN_lshift(D, D, nm - nd)) goto end; for (i = nm - nd; i >= 0; i--) { if (!BN_lshift1(dv, dv)) goto end; if (BN_ucmp(rem, D) >= 0) { dv->d[0] |= 1; if (!BN_usub(rem, rem, D)) goto end; } /* CAN IMPROVE (and have now :=) */ if (!BN_rshift1(D, D)) goto end; } rem->neg = BN_is_zero(rem) ? 0 : m->neg; dv->neg = m->neg ^ d->neg; ret = 1; end: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } #else # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) \ && !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(BN_DIV3W) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # if defined(__i386) || defined (__i386__) /*- * There were two reasons for implementing this template: * - GNU C generates a call to a function (__udivdi3 to be exact) * in reply to ((((BN_ULLONG)n0)< */ # undef bn_div_words # define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0) \ ({ asm volatile ( \ "divl %4" \ : "=a"(q), "=d"(rem) \ : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0) \ : "cc"); \ q; \ }) # define REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED # elif defined(__x86_64) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) /* * Same story here, but it's 128-bit by 64-bit division. Wow! * */ # undef bn_div_words # define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0) \ ({ asm volatile ( \ "divq %4" \ : "=a"(q), "=d"(rem) \ : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0) \ : "cc"); \ q; \ }) # define REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED # endif /* __ */ # endif /* __GNUC__ */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */ /*- * BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards * zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds. * Thus: * dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero) * rm->neg == num->neg (unless the remainder is zero) * If 'dv' or 'rm' is NULL, the respective value is not returned. */ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) { int norm_shift, i, loop; BIGNUM *tmp, wnum, *snum, *sdiv, *res; BN_ULONG *resp, *wnump; BN_ULONG d0, d1; int num_n, div_n; int no_branch = 0; /* * Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences so don't * just rely on bn_check_top() here (bn_check_top() works only for * BN_DEBUG builds) */ if ((num->top > 0 && num->d[num->top - 1] == 0) || (divisor->top > 0 && divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] == 0)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } bn_check_top(num); bn_check_top(divisor); if ((BN_get_flags(num, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) || (BN_get_flags(divisor, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)) { no_branch = 1; } bn_check_top(dv); bn_check_top(rm); /*- bn_check_top(num); *//* * 'num' has been checked already */ /*- bn_check_top(divisor); *//* * 'divisor' has been checked already */ if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO); return (0); } if (!no_branch && BN_ucmp(num, divisor) < 0) { if (rm != NULL) { if (BN_copy(rm, num) == NULL) return (0); } if (dv != NULL) BN_zero(dv); return (1); } BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); snum = BN_CTX_get(ctx); sdiv = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (dv == NULL) res = BN_CTX_get(ctx); else res = dv; if (sdiv == NULL || res == NULL || tmp == NULL || snum == NULL) goto err; /* First we normalise the numbers */ norm_shift = BN_BITS2 - ((BN_num_bits(divisor)) % BN_BITS2); if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv, divisor, norm_shift))) goto err; sdiv->neg = 0; norm_shift += BN_BITS2; if (!(BN_lshift(snum, num, norm_shift))) goto err; snum->neg = 0; if (no_branch) { /* * Since we don't know whether snum is larger than sdiv, we pad snum * with enough zeroes without changing its value. */ if (snum->top <= sdiv->top + 1) { if (bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->top + 2) == NULL) goto err; for (i = snum->top; i < sdiv->top + 2; i++) snum->d[i] = 0; snum->top = sdiv->top + 2; } else { if (bn_wexpand(snum, snum->top + 1) == NULL) goto err; snum->d[snum->top] = 0; snum->top++; } } div_n = sdiv->top; num_n = snum->top; loop = num_n - div_n; /* * Lets setup a 'window' into snum This is the part that corresponds to * the current 'area' being divided */ wnum.neg = 0; wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]); wnum.top = div_n; + wnum.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA; /* * only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max */ wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop; /* so we don't step out of bounds */ /* Get the top 2 words of sdiv */ /* div_n=sdiv->top; */ d0 = sdiv->d[div_n - 1]; d1 = (div_n == 1) ? 0 : sdiv->d[div_n - 2]; /* pointer to the 'top' of snum */ wnump = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]); /* Setup to 'res' */ res->neg = (num->neg ^ divisor->neg); if (!bn_wexpand(res, (loop + 1))) goto err; res->top = loop - no_branch; resp = &(res->d[loop - 1]); /* space for temp */ if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, (div_n + 1))) goto err; if (!no_branch) { if (BN_ucmp(&wnum, sdiv) >= 0) { /* * If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined BN_ucmp changes (via bn_pollute) * the const bignum arguments => clean the values between top and * max again */ bn_clear_top2max(&wnum); bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n); *resp = 1; } else res->top--; } /* * if res->top == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease the resp * pointer */ if (res->top == 0) res->neg = 0; else resp--; for (i = 0; i < loop - 1; i++, wnump--, resp--) { BN_ULONG q, l0; /* * the first part of the loop uses the top two words of snum and sdiv * to calculate a BN_ULONG q such that | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv */ # if defined(BN_DIV3W) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) BN_ULONG bn_div_3_words(BN_ULONG *, BN_ULONG, BN_ULONG); q = bn_div_3_words(wnump, d1, d0); # else BN_ULONG n0, n1, rem = 0; n0 = wnump[0]; n1 = wnump[-1]; if (n0 == d0) q = BN_MASK2; else { /* n0 < d0 */ # ifdef BN_LLONG BN_ULLONG t2; # if defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) && !defined(bn_div_words) q = (BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG) n0) << BN_BITS2) | n1) / d0); # else q = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0); # ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE fprintf(stderr, "DEBUG: bn_div_words(0x%08X,0x%08X,0x%08\ X) -> 0x%08X\n", n0, n1, d0, q); # endif # endif # ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED /* * rem doesn't have to be BN_ULLONG. The least we * know it's less that d0, isn't it? */ rem = (n1 - q * d0) & BN_MASK2; # endif t2 = (BN_ULLONG) d1 *q; for (;;) { if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG) rem) << BN_BITS2) | wnump[-2])) break; q--; rem += d0; if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */ t2 -= d1; } # else /* !BN_LLONG */ BN_ULONG t2l, t2h; q = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0); # ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE fprintf(stderr, "DEBUG: bn_div_words(0x%08X,0x%08X,0x%08\ X) -> 0x%08X\n", n0, n1, d0, q); # endif # ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED rem = (n1 - q * d0) & BN_MASK2; # endif # if defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l, t2h, d1, q); # elif defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH) t2l = d1 * q; t2h = BN_UMULT_HIGH(d1, q); # else { BN_ULONG ql, qh; t2l = LBITS(d1); t2h = HBITS(d1); ql = LBITS(q); qh = HBITS(q); mul64(t2l, t2h, ql, qh); /* t2=(BN_ULLONG)d1*q; */ } # endif for (;;) { if ((t2h < rem) || ((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= wnump[-2]))) break; q--; rem += d0; if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */ if (t2l < d1) t2h--; t2l -= d1; } # endif /* !BN_LLONG */ } # endif /* !BN_DIV3W */ l0 = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q); tmp->d[div_n] = l0; wnum.d--; /* * ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two BN_ULONG arrays * with bn_sub_words */ if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n + 1)) { /* * Note: As we have considered only the leading two BN_ULONGs in * the calculation of q, sdiv * q might be greater than wnum (but * then (q-1) * sdiv is less or equal than wnum) */ q--; if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n)) /* * we can't have an overflow here (assuming that q != 0, but * if q == 0 then tmp is zero anyway) */ (*wnump)++; } /* store part of the result */ *resp = q; } bn_correct_top(snum); if (rm != NULL) { /* * Keep a copy of the neg flag in num because if rm==num BN_rshift() * will overwrite it. */ int neg = num->neg; BN_rshift(rm, snum, norm_shift); if (!BN_is_zero(rm)) rm->neg = neg; bn_check_top(rm); } if (no_branch) bn_correct_top(res); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (1); err: bn_check_top(rm); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (0); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,1472 +1,1477 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_exp.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include "cryptlib.h" #include "constant_time_locl.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #include #ifdef _WIN32 # include # ifndef alloca # define alloca _alloca # endif #elif defined(__GNUC__) # ifndef alloca # define alloca(s) __builtin_alloca((s)) # endif #elif defined(__sun) # include #endif #include "rsaz_exp.h" #undef SPARC_T4_MONT #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (defined(__sparc__) || defined(__sparc)) # include "sparc_arch.h" extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[]; # define SPARC_T4_MONT #endif /* maximum precomputation table size for *variable* sliding windows */ #define TABLE_SIZE 32 /* this one works - simple but works */ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, bits, ret = 0; BIGNUM *v, *rr; if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((r == a) || (r == p)) rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx); else rr = r; v = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (rr == NULL || v == NULL) goto err; if (BN_copy(v, a) == NULL) goto err; bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (BN_is_odd(p)) { if (BN_copy(rr, a) == NULL) goto err; } else { if (!BN_one(rr)) goto err; } for (i = 1; i < bits; i++) { if (!BN_sqr(v, v, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_bit_set(p, i)) { if (!BN_mul(rr, rr, v, ctx)) goto err; } } if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); /*- * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute * a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT. * * For now, we use Montgomery only if the modulus is odd; otherwise, * exponentiation using the reciprocal-based quick remaindering * algorithm is used. * * (Timing obtained with expspeed.c [computations a^p mod m * where a, p, m are of the same length: 256, 512, 1024, 2048, * 4096, 8192 bits], compared to the running time of the * standard algorithm: * * BN_mod_exp_mont 33 .. 40 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration] * 55 .. 77 % [UltraSparc processor, but * debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc conf.] * * BN_mod_exp_recp 50 .. 70 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration] * 62 .. 118 % [UltraSparc, debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc] * * On the Sparc, BN_mod_exp_recp was faster than BN_mod_exp_mont * at 2048 and more bits, but at 512 and 1024 bits, it was * slower even than the standard algorithm! * * "Real" timings [linux-elf, solaris-sparcv9-gcc configurations] * should be obtained when the new Montgomery reduction code * has been integrated into OpenSSL.) */ #define MONT_MUL_MOD #define MONT_EXP_WORD #define RECP_MUL_MOD #ifdef MONT_MUL_MOD /* * I have finally been able to take out this pre-condition of the top bit * being set. It was caused by an error in BN_div with negatives. There * was also another problem when for a^b%m a >= m. eay 07-May-97 */ /* if ((m->d[m->top-1]&BN_TBIT) && BN_is_odd(m)) */ if (BN_is_odd(m)) { # ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0) && (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0) && (BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) { BN_ULONG A = a->d[0]; ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, A, p, m, ctx, NULL); } else # endif ret = BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL); } else #endif #ifdef RECP_MUL_MOD { ret = BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, p, m, ctx); } #else { ret = BN_mod_exp_simple(r, a, p, m, ctx); } #endif bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue; int start = 1; BIGNUM *aa; /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_RECP_CTX recp; if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (bits == 0) { - /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ - if (BN_is_one(m)) { + /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */ + if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(r); } else { ret = BN_one(r); } return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); aa = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!aa || !val[0]) goto err; BN_RECP_CTX_init(&recp); if (m->neg) { /* ignore sign of 'm' */ if (!BN_copy(aa, m)) goto err; aa->neg = 0; if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, aa, ctx) <= 0) goto err; } else { if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, m, ctx) <= 0) goto err; } if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx)) goto err; /* 1 */ if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) { BN_zero(r); ret = 1; goto err; } window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits); if (window > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(aa, val[0], val[0], &recp, ctx)) goto err; /* 2 */ j = 1 << (window - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || !BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(val[i], val[i - 1], aa, &recp, ctx)) goto err; } } start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc * when there is only the value '1' in the * buffer. */ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */ wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */ wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */ if (!BN_one(r)) goto err; for (;;) { if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) { if (!start) if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx)) goto err; if (wstart == 0) break; wstart--; continue; } /* * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last * set bit before the end of the window */ j = wstart; wvalue = 1; wend = 0; for (i = 1; i < window; i++) { if (wstart - i < 0) break; if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) { wvalue <<= (i - wend); wvalue |= 1; wend = i; } } /* wend is the size of the current window */ j = wend + 1; /* add the 'bytes above' */ if (!start) for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx)) goto err; } /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */ if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], &recp, ctx)) goto err; /* move the 'window' down further */ wstart -= wend + 1; wvalue = 0; start = 0; if (wstart < 0) break; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_RECP_CTX_free(&recp); bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue; int start = 1; BIGNUM *d, *r; const BIGNUM *aa; /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont); } bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); return (0); } bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (bits == 0) { - /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ - if (BN_is_one(m)) { + /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */ + if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(rr); } else { ret = BN_one(rr); } return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); d = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!d || !r || !val[0]) goto err; /* * If this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part */ if (in_mont != NULL) mont = in_mont; else { if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) goto err; } if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx)) goto err; aa = val[0]; } else aa = a; if (BN_is_zero(aa)) { BN_zero(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } - if (!BN_to_montgomery(val[0], aa, mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(val[0], aa, mont, ctx)) goto err; /* 1 */ window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits); if (window > 1) { - if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx)) goto err; /* 2 */ j = 1 << (window - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || - !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx)) + !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx)) goto err; } } start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc * when there is only the value '1' in the * buffer. */ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */ wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */ wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */ #if 1 /* by Shay Gueron's suggestion */ j = m->top; /* borrow j */ if (m->d[j - 1] & (((BN_ULONG)1) << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) { if (bn_wexpand(r, j) == NULL) goto err; /* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */ r->d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2; for (i = 1; i < j; i++) r->d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2; r->top = j; - /* - * Upper words will be zero if the corresponding words of 'm' were - * 0xfff[...], so decrement r->top accordingly. - */ - bn_correct_top(r); + r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; } else #endif - if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) goto err; for (;;) { if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) { if (!start) { - if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } if (wstart == 0) break; wstart--; continue; } /* * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last * set bit before the end of the window */ j = wstart; wvalue = 1; wend = 0; for (i = 1; i < window; i++) { if (wstart - i < 0) break; if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) { wvalue <<= (i - wend); wvalue |= 1; wend = i; } } /* wend is the size of the current window */ j = wend + 1; /* add the 'bytes above' */ if (!start) for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { - if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */ - if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx)) goto err; /* move the 'window' down further */ wstart -= wend + 1; wvalue = 0; start = 0; if (wstart < 0) break; } + /* + * Done with zero-padded intermediate BIGNUMs. Final BN_from_montgomery + * removes padding [if any] and makes return value suitable for public + * API consumer. + */ #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) { j = mont->N.top; /* borrow j */ val[0]->d[0] = 1; /* borrow val[0] */ for (i = 1; i < j; i++) val[0]->d[i] = 0; val[0]->top = j; if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(rr, r, val[0], mont, ctx)) goto err; } else #endif if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL)) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(rr); return (ret); } #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) static BN_ULONG bn_get_bits(const BIGNUM *a, int bitpos) { BN_ULONG ret = 0; int wordpos; wordpos = bitpos / BN_BITS2; bitpos %= BN_BITS2; if (wordpos >= 0 && wordpos < a->top) { ret = a->d[wordpos] & BN_MASK2; if (bitpos) { ret >>= bitpos; if (++wordpos < a->top) ret |= a->d[wordpos] << (BN_BITS2 - bitpos); } } return ret & BN_MASK2; } #endif /* * BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() stores the precomputed powers in a specific * layout so that accessing any of these table values shows the same access * pattern as far as cache lines are concerned. The following functions are * used to transfer a BIGNUM from/to that table. */ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top, unsigned char *buf, int idx, int window) { int i, j; int width = 1 << window; BN_ULONG *table = (BN_ULONG *)buf; if (top > b->top) top = b->top; /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly * zeroed */ for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top; i++, j += width) { table[j] = b->d[i]; } return 1; } static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top, unsigned char *buf, int idx, int window) { int i, j; int width = 1 << window; volatile BN_ULONG *table = (volatile BN_ULONG *)buf; if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL) return 0; if (window <= 3) { for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) { BN_ULONG acc = 0; for (j = 0; j < width; j++) { acc |= table[j] & ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1)); } b->d[i] = acc; } } else { int xstride = 1 << (window - 2); BN_ULONG y0, y1, y2, y3; i = idx >> (window - 2); /* equivalent of idx / xstride */ idx &= xstride - 1; /* equivalent of idx % xstride */ y0 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,0)&1); y1 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,1)&1); y2 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,2)&1); y3 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,3)&1); for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) { BN_ULONG acc = 0; for (j = 0; j < xstride; j++) { acc |= ( (table[j + 0 * xstride] & y0) | (table[j + 1 * xstride] & y1) | (table[j + 2 * xstride] & y2) | (table[j + 3 * xstride] & y3) ) & ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1)); } b->d[i] = acc; } } b->top = top; - bn_correct_top(b); + b->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; return 1; } /* * Given a pointer value, compute the next address that is a cache line * multiple. */ #define MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(x_) \ ((unsigned char*)(x_) + (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH - (((size_t)(x_)) & (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_MASK)))) /* * This variant of BN_mod_exp_mont() uses fixed windows and the special * precomputation memory layout to limit data-dependency to a minimum to * protect secret exponents (cf. the hyper-threading timing attacks pointed * out by Colin Percival, * http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/) */ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { int i, bits, ret = 0, window, wvalue; int top; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int numPowers; unsigned char *powerbufFree = NULL; int powerbufLen = 0; unsigned char *powerbuf = NULL; BIGNUM tmp, am; #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) unsigned int t4 = 0; #endif bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); return (0); } top = m->top; /* * Use all bits stored in |p|, rather than |BN_num_bits|, so we do not leak * whether the top bits are zero. */ bits = p->top * BN_BITS2; if (bits == 0) { - /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ - if (BN_is_one(m)) { + /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */ + if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(rr); } else { ret = BN_one(rr); } return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); /* * Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. If * this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part. */ if (in_mont != NULL) mont = in_mont; else { if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) goto err; } #ifdef RSAZ_ENABLED /* * If the size of the operands allow it, perform the optimized * RSAZ exponentiation. For further information see * crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c and accompanying assembly modules. */ if ((16 == a->top) && (16 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 1024) && rsaz_avx2_eligible()) { if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 16)) goto err; RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->RR.d, mont->n0[0]); rr->top = 16; rr->neg = 0; bn_correct_top(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } else if ((8 == a->top) && (8 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 512)) { if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 8)) goto err; RSAZ_512_mod_exp(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->n0[0], mont->RR.d); rr->top = 8; rr->neg = 0; bn_correct_top(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } #endif /* Get the window size to use with size of p. */ window = BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(bits); #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) if (window >= 5 && (top & 15) == 0 && top <= 64 && (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR)) == (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR) && (t4 = OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0])) window = 5; else #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5) if (window >= 5) { window = 5; /* ~5% improvement for RSA2048 sign, and even * for RSA4096 */ /* reserve space for mont->N.d[] copy */ powerbufLen += top * sizeof(mont->N.d[0]); } #endif (void)0; /* * Allocate a buffer large enough to hold all of the pre-computed powers * of am, am itself and tmp. */ numPowers = 1 << window; powerbufLen += sizeof(m->d[0]) * (top * numPowers + ((2 * top) > numPowers ? (2 * top) : numPowers)); #ifdef alloca if (powerbufLen < 3072) powerbufFree = alloca(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH); else #endif if ((powerbufFree = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH)) == NULL) goto err; powerbuf = MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(powerbufFree); memset(powerbuf, 0, powerbufLen); #ifdef alloca if (powerbufLen < 3072) powerbufFree = NULL; #endif /* lay down tmp and am right after powers table */ tmp.d = (BN_ULONG *)(powerbuf + sizeof(m->d[0]) * top * numPowers); am.d = tmp.d + top; tmp.top = am.top = 0; tmp.dmax = am.dmax = top; tmp.neg = am.neg = 0; tmp.flags = am.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA; /* prepare a^0 in Montgomery domain */ #if 1 /* by Shay Gueron's suggestion */ if (m->d[top - 1] & (((BN_ULONG)1) << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) { /* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */ tmp.d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2; for (i = 1; i < top; i++) tmp.d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2; tmp.top = top; } else #endif - if (!BN_to_montgomery(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) goto err; /* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */ if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_mod(&am, a, m, ctx)) goto err; - if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, &am, mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&am, &am, mont, ctx)) goto err; - } else if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx)) + } else if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(&am, a, mont, ctx)) goto err; #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) if (t4) { typedef int (*bn_pwr5_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); static const bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_funcs[4] = { bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32 }; bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_worker = pwr5_funcs[top / 16 - 1]; typedef int (*bn_mul_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); static const bn_mul_mont_f mul_funcs[4] = { bn_mul_mont_t4_8, bn_mul_mont_t4_16, bn_mul_mont_t4_24, bn_mul_mont_t4_32 }; bn_mul_mont_f mul_worker = mul_funcs[top / 16 - 1]; void bn_mul_mont_vis3(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); void bn_mul_mont_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); void bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power); void bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num, void *table, size_t power); void bn_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power); void bn_flip_t4(BN_ULONG *dst, BN_ULONG *src, size_t num); BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0; int stride = 5 * (6 - (top / 16 - 1)); /* multiple of 5, but less * than 32 */ /* * BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in * BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]... */ for (i = am.top; i < top; i++) am.d[i] = 0; for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++) tmp.d[i] = 0; bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0); bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(am.d, top, powerbuf, 1); if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0) && !(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0)) bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top); bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2); for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) { /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */ if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0) && !(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0)) bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0, top); bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); } /* switch to 64-bit domain */ np = alloca(top * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); top /= 2; bn_flip_t4(np, mont->N.d, top); bits--; for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--) wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); bn_gather5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue); /* * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most * significant bits. */ while (bits >= 0) { if (bits < stride) stride = bits + 1; bits -= stride; wvalue = bn_get_bits(p, bits + 1); if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride)) continue; /* retry once and fall back */ if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride)) continue; bits += stride - 5; wvalue >>= stride - 5; wvalue &= 31; bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue); } bn_flip_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, top); top *= 2; /* back to 32-bit domain */ tmp.top = top; bn_correct_top(&tmp); OPENSSL_cleanse(np, top * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); } else #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5) if (window == 5 && top > 1) { /* * This optimization uses ideas from http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/239, * specifically optimization of cache-timing attack countermeasures * and pre-computation optimization. */ /* * Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as * 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size... */ void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power); void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num, void *table, size_t power); void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power); void bn_power5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power); int bn_get_bits5(const BN_ULONG *ap, int off); int bn_from_montgomery(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *not_used, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); BN_ULONG *n0 = mont->n0, *np; /* * BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in * BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]... */ for (i = am.top; i < top; i++) am.d[i] = 0; for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++) tmp.d[i] = 0; /* * copy mont->N.d[] to improve cache locality */ for (np = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++) np[i] = mont->N.d[i]; bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0); bn_scatter5(am.d, am.top, powerbuf, 1); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2); # if 0 for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) { /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); } # else /* same as above, but uses squaring for 1/2 of operations */ for (i = 4; i < 32; i *= 2) { bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); } for (i = 3; i < 8; i += 2) { int j; bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); for (j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) { bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, j); } } for (; i < 16; i += 2) { bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2 * i); } for (; i < 32; i += 2) { bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); } # endif bits--; for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--) wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); bn_gather5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue); /* * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most * significant bits. */ if (top & 7) while (bits >= 0) { for (wvalue = 0, i = 0; i < 5; i++, bits--) wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue); } else { while (bits >= 0) { wvalue = bn_get_bits5(p->d, bits - 4); bits -= 5; bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue); } } ret = bn_from_montgomery(tmp.d, tmp.d, NULL, np, n0, top); tmp.top = top; bn_correct_top(&tmp); if (ret) { if (!BN_copy(rr, &tmp)) ret = 0; goto err; /* non-zero ret means it's not error */ } } else #endif { if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, window)) goto err; if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, window)) goto err; /* * If the window size is greater than 1, then calculate * val[i=2..2^winsize-1]. Powers are computed as a*a^(i-1) (even * powers could instead be computed as (a^(i/2))^2 to use the slight * performance advantage of sqr over mul). */ if (window > 1) { - if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx)) goto err; if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, window)) goto err; for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) { /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */ - if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx)) goto err; if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, window)) goto err; } } bits--; for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--) wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, window)) goto err; /* * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most * significant bits. */ while (bits >= 0) { wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */ /* Scan the window, squaring the result as we go */ for (i = 0; i < window; i++, bits--) { - if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx)) goto err; wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); } /* * Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf */ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, window)) goto err; /* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */ - if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx)) + if (!bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx)) goto err; } } - /* Convert the final result from montgomery to standard format */ + /* + * Done with zero-padded intermediate BIGNUMs. Final BN_from_montgomery + * removes padding [if any] and makes return value suitable for public + * API consumer. + */ #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) { am.d[0] = 1; /* borrow am */ for (i = 1; i < top; i++) am.d[i] = 0; if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(rr, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx)) goto err; } else #endif if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL)) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); if (powerbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(powerbuf, powerbufLen); if (powerbufFree) OPENSSL_free(powerbufFree); } BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int b, bits, ret = 0; int r_is_one; BN_ULONG w, next_w; BIGNUM *d, *r, *t; BIGNUM *swap_tmp; #define BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m) \ (BN_mul_word(r, (w)) && \ (/* BN_ucmp(r, (m)) < 0 ? 1 :*/ \ (BN_mod(t, r, m, ctx) && (swap_tmp = r, r = t, t = swap_tmp, 1)))) /* * BN_MOD_MUL_WORD is only used with 'w' large, so the BN_ucmp test is * probably more overhead than always using BN_mod (which uses BN_copy if * a similar test returns true). */ /* * We can use BN_mod and do not need BN_nnmod because our accumulator is * never negative (the result of BN_mod does not depend on the sign of * the modulus). */ #define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \ (BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx)) if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); return (0); } if (m->top == 1) a %= m->d[0]; /* make sure that 'a' is reduced */ bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (bits == 0) { - /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ - if (BN_is_one(m)) { + /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */ + if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(rr); } else { ret = BN_one(rr); } return ret; } if (a == 0) { BN_zero(rr); ret = 1; return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); d = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (d == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL) goto err; if (in_mont != NULL) mont = in_mont; else { if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) goto err; } r_is_one = 1; /* except for Montgomery factor */ /* bits-1 >= 0 */ /* The result is accumulated in the product r*w. */ w = a; /* bit 'bits-1' of 'p' is always set */ for (b = bits - 2; b >= 0; b--) { /* First, square r*w. */ next_w = w * w; if ((next_w / w) != w) { /* overflow */ if (r_is_one) { if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont)) goto err; r_is_one = 0; } else { if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m)) goto err; } next_w = 1; } w = next_w; if (!r_is_one) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } /* Second, multiply r*w by 'a' if exponent bit is set. */ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, b)) { next_w = w * a; if ((next_w / a) != w) { /* overflow */ if (r_is_one) { if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont)) goto err; r_is_one = 0; } else { if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m)) goto err; } next_w = a; } w = next_w; } } /* Finally, set r:=r*w. */ if (w != 1) { if (r_is_one) { if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont)) goto err; r_is_one = 0; } else { if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m)) goto err; } } if (r_is_one) { /* can happen only if a == 1 */ if (!BN_one(rr)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL)) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(rr); return (ret); } /* The old fallback, simple version :-) */ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue; int start = 1; BIGNUM *d; /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } bits = BN_num_bits(p); - if (bits == 0) { - /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ - if (BN_is_one(m)) { + if (bits == 0) { + /* x**0 mod 1, or x**0 mod -1 is still zero. */ + if (BN_abs_is_word(m, 1)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(r); } else { ret = BN_one(r); } return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); d = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!d || !val[0]) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx)) goto err; /* 1 */ if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) { BN_zero(r); ret = 1; goto err; } window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits); if (window > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul(d, val[0], val[0], m, ctx)) goto err; /* 2 */ j = 1 << (window - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || !BN_mod_mul(val[i], val[i - 1], d, m, ctx)) goto err; } } start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc * when there is only the value '1' in the * buffer. */ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */ wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */ wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */ if (!BN_one(r)) goto err; for (;;) { if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) { if (!start) if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx)) goto err; if (wstart == 0) break; wstart--; continue; } /* * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last * set bit before the end of the window */ j = wstart; wvalue = 1; wend = 0; for (i = 1; i < window; i++) { if (wstart - i < 0) break; if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) { wvalue <<= (i - wend); wvalue |= 1; wend = i; } } /* wend is the size of the current window */ j = wend + 1; /* add the 'bytes above' */ if (!start) for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx)) goto err; } /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */ if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], m, ctx)) goto err; /* move the 'window' down further */ wstart -= wend + 1; wvalue = 0; start = 0; if (wstart < 0) break; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,1300 +1,1302 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed * to the OpenSSL project. * * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided below. * * In addition, Sun covenants to all licensees who provide a reciprocal * covenant with respect to their own patents if any, not to sue under * current and future patent claims necessarily infringed by the making, * using, practicing, selling, offering for sale and/or otherwise * disposing of the ECC Code as delivered hereunder (or portions thereof), * provided that such covenant shall not apply: * 1) for code that a licensee deletes from the ECC Code; * 2) separates from the ECC Code; or * 3) for infringements caused by: * i) the modification of the ECC Code or * ii) the combination of the ECC Code with other software or * devices where such combination causes the infringement. * * The software is originally written by Sheueling Chang Shantz and * Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* * NOTE: This file is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL license below and may * be modified; but after modifications, the above covenant may no longer * apply! In such cases, the corresponding paragraph ["In addition, Sun * covenants ... causes the infringement."] and this note can be edited out; * but please keep the Sun copyright notice and attribution. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should * fail. */ # define MAX_ITERATIONS 50 -static const BN_ULONG SQR_tb[16] = { 0, 1, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21, - 64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 84, 85 -}; +# define SQR_nibble(w) ((((w) & 8) << 3) \ + | (((w) & 4) << 2) \ + | (((w) & 2) << 1) \ + | ((w) & 1)) + /* Platform-specific macros to accelerate squaring. */ # if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) # define SQR1(w) \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 60 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 56 & 0xF] << 48 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 52 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 48 & 0xF] << 32 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 44 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 40 & 0xF] << 16 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 36 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 32 & 0xF] + SQR_nibble((w) >> 60) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 56) << 48 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 52) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 48) << 32 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 44) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 40) << 16 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 36) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 32) # define SQR0(w) \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 48 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] << 32 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF] + SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 48 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16) << 32 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 8) << 16 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 4) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) ) # endif # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT # define SQR1(w) \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 16 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] + SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 16 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16) # define SQR0(w) \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \ - SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF] + SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 8) << 16 | \ + SQR_nibble((w) >> 4) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) ) # endif # if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m) /* * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < BN_BITS2 - 1, result is * a polynomial r with degree < 2 * BN_BITS - 1 The caller MUST ensure that * the variables have the right amount of space allocated. */ # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a, const BN_ULONG b) { register BN_ULONG h, l, s; BN_ULONG tab[8], top2b = a >> 30; register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4; a1 = a & (0x3FFFFFFF); a2 = a1 << 1; a4 = a2 << 1; tab[0] = 0; tab[1] = a1; tab[2] = a2; tab[3] = a1 ^ a2; tab[4] = a4; tab[5] = a1 ^ a4; tab[6] = a2 ^ a4; tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4; s = tab[b & 0x7]; l = s; s = tab[b >> 3 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 3; h = s >> 29; s = tab[b >> 6 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 6; h ^= s >> 26; s = tab[b >> 9 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 9; h ^= s >> 23; s = tab[b >> 12 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 12; h ^= s >> 20; s = tab[b >> 15 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 15; h ^= s >> 17; s = tab[b >> 18 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 18; h ^= s >> 14; s = tab[b >> 21 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 21; h ^= s >> 11; s = tab[b >> 24 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 24; h ^= s >> 8; s = tab[b >> 27 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 27; h ^= s >> 5; s = tab[b >> 30]; l ^= s << 30; h ^= s >> 2; /* compensate for the top two bits of a */ if (top2b & 01) { l ^= b << 30; h ^= b >> 2; } if (top2b & 02) { l ^= b << 31; h ^= b >> 1; } *r1 = h; *r0 = l; } # endif # if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a, const BN_ULONG b) { register BN_ULONG h, l, s; BN_ULONG tab[16], top3b = a >> 61; register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4, a8; a1 = a & (0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); a2 = a1 << 1; a4 = a2 << 1; a8 = a4 << 1; tab[0] = 0; tab[1] = a1; tab[2] = a2; tab[3] = a1 ^ a2; tab[4] = a4; tab[5] = a1 ^ a4; tab[6] = a2 ^ a4; tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4; tab[8] = a8; tab[9] = a1 ^ a8; tab[10] = a2 ^ a8; tab[11] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a8; tab[12] = a4 ^ a8; tab[13] = a1 ^ a4 ^ a8; tab[14] = a2 ^ a4 ^ a8; tab[15] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4 ^ a8; s = tab[b & 0xF]; l = s; s = tab[b >> 4 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 4; h = s >> 60; s = tab[b >> 8 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 8; h ^= s >> 56; s = tab[b >> 12 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 12; h ^= s >> 52; s = tab[b >> 16 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 16; h ^= s >> 48; s = tab[b >> 20 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 20; h ^= s >> 44; s = tab[b >> 24 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 24; h ^= s >> 40; s = tab[b >> 28 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 28; h ^= s >> 36; s = tab[b >> 32 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 32; h ^= s >> 32; s = tab[b >> 36 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 36; h ^= s >> 28; s = tab[b >> 40 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 40; h ^= s >> 24; s = tab[b >> 44 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 44; h ^= s >> 20; s = tab[b >> 48 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 48; h ^= s >> 16; s = tab[b >> 52 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 52; h ^= s >> 12; s = tab[b >> 56 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 56; h ^= s >> 8; s = tab[b >> 60]; l ^= s << 60; h ^= s >> 4; /* compensate for the top three bits of a */ if (top3b & 01) { l ^= b << 61; h ^= b >> 3; } if (top3b & 02) { l ^= b << 62; h ^= b >> 2; } if (top3b & 04) { l ^= b << 63; h ^= b >> 1; } *r1 = h; *r0 = l; } # endif /* * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < 2 * BN_BITS2 - 1, * result is a polynomial r with degree < 4 * BN_BITS2 - 1 The caller MUST * ensure that the variables have the right amount of space allocated. */ static void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG a1, const BN_ULONG a0, const BN_ULONG b1, const BN_ULONG b0) { BN_ULONG m1, m0; /* r[3] = h1, r[2] = h0; r[1] = l1; r[0] = l0 */ bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 3, r + 2, a1, b1); bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 1, r, a0, b0); bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(&m1, &m0, a0 ^ a1, b0 ^ b1); /* Correction on m1 ^= l1 ^ h1; m0 ^= l0 ^ h0; */ r[2] ^= m1 ^ r[1] ^ r[3]; /* h0 ^= m1 ^ l1 ^ h1; */ r[1] = r[3] ^ r[2] ^ r[0] ^ m1 ^ m0; /* l1 ^= l0 ^ h0 ^ m0; */ } # else void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG a1, BN_ULONG a0, BN_ULONG b1, BN_ULONG b0); # endif /* * Add polynomials a and b and store result in r; r could be a or b, a and b * could be equal; r is the bitwise XOR of a and b. */ int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; const BIGNUM *at, *bt; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (a->top < b->top) { at = b; bt = a; } else { at = a; bt = b; } if (bn_wexpand(r, at->top) == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < bt->top; i++) { r->d[i] = at->d[i] ^ bt->d[i]; } for (; i < at->top; i++) { r->d[i] = at->d[i]; } r->top = at->top; bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } /*- * Some functions allow for representation of the irreducible polynomials * as an int[], say p. The irreducible f(t) is then of the form: * t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] * where m = p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. */ /* Performs modular reduction of a and store result in r. r could be a. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[]) { int j, k; int n, dN, d0, d1; BN_ULONG zz, *z; bn_check_top(a); if (!p[0]) { /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */ BN_zero(r); return 1; } /* * Since the algorithm does reduction in the r value, if a != r, copy the * contents of a into r so we can do reduction in r. */ if (a != r) { if (!bn_wexpand(r, a->top)) return 0; for (j = 0; j < a->top; j++) { r->d[j] = a->d[j]; } r->top = a->top; } z = r->d; /* start reduction */ dN = p[0] / BN_BITS2; for (j = r->top - 1; j > dN;) { zz = z[j]; if (z[j] == 0) { j--; continue; } z[j] = 0; for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) { /* reducing component t^p[k] */ n = p[0] - p[k]; d0 = n % BN_BITS2; d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0; n /= BN_BITS2; z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0); if (d0) z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1); } /* reducing component t^0 */ n = dN; d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2; d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0; z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0); if (d0) z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1); } /* final round of reduction */ while (j == dN) { d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2; zz = z[dN] >> d0; if (zz == 0) break; d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0; /* clear up the top d1 bits */ if (d0) z[dN] = (z[dN] << d1) >> d1; else z[dN] = 0; z[0] ^= zz; /* reduction t^0 component */ for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) { BN_ULONG tmp_ulong; /* reducing component t^p[k] */ n = p[k] / BN_BITS2; d0 = p[k] % BN_BITS2; d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0; z[n] ^= (zz << d0); if (d0 && (tmp_ulong = zz >> d1)) z[n + 1] ^= tmp_ulong; } } bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } /* * Performs modular reduction of a by p and store result in r. r could be a. * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_arr implementation; this wrapper * function is only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the * BN_GF2m_mod_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p) { int ret = 0; int arr[6]; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, sizeof(arr) / sizeof(arr[0])); if (!ret || ret > (int)(sizeof(arr) / sizeof(arr[0]))) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); return 0; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, a, arr); bn_check_top(r); return ret; } /* * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store * the result in r. r could be a or b; a could be b. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int zlen, i, j, k, ret = 0; BIGNUM *s; BN_ULONG x1, x0, y1, y0, zz[4]; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (a == b) { return BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, p, ctx); } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; zlen = a->top + b->top + 4; if (!bn_wexpand(s, zlen)) goto err; s->top = zlen; for (i = 0; i < zlen; i++) s->d[i] = 0; for (j = 0; j < b->top; j += 2) { y0 = b->d[j]; y1 = ((j + 1) == b->top) ? 0 : b->d[j + 1]; for (i = 0; i < a->top; i += 2) { x0 = a->d[i]; x1 = ((i + 1) == a->top) ? 0 : a->d[i + 1]; bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(zz, x1, x0, y1, y0); for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) s->d[i + j + k] ^= zz[k]; } } bn_correct_top(s); if (BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p)) ret = 1; bn_check_top(r); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store * the result in r. r could be a or b; a could equal b. This function calls * down to the BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr implementation; this wrapper function is * only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the * BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: if (arr) OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a. r could be a. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, ret = 0; BIGNUM *s; bn_check_top(a); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top)) goto err; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { s->d[2 * i + 1] = SQR1(a->d[i]); s->d[2 * i] = SQR0(a->d[i]); } s->top = 2 * a->top; bn_correct_top(s); if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a. r could be a. This * function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr implementation; this * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance, * use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: if (arr) OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* * Invert a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be a. Uses * Modified Almost Inverse Algorithm (Algorithm 10) from Hankerson, D., * Hernandez, J.L., and Menezes, A. "Software Implementation of Elliptic * Curve Cryptography Over Binary Fields". */ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *b, *c = NULL, *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *tmp; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((c = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, a, p)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(u)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(v, p)) goto err; # if 0 if (!BN_one(b)) goto err; while (1) { while (!BN_is_odd(u)) { if (BN_is_zero(u)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err; if (BN_is_odd(b)) { if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, p)) goto err; } if (!BN_rshift1(b, b)) goto err; } if (BN_abs_is_word(u, 1)) break; if (BN_num_bits(u) < BN_num_bits(v)) { tmp = u; u = v; v = tmp; tmp = b; b = c; c = tmp; } if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, c)) goto err; } # else { int i; int ubits = BN_num_bits(u); int vbits = BN_num_bits(v); /* v is copy of p */ int top = p->top; BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp; if (!bn_wexpand(u, top)) goto err; udp = u->d; for (i = u->top; i < top; i++) udp[i] = 0; u->top = top; if (!bn_wexpand(b, top)) goto err; bdp = b->d; bdp[0] = 1; for (i = 1; i < top; i++) bdp[i] = 0; b->top = top; if (!bn_wexpand(c, top)) goto err; cdp = c->d; for (i = 0; i < top; i++) cdp[i] = 0; c->top = top; vdp = v->d; /* It pays off to "cache" *->d pointers, * because it allows optimizer to be more * aggressive. But we don't have to "cache" * p->d, because *p is declared 'const'... */ while (1) { while (ubits && !(udp[0] & 1)) { BN_ULONG u0, u1, b0, b1, mask; u0 = udp[0]; b0 = bdp[0]; mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - (b0 & 1); b0 ^= p->d[0] & mask; for (i = 0; i < top - 1; i++) { u1 = udp[i + 1]; udp[i] = ((u0 >> 1) | (u1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2; u0 = u1; b1 = bdp[i + 1] ^ (p->d[i + 1] & mask); bdp[i] = ((b0 >> 1) | (b1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2; b0 = b1; } udp[i] = u0 >> 1; bdp[i] = b0 >> 1; ubits--; } if (ubits <= BN_BITS2) { if (udp[0] == 0) /* poly was reducible */ goto err; if (udp[0] == 1) break; } if (ubits < vbits) { i = ubits; ubits = vbits; vbits = i; tmp = u; u = v; v = tmp; tmp = b; b = c; c = tmp; udp = vdp; vdp = v->d; bdp = cdp; cdp = c->d; } for (i = 0; i < top; i++) { udp[i] ^= vdp[i]; bdp[i] ^= cdp[i]; } if (ubits == vbits) { BN_ULONG ul; int utop = (ubits - 1) / BN_BITS2; while ((ul = udp[utop]) == 0 && utop) utop--; ubits = utop * BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(ul); } } bn_correct_top(b); } # endif if (!BN_copy(r, b)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: # ifdef BN_DEBUG /* BN_CTX_end would complain about the * expanded form */ bn_correct_top(c); bn_correct_top(u); bn_correct_top(v); # endif BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Invert xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx. * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_inv implementation; this * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance, * use the BN_GF2m_mod_inv function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *xx, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *field; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(xx); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field)) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_mod_inv(r, xx, field, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } # ifndef OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV /* * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x * or y, x could equal y. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *xinv = NULL; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(y); bn_check_top(x); bn_check_top(p); BN_CTX_start(ctx); xinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (xinv == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_inv(xinv, x, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul(r, y, xinv, p, ctx)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } # else /* * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x * or y, x could equal y. Uses algorithm Modular_Division_GF(2^m) from * Chang-Shantz, S. "From Euclid's GCD to Montgomery Multiplication to the * Great Divide". */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *u, *v; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(y); bn_check_top(x); bn_check_top(p); BN_CTX_start(ctx); a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); u = BN_CTX_get(ctx); v = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (v == NULL) goto err; /* reduce x and y mod p */ if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, y, p)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod(a, x, p)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(b, p)) goto err; while (!BN_is_odd(a)) { if (!BN_rshift1(a, a)) goto err; if (BN_is_odd(u)) if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err; } do { if (BN_GF2m_cmp(b, a) > 0) { if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, a)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, u)) goto err; do { if (!BN_rshift1(b, b)) goto err; if (BN_is_odd(v)) if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, p)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(v, v)) goto err; } while (!BN_is_odd(b)); } else if (BN_abs_is_word(a, 1)) break; else { if (!BN_GF2m_add(a, a, b)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v)) goto err; do { if (!BN_rshift1(a, a)) goto err; if (BN_is_odd(u)) if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err; } while (!BN_is_odd(a)); } } while (1); if (!BN_copy(r, u)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } # endif /* * Divide yy by xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx * * or yy, xx could equal yy. This function calls down to the * BN_GF2m_mod_div implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for * convenience; for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_div function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *yy, const BIGNUM *xx, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *field; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(yy); bn_check_top(xx); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field)) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_mod_div(r, yy, xx, field, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r * could be a. Uses simple square-and-multiply algorithm A.5.1 from IEEE * P1363. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0, i, n; BIGNUM *u; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (BN_is_zero(b)) return (BN_one(r)); if (BN_abs_is_word(b, 1)) return (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(u, a, p)) goto err; n = BN_num_bits(b) - 1; for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(u, u, p, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_bit_set(b, i)) { if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(u, u, a, p, ctx)) goto err; } } if (!BN_copy(r, u)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r * could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience; * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: if (arr) OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. * r could be a. Uses exponentiation as in algorithm A.4.1 from IEEE P1363. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *u; bn_check_top(a); if (!p[0]) { /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */ BN_zero(r); return 1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(u, p[0] - 1)) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, u, p, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. * r could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience; * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(r, a, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: if (arr) OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p. r could be a. If no r exists returns * 0. Uses algorithms A.4.7 and A.4.6 from IEEE P1363. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a_, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0, count = 0, j; BIGNUM *a, *z, *rho, *w, *w2, *tmp; bn_check_top(a_); if (!p[0]) { /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */ BN_zero(r); return 1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); w = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (w == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(a, a_, p)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(a)) { BN_zero(r); ret = 1; goto err; } if (p[0] & 0x1) { /* m is odd */ /* compute half-trace of a */ if (!BN_copy(z, a)) goto err; for (j = 1; j <= (p[0] - 1) / 2; j++) { if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, a)) goto err; } } else { /* m is even */ rho = BN_CTX_get(ctx); w2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; do { if (!BN_rand(rho, p[0], 0, 0)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(rho, rho, p)) goto err; BN_zero(z); if (!BN_copy(w, rho)) goto err; for (j = 1; j <= p[0] - 1; j++) { if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w2, w, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(tmp, w2, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, tmp)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, w2, rho)) goto err; } count++; } while (BN_is_zero(w) && (count < MAX_ITERATIONS)); if (BN_is_zero(w)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); goto err; } } if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w, z, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, z, w)) goto err; if (BN_GF2m_cmp(w, a)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_NO_SOLUTION); goto err; } if (!BN_copy(r, z)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p. r could be a. If no r exists returns * 0. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience; * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(r, a, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: if (arr) OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i * * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would * be filled if array was large enough. */ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) { int i, j, k = 0; BN_ULONG mask; if (BN_is_zero(a)) return 0; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { if (!a->d[i]) /* skip word if a->d[i] == 0 */ continue; mask = BN_TBIT; for (j = BN_BITS2 - 1; j >= 0; j--) { if (a->d[i] & mask) { if (k < max) p[k] = BN_BITS2 * i + j; k++; } mask >>= 1; } } if (k < max) { p[k] = -1; k++; } return k; } /* * Convert the coefficient array representation of a polynomial to a * bit-string. The array must be terminated by -1. */ int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const int p[], BIGNUM *a) { int i; bn_check_top(a); BN_zero(a); for (i = 0; p[i] != -1; i++) { if (BN_set_bit(a, p[i]) == 0) return 0; } bn_check_top(a); return 1; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h (revision 337764) @@ -1,537 +1,538 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #ifndef HEADER_BN_LCL_H # define HEADER_BN_LCL_H # include +# include "bn_int.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions * * * For window size 'w' (w >= 2) and a random 'b' bits exponent, * the number of multiplications is a constant plus on average * * 2^(w-1) + (b-w)/(w+1); * * here 2^(w-1) is for precomputing the table (we actually need * entries only for windows that have the lowest bit set), and * (b-w)/(w+1) is an approximation for the expected number of * w-bit windows, not counting the first one. * * Thus we should use * * w >= 6 if b > 671 * w = 5 if 671 > b > 239 * w = 4 if 239 > b > 79 * w = 3 if 79 > b > 23 * w <= 2 if 23 > b * * (with draws in between). Very small exponents are often selected * with low Hamming weight, so we use w = 1 for b <= 23. */ # if 1 # define BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 671 ? 6 : \ (b) > 239 ? 5 : \ (b) > 79 ? 4 : \ (b) > 23 ? 3 : 1) # else /* * Old SSLeay/OpenSSL table. Maximum window size was 5, so this table differs * for b==1024; but it coincides for other interesting values (b==160, * b==512). */ # define BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 255 ? 5 : \ (b) > 127 ? 4 : \ (b) > 17 ? 3 : 1) # endif /* * BN_mod_exp_mont_conttime is based on the assumption that the L1 data cache * line width of the target processor is at least the following value. */ # define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH ( 64 ) # define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_MASK (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH - 1) /* * Window sizes optimized for fixed window size modular exponentiation * algorithm (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime). To achieve the security goals of * BN_mode_exp_mont_consttime, the maximum size of the window must not exceed * log_2(MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH). Window size thresholds are * defined for cache line sizes of 32 and 64, cache line sizes where * log_2(32)=5 and log_2(64)=6 respectively. A window size of 7 should only be * used on processors that have a 128 byte or greater cache line size. */ # if MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH == 64 # define BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 937 ? 6 : \ (b) > 306 ? 5 : \ (b) > 89 ? 4 : \ (b) > 22 ? 3 : 1) # define BN_MAX_WINDOW_BITS_FOR_CTIME_EXPONENT_SIZE (6) # elif MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH == 32 # define BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 306 ? 5 : \ (b) > 89 ? 4 : \ (b) > 22 ? 3 : 1) # define BN_MAX_WINDOW_BITS_FOR_CTIME_EXPONENT_SIZE (5) # endif /* Pentium pro 16,16,16,32,64 */ /* Alpha 16,16,16,16.64 */ # define BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL (16)/* 32 */ # define BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (16)/* 32 less than */ # define BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (16)/* 32 */ # define BN_MUL_LOW_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (32)/* 32 */ # define BN_MONT_CTX_SET_SIZE_WORD (64)/* 32 */ /* * 2011-02-22 SMS. In various places, a size_t variable or a type cast to * size_t was used to perform integer-only operations on pointers. This * failed on VMS with 64-bit pointers (CC /POINTER_SIZE = 64) because size_t * is still only 32 bits. What's needed in these cases is an integer type * with the same size as a pointer, which size_t is not certain to be. The * only fix here is VMS-specific. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define PTR_SIZE_INT long long # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define PTR_SIZE_INT int # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ # elif !defined(PTR_SIZE_INT) /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) */ # define PTR_SIZE_INT size_t # endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) [else] */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) && !defined(PEDANTIC) /* * BN_UMULT_HIGH section. * * No, I'm not trying to overwhelm you when stating that the * product of N-bit numbers is 2*N bits wide:-) No, I don't expect * you to be impressed when I say that if the compiler doesn't * support 2*N integer type, then you have to replace every N*N * multiplication with 4 (N/2)*(N/2) accompanied by some shifts * and additions which unavoidably results in severe performance * penalties. Of course provided that the hardware is capable of * producing 2*N result... That's when you normally start * considering assembler implementation. However! It should be * pointed out that some CPUs (most notably Alpha, PowerPC and * upcoming IA-64 family:-) provide *separate* instruction * calculating the upper half of the product placing the result * into a general purpose register. Now *if* the compiler supports * inline assembler, then it's not impossible to implement the * "bignum" routines (and have the compiler optimize 'em) * exhibiting "native" performance in C. That's what BN_UMULT_HIGH * macro is about:-) * * */ # if defined(__alpha) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT)) # if defined(__DECC) # include # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (BN_ULONG)asm("umulh %a0,%a1,%v0",(a),(b)) # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("umulh %1,%2,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); \ ret; }) # endif /* compiler */ # elif defined(_ARCH_PPC) && defined(__64BIT__) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("mulhdu %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); \ ret; }) # endif /* compiler */ # elif (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)) && \ (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT)) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret,discard; \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(discard),"=d"(ret) \ : "a"(a), "g"(b) \ : "cc"); \ ret; }) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \ : "a"(a),"g"(b) \ : "cc"); # endif # elif (defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) # if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1400 unsigned __int64 __umulh(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b); unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b, unsigned __int64 *h); # pragma intrinsic(__umulh,_umul128) # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) __umulh((a),(b)) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ((low)=_umul128((a),(b),&(high))) # endif # elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # if __GNUC__>4 || (__GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4) /* "h" constraint is no more since 4.4 */ # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({ \ __uint128_t ret=(__uint128_t)(a)*(b); \ (high)=ret>>64; (low)=ret; }) # else # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("dmultu %1,%2" \ : "=h"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b) : "l"); \ ret; }) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)\ asm ("dmultu %2,%3" \ : "=l"(low),"=h"(high) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); # endif # endif # elif defined(__aarch64__) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("umulh %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); \ ret; }) # endif # endif /* cpu */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */ /************************************************************* * Using the long long type */ # define Lw(t) (((BN_ULONG)(t))&BN_MASK2) # define Hw(t) (((BN_ULONG)((t)>>BN_BITS2))&BN_MASK2) # ifdef BN_DEBUG_RAND # define bn_clear_top2max(a) \ { \ int ind = (a)->dmax - (a)->top; \ BN_ULONG *ftl = &(a)->d[(a)->top-1]; \ for (; ind != 0; ind--) \ *(++ftl) = 0x0; \ } # else # define bn_clear_top2max(a) # endif # ifdef BN_LLONG # define mul_add(r,a,w,c) { \ BN_ULLONG t; \ t=(BN_ULLONG)w * (a) + (r) + (c); \ (r)= Lw(t); \ (c)= Hw(t); \ } # define mul(r,a,w,c) { \ BN_ULLONG t; \ t=(BN_ULLONG)w * (a) + (c); \ (r)= Lw(t); \ (c)= Hw(t); \ } # define sqr(r0,r1,a) { \ BN_ULLONG t; \ t=(BN_ULLONG)(a)*(a); \ (r0)=Lw(t); \ (r1)=Hw(t); \ } # elif defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) # define mul_add(r,a,w,c) { \ BN_ULONG high,low,ret,tmp=(a); \ ret = (r); \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,w,tmp); \ ret += (c); \ (c) = (ret<(c))?1:0; \ (c) += high; \ ret += low; \ (c) += (ret>BN_BITS4)&BN_MASK2l) # define L2HBITS(a) (((a)<>BN_BITS2)&BN_MASKl) # define LL2HBITS(a) ((BN_ULLONG)((a)&BN_MASKl)<>(BN_BITS4-1); \ m =(m&BN_MASK2l)<<(BN_BITS4+1); \ l=(l+m)&BN_MASK2; if (l < m) h++; \ (lo)=l; \ (ho)=h; \ } # define mul_add(r,a,bl,bh,c) { \ BN_ULONG l,h; \ \ h= (a); \ l=LBITS(h); \ h=HBITS(h); \ mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \ \ /* non-multiply part */ \ l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \ (c)=(r); \ l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \ (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \ (r)=l; \ } # define mul(r,a,bl,bh,c) { \ BN_ULONG l,h; \ \ h= (a); \ l=LBITS(h); \ h=HBITS(h); \ mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \ \ /* non-multiply part */ \ l+=(c); if ((l&BN_MASK2) < (c)) h++; \ (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \ (r)=l&BN_MASK2; \ } # endif /* !BN_LLONG */ # if defined(OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND) && defined(OPENSSL_FIPS) # undef bn_div_words # endif void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b, int nb); void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp); void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a); void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a); int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n); int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl); void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n, int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n); void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2, BN_ULONG *t); BN_ULONG bn_add_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl); BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl); int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,889 +1,926 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #ifndef BN_DEBUG # undef NDEBUG /* avoid conflicting definitions */ # define NDEBUG #endif #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" const char BN_version[] = "Big Number" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; /* This stuff appears to be completely unused, so is deprecated */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED /*- * For a 32 bit machine * 2 - 4 == 128 * 3 - 8 == 256 * 4 - 16 == 512 * 5 - 32 == 1024 * 6 - 64 == 2048 * 7 - 128 == 4096 * 8 - 256 == 8192 */ static int bn_limit_bits = 0; static int bn_limit_num = 8; /* (1<= 0) { if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) mult = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits = mult; bn_limit_num = 1 << mult; } if (high >= 0) { if (high > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) high = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits_high = high; bn_limit_num_high = 1 << high; } if (low >= 0) { if (low > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) low = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits_low = low; bn_limit_num_low = 1 << low; } if (mont >= 0) { if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) mont = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits_mont = mont; bn_limit_num_mont = 1 << mont; } } int BN_get_params(int which) { if (which == 0) return (bn_limit_bits); else if (which == 1) return (bn_limit_bits_high); else if (which == 2) return (bn_limit_bits_low); else if (which == 3) return (bn_limit_bits_mont); else return (0); } #endif const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void) { static const BN_ULONG data_one = 1L; static const BIGNUM const_one = { (BN_ULONG *)&data_one, 1, 1, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; return (&const_one); } int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l) { BN_ULONG x, mask; int bits = (l != 0); #if BN_BITS2 > 32 x = l >> 32; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 32 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; #endif x = l >> 16; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 16 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; x = l >> 8; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 8 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; x = l >> 4; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 4 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; x = l >> 2; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 2 & mask; l ^= (x ^ l) & mask; x = l >> 1; mask = (0 - x) & BN_MASK2; mask = (0 - (mask >> (BN_BITS2 - 1))); bits += 1 & mask; return bits; } int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a) { int i = a->top - 1; bn_check_top(a); if (BN_is_zero(a)) return 0; return ((i * BN_BITS2) + BN_num_bits_word(a->d[i])); } void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; bn_check_top(a); if (a->d != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0])); if (!(BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))) OPENSSL_free(a->d); } i = BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_MALLOCED); OPENSSL_cleanse(a, sizeof(BIGNUM)); if (i) OPENSSL_free(a); } void BN_free(BIGNUM *a) { if (a == NULL) return; bn_check_top(a); if ((a->d != NULL) && !(BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))) OPENSSL_free(a->d); if (a->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) OPENSSL_free(a); else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED a->flags |= BN_FLG_FREE; #endif a->d = NULL; } } void BN_init(BIGNUM *a) { memset(a, 0, sizeof(BIGNUM)); bn_check_top(a); } BIGNUM *BN_new(void) { BIGNUM *ret; if ((ret = (BIGNUM *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIGNUM))) == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED; ret->top = 0; ret->neg = 0; ret->dmax = 0; ret->d = NULL; bn_check_top(ret); return (ret); } /* This is used both by bn_expand2() and bn_dup_expand() */ /* The caller MUST check that words > b->dmax before calling this */ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words) { BN_ULONG *A, *a = NULL; const BN_ULONG *B; int i; - bn_check_top(b); - if (words > (INT_MAX / (4 * BN_BITS2))) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG); return NULL; } if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA); return (NULL); } a = A = (BN_ULONG *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words); if (A == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } #ifdef PURIFY /* * Valgrind complains in BN_consttime_swap because we process the whole * array even if it's not initialised yet. This doesn't matter in that * function - what's important is constant time operation (we're not * actually going to use the data) */ memset(a, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words); #endif #if 1 B = b->d; /* Check if the previous number needs to be copied */ if (B != NULL) { for (i = b->top >> 2; i > 0; i--, A += 4, B += 4) { /* * The fact that the loop is unrolled * 4-wise is a tribute to Intel. It's * the one that doesn't have enough * registers to accomodate more data. * I'd unroll it 8-wise otherwise:-) * * */ BN_ULONG a0, a1, a2, a3; a0 = B[0]; a1 = B[1]; a2 = B[2]; a3 = B[3]; A[0] = a0; A[1] = a1; A[2] = a2; A[3] = a3; } /* * workaround for ultrix cc: without 'case 0', the optimizer does * the switch table by doing a=top&3; a--; goto jump_table[a]; * which fails for top== 0 */ switch (b->top & 3) { case 3: A[2] = B[2]; case 2: A[1] = B[1]; case 1: A[0] = B[0]; case 0: ; } } #else memset(A, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words); memcpy(A, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top); #endif return (a); } /* * This is an internal function that can be used instead of bn_expand2() when * there is a need to copy BIGNUMs instead of only expanding the data part, * while still expanding them. Especially useful when needing to expand * BIGNUMs that are declared 'const' and should therefore not be changed. The * reason to use this instead of a BN_dup() followed by a bn_expand2() is * memory allocation overhead. A BN_dup() followed by a bn_expand2() will * allocate new memory for the BIGNUM data twice, and free it once, while * bn_dup_expand() makes sure allocation is made only once. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED BIGNUM *bn_dup_expand(const BIGNUM *b, int words) { BIGNUM *r = NULL; bn_check_top(b); /* * This function does not work if words <= b->dmax && top < words because * BN_dup() does not preserve 'dmax'! (But bn_dup_expand() is not used * anywhere yet.) */ if (words > b->dmax) { BN_ULONG *a = bn_expand_internal(b, words); if (a) { r = BN_new(); if (r) { r->top = b->top; r->dmax = words; r->neg = b->neg; r->d = a; } else { /* r == NULL, BN_new failure */ OPENSSL_free(a); } } /* * If a == NULL, there was an error in allocation in * bn_expand_internal(), and NULL should be returned */ } else { r = BN_dup(b); } bn_check_top(r); return r; } #endif /* * This is an internal function that should not be used in applications. It * ensures that 'b' has enough room for a 'words' word number and initialises * any unused part of b->d with leading zeros. It is mostly used by the * various BIGNUM routines. If there is an error, NULL is returned. If not, * 'b' is returned. */ BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words) { - bn_check_top(b); - if (words > b->dmax) { BN_ULONG *a = bn_expand_internal(b, words); if (!a) return NULL; if (b->d) OPENSSL_free(b->d); b->d = a; b->dmax = words; } /* None of this should be necessary because of what b->top means! */ #if 0 /* * NB: bn_wexpand() calls this only if the BIGNUM really has to grow */ if (b->top < b->dmax) { int i; BN_ULONG *A = &(b->d[b->top]); for (i = (b->dmax - b->top) >> 3; i > 0; i--, A += 8) { A[0] = 0; A[1] = 0; A[2] = 0; A[3] = 0; A[4] = 0; A[5] = 0; A[6] = 0; A[7] = 0; } for (i = (b->dmax - b->top) & 7; i > 0; i--, A++) A[0] = 0; assert(A == &(b->d[b->dmax])); } #endif - bn_check_top(b); return b; } BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a) { BIGNUM *t; if (a == NULL) return NULL; bn_check_top(a); t = BN_new(); if (t == NULL) return NULL; if (!BN_copy(t, a)) { BN_free(t); return NULL; } bn_check_top(t); return t; } BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; BN_ULONG *A; const BN_ULONG *B; bn_check_top(b); if (a == b) return (a); if (bn_wexpand(a, b->top) == NULL) return (NULL); #if 1 A = a->d; B = b->d; for (i = b->top >> 2; i > 0; i--, A += 4, B += 4) { BN_ULONG a0, a1, a2, a3; a0 = B[0]; a1 = B[1]; a2 = B[2]; a3 = B[3]; A[0] = a0; A[1] = a1; A[2] = a2; A[3] = a3; } /* ultrix cc workaround, see comments in bn_expand_internal */ switch (b->top & 3) { case 3: A[2] = B[2]; case 2: A[1] = B[1]; case 1: A[0] = B[0]; case 0:; } #else memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top); #endif - a->top = b->top; a->neg = b->neg; + a->top = b->top; + a->flags |= b->flags & BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; bn_check_top(a); return (a); } +#define FLAGS_DATA(flags) ((flags) & (BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA \ + | BN_FLG_CONSTTIME \ + | BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP)) +#define FLAGS_STRUCT(flags) ((flags) & (BN_FLG_MALLOCED)) + void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b) { int flags_old_a, flags_old_b; BN_ULONG *tmp_d; int tmp_top, tmp_dmax, tmp_neg; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); flags_old_a = a->flags; flags_old_b = b->flags; tmp_d = a->d; tmp_top = a->top; tmp_dmax = a->dmax; tmp_neg = a->neg; a->d = b->d; a->top = b->top; a->dmax = b->dmax; a->neg = b->neg; b->d = tmp_d; b->top = tmp_top; b->dmax = tmp_dmax; b->neg = tmp_neg; - a->flags = - (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA); - b->flags = - (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA); + a->flags = FLAGS_STRUCT(flags_old_a) | FLAGS_DATA(flags_old_b); + b->flags = FLAGS_STRUCT(flags_old_b) | FLAGS_DATA(flags_old_a); bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); } void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a) { bn_check_top(a); if (a->d != NULL) OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0])); a->top = 0; a->neg = 0; + a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; } BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a) { if (a->top > 1) return BN_MASK2; else if (a->top == 1) return a->d[0]; /* a->top == 0 */ return 0; } int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) { bn_check_top(a); if (bn_expand(a, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8) == NULL) return (0); a->neg = 0; a->d[0] = w; a->top = (w ? 1 : 0); + a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; bn_check_top(a); return (1); } BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret) { unsigned int i, m; unsigned int n; BN_ULONG l; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; if (ret == NULL) ret = bn = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); bn_check_top(ret); l = 0; n = len; if (n == 0) { ret->top = 0; return (ret); } i = ((n - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1; m = ((n - 1) % (BN_BYTES)); if (bn_wexpand(ret, (int)i) == NULL) { if (bn) BN_free(bn); return NULL; } ret->top = i; ret->neg = 0; while (n--) { l = (l << 8L) | *(s++); if (m-- == 0) { ret->d[--i] = l; l = 0; m = BN_BYTES - 1; } } /* * need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding having the top * bit set (-ve number) */ bn_correct_top(ret); return (ret); } /* ignore negative */ +static int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen) +{ + int n; + size_t i, inc, lasti, j; + BN_ULONG l; + + n = BN_num_bytes(a); + if (tolen == -1) + tolen = n; + else if (tolen < n) + return -1; + + if (n == 0) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(to, tolen); + return tolen; + } + + lasti = n - 1; + for (i = 0, inc = 1, j = tolen; j > 0;) { + l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES]; + to[--j] = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES)) & (0 - inc)); + inc = (i - lasti) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); + i += inc; /* stay on top limb */ + } + + return tolen; +} + +int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen) +{ + if (tolen < 0) + return -1; + return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen); +} + int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to) { int n, i; BN_ULONG l; bn_check_top(a); n = i = BN_num_bytes(a); while (i--) { l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES]; *(to++) = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff; } return (n); } int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; BN_ULONG t1, t2, *ap, *bp; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); i = a->top - b->top; if (i != 0) return (i); ap = a->d; bp = b->d; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { t1 = ap[i]; t2 = bp[i]; if (t1 != t2) return ((t1 > t2) ? 1 : -1); } return (0); } int BN_cmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; int gt, lt; BN_ULONG t1, t2; if ((a == NULL) || (b == NULL)) { if (a != NULL) return (-1); else if (b != NULL) return (1); else return (0); } bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (a->neg != b->neg) { if (a->neg) return (-1); else return (1); } if (a->neg == 0) { gt = 1; lt = -1; } else { gt = -1; lt = 1; } if (a->top > b->top) return (gt); if (a->top < b->top) return (lt); for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { t1 = a->d[i]; t2 = b->d[i]; if (t1 > t2) return (gt); if (t1 < t2) return (lt); } return (0); } int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j, k; if (n < 0) return 0; i = n / BN_BITS2; j = n % BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) { if (bn_wexpand(a, i + 1) == NULL) return (0); for (k = a->top; k < i + 1; k++) a->d[k] = 0; a->top = i + 1; + a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; } a->d[i] |= (((BN_ULONG)1) << j); bn_check_top(a); return (1); } int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j; bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; i = n / BN_BITS2; j = n % BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) return (0); a->d[i] &= (~(((BN_ULONG)1) << j)); bn_correct_top(a); return (1); } int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j; bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; i = n / BN_BITS2; j = n % BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) return 0; return (int)(((a->d[i]) >> j) & ((BN_ULONG)1)); } int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int b, w; bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; w = n / BN_BITS2; b = n % BN_BITS2; if (w >= a->top) return 0; if (b == 0) a->top = w; else { a->top = w + 1; a->d[w] &= ~(BN_MASK2 << b); } bn_correct_top(a); return (1); } void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int b) { if (b && !BN_is_zero(a)) a->neg = 1; else a->neg = 0; } int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n) { int i; BN_ULONG aa, bb; aa = a[n - 1]; bb = b[n - 1]; if (aa != bb) return ((aa > bb) ? 1 : -1); for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { aa = a[i]; bb = b[i]; if (aa != bb) return ((aa > bb) ? 1 : -1); } return (0); } /* * Here follows a specialised variants of bn_cmp_words(). It has the * property of performing the operation on arrays of different sizes. The * sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common length * ( basicall, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta between the * two lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the number of * BN_ULONGs... */ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) { int n, i; n = cl - 1; if (dl < 0) { for (i = dl; i < 0; i++) { if (b[n - i] != 0) return -1; /* a < b */ } } if (dl > 0) { for (i = dl; i > 0; i--) { if (a[n + i] != 0) return 1; /* a > b */ } } return bn_cmp_words(a, b, cl); } /* * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b. * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0. The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set. * nwords is the number of words to swap. The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b, * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b. * a and b cannot be the same number */ void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords) { BN_ULONG t; int i; bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords); bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords); assert(a != b); assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0); assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int)); condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1; t = (a->top ^ b->top) & condition; a->top ^= t; b->top ^= t; #define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \ do { \ t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \ a->d[ind] ^= t; \ b->d[ind] ^= t; \ } while (0) switch (nwords) { default: for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i); /* Fallthrough */ case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */ case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */ case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */ case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */ case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */ case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */ case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */ case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */ case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */ case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0); } #undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,316 +1,371 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_mod.c */ /* * Includes code written by Lenka Fibikova * for the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #if 0 /* now just a #define */ int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) { return (BN_div(NULL, rem, m, d, ctx)); /* note that rem->neg == m->neg (unless the remainder is zero) */ } #endif int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* * like BN_mod, but returns non-negative remainder (i.e., 0 <= r < |d| * always holds) */ if (!(BN_mod(r, m, d, ctx))) return 0; if (!r->neg) return 1; /* now -|d| < r < 0, so we have to set r := r + |d| */ return (d->neg ? BN_sub : BN_add) (r, r, d); } int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_add(r, a, b)) return 0; return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx); } /* * BN_mod_add variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and - * less than m + * less than m. The original algorithm was + * + * if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b)) + * return 0; + * if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0) + * return BN_usub(r, r, m); + * + * which is replaced with addition, subtracting modulus, and conditional + * move depending on whether or not subtraction borrowed. */ -int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, - const BIGNUM *m) +int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const BIGNUM *m) { - if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b)) + size_t i, ai, bi, mtop = m->top; + BN_ULONG storage[1024 / BN_BITS2]; + BN_ULONG carry, temp, mask, *rp, *tp = storage; + const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp; + + if (bn_wexpand(r, m->top) == NULL) return 0; - if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0) - return BN_usub(r, r, m); + + if (mtop > sizeof(storage) / sizeof(storage[0]) + && (tp = OPENSSL_malloc(mtop * sizeof(BN_ULONG))) == NULL) + return 0; + + ap = a->d != NULL ? a->d : tp; + bp = b->d != NULL ? b->d : tp; + + for (i = 0, ai = 0, bi = 0, carry = 0; i < mtop;) { + mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - a->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1)); + temp = ((ap[ai] & mask) + carry) & BN_MASK2; + carry = (temp < carry); + + mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - b->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1)); + tp[i] = ((bp[bi] & mask) + temp) & BN_MASK2; + carry += (tp[i] < temp); + + i++; + ai += (i - a->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); + bi += (i - b->dmax) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); + } + rp = r->d; + carry -= bn_sub_words(rp, tp, m->d, mtop); + for (i = 0; i < mtop; i++) { + rp[i] = (carry & tp[i]) | (~carry & rp[i]); + ((volatile BN_ULONG *)tp)[i] = 0; + } + r->top = mtop; + r->neg = 0; + + if (tp != storage) + OPENSSL_free(tp); + return 1; +} + +int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const BIGNUM *m) +{ + int ret = bn_mod_add_fixed_top(r, a, b, m); + + if (ret) + bn_correct_top(r); + + return ret; } int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) return 0; return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx); } /* * BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and * less than m */ int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m) { if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) return 0; if (r->neg) return BN_add(r, r, m); return 1; } /* slow but works */ int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *t; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); bn_check_top(m); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (a == b) { if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mul(t, a, b, ctx)) goto err; } if (!BN_nnmod(r, t, m, ctx)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx)) return 0; /* r->neg == 0, thus we don't need BN_nnmod */ return BN_mod(r, r, m, ctx); } int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) return 0; bn_check_top(r); return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx); } /* * BN_mod_lshift1 variant that may be used if a is non-negative and less than * m */ int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m) { if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) return 0; bn_check_top(r); if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) return BN_sub(r, r, m); return 1; } int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *abs_m = NULL; int ret; if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) return 0; if (m->neg) { abs_m = BN_dup(m); if (abs_m == NULL) return 0; abs_m->neg = 0; } ret = BN_mod_lshift_quick(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m : m)); bn_check_top(r); if (abs_m) BN_free(abs_m); return ret; } /* * BN_mod_lshift variant that may be used if a is non-negative and less than * m */ int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m) { if (r != a) { if (BN_copy(r, a) == NULL) return 0; } while (n > 0) { int max_shift; /* 0 < r < m */ max_shift = BN_num_bits(m) - BN_num_bits(r); /* max_shift >= 0 */ if (max_shift < 0) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_LSHIFT_QUICK, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED); return 0; } if (max_shift > n) max_shift = n; if (max_shift) { if (!BN_lshift(r, r, max_shift)) return 0; n -= max_shift; } else { if (!BN_lshift1(r, r)) return 0; --n; } /* BN_num_bits(r) <= BN_num_bits(m) */ if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_sub(r, r, m)) return 0; } } bn_check_top(r); return 1; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,528 +1,550 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_mont.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* * Details about Montgomery multiplication algorithms can be found at * http://security.ece.orst.edu/publications.html, e.g. * http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/j37acmon.pdf and * sections 3.8 and 4.2 in http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/r01rsasw.pdf */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #define MONT_WORD /* use the faster word-based algorithm */ #ifdef MONT_WORD -static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont); +static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont); #endif int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) { + int ret = bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, a, b, mont, ctx); + + bn_correct_top(r); + bn_check_top(r); + + return ret; +} + +int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) +{ BIGNUM *tmp; int ret = 0; #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && defined(MONT_WORD) int num = mont->N.top; if (num > 1 && a->top == num && b->top == num) { if (bn_wexpand(r, num) == NULL) return (0); if (bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) { r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg; r->top = num; - bn_correct_top(r); - return (1); + r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; + return 1; } } #endif BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; bn_check_top(tmp); if (a == b) { if (!BN_sqr(tmp, a, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mul(tmp, a, b, ctx)) goto err; } /* reduce from aRR to aR */ #ifdef MONT_WORD - if (!BN_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont)) + if (!bn_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont)) goto err; #else if (!BN_from_montgomery(r, tmp, mont, ctx)) goto err; #endif - bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } #ifdef MONT_WORD -static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont) +static int bn_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont) { BIGNUM *n; BN_ULONG *ap, *np, *rp, n0, v, carry; int nl, max, i; n = &(mont->N); nl = n->top; if (nl == 0) { ret->top = 0; return (1); } max = (2 * nl); /* carry is stored separately */ if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL) return (0); r->neg ^= n->neg; np = n->d; rp = r->d; /* clear the top words of T */ # if 1 for (i = r->top; i < max; i++) /* memset? XXX */ rp[i] = 0; # else memset(&(rp[r->top]), 0, (max - r->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); # endif r->top = max; + r->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; n0 = mont->n0[0]; /* * Add multiples of |n| to |r| until R = 2^(nl * BN_BITS2) divides it. On * input, we had |r| < |n| * R, so now |r| < 2 * |n| * R. Note that |r| * includes |carry| which is stored separately. */ for (carry = 0, i = 0; i < nl; i++, rp++) { v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (rp[0] * n0) & BN_MASK2); v = (v + carry + rp[nl]) & BN_MASK2; carry |= (v != rp[nl]); carry &= (v <= rp[nl]); rp[nl] = v; } if (bn_wexpand(ret, nl) == NULL) return (0); ret->top = nl; + ret->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; ret->neg = r->neg; rp = ret->d; /* * Shift |nl| words to divide by R. We have |ap| < 2 * |n|. Note that |ap| * includes |carry| which is stored separately. */ ap = &(r->d[nl]); + carry -= bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl); /* - * |v| is one if |ap| - |np| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note |v| - * cannot be -1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in |nl| words, - * and we know at most one subtraction is needed. + * |carry| is -1 if |ap| - |np| underflowed or zero if it did not. Note + * |carry| cannot be 1. That would imply the subtraction did not fit in + * |nl| words, and we know at most one subtraction is needed. */ - v = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry; - v = 0 - v; for (i = 0; i < nl; i++) { - rp[i] = (v & ap[i]) | (~v & rp[i]); + rp[i] = (carry & ap[i]) | (~carry & rp[i]); ap[i] = 0; } - bn_correct_top(r); - bn_correct_top(ret); - bn_check_top(ret); return (1); } #endif /* MONT_WORD */ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) { int retn = 0; #ifdef MONT_WORD BIGNUM *t; BN_CTX_start(ctx); - if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a)) - retn = BN_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont); + if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a)) { + retn = bn_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont); + bn_correct_top(ret); + bn_check_top(ret); + } BN_CTX_end(ctx); #else /* !MONT_WORD */ BIGNUM *t1, *t2; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_copy(t1, a)) goto err; BN_mask_bits(t1, mont->ri); if (!BN_mul(t2, t1, &mont->Ni, ctx)) goto err; BN_mask_bits(t2, mont->ri); if (!BN_mul(t1, t2, &mont->N, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(t2, a, t1)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift(ret, t2, mont->ri)) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(ret, &(mont->N)) >= 0) { if (!BN_usub(ret, ret, &(mont->N))) goto err; } retn = 1; bn_check_top(ret); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); #endif /* MONT_WORD */ return (retn); } +int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + return bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(r, a, &(mont->RR), mont, ctx); +} + BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void) { BN_MONT_CTX *ret; if ((ret = (BN_MONT_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX))) == NULL) return (NULL); BN_MONT_CTX_init(ret); ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED; return (ret); } void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx) { ctx->ri = 0; BN_init(&(ctx->RR)); BN_init(&(ctx->N)); BN_init(&(ctx->Ni)); ctx->n0[0] = ctx->n0[1] = 0; ctx->flags = 0; } void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) { if (mont == NULL) return; BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR)); BN_clear_free(&(mont->N)); BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni)); if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) OPENSSL_free(mont); } int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) { - int ret = 0; + int i, ret = 0; BIGNUM *Ri, *R; if (BN_is_zero(mod)) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; R = &(mont->RR); /* grab RR as a temp */ if (!BN_copy(&(mont->N), mod)) goto err; /* Set N */ if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) BN_set_flags(&(mont->N), BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); mont->N.neg = 0; #ifdef MONT_WORD { BIGNUM tmod; BN_ULONG buf[2]; BN_init(&tmod); tmod.d = buf; tmod.dmax = 2; tmod.neg = 0; if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) BN_set_flags(&tmod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2; # if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2<=32) /* * Only certain BN_BITS2<=32 platforms actually make use of n0[1], * and we could use the #else case (with a shorter R value) for the * others. However, currently only the assembler files do know which * is which. */ BN_zero(R); if (!(BN_set_bit(R, 2 * BN_BITS2))) goto err; tmod.top = 0; if ((buf[0] = mod->d[0])) tmod.top = 1; if ((buf[1] = mod->top > 1 ? mod->d[1] : 0)) tmod.top = 2; if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, 2 * BN_BITS2)) goto err; /* R*Ri */ if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) { if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) goto err; } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */ if (bn_expand(Ri, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 2) == NULL) goto err; /* Ri-- (mod double word size) */ Ri->neg = 0; Ri->d[0] = BN_MASK2; Ri->d[1] = BN_MASK2; Ri->top = 2; } if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx)) goto err; /* * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only couple of least significant words: */ mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0; mont->n0[1] = (Ri->top > 1) ? Ri->d[1] : 0; # else BN_zero(R); if (!(BN_set_bit(R, BN_BITS2))) goto err; /* R */ buf[0] = mod->d[0]; /* tmod = N mod word size */ buf[1] = 0; tmod.top = buf[0] != 0 ? 1 : 0; /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, BN_BITS2)) goto err; /* R*Ri */ if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) { if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) goto err; } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */ if (!BN_set_word(Ri, BN_MASK2)) goto err; /* Ri-- (mod word size) */ } if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx)) goto err; /* * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only least significant word: */ mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0; mont->n0[1] = 0; # endif } #else /* !MONT_WORD */ { /* bignum version */ mont->ri = BN_num_bits(&mont->N); BN_zero(R); if (!BN_set_bit(R, mont->ri)) goto err; /* R = 2^ri */ /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &mont->N, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, mont->ri)) goto err; /* R*Ri */ if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) goto err; /* * Ni = (R*Ri-1) / N */ if (!BN_div(&(mont->Ni), NULL, Ri, &mont->N, ctx)) goto err; } #endif /* setup RR for conversions */ BN_zero(&(mont->RR)); if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), mont->ri * 2)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx)) goto err; + + for (i = mont->RR.top, ret = mont->N.top; i < ret; i++) + mont->RR.d[i] = 0; + mont->RR.top = ret; + mont->RR.flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from) { if (to == from) return (to); if (!BN_copy(&(to->RR), &(from->RR))) return NULL; if (!BN_copy(&(to->N), &(from->N))) return NULL; if (!BN_copy(&(to->Ni), &(from->Ni))) return NULL; to->ri = from->ri; to->n0[0] = from->n0[0]; to->n0[1] = from->n0[1]; return (to); } BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_MONT_CTX *ret; CRYPTO_r_lock(lock); ret = *pmont; CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock); if (ret) return ret; /* * We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race * (the losers throw away the work they've done). */ ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (!ret) return NULL; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx)) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret); return NULL; } /* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */ CRYPTO_w_lock(lock); if (*pmont) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret); ret = *pmont; } else *pmont = ret; CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock); return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,291 +1,285 @@ /* crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /* r must not be a */ /* * I've just gone over this and it is now %20 faster on x86 - eay - 27 Jun 96 */ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { int max, al; int ret = 0; BIGNUM *tmp, *rr; #ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, "BN_sqr %d * %d\n", a->top, a->top); #endif bn_check_top(a); al = a->top; if (al <= 0) { r->top = 0; r->neg = 0; return 1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); rr = (a != r) ? r : BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!rr || !tmp) goto err; max = 2 * al; /* Non-zero (from above) */ if (bn_wexpand(rr, max) == NULL) goto err; if (al == 4) { #ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA BN_ULONG t[8]; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, 4, t); #else bn_sqr_comba4(rr->d, a->d); #endif } else if (al == 8) { #ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA BN_ULONG t[16]; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, 8, t); #else bn_sqr_comba8(rr->d, a->d); #endif } else { #if defined(BN_RECURSION) if (al < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { BN_ULONG t[BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL * 2]; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, t); } else { int j, k; j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al); j = 1 << (j - 1); k = j + j; if (al == j) { if (bn_wexpand(tmp, k * 2) == NULL) goto err; bn_sqr_recursive(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d); } else { if (bn_wexpand(tmp, max) == NULL) goto err; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d); } } #else if (bn_wexpand(tmp, max) == NULL) goto err; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d); #endif } rr->neg = 0; - /* - * If the most-significant half of the top word of 'a' is zero, then the - * square of 'a' will max-1 words. - */ - if (a->d[al - 1] == (a->d[al - 1] & BN_MASK2l)) - rr->top = max - 1; - else - rr->top = max; + rr->top = max; + bn_correct_top(rr); if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL) goto err; ret = 1; err: bn_check_top(rr); bn_check_top(tmp); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } /* tmp must have 2*n words */ void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp) { int i, j, max; const BN_ULONG *ap; BN_ULONG *rp; max = n * 2; ap = a; rp = r; rp[0] = rp[max - 1] = 0; rp++; j = n; if (--j > 0) { ap++; rp[j] = bn_mul_words(rp, ap, j, ap[-1]); rp += 2; } for (i = n - 2; i > 0; i--) { j--; ap++; rp[j] = bn_mul_add_words(rp, ap, j, ap[-1]); rp += 2; } bn_add_words(r, r, r, max); /* There will not be a carry */ bn_sqr_words(tmp, a, n); bn_add_words(r, r, tmp, max); } #ifdef BN_RECURSION /*- * r is 2*n words in size, * a and b are both n words in size. (There's not actually a 'b' here ...) * n must be a power of 2. * We multiply and return the result. * t must be 2*n words in size * We calculate * a[0]*b[0] * a[0]*b[0]+a[1]*b[1]+(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) * a[1]*b[1] */ void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t) { int n = n2 / 2; int zero, c1; BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p; # ifdef BN_COUNT fprintf(stderr, " bn_sqr_recursive %d * %d\n", n2, n2); # endif if (n2 == 4) { # ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 4, t); # else bn_sqr_comba4(r, a); # endif return; } else if (n2 == 8) { # ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 8, t); # else bn_sqr_comba8(r, a); # endif return; } if (n2 < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_sqr_normal(r, a, n2, t); return; } /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]) */ c1 = bn_cmp_words(a, &(a[n]), n); zero = 0; if (c1 > 0) bn_sub_words(t, a, &(a[n]), n); else if (c1 < 0) bn_sub_words(t, &(a[n]), a, n); else zero = 1; /* The result will always be negative unless it is zero */ p = &(t[n2 * 2]); if (!zero) bn_sqr_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, n, p); else memset(&(t[n2]), 0, n2 * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p); bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p); /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2)); /* t[32] is negative */ c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2)); /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0]) * r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2)); if (c1) { p = &(r[n + n2]); lo = *p; ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; /* * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not * overwrite */ if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) { do { p++; lo = *p; ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; } while (ln == 0); } } } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn_int.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn_int.h (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn_int.h (revision 337764) @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* + * Some BIGNUM functions assume most significant limb to be non-zero, which + * is customarily arranged by bn_correct_top. Output from below functions + * is not processed with bn_correct_top, and for this reason it may not be + * returned out of public API. It may only be passed internally into other + * functions known to support non-minimal or zero-padded BIGNUMs. + */ +int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); +int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx); +int bn_mod_add_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + const BIGNUM *m); + +int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen); Property changes on: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/bn_int.h ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/conf_api.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/conf_api.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/conf/conf_api.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,305 +1,307 @@ /* conf_api.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* Part of the code in here was originally in conf.c, which is now removed */ #ifndef CONF_DEBUG # undef NDEBUG /* avoid conflicting definitions */ # define NDEBUG #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" static void value_free_hash_doall_arg(CONF_VALUE *a, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf); static void value_free_stack_doall(CONF_VALUE *a); static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(value_free_hash, CONF_VALUE, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE)) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_FN(value_free_stack, CONF_VALUE) /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was get_section */ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section) { CONF_VALUE *v, vv; if ((conf == NULL) || (section == NULL)) return (NULL); vv.name = NULL; vv.section = (char *)section; v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv); return (v); } /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was CONF_get_section */ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *_CONF_get_section_values(const CONF *conf, const char *section) { CONF_VALUE *v; v = _CONF_get_section(conf, section); if (v != NULL) return ((STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)v->value); else return (NULL); } int _CONF_add_string(CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section, CONF_VALUE *value) { CONF_VALUE *v = NULL; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ts; ts = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)section->value; value->section = section->section; if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(ts, value)) { return 0; } v = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, value); if (v != NULL) { (void)sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(ts, v); OPENSSL_free(v->name); OPENSSL_free(v->value); OPENSSL_free(v); } return 1; } char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *name) { CONF_VALUE *v, vv; char *p; if (name == NULL) return (NULL); if (conf != NULL) { if (section != NULL) { vv.name = (char *)name; vv.section = (char *)section; v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv); if (v != NULL) return (v->value); if (strcmp(section, "ENV") == 0) { p = getenv(name); if (p != NULL) return (p); } } vv.section = "default"; vv.name = (char *)name; v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv); if (v != NULL) return (v->value); else return (NULL); } else return (getenv(name)); } #if 0 /* There's no way to provide error checking * with this function, so force implementors * of the higher levels to get a string and * read the number themselves. */ long _CONF_get_number(CONF *conf, char *section, char *name) { char *str; long ret = 0; str = _CONF_get_string(conf, section, name); if (str == NULL) return (0); for (;;) { if (conf->meth->is_number(conf, *str)) ret = ret * 10 + conf->meth->to_int(conf, *str); else return (ret); str++; } } #endif static unsigned long conf_value_hash(const CONF_VALUE *v) { return (lh_strhash(v->section) << 2) ^ lh_strhash(v->name); } static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(conf_value, CONF_VALUE) static int conf_value_cmp(const CONF_VALUE *a, const CONF_VALUE *b) { int i; if (a->section != b->section) { i = strcmp(a->section, b->section); if (i) return (i); } if ((a->name != NULL) && (b->name != NULL)) { i = strcmp(a->name, b->name); return (i); } else if (a->name == b->name) return (0); else return ((a->name == NULL) ? -1 : 1); } static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(conf_value, CONF_VALUE) int _CONF_new_data(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL) { return 0; } if (conf->data == NULL) if ((conf->data = lh_CONF_VALUE_new()) == NULL) { return 0; } return 1; } void _CONF_free_data(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL || conf->data == NULL) return; lh_CONF_VALUE_down_load(conf->data) = 0; /* evil thing to make * sure the * 'OPENSSL_free()' works as * * expected */ lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_arg(conf->data, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(value_free_hash), LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE), conf->data); /* * We now have only 'section' entries in the hash table. Due to problems * with */ lh_CONF_VALUE_doall(conf->data, LHASH_DOALL_FN(value_free_stack)); lh_CONF_VALUE_free(conf->data); } static void value_free_hash_doall_arg(CONF_VALUE *a, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf) { if (a->name != NULL) (void)lh_CONF_VALUE_delete(conf, a); } static void value_free_stack_doall(CONF_VALUE *a) { CONF_VALUE *vv; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk; int i; if (a->name != NULL) return; sk = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)a->value; for (i = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { vv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk, i); OPENSSL_free(vv->value); OPENSSL_free(vv->name); OPENSSL_free(vv); } if (sk != NULL) sk_CONF_VALUE_free(sk); OPENSSL_free(a->section); OPENSSL_free(a); } /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was new_section */ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_new_section(CONF *conf, const char *section) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL; int ok = 0, i; CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *vv; if ((sk = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if ((v = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE))) == NULL) goto err; i = strlen(section) + 1; if ((v->section = OPENSSL_malloc(i)) == NULL) goto err; memcpy(v->section, section, i); v->name = NULL; v->value = (char *)sk; vv = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, v); OPENSSL_assert(vv == NULL); + if (lh_CONF_VALUE_error(conf->data) > 0) + goto err; ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { if (sk != NULL) sk_CONF_VALUE_free(sk); if (v != NULL) OPENSSL_free(v); v = NULL; } return (v); } IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dh/dh_key.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dh/dh_key.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dh/dh_key.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,291 +1,296 @@ /* crypto/dh/dh_key.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include static int generate_key(DH *dh); static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); static int dh_init(DH *dh); static int dh_finish(DH *dh); int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) { #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && !(dh->meth->flags & DH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && !(dh->flags & DH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD); return 0; } #endif return dh->meth->generate_key(dh); } int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && !(dh->meth->flags & DH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && !(dh->flags & DH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD); return 0; } #endif return dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh); } int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { int rv, pad; rv = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh); if (rv <= 0) return rv; pad = BN_num_bytes(dh->p) - rv; if (pad > 0) { memmove(key + pad, key, rv); memset(key, 0, pad); } return rv + pad; } static DH_METHOD dh_ossl = { "OpenSSL DH Method", generate_key, compute_key, dh_bn_mod_exp, dh_init, dh_finish, 0, NULL, NULL }; const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void) { return &dh_ossl; } static int generate_key(DH *dh) { int ok = 0; int generate_new_key = 0; unsigned l; - BN_CTX *ctx; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; + + if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { + DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { priv_key = BN_new(); if (priv_key == NULL) goto err; generate_new_key = 1; } else priv_key = dh->priv_key; if (dh->pub_key == NULL) { pub_key = BN_new(); if (pub_key == NULL) goto err; } else pub_key = dh->pub_key; if (dh->flags & DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_DH, dh->p, ctx); if (!mont) goto err; } if (generate_new_key) { if (dh->q) { do { if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->q)) goto err; } while (BN_is_zero(priv_key) || BN_is_one(priv_key)); } else { /* secret exponent length */ l = dh->length ? dh->length : BN_num_bits(dh->p) - 1; if (!BN_rand(priv_key, l, 0, 0)) goto err; } } { BIGNUM local_prk; BIGNUM *prk; if ((dh->flags & DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { BN_init(&local_prk); prk = &local_prk; BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else prk = priv_key; if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, pub_key, dh->g, prk, dh->p, ctx, mont)) goto err; } dh->pub_key = pub_key; dh->priv_key = priv_key; ok = 1; err: if (ok != 1) DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); if ((pub_key != NULL) && (dh->pub_key == NULL)) BN_free(pub_key); if ((priv_key != NULL) && (dh->priv_key == NULL)) BN_free(priv_key); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return (ok); } static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp; int ret = -1; int check_result; if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE); goto err; } if (dh->flags & DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_DH, dh->p, ctx); if ((dh->flags & DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { /* XXX */ BN_set_flags(dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } if (!mont) goto err; } if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &check_result) || check_result) { DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY); goto err; } if (!dh-> meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, tmp, pub_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p, ctx, mont)) { DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, key); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } return (ret); } static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) { /* * If a is only one word long and constant time is false, use the faster * exponenentiation function. */ if (a->top == 1 && ((dh->flags & DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0)) { BN_ULONG A = a->d[0]; return BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, A, p, m, ctx, m_ctx); } else return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx); } static int dh_init(DH *dh) { dh->flags |= DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; return (1); } static int dh_finish(DH *dh) { if (dh->method_mont_p) BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p); return (1); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,558 +1,558 @@ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2006. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include #endif #include #include "evp_locl.h" /* DH pkey context structure */ typedef struct { /* Parameter gen parameters */ int prime_len; int generator; int use_dsa; int subprime_len; /* message digest used for parameter generation */ const EVP_MD *md; int rfc5114_param; /* Keygen callback info */ int gentmp[2]; /* KDF (if any) to use for DH */ char kdf_type; /* OID to use for KDF */ ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_oid; /* Message digest to use for key derivation */ const EVP_MD *kdf_md; /* User key material */ unsigned char *kdf_ukm; size_t kdf_ukmlen; /* KDF output length */ size_t kdf_outlen; } DH_PKEY_CTX; static int pkey_dh_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx; dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH_PKEY_CTX)); if (!dctx) return 0; dctx->prime_len = 1024; dctx->subprime_len = -1; dctx->generator = 2; dctx->use_dsa = 0; dctx->md = NULL; dctx->rfc5114_param = 0; dctx->kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE; dctx->kdf_oid = NULL; dctx->kdf_md = NULL; dctx->kdf_ukm = NULL; dctx->kdf_ukmlen = 0; dctx->kdf_outlen = 0; ctx->data = dctx; ctx->keygen_info = dctx->gentmp; ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; return 1; } static int pkey_dh_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; if (!pkey_dh_init(dst)) return 0; sctx = src->data; dctx = dst->data; dctx->prime_len = sctx->prime_len; dctx->subprime_len = sctx->subprime_len; dctx->generator = sctx->generator; dctx->use_dsa = sctx->use_dsa; dctx->md = sctx->md; dctx->rfc5114_param = sctx->rfc5114_param; dctx->kdf_type = sctx->kdf_type; dctx->kdf_oid = OBJ_dup(sctx->kdf_oid); if (!dctx->kdf_oid) return 0; dctx->kdf_md = sctx->kdf_md; if (dctx->kdf_ukm) { dctx->kdf_ukm = BUF_memdup(sctx->kdf_ukm, sctx->kdf_ukmlen); dctx->kdf_ukmlen = sctx->kdf_ukmlen; } dctx->kdf_outlen = sctx->kdf_outlen; return 1; } static void pkey_dh_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; if (dctx) { if (dctx->kdf_ukm) OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm); if (dctx->kdf_oid) ASN1_OBJECT_free(dctx->kdf_oid); OPENSSL_free(dctx); } } static int pkey_dh_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_PRIME_LEN: if (p1 < 256) return -2; dctx->prime_len = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_SUBPRIME_LEN: if (dctx->use_dsa == 0) return -2; dctx->subprime_len = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_GENERATOR: if (dctx->use_dsa) return -2; dctx->generator = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE: #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (p1 != 0) return -2; #else if (p1 < 0 || p1 > 2) return -2; #endif dctx->use_dsa = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_RFC5114: if (p1 < 1 || p1 > 3) return -2; dctx->rfc5114_param = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: /* Default behaviour is OK */ return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE: if (p1 == -2) return dctx->kdf_type; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMS if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) #else if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) #endif return -2; dctx->kdf_type = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_MD: dctx->kdf_md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_MD: *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->kdf_md; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OUTLEN: if (p1 <= 0) return -2; dctx->kdf_outlen = (size_t)p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OUTLEN: *(int *)p2 = dctx->kdf_outlen; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_UKM: if (dctx->kdf_ukm) OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm); dctx->kdf_ukm = p2; if (p2) dctx->kdf_ukmlen = p1; else dctx->kdf_ukmlen = 0; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_UKM: *(unsigned char **)p2 = dctx->kdf_ukm; return dctx->kdf_ukmlen; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OID: if (dctx->kdf_oid) ASN1_OBJECT_free(dctx->kdf_oid); dctx->kdf_oid = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OID: *(ASN1_OBJECT **)p2 = dctx->kdf_oid; return 1; default: return -2; } } static int pkey_dh_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (!strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_prime_len")) { int len; len = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(ctx, len); } if (!strcmp(type, "dh_rfc5114")) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; int len; len = atoi(value); if (len < 0 || len > 3) return -2; dctx->rfc5114_param = len; return 1; } if (!strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_generator")) { int len; len = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator(ctx, len); } if (!strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_subprime_len")) { int len; len = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_subprime_len(ctx, len); } if (!strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_type")) { int typ; typ = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_type(ctx, typ); } return -2; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA extern int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); extern int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); static DSA *dsa_dh_generate(DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx, BN_GENCB *pcb) { DSA *ret; int rv = 0; int prime_len = dctx->prime_len; int subprime_len = dctx->subprime_len; const EVP_MD *md = dctx->md; if (dctx->use_dsa > 2) return NULL; ret = DSA_new(); if (!ret) return NULL; if (subprime_len == -1) { if (prime_len >= 2048) subprime_len = 256; else subprime_len = 160; } if (md == NULL) { if (prime_len >= 2048) md = EVP_sha256(); else md = EVP_sha1(); } if (dctx->use_dsa == 1) rv = dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, prime_len, subprime_len, md, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb); else if (dctx->use_dsa == 2) rv = dsa_builtin_paramgen2(ret, prime_len, subprime_len, md, NULL, 0, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb); if (rv <= 0) { DSA_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } #endif static int pkey_dh_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *dh = NULL; DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; BN_GENCB *pcb, cb; int ret; if (dctx->rfc5114_param) { switch (dctx->rfc5114_param) { case 1: dh = DH_get_1024_160(); break; case 2: dh = DH_get_2048_224(); break; case 3: dh = DH_get_2048_256(); break; default: return -2; } EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_DHX, dh); return 1; } if (ctx->pkey_gencb) { pcb = &cb; evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx); } else pcb = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (dctx->use_dsa) { DSA *dsa_dh; dsa_dh = dsa_dh_generate(dctx, pcb); if (!dsa_dh) return 0; dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa_dh); DSA_free(dsa_dh); if (!dh) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_DHX, dh); return 1; } #endif dh = DH_new(); if (!dh) return 0; ret = DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, dctx->prime_len, dctx->generator, pcb); if (ret) EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, dh); else DH_free(dh); return ret; } static int pkey_dh_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *dh = NULL; if (ctx->pkey == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_PKEY_DH_KEYGEN, DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET); return 0; } dh = DH_new(); if (!dh) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, dh); /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */ if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey)) return 0; return DH_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dh); } static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen) { int ret; DH *dh; DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; BIGNUM *dhpub; if (!ctx->pkey || !ctx->peerkey) { DHerr(DH_F_PKEY_DH_DERIVE, DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET); return 0; } dh = ctx->pkey->pkey.dh; dhpub = ctx->peerkey->pkey.dh->pub_key; if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) { if (key == NULL) { *keylen = DH_size(dh); return 1; } ret = DH_compute_key(key, dhpub, dh); if (ret < 0) return ret; *keylen = ret; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS else if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) { unsigned char *Z = NULL; size_t Zlen = 0; if (!dctx->kdf_outlen || !dctx->kdf_oid) return 0; if (key == NULL) { *keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen; return 1; } if (*keylen != dctx->kdf_outlen) return 0; ret = 0; Zlen = DH_size(dh); Z = OPENSSL_malloc(Zlen); if (!Z) { goto err; } if (DH_compute_key_padded(Z, dhpub, dh) <= 0) goto err; if (!DH_KDF_X9_42(key, *keylen, Z, Zlen, dctx->kdf_oid, dctx->kdf_ukm, dctx->kdf_ukmlen, dctx->kdf_md)) goto err; *keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen; ret = 1; err: if (Z) { OPENSSL_cleanse(Z, Zlen); OPENSSL_free(Z); } return ret; } #endif - return 1; + return 0; } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dh_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DH, 0, pkey_dh_init, pkey_dh_copy, pkey_dh_cleanup, 0, pkey_dh_paramgen, 0, pkey_dh_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_dh_derive, pkey_dh_ctrl, pkey_dh_ctrl_str }; const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dhx_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DHX, 0, pkey_dh_init, pkey_dh_copy, pkey_dh_cleanup, 0, pkey_dh_paramgen, 0, pkey_dh_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_dh_derive, pkey_dh_ctrl, pkey_dh_ctrl_str }; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa.h (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa.h (revision 337764) @@ -1,332 +1,335 @@ /* crypto/dsa/dsa.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* * The DSS routines are based on patches supplied by * Steven Schoch . He basically did the * work and I have just tweaked them a little to fit into my * stylistic vision for SSLeay :-) */ #ifndef HEADER_DSA_H # define HEADER_DSA_H # include # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # error DSA is disabled. # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO # include # endif # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include # endif # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS # define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 # endif # define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P 0x01 /* * new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DSA implementation now uses constant time * modular exponentiation for secret exponents by default. This flag causes * the faster variable sliding window method to be used for all exponents. */ # define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* * If this flag is set the DSA method is FIPS compliant and can be used in * FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application * sets this flag in its own methods it is its reposibility to ensure the * result is compliant. */ # define DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD 0x0400 /* * If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are * permitted it is then the applications responsibility to ensure that the * usage is compliant. */ # define DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x0400 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Already defined in ossl_typ.h */ /* typedef struct dsa_st DSA; */ /* typedef struct dsa_method DSA_METHOD; */ typedef struct DSA_SIG_st { BIGNUM *r; BIGNUM *s; } DSA_SIG; struct dsa_method { const char *name; DSA_SIG *(*dsa_do_sign) (const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); int (*dsa_sign_setup) (DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); int (*dsa_do_verify) (const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); int (*dsa_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); /* Can be null */ int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int (*init) (DSA *dsa); int (*finish) (DSA *dsa); int flags; char *app_data; /* If this is non-NULL, it is used to generate DSA parameters */ int (*dsa_paramgen) (DSA *dsa, int bits, const unsigned char *seed, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); /* If this is non-NULL, it is used to generate DSA keys */ int (*dsa_keygen) (DSA *dsa); }; struct dsa_st { /* * This first variable is used to pick up errors where a DSA is passed * instead of of a EVP_PKEY */ int pad; long version; int write_params; BIGNUM *p; BIGNUM *q; /* == 20 */ BIGNUM *g; BIGNUM *pub_key; /* y public key */ BIGNUM *priv_key; /* x private key */ BIGNUM *kinv; /* Signing pre-calc */ BIGNUM *r; /* Signing pre-calc */ int flags; /* Normally used to cache montgomery values */ BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p; int references; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; const DSA_METHOD *meth; /* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */ ENGINE *engine; }; # define d2i_DSAparams_fp(fp,x) (DSA *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())DSA_new, \ (char *(*)())d2i_DSAparams,(fp),(unsigned char **)(x)) # define i2d_DSAparams_fp(fp,x) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_DSAparams,(fp), \ (unsigned char *)(x)) # define d2i_DSAparams_bio(bp,x) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA,DSA_new,d2i_DSAparams,bp,x) # define i2d_DSAparams_bio(bp,x) ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DSA,i2d_DSAparams,bp,x) DSA *DSAparams_dup(DSA *x); DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void); void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a); int i2d_DSA_SIG(const DSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp); DSA_SIG *d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **v, const unsigned char **pp, long length); DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void); void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *); const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void); int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *); DSA *DSA_new(void); DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine); void DSA_free(DSA *r); /* "up" the DSA object's reference count */ int DSA_up_ref(DSA *r); int DSA_size(const DSA *); /* next 4 return -1 on error */ int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa); int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa); int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg); void *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx); DSA *d2i_DSAPublicKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); DSA *d2i_DSAparams(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); /* Deprecated version */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); # endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED) */ /* New version */ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, int bits, const unsigned char *seed, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); int DSA_generate_key(DSA *a); int i2d_DSAPublicKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); int i2d_DSAPrivateKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); int i2d_DSAparams(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x); int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x); int DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off); # endif -# define DSS_prime_checks 50 +# define DSS_prime_checks 64 /* - * Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of - * Rabin-Miller + * Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix C.3. Since we only + * have one value here we set the number of checks to 64 which is the 128 bit + * security level that is the highest level and valid for creating a 3072 bit + * DSA key. */ # define DSA_is_prime(n, callback, cb_arg) \ BN_is_prime(n, DSS_prime_checks, callback, NULL, cb_arg) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* * Convert DSA structure (key or just parameters) into DH structure (be * careful to avoid small subgroup attacks when using this!) */ DH *DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r); # endif # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(ctx, nbits) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS, nbits, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3) /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void); /* Error codes for the DSA functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define DSA_F_D2I_DSA_SIG 110 # define DSA_F_DO_DSA_PRINT 104 # define DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT 100 # define DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP 101 # define DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2 126 # define DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN 112 # define DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY 113 # define DSA_F_DSA_GENERATE_KEY 124 # define DSA_F_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX 123 # define DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD 103 # define DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE 119 # define DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP 105 # define DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE 115 # define DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE 116 # define DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE 117 # define DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE 118 # define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN 106 # define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP 107 # define DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW 109 # define DSA_F_DSA_SIG_PRINT 125 # define DSA_F_DSA_VERIFY 108 # define DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG 111 # define DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE 122 # define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL 120 +# define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR 127 # define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN 121 # define DSA_F_SIG_CB 114 /* Reason codes. */ # define DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE 102 # define DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR 108 # define DSA_R_BN_ERROR 109 # define DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE 100 # define DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR 104 # define DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE 106 # define DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS 112 # define DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 101 # define DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 103 # define DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES 110 # define DSA_R_NON_FIPS_DSA_METHOD 111 # define DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET 107 # define DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR 105 # define DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 113 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,133 +1,134 @@ /* crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file, * only reason strings will be preserved. */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_D2I_DSA_SIG), "d2i_DSA_SIG"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DO_DSA_PRINT), "DO_DSA_PRINT"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT), "DSAparams_print"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP), "DSAparams_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2), "DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN), "DSA_do_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY), "DSA_do_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_GENERATE_KEY), "DSA_generate_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX), "DSA_generate_parameters_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD), "DSA_new_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE), "DSA_PARAM_DECODE"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP), "DSA_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE), "DSA_PRIV_DECODE"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE), "DSA_PRIV_ENCODE"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE), "DSA_PUB_DECODE"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE), "DSA_PUB_ENCODE"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN), "DSA_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP), "DSA_sign_setup"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW), "DSA_SIG_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_PRINT), "DSA_SIG_PRINT"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_VERIFY), "DSA_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_I2D_DSA_SIG), "i2d_DSA_SIG"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE), "OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL), "PKEY_DSA_CTRL"}, + {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR), "PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN), "PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_SIG_CB), "SIG_CB"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE), "bad q value"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR), "bn decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BN_ERROR), "bn error"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE), "data too large for key size"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE), "invalid digest type"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS), "invalid parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES), "need new setup values"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_NON_FIPS_DSA_METHOD), "non fips dsa method"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET), "no parameters set"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR), "parameter encoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(DSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, DSA_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, DSA_str_reasons); } #endif } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,753 +1,760 @@ /* crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #undef GENUINE_DSA #ifdef GENUINE_DSA /* * Parameter generation follows the original release of FIPS PUB 186, * Appendix 2.2 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB 180) */ # define HASH EVP_sha() #else /* * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186, * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB * 180-1) */ # define HASH EVP_sha1() #endif #include /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_SHA is defined */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA # include # include "cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include # include "dsa_locl.h" # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS /* Workaround bug in prototype */ # define fips_dsa_builtin_paramgen2 fips_dsa_paramgen_bad # include # endif int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits, const unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb) { # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && !(ret->meth->flags & DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && !(ret->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX, DSA_R_NON_FIPS_DSA_METHOD); return 0; } # endif if (ret->meth->dsa_paramgen) return ret->meth->dsa_paramgen(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS else if (FIPS_mode()) { return FIPS_dsa_generate_parameters_ex(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); } # endif else { const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1(); size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8; return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd, seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); } } int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ok = 0; unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test; BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = qbits >> 3; int counter = 0; int r = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned int h = 2; if (qsize != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) /* invalid q size */ return 0; - if (evpmd == NULL) - /* use SHA1 as default */ - evpmd = EVP_sha1(); + if (evpmd == NULL) { + if (qsize == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) + evpmd = EVP_sha1(); + else if (qsize == SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH) + evpmd = EVP_sha224(); + else + evpmd = EVP_sha256(); + } else { + qsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd); + } if (bits < 512) bits = 512; bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64; /* * NB: seed_len == 0 is special case: copy generated seed to seed_in if * it is not NULL. */ if (seed_len && (seed_len < (size_t)qsize)) seed_in = NULL; /* seed buffer too small -- ignore */ if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize) seed_len = qsize; /* App. 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186 allows larger * SEED, but our internal buffers are * restricted to 160 bits */ if (seed_in != NULL) memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len); if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); g = BN_CTX_get(ctx); W = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); c = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); test = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (test == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1)) goto err; for (;;) { for (;;) { /* find q */ int seed_is_random; /* step 1 */ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) goto err; if (!seed_len || !seed_in) { if (RAND_bytes(seed, qsize) <= 0) goto err; seed_is_random = 1; } else { seed_is_random = 0; seed_len = 0; /* use random seed if 'seed_in' turns out to * be bad */ } memcpy(buf, seed, qsize); memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize); /* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */ for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) { buf[i]++; if (buf[i] != 0) break; } /* step 2 */ if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++) md[i] ^= buf2[i]; /* step 3 */ md[0] |= 0x80; md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01; if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q)) goto err; /* step 4 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, seed_is_random, cb); if (r > 0) break; if (r != 0) goto err; /* do a callback call */ /* step 5 */ } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0)) goto err; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; /* step 6 */ counter = 0; /* "offset = 2" */ n = (bits - 1) / 160; for (;;) { if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)) goto err; /* step 7 */ BN_zero(W); /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */ for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) { /* * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */ for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) { buf[i]++; if (buf[i] != 0) break; } if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; /* step 8 */ if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0)) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k)) goto err; if (!BN_add(W, W, r0)) goto err; } /* more of step 8 */ if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(X, W)) goto err; if (!BN_add(X, X, test)) goto err; /* step 9 */ if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0)) goto err; /* step 10 */ if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) { /* step 11 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb); if (r > 0) goto end; /* found it */ if (r != 0) goto err; } /* step 13 */ counter++; /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */ /* step 14 */ if (counter >= 4096) break; } } end: if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) goto err; /* We now need to generate g */ /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */ if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(test, h)) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) goto err; for (;;) { /* g=test^r0%p */ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) goto err; if (!BN_is_one(g)) break; if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) goto err; h++; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (ok) { if (ret->p) BN_free(ret->p); if (ret->q) BN_free(ret->q); if (ret->g) BN_free(ret->g); ret->p = BN_dup(p); ret->q = BN_dup(q); ret->g = BN_dup(g); if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) { ok = 0; goto err; } if (counter_ret != NULL) *counter_ret = counter; if (h_ret != NULL) *h_ret = h; if (seed_out) memcpy(seed_out, seed, qsize); } if (ctx) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (mont != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); return ok; } # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # undef fips_dsa_builtin_paramgen2 extern int fips_dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); # endif /* * This is a parameter generation algorithm for the DSA2 algorithm as * described in FIPS 186-3. */ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ok = -1; unsigned char *seed = NULL, *seed_tmp = NULL; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdsize; BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test; BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = N >> 3; int counter = 0; int r = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; unsigned int h = 2; # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode()) return fips_dsa_builtin_paramgen2(ret, L, N, evpmd, seed_in, seed_len, idx, seed_out, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); # endif EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); if (evpmd == NULL) { if (N == 160) evpmd = EVP_sha1(); else if (N == 224) evpmd = EVP_sha224(); else evpmd = EVP_sha256(); } mdsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd); /* If unverificable g generation only don't need seed */ if (!ret->p || !ret->q || idx >= 0) { if (seed_len == 0) seed_len = mdsize; seed = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len); if (seed_out) seed_tmp = seed_out; else seed_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len); if (!seed || !seed_tmp) goto err; if (seed_in) memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len); } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); g = BN_CTX_get(ctx); W = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); c = BN_CTX_get(ctx); test = BN_CTX_get(ctx); /* if p, q already supplied generate g only */ if (ret->p && ret->q) { p = ret->p; q = ret->q; if (idx >= 0) memcpy(seed_tmp, seed, seed_len); goto g_only; } else { p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (q == NULL) goto err; } if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), L - 1)) goto err; for (;;) { for (;;) { /* find q */ unsigned char *pmd; /* step 1 */ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) goto err; if (!seed_in) { if (RAND_bytes(seed, seed_len) <= 0) goto err; } /* step 2 */ if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; /* Take least significant bits of md */ if (mdsize > qsize) pmd = md + mdsize - qsize; else pmd = md; if (mdsize < qsize) memset(md + mdsize, 0, qsize - mdsize); /* step 3 */ pmd[0] |= 0x80; pmd[qsize - 1] |= 0x01; if (!BN_bin2bn(pmd, qsize, q)) goto err; /* step 4 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, seed_in ? 1 : 0, cb); if (r > 0) break; if (r != 0) goto err; /* Provided seed didn't produce a prime: error */ if (seed_in) { ok = 0; DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME); goto err; } /* do a callback call */ /* step 5 */ } /* Copy seed to seed_out before we mess with it */ if (seed_out) memcpy(seed_out, seed, seed_len); if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0)) goto err; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; /* step 6 */ counter = 0; /* "offset = 1" */ n = (L - 1) / (mdsize << 3); for (;;) { if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)) goto err; /* step 7 */ BN_zero(W); /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */ for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) { /* * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */ for (i = seed_len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { seed[i]++; if (seed[i] != 0) break; } if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; /* step 8 */ if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, r0)) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (mdsize << 3) * k)) goto err; if (!BN_add(W, W, r0)) goto err; } /* more of step 8 */ if (!BN_mask_bits(W, L - 1)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(X, W)) goto err; if (!BN_add(X, X, test)) goto err; /* step 9 */ if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0)) goto err; /* step 10 */ if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) { /* step 11 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb); if (r > 0) goto end; /* found it */ if (r != 0) goto err; } /* step 13 */ counter++; /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */ /* step 14 */ if (counter >= (int)(4 * L)) break; } if (seed_in) { ok = 0; DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS); goto err; } } end: if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) goto err; g_only: /* We now need to generate g */ /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */ if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) goto err; if (idx < 0) { if (!BN_set_word(test, h)) goto err; } else h = 1; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) goto err; for (;;) { static const unsigned char ggen[4] = { 0x67, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6e }; if (idx >= 0) { md[0] = idx & 0xff; md[1] = (h >> 8) & 0xff; md[2] = h & 0xff; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, seed_tmp, seed_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, ggen, sizeof(ggen))) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, md, 3)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)) goto err; if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, test)) goto err; } /* g=test^r0%p */ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) goto err; if (!BN_is_one(g)) break; if (idx < 0 && !BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) goto err; h++; if (idx >= 0 && h > 0xffff) goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (ok == 1) { if (p != ret->p) { if (ret->p) BN_free(ret->p); ret->p = BN_dup(p); } if (q != ret->q) { if (ret->q) BN_free(ret->q); ret->q = BN_dup(q); } if (ret->g) BN_free(ret->g); ret->g = BN_dup(g); if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) { ok = -1; goto err; } if (counter_ret != NULL) *counter_ret = counter; if (h_ret != NULL) *h_ret = h; } if (seed) OPENSSL_free(seed); if (seed_out != seed_tmp) OPENSSL_free(seed_tmp); if (ctx) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (mont != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); return ok; } int dsa_paramgen_check_g(DSA *dsa) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM *tmp; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int rv = -1; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) return -1; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (BN_cmp(dsa->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) return 0; if (BN_cmp(dsa->g, dsa->p) >= 0) return 0; tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!tmp) goto err; if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, dsa->p, ctx)) goto err; /* Work out g^q mod p */ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(tmp, dsa->g, dsa->q, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) goto err; if (!BN_cmp(tmp, BN_value_one())) rv = 1; else rv = 0; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (mont) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return rv; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,439 +1,470 @@ /* crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* Original version from Steven Schoch */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa); static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa); static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { "OpenSSL DSA method", dsa_do_sign, dsa_sign_setup, dsa_do_verify, NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp, */ NULL, /* dsa_bn_mod_exp, */ dsa_init, dsa_finish, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL }; /*- * These macro wrappers replace attempts to use the dsa_mod_exp() and * bn_mod_exp() handlers in the DSA_METHOD structure. We avoid the problem of * having a the macro work as an expression by bundling an "err_instr". So; * * if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r,dsa->g,&k,dsa->p,ctx, * dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err; * * can be replaced by; * * DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, &k, dsa->p, ctx, * dsa->method_mont_p); */ #define DSA_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,rr,a1,p1,a2,p2,m,ctx,in_mont) \ do { \ int _tmp_res53; \ if ((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \ _tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp((dsa), (rr), (a1), (p1), \ (a2), (p2), (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \ else \ _tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp2_mont((rr), (a1), (p1), (a2), (p2), \ (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \ if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \ } while(0) #define DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,r,a,p,m,ctx,m_ctx) \ do { \ int _tmp_res53; \ if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \ _tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp((dsa), (r), (a), (p), \ (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \ else \ _tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp_mont((r), (a), (p), (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \ if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \ } while(0) const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void) { return &openssl_dsa_meth; } static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) { BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL; - BIGNUM m; - BIGNUM xr; + BIGNUM *m, *blind, *blindm, *tmp; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB; DSA_SIG *ret = NULL; int noredo = 0; - BN_init(&m); - BN_init(&xr); - - if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { + if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) { reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS; goto err; } s = BN_new(); if (s == NULL) goto err; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; + m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (tmp == NULL) + goto err; + redo: if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL)) { if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) goto err; } else { kinv = dsa->kinv; dsa->kinv = NULL; r = dsa->r; dsa->r = NULL; noredo = 1; } if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) /* * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3, * 4.2 */ dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); - if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, &m) == NULL) + if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL) goto err; - /* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; /* s = xr */ - if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) - goto err; /* s = m + xr */ - if (BN_cmp(s, dsa->q) > 0) - if (!BN_sub(s, s, dsa->q)) + /* + * The normal signature calculation is: + * + * s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod q + * + * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks + * + * s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod q + */ + + /* Generate a blinding value */ + do { + if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->q) - 1, -1, 0)) goto err; + } while (BN_is_zero(blind)); + BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, r, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* blindm := blind * m mod q */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */ + if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, dsa->q)) + goto err; + + /* s := s * k^-1 mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; + /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */ + if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) + goto err; + if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + /* * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very * unlikely. */ if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) { if (noredo) { reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES; goto err; } goto redo; } ret = DSA_SIG_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; ret->r = r; ret->s = s; err: if (ret == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason); BN_free(r); BN_free(s); } - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_clear_free(&m); - BN_clear_free(&xr); - if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */ - BN_clear_free(kinv); - return (ret); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + BN_clear_free(kinv); + return ret; } static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL; BIGNUM l, m; int ret = 0; int q_bits; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } BN_init(&k); BN_init(&kq); BN_init(&l); BN_init(&m); if (ctx_in == NULL) { if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; } else ctx = ctx_in; if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* Preallocate space */ q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits) || !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits) || !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits)) goto err; /* Get random k */ do if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) goto err; while (BN_is_zero(&k)); if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { /* * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length. * * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is * one bit longer than the modulus. * * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic * conditional copy. */ if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q) || !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q) || !BN_copy(&kq, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m)) goto err; BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); K = &kq; } else { K = &k; } DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p); if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (*kinvp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*kinvp); *kinvp = kinv; kinv = NULL; if (*rp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*rp); *rp = r; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r); } if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(&k); BN_clear_free(&kq); BN_clear_free(&l); BN_clear_free(&m); return ret; } static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM u1, u2, t1; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int ret = -1, i; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return -1; } i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); /* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */ if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE); return -1; } if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } BN_init(&u1); BN_init(&u2); BN_init(&t1); if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } /* * Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2 */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; /* save M in u1 */ if (dgst_len > (i >> 3)) /* * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3, * 4.2 */ dgst_len = (i >> 3); if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, &u1) == NULL) goto err; /* u1 = M * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* u2 = r * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx); if (!mont) goto err; } DSA_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, &t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont); /* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */ /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ if (!BN_mod(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* * V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be equal to R. */ ret = (BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0); err: if (ret < 0) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_free(&u1); BN_free(&u2); BN_free(&t1); return (ret); } static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa) { dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; return (1); } static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) { if (dsa->method_mont_p) BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p); return (1); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,312 +1,318 @@ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2006. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "evp_locl.h" #include "dsa_locl.h" /* DSA pkey context structure */ typedef struct { /* Parameter gen parameters */ int nbits; /* size of p in bits (default: 1024) */ int qbits; /* size of q in bits (default: 160) */ const EVP_MD *pmd; /* MD for parameter generation */ /* Keygen callback info */ int gentmp[2]; /* message digest */ const EVP_MD *md; /* MD for the signature */ } DSA_PKEY_CTX; static int pkey_dsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx; dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA_PKEY_CTX)); if (!dctx) return 0; dctx->nbits = 1024; dctx->qbits = 160; dctx->pmd = NULL; dctx->md = NULL; ctx->data = dctx; ctx->keygen_info = dctx->gentmp; ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; return 1; } static int pkey_dsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; if (!pkey_dsa_init(dst)) return 0; sctx = src->data; dctx = dst->data; dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits; dctx->qbits = sctx->qbits; dctx->pmd = sctx->pmd; dctx->md = sctx->md; return 1; } static void pkey_dsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; if (dctx) OPENSSL_free(dctx); } static int pkey_dsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { int ret, type; unsigned int sltmp; DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa; if (dctx->md) type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md); else type = NID_sha1; ret = DSA_sign(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, dsa); if (ret <= 0) return ret; *siglen = sltmp; return 1; } static int pkey_dsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { int ret, type; DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa; if (dctx->md) type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md); else type = NID_sha1; ret = DSA_verify(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, dsa); return ret; } static int pkey_dsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS: if (p1 < 256) return -2; dctx->nbits = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS: if (p1 != 160 && p1 != 224 && p1 && p1 != 256) return -2; dctx->qbits = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD: if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256) { DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE); return 0; } dctx->pmd = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_dsa && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_dsaWithSHA && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha384 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha512) { DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE); return 0; } dctx->md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD: *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->md; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; default: return -2; } } static int pkey_dsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (!strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_bits")) { int nbits; nbits = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(ctx, nbits); } if (!strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_q_bits")) { int qbits = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS, qbits, NULL); } - if (!strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_md")) { + if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_md") == 0) { + const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value); + + if (md == NULL) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL_STR, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE); + return 0; + } return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD, 0, - (void *)EVP_get_digestbyname(value)); + (void *)md); } return -2; } static int pkey_dsa_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA *dsa = NULL; DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; BN_GENCB *pcb, cb; int ret; if (ctx->pkey_gencb) { pcb = &cb; evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx); } else pcb = NULL; dsa = DSA_new(); if (!dsa) return 0; ret = dsa_builtin_paramgen(dsa, dctx->nbits, dctx->qbits, dctx->pmd, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb); if (ret) EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa); else DSA_free(dsa); return ret; } static int pkey_dsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA *dsa = NULL; if (ctx->pkey == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN, DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET); return 0; } dsa = DSA_new(); if (!dsa) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa); /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */ if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey)) return 0; return DSA_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dsa); } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dsa_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, pkey_dsa_init, pkey_dsa_copy, pkey_dsa_cleanup, 0, pkey_dsa_paramgen, 0, pkey_dsa_keygen, 0, pkey_dsa_sign, 0, pkey_dsa_verify, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_dsa_ctrl, pkey_dsa_ctrl_str }; Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,967 +1,967 @@ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2006. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS # include #endif #include #include "asn1_locl.h" #include "ec_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int ecdh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); #endif static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key) { const EC_GROUP *group; int nid; if (ec_key == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group) && (nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) /* we have a 'named curve' => just set the OID */ { *ppval = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); *pptype = V_ASN1_OBJECT; } else { /* explicit parameters */ ASN1_STRING *pstr = NULL; pstr = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (!pstr) return 0; pstr->length = i2d_ECParameters(ec_key, &pstr->data); if (pstr->length <= 0) { ASN1_STRING_free(pstr); ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } *ppval = pstr; *pptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; } return 1; } static int eckey_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY *ec_key = pkey->pkey.ec; void *pval = NULL; int ptype; unsigned char *penc = NULL, *p; int penclen; if (!eckey_param2type(&ptype, &pval, ec_key)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, NULL); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; penc = OPENSSL_malloc(penclen); if (!penc) goto err; p = penc; penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, &p); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_EC), ptype, pval, penc, penclen)) return 1; err: if (ptype == V_ASN1_OBJECT) ASN1_OBJECT_free(pval); else ASN1_STRING_free(pval); if (penc) OPENSSL_free(penc); return 0; } static EC_KEY *eckey_type2param(int ptype, void *pval) { EC_KEY *eckey = NULL; + EC_GROUP *group = NULL; + if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { - ASN1_STRING *pstr = pval; - const unsigned char *pm = NULL; - int pmlen; - pm = pstr->data; - pmlen = pstr->length; - if (!(eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, &pm, pmlen))) { + const ASN1_STRING *pstr = pval; + const unsigned char *pm = pstr->data; + int pmlen = pstr->length; + + if ((eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto ecerr; } } else if (ptype == V_ASN1_OBJECT) { - ASN1_OBJECT *poid = pval; - EC_GROUP *group; + const ASN1_OBJECT *poid = pval; /* * type == V_ASN1_OBJECT => the parameters are given by an asn1 OID */ if ((eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto ecerr; } group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(OBJ_obj2nid(poid)); if (group == NULL) goto ecerr; EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0) goto ecerr; EC_GROUP_free(group); } else { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto ecerr; } return eckey; ecerr: - if (eckey) - EC_KEY_free(eckey); + EC_KEY_free(eckey); + EC_GROUP_free(group); return NULL; } static int eckey_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { const unsigned char *p = NULL; void *pval; int ptype, pklen; EC_KEY *eckey = NULL; X509_ALGOR *palg; if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); eckey = eckey_type2param(ptype, pval); if (!eckey) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } /* We have parameters now set public key */ if (!o2i_ECPublicKey(&eckey, &p, pklen)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto ecerr; } EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey); return 1; ecerr: if (eckey) EC_KEY_free(eckey); return 0; } static int eckey_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { int r; const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->pkey.ec); const EC_POINT *pa = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->pkey.ec), *pb = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->pkey.ec); if (group == NULL || pa == NULL || pb == NULL) return -2; r = EC_POINT_cmp(group, pa, pb, NULL); if (r == 0) return 1; if (r == 1) return 0; return -2; } static int eckey_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { const unsigned char *p = NULL; void *pval; int ptype, pklen; EC_KEY *eckey = NULL; X509_ALGOR *palg; if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); eckey = eckey_type2param(ptype, pval); if (!eckey) goto ecliberr; /* We have parameters now set private key */ if (!d2i_ECPrivateKey(&eckey, &p, pklen)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto ecerr; } /* calculate public key (if necessary) */ if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey) == NULL) { const BIGNUM *priv_key; const EC_GROUP *group; EC_POINT *pub_key; /* * the public key was not included in the SEC1 private key => * calculate the public key */ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group); if (pub_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto ecliberr; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(pub_key, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group))) { EC_POINT_free(pub_key); ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto ecliberr; } priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey); if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { EC_POINT_free(pub_key); ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto ecliberr; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, pub_key) == 0) { EC_POINT_free(pub_key); ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto ecliberr; } EC_POINT_free(pub_key); } EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey); return 1; ecliberr: ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); ecerr: if (eckey) EC_KEY_free(eckey); return 0; } static int eckey_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY ec_key = *(pkey->pkey.ec); unsigned char *ep, *p; int eplen, ptype; void *pval; unsigned int old_flags; if (!eckey_param2type(&ptype, &pval, &ec_key)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } /* set the private key */ /* * do not include the parameters in the SEC1 private key see PKCS#11 * 12.11 */ old_flags = EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(&ec_key); EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(&ec_key, old_flags | EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS); eplen = i2d_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, NULL); if (!eplen) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } ep = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(eplen); if (!ep) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } p = ep; if (!i2d_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, &p)) { OPENSSL_free(ep); ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey), 0, ptype, pval, ep, eplen)) { OPENSSL_free(ep); return 0; } return 1; } static int int_ec_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ECDSA_size(pkey->pkey.ec); } static int ec_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { BIGNUM *order = BN_new(); const EC_GROUP *group; int ret; if (!order) { ERR_clear_error(); return 0; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL)) { ERR_clear_error(); return 0; } ret = BN_num_bits(order); BN_free(order); return ret; } static int ec_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->pkey.ec == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec) == NULL) return 1; return 0; } static int ec_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) { EC_GROUP *group = EC_GROUP_dup(EC_KEY_get0_group(from->pkey.ec)); if (group == NULL) return 0; if (EC_KEY_set_group(to->pkey.ec, group) == 0) return 0; EC_GROUP_free(group); return 1; } static int ec_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { const EC_GROUP *group_a = EC_KEY_get0_group(a->pkey.ec), *group_b = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->pkey.ec); if (group_a == NULL || group_b == NULL) return -2; if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group_a, group_b, NULL)) return 0; else return 1; } static void int_ec_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY_free(pkey->pkey.ec); } static int do_EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x, int off, int ktype) { unsigned char *buffer = NULL; const char *ecstr; size_t buf_len = 0, i; int ret = 0, reason = ERR_R_BIO_LIB; BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *order = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; const EC_POINT *public_key; const BIGNUM *priv_key; if (x == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(x)) == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER; goto err; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } if (ktype > 0) { public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(x); if (public_key != NULL) { if ((pub_key = EC_POINT_point2bn(group, public_key, EC_KEY_get_conv_form(x), NULL, ctx)) == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB; goto err; } buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(pub_key); } } if (ktype == 2) { priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(x); if (priv_key && (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(priv_key)) > buf_len) buf_len = i; } else priv_key = NULL; if (ktype > 0) { buf_len += 10; if ((buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } } if (ktype == 2) ecstr = "Private-Key"; else if (ktype == 1) ecstr = "Public-Key"; else ecstr = "ECDSA-Parameters"; if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) goto err; if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL)) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ecstr, BN_num_bits(order)) <= 0) goto err; if ((priv_key != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "priv:", priv_key, buffer, off)) goto err; if ((pub_key != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "pub: ", pub_key, buffer, off)) goto err; if (!ECPKParameters_print(bp, group, off)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) ECerr(EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT, reason); if (pub_key) BN_free(pub_key); if (order) BN_free(order); if (ctx) BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (buffer != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buffer); return (ret); } static int eckey_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { EC_KEY *eckey; if (!(eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, pder, derlen))) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey); return 1; } static int eckey_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { return i2d_ECParameters(pkey->pkey.ec, pder); } static int eckey_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, pkey->pkey.ec, indent, 0); } static int eckey_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, pkey->pkey.ec, indent, 1); } static int eckey_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, pkey->pkey.ec, indent, 2); } static int old_ec_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { EC_KEY *ec; if (!(ec = d2i_ECPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen))) { ECerr(EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec); return 1; } static int old_ec_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { return i2d_ECPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.ec, pder); } static int ec_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { switch (op) { case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: if (arg1 == 0) { int snid, hnid; X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, &alg1, &alg2); if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL) return -1; hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm); if (hnid == NID_undef) return -1; if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) return -1; X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0); } return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: if (arg1 == 0) { int snid, hnid; X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2; CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg1, &alg2); if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL) return -1; hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm); if (hnid == NID_undef) return -1; if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) return -1; X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0); } return 1; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE: if (arg1 == 1) return ecdh_cms_decrypt(arg2); else if (arg1 == 0) return ecdh_cms_encrypt(arg2); return -2; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE: *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; return 1; #endif case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID: *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256; return 2; default: return -2; } } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD eckey_asn1_meth = { EVP_PKEY_EC, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0, "EC", "OpenSSL EC algorithm", eckey_pub_decode, eckey_pub_encode, eckey_pub_cmp, eckey_pub_print, eckey_priv_decode, eckey_priv_encode, eckey_priv_print, int_ec_size, ec_bits, eckey_param_decode, eckey_param_encode, ec_missing_parameters, ec_copy_parameters, ec_cmp_parameters, eckey_param_print, 0, int_ec_free, ec_pkey_ctrl, old_ec_priv_decode, old_ec_priv_encode }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int ecdh_cms_set_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey) { ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; int atype; void *aval; int rv = 0; EVP_PKEY *pkpeer = NULL; EC_KEY *ecpeer = NULL; const unsigned char *p; int plen; X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &atype, &aval, alg); if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) goto err; /* If absent parameters get group from main key */ if (atype == V_ASN1_UNDEF || atype == V_ASN1_NULL) { const EC_GROUP *grp; EVP_PKEY *pk; pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); if (!pk) goto err; grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pk->pkey.ec); ecpeer = EC_KEY_new(); if (!ecpeer) goto err; if (!EC_KEY_set_group(ecpeer, grp)) goto err; } else { ecpeer = eckey_type2param(atype, aval); if (!ecpeer) goto err; } /* We have parameters now set public key */ plen = ASN1_STRING_length(pubkey); p = ASN1_STRING_data(pubkey); if (!p || !plen) goto err; if (!o2i_ECPublicKey(&ecpeer, &p, plen)) goto err; pkpeer = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (!pkpeer) goto err; EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkpeer, ecpeer); if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pkpeer) > 0) rv = 1; err: if (ecpeer) EC_KEY_free(ecpeer); if (pkpeer) EVP_PKEY_free(pkpeer); return rv; } /* Set KDF parameters based on KDF NID */ static int ecdh_cms_set_kdf_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, int eckdf_nid) { int kdf_nid, kdfmd_nid, cofactor; const EVP_MD *kdf_md; if (eckdf_nid == NID_undef) return 0; /* Lookup KDF type, cofactor mode and digest */ if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(eckdf_nid, &kdfmd_nid, &kdf_nid)) return 0; if (kdf_nid == NID_dh_std_kdf) cofactor = 0; else if (kdf_nid == NID_dh_cofactor_kdf) cofactor = 1; else return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(pctx, cofactor) <= 0) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62) <= 0) return 0; kdf_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(kdfmd_nid); if (!kdf_md) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } static int ecdh_cms_set_shared_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { int rv = 0; X509_ALGOR *alg, *kekalg = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *der = NULL; int plen, keylen; const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &alg, &ukm)) return 0; if (!ecdh_cms_set_kdf_param(pctx, OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm))) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO, EC_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR); return 0; } if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) return 0; p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data; plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length; kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen); if (!kekalg) goto err; kekctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri); if (!kekctx) goto err; kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm); if (!kekcipher || EVP_CIPHER_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) goto err; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) <= 0) goto err; keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kekctx); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0) goto err; plen = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&der, kekalg, ukm, keylen); if (!plen) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(pctx, der, plen) <= 0) goto err; der = NULL; rv = 1; err: if (kekalg) X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg); if (der) OPENSSL_free(der); return rv; } static int ecdh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!pctx) return 0; /* See if we need to set peer key */ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(pctx)) { X509_ALGOR *alg; ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &alg, &pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL)) return 0; if (!alg || !pubkey) return 0; if (!ecdh_cms_set_peerkey(pctx, alg, pubkey)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT, EC_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR); return 0; } } /* Set ECDH derivation parameters and initialise unwrap context */ if (!ecdh_cms_set_shared_info(pctx, ri)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT, EC_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int keylen; X509_ALGOR *talg, *wrap_alg = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey; ASN1_STRING *wrap_str; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm; unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; int rv = 0; int ecdh_nid, kdf_type, kdf_nid, wrap_nid; const EVP_MD *kdf_md; pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!pctx) return 0; /* Get ephemeral key */ pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &talg, &pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, talg); /* Is everything uninitialised? */ if (aoid == OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef)) { EC_KEY *eckey = pkey->pkey.ec; /* Set the key */ unsigned char *p; penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(eckey, NULL); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; penc = OPENSSL_malloc(penclen); if (!penc) goto err; p = penc; penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(eckey, &p); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(pubkey, penc, penclen); pubkey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); pubkey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; penc = NULL; X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); } /* See if custom paraneters set */ kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx); if (kdf_type <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(pctx, &kdf_md)) goto err; ecdh_nid = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(pctx); if (ecdh_nid < 0) goto err; else if (ecdh_nid == 0) ecdh_nid = NID_dh_std_kdf; else if (ecdh_nid == 1) ecdh_nid = NID_dh_cofactor_kdf; if (kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE) { kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, kdf_type) <= 0) goto err; } else /* Uknown KDF */ goto err; if (kdf_md == NULL) { /* Fixme later for better MD */ kdf_md = EVP_sha1(); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0) goto err; } if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &talg, &ukm)) goto err; /* Lookup NID for KDF+cofactor+digest */ if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&kdf_nid, EVP_MD_type(kdf_md), ecdh_nid)) goto err; /* Get wrap NID */ ctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri); wrap_nid = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx); keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); /* Package wrap algorithm in an AlgorithmIdentifier */ wrap_alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (!wrap_alg) goto err; wrap_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid); wrap_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (!wrap_alg->parameter) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, wrap_alg->parameter) <= 0) goto err; if (ASN1_TYPE_get(wrap_alg->parameter) == NID_undef) { ASN1_TYPE_free(wrap_alg->parameter); wrap_alg->parameter = NULL; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0) goto err; penclen = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&penc, wrap_alg, ukm, keylen); if (!penclen) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(pctx, penc, penclen) <= 0) goto err; penc = NULL; /* * Now need to wrap encoding of wrap AlgorithmIdentifier into parameter * of another AlgorithmIdentifier. */ penclen = i2d_X509_ALGOR(wrap_alg, &penc); if (!penc || !penclen) goto err; wrap_str = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (!wrap_str) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(wrap_str, penc, penclen); penc = NULL; X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(kdf_nid), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, wrap_str); rv = 1; err: if (penc) OPENSSL_free(penc); if (wrap_alg) X509_ALGOR_free(wrap_alg); return rv; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,1134 +1,1138 @@ /* crypto/ec/ec_lib.c */ /* * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Binary polynomial ECC support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" const char EC_version[] = "EC" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; /* functions for EC_GROUP objects */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth) { EC_GROUP *ret; if (meth == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, EC_R_SLOT_FULL); return NULL; } if (meth->group_init == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return NULL; } ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->meth = meth; ret->extra_data = NULL; ret->mont_data = NULL; ret->generator = NULL; BN_init(&ret->order); BN_init(&ret->cofactor); ret->curve_name = 0; ret->asn1_flag = ~EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK; ret->asn1_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED; ret->seed = NULL; ret->seed_len = 0; if (!meth->group_init(ret)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group) { if (!group) return; if (group->meth->group_finish != 0) group->meth->group_finish(group); EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&group->extra_data); if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) && group->mont_data) BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); if (group->generator != NULL) EC_POINT_free(group->generator); BN_free(&group->order); BN_free(&group->cofactor); if (group->seed) OPENSSL_free(group->seed); OPENSSL_free(group); } void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group) { if (!group) return; if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0) group->meth->group_clear_finish(group); else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0) group->meth->group_finish(group); EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data); if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) && group->mont_data) BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); if (group->generator != NULL) EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator); BN_clear_free(&group->order); BN_clear_free(&group->cofactor); if (group->seed) { OPENSSL_cleanse(group->seed, group->seed_len); OPENSSL_free(group->seed); } OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof(*group)); OPENSSL_free(group); } int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; if (dest->meth->group_copy == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (dest->meth != src->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (dest == src) return 1; EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&dest->extra_data); for (d = src->extra_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) { void *t = d->dup_func(d->data); if (t == NULL) return 0; if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data (&dest->extra_data, t, d->dup_func, d->free_func, d->clear_free_func)) return 0; } if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(src) && src->mont_data != NULL) { if (dest->mont_data == NULL) { dest->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (dest->mont_data == NULL) return 0; } if (!BN_MONT_CTX_copy(dest->mont_data, src->mont_data)) return 0; } else { /* src->generator == NULL */ if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(dest) && dest->mont_data != NULL) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->mont_data); dest->mont_data = NULL; } } if (src->generator != NULL) { if (dest->generator == NULL) { dest->generator = EC_POINT_new(dest); if (dest->generator == NULL) return 0; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->generator, src->generator)) return 0; } else { /* src->generator == NULL */ if (dest->generator != NULL) { EC_POINT_clear_free(dest->generator); dest->generator = NULL; } } if (!BN_copy(&dest->order, &src->order)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(&dest->cofactor, &src->cofactor)) return 0; dest->curve_name = src->curve_name; dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag; dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form; if (src->seed) { if (dest->seed) OPENSSL_free(dest->seed); dest->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(src->seed_len); if (dest->seed == NULL) return 0; if (!memcpy(dest->seed, src->seed, src->seed_len)) return 0; dest->seed_len = src->seed_len; } else { if (dest->seed) OPENSSL_free(dest->seed); dest->seed = NULL; dest->seed_len = 0; } return dest->meth->group_copy(dest, src); } EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *a) { EC_GROUP *t = NULL; int ok = 0; if (a == NULL) return NULL; if ((t = EC_GROUP_new(a->meth)) == NULL) return (NULL); if (!EC_GROUP_copy(t, a)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { if (t) EC_GROUP_free(t); return NULL; } else return t; } const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->meth; } int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth) { return meth->field_type; } int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator, const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor) { if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (group->generator == NULL) { group->generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (group->generator == NULL) return 0; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(group->generator, generator)) return 0; if (order != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(&group->order, order)) return 0; } else BN_zero(&group->order); if (cofactor != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(&group->cofactor, cofactor)) return 0; } else BN_zero(&group->cofactor); /* - * We ignore the return value because some groups have an order with + * Some groups have an order with * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail. * |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case. */ - ec_precompute_mont_data(group); + if (BN_is_odd(&group->order)) { + return ec_precompute_mont_data(group); + } + BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); + group->mont_data = NULL; return 1; } const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->generator; } BN_MONT_CTX *EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(const EC_GROUP *group) { return EC_GROUP_VERSION(group) ? group->mont_data : NULL; } int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_copy(order, &group->order)) return 0; return !BN_is_zero(order); } int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_copy(cofactor, &group->cofactor)) return 0; return !BN_is_zero(&group->cofactor); } void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid) { group->curve_name = nid; } int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->curve_name; } void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag) { group->asn1_flag &= ~EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK; group->asn1_flag |= flag & EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK; } int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->asn1_flag & EC_GROUP_ASN1_FLAG_MASK; } void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group, point_conversion_form_t form) { group->asn1_form = form; } point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->asn1_form; } size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *group, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) { if (group->seed) { OPENSSL_free(group->seed); group->seed = NULL; group->seed_len = 0; } if (!len || !p) return 1; if ((group->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) return 0; memcpy(group->seed, p, len); group->seed_len = len; return len; } unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->seed; } size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->seed_len; } int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_set_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_get_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_get_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_set_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_get_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_get_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } #endif int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group) { if (group->meth->group_get_degree == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_get_degree(group); } int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_check_discriminant == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_check_discriminant(group, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int r = 0; BIGNUM *a1, *a2, *a3, *b1, *b2, *b3; BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL; /* compare the field types */ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) != EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b))) return 1; /* compare the curve name (if present in both) */ if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b)) return 1; if (!ctx) ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) return -1; BN_CTX_start(ctx); a1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); a2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); a3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!b3) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_new) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return -1; } /* * XXX This approach assumes that the external representation of curves * over the same field type is the same. */ if (!a->meth->group_get_curve(a, a1, a2, a3, ctx) || !b->meth->group_get_curve(b, b1, b2, b3, ctx)) r = 1; if (r || BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2) || BN_cmp(a3, b3)) r = 1; /* XXX EC_POINT_cmp() assumes that the methods are equal */ if (r || EC_POINT_cmp(a, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(a), EC_GROUP_get0_generator(b), ctx)) r = 1; if (!r) { /* compare the order and cofactor */ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(a, a1, ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_order(b, b1, ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(a, a2, ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(b, b2, ctx)) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_new) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return -1; } if (BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2)) r = 1; } BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_new) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return r; } /* this has 'package' visibility */ int EC_EX_DATA_set_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data, void *data, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; if (ex_data == NULL) return 0; for (d = *ex_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) { if (d->dup_func == dup_func && d->free_func == free_func && d->clear_free_func == clear_free_func) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_EX_DATA_SET_DATA, EC_R_SLOT_FULL); return 0; } } if (data == NULL) /* no explicit entry needed */ return 1; d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d)); if (d == NULL) return 0; d->data = data; d->dup_func = dup_func; d->free_func = free_func; d->clear_free_func = clear_free_func; d->next = *ex_data; *ex_data = d; return 1; } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void *EC_EX_DATA_get_data(const EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) { const EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; for (d = ex_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) { if (d->dup_func == dup_func && d->free_func == free_func && d->clear_free_func == clear_free_func) return d->data; } return NULL; } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void EC_EX_DATA_free_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) { EC_EXTRA_DATA **p; if (ex_data == NULL) return; for (p = ex_data; *p != NULL; p = &((*p)->next)) { if ((*p)->dup_func == dup_func && (*p)->free_func == free_func && (*p)->clear_free_func == clear_free_func) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *next = (*p)->next; (*p)->free_func((*p)->data); OPENSSL_free(*p); *p = next; return; } } } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data, void *(*dup_func) (void *), void (*free_func) (void *), void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) { EC_EXTRA_DATA **p; if (ex_data == NULL) return; for (p = ex_data; *p != NULL; p = &((*p)->next)) { if ((*p)->dup_func == dup_func && (*p)->free_func == free_func && (*p)->clear_free_func == clear_free_func) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *next = (*p)->next; (*p)->clear_free_func((*p)->data); OPENSSL_free(*p); *p = next; return; } } } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; if (ex_data == NULL) return; d = *ex_data; while (d) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *next = d->next; d->free_func(d->data); OPENSSL_free(d); d = next; } *ex_data = NULL; } /* this has 'package' visibility */ void EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(EC_EXTRA_DATA **ex_data) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; if (ex_data == NULL) return; d = *ex_data; while (d) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *next = d->next; d->clear_free_func(d->data); OPENSSL_free(d); d = next; } *ex_data = NULL; } /* functions for EC_POINT objects */ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group) { EC_POINT *ret; if (group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } if (group->meth->point_init == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return NULL; } ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->meth = group->meth; if (!ret->meth->point_init(ret)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point) { if (!point) return; if (point->meth->point_finish != 0) point->meth->point_finish(point); OPENSSL_free(point); } void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point) { if (!point) return; if (point->meth->point_clear_finish != 0) point->meth->point_clear_finish(point); else if (point->meth->point_finish != 0) point->meth->point_finish(point); OPENSSL_cleanse(point, sizeof(*point)); OPENSSL_free(point); } int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src) { if (dest->meth->point_copy == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (dest->meth != src->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (dest == src) return 1; return dest->meth->point_copy(dest, src); } EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *a, const EC_GROUP *group) { EC_POINT *t; int r; if (a == NULL) return NULL; t = EC_POINT_new(group); if (t == NULL) return (NULL); r = EC_POINT_copy(t, a); if (!r) { EC_POINT_free(t); return NULL; } else return t; } const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point) { return point->meth; } int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point) { if (group->meth->point_set_to_infinity == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_to_infinity(group, point); } int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, z, ctx); } int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, z, ctx); } int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #endif int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #endif int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->add == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->add(group, r, a, b, ctx); } int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->dbl == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->dbl(group, r, a, ctx); } int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->invert == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != a->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->invert(group, a, ctx); } int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { if (group->meth->is_at_infinity == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->is_at_infinity(group, point); } /* * Check whether an EC_POINT is on the curve or not. Note that the return * value for this function should NOT be treated as a boolean. Return values: * 1: The point is on the curve * 0: The point is not on the curve * -1: An error occurred */ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->is_on_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->is_on_curve(group, point, ctx); } int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; } if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return -1; } return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx); } int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->make_affine == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->make_affine(group, point, ctx); } int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t i; if (group->meth->points_make_affine == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } } return group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx); } /* * Functions for point multiplication. If group->meth->mul is 0, we use the * wNAF-based implementations in ec_mult.c; otherwise we dispatch through * methods. */ int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->mul == 0) /* use default */ return ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx); return group->meth->mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx); } int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar, const EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *p_scalar, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* just a convenient interface to EC_POINTs_mul() */ const EC_POINT *points[1]; const BIGNUM *scalars[1]; points[0] = point; scalars[0] = p_scalar; return EC_POINTs_mul(group, r, g_scalar, (point != NULL && p_scalar != NULL), points, scalars, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->mul == 0) /* use default */ return ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(group, ctx); if (group->meth->precompute_mult != 0) return group->meth->precompute_mult(group, ctx); else return 1; /* nothing to do, so report success */ } int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { if (group->meth->mul == 0) /* use default */ return ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(group); if (group->meth->have_precompute_mult != 0) return group->meth->have_precompute_mult(group); else return 0; /* cannot tell whether precomputation has * been performed */ } /* * ec_precompute_mont_data sets |group->mont_data| from |group->order| and * returns one on success. On error it returns zero. */ int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group) { BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); int ret = 0; if (!EC_GROUP_VERSION(group)) goto err; if (group->mont_data) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); group->mont_data = NULL; } if (ctx == NULL) goto err; group->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (!group->mont_data) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(group->mont_data, &group->order, ctx)) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); group->mont_data = NULL; goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (ctx) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,1568 +1,1577 @@ /****************************************************************************** * * * Copyright 2014 Intel Corporation * * * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * * limitations under the License. * * * ****************************************************************************** * * * Developers and authors: * * Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) * * (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center * * (2) University of Haifa * * Reference: * * S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography with * * 256 Bit Primes" * * * ******************************************************************************/ #include #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "ec_lcl.h" #if BN_BITS2 != 64 # define TOBN(hi,lo) lo,hi #else # define TOBN(hi,lo) ((BN_ULONG)hi<<32|lo) #endif #if defined(__GNUC__) # define ALIGN32 __attribute((aligned(32))) #elif defined(_MSC_VER) # define ALIGN32 __declspec(align(32)) #else # define ALIGN32 #endif #define ALIGNPTR(p,N) ((unsigned char *)p+N-(size_t)p%N) #define P256_LIMBS (256/BN_BITS2) typedef unsigned short u16; typedef struct { BN_ULONG X[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Y[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Z[P256_LIMBS]; } P256_POINT; typedef struct { BN_ULONG X[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Y[P256_LIMBS]; } P256_POINT_AFFINE; typedef P256_POINT_AFFINE PRECOMP256_ROW[64]; /* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */ typedef struct ec_pre_comp_st { const EC_GROUP *group; /* Parent EC_GROUP object */ size_t w; /* Window size */ /* * Constant time access to the X and Y coordinates of the pre-computed, * generator multiplies, in the Montgomery domain. Pre-calculated * multiplies are stored in affine form. */ PRECOMP256_ROW *precomp; void *precomp_storage; int references; } EC_PRE_COMP; /* Functions implemented in assembly */ /* * Most of below mentioned functions *preserve* the property of inputs * being fully reduced, i.e. being in [0, modulus) range. Simply put if * inputs are fully reduced, then output is too. Note that reverse is * not true, in sense that given partially reduced inputs output can be * either, not unlikely reduced. And "most" in first sentence refers to * the fact that given the calculations flow one can tolerate that * addition, 1st function below, produces partially reduced result *if* * multiplications by 2 and 3, which customarily use addition, fully * reduce it. This effectively gives two options: a) addition produces * fully reduced result [as long as inputs are, just like remaining * functions]; b) addition is allowed to produce partially reduced * result, but multiplications by 2 and 3 perform additional reduction * step. Choice between the two can be platform-specific, but it was a) * in all cases so far... */ /* Modular add: res = a+b mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular mul by 2: res = 2*a mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular mul by 3: res = 3*a mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular div by 2: res = a/2 mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular sub: res = a-b mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular neg: res = -a mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Montgomery mul: res = a*b*2^-256 mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]); /* Montgomery sqr: res = a*a*2^-256 mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Convert a number from Montgomery domain, by multiplying with 1 */ void ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS]); /* Convert a number to Montgomery domain, by multiplying with 2^512 mod P*/ void ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS]); /* Functions that perform constant time access to the precomputed tables */ void ecp_nistz256_select_w5(P256_POINT * val, const P256_POINT * in_t, int index); void ecp_nistz256_select_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE * val, const P256_POINT_AFFINE * in_t, int index); /* One converted into the Montgomery domain */ static const BN_ULONG ONE[P256_LIMBS] = { TOBN(0x00000000, 0x00000001), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0x00000000), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x00000000, 0xfffffffe) }; static void *ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_dup(void *); static void ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_free(void *); static void ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_clear_free(void *); static EC_PRE_COMP *ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group); /* Precomputed tables for the default generator */ #include "ecp_nistz256_table.c" /* Recode window to a signed digit, see ecp_nistputil.c for details */ static unsigned int _booth_recode_w5(unsigned int in) { unsigned int s, d; s = ~((in >> 5) - 1); d = (1 << 6) - in - 1; d = (d & s) | (in & ~s); d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1); return (d << 1) + (s & 1); } static unsigned int _booth_recode_w7(unsigned int in) { unsigned int s, d; s = ~((in >> 7) - 1); d = (1 << 8) - in - 1; d = (d & s) | (in & ~s); d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1); return (d << 1) + (s & 1); } static void copy_conditional(BN_ULONG dst[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG src[P256_LIMBS], BN_ULONG move) { BN_ULONG mask1 = -move; BN_ULONG mask2 = ~mask1; dst[0] = (src[0] & mask1) ^ (dst[0] & mask2); dst[1] = (src[1] & mask1) ^ (dst[1] & mask2); dst[2] = (src[2] & mask1) ^ (dst[2] & mask2); dst[3] = (src[3] & mask1) ^ (dst[3] & mask2); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { dst[4] = (src[4] & mask1) ^ (dst[4] & mask2); dst[5] = (src[5] & mask1) ^ (dst[5] & mask2); dst[6] = (src[6] & mask1) ^ (dst[6] & mask2); dst[7] = (src[7] & mask1) ^ (dst[7] & mask2); } } static BN_ULONG is_zero(BN_ULONG in) { in |= (0 - in); in = ~in; in &= BN_MASK2; in >>= BN_BITS2 - 1; return in; } static BN_ULONG is_equal(const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]) { BN_ULONG res; res = a[0] ^ b[0]; res |= a[1] ^ b[1]; res |= a[2] ^ b[2]; res |= a[3] ^ b[3]; if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { res |= a[4] ^ b[4]; res |= a[5] ^ b[5]; res |= a[6] ^ b[6]; res |= a[7] ^ b[7]; } return is_zero(res); } static BN_ULONG is_one(const BIGNUM *z) { BN_ULONG res = 0; BN_ULONG *a = z->d; if (z->top == (P256_LIMBS - P256_LIMBS / 8)) { res = a[0] ^ ONE[0]; res |= a[1] ^ ONE[1]; res |= a[2] ^ ONE[2]; res |= a[3] ^ ONE[3]; if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { res |= a[4] ^ ONE[4]; res |= a[5] ^ ONE[5]; res |= a[6] ^ ONE[6]; /* * no check for a[7] (being zero) on 32-bit platforms, * because value of "one" takes only 7 limbs. */ } res = is_zero(res); } return res; } static int ecp_nistz256_set_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG words[P256_LIMBS]) { if (bn_wexpand(a, P256_LIMBS) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_SET_WORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(a->d, words, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * P256_LIMBS); a->top = P256_LIMBS; bn_correct_top(a); return 1; } #ifndef ECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a); void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT *b); void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT_AFFINE *b); #else /* Point double: r = 2*a */ static void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a) { BN_ULONG S[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG M[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Zsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG tmp0[P256_LIMBS]; const BN_ULONG *in_x = a->X; const BN_ULONG *in_y = a->Y; const BN_ULONG *in_z = a->Z; BN_ULONG *res_x = r->X; BN_ULONG *res_y = r->Y; BN_ULONG *res_z = r->Z; ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(S, in_y); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(S, S); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, in_z, in_y); ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(res_z, res_z); ecp_nistz256_add(M, in_x, Zsqr); ecp_nistz256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res_y, S); ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(res_y, res_y); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr); ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(M, M); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x); ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res_x, M); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0); ecp_nistz256_sub(S, S, res_x); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S, S, M); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, S, res_y); } /* Point addition: r = a+b */ static void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT *b) { BN_ULONG U2[P256_LIMBS], S2[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG U1[P256_LIMBS], S1[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Z1sqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Z2sqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG H[P256_LIMBS], R[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Hsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Rsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Hcub[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_x[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_y[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_z[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG in1infty, in2infty; const BN_ULONG *in1_x = a->X; const BN_ULONG *in1_y = a->Y; const BN_ULONG *in1_z = a->Z; const BN_ULONG *in2_x = b->X; const BN_ULONG *in2_y = b->Y; const BN_ULONG *in2_z = b->Z; /* * Infinity in encoded as (,,0) */ in1infty = (in1_z[0] | in1_z[1] | in1_z[2] | in1_z[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) in1infty |= (in1_z[4] | in1_z[5] | in1_z[6] | in1_z[7]); in2infty = (in2_z[0] | in2_z[1] | in2_z[2] | in2_z[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) in2infty |= (in2_z[4] | in2_z[5] | in2_z[6] | in2_z[7]); in1infty = is_zero(in1infty); in2infty = is_zero(in2infty); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z); /* Z2^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); /* Z1^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z); /* S1 = Z2^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); /* S2 = Z1^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y); /* S1 = Y1*Z2^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); /* S2 = Y2*Z1^3 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(R, S2, S1); /* R = S2 - S1 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr); /* U1 = X1*Z2^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); /* U2 = X2*Z1^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(H, U2, U1); /* H = U2 - U1 */ /* * This should not happen during sign/ecdh, so no constant time violation */ if (is_equal(U1, U2) && !in1infty && !in2infty) { if (is_equal(S1, S2)) { ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, a); return; } else { memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); return; } } ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); /* R^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); /* Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); /* H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z); /* Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); /* H^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr); /* U1*H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); /* 2*U1*H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_y, R, res_y); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_z, in2_z, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty); copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty); copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty); memcpy(r->X, res_x, sizeof(res_x)); memcpy(r->Y, res_y, sizeof(res_y)); memcpy(r->Z, res_z, sizeof(res_z)); } /* Point addition when b is known to be affine: r = a+b */ static void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT_AFFINE *b) { BN_ULONG U2[P256_LIMBS], S2[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Z1sqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG H[P256_LIMBS], R[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Hsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Rsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Hcub[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_x[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_y[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_z[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG in1infty, in2infty; const BN_ULONG *in1_x = a->X; const BN_ULONG *in1_y = a->Y; const BN_ULONG *in1_z = a->Z; const BN_ULONG *in2_x = b->X; const BN_ULONG *in2_y = b->Y; /* * Infinity in encoded as (,,0) */ in1infty = (in1_z[0] | in1_z[1] | in1_z[2] | in1_z[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) in1infty |= (in1_z[4] | in1_z[5] | in1_z[6] | in1_z[7]); /* * In affine representation we encode infinity as (0,0), which is * not on the curve, so it is OK */ in2infty = (in2_x[0] | in2_x[1] | in2_x[2] | in2_x[3] | in2_y[0] | in2_y[1] | in2_y[2] | in2_y[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) in2infty |= (in2_x[4] | in2_x[5] | in2_x[6] | in2_x[7] | in2_y[4] | in2_y[5] | in2_y[6] | in2_y[7]); in1infty = is_zero(in1infty); in2infty = is_zero(in2infty); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); /* Z1^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); /* U2 = X2*Z1^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(H, U2, in1_x); /* H = U2 - U1 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); /* S2 = Z1^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); /* Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); /* S2 = Y2*Z1^3 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(R, S2, in1_y); /* R = S2 - S1 */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); /* H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); /* R^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); /* H^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr); /* U1*H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); /* 2*U1*H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); ecp_nistz256_sub(H, U2, res_x); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(H, H, R); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, H, S2); copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty); copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty); copy_conditional(res_z, ONE, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty); memcpy(r->X, res_x, sizeof(res_x)); memcpy(r->Y, res_y, sizeof(res_y)); memcpy(r->Z, res_z, sizeof(res_z)); } #endif /* r = in^-1 mod p */ static void ecp_nistz256_mod_inverse(BN_ULONG r[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS]) { /* * The poly is ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff * ffffffff ffffffff We use FLT and used poly-2 as exponent */ BN_ULONG p2[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG p4[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG p8[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG p16[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG p32[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS]; int i; ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, in); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p2, res, in); /* 3*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p2); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p4, res, p2); /* f*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p4); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p8, res, p4); /* ff*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p8); for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p16, res, p8); /* ffff*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p16); for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p32, res, p16); /* ffffffff*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p32); for (i = 0; i < 31; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, in); for (i = 0; i < 32 * 4; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p32); for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p32); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p16); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p8); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p4); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p2); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, in); memcpy(r, res, sizeof(res)); } /* * ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem copies the contents of |in| to |out| and * returns one if it fits. Otherwise it returns zero. */ static int ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(BN_ULONG out[P256_LIMBS], const BIGNUM *in) { if (in->top > P256_LIMBS) return 0; memset(out, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * P256_LIMBS); memcpy(out, in->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * in->top); return 1; } /* r = sum(scalar[i]*point[i]) */ static int ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, P256_POINT *r, const BIGNUM **scalar, const EC_POINT **point, int num, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, j, ret = 0; unsigned int index; unsigned char (*p_str)[33] = NULL; const unsigned int window_size = 5; const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1; unsigned int wvalue; BN_ULONG tmp[P256_LIMBS]; ALIGN32 P256_POINT h; const BIGNUM **scalars = NULL; P256_POINT (*table)[16] = NULL; void *table_storage = NULL; if ((table_storage = OPENSSL_malloc(num * 16 * sizeof(P256_POINT) + 64)) == NULL || (p_str = OPENSSL_malloc(num * 33 * sizeof(unsigned char))) == NULL || (scalars = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof(BIGNUM *))) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } else { table = (void *)ALIGNPTR(table_storage, 64); } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { P256_POINT *row = table[i]; /* This is an unusual input, we don't guarantee constant-timeness. */ if ((BN_num_bits(scalar[i]) > 256) || BN_is_negative(scalar[i])) { BIGNUM *mod; if ((mod = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(mod, scalar[i], &group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } scalars[i] = mod; } else scalars[i] = scalar[i]; for (j = 0; j < scalars[i]->top * BN_BYTES; j += BN_BYTES) { BN_ULONG d = scalars[i]->d[j / BN_BYTES]; p_str[i][j + 0] = d & 0xff; p_str[i][j + 1] = (d >> 8) & 0xff; p_str[i][j + 2] = (d >> 16) & 0xff; p_str[i][j + 3] = (d >>= 24) & 0xff; if (BN_BYTES == 8) { d >>= 8; p_str[i][j + 4] = d & 0xff; p_str[i][j + 5] = (d >> 8) & 0xff; p_str[i][j + 6] = (d >> 16) & 0xff; p_str[i][j + 7] = (d >> 24) & 0xff; } } for (; j < 33; j++) p_str[i][j] = 0; /* table[0] is implicitly (0,0,0) (the point at infinity), * therefore it is not stored. All other values are actually * stored with an offset of -1 in table. */ if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(row[1 - 1].X, &point[i]->X) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(row[1 - 1].Y, &point[i]->Y) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(row[1 - 1].Z, &point[i]->Z)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE); goto err; } ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[ 2 - 1], &row[ 1 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&row[ 3 - 1], &row[ 2 - 1], &row[1 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[ 4 - 1], &row[ 2 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[ 6 - 1], &row[ 3 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[ 8 - 1], &row[ 4 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[12 - 1], &row[ 6 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&row[ 5 - 1], &row[ 4 - 1], &row[1 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&row[ 7 - 1], &row[ 6 - 1], &row[1 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&row[ 9 - 1], &row[ 8 - 1], &row[1 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&row[13 - 1], &row[12 - 1], &row[1 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[14 - 1], &row[ 7 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&row[10 - 1], &row[ 5 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&row[15 - 1], &row[14 - 1], &row[1 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&row[11 - 1], &row[10 - 1], &row[1 - 1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&row[16 - 1], &row[15 - 1], &row[1 - 1]); } index = 255; wvalue = p_str[0][(index - 1) / 8]; wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; ecp_nistz256_select_w5(r, table[0], _booth_recode_w5(wvalue) >> 1); while (index >= 5) { for (i = (index == 255 ? 1 : 0); i < num; i++) { unsigned int off = (index - 1) / 8; wvalue = p_str[i][off] | p_str[i][off + 1] << 8; wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; wvalue = _booth_recode_w5(wvalue); ecp_nistz256_select_w5(&h, table[i], wvalue >> 1); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, h.Y); copy_conditional(h.Y, tmp, (wvalue & 1)); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &h); } index -= window_size; ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); } /* Final window */ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { wvalue = p_str[i][0]; wvalue = (wvalue << 1) & mask; wvalue = _booth_recode_w5(wvalue); ecp_nistz256_select_w5(&h, table[i], wvalue >> 1); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, h.Y); copy_conditional(h.Y, tmp, wvalue & 1); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &h); } ret = 1; err: if (table_storage) OPENSSL_free(table_storage); if (p_str) OPENSSL_free(p_str); if (scalars) OPENSSL_free(scalars); return ret; } /* Coordinates of G, for which we have precomputed tables */ const static BN_ULONG def_xG[P256_LIMBS] = { TOBN(0x79e730d4, 0x18a9143c), TOBN(0x75ba95fc, 0x5fedb601), TOBN(0x79fb732b, 0x77622510), TOBN(0x18905f76, 0xa53755c6) }; const static BN_ULONG def_yG[P256_LIMBS] = { TOBN(0xddf25357, 0xce95560a), TOBN(0x8b4ab8e4, 0xba19e45c), TOBN(0xd2e88688, 0xdd21f325), TOBN(0x8571ff18, 0x25885d85) }; /* * ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G returns one if |generator| is the standard, P-256 * generator. */ static int ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(const EC_POINT *generator) { return (generator->X.top == P256_LIMBS) && (generator->Y.top == P256_LIMBS) && is_equal(generator->X.d, def_xG) && is_equal(generator->Y.d, def_yG) && is_one(&generator->Z); } static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* * We precompute a table for a Booth encoded exponent (wNAF) based * computation. Each table holds 64 values for safe access, with an * implicit value of infinity at index zero. We use window of size 7, and * therefore require ceil(256/7) = 37 tables. */ BIGNUM *order; EC_POINT *P = NULL, *T = NULL; const EC_POINT *generator; EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; int i, j, k, ret = 0; size_t w; PRECOMP256_ROW *preComputedTable = NULL; unsigned char *precomp_storage = NULL; /* if there is an old EC_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */ EC_EX_DATA_free_data(&group->extra_data, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_dup, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_free, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_clear_free); generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); return 0; } if (ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(generator)) { /* * No need to calculate tables for the standard generator because we * have them statically. */ return 1; } if ((pre_comp = ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new(group)) == NULL) return 0; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (order == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(order)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER); goto err; } w = 7; if ((precomp_storage = OPENSSL_malloc(37 * 64 * sizeof(P256_POINT_AFFINE) + 64)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } else { preComputedTable = (void *)ALIGNPTR(precomp_storage, 64); } P = EC_POINT_new(group); T = EC_POINT_new(group); if (P == NULL || T == NULL) goto err; /* * The zero entry is implicitly infinity, and we skip it, storing other * values with -1 offset. */ if (!EC_POINT_copy(T, generator)) goto err; for (k = 0; k < 64; k++) { if (!EC_POINT_copy(P, T)) goto err; for (j = 0; j < 37; j++) { /* * It would be faster to use EC_POINTs_make_affine and * make multiple points affine at the same time. */ if (!EC_POINT_make_affine(group, P, ctx)) goto err; if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j][k].X, &P->X) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j][k].Y, &P->Y)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx)) goto err; } } if (!EC_POINT_add(group, T, T, generator, ctx)) goto err; } pre_comp->group = group; pre_comp->w = w; pre_comp->precomp = preComputedTable; pre_comp->precomp_storage = precomp_storage; precomp_storage = NULL; if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre_comp, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_dup, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_free, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_clear_free)) { goto err; } pre_comp = NULL; ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); if (pre_comp) ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_free(pre_comp); if (precomp_storage) OPENSSL_free(precomp_storage); if (P) EC_POINT_free(P); if (T) EC_POINT_free(T); return ret; } /* * Note that by default ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is undefined. While it's great * code processing 4 points in parallel, corresponding serial operation * is several times slower, because it uses 29x29=58-bit multiplication * as opposite to 64x64=128-bit in integer-only scalar case. As result * it doesn't provide *significant* performance improvement. Note that * just defining ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is not sufficient to make it work, * you'd need to compile even asm/ecp_nistz256-avx.pl module. */ #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2) # if !(defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_MX64)) || \ !(defined(__GNUC__) || defined(_MSC_VER)) /* this is for ALIGN32 */ # undef ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 # else /* Constant time access, loading four values, from four consecutive tables */ void ecp_nistz256_avx2_select_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE * val, const P256_POINT_AFFINE * in_t, int index); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_select_w7(void *result, const void *in, int index0, int index1, int index2, int index3); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(void *RESULTx4, const void *in); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back(void *result, const void *Ax4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4, const void *Bx4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4, const void *Bx4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(void *RESULTx4); int ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible(void); static void booth_recode_w7(unsigned char *sign, unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in) { unsigned char s, d; s = ~((in >> 7) - 1); d = (1 << 8) - in - 1; d = (d & s) | (in & ~s); d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1); *sign = s & 1; *digit = d; } /* * ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g performs multiplication by G, using only the * precomputed table. It does 4 affine point additions in parallel, * significantly speeding up point multiplication for a fixed value. */ static void ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g(P256_POINT *r, unsigned char p_str[33], const P256_POINT_AFFINE(*preComputedTable)[64]) { const unsigned int window_size = 7; const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1; unsigned int wvalue; /* Using 4 windows at a time */ unsigned char sign0, digit0; unsigned char sign1, digit1; unsigned char sign2, digit2; unsigned char sign3, digit3; unsigned int index = 0; BN_ULONG tmp[P256_LIMBS]; int i; ALIGN32 BN_ULONG aX4[4 * 9 * 3] = { 0 }; ALIGN32 BN_ULONG bX4[4 * 9 * 2] = { 0 }; ALIGN32 P256_POINT_AFFINE point_arr[P256_LIMBS]; ALIGN32 P256_POINT res_point_arr[P256_LIMBS]; /* Initial four windows */ wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[0]); wvalue = (wvalue << 1) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue); ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_select_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[0], digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3); ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(aX4, point_arr); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(aX4, aX4); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&aX4[4 * 9], &aX4[4 * 9]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(&aX4[4 * 9 * 2]); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue); ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_select_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[4 * 1], digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3); ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(bX4, point_arr); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(bX4, bX4); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&bX4[4 * 9], &bX4[4 * 9]); /* Optimized when both inputs are affine */ ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(aX4, aX4, bX4); for (i = 2; i < 9; i++) { wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue); ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_select_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[4 * i], digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3); ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(bX4, point_arr); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(bX4, bX4); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&bX4[4 * 9], &bX4[4 * 9]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(aX4, aX4, bX4); } ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 0], &aX4[4 * 9 * 0]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 1], &aX4[4 * 9 * 1]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 2], &aX4[4 * 9 * 2]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back(res_point_arr, aX4); /* Last window is performed serially */ wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(index - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); ecp_nistz256_avx2_select_w7((P256_POINT_AFFINE *) r, preComputedTable[36], digit0); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, r->Y); copy_conditional(r->Y, tmp, sign0); memcpy(r->Z, ONE, sizeof(ONE)); /* Sum the four windows */ ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[0]); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[2]); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[3]); } # endif #endif static int ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine(EC_POINT *out, const EC_GROUP *group, const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in, BN_CTX *ctx) { - BIGNUM x, y; - BN_ULONG d_x[P256_LIMBS], d_y[P256_LIMBS]; + BIGNUM x, y, z; int ret = 0; - memcpy(d_x, in->X, sizeof(d_x)); - x.d = d_x; + /* + * |const| qualifier omission is compensated by BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA + * flag, which effectively means "read-only data". + */ + x.d = (BN_ULONG *)in->X; x.dmax = x.top = P256_LIMBS; x.neg = 0; x.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA; - memcpy(d_y, in->Y, sizeof(d_y)); - y.d = d_y; + y.d = (BN_ULONG *)in->Y; y.dmax = y.top = P256_LIMBS; y.neg = 0; y.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA; - ret = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, out, &x, &y, ctx); + z.d = (BN_ULONG *)ONE; + z.dmax = z.top = P256_LIMBS; + z.neg = 0; + z.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA; + + if ((ret = (BN_copy(&out->X, &x) != NULL)) + && (ret = (BN_copy(&out->Y, &y) != NULL)) + && (ret = (BN_copy(&out->Z, &z) != NULL))) + out->Z_is_one = 1; return ret; } /* r = scalar*G + sum(scalars[i]*points[i]) */ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int i = 0, ret = 0, no_precomp_for_generator = 0, p_is_infinity = 0; size_t j; unsigned char p_str[33] = { 0 }; const PRECOMP256_ROW *preComputedTable = NULL; const EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL; const EC_POINT *generator = NULL; unsigned int index = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; const BIGNUM **new_scalars = NULL; const EC_POINT **new_points = NULL; const unsigned int window_size = 7; const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1; unsigned int wvalue; ALIGN32 union { P256_POINT p; P256_POINT_AFFINE a; } t, p; BIGNUM *tmp_scalar; if (group->meth != r->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) { if (group->meth != points[j]->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (scalar) { generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } /* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */ pre_comp = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(group->extra_data, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_dup, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_free, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_clear_free); if (pre_comp) { /* * If there is a precomputed table for the generator, check that * it was generated with the same generator. */ EC_POINT *pre_comp_generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (pre_comp_generator == NULL) goto err; if (!ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine (pre_comp_generator, group, pre_comp->precomp[0], ctx)) { EC_POINT_free(pre_comp_generator); goto err; } if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp_generator, ctx)) preComputedTable = (const PRECOMP256_ROW *)pre_comp->precomp; EC_POINT_free(pre_comp_generator); } if (preComputedTable == NULL && ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(generator)) { /* * If there is no precomputed data, but the generator * is the default, a hardcoded table of precomputed * data is used. This is because applications, such as * Apache, do not use EC_KEY_precompute_mult. */ preComputedTable = (const PRECOMP256_ROW *)ecp_nistz256_precomputed; } if (preComputedTable) { if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 256) || BN_is_negative(scalar)) { if ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, &group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } scalar = tmp_scalar; } for (i = 0; i < scalar->top * BN_BYTES; i += BN_BYTES) { BN_ULONG d = scalar->d[i / BN_BYTES]; p_str[i + 0] = d & 0xff; p_str[i + 1] = (d >> 8) & 0xff; p_str[i + 2] = (d >> 16) & 0xff; p_str[i + 3] = (d >>= 24) & 0xff; if (BN_BYTES == 8) { d >>= 8; p_str[i + 4] = d & 0xff; p_str[i + 5] = (d >> 8) & 0xff; p_str[i + 6] = (d >> 16) & 0xff; p_str[i + 7] = (d >> 24) & 0xff; } } for (; i < 33; i++) p_str[i] = 0; #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2) if (ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible()) { ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g(&p.p, p_str, preComputedTable); } else #endif { BN_ULONG infty; /* First window */ wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & mask; index += window_size; wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue); ecp_nistz256_select_w7(&p.a, preComputedTable[0], wvalue >> 1); ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Z, p.p.Y); copy_conditional(p.p.Y, p.p.Z, wvalue & 1); /* * Since affine infinity is encoded as (0,0) and * Jacobian ias (,,0), we need to harmonize them * by assigning "one" or zero to Z. */ infty = (p.p.X[0] | p.p.X[1] | p.p.X[2] | p.p.X[3] | p.p.Y[0] | p.p.Y[1] | p.p.Y[2] | p.p.Y[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) infty |= (p.p.X[4] | p.p.X[5] | p.p.X[6] | p.p.X[7] | p.p.Y[4] | p.p.Y[5] | p.p.Y[6] | p.p.Y[7]); infty = 0 - is_zero(infty); infty = ~infty; p.p.Z[0] = ONE[0] & infty; p.p.Z[1] = ONE[1] & infty; p.p.Z[2] = ONE[2] & infty; p.p.Z[3] = ONE[3] & infty; if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { p.p.Z[4] = ONE[4] & infty; p.p.Z[5] = ONE[5] & infty; p.p.Z[6] = ONE[6] & infty; p.p.Z[7] = ONE[7] & infty; } for (i = 1; i < 37; i++) { unsigned int off = (index - 1) / 8; wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8; wvalue = (wvalue >> ((index - 1) % 8)) & mask; index += window_size; wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue); ecp_nistz256_select_w7(&t.a, preComputedTable[i], wvalue >> 1); ecp_nistz256_neg(t.p.Z, t.a.Y); copy_conditional(t.a.Y, t.p.Z, wvalue & 1); ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(&p.p, &p.p, &t.a); } } } else { p_is_infinity = 1; no_precomp_for_generator = 1; } } else p_is_infinity = 1; if (no_precomp_for_generator) { /* * Without a precomputed table for the generator, it has to be * handled like a normal point. */ new_scalars = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(BIGNUM *)); if (!new_scalars) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } new_points = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(EC_POINT *)); if (!new_points) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(new_scalars, scalars, num * sizeof(BIGNUM *)); new_scalars[num] = scalar; memcpy(new_points, points, num * sizeof(EC_POINT *)); new_points[num] = generator; scalars = new_scalars; points = new_points; num++; } if (num) { P256_POINT *out = &t.p; if (p_is_infinity) out = &p.p; if (!ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(group, out, scalars, points, num, ctx)) goto err; if (!p_is_infinity) ecp_nistz256_point_add(&p.p, &p.p, out); } /* Not constant-time, but we're only operating on the public output. */ if (!ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->X, p.p.X) || !ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->Y, p.p.Y) || !ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->Z, p.p.Z)) { goto err; } r->Z_is_one = is_one(&r->Z) & 1; ret = 1; err: if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); if (new_points) OPENSSL_free(new_points); if (new_scalars) OPENSSL_free(new_scalars); return ret; } static int ecp_nistz256_get_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_ULONG z_inv2[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG z_inv3[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG x_aff[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG y_aff[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG point_x[P256_LIMBS], point_y[P256_LIMBS], point_z[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG x_ret[P256_LIMBS], y_ret[P256_LIMBS]; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); return 0; } if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(point_x, &point->X) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(point_y, &point->Y) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(point_z, &point->Z)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } ecp_nistz256_mod_inverse(z_inv3, point_z); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(z_inv2, z_inv3); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(x_aff, z_inv2, point_x); if (x != NULL) { ecp_nistz256_from_mont(x_ret, x_aff); if (!ecp_nistz256_set_words(x, x_ret)) return 0; } if (y != NULL) { ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(z_inv3, z_inv3, z_inv2); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(y_aff, z_inv3, point_y); ecp_nistz256_from_mont(y_ret, y_aff); if (!ecp_nistz256_set_words(y, y_ret)) return 0; } return 1; } static EC_PRE_COMP *ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group) { EC_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL; if (!group) return NULL; ret = (EC_PRE_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_PRE_COMP)); if (!ret) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; } ret->group = group; ret->w = 6; /* default */ ret->precomp = NULL; ret->precomp_storage = NULL; ret->references = 1; return ret; } static void *ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_dup(void *src_) { EC_PRE_COMP *src = src_; /* no need to actually copy, these objects never change! */ CRYPTO_add(&src->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP); return src_; } static void ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_free(void *pre_) { int i; EC_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_; if (!pre) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&pre->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP); if (i > 0) return; if (pre->precomp_storage) OPENSSL_free(pre->precomp_storage); OPENSSL_free(pre); } static void ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_clear_free(void *pre_) { int i; EC_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_; if (!pre) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&pre->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP); if (i > 0) return; if (pre->precomp_storage) { OPENSSL_cleanse(pre->precomp, 32 * sizeof(unsigned char) * (1 << pre->w) * 2 * 37); OPENSSL_free(pre->precomp_storage); } OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof(*pre)); OPENSSL_free(pre); } static int ecp_nistz256_window_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { /* There is a hard-coded table for the default generator. */ const EC_POINT *generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator != NULL && ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(generator)) { /* There is a hard-coded table for the default generator. */ return 1; } return EC_EX_DATA_get_data(group->extra_data, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_dup, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_free, ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_clear_free) != NULL; } const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistz256_method(void) { static const EC_METHOD ret = { EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, NID_X9_62_prime_field, ec_GFp_mont_group_init, ec_GFp_mont_group_finish, ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish, ec_GFp_mont_group_copy, ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GFp_simple_point_init, ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, ecp_nistz256_get_affine, 0, 0, 0, ec_GFp_simple_add, ec_GFp_simple_dbl, ec_GFp_simple_invert, ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GFp_simple_cmp, ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, ecp_nistz256_points_mul, /* mul */ ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute, /* precompute_mult */ ecp_nistz256_window_have_precompute_mult, /* have_precompute_mult */ ec_GFp_mont_field_mul, ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr, 0, /* field_div */ ec_GFp_mont_field_encode, ec_GFp_mont_field_decode, ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one }; return &ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile (revision 337764) @@ -1,142 +1,142 @@ # # crypto/ecdsa/Makefile # DIR= ecdsa TOP= ../.. CC= cc INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include CFLAG=-g -Wall MAKEFILE= Makefile AR= ar r CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile TEST=ecdsatest.c APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a LIBSRC= ecs_lib.c ecs_asn1.c ecs_ossl.c ecs_sign.c ecs_vrf.c ecs_err.c LIBOBJ= ecs_lib.o ecs_asn1.o ecs_ossl.o ecs_sign.o ecs_vrf.o ecs_err.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= ecdsa.h HEADER= ecs_locl.h $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all) all: lib lib: $(LIBOBJ) $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. @touch lib files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist; \ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; tags: ctags $(SRC) tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff update: depend depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) clean: rm -f *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_asn1.c ecs_locl.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_err.o: ecs_err.c ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ecs_lib.c ecs_locl.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_locl.h ecs_ossl.c +ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ecs_locl.h ecs_ossl.c ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ecs_sign.o: ecs_locl.h ecs_sign.c ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ecs_locl.h ecs_vrf.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,556 +1,563 @@ /* crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c */ /* * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include #include #include /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA is defined */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { puts("Elliptic curves are disabled."); return 0; } #else # include # include # include # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include # endif # include # include static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator " "think it has entropy"; /* declaration of the test functions */ int x9_62_tests(BIO *); int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r, const char *s); int test_builtin(BIO *); /* functions to change the RAND_METHOD */ int change_rand(void); int restore_rand(void); int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); RAND_METHOD fake_rand; const RAND_METHOD *old_rand; int change_rand(void) { /* save old rand method */ if ((old_rand = RAND_get_rand_method()) == NULL) return 0; fake_rand.seed = old_rand->seed; fake_rand.cleanup = old_rand->cleanup; fake_rand.add = old_rand->add; fake_rand.status = old_rand->status; /* use own random function */ fake_rand.bytes = fbytes; fake_rand.pseudorand = old_rand->bytes; /* set new RAND_METHOD */ if (!RAND_set_rand_method(&fake_rand)) return 0; return 1; } int restore_rand(void) { if (!RAND_set_rand_method(old_rand)) return 0; else return 1; } -static int fbytes_counter = 0; +static int fbytes_counter = 0, use_fake = 0; static const char *numbers[8] = { "651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659", "6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654", "8763001015071075675010661307616710783570106710677817767166" "71676178726717", "7000000175690566466555057817571571075705015757757057795755" "55657156756655", "1275552191113212300012030439187146164646146646466749494799", "1542725565216523985789236956265265265235675811949404040041", "1456427555219115346513212300075341203043918714616464614664" "64667494947990", "1712787255652165239672857892369562652652652356758119494040" "40041670216363" }; int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { int ret; BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; + if (use_fake == 0) + return old_rand->bytes(buf, num); + + use_fake = 0; + if (fbytes_counter >= 8) return 0; tmp = BN_new(); if (!tmp) return 0; if (!BN_dec2bn(&tmp, numbers[fbytes_counter])) { BN_free(tmp); return 0; } fbytes_counter++; if (num != BN_num_bytes(tmp) || !BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf)) ret = 0; else ret = 1; if (tmp) BN_free(tmp); return ret; } /* some tests from the X9.62 draft */ int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in) { int ret = 0; const char message[] = "abc"; unsigned char digest[20]; unsigned int dgst_len = 0; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; EC_KEY *key = NULL; ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL; BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); /* get the message digest */ EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx, EVP_ecdsa()); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, (const void *)message, 3); EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, digest, &dgst_len); BIO_printf(out, "testing %s: ", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); /* create the key */ if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) goto x962_int_err; + use_fake = 1; if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key)) goto x962_int_err; BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* create the signature */ + use_fake = 1; signature = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, key); if (signature == NULL) goto x962_int_err; BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* compare the created signature with the expected signature */ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL || (s = BN_new()) == NULL) goto x962_int_err; if (!BN_dec2bn(&r, r_in) || !BN_dec2bn(&s, s_in)) goto x962_int_err; if (BN_cmp(signature->r, r) || BN_cmp(signature->s, s)) goto x962_int_err; BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* verify the signature */ if (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, signature, key) != 1) goto x962_int_err; BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); BIO_printf(out, " ok\n"); ret = 1; x962_int_err: if (!ret) BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); if (key) EC_KEY_free(key); if (signature) ECDSA_SIG_free(signature); if (r) BN_free(r); if (s) BN_free(s); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return ret; } int x9_62_tests(BIO *out) { int ret = 0; BIO_printf(out, "some tests from X9.62:\n"); /* set own rand method */ if (!change_rand()) goto x962_err; if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_prime192v1, "3342403536405981729393488334694600415596881826869351677613", "5735822328888155254683894997897571951568553642892029982342")) goto x962_err; if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_prime239v1, "3086361431751678114926225473006680188549593787585317781474" "62058306432176", "3238135532097973577080787768312505059318910517550078427819" "78505179448783")) goto x962_err; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1, "87194383164871543355722284926904419997237591535066528048", "308992691965804947361541664549085895292153777025772063598")) goto x962_err; if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1, "2159633321041961198501834003903461262881815148684178964245" "5876922391552", "1970303740007316867383349976549972270528498040721988191026" "49413465737174")) goto x962_err; # endif ret = 1; x962_err: if (!restore_rand()) ret = 0; return ret; } int test_builtin(BIO *out) { EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL; size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0; EC_KEY *eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL; EC_GROUP *group; ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig = NULL; unsigned char digest[20], wrong_digest[20]; unsigned char *signature = NULL; const unsigned char *sig_ptr; unsigned char *sig_ptr2; unsigned char *raw_buf = NULL; unsigned int sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len; int nid, ret = 0; /* fill digest values with some random data */ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digest, 20) <= 0 || RAND_pseudo_bytes(wrong_digest, 20) <= 0) { BIO_printf(out, "ERROR: unable to get random data\n"); goto builtin_err; } /* * create and verify a ecdsa signature with every availble curve (with ) */ BIO_printf(out, "\ntesting ECDSA_sign() and ECDSA_verify() " "with some internal curves:\n"); /* get a list of all internal curves */ crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0); curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_builtin_curve) * crv_len); if (curves == NULL) { BIO_printf(out, "malloc error\n"); goto builtin_err; } if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) { BIO_printf(out, "unable to get internal curves\n"); goto builtin_err; } /* now create and verify a signature for every curve */ for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) { unsigned char dirt, offset; nid = curves[n].nid; if (nid == NID_ipsec4) continue; /* create new ecdsa key (== EC_KEY) */ if ((eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) goto builtin_err; group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (group == NULL) goto builtin_err; if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0) goto builtin_err; EC_GROUP_free(group); degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); if (degree < 160) /* drop the curve */ { EC_KEY_free(eckey); eckey = NULL; continue; } BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); /* create key */ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } /* create second key */ if ((wrong_eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) goto builtin_err; group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (group == NULL) goto builtin_err; if (EC_KEY_set_group(wrong_eckey, group) == 0) goto builtin_err; EC_GROUP_free(group); if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(wrong_eckey)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* check key */ if (!EC_KEY_check_key(eckey)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* create signature */ sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey); if ((signature = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL) goto builtin_err; if (!ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, signature, &sig_len, eckey)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* verify signature */ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* verify signature with the wrong key */ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, wrong_eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* wrong digest */ if (ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* wrong length */ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1, eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* * Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't garble * the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and modify a byte in * one of the bignums directly. */ sig_ptr = signature; if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } /* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */ r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r); s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s); bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8; if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } buf_len = 2 * bn_len; if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) goto builtin_err; /* Pad the bignums with leading zeroes. */ memset(raw_buf, 0, buf_len); BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len); BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len); /* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */ offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len; dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1; raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt; /* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */ if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) || (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL)) goto builtin_err; sig_ptr2 = signature; sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2); if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } /* * Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */ raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt; if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) || (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL)) goto builtin_err; sig_ptr2 = signature; sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2); if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); BIO_printf(out, " ok\n"); /* cleanup */ /* clean bogus errors */ ERR_clear_error(); OPENSSL_free(signature); signature = NULL; EC_KEY_free(eckey); eckey = NULL; EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey); wrong_eckey = NULL; ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); ecdsa_sig = NULL; OPENSSL_free(raw_buf); raw_buf = NULL; } ret = 1; builtin_err: if (eckey) EC_KEY_free(eckey); if (wrong_eckey) EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey); if (ecdsa_sig) ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); if (signature) OPENSSL_free(signature); if (raw_buf) OPENSSL_free(raw_buf); if (curves) OPENSSL_free(curves); return ret; } int main(void) { int ret = 1; BIO *out; out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); /* enable memory leak checking unless explicitly disabled */ if (!((getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY") != NULL) && (0 == strcmp(getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"), "off")))) { CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init(); CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL); } else { /* OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=off */ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions(0, 0, 0, 0, 0); } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* initialize the prng */ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed)); /* the tests */ if (!x9_62_tests(out)) goto err; if (!test_builtin(out)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) BIO_printf(out, "\nECDSA test failed\n"); else BIO_printf(out, "\nECDSA test passed\n"); if (ret) ERR_print_errors(out); CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); ERR_free_strings(); CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out); if (out != NULL) BIO_free(out); return ret; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,478 +1,492 @@ /* crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c */ /* * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include "ecs_locl.h" #include #include #include +#include "bn_int.h" static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *eckey); static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey); static ECDSA_METHOD openssl_ecdsa_meth = { "OpenSSL ECDSA method", ecdsa_do_sign, ecdsa_sign_setup, ecdsa_do_verify, #if 0 NULL, /* init */ NULL, /* finish */ #endif 0, /* flags */ NULL /* app_data */ }; const ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_OpenSSL(void) { return &openssl_ecdsa_meth; } static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL; EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; int ret = 0; int order_bits; if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (ctx_in == NULL) { if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } else ctx = ctx_in; k = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */ r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */ order = BN_new(); X = BN_new(); if (!k || !r || !order || !X) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* Preallocate space */ order_bits = BN_num_bits(order); if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits)) goto err; do { /* get random k */ do if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED); goto err; } while (BN_is_zero(k)) ; /* * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length. * * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is * one bit longer than the order. This guarantees the code * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere. * * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic * conditional copy. */ if (!BN_add(r, k, order) || !BN_add(X, r, order) || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X)) goto err; /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp (group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #endif if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } } while (BN_is_zero(r)); /* compute the inverse of k */ if (EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group) != NULL) { /* * We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact * order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead. */ if (!BN_set_word(X, 2)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!BN_mod_sub(X, order, X, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } BN_set_flags(X, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime (k, k, X, order, ctx, EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group))) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } } else { if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } } /* clear old values if necessary */ if (*rp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*rp); if (*kinvp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*kinvp); /* save the pre-computed values */ *rp = r; *kinvp = k; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { if (k != NULL) BN_clear_free(k); if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r); } if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (order != NULL) BN_free(order); if (tmp_point != NULL) EC_POINT_free(tmp_point); if (X) BN_clear_free(X); return (ret); } static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey) { int ok = 0, i; - BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL; + BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *order = NULL; const BIGNUM *ckinv; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; ECDSA_SIG *ret; ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa; const BIGNUM *priv_key; + BN_MONT_CTX *mont_data; ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey); group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey); if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL || ecdsa == NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } ret = ECDSA_SIG_new(); if (!ret) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } s = ret->s; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL || - (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) { + (m = BN_new()) == NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } + mont_data = EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group); + i = BN_num_bits(order); /* * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. */ if (8 * dgst_len > i) dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8; if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } do { if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) { if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); goto err; } ckinv = kinv; } else { ckinv = in_kinv; if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } - if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + /* + * With only one multiplicant being in Montgomery domain + * multiplication yields real result without post-conversion. + * Also note that all operations but last are performed with + * zero-padded vectors. Last operation, BN_mod_mul_montgomery + * below, returns user-visible value with removed zero padding. + */ + if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(s, ret->r, mont_data, ctx) + || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(s, s, priv_key, mont_data, ctx)) { goto err; } - if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) { + if (!bn_mod_add_fixed_top(s, s, m, order)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } - if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) { + /* + * |s| can still be larger than modulus, because |m| can be. In + * such case we count on Montgomery reduction to tie it up. + */ + if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(s, s, mont_data, ctx) + || !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(s, s, ckinv, mont_data, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(s)) { /* * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to * generate new kinv and r values */ if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES); goto err; } } else /* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */ break; } while (1); ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { ECDSA_SIG_free(ret); ret = NULL; } if (ctx) BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (m) BN_clear_free(m); - if (tmp) - BN_clear_free(tmp); if (order) BN_free(order); if (kinv) BN_clear_free(kinv); return ret; } static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) { int ret = -1, i; BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM *order, *u1, *u2, *m, *X; EC_POINT *point = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; const EC_POINT *pub_key; /* check input values */ if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL || (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return -1; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!X) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */ goto err; } /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */ if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* digest -> m */ i = BN_num_bits(order); /* * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. */ if (8 * dgst_len > i) dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8; if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* u2 = r * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #endif if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */ ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (point) EC_POINT_free(point); return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,347 +1,349 @@ /* crypto/engine/eng_lib.c */ /* * Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project * 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include "eng_int.h" #include /* The "new"/"free" stuff first */ ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void) { ENGINE *ret; ret = (ENGINE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ENGINE)); if (ret == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } memset(ret, 0, sizeof(ENGINE)); ret->struct_ref = 1; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1) CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, ret, &ret->ex_data); return ret; } /* * Placed here (close proximity to ENGINE_new) so that modifications to the * elements of the ENGINE structure are more likely to be caught and changed * here. */ void engine_set_all_null(ENGINE *e) { e->id = NULL; e->name = NULL; e->rsa_meth = NULL; e->dsa_meth = NULL; e->dh_meth = NULL; e->rand_meth = NULL; e->store_meth = NULL; e->ciphers = NULL; e->digests = NULL; e->destroy = NULL; e->init = NULL; e->finish = NULL; e->ctrl = NULL; e->load_privkey = NULL; e->load_pubkey = NULL; e->cmd_defns = NULL; e->flags = 0; } int engine_free_util(ENGINE *e, int locked) { int i; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_FREE_UTIL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (locked) i = CRYPTO_add(&e->struct_ref, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); else i = --e->struct_ref; engine_ref_debug(e, 0, -1) if (i > 0) return 1; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ENGINE_free, bad structural reference count\n"); abort(); } #endif /* Free up any dynamically allocated public key methods */ engine_pkey_meths_free(e); engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(e); /* * Give the ENGINE a chance to do any structural cleanup corresponding to * allocation it did in its constructor (eg. unload error strings) */ if (e->destroy) e->destroy(e); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, e, &e->ex_data); OPENSSL_free(e); return 1; } int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e) { return engine_free_util(e, 1); } /* Cleanup stuff */ /* * ENGINE_cleanup() is coded such that anything that does work that will need * cleanup can register a "cleanup" callback here. That way we don't get * linker bloat by referring to all *possible* cleanups, but any linker bloat * into code "X" will cause X's cleanup function to end up here. */ static STACK_OF(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM) *cleanup_stack = NULL; static int int_cleanup_check(int create) { if (cleanup_stack) return 1; if (!create) return 0; cleanup_stack = sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_new_null(); return (cleanup_stack ? 1 : 0); } static ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *int_cleanup_item(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb) { ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM)); if (!item) return NULL; item->cb = cb; return item; } void engine_cleanup_add_first(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb) { ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item; if (!int_cleanup_check(1)) return; item = int_cleanup_item(cb); if (item) sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_insert(cleanup_stack, item, 0); } void engine_cleanup_add_last(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb) { ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item; if (!int_cleanup_check(1)) return; item = int_cleanup_item(cb); - if (item) - sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_push(cleanup_stack, item); + if (item != NULL) { + if (sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_push(cleanup_stack, item) <= 0) + OPENSSL_free(item); + } } /* The API function that performs all cleanup */ static void engine_cleanup_cb_free(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item) { (*(item->cb)) (); OPENSSL_free(item); } void ENGINE_cleanup(void) { if (int_cleanup_check(0)) { sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_pop_free(cleanup_stack, engine_cleanup_cb_free); cleanup_stack = NULL; } /* * FIXME: This should be handled (somehow) through RAND, eg. by it * registering a cleanup callback. */ RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); } /* Now the "ex_data" support */ int ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int ENGINE_set_ex_data(ENGINE *e, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&e->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *ENGINE_get_ex_data(const ENGINE *e, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&e->ex_data, idx)); } /* * Functions to get/set an ENGINE's elements - mainly to avoid exposing the * ENGINE structure itself. */ int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id) { if (id == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } e->id = id; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name) { if (name == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_NAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } e->name = name; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f) { e->destroy = destroy_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f) { e->init = init_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f) { e->finish = finish_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f) { e->ctrl = ctrl_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags) { e->flags = flags; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns) { e->cmd_defns = defns; return 1; } const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e) { return e->id; } const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e) { return e->name; } ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->destroy; } ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->init; } ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->finish; } ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->ctrl; } int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e) { return e->flags; } const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e) { return e->cmd_defns; } /* * eng_lib.o is pretty much linked into anything that touches ENGINE already, * so put the "static_state" hack here. */ static int internal_static_hack = 0; void *ENGINE_get_static_state(void) { return &internal_static_hack; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,246 +1,246 @@ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include "eng_int.h" #include "asn1_locl.h" #include /* * If this symbol is defined then ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(), the * function that is used by EVP to hook in pkey_asn1_meth code and cache * defaults (etc), will display brief debugging summaries to stderr with the * 'nid'. */ /* #define ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METH_DEBUG */ static ENGINE_TABLE *pkey_asn1_meth_table = NULL; void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_pkey_asn1_meths(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&pkey_asn1_meth_table); } int ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e) { if (e->pkey_asn1_meths) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, engine_unregister_all_pkey_asn1_meths, e, nids, num_nids, 0); } return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_asn1_meths(void) { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e) { if (e->pkey_asn1_meths) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, engine_unregister_all_pkey_asn1_meths, e, nids, num_nids, 1); } return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references) for a given pkey_asn1_meth 'nid' */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(int nid) { return engine_table_select(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, nid); } /* * Obtains a pkey_asn1_meth implementation from an ENGINE functional * reference */ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid) { EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ret; ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR fn = ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(e); if (!fn || !fn(e, &ret, NULL, nid)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_ASN1_METH, ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_PUBLIC_KEY_METHOD); return NULL; } return ret; } /* Gets the pkey_asn1_meth callback from an ENGINE structure */ ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(const ENGINE *e) { return e->pkey_asn1_meths; } /* Sets the pkey_asn1_meth callback in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR f) { e->pkey_asn1_meths = f; return 1; } /* * Internal function to free up EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structures before an * ENGINE is destroyed */ void engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(ENGINE *e) { int i; EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *pkm; if (e->pkey_asn1_meths) { const int *pknids; int npknids; npknids = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &pknids, 0); for (i = 0; i < npknids; i++) { if (e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &pkm, NULL, pknids[i])) { EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(pkm); } } } } /* * Find a method based on a string. This does a linear search through all * implemented algorithms. This is OK in practice because only a small number * of algorithms are likely to be implemented in an engine and it is not used * for speed critical operations. */ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_str(ENGINE *e, const char *str, int len) { int i, nidcount; const int *nids; EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (!e->pkey_asn1_meths) return NULL; if (len == -1) len = strlen(str); nidcount = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0); for (i = 0; i < nidcount; i++) { e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &ameth, NULL, nids[i]); if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == len) && !strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, str, len)) return ameth; } return NULL; } typedef struct { ENGINE *e; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; const char *str; int len; } ENGINE_FIND_STR; static void look_str_cb(int nid, STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk, ENGINE *def, void *arg) { ENGINE_FIND_STR *lk = arg; int i; if (lk->ameth) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_ENGINE_num(sk); i++) { ENGINE *e = sk_ENGINE_value(sk, i); EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &ameth, NULL, nid); - if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == lk->len) && + if (ameth != NULL && ((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == lk->len) && !strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, lk->str, lk->len)) { lk->e = e; lk->ameth = ameth; return; } } } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe, const char *str, int len) { ENGINE_FIND_STR fstr; fstr.e = NULL; fstr.ameth = NULL; fstr.str = str; fstr.len = len; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); engine_table_doall(pkey_asn1_meth_table, look_str_cb, &fstr); /* If found obtain a structural reference to engine */ if (fstr.e) { fstr.e->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(fstr.e, 0, 1) } *pe = fstr.e; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); return fstr.ameth; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/o_time.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/o_time.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/o_time.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,474 +1,478 @@ /* crypto/o_time.c */ /* * Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2001. */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2008. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include "o_time.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # if __CRTL_VER >= 70000000 && \ (defined _POSIX_C_SOURCE || !defined _ANSI_C_SOURCE) # define VMS_GMTIME_OK # endif # ifndef VMS_GMTIME_OK # include # include # include # include # include # include # endif /* ndef VMS_GMTIME_OK */ /* * Needed to pick up the correct definitions and declarations in some of the * DEC C Header Files (*.H). */ # define __NEW_STARLET 1 # if (defined(__alpha) || defined(__ia64)) # include # else /* VAX */ typedef struct _ile3 { /* Copied from ILEDEF.H for Alpha */ # pragma __nomember_alignment unsigned short int ile3$w_length; /* Length of buffer in bytes */ unsigned short int ile3$w_code; /* Item code value */ void *ile3$ps_bufaddr; /* Buffer address */ unsigned short int *ile3$ps_retlen_addr; /* Address of word for returned length */ } ILE3; # endif /* alpha || ia64 */ #endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VMS */ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result) { struct tm *ts = NULL; #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && (!defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(gmtime_r)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS) if (gmtime_r(timer, result) == NULL) return NULL; ts = result; +#elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1400 + if (gmtime_s(result, timer)) + return NULL; + ts = result; #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(VMS_GMTIME_OK) ts = gmtime(timer); if (ts == NULL) return NULL; memcpy(result, ts, sizeof(struct tm)); ts = result; #endif #if defined( OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined( VMS_GMTIME_OK) if (ts == NULL) { static $DESCRIPTOR(tabnam, "LNM$DCL_LOGICAL"); static $DESCRIPTOR(lognam, "SYS$TIMEZONE_DIFFERENTIAL"); char logvalue[256]; unsigned int reslen = 0; # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 ILEB_64 itemlist[2], *pitem; # else ILE3 itemlist[2], *pitem; # endif int status; time_t t; /* * Setup an itemlist for the call to $TRNLNM - Translate Logical Name. */ pitem = itemlist; # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 pitem->ileb_64$w_mbo = 1; pitem->ileb_64$w_code = LNM$_STRING; pitem->ileb_64$l_mbmo = -1; pitem->ileb_64$q_length = sizeof(logvalue); pitem->ileb_64$pq_bufaddr = logvalue; pitem->ileb_64$pq_retlen_addr = (unsigned __int64 *) &reslen; pitem++; /* Last item of the item list is null terminated */ pitem->ileb_64$q_length = pitem->ileb_64$w_code = 0; # else pitem->ile3$w_length = sizeof(logvalue); pitem->ile3$w_code = LNM$_STRING; pitem->ile3$ps_bufaddr = logvalue; pitem->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = (unsigned short int *) &reslen; pitem++; /* Last item of the item list is null terminated */ pitem->ile3$w_length = pitem->ile3$w_code = 0; # endif /* Get the value for SYS$TIMEZONE_DIFFERENTIAL */ status = sys$trnlnm(0, &tabnam, &lognam, 0, itemlist); if (!(status & 1)) return NULL; logvalue[reslen] = '\0'; t = *timer; /* The following is extracted from the DEC C header time.h */ /* ** Beginning in OpenVMS Version 7.0 mktime, time, ctime, strftime ** have two implementations. One implementation is provided ** for compatibility and deals with time in terms of local time, ** the other __utc_* deals with time in terms of UTC. */ /* * We use the same conditions as in said time.h to check if we should * assume that t contains local time (and should therefore be * adjusted) or UTC (and should therefore be left untouched). */ # if __CRTL_VER < 70000000 || defined _VMS_V6_SOURCE /* Get the numerical value of the equivalence string */ status = atoi(logvalue); /* and use it to move time to GMT */ t -= status; # endif /* then convert the result to the time structure */ /* * Since there was no gmtime_r() to do this stuff for us, we have to * do it the hard way. */ { /*- * The VMS epoch is the astronomical Smithsonian date, if I remember correctly, which is November 17, 1858. Furthermore, time is measure in thenths of microseconds and stored in quadwords (64 bit integers). unix_epoch below is January 1st 1970 expressed as a VMS time. The following code was used to get this number: #include #include #include #include main() { unsigned long systime[2]; unsigned short epoch_values[7] = { 1970, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; lib$cvt_vectim(epoch_values, systime); printf("%u %u", systime[0], systime[1]); } */ unsigned long unix_epoch[2] = { 1273708544, 8164711 }; unsigned long deltatime[2]; unsigned long systime[2]; struct vms_vectime { short year, month, day, hour, minute, second, centi_second; } time_values; long operation; /* * Turn the number of seconds since January 1st 1970 to an * internal delta time. Note that lib$cvt_to_internal_time() will * assume that t is signed, and will therefore break on 32-bit * systems some time in 2038. */ operation = LIB$K_DELTA_SECONDS; status = lib$cvt_to_internal_time(&operation, &t, deltatime); /* * Add the delta time with the Unix epoch and we have the current * UTC time in internal format */ status = lib$add_times(unix_epoch, deltatime, systime); /* Turn the internal time into a time vector */ status = sys$numtim(&time_values, systime); /* Fill in the struct tm with the result */ result->tm_sec = time_values.second; result->tm_min = time_values.minute; result->tm_hour = time_values.hour; result->tm_mday = time_values.day; result->tm_mon = time_values.month - 1; result->tm_year = time_values.year - 1900; operation = LIB$K_DAY_OF_WEEK; status = lib$cvt_from_internal_time(&operation, &result->tm_wday, systime); result->tm_wday %= 7; operation = LIB$K_DAY_OF_YEAR; status = lib$cvt_from_internal_time(&operation, &result->tm_yday, systime); result->tm_yday--; result->tm_isdst = 0; /* There's no way to know... */ ts = result; } } #endif return ts; } /* * Take a tm structure and add an offset to it. This avoids any OS issues * with restricted date types and overflows which cause the year 2038 * problem. */ #define SECS_PER_DAY (24 * 60 * 60) static long date_to_julian(int y, int m, int d); static void julian_to_date(long jd, int *y, int *m, int *d); static int julian_adj(const struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec, long *pday, int *psec); int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec) { int time_sec, time_year, time_month, time_day; long time_jd; /* Convert time and offset into julian day and seconds */ if (!julian_adj(tm, off_day, offset_sec, &time_jd, &time_sec)) return 0; /* Convert Julian day back to date */ julian_to_date(time_jd, &time_year, &time_month, &time_day); if (time_year < 1900 || time_year > 9999) return 0; /* Update tm structure */ tm->tm_year = time_year - 1900; tm->tm_mon = time_month - 1; tm->tm_mday = time_day; tm->tm_hour = time_sec / 3600; tm->tm_min = (time_sec / 60) % 60; tm->tm_sec = time_sec % 60; return 1; } int OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(int *pday, int *psec, const struct tm *from, const struct tm *to) { int from_sec, to_sec, diff_sec; long from_jd, to_jd, diff_day; if (!julian_adj(from, 0, 0, &from_jd, &from_sec)) return 0; if (!julian_adj(to, 0, 0, &to_jd, &to_sec)) return 0; diff_day = to_jd - from_jd; diff_sec = to_sec - from_sec; /* Adjust differences so both positive or both negative */ if (diff_day > 0 && diff_sec < 0) { diff_day--; diff_sec += SECS_PER_DAY; } if (diff_day < 0 && diff_sec > 0) { diff_day++; diff_sec -= SECS_PER_DAY; } if (pday) *pday = (int)diff_day; if (psec) *psec = diff_sec; return 1; } /* Convert tm structure and offset into julian day and seconds */ static int julian_adj(const struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec, long *pday, int *psec) { int offset_hms, offset_day; long time_jd; int time_year, time_month, time_day; /* split offset into days and day seconds */ offset_day = offset_sec / SECS_PER_DAY; /* Avoid sign issues with % operator */ offset_hms = offset_sec - (offset_day * SECS_PER_DAY); offset_day += off_day; /* Add current time seconds to offset */ offset_hms += tm->tm_hour * 3600 + tm->tm_min * 60 + tm->tm_sec; /* Adjust day seconds if overflow */ if (offset_hms >= SECS_PER_DAY) { offset_day++; offset_hms -= SECS_PER_DAY; } else if (offset_hms < 0) { offset_day--; offset_hms += SECS_PER_DAY; } /* * Convert date of time structure into a Julian day number. */ time_year = tm->tm_year + 1900; time_month = tm->tm_mon + 1; time_day = tm->tm_mday; time_jd = date_to_julian(time_year, time_month, time_day); /* Work out Julian day of new date */ time_jd += offset_day; if (time_jd < 0) return 0; *pday = time_jd; *psec = offset_hms; return 1; } /* * Convert date to and from julian day Uses Fliegel & Van Flandern algorithm */ static long date_to_julian(int y, int m, int d) { return (1461 * (y + 4800 + (m - 14) / 12)) / 4 + (367 * (m - 2 - 12 * ((m - 14) / 12))) / 12 - (3 * ((y + 4900 + (m - 14) / 12) / 100)) / 4 + d - 32075; } static void julian_to_date(long jd, int *y, int *m, int *d) { long L = jd + 68569; long n = (4 * L) / 146097; long i, j; L = L - (146097 * n + 3) / 4; i = (4000 * (L + 1)) / 1461001; L = L - (1461 * i) / 4 + 31; j = (80 * L) / 2447; *d = L - (2447 * j) / 80; L = j / 11; *m = j + 2 - (12 * L); *y = 100 * (n - 49) + i + L; } #ifdef OPENSSL_TIME_TEST # include /* * Time checking test code. Check times are identical for a wide range of * offsets. This should be run on a machine with 64 bit time_t or it will * trigger the very errors the routines fix. */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { long offset; for (offset = 0; offset < 1000000; offset++) { check_time(offset); check_time(-offset); check_time(offset * 1000); check_time(-offset * 1000); } } int check_time(long offset) { struct tm tm1, tm2, o1; int off_day, off_sec; long toffset; time_t t1, t2; time(&t1); t2 = t1 + offset; OPENSSL_gmtime(&t2, &tm2); OPENSSL_gmtime(&t1, &tm1); o1 = tm1; OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(&tm1, 0, offset); if ((tm1.tm_year != tm2.tm_year) || (tm1.tm_mon != tm2.tm_mon) || (tm1.tm_mday != tm2.tm_mday) || (tm1.tm_hour != tm2.tm_hour) || (tm1.tm_min != tm2.tm_min) || (tm1.tm_sec != tm2.tm_sec)) { fprintf(stderr, "TIME ERROR!!\n"); fprintf(stderr, "Time1: %d/%d/%d, %d:%02d:%02d\n", tm2.tm_mday, tm2.tm_mon + 1, tm2.tm_year + 1900, tm2.tm_hour, tm2.tm_min, tm2.tm_sec); fprintf(stderr, "Time2: %d/%d/%d, %d:%02d:%02d\n", tm1.tm_mday, tm1.tm_mon + 1, tm1.tm_year + 1900, tm1.tm_hour, tm1.tm_min, tm1.tm_sec); return 0; } OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&o1, &tm1, &off_day, &off_sec); toffset = (long)off_day *SECS_PER_DAY + off_sec; if (offset != toffset) { fprintf(stderr, "TIME OFFSET ERROR!!\n"); fprintf(stderr, "Expected %ld, Got %ld (%d:%d)\n", offset, toffset, off_day, off_sec); return 0; } return 1; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/opensslv.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/opensslv.h (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/opensslv.h (revision 337764) @@ -1,97 +1,97 @@ #ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H # define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- * Numeric release version identifier: * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas * 1 to 14, and f for release. The patch level is exactly that. * For example: * 0.9.3-dev 0x00903000 * 0.9.3-beta1 0x00903001 * 0.9.3-beta2-dev 0x00903002 * 0.9.3-beta2 0x00903002 (same as ...beta2-dev) * 0.9.3 0x0090300f * 0.9.3a 0x0090301f * 0.9.4 0x0090400f * 1.2.3z 0x102031af * * For continuity reasons (because 0.9.5 is already out, and is coded * 0x00905100), between 0.9.5 and 0.9.6 the coding of the patch level * part is slightly different, by setting the highest bit. This means * that 0.9.5a looks like this: 0x0090581f. At 0.9.6, we can start * with 0x0090600S... * * (Prior to 0.9.3-dev a different scheme was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.) * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100020ffL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000210fL # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2o-fips 27 Mar 2018" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2p-fips 14 Aug 2018" # else -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2o 27 Mar 2018" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2p 14 Aug 2018" # endif # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT /*- * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...) * versioning. That kind of versioning works a bit differently between * operating systems. The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal * to what it was at application link time, while the minor number has to * be greater or equal to what it was at application link time. With this * scheme, the version number is usually part of the file name, like this: * * libcrypto.so.0.9 * * Some unixen also make a softlink with the major verson number only: * * libcrypto.so.0 * * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently. There, the * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series * of versions, separated by colons. The rightmost version present in the * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be * matched at run time. When the application is run, a check is done to * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the * versions in the version string of the library itself. * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what * kind of matching is desired. However, to implement the same scheme as * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest * to highest, should be part of the string. Consecutive builds would * give the following versions strings: * * 3.0 * 3.0:3.1 * 3.0:3.1:3.2 * 4.0 * 4.0:4.1 * * Notice how version 4 is completely incompatible with version, and * therefore give the breach you can see. * * There may be other schemes as well that I haven't yet discovered. * * So, here's the way it works here: first of all, the library version * number doesn't need at all to match the overall OpenSSL version. * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does. * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER, * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit). * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways, * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY. The numbers are separated by colons and * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current. */ # define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY "" # define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0" #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem.h (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem.h (revision 337764) @@ -1,617 +1,618 @@ /* crypto/pem/pem.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #ifndef HEADER_PEM_H # define HEADER_PEM_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STACK # include # endif # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define PEM_BUFSIZE 1024 # define PEM_OBJ_UNDEF 0 # define PEM_OBJ_X509 1 # define PEM_OBJ_X509_REQ 2 # define PEM_OBJ_CRL 3 # define PEM_OBJ_SSL_SESSION 4 # define PEM_OBJ_PRIV_KEY 10 # define PEM_OBJ_PRIV_RSA 11 # define PEM_OBJ_PRIV_DSA 12 # define PEM_OBJ_PRIV_DH 13 # define PEM_OBJ_PUB_RSA 14 # define PEM_OBJ_PUB_DSA 15 # define PEM_OBJ_PUB_DH 16 # define PEM_OBJ_DHPARAMS 17 # define PEM_OBJ_DSAPARAMS 18 # define PEM_OBJ_PRIV_RSA_PUBLIC 19 # define PEM_OBJ_PRIV_ECDSA 20 # define PEM_OBJ_PUB_ECDSA 21 # define PEM_OBJ_ECPARAMETERS 22 # define PEM_ERROR 30 # define PEM_DEK_DES_CBC 40 # define PEM_DEK_IDEA_CBC 45 # define PEM_DEK_DES_EDE 50 # define PEM_DEK_DES_ECB 60 # define PEM_DEK_RSA 70 # define PEM_DEK_RSA_MD2 80 # define PEM_DEK_RSA_MD5 90 # define PEM_MD_MD2 NID_md2 # define PEM_MD_MD5 NID_md5 # define PEM_MD_SHA NID_sha # define PEM_MD_MD2_RSA NID_md2WithRSAEncryption # define PEM_MD_MD5_RSA NID_md5WithRSAEncryption # define PEM_MD_SHA_RSA NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption # define PEM_STRING_X509_OLD "X509 CERTIFICATE" # define PEM_STRING_X509 "CERTIFICATE" # define PEM_STRING_X509_PAIR "CERTIFICATE PAIR" # define PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" # define PEM_STRING_X509_REQ_OLD "NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST" # define PEM_STRING_X509_REQ "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" # define PEM_STRING_X509_CRL "X509 CRL" # define PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY "ANY PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_PUBLIC "PUBLIC KEY" # define PEM_STRING_RSA "RSA PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_RSA_PUBLIC "RSA PUBLIC KEY" # define PEM_STRING_DSA "DSA PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_DSA_PUBLIC "DSA PUBLIC KEY" # define PEM_STRING_PKCS7 "PKCS7" # define PEM_STRING_PKCS7_SIGNED "PKCS #7 SIGNED DATA" # define PEM_STRING_PKCS8 "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF "PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS "DH PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS "X9.42 DH PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION "SSL SESSION PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_DSAPARAMS "DSA PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_ECDSA_PUBLIC "ECDSA PUBLIC KEY" # define PEM_STRING_ECPARAMETERS "EC PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY "EC PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS "PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_CMS "CMS" /* * Note that this structure is initialised by PEM_SealInit and cleaned up * by PEM_SealFinal (at least for now) */ typedef struct PEM_Encode_Seal_st { EVP_ENCODE_CTX encode; EVP_MD_CTX md; EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher; } PEM_ENCODE_SEAL_CTX; /* enc_type is one off */ # define PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED 10 # define PEM_TYPE_MIC_ONLY 20 # define PEM_TYPE_MIC_CLEAR 30 # define PEM_TYPE_CLEAR 40 typedef struct pem_recip_st { char *name; X509_NAME *dn; int cipher; int key_enc; /* char iv[8]; unused and wrong size */ } PEM_USER; typedef struct pem_ctx_st { int type; /* what type of object */ struct { int version; int mode; } proc_type; char *domain; struct { int cipher; /*- unused, and wrong size unsigned char iv[8]; */ } DEK_info; PEM_USER *originator; int num_recipient; PEM_USER **recipient; /*- XXX(ben): don#t think this is used! STACK *x509_chain; / * certificate chain */ EVP_MD *md; /* signature type */ int md_enc; /* is the md encrypted or not? */ int md_len; /* length of md_data */ char *md_data; /* message digest, could be pkey encrypted */ EVP_CIPHER *dec; /* date encryption cipher */ int key_len; /* key length */ unsigned char *key; /* key */ /*- unused, and wrong size unsigned char iv[8]; */ int data_enc; /* is the data encrypted */ int data_len; unsigned char *data; } PEM_CTX; /* * These macros make the PEM_read/PEM_write functions easier to maintain and * write. Now they are all implemented with either: IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(...) or * IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_cb(...) */ # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # else # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \ type *PEM_read_##name(FILE *fp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)\ { \ return PEM_ASN1_read((d2i_of_void *)d2i_##asn1, str,fp,(void **)x,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, const type *x) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,(void *)x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, \ void *u) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, \ void *u) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \ } # endif # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ type *PEM_read_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)\ { \ return PEM_ASN1_read_bio((d2i_of_void *)d2i_##asn1, str,bp,(void **)x,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, const type *x) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,(void *)x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,(void *)x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_cb(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(name, type, str, asn1) /* These are the same except they are for the declarations */ # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_FP_API) # define DECLARE_PEM_read_fp(name, type) /**/ # define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp(name, type) /**/ # define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type) /**/ # else # define DECLARE_PEM_read_fp(name, type) \ type *PEM_read_##name(FILE *fp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp(name, type) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, const type *x); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO # define DECLARE_PEM_read_bio(name, type) \ type *PEM_read_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_bio(name, type) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, const type *x); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # else # define DECLARE_PEM_read_bio(name, type) /**/ # define DECLARE_PEM_write_bio(name, type) /**/ # define DECLARE_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type) /**/ # define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type) /**/ # endif # define DECLARE_PEM_write(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_bio(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_fp(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_write_const(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read_bio(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read_fp(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_rw(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_const(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_cb(name, type) # if 1 /* "userdata": new with OpenSSL 0.9.4 */ typedef int pem_password_cb (char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata); # else /* OpenSSL 0.9.3, 0.9.3a */ typedef int pem_password_cb (char *buf, int size, int rwflag); # endif int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher); int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *len, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int PEM_read_bio(BIO *bp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len); int PEM_write_bio(BIO *bp, const char *name, const char *hdr, const unsigned char *data, long len); int PEM_bytes_read_bio(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm, const char *name, BIO *bp, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); void *PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, BIO *bp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio(BIO *bp, X509_INFO *xi, EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cd, void *u); # endif int PEM_read(FILE *fp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len); int PEM_write(FILE *fp, const char *name, const char *hdr, const unsigned char *data, long len); void *PEM_ASN1_read(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, FILE *fp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_ASN1_write(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, FILE *fp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u); STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read(FILE *fp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_SealInit(PEM_ENCODE_SEAL_CTX *ctx, EVP_CIPHER *type, EVP_MD *md_type, unsigned char **ek, int *ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk); void PEM_SealUpdate(PEM_ENCODE_SEAL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); int PEM_SealFinal(PEM_ENCODE_SEAL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, int *sigl, unsigned char *out, int *outl, EVP_PKEY *priv); void PEM_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD *type); void PEM_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, unsigned int cnt); int PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey); -int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key); +/* The default pem_password_cb that's used internally */ +int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int rwflag, void *userdata); void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type); void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str); # include DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509, X509) DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_AUX, X509) DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_CERT_PAIR, X509_CERT_PAIR) DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_REQ, X509_REQ) DECLARE_PEM_write(X509_REQ_NEW, X509_REQ) DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_CRL, X509_CRL) DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS7, PKCS7) DECLARE_PEM_rw(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE) DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS8, X509_SIG) DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(RSAPrivateKey, RSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(RSAPublicKey, RSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw(RSA_PUBKEY, RSA) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(DSAPrivateKey, DSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw(DSA_PUBKEY, DSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(DSAparams, DSA) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(ECPKParameters, EC_GROUP) DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(ECPrivateKey, EC_KEY) DECLARE_PEM_rw(EC_PUBKEY, EC_KEY) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(DHparams, DH) DECLARE_PEM_write_const(DHxparams, DH) # endif DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(PrivateKey, EVP_PKEY) DECLARE_PEM_rw(PUBKEY, EVP_PKEY) int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(BIO *, EVP_PKEY *, const EVP_CIPHER *, char *, int, pem_password_cb *, void *); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cd, void *u); EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x); int PEM_write_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x); EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey(const unsigned char **in, long length); EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey(const unsigned char **in, long length); EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *in); EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey_bio(BIO *in); int i2b_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk); int i2b_PublicKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 EVP_PKEY *b2i_PVK_bio(BIO *in, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2b_PVK_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ void ERR_load_PEM_strings(void); /* Error codes for the PEM functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define PEM_F_B2I_DSS 127 # define PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO 128 # define PEM_F_B2I_RSA 129 # define PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA 130 # define PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA 131 # define PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO 120 # define PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_FP 121 # define PEM_F_DO_B2I 132 # define PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO 133 # define PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER 134 # define PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY 126 # define PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY_FP 125 # define PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY 135 # define PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER 136 # define PEM_F_I2B_PVK 137 # define PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO 138 # define PEM_F_LOAD_IV 101 # define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ 102 # define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ_BIO 103 # define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE 104 # define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO 105 # define PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK 100 # define PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER 106 # define PEM_F_PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY 118 # define PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO 107 # define PEM_F_PEM_PK8PKEY 119 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ 108 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO 109 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_DHPARAMS 141 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PARAMETERS 140 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY 123 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_DHPARAMS 142 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_PRIVATEKEY 124 # define PEM_F_PEM_SEALFINAL 110 # define PEM_F_PEM_SEALINIT 111 # define PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL 112 # define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE 113 # define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO 114 # define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY 139 # define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ 115 # define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO 116 # define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO 117 /* Reason codes. */ # define PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE 100 # define PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT 101 # define PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE 102 # define PEM_R_BAD_IV_CHARS 103 # define PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER 116 # define PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ 104 # define PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER 117 # define PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE 118 # define PEM_R_CIPHER_IS_NULL 127 # define PEM_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_PRIVATE_KEY 115 # define PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB 119 # define PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB 120 # define PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG 128 # define PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER 121 # define PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR 122 # define PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT 123 # define PEM_R_NOT_DEK_INFO 105 # define PEM_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED 106 # define PEM_R_NOT_PROC_TYPE 107 # define PEM_R_NO_START_LINE 108 # define PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD 109 # define PEM_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NO_RSA 110 # define PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT 124 # define PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT 125 # define PEM_R_READ_KEY 111 # define PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER 112 # define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 113 # define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION 114 # define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS 126 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,872 +1,861 @@ /* crypto/pem/pem_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "asn1_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif const char PEM_version[] = "PEM" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; #define MIN_LENGTH 4 static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num); static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name); int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix); -int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key) +int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int rwflag, void *userdata) { -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API - /* - * We should not ever call the default callback routine from windows. - */ - PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); - return (-1); -#else - int i, j; + int i, min_len; const char *prompt; - if (key) { - i = strlen(key); + + /* We assume that the user passes a default password as userdata */ + if (userdata) { + i = strlen(userdata); i = (i > num) ? num : i; - memcpy(buf, key, i); - return (i); + memcpy(buf, userdata, i); + return i; } prompt = EVP_get_pw_prompt(); if (prompt == NULL) prompt = "Enter PEM pass phrase:"; - for (;;) { - /* - * We assume that w == 0 means decryption, - * while w == 1 means encryption - */ - int min_len = w ? MIN_LENGTH : 0; + /* + * rwflag == 0 means decryption + * rwflag == 1 means encryption + * + * We assume that for encryption, we want a minimum length, while for + * decryption, we cannot know any minimum length, so we assume zero. + */ + min_len = rwflag ? MIN_LENGTH : 0; - i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, w); - if (i != 0) { - PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD); - memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num); - return (-1); - } - j = strlen(buf); - if (min_len && j < min_len) { - fprintf(stderr, - "phrase is too short, needs to be at least %d chars\n", - min_len); - } else - break; + i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, rwflag); + if (i != 0) { + PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD); + memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num); + return -1; } - return (j); -#endif + return strlen(buf); } void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type) { const char *str; if (type == PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED) str = "ENCRYPTED"; else if (type == PEM_TYPE_MIC_CLEAR) str = "MIC-CLEAR"; else if (type == PEM_TYPE_MIC_ONLY) str = "MIC-ONLY"; else str = "BAD-TYPE"; BUF_strlcat(buf, "Proc-Type: 4,", PEM_BUFSIZE); BUF_strlcat(buf, str, PEM_BUFSIZE); BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", PEM_BUFSIZE); } void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str) { static const unsigned char map[17] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; long i; int j; BUF_strlcat(buf, "DEK-Info: ", PEM_BUFSIZE); BUF_strlcat(buf, type, PEM_BUFSIZE); BUF_strlcat(buf, ",", PEM_BUFSIZE); j = strlen(buf); if (j + (len * 2) + 1 > PEM_BUFSIZE) return; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { buf[j + i * 2] = map[(str[i] >> 4) & 0x0f]; buf[j + i * 2 + 1] = map[(str[i]) & 0x0f]; } buf[j + i * 2] = '\n'; buf[j + i * 2 + 1] = '\0'; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API void *PEM_ASN1_read(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, FILE *fp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; void *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i, name, b, x, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name) { /* Normal matching nm and name */ if (!strcmp(nm, name)) return 1; /* Make PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY match any private key */ if (!strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY)) { int slen; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8)) return 1; if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF)) return 1; slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PRIVATE KEY"); if (slen > 0) { /* * NB: ENGINE implementations wont contain a deprecated old * private key decode function so don't look for them. */ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, nm, slen); if (ameth && ameth->old_priv_decode) return 1; } return 0; } if (!strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS)) { int slen; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PARAMETERS"); if (slen > 0) { ENGINE *e; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&e, nm, slen); if (ameth) { int r; if (ameth->param_decode) r = 1; else r = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (e) ENGINE_finish(e); #endif return r; } } return 0; } /* If reading DH parameters handle X9.42 DH format too */ if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS) && !strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS)) return 1; /* Permit older strings */ if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) && !strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509)) return 1; if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ_OLD) && !strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ)) return 1; /* Allow normal certs to be read as trusted certs */ if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) && !strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED)) return 1; if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) && !strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED)) return 1; /* Some CAs use PKCS#7 with CERTIFICATE headers */ if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) && !strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PKCS7)) return 1; if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS7_SIGNED) && !strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PKCS7)) return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) && !strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_CMS)) return 1; /* Allow CMS to be read from PKCS#7 headers */ if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) && !strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_CMS)) return 1; #endif return 0; } int PEM_bytes_read_bio(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm, const char *name, BIO *bp, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher; char *nm = NULL, *header = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len; int ret = 0; for (;;) { if (!PEM_read_bio(bp, &nm, &header, &data, &len)) { if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) ERR_add_error_data(2, "Expecting: ", name); return 0; } if (check_pem(nm, name)) break; OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_free(header); OPENSSL_free(data); } if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &cipher)) goto err; if (!PEM_do_header(&cipher, data, &len, cb, u)) goto err; *pdata = data; *plen = len; if (pnm) *pnm = nm; ret = 1; err: if (!ret || !pnm) OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_free(header); if (!ret) OPENSSL_free(data); return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int PEM_ASN1_write(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, FILE *fp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d, name, b, x, enc, kstr, klen, callback, u); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; int dsize = 0, i, j, ret = 0; unsigned char *p, *data = NULL; const char *objstr = NULL; char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; if (enc != NULL) { objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc)); if (objstr == NULL || EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) == 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto err; } } if ((dsize = i2d(x, NULL)) < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); dsize = 0; goto err; } /* dzise + 8 bytes are needed */ /* actually it needs the cipher block size extra... */ data = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)dsize + 20); if (data == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = data; i = i2d(x, &p); if (enc != NULL) { if (kstr == NULL) { if (callback == NULL) klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); else klen = (*callback) (buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); if (klen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_READ_KEY); goto err; } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* Convert the pass phrase from EBCDIC */ ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, klen); #endif kstr = (unsigned char *)buf; } RAND_add(data, i, 0); /* put in the RSA key. */ OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv)); if (RAND_bytes(iv, enc->iv_len) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */ goto err; /* * The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt. It is NOT taken from * the BytesToKey function */ if (!EVP_BytesToKey(enc, EVP_md5(), iv, kstr, klen, 1, key, NULL)) goto err; if (kstr == (unsigned char *)buf) OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE); OPENSSL_assert(strlen(objstr) + 23 + 2 * enc->iv_len + 13 <= sizeof(buf)); buf[0] = '\0'; PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED); PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, enc->iv_len, (char *)iv); /* k=strlen(buf); */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); ret = 1; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, enc, NULL, key, iv) || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, data, &j, data, i) || !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, &(data[j]), &i)) ret = 0; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); if (ret == 0) goto err; i += j; } else { ret = 1; buf[0] = '\0'; } i = PEM_write_bio(bp, name, buf, data, i); if (i <= 0) ret = 0; err: OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, sizeof(iv)); OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)&ctx, sizeof(ctx)); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE); if (data != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(data, (unsigned int)dsize); OPENSSL_free(data); } return (ret); } int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *plen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { int i = 0, j, o, klen; long len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; len = *plen; if (cipher->cipher == NULL) return (1); if (callback == NULL) klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); else klen = callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); - if (klen <= 0) { + if (klen < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); return (0); } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* Convert the pass phrase from EBCDIC */ ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, klen); #endif if (!EVP_BytesToKey(cipher->cipher, EVP_md5(), &(cipher->iv[0]), (unsigned char *)buf, klen, 1, key, NULL)) return 0; j = (int)len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); o = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, cipher->cipher, NULL, key, &(cipher->iv[0])); if (o) o = EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, data, &i, data, j); if (o) o = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, &(data[i]), &j); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)buf, sizeof(buf)); OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)key, sizeof(key)); if (o) j += i; else { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return (0); } *plen = j; return (1); } int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher) { const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; char *p, c; char **header_pp = &header; cipher->cipher = NULL; + memset(cipher->iv, 0, sizeof(cipher->iv)); if ((header == NULL) || (*header == '\0') || (*header == '\n')) return (1); if (strncmp(header, "Proc-Type: ", 11) != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_PROC_TYPE); return (0); } header += 11; if (*header != '4') return (0); header++; if (*header != ',') return (0); header++; if (strncmp(header, "ENCRYPTED", 9) != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED); return (0); } for (; (*header != '\n') && (*header != '\0'); header++) ; if (*header == '\0') { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER); return (0); } header++; if (strncmp(header, "DEK-Info: ", 10) != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_DEK_INFO); return (0); } header += 10; p = header; for (;;) { c = *header; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC if (!(((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) || (c == '-') || ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')))) break; #else if (!(isupper((unsigned char)c) || (c == '-') || isdigit((unsigned char)c))) break; #endif header++; } *header = '\0'; cipher->cipher = enc = EVP_get_cipherbyname(p); *header = c; header++; if (enc == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION); return (0); } if (!load_iv(header_pp, &(cipher->iv[0]), enc->iv_len)) return (0); return (1); } static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num) { int v, i; char *from; from = *fromp; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) to[i] = 0; num *= 2; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if ((*from >= '0') && (*from <= '9')) v = *from - '0'; else if ((*from >= 'A') && (*from <= 'F')) v = *from - 'A' + 10; else if ((*from >= 'a') && (*from <= 'f')) v = *from - 'a' + 10; else { PEMerr(PEM_F_LOAD_IV, PEM_R_BAD_IV_CHARS); return (0); } from++; to[i / 2] |= v << (long)((!(i & 1)) * 4); } *fromp = from; return (1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int PEM_write(FILE *fp, const char *name, const char *header, const unsigned char *data, long len) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_write_bio(b, name, header, data, len); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int PEM_write_bio(BIO *bp, const char *name, const char *header, const unsigned char *data, long len) { int nlen, n, i, j, outl; unsigned char *buf = NULL; EVP_ENCODE_CTX ctx; int reason = ERR_R_BUF_LIB; EVP_EncodeInit(&ctx); nlen = strlen(name); if ((BIO_write(bp, "-----BEGIN ", 11) != 11) || (BIO_write(bp, name, nlen) != nlen) || (BIO_write(bp, "-----\n", 6) != 6)) goto err; i = strlen(header); if (i > 0) { if ((BIO_write(bp, header, i) != i) || (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)) goto err; } buf = OPENSSL_malloc(PEM_BUFSIZE * 8); if (buf == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } i = j = 0; while (len > 0) { n = (int)((len > (PEM_BUFSIZE * 5)) ? (PEM_BUFSIZE * 5) : len); EVP_EncodeUpdate(&ctx, buf, &outl, &(data[j]), n); if ((outl) && (BIO_write(bp, (char *)buf, outl) != outl)) goto err; i += outl; len -= n; j += n; } EVP_EncodeFinal(&ctx, buf, &outl); if ((outl > 0) && (BIO_write(bp, (char *)buf, outl) != outl)) goto err; OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE * 8); OPENSSL_free(buf); buf = NULL; if ((BIO_write(bp, "-----END ", 9) != 9) || (BIO_write(bp, name, nlen) != nlen) || (BIO_write(bp, "-----\n", 6) != 6)) goto err; return (i + outl); err: if (buf) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE * 8); OPENSSL_free(buf); } PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO, reason); return (0); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int PEM_read(FILE *fp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_read_bio(b, name, header, data, len); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int PEM_read_bio(BIO *bp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len) { EVP_ENCODE_CTX ctx; int end = 0, i, k, bl = 0, hl = 0, nohead = 0; char buf[256]; BUF_MEM *nameB; BUF_MEM *headerB; BUF_MEM *dataB, *tmpB; nameB = BUF_MEM_new(); headerB = BUF_MEM_new(); dataB = BUF_MEM_new(); if ((nameB == NULL) || (headerB == NULL) || (dataB == NULL)) { BUF_MEM_free(nameB); BUF_MEM_free(headerB); BUF_MEM_free(dataB); PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } buf[254] = '\0'; for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254); if (i <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_NO_START_LINE); goto err; } while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' ')) i--; buf[++i] = '\n'; buf[++i] = '\0'; if (strncmp(buf, "-----BEGIN ", 11) == 0) { i = strlen(&(buf[11])); if (strncmp(&(buf[11 + i - 6]), "-----\n", 6) != 0) continue; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(nameB, i + 9)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(nameB->data, &(buf[11]), i - 6); nameB->data[i - 6] = '\0'; break; } } hl = 0; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(headerB, 256)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } headerB->data[0] = '\0'; for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254); if (i <= 0) break; while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' ')) i--; buf[++i] = '\n'; buf[++i] = '\0'; if (buf[0] == '\n') break; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(headerB, hl + i + 9)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (strncmp(buf, "-----END ", 9) == 0) { nohead = 1; break; } memcpy(&(headerB->data[hl]), buf, i); headerB->data[hl + i] = '\0'; hl += i; } bl = 0; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(dataB, 1024)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } dataB->data[0] = '\0'; if (!nohead) { for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254); if (i <= 0) break; while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' ')) i--; buf[++i] = '\n'; buf[++i] = '\0'; if (i != 65) end = 1; if (strncmp(buf, "-----END ", 9) == 0) break; if (i > 65) break; if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(dataB, i + bl + 9)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(&(dataB->data[bl]), buf, i); dataB->data[bl + i] = '\0'; bl += i; if (end) { buf[0] = '\0'; i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254); if (i <= 0) break; while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' ')) i--; buf[++i] = '\n'; buf[++i] = '\0'; break; } } } else { tmpB = headerB; headerB = dataB; dataB = tmpB; bl = hl; } i = strlen(nameB->data); if ((strncmp(buf, "-----END ", 9) != 0) || (strncmp(nameB->data, &(buf[9]), i) != 0) || (strncmp(&(buf[9 + i]), "-----\n", 6) != 0)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE); goto err; } EVP_DecodeInit(&ctx); i = EVP_DecodeUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)dataB->data, &bl, (unsigned char *)dataB->data, bl); if (i < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE); goto err; } i = EVP_DecodeFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)&(dataB->data[bl]), &k); if (i < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE); goto err; } bl += k; if (bl == 0) goto err; *name = nameB->data; *header = headerB->data; *data = (unsigned char *)dataB->data; *len = bl; OPENSSL_free(nameB); OPENSSL_free(headerB); OPENSSL_free(dataB); return (1); err: BUF_MEM_free(nameB); BUF_MEM_free(headerB); BUF_MEM_free(dataB); return (0); } /* * Check pem string and return prefix length. If for example the pem_str == * "RSA PRIVATE KEY" and suffix = "PRIVATE KEY" the return value is 3 for the * string "RSA". */ int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix) { int pem_len = strlen(pem_str); int suffix_len = strlen(suffix); const char *p; if (suffix_len + 1 >= pem_len) return 0; p = pem_str + pem_len - suffix_len; if (strcmp(p, suffix)) return 0; p--; if (*p != ' ') return 0; return p - pem_str; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,260 +1,260 @@ /* crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static int do_pk8pkey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); static int do_pk8pkey_fp(FILE *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); /* * These functions write a private key in PKCS#8 format: it is a "drop in" * replacement for PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() and friends. As usual if 'enc' * is NULL then it uses the unencrypted private key form. The 'nid' versions * uses PKCS#5 v1.5 PBE algorithms whereas the others use PKCS#5 v2.0. */ int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 0, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 0, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 1, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 1, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u); } static int do_pk8pkey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { X509_SIG *p8; PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; int ret; if (!(p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(x))) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY, PEM_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_PRIVATE_KEY); return 0; } if (enc || (nid != -1)) { if (!kstr) { if (!cb) klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); else klen = cb(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); if (klen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY, PEM_R_READ_KEY); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); return 0; } kstr = buf; } p8 = PKCS8_encrypt(nid, enc, kstr, klen, NULL, 0, 0, p8inf); if (kstr == buf) OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, klen); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); if (p8 == NULL) return 0; if (isder) ret = i2d_PKCS8_bio(bp, p8); else ret = PEM_write_bio_PKCS8(bp, p8); X509_SIG_free(p8); return ret; } else { if (isder) ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bp, p8inf); else ret = PEM_write_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(bp, p8inf); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); return ret; } } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = NULL; X509_SIG *p8 = NULL; int klen; EVP_PKEY *ret; char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; p8 = d2i_PKCS8_bio(bp, NULL); if (!p8) return NULL; if (cb) klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); else klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); - if (klen <= 0) { + if (klen < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); X509_SIG_free(p8); return NULL; } p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen); X509_SIG_free(p8); OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen); if (!p8inf) return NULL; ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); if (!ret) return NULL; if (x) { if (*x) EVP_PKEY_free(*x); *x = ret; } return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 1, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 1, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 0, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 0, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } static int do_pk8pkey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *bp; int ret; if (!(bp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE))) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } ret = do_pk8pkey(bp, x, isder, nid, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); BIO_free(bp); return ret; } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *bp; EVP_PKEY *ret; if (!(bp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE))) { PEMerr(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return NULL; } ret = d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(bp, x, cb, u); BIO_free(bp); return ret; } #endif IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PKCS8, X509_SIG, PEM_STRING_PKCS8, X509_SIG) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,294 +1,294 @@ /* crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #include "asn1_locl.h" int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix); EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { char *nm = NULL; const unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len; int slen; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, &nm, PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY, bp, cb, u)) return NULL; p = data; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF) == 0) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; p8inf = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, len); if (!p8inf) goto p8err; ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); if (x) { if (*x) EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *)*x); *x = ret; } PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); } else if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) == 0) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; X509_SIG *p8; int klen; char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; p8 = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &p, len); if (!p8) goto p8err; if (cb) klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); else klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); - if (klen <= 0) { + if (klen < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); X509_SIG_free(p8); goto err; } p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen); X509_SIG_free(p8); OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen); if (!p8inf) goto p8err; ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); if (x) { if (*x) EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *)*x); *x = ret; } PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); } else if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PRIVATE KEY")) > 0) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, nm, slen); if (!ameth || !ameth->old_priv_decode) goto p8err; ret = d2i_PrivateKey(ameth->pkey_id, x, &p, len); } p8err: if (ret == NULL) PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); err: OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_cleanse(data, len); OPENSSL_free(data); return (ret); } int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { char pem_str[80]; if (!x->ameth || x->ameth->priv_encode) return PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, x, enc, (char *)kstr, klen, cb, u); BIO_snprintf(pem_str, 80, "%s PRIVATE KEY", x->ameth->pem_str); return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_PrivateKey, pem_str, bp, x, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x) { char *nm = NULL; const unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len; int slen; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, &nm, PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS, bp, 0, NULL)) return NULL; p = data; if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PARAMETERS")) > 0) { ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (!ret) goto err; if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(ret, nm, slen) || !ret->ameth->param_decode || !ret->ameth->param_decode(ret, &p, len)) { EVP_PKEY_free(ret); ret = NULL; goto err; } if (x) { if (*x) EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *)*x); *x = ret; } } err: if (ret == NULL) PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_free(data); return (ret); } int PEM_write_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x) { char pem_str[80]; if (!x->ameth || !x->ameth->param_encode) return 0; BIO_snprintf(pem_str, 80, "%s PARAMETERS", x->ameth->pem_str); return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)x->ameth->param_encode, pem_str, bp, x, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; EVP_PKEY *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, x, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } int PEM_write_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(b, x, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* Transparently read in PKCS#3 or X9.42 DH parameters */ DH *PEM_read_bio_DHparams(BIO *bp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { char *nm = NULL; const unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len; DH *ret = NULL; if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, &nm, PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS, bp, cb, u)) return NULL; p = data; if (!strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS)) ret = d2i_DHxparams(x, &p, len); else ret = d2i_DHparams(x, &p, len); if (ret == NULL) PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_DHPARAMS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_free(data); return ret; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API DH *PEM_read_DHparams(FILE *fp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; DH *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_DHPARAMS, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(b, x, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } # endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,895 +1,895 @@ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* * Support for PVK format keys and related structures (such a PUBLICKEYBLOB * and PRIVATEKEYBLOB). */ #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) # include # include /* * Utility function: read a DWORD (4 byte unsigned integer) in little endian * format */ static unsigned int read_ledword(const unsigned char **in) { const unsigned char *p = *in; unsigned int ret; ret = *p++; ret |= (*p++ << 8); ret |= (*p++ << 16); ret |= (*p++ << 24); *in = p; return ret; } /* * Read a BIGNUM in little endian format. The docs say that this should take * up bitlen/8 bytes. */ static int read_lebn(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int nbyte, BIGNUM **r) { const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *tmpbuf, *q; unsigned int i; p = *in + nbyte - 1; tmpbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(nbyte); if (!tmpbuf) return 0; q = tmpbuf; for (i = 0; i < nbyte; i++) *q++ = *p--; *r = BN_bin2bn(tmpbuf, nbyte, NULL); OPENSSL_free(tmpbuf); if (*r) { *in += nbyte; return 1; } else return 0; } /* Convert private key blob to EVP_PKEY: RSA and DSA keys supported */ # define MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB 0x6 # define MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB 0x7 # define MS_RSA1MAGIC 0x31415352L # define MS_RSA2MAGIC 0x32415352L # define MS_DSS1MAGIC 0x31535344L # define MS_DSS2MAGIC 0x32535344L # define MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX 0xa400 # define MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN 0x2200 # define MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX 0x1 # define MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN 0x2 /* Maximum length of a blob after header */ # define BLOB_MAX_LENGTH 102400 /* The PVK file magic number: seems to spell out "bobsfile", who is Bob? */ # define MS_PVKMAGIC 0xb0b5f11eL /* Salt length for PVK files */ # define PVK_SALTLEN 0x10 /* Maximum length in PVK header */ # define PVK_MAX_KEYLEN 102400 /* Maximum salt length */ # define PVK_MAX_SALTLEN 10240 static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, unsigned int bitlen, int ispub); static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, unsigned int bitlen, int ispub); static int do_blob_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, unsigned int *pmagic, unsigned int *pbitlen, int *pisdss, int *pispub) { const unsigned char *p = *in; if (length < 16) return 0; /* bType */ if (*p == MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB) { if (*pispub == 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB); return 0; } *pispub = 1; } else if (*p == MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB) { if (*pispub == 1) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB); return 0; } *pispub = 0; } else return 0; p++; /* Version */ if (*p++ != 0x2) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER); return 0; } /* Ignore reserved, aiKeyAlg */ p += 6; *pmagic = read_ledword(&p); *pbitlen = read_ledword(&p); *pisdss = 0; switch (*pmagic) { case MS_DSS1MAGIC: *pisdss = 1; case MS_RSA1MAGIC: if (*pispub == 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB); return 0; } break; case MS_DSS2MAGIC: *pisdss = 1; case MS_RSA2MAGIC: if (*pispub == 1) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB); return 0; } break; default: PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER); return -1; } *in = p; return 1; } static unsigned int blob_length(unsigned bitlen, int isdss, int ispub) { unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte; nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3; hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4; if (isdss) { /* * Expected length: 20 for q + 3 components bitlen each + 24 for seed * structure. */ if (ispub) return 44 + 3 * nbyte; /* * Expected length: 20 for q, priv, 2 bitlen components + 24 for seed * structure. */ else return 64 + 2 * nbyte; } else { /* Expected length: 4 for 'e' + 'n' */ if (ispub) return 4 + nbyte; else /* * Expected length: 4 for 'e' and 7 other components. 2 * components are bitlen size, 5 are bitlen/2 */ return 4 + 2 * nbyte + 5 * hnbyte; } } static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, int ispub) { const unsigned char *p = *in; unsigned int bitlen, magic; int isdss; if (do_blob_header(&p, length, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR); return NULL; } length -= 16; if (length < blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT); return NULL; } if (isdss) return b2i_dss(&p, length, bitlen, ispub); else return b2i_rsa(&p, length, bitlen, ispub); } static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i_bio(BIO *in, int ispub) { const unsigned char *p; unsigned char hdr_buf[16], *buf = NULL; unsigned int bitlen, magic, length; int isdss; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; if (BIO_read(in, hdr_buf, 16) != 16) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT); return NULL; } p = hdr_buf; if (do_blob_header(&p, 16, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0) return NULL; length = blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub); if (length > BLOB_MAX_LENGTH) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG); return NULL; } buf = OPENSSL_malloc(length); if (!buf) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = buf; if (BIO_read(in, buf, length) != (int)length) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } if (isdss) ret = b2i_dss(&p, length, bitlen, ispub); else ret = b2i_rsa(&p, length, bitlen, ispub); err: if (buf) OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, unsigned int bitlen, int ispub) { const unsigned char *p = *in; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; DSA *dsa = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned int nbyte; nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3; dsa = DSA_new(); ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (!dsa || !ret) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &dsa->p)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &dsa->q)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &dsa->g)) goto memerr; if (ispub) { if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &dsa->pub_key)) goto memerr; } else { if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &dsa->priv_key)) goto memerr; /* Calculate public key */ if (!(dsa->pub_key = BN_new())) goto memerr; if (!(ctx = BN_CTX_new())) goto memerr; if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) goto memerr; BN_CTX_free(ctx); } EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(ret, dsa); DSA_free(dsa); *in = p; return ret; memerr: PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_DSS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if (dsa) DSA_free(dsa); if (ret) EVP_PKEY_free(ret); if (ctx) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return NULL; } static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, unsigned int bitlen, int ispub) { const unsigned char *p = *in; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; RSA *rsa = NULL; unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte; nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3; hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4; rsa = RSA_new(); ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (!rsa || !ret) goto memerr; rsa->e = BN_new(); if (!rsa->e) goto memerr; if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e, read_ledword(&p))) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &rsa->n)) goto memerr; if (!ispub) { if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->p)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->q)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->dmp1)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->dmq1)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->iqmp)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &rsa->d)) goto memerr; } EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(ret, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); *in = p; return ret; memerr: PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if (rsa) RSA_free(rsa); if (ret) EVP_PKEY_free(ret); return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey(const unsigned char **in, long length) { return do_b2i(in, length, 0); } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey(const unsigned char **in, long length) { return do_b2i(in, length, 1); } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *in) { return do_b2i_bio(in, 0); } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey_bio(BIO *in) { return do_b2i_bio(in, 1); } static void write_ledword(unsigned char **out, unsigned int dw) { unsigned char *p = *out; *p++ = dw & 0xff; *p++ = (dw >> 8) & 0xff; *p++ = (dw >> 16) & 0xff; *p++ = (dw >> 24) & 0xff; *out = p; } static void write_lebn(unsigned char **out, const BIGNUM *bn, int len) { int nb, i; unsigned char *p = *out, *q, c; nb = BN_num_bytes(bn); BN_bn2bin(bn, p); q = p + nb - 1; /* In place byte order reversal */ for (i = 0; i < nb / 2; i++) { c = *p; *p++ = *q; *q-- = c; } *out += nb; /* Pad with zeroes if we have to */ if (len > 0) { len -= nb; if (len > 0) { memset(*out, 0, len); *out += len; } } } static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic); static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic); static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub); static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub); static int do_i2b(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub) { unsigned char *p; unsigned int bitlen, magic = 0, keyalg; int outlen, noinc = 0; if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { bitlen = check_bitlen_dsa(pk->pkey.dsa, ispub, &magic); keyalg = MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN; } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { bitlen = check_bitlen_rsa(pk->pkey.rsa, ispub, &magic); keyalg = MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX; } else return -1; if (bitlen == 0) return -1; outlen = 16 + blob_length(bitlen, keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN ? 1 : 0, ispub); if (out == NULL) return outlen; if (*out) p = *out; else { p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); if (!p) return -1; *out = p; noinc = 1; } if (ispub) *p++ = MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB; else *p++ = MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB; *p++ = 0x2; *p++ = 0; *p++ = 0; write_ledword(&p, keyalg); write_ledword(&p, magic); write_ledword(&p, bitlen); if (keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN) write_dsa(&p, pk->pkey.dsa, ispub); else write_rsa(&p, pk->pkey.rsa, ispub); if (!noinc) *out += outlen; return outlen; } static int do_i2b_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub) { unsigned char *tmp = NULL; int outlen, wrlen; outlen = do_i2b(&tmp, pk, ispub); if (outlen < 0) return -1; wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen); OPENSSL_free(tmp); if (wrlen == outlen) return outlen; return -1; } static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic) { int bitlen; bitlen = BN_num_bits(dsa->p); if ((bitlen & 7) || (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160) || (BN_num_bits(dsa->g) > bitlen)) goto badkey; if (ispub) { if (BN_num_bits(dsa->pub_key) > bitlen) goto badkey; *pmagic = MS_DSS1MAGIC; } else { if (BN_num_bits(dsa->priv_key) > 160) goto badkey; *pmagic = MS_DSS2MAGIC; } return bitlen; badkey: PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS); return 0; } static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic) { int nbyte, hnbyte, bitlen; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > 32) goto badkey; bitlen = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); nbyte = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); hnbyte = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) + 15) >> 4; if (ispub) { *pmagic = MS_RSA1MAGIC; return bitlen; } else { *pmagic = MS_RSA2MAGIC; /* * For private key each component must fit within nbyte or hnbyte. */ if (BN_num_bytes(rsa->d) > nbyte) goto badkey; if ((BN_num_bytes(rsa->iqmp) > hnbyte) || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->p) > hnbyte) || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->q) > hnbyte) || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->dmp1) > hnbyte) || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->dmq1) > hnbyte)) goto badkey; } return bitlen; badkey: PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS); return 0; } static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub) { int nbyte, hnbyte; nbyte = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); hnbyte = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) + 15) >> 4; write_lebn(out, rsa->e, 4); write_lebn(out, rsa->n, -1); if (ispub) return; write_lebn(out, rsa->p, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, rsa->q, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, rsa->dmp1, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, rsa->dmq1, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, rsa->iqmp, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, rsa->d, nbyte); } static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub) { int nbyte; nbyte = BN_num_bytes(dsa->p); write_lebn(out, dsa->p, nbyte); write_lebn(out, dsa->q, 20); write_lebn(out, dsa->g, nbyte); if (ispub) write_lebn(out, dsa->pub_key, nbyte); else write_lebn(out, dsa->priv_key, 20); /* Set "invalid" for seed structure values */ memset(*out, 0xff, 24); *out += 24; return; } int i2b_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk) { return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 0); } int i2b_PublicKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk) { return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 1); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, int skip_magic, unsigned int *psaltlen, unsigned int *pkeylen) { const unsigned char *p = *in; unsigned int pvk_magic, is_encrypted; if (skip_magic) { if (length < 20) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } } else { if (length < 24) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p); if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER); return 0; } } /* Skip reserved */ p += 4; /* * keytype = */ read_ledword(&p); is_encrypted = read_ledword(&p); *psaltlen = read_ledword(&p); *pkeylen = read_ledword(&p); if (*pkeylen > PVK_MAX_KEYLEN || *psaltlen > PVK_MAX_SALTLEN) return 0; if (is_encrypted && !*psaltlen) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER); return 0; } *in = p; return 1; } static int derive_pvk_key(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *salt, unsigned int saltlen, const unsigned char *pass, int passlen) { EVP_MD_CTX mctx; int rv = 1; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, salt, saltlen) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, pass, passlen) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mctx, key, NULL)) rv = 0; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); return rv; } static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int saltlen, unsigned int keylen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; const unsigned char *p = *in; unsigned int magic; unsigned char *enctmp = NULL, *q; EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cctx); if (saltlen) { char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; unsigned char keybuf[20]; int enctmplen, inlen; if (cb) inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); else inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); - if (inlen <= 0) { + if (inlen < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); goto err; } enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8); if (!enctmp) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen, (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen)) goto err; p += saltlen; /* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */ memcpy(enctmp, p, 8); p += 8; if (keylen < 8) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } inlen = keylen - 8; q = enctmp + 8; if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen)) goto err; if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen)) goto err; magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q); if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) { q = enctmp + 8; memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11); if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL)) goto err; OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20); if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen)) goto err; if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen)) goto err; magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q); if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT); goto err; } } else OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20); p = enctmp; } ret = b2i_PrivateKey(&p, keylen); err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cctx); if (enctmp && saltlen) OPENSSL_free(enctmp); return ret; } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PVK_bio(BIO *in, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { unsigned char pvk_hdr[24], *buf = NULL; const unsigned char *p; int buflen; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; unsigned int saltlen, keylen; if (BIO_read(in, pvk_hdr, 24) != 24) { PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT); return NULL; } p = pvk_hdr; if (!do_PVK_header(&p, 24, 0, &saltlen, &keylen)) return 0; buflen = (int)keylen + saltlen; buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen); if (!buf) { PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } p = buf; if (BIO_read(in, buf, buflen) != buflen) { PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } ret = do_PVK_body(&p, saltlen, keylen, cb, u); err: if (buf) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, buflen); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return ret; } static int i2b_PVK(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { int outlen = 24, pklen; unsigned char *p, *salt = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cctx); if (enclevel) outlen += PVK_SALTLEN; pklen = do_i2b(NULL, pk, 0); if (pklen < 0) return -1; outlen += pklen; if (!out) return outlen; if (*out) p = *out; else { p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); if (!p) { PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } *out = p; } write_ledword(&p, MS_PVKMAGIC); write_ledword(&p, 0); if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN); else write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX); write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? 1 : 0); write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? PVK_SALTLEN : 0); write_ledword(&p, pklen); if (enclevel) { if (RAND_bytes(p, PVK_SALTLEN) <= 0) goto error; salt = p; p += PVK_SALTLEN; } do_i2b(&p, pk, 0); if (enclevel == 0) return outlen; else { char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; unsigned char keybuf[20]; int enctmplen, inlen; if (cb) inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); else inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); if (inlen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); goto error; } if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, salt, PVK_SALTLEN, (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen)) goto error; if (enclevel == 1) memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11); p = salt + PVK_SALTLEN + 8; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL)) goto error; OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20); if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cctx, p, &enctmplen, p, pklen - 8)) goto error; if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cctx, p + enctmplen, &enctmplen)) goto error; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cctx); return outlen; error: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cctx); return -1; } int i2b_PVK_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { unsigned char *tmp = NULL; int outlen, wrlen; outlen = i2b_PVK(&tmp, pk, enclevel, cb, u); if (outlen < 0) return -1; wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen); OPENSSL_free(tmp); if (wrlen == outlen) { PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE); return outlen; } return -1; } # endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,125 +1,125 @@ /* p12_asn.c */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 1999. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include /* PKCS#12 ASN1 module */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12, authsafes, PKCS7), ASN1_OPT(PKCS12, mac, PKCS12_MAC_DATA) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12) ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12_MAC_DATA) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_MAC_DATA, dinfo, X509_SIG), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_MAC_DATA, salt, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_OPT(PKCS12_MAC_DATA, iter, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12_MAC_DATA) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_MAC_DATA) ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(bag_default) = ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.other, ASN1_ANY, 0); ASN1_ADB(PKCS12_BAGS) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_x509Certificate, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.x509cert, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_x509Crl, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.x509crl, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_sdsiCertificate, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.sdsicert, ASN1_IA5STRING, 0)), } ASN1_ADB_END(PKCS12_BAGS, 0, type, 0, &bag_default_tt, NULL); ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12_BAGS) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_BAGS, type, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(PKCS12_BAGS), } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12_BAGS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_BAGS) ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(safebag_default) = ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.other, ASN1_ANY, 0); ASN1_ADB(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_keyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.keybag, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.shkeybag, X509_SIG, 0)), - ADB_ENTRY(NID_safeContentsBag, ASN1_EXP_SET_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.safes, PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0)), + ADB_ENTRY(NID_safeContentsBag, ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.safes, PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_certBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_crlBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_secretBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)) } ASN1_ADB_END(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0, type, 0, &safebag_default_tt, NULL); ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, type, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(PKCS12_SAFEBAG), ASN1_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, attrib, X509_ATTRIBUTE) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) /* SEQUENCE OF SafeBag */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, PKCS12_SAFEBAGS, PKCS12_SAFEBAG) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS) /* Authsafes: SEQUENCE OF PKCS7 */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, PKCS12_AUTHSAFES, PKCS7) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/Makefile (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/Makefile (revision 337764) @@ -1,312 +1,312 @@ # # OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/Makefile # DIR= rsa TOP= ../.. CC= cc INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include CFLAG=-g MAKEFILE= Makefile AR= ar r CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile TEST=rsa_test.c APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a LIBSRC= rsa_eay.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \ rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c rsa_null.c \ rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_depr.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \ rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c LIBOBJ= rsa_eay.o rsa_gen.o rsa_lib.o rsa_sign.o rsa_saos.o rsa_err.o \ rsa_pk1.o rsa_ssl.o rsa_none.o rsa_oaep.o rsa_chk.o rsa_null.o \ rsa_pss.o rsa_x931.o rsa_asn1.o rsa_depr.o rsa_ameth.o rsa_prn.o \ rsa_pmeth.o rsa_crpt.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= rsa.h HEADER= $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all) all: lib lib: $(LIBOBJ) $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. @touch lib files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; tags: ctags $(SRC) tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff update: depend depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) clean: rm -f *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. rsa_ameth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/cms.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_ameth.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h rsa_ameth.o: ../asn1/asn1_locl.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_ameth.c rsa_asn1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h rsa_asn1.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_asn1.c rsa_chk.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h rsa_chk.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_chk.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_chk.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_chk.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_chk.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rsa_chk.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_chk.o: rsa_chk.c rsa_crpt.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h rsa_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_crpt.c rsa_depr.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rsa_depr.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_depr.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_depr.c rsa_eay.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c +rsa_eay.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_eay.c rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rsa_err.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_err.c rsa_gen.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rsa_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_gen.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h rsa_lib.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_lib.c rsa_none.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_none.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_none.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_none.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_none.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_none.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_none.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_none.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rsa_none.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_none.c rsa_null.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_null.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_null.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_null.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_null.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_null.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_null.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_null.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rsa_null.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_null.c rsa_oaep.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h rsa_oaep.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_oaep.o: ../constant_time_locl.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_oaep.c rsa_pk1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rsa_pk1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h rsa_pk1.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_pk1.c rsa_pmeth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/cms.h ../../include/openssl/conf.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h rsa_pmeth.o: ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h ../cryptlib.h ../evp/evp_locl.h rsa_pmeth.o: rsa_locl.h rsa_pmeth.c rsa_prn.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h rsa_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h rsa_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h rsa_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rsa_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rsa_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_prn.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_prn.c rsa_pss.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rsa_pss.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_pss.c rsa_saos.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_saos.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h rsa_saos.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_saos.c rsa_sign.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h rsa_sign.o: ../cryptlib.h rsa_locl.h rsa_sign.c rsa_ssl.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rsa_ssl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_ssl.c rsa_x931.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h rsa_x931.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h rsa_x931.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,904 +1,891 @@ /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include +#include "bn_int.h" #ifndef RSA_NULL static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = { "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", RSA_eay_public_encrypt, RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ RSA_eay_private_decrypt, RSA_eay_mod_exp, BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery * if e == 3 */ RSA_eay_init, RSA_eay_finish, 0, /* flags */ NULL, 0, /* rsa_sign */ 0, /* rsa_verify */ NULL /* rsa_keygen */ }; const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) { return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); } static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; - int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; + int i, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); break; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); break; # endif case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (i <= 0) goto err; if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; /* - * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the - * modulus + * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than + * the length of the modulus. */ - j = BN_num_bytes(ret); - i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j])); - for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) - to[k] = 0; - - r = num; + r = bn_bn2binpad(ret, to, num); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); } static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_BLINDING *ret; int got_write_lock = 0; CRYPTO_THREADID cur; CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); got_write_lock = 1; if (rsa->blinding == NULL) rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); } ret = rsa->blinding; if (ret == NULL) goto err; CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) { /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ *local = 1; } else { /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ /* * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING */ *local = 0; if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { if (!got_write_lock) { CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); got_write_lock = 1; } if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); } ret = rsa->mt_blinding; } err: if (got_write_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); else CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); return ret; } static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (unblind == NULL) /* * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING. */ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); else { /* * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING. */ int ret; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); return ret; } } static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe * to access the blinding without a lock. */ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); } /* signing */ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; - int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; + int i, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int local_blinding = 0; /* * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (i <= 0) goto err; if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (blinding != NULL) { if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; } if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; } else { BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { BN_init(&local_d); d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } if (blinding) if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) res = f; else res = ret; } else res = ret; /* - * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the - * modulus + * BN_bn2binpad puts in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than + * the length of the modulus. */ - j = BN_num_bytes(res); - i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); - for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) - to[k] = 0; - - r = num; + r = bn_bn2binpad(res, to, num); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); } static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int j, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *p; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int local_blinding = 0; /* * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the * top '0' bytes */ if (flen > num) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); goto err; } /* make data into a big number */ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (blinding != NULL) { if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; } /* do the decrypt */ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; } else { BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } if (blinding) if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; - p = buf; - j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ + j = bn_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num); switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); break; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); break; # endif case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); + memcpy(to, buf, (r = j)); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (r < 0) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); } /* signature verification */ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int i, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *p; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the * top '0' bytes */ if (flen > num) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); goto err; } if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)) if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err; - p = buf; - i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); + i = bn_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num); switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); + memcpy(to, buf, (r = i)); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (r < 0) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); } static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; int ret = 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); { BIGNUM local_p, local_q; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; /* * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { BN_init(&local_p); p = &local_p; BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_init(&local_q); q = &local_q; BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else { p = rsa->p; q = rsa->q; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) goto err; } } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; /* compute I mod q */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; } /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmq1 = &local_dmq1; BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; /* compute I mod p */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmp1 = &local_dmp1; BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) goto err; /* * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) goto err; /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { pr1 = &local_r1; BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else pr1 = r1; if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) goto err; /* * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can * break the private key operations: the following second correction * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) goto err; if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; /* * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for * absolute equality, just congruency. */ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { /* * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and * return that instead. */ BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) { rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; return (1); } static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) { if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); return (1); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,270 +1,272 @@ /* crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. - * Geoff */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include extern int FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb); #endif static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb); /* * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD. */ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD); return 0; } #endif if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen) return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode()) return FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); #endif return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); } static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp; BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p; BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p; int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned long error = 0; /* * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck * continually regenerating the same prime values. */ if (bits < 16) { ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (r3 == NULL) goto err; bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2; bitsq = bits - bitsp; /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */ if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL) goto err; + BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* generate p and q */ for (;;) { if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) goto err; ERR_set_mark(); if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ break; } error = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { /* GCD != 1 */ ERR_pop_to_mark(); } else { goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; for (;;) { do { if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) goto err; } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0); if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) goto err; ERR_set_mark(); if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ break; } error = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { /* GCD != 1 */ ERR_pop_to_mark(); } else { goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) { tmp = rsa->p; rsa->p = rsa->q; rsa->q = tmp; } /* calculate n */ if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* calculate d */ if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */ if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { pr0 = &local_r0; BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else pr0 = r0; if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) goto err; /* d */ /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)) goto err; /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) goto err; /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { p = &local_p; BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else p = rsa->p; if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (ok == -1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN); ok = 0; } if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } return ok; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,291 +1,300 @@ /* crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c */ /* * Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. */ /* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */ /* * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, for problems with the security * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, . The new proof has stronger requirements * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of * one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion. */ #include "constant_time_locl.h" #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1) # include # include "cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include # include int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, const unsigned char *param, int plen) { return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, param, plen, NULL, NULL); } int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, const unsigned char *param, int plen, const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) { int i, emlen = tlen - 1; unsigned char *db, *seed; unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdlen; if (md == NULL) md = EVP_sha1(); if (mgf1md == NULL) mgf1md = md; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return 0; } if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } to[0] = 0; seed = to + 1; db = to + mdlen + 1; if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL)) return 0; memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1); db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01; memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen); if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0) return 0; # ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT memcpy(seed, "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f", 20); # endif dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen); if (dbmask == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++) db[i] ^= dbmask[i]; if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) seed[i] ^= seedmask[i]; OPENSSL_free(dbmask); return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(dbmask); return 0; } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param, int plen) { return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num, param, plen, NULL, NULL); } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param, int plen, const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) { - int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index; + int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index; unsigned int good, found_one_byte; const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb; /* * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em = * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB */ unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdlen; if (md == NULL) md = EVP_sha1(); if (mgf1md == NULL) mgf1md = md; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) return -1; /* * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. * This does not leak any side-channel information. */ if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) goto decoding_err; dblen = num - mdlen - 1; db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen); - em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (db == NULL || em == NULL) { + if (db == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto cleanup; } - /* - * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid - * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel - * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access - * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. - * - * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. - */ - memset(em, 0, num); - memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); + if (flen != num) { + em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (em == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto cleanup; + } + /* + * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with + * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy + * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some + * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed + * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of + * |from|. + */ + memset(em, 0, num); + memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); + from = em; + } + /* * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). */ - good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); + good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); - maskedseed = em + 1; - maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen; + maskedseed = from + 1; + maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen; if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md)) goto cleanup; for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i]; if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md)) goto cleanup; for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) db[i] ^= maskeddb[i]; if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL)) goto cleanup; good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen)); found_one_byte = 0; for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) { /* * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. */ unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1); unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]); one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1, i, one_index); found_one_byte |= equals1; good &= (found_one_byte | equals0); } good &= found_one_byte; /* * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid, * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a * concern. */ if (!good) goto decoding_err; msg_index = one_index + 1; mlen = dblen - msg_index; if (tlen < mlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); mlen = -1; } else { memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen); goto cleanup; } decoding_err: /* * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not * reveal which kind of decoding error happened. */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); cleanup: if (db != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen); OPENSSL_free(db); } if (em != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num); OPENSSL_free(em); } return mlen; } int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst) { long i, outlen = 0; unsigned char cnt[4]; EVP_MD_CTX c; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdlen; int rv = -1; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c); mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); if (mdlen < 0) goto err; for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) { cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255); cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255); cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255; cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, dgst, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4)) goto err; if (outlen + mdlen <= len) { if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL)) goto err; outlen += mdlen; } else { if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL)) goto err; memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen); outlen = len; } } rv = 0; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c); return rv; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,275 +1,299 @@ /* crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include "constant_time_locl.h" #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { int j; unsigned char *p; if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return (0); } p = (unsigned char *)to; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */ /* pad out with 0xff data */ j = tlen - 3 - flen; memset(p, 0xff, j); p += j; *(p++) = '\0'; memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen); return (1); } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) { int i, j; const unsigned char *p; p = from; + + /* + * The format is + * 00 || 01 || PS || 00 || D + * PS - padding string, at least 8 bytes of FF + * D - data. + */ + + if (num < 11) + return -1; + + /* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */ + if (num == flen) { + if ((*p++) != 0x00) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, + RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING); + return -1; + } + flen--; + } + if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 01)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01); return (-1); } /* scan over padding data */ j = flen - 1; /* one for type. */ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (*p != 0xff) { /* should decrypt to 0xff */ if (*p == 0) { p++; break; } else { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT); return (-1); } } p++; } if (i == j) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING); return (-1); } if (i < 8) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT); return (-1); } i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */ j -= i; if (j > tlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); return (-1); } memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j); return (j); } int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { int i, j; unsigned char *p; if (flen > (tlen - 11)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return (0); } p = (unsigned char *)to; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */ /* pad out with non-zero random data */ j = tlen - 3 - flen; if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (*p == '\0') do { if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0) return (0); } while (*p == '\0'); p++; } *(p++) = '\0'; memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen); return (1); } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) { int i; /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */ unsigned char *em = NULL; unsigned int good, found_zero_byte; int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1; if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0) return -1; /* * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard", * section 7.2.2. */ if (flen > num) goto err; if (num < 11) goto err; - em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (em == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; + if (flen != num) { + em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (em == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + /* + * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with + * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy + * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some + * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed + * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of + * |from|. + */ + memset(em, 0, num); + memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); + from = em; } - memset(em, 0, num); - /* - * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid - * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel - * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access - * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. - * - * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. - */ - memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); - good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); - good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2); + good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); + good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2); found_zero_byte = 0; for (i = 2; i < num; i++) { - unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]); + unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]); zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index); found_zero_byte |= equals0; } /* - * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|. + * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|. * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check * also fails. */ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8); /* * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte * but in this case we also do not copy the message out. */ msg_index = zero_index + 1; mlen = num - msg_index; /* * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding. */ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen)); /* * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing * information at the API boundary. */ if (!good) { mlen = -1; goto err; } - memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen); + memcpy(to, from + msg_index, mlen); err: if (em != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num); OPENSSL_free(em); } if (mlen == -1) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR); return mlen; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,301 +1,301 @@ /* crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "rsa_locl.h" /* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ #define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa) { X509_SIG sig; ASN1_TYPE parameter; int i, j, ret = 1; unsigned char *p, *tmps = NULL; const unsigned char *s = NULL; X509_ALGOR algor; ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD); return 0; } #endif - if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) { + if ((rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) { return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa); } /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) { if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); return (0); } i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; s = m; } else { sig.algor = &algor; sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); return (0); } if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD); return (0); } parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; parameter.value.ptr = NULL; sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; sig.digest = &digest; sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; /* TMP UGLY CAST */ sig.digest->length = m_len; i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); } j = RSA_size(rsa); if (i > (j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY); return (0); } if (type != NID_md5_sha1) { tmps = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j + 1); if (tmps == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } p = tmps; i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); s = tmps; } i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (i <= 0) ret = 0; else *siglen = i; if (type != NID_md5_sha1) { OPENSSL_cleanse(tmps, (unsigned int)j + 1); OPENSSL_free(tmps); } return (ret); } /* * Check DigestInfo structure does not contain extraneous data by reencoding * using DER and checking encoding against original. */ static int rsa_check_digestinfo(X509_SIG *sig, const unsigned char *dinfo, int dinfolen) { unsigned char *der = NULL; int derlen; int ret = 0; derlen = i2d_X509_SIG(sig, &der); if (derlen <= 0) return 0; if (derlen == dinfolen && !memcmp(dinfo, der, derlen)) ret = 1; OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen); OPENSSL_free(der); return ret; } int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) { int i, ret = 0, sigtype; unsigned char *s; X509_SIG *sig = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD); return 0; } #endif if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); return (0); } if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && rm) { i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, rm, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (i <= 0) return 0; *prm_len = i; return 1; } s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen); if (s == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); goto err; } i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (i <= 0) goto err; /* * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct * tag and length octets. */ if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10) { if (rm) { memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16); *prm_len = 16; ret = 1; } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); } else { ret = 1; } } else if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) { /* Special case: SSL signature */ if ((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH)) RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); else ret = 1; } else { const unsigned char *p = s; sig = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &p, (long)i); if (sig == NULL) goto err; /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */ if (p != s + i || !rsa_check_digestinfo(sig, s, i)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } /* * Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to create * forgeries */ if (sig->algor->parameter && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } sigtype = OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm); #ifdef RSA_DEBUG /* put a backward compatibility flag in EAY */ fprintf(stderr, "in(%s) expect(%s)\n", OBJ_nid2ln(sigtype), OBJ_nid2ln(dtype)); #endif if (sigtype != dtype) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (rm) { const EVP_MD *md; md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dtype); if (md && (EVP_MD_size(md) != sig->digest->length)) RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); else { memcpy(rm, sig->digest->data, sig->digest->length); *prm_len = sig->digest->length; ret = 1; } } else if (((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) || (memcmp(m, sig->digest->data, m_len) != 0)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); } else ret = 1; } err: if (sig != NULL) X509_SIG_free(sig); if (s != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(s, (unsigned int)siglen); OPENSSL_free(s); } return (ret); } int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa) { - if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) { + if ((rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) { return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa); } return int_rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,149 +1,157 @@ /* crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { int i, j; unsigned char *p; if (flen > (tlen - 11)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return (0); } p = (unsigned char *)to; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */ /* pad out with non-zero random data */ j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen; if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (*p == '\0') do { if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0) return (0); } while (*p == '\0'); p++; } memset(p, 3, 8); p += 8; *(p++) = '\0'; memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen); return (1); } int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) { int i, j, k; const unsigned char *p; p = from; if (flen < 10) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL); return (-1); } + /* Accept even zero-padded input */ + if (flen == num) { + if (*(p++) != 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02); + return -1; + } + flen--; + } if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02); return (-1); } /* scan over padding data */ j = flen - 1; /* one for type */ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) if (*(p++) == 0) break; if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING); return (-1); } for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) { if (p[k] != 0x03) break; } if (k == -1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK); return (-1); } i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */ j -= i; if (j > tlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); return (-1); } memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j); return (j); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,1476 +1,1476 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # ==================================================================== # [Re]written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # "[Re]written" was achieved in two major overhauls. In 2004 BODY_* # functions were re-implemented to address P4 performance issue [see # commentary below], and in 2006 the rest was rewritten in order to # gain freedom to liberate licensing terms. # January, September 2004. # # It was noted that Intel IA-32 C compiler generates code which # performs ~30% *faster* on P4 CPU than original *hand-coded* # SHA1 assembler implementation. To address this problem (and # prove that humans are still better than machines:-), the # original code was overhauled, which resulted in following # performance changes: # # compared with original compared with Intel cc # assembler impl. generated code # Pentium -16% +48% # PIII/AMD +8% +16% # P4 +85%(!) +45% # # As you can see Pentium came out as looser:-( Yet I reckoned that # improvement on P4 outweights the loss and incorporate this # re-tuned code to 0.9.7 and later. # ---------------------------------------------------------------- # # August 2009. # # George Spelvin has tipped that F_40_59(b,c,d) can be rewritten as # '(c&d) + (b&(c^d))', which allows to accumulate partial results # and lighten "pressure" on scratch registers. This resulted in # >12% performance improvement on contemporary AMD cores (with no # degradation on other CPUs:-). Also, the code was revised to maximize # "distance" between instructions producing input to 'lea' instruction # and the 'lea' instruction itself, which is essential for Intel Atom # core and resulted in ~15% improvement. # October 2010. # # Add SSSE3, Supplemental[!] SSE3, implementation. The idea behind it # is to offload message schedule denoted by Wt in NIST specification, # or Xupdate in OpenSSL source, to SIMD unit. The idea is not novel, # and in SSE2 context was first explored by Dean Gaudet in 2004, see # http://arctic.org/~dean/crypto/sha1.html. Since then several things # have changed that made it interesting again: # # a) XMM units became faster and wider; # b) instruction set became more versatile; # c) an important observation was made by Max Locktykhin, which made # it possible to reduce amount of instructions required to perform # the operation in question, for further details see # http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/improving-the-performance-of-the-secure-hash-algorithm-1/. # April 2011. # # Add AVX code path, probably most controversial... The thing is that # switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in # comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like # 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as # pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that # make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded # as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with # equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1 # cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used # to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer # [according to its optimization manual]. Which is why AVX code path # is guarded by *both* AVX and synthetic bit denoting Intel CPUs. # One can argue that it's unfair to AMD, but without 'sh[rl]d' it # makes no sense to keep the AVX code path. If somebody feels that # strongly, it's probably more appropriate to discuss possibility of # using vector rotate XOP on AMD... # March 2014. # # Add support for Intel SHA Extensions. ###################################################################### # Current performance is summarized in following table. Numbers are # CPU clock cycles spent to process single byte (less is better). # # x86 SSSE3 AVX # Pentium 15.7 - # PIII 11.5 - # P4 10.6 - # AMD K8 7.1 - # Core2 7.3 6.0/+22% - # Westmere 7.3 5.5/+33% - # Sandy Bridge 8.8 6.2/+40% 5.1(**)/+73% # Ivy Bridge 7.2 4.8/+51% 4.7(**)/+53% # Haswell 6.5 4.3/+51% 4.1(**)/+58% # Bulldozer 11.6 6.0/+92% # VIA Nano 10.6 7.5/+41% # Atom 12.5 9.3(*)/+35% # Silvermont 14.5 9.9(*)/+46% # # (*) Loop is 1056 instructions long and expected result is ~8.25. # The discrepancy is because of front-end limitations, so # called MS-ROM penalties, and on Silvermont even rotate's # limited parallelism. # # (**) As per above comment, the result is for AVX *plus* sh[rl]d. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha1-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $xmm=$ymm=0; for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } $ymm=1 if ($xmm && `$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $1>=2.19); # first version supporting AVX $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $1>=2.03); # first version supporting AVX $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" && `ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ && $1>=10); # first version supporting AVX -$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && +$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0); # first version supporting AVX $shaext=$xmm; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($xmm); $A="eax"; $B="ebx"; $C="ecx"; $D="edx"; $E="edi"; $T="esi"; $tmp1="ebp"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T); $alt=0; # 1 denotes alternative IALU implementation, which performs # 8% *worse* on P4, same on Westmere and Atom, 2% better on # Sandy Bridge... sub BODY_00_15 { local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; &comment("00_15 $n"); &mov($f,$c); # f to hold F_00_19(b,c,d) if ($n==0) { &mov($tmp1,$a); } else { &mov($a,$tmp1); } &rotl($tmp1,5); # tmp1=ROTATE(a,5) &xor($f,$d); &add($tmp1,$e); # tmp1+=e; &mov($e,&swtmp($n%16)); # e becomes volatile and is loaded # with xi, also note that e becomes # f in next round... &and($f,$b); &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &xor($f,$d); # f holds F_00_19(b,c,d) &lea($tmp1,&DWP(0x5a827999,$tmp1,$e)); # tmp1+=K_00_19+xi if ($n==15) { &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16));# pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$tmp1); } # f+=tmp1 else { &add($tmp1,$f); } # f becomes a in next round &mov($tmp1,$a) if ($alt && $n==15); } sub BODY_16_19 { local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; &comment("16_19 $n"); if ($alt) { &xor($c,$d); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &and($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d), b&=c^d &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_00_19(b,c,d) &xor($c,$d); # restore $c &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round &rotr($b,$n==16?2:7); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) } else { &mov($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &xor($tmp1,$d); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &and($tmp1,$b); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d) &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_00_19(b,c,d) &mov($tmp1,$a); &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f &rotl($tmp1,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) } } sub BODY_20_39 { local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; local $K=($n<40)?0x6ed9eba1:0xca62c1d6; &comment("20_39 $n"); if ($alt) { &xor($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d), b^=c &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_20_39(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round &rotr($b,7); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f) if($n<77);# xi=f &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &xor($b,$c) if($n==39);# warm up for BODY_40_59 &and($tmp1,$b) if($n==39); &lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e)); # f+=e+K_XX_YY &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)) if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) &rotr($a,5) if ($n==79); } else { &mov($tmp1,$b); # tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &xor($tmp1,$c); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_20_39(b,c,d) &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov($tmp1,$a); &rotl($tmp1,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f) if($n<77);# xi=f &lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e)); # f+=e+K_XX_YY &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)) if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) } } sub BODY_40_59 { local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; &comment("40_59 $n"); if ($alt) { &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=b&(c^d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &mov($tmp1,$d); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &xor($c,$d); # restore $c &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &and($tmp1,$c); &rotr($b,7); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=c&d &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &xor($b,$c) if ($n<59); &and($tmp1,$b) if ($n<59);# tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d) &lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$e));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d)) &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) } else { &mov($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &xor($tmp1,$d); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &and($tmp1,$b); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &add($tmp1,$e); # b&(c^d)+=e &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov($e,$a); # e becomes volatile &rotl($e,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f &lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$tmp1));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d)) &mov($tmp1,$c); &add($f,$e); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) &and($tmp1,$d); &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=c&d } } &function_begin("sha1_block_data_order"); if ($xmm) { &static_label("shaext_shortcut") if ($shaext); &static_label("ssse3_shortcut"); &static_label("avx_shortcut") if ($ymm); &static_label("K_XX_XX"); &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tmp1); &picmeup($T,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tmp1,&label("pic_point")); &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1)); &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$T)); &mov ($D,&DWP(4,$T)); &test ($D,1<<9); # check SSSE3 bit &jz (&label("x86")); &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$T)); &test ($A,1<<24); # check FXSR bit &jz (&label("x86")); if ($shaext) { &test ($C,1<<29); # check SHA bit &jnz (&label("shaext_shortcut")); } if ($ymm) { &and ($D,1<<28); # mask AVX bit &and ($A,1<<30); # mask "Intel CPU" bit &or ($A,$D); &cmp ($A,1<<28|1<<30); &je (&label("avx_shortcut")); } &jmp (&label("ssse3_shortcut")); &set_label("x86",16); } &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); # SHA_CTX *c &mov($T,&wparam(1)); # const void *input &mov($A,&wparam(2)); # size_t num &stack_push(16+3); # allocate X[16] &shl($A,6); &add($A,$T); &mov(&wparam(2),$A); # pointer beyond the end of input &mov($E,&DWP(16,$tmp1));# pre-load E &jmp(&label("loop")); &set_label("loop",16); # copy input chunk to X, but reversing byte order! for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=4) { &mov($A,&DWP(4*($i+0),$T)); &mov($B,&DWP(4*($i+1),$T)); &mov($C,&DWP(4*($i+2),$T)); &mov($D,&DWP(4*($i+3),$T)); &bswap($A); &bswap($B); &bswap($C); &bswap($D); &mov(&swtmp($i+0),$A); &mov(&swtmp($i+1),$B); &mov(&swtmp($i+2),$C); &mov(&swtmp($i+3),$D); } &mov(&wparam(1),$T); # redundant in 1st spin &mov($A,&DWP(0,$tmp1)); # load SHA_CTX &mov($B,&DWP(4,$tmp1)); &mov($C,&DWP(8,$tmp1)); &mov($D,&DWP(12,$tmp1)); # E is pre-loaded for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_16_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } (($V[5] eq $D) and ($V[0] eq $E)) or die; # double-check &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); # re-load SHA_CTX* &mov($D,&wparam(1)); # D is last "T" and is discarded &add($E,&DWP(0,$tmp1)); # E is last "A"... &add($T,&DWP(4,$tmp1)); &add($A,&DWP(8,$tmp1)); &add($B,&DWP(12,$tmp1)); &add($C,&DWP(16,$tmp1)); &mov(&DWP(0,$tmp1),$E); # update SHA_CTX &add($D,64); # advance input pointer &mov(&DWP(4,$tmp1),$T); &cmp($D,&wparam(2)); # have we reached the end yet? &mov(&DWP(8,$tmp1),$A); &mov($E,$C); # C is last "E" which needs to be "pre-loaded" &mov(&DWP(12,$tmp1),$B); &mov($T,$D); # input pointer &mov(&DWP(16,$tmp1),$C); &jb(&label("loop")); &stack_pop(16+3); &function_end("sha1_block_data_order"); if ($xmm) { if ($shaext) { ###################################################################### # Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA1 update function. # my ($ctx,$inp,$num)=("edi","esi","ecx"); my ($ABCD,$E,$E_,$BSWAP)=map("xmm$_",(0..3)); my @MSG=map("xmm$_",(4..7)); sub sha1rnds4 { my ($dst,$src,$imm)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &data_byte(0x0f,0x3a,0xcc,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm); } } sub sha1op38 { my ($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &data_byte(0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2); } } sub sha1nexte { sha1op38(0xc8,@_); } sub sha1msg1 { sha1op38(0xc9,@_); } sub sha1msg2 { sha1op38(0xca,@_); } &function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_shaext"); &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tmp1); &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1)); &set_label("shaext_shortcut"); &mov ($ctx,&wparam(0)); &mov ("ebx","esp"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(1)); &mov ($num,&wparam(2)); &sub ("esp",32); &movdqu ($ABCD,&QWP(0,$ctx)); &movd ($E,&DWP(16,$ctx)); &and ("esp",-32); &movdqa ($BSWAP,&QWP(0x50,$tmp1)); # byte-n-word swap &movdqu (@MSG[0],&QWP(0,$inp)); &pshufd ($ABCD,$ABCD,0b00011011); # flip word order &movdqu (@MSG[1],&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &pshufd ($E,$E,0b00011011); # flip word order &movdqu (@MSG[2],&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[0],$BSWAP); &movdqu (@MSG[3],&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[1],$BSWAP); &pshufb (@MSG[2],$BSWAP); &pshufb (@MSG[3],$BSWAP); &jmp (&label("loop_shaext")); &set_label("loop_shaext",16); &dec ($num); &lea ("eax",&DWP(0x40,$inp)); &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),$E); # offload $E &paddd ($E,@MSG[0]); &cmovne ($inp,"eax"); &movdqa (&QWP(16,"esp"),$ABCD); # offload $ABCD for($i=0;$i<20-4;$i+=2) { &sha1msg1 (@MSG[0],@MSG[1]); &movdqa ($E_,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E,int($i/5)); # 0-3... &sha1nexte ($E_,@MSG[1]); &pxor (@MSG[0],@MSG[2]); &sha1msg1 (@MSG[1],@MSG[2]); &sha1msg2 (@MSG[0],@MSG[3]); &movdqa ($E,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E_,int(($i+1)/5)); &sha1nexte ($E,@MSG[2]); &pxor (@MSG[1],@MSG[3]); &sha1msg2 (@MSG[1],@MSG[0]); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); } &movdqu (@MSG[0],&QWP(0,$inp)); &movdqa ($E_,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E,3); # 64-67 &sha1nexte ($E_,@MSG[1]); &movdqu (@MSG[1],&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[0],$BSWAP); &movdqa ($E,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E_,3); # 68-71 &sha1nexte ($E,@MSG[2]); &movdqu (@MSG[2],&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[1],$BSWAP); &movdqa ($E_,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E,3); # 72-75 &sha1nexte ($E_,@MSG[3]); &movdqu (@MSG[3],&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[2],$BSWAP); &movdqa ($E,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E_,3); # 76-79 &movdqa ($E_,&QWP(0,"esp")); &pshufb (@MSG[3],$BSWAP); &sha1nexte ($E,$E_); &paddd ($ABCD,&QWP(16,"esp")); &jnz (&label("loop_shaext")); &pshufd ($ABCD,$ABCD,0b00011011); &pshufd ($E,$E,0b00011011); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$ctx),$ABCD) &movd (&DWP(16,$ctx),$E); &mov ("esp","ebx"); &function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_shaext"); } ###################################################################### # The SSSE3 implementation. # # %xmm[0-7] are used as ring @X[] buffer containing quadruples of last # 32 elements of the message schedule or Xupdate outputs. First 4 # quadruples are simply byte-swapped input, next 4 are calculated # according to method originally suggested by Dean Gaudet (modulo # being implemented in SSSE3). Once 8 quadruples or 32 elements are # collected, it switches to routine proposed by Max Locktyukhin. # # Calculations inevitably require temporary reqisters, and there are # no %xmm registers left to spare. For this reason part of the ring # buffer, X[2..4] to be specific, is offloaded to 3 quadriples ring # buffer on the stack. Keep in mind that X[2] is alias X[-6], X[3] - # X[-5], and X[4] - X[-4]... # # Another notable optimization is aggressive stack frame compression # aiming to minimize amount of 9-byte instructions... # # Yet another notable optimization is "jumping" $B variable. It means # that there is no register permanently allocated for $B value. This # allowed to eliminate one instruction from body_20_39... # my $Xi=4; # 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); # pre-seeded for $Xi=4 my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); my $j=0; # hash round my $rx=0; my @T=($T,$tmp1); my $inp; my $_rol=sub { &rol(@_) }; my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) }; &function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3"); &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tmp1); &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1)); &set_label("ssse3_shortcut"); &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1)); # K_00_19 &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1)); # K_20_39 &movdqa (@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1)); # K_40_59 &movdqa (@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1)); # K_60_79 &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1)); # pbswap mask &mov ($E,&wparam(0)); # load argument block &mov ($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1)); &mov ($D,&wparam(2)); &mov (@T[0],"esp"); # stack frame layout # # +0 X[0]+K X[1]+K X[2]+K X[3]+K # XMM->IALU xfer area # X[4]+K X[5]+K X[6]+K X[7]+K # X[8]+K X[9]+K X[10]+K X[11]+K # X[12]+K X[13]+K X[14]+K X[15]+K # # +64 X[0] X[1] X[2] X[3] # XMM->XMM backtrace area # X[4] X[5] X[6] X[7] # X[8] X[9] X[10] X[11] # even borrowed for K_00_19 # # +112 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 # constants # K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 # K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 # K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 # pbswap mask # # +192 ctx # argument block # +196 inp # +200 end # +204 esp &sub ("esp",208); &and ("esp",-64); &movdqa (&QWP(112+0,"esp"),@X[4]); # copy constants &movdqa (&QWP(112+16,"esp"),@X[5]); &movdqa (&QWP(112+32,"esp"),@X[6]); &shl ($D,6); # len*64 &movdqa (&QWP(112+48,"esp"),@X[3]); &add ($D,$inp); # end of input &movdqa (&QWP(112+64,"esp"),@X[2]); &add ($inp,64); &mov (&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E); # save argument block &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp); &mov (&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D); &mov (&DWP(192+12,"esp"),@T[0]); # save original %esp &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$E)); # load context &mov ($B,&DWP(4,$E)); &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$E)); &mov ($D,&DWP(12,$E)); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,$E)); &mov (@T[0],$B); # magic seed &movdqu (@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp)); # load input to %xmm[0-3] &movdqu (@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp)); &movdqu (@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp)); &movdqu (@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp)); &pshufb (@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &pshufb (@X[-3&7],@X[2]); &pshufb (@X[-2&7],@X[2]); &movdqa (&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot &pshufb (@X[-1&7],@X[2]); &paddd (@X[-4&7],@X[3]); # add K_00_19 &paddd (@X[-3&7],@X[3]); &paddd (@X[-2&7],@X[3]); &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),@X[-4&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU &psubd (@X[-4&7],@X[3]); # restore X[] &movdqa (&QWP(0+16,"esp"),@X[-3&7]); &psubd (@X[-3&7],@X[3]); &movdqa (&QWP(0+32,"esp"),@X[-2&7]); &mov (@T[1],$C); &psubd (@X[-2&7],@X[3]); &xor (@T[1],$D); &pshufd (@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee); # was &movdqa (@X[0],@X[-3&7]); &and (@T[0],@T[1]); &jmp (&label("loop")); ###################################################################### # SSE instruction sequence is first broken to groups of indepentent # instructions, independent in respect to their inputs and shifter # (not all architectures have more than one). Then IALU instructions # are "knitted in" between the SSE groups. Distance is maintained for # SSE latency of 2 in hope that it fits better upcoming AMD Bulldozer # [which allegedly also implements SSSE3]... # # Temporary registers usage. X[2] is volatile at the entry and at the # end is restored from backtrace ring buffer. X[3] is expected to # contain current K_XX_XX constant and is used to caclulate X[-1]+K # from previous round, it becomes volatile the moment the value is # saved to stack for transfer to IALU. X[4] becomes volatile whenever # X[-4] is accumulated and offloaded to backtrace ring buffer, at the # end it is loaded with next K_XX_XX [which becomes X[3] in next # round]... # sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4 { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &punpcklqdq(@X[0],@X[-3&7]); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]", was &palignr(@X[0],@X[-4&7],8); &movdqa (@X[2],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[3],@X[-1&7]); &movdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); &psrldq (@X[2],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &pxor (@X[2],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@X[4],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &movdqa (@X[2],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslldq (@X[4],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &paddd (@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@X[2],31); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &movdqa (@X[3],@X[4]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@X[4],30); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &por (@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslld (@X[3],2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &pxor (@X[0],@X[4]); &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp")); # K_XX_XX eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[3]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2 &pshufd (@X[1],@X[-3&7],0xee) if ($Xi<7); # was &movdqa (@X[1],@X[-2&7]) &pshufd (@X[3],@X[-1&7],0xee) if ($Xi==7); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xupdate_ssse3_32_79() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 44 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 &pxor (@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" &punpcklqdq(@X[2],@X[-1&7]); # compose "X[-6]", was &palignr(@X[2],@X[-2&7],8) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &pxor (@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" &movdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]); # save X[] to backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/); if ($Xi%5) { &movdqa (@X[4],@X[3]); # "perpetuate" K_XX_XX... } else { # ... or load next one &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp")); } eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &paddd (@X[3],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &movdqa (@X[2],@X[0]); &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/); &pslld (@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@X[2],30); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[1] =~ /_rol/); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/); &por (@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=2 eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &pshufd (@X[3],@X[-1],0xee) if ($Xi<19); # was &movdqa (@X[3],@X[0]) eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xuplast_ssse3_80() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[3],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &mov ($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp")); &cmp ($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp")); &je (&label("done")); &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp")); # K_00_19 &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp")); # pbswap mask &movdqu (@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu (@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp)); &movdqu (@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp)); &movdqu (@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp)); &add ($inp,64); &pshufb (@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp); &movdqa (&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot $Xi=0; } sub Xloop_ssse3() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[($Xi-4)&7],@X[3]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"),@X[($Xi-4)&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psubd (@X[($Xi-4)&7],@X[3]); foreach (@insns) { eval; } $Xi++; } sub Xtail_ssse3() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); foreach (@insns) { eval; } } sub body_00_19 () { # ((c^d)&b)^d # on start @T[0]=(c^d)&b return &body_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&$_ror ($b,$j?7:2);', # $b>>>2 '&xor (@T[0],$d);', '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer '&xor ($b,$c);', # $c^$d for next round '&$_rol ($a,5);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);', '&and (@T[1],$b);', # ($b&($c^$d)) for next round '&xor ($b,$c);', # restore $b '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub body_20_39 () { # b^d^c # on entry @T[0]=b^d return &body_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer '&xor (@T[0],$d) if($j==19);'. '&xor (@T[0],$c) if($j> 19);', # ($b^$d^$c) '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round '&$_rol ($a,5);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);', '&xor (@T[1],$c) if ($j< 79);', # $b^$d for next round '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2 '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub body_40_59 () { # ((b^c)&(c^d))^c # on entry @T[0]=(b^c), (c^=d) $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer '&and (@T[0],$c) if ($j>=40);', # (b^c)&(c^d) '&xor ($c,$d) if ($j>=40);', # restore $c '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2 '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b for next round '&xor (@T[0],$c);', '&$_rol ($a,5);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);', '&xor (@T[1],$c) if ($j==59);'. '&xor (@T[1],$b) if ($j< 59);', # b^c for next round '&xor ($b,$c) if ($j< 59);', # c^d for next round '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } ###### sub bodyx_00_19 () { # ((c^d)&b)^d # on start @T[0]=(b&c)^(~b&d), $e+=X[]+K return &bodyx_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&rorx ($b,$b,2) if ($j==0);'. # $b>>>2 '&rorx ($b,@T[1],7) if ($j!=0);', # $b>>>2 '&lea ($e,&DWP(0,$e,@T[0]));', '&rorx (@T[0],$a,5);', '&andn (@T[1],$a,$c);', '&and ($a,$b)', '&add ($d,&DWP(4*(($j+1)&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer '&xor (@T[1],$a)', '&add ($e,@T[0]);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub bodyx_20_39 () { # b^d^c # on start $b=b^c^d return &bodyx_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,($j==19?@T[0]:$b))', '&rorx ($b,@T[1],7);', # $b>>>2 '&rorx (@T[0],$a,5);', '&xor ($a,$b) if ($j<79);', '&add ($d,&DWP(4*(($j+1)&15),"esp")) if ($j<79);', # X[]+K xfer '&xor ($a,$c) if ($j<79);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub bodyx_40_59 () { # ((b^c)&(c^d))^c # on start $b=((b^c)&(c^d))^c return &bodyx_20_39() if ($rx==59); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&rorx (@T[0],$a,5)', '&lea ($e,&DWP(0,$e,$b))', '&rorx ($b,@T[1],7)', # $b>>>2 '&add ($d,&DWP(4*(($j+1)&15),"esp"))', # X[]+K xfer '&mov (@T[1],$c)', '&xor ($a,$b)', # b^c for next round '&xor (@T[1],$b)', # c^d for next round '&and ($a,@T[1])', '&add ($e,@T[0])', '&xor ($a,$b)' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } &set_label("loop",16); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context &add ($A,&DWP(0,@T[1])); &add (@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1])); # $b &add ($C,&DWP(8,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A); &add ($D,&DWP(12,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]); &add ($E,&DWP(16,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C); &mov ($B,$C); &mov (&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D); &xor ($B,$D); &mov (&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E); &mov (@T[1],@T[0]); &pshufd (@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee); # was &movdqa (@X[0],@X[-3&7]); &and (@T[0],$B); &mov ($B,$T[1]); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("done",16); $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context &add ($A,&DWP(0,@T[1])); &mov ("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp")); # restore %esp &add (@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1])); # $b &add ($C,&DWP(8,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A); &add ($D,&DWP(12,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]); &add ($E,&DWP(16,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C); &mov (&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D); &mov (&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E); &function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3"); $rx=0; # reset if ($ymm) { my $Xi=4; # 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); # pre-seeded for $Xi=4 my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); my $j=0; # hash round my @T=($T,$tmp1); my $inp; my $_rol=sub { &shld(@_[0],@_) }; my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; &function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_avx"); &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tmp1); &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1)); &set_label("avx_shortcut"); &vzeroall(); &vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1)); # K_00_19 &vmovdqa(@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1)); # K_20_39 &vmovdqa(@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1)); # K_40_59 &vmovdqa(@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1)); # K_60_79 &vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1)); # pbswap mask &mov ($E,&wparam(0)); # load argument block &mov ($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1)); &mov ($D,&wparam(2)); &mov (@T[0],"esp"); # stack frame layout # # +0 X[0]+K X[1]+K X[2]+K X[3]+K # XMM->IALU xfer area # X[4]+K X[5]+K X[6]+K X[7]+K # X[8]+K X[9]+K X[10]+K X[11]+K # X[12]+K X[13]+K X[14]+K X[15]+K # # +64 X[0] X[1] X[2] X[3] # XMM->XMM backtrace area # X[4] X[5] X[6] X[7] # X[8] X[9] X[10] X[11] # even borrowed for K_00_19 # # +112 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 # constants # K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 # K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 # K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 # pbswap mask # # +192 ctx # argument block # +196 inp # +200 end # +204 esp &sub ("esp",208); &and ("esp",-64); &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+0,"esp"),@X[4]); # copy constants &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+16,"esp"),@X[5]); &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+32,"esp"),@X[6]); &shl ($D,6); # len*64 &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+48,"esp"),@X[3]); &add ($D,$inp); # end of input &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+64,"esp"),@X[2]); &add ($inp,64); &mov (&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E); # save argument block &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp); &mov (&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D); &mov (&DWP(192+12,"esp"),@T[0]); # save original %esp &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$E)); # load context &mov ($B,&DWP(4,$E)); &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$E)); &mov ($D,&DWP(12,$E)); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,$E)); &mov (@T[0],$B); # magic seed &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp)); # load input to %xmm[0-3] &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp)); &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp)); &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp)); &vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &vpshufb(@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7],@X[2]); &vpshufb(@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7],@X[2]); &vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot &vpshufb(@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7],@X[2]); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[-4&7],@X[3]); # add K_00_19 &vpaddd (@X[1],@X[-3&7],@X[3]); &vpaddd (@X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[3]); &vmovdqa(&QWP(0,"esp"),@X[0]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU &mov (@T[1],$C); &vmovdqa(&QWP(0+16,"esp"),@X[1]); &xor (@T[1],$D); &vmovdqa(&QWP(0+32,"esp"),@X[2]); &and (@T[0],@T[1]); &jmp (&label("loop")); sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4 { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[3],@X[3],@X[-1&7]); &vmovdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrldq(@X[2],@X[-1&7],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[2],@X[2],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@X[2],@X[0],31); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslldq(@X[4],@X[0],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@X[3],@X[4],30); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslld (@X[4],@X[4],2); &vmovdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[3]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[4]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp")); # K_XX_XX eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xupdate_avx_32_79() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 44 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vpalignr(@X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-2&7],8); # compose "X[-6]" &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" &vmovdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]); # save X[] to backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); if ($Xi%5) { &vmovdqa (@X[4],@X[3]); # "perpetuate" K_XX_XX... } else { # ... or load next one &vmovdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp")); } &vpaddd (@X[3],@X[3],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &vpsrld (@X[2],@X[0],30); &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslld (@X[0],@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=2 eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xuplast_avx_80() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[3],@X[3],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &mov ($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp")); &cmp ($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp")); &je (&label("done")); &vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp")); # K_00_19 &vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp")); # pbswap mask &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp)); &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp)); &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp)); &add ($inp,64); &vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp); &vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot $Xi=0; } sub Xloop_avx() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[$Xi&7],@X[($Xi-4)&7],@X[3]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"),@X[$Xi&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } $Xi++; } sub Xtail_avx() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); foreach (@insns) { eval; } } &set_label("loop",16); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context &add ($A,&DWP(0,@T[1])); &add (@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1])); # $b &add ($C,&DWP(8,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A); &add ($D,&DWP(12,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]); &add ($E,&DWP(16,@T[1])); &mov ($B,$C); &mov (&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C); &xor ($B,$D); &mov (&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D); &mov (&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E); &mov (@T[1],@T[0]); &and (@T[0],$B); &mov ($B,@T[1]); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("done",16); $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &vzeroall(); &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context &add ($A,&DWP(0,@T[1])); &mov ("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp")); # restore %esp &add (@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1])); # $b &add ($C,&DWP(8,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A); &add ($D,&DWP(12,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]); &add ($E,&DWP(16,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C); &mov (&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D); &mov (&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E); &function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_avx"); } &set_label("K_XX_XX",64); &data_word(0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999); # K_00_19 &data_word(0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1); # K_20_39 &data_word(0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc); # K_40_59 &data_word(0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6); # K_60_79 &data_word(0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f); # pbswap mask &data_byte(0xf,0xe,0xd,0xc,0xb,0xa,0x9,0x8,0x7,0x6,0x5,0x4,0x3,0x2,0x1,0x0); } &asciz("SHA1 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl (revision 337764) @@ -1,1281 +1,1281 @@ #!/usr/bin/env perl # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # SHA256 block transform for x86. September 2007. # # Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from # 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but # it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes. # # May 2012. # # Optimization including two of Pavel Semjanov's ideas, alternative # Maj and full unroll, resulted in ~20-25% improvement on most CPUs, # ~7% on Pentium, ~40% on Atom. As fully unrolled loop body is almost # 15x larger, 8KB vs. 560B, it's fired only for longer inputs. But not # on P4, where it kills performance, nor Sandy Bridge, where folded # loop is approximately as fast... # # June 2012. # # Add AMD XOP-specific code path, >30% improvement on Bulldozer over # May version, >60% over original. Add AVX+shrd code path, >25% # improvement on Sandy Bridge over May version, 60% over original. # # May 2013. # # Replace AMD XOP code path with SSSE3 to cover more processors. # (Biggest improvement coefficient is on upcoming Atom Silvermont, # not shown.) Add AVX+BMI code path. # # March 2014. # # Add support for Intel SHA Extensions. # # Performance in clock cycles per processed byte (less is better): # # gcc icc x86 asm(*) SIMD x86_64 asm(**) # Pentium 46 57 40/38 - - # PIII 36 33 27/24 - - # P4 41 38 28 - 17.3 # AMD K8 27 25 19/15.5 - 14.9 # Core2 26 23 18/15.6 14.3 13.8 # Westmere 27 - 19/15.7 13.4 12.3 # Sandy Bridge 25 - 15.9 12.4 11.6 # Ivy Bridge 24 - 15.0 11.4 10.3 # Haswell 22 - 13.9 9.46 7.80 # Bulldozer 36 - 27/22 17.0 13.6 # VIA Nano 36 - 25/22 16.8 16.5 # Atom 50 - 30/25 21.9 18.9 # Silvermont 40 - 34/31 22.9 20.6 # # (*) numbers after slash are for unrolled loop, where applicable; # (**) x86_64 assembly performance is presented for reference # purposes, results are best-available; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha512-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $xmm=$avx=0; for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } if ($xmm && `$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if ($xmm && !$avx && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.03) + ($1>=2.10); } if ($xmm && !$avx && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" && `ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if ($xmm && !$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { +if ($xmm && !$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } $shaext=$xmm; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 $unroll_after = 64*4; # If pre-evicted from L1P cache first spin of # fully unrolled loop was measured to run about # 3-4x slower. If slowdown coefficient is N and # unrolled loop is m times faster, then you break # even at (N-1)/(m-1) blocks. Then it needs to be # adjusted for probability of code being evicted, # code size/cache size=1/4. Typical m is 1.15... $A="eax"; $E="edx"; $T="ebx"; $Aoff=&DWP(4,"esp"); $Boff=&DWP(8,"esp"); $Coff=&DWP(12,"esp"); $Doff=&DWP(16,"esp"); $Eoff=&DWP(20,"esp"); $Foff=&DWP(24,"esp"); $Goff=&DWP(28,"esp"); $Hoff=&DWP(32,"esp"); $Xoff=&DWP(36,"esp"); $K256="ebp"; sub BODY_16_63() { &mov ($T,"ecx"); # "ecx" is preloaded &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*(9+15+16-14),"esp")); &ror ("ecx",18-7); &mov ("edi","esi"); &ror ("esi",19-17); &xor ("ecx",$T); &shr ($T,3); &ror ("ecx",7); &xor ("esi","edi"); &xor ($T,"ecx"); # T = sigma0(X[-15]) &ror ("esi",17); &add ($T,&DWP(4*(9+15+16),"esp")); # T += X[-16] &shr ("edi",10); &add ($T,&DWP(4*(9+15+16-9),"esp")); # T += X[-7] #&xor ("edi","esi") # sigma1(X[-2]) # &add ($T,"edi"); # T += sigma1(X[-2]) # &mov (&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"),$T); # save X[0] &BODY_00_15(1); } sub BODY_00_15() { my $in_16_63=shift; &mov ("ecx",$E); &xor ("edi","esi") if ($in_16_63); # sigma1(X[-2]) &mov ("esi",$Foff); &ror ("ecx",25-11); &add ($T,"edi") if ($in_16_63); # T += sigma1(X[-2]) &mov ("edi",$Goff); &xor ("ecx",$E); &xor ("esi","edi"); &mov ($T,&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp")) if (!$in_16_63); &mov (&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"),$T) if ($in_16_63); # save X[0] &ror ("ecx",11-6); &and ("esi",$E); &mov ($Eoff,$E); # modulo-scheduled &xor ($E,"ecx"); &add ($T,$Hoff); # T += h &xor ("esi","edi"); # Ch(e,f,g) &ror ($E,6); # Sigma1(e) &mov ("ecx",$A); &add ($T,"esi"); # T += Ch(e,f,g) &ror ("ecx",22-13); &add ($T,$E); # T += Sigma1(e) &mov ("edi",$Boff); &xor ("ecx",$A); &mov ($Aoff,$A); # modulo-scheduled &lea ("esp",&DWP(-4,"esp")); &ror ("ecx",13-2); &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,$K256)); &xor ("ecx",$A); &mov ($E,$Eoff); # e in next iteration, d in this one &xor ($A,"edi"); # a ^= b &ror ("ecx",2); # Sigma0(a) &add ($T,"esi"); # T+= K[i] &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$A); # (b^c) in next round &add ($E,$T); # d += T &and ($A,&DWP(4,"esp")); # a &= (b^c) &add ($T,"ecx"); # T += Sigma0(a) &xor ($A,"edi"); # h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b) &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*(9+15+16-1),"esp")) if ($in_16_63); # preload T &add ($K256,4); &add ($A,$T); # h += T } &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if (!$i386); &function_begin("sha256_block_data_order"); &mov ("esi",wparam(0)); # ctx &mov ("edi",wparam(1)); # inp &mov ("eax",wparam(2)); # num &mov ("ebx","esp"); # saved sp &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($K256); &lea ($K256,&DWP(&label("K256")."-".&label("pic_point"),$K256)); &sub ("esp",16); &and ("esp",-64); &shl ("eax",6); &add ("eax","edi"); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"esi"); # ctx &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"edi"); # inp &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax"); # inp+num*128 &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx"); # saved sp if (!$i386 && $xmm) { &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$K256,&label("K256")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"edx")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edx")); &test ("ecx",1<<20); # check for P4 &jnz (&label("loop")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(8,"edx")) if ($xmm); &test ("ecx",1<<24); # check for FXSR &jz ($unroll_after?&label("no_xmm"):&label("loop")); &and ("ecx",1<<30); # mask "Intel CPU" bit &and ("ebx",1<<28|1<<9); # mask AVX and SSSE3 bits &test ("edx",1<<29) if ($shaext); # check for SHA &jnz (&label("shaext")) if ($shaext); &or ("ecx","ebx"); &and ("ecx",1<<28|1<<30); &cmp ("ecx",1<<28|1<<30); if ($xmm) { &je (&label("AVX")) if ($avx); &test ("ebx",1<<9); # check for SSSE3 &jnz (&label("SSSE3")); } else { &je (&label("loop_shrd")); } if ($unroll_after) { &set_label("no_xmm"); &sub ("eax","edi"); &cmp ("eax",$unroll_after); &jae (&label("unrolled")); } } &jmp (&label("loop")); sub COMPACT_LOOP() { my $suffix=shift; &set_label("loop$suffix",$suffix?32:16); # copy input block to stack reversing byte and dword order for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"edi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"edi")); &bswap ("eax"); &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"edi")); &bswap ("ebx"); &push ("eax"); &bswap ("ecx"); &push ("ebx"); &bswap ("edx"); &push ("ecx"); &push ("edx"); } &add ("edi",64); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-4*9,"esp"));# place for A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H &mov (&DWP(4*(9+16)+4,"esp"),"edi"); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($A,&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi")); # &mov ($Aoff,$A); &mov ($Boff,"ebx"); &xor ("ebx","ecx"); &mov ($Coff,"ecx"); &mov ($Doff,"edi"); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"ebx"); # magic &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi")); # &mov ($Eoff,$E); &mov ($Foff,"ebx"); &mov ($Goff,"ecx"); &mov ($Hoff,"edi"); &set_label("00_15$suffix",16); &BODY_00_15(); &cmp ("esi",0xc19bf174); &jne (&label("00_15$suffix")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*(9+15+16-1),"esp")); # preloaded in BODY_00_15(1) &jmp (&label("16_63$suffix")); &set_label("16_63$suffix",16); &BODY_16_63(); &cmp ("esi",0xc67178f2); &jne (&label("16_63$suffix")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*(9+16+64)+0,"esp"));#ctx # &mov ($A,$Aoff); &mov ("ebx",$Boff); # &mov ("edi",$Coff); &mov ("ecx",$Doff); &add ($A,&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$A); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); # &mov ($E,$Eoff); &mov ("eax",$Foff); &mov ("ebx",$Goff); &mov ("ecx",$Hoff); &mov ("edi",&DWP(4*(9+16+64)+4,"esp"));#inp &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("eax",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ebx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"ecx"); &lea ("esp",&DWP(4*(9+16+64),"esp"));# destroy frame &sub ($K256,4*64); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("loop$suffix")); } &COMPACT_LOOP(); &mov ("esp",&DWP(12,"esp")); # restore sp &function_end_A(); if (!$i386 && !$xmm) { # ~20% improvement on Sandy Bridge local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; &COMPACT_LOOP("_shrd"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(12,"esp")); # restore sp &function_end_A(); } &set_label("K256",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment! @K256=( 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5, 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174, 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da, 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967, 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13, 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85, 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070, 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3, 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 ); &data_word(@K256); &data_word(0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f); # byte swap mask &asciz("SHA256 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=(0..7); # offsets sub off { &DWP(4*(((shift)-$i)&7),"esp"); } if (!$i386 && $unroll_after) { my @AH=($A,$K256); &set_label("unrolled",16); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp")); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(12,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"ecx"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(28,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi"); &jmp (&label("grand_loop")); &set_label("grand_loop",16); # copy input block to stack reversing byte order for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) { &mov ("ebx",&DWP(12*$i+0,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12*$i+4,"edi")); &bswap ("ebx"); &mov ("esi",&DWP(12*$i+8,"edi")); &bswap ("ecx"); &mov (&DWP(32+12*$i+0,"esp"),"ebx"); &bswap ("esi"); &mov (&DWP(32+12*$i+4,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(32+12*$i+8,"esp"),"esi"); } &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*12,"edi")); &add ("edi",64); &bswap ("ebx"); &mov (&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(32+12*$i,"esp"),"ebx"); my ($t1,$t2) = ("ecx","esi"); for ($i=0;$i<64;$i++) { if ($i>=16) { &mov ($T,$t1); # $t1 is preloaded # &mov ($t2,&DWP(32+4*(($i+14)&15),"esp")); &ror ($t1,18-7); &mov ("edi",$t2); &ror ($t2,19-17); &xor ($t1,$T); &shr ($T,3); &ror ($t1,7); &xor ($t2,"edi"); &xor ($T,$t1); # T = sigma0(X[-15]) &ror ($t2,17); &add ($T,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp")); # T += X[-16] &shr ("edi",10); &add ($T,&DWP(32+4*(($i+9)&15),"esp")); # T += X[-7] #&xor ("edi",$t2) # sigma1(X[-2]) # &add ($T,"edi"); # T += sigma1(X[-2]) # &mov (&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"),$T); # save X[0] } &mov ($t1,$E); &xor ("edi",$t2) if ($i>=16); # sigma1(X[-2]) &mov ($t2,&off($f)); &ror ($E,25-11); &add ($T,"edi") if ($i>=16); # T += sigma1(X[-2]) &mov ("edi",&off($g)); &xor ($E,$t1); &mov ($T,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp")) if ($i<16); # X[i] &mov (&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"),$T) if ($i>=16 && $i<62); # save X[0] &xor ($t2,"edi"); &ror ($E,11-6); &and ($t2,$t1); &mov (&off($e),$t1); # save $E, modulo-scheduled &xor ($E,$t1); &add ($T,&off($h)); # T += h &xor ("edi",$t2); # Ch(e,f,g) &ror ($E,6); # Sigma1(e) &mov ($t1,$AH[0]); &add ($T,"edi"); # T += Ch(e,f,g) &ror ($t1,22-13); &mov ($t2,$AH[0]); &mov ("edi",&off($b)); &xor ($t1,$AH[0]); &mov (&off($a),$AH[0]); # save $A, modulo-scheduled &xor ($AH[0],"edi"); # a ^= b, (b^c) in next round &ror ($t1,13-2); &and ($AH[1],$AH[0]); # (b^c) &= (a^b) &lea ($E,&DWP(@K256[$i],$T,$E)); # T += Sigma1(1)+K[i] &xor ($t1,$t2); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b) &mov ($t2,&DWP(32+4*(($i+2)&15),"esp")) if ($i>=15 && $i<63); &ror ($t1,2); # Sigma0(a) &add ($AH[1],$E); # h += T &add ($E,&off($d)); # d += T &add ($AH[1],$t1); # h += Sigma0(a) &mov ($t1,&DWP(32+4*(($i+15)&15),"esp")) if ($i>=15 && $i<63); @AH = reverse(@AH); # rotate(a,h) ($t1,$t2) = ($t2,$t1); # rotate(t1,t2) } &mov ("esi",&DWP(96,"esp")); #ctx #&mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp")); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); #&mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp")); #&mov ("edi", &DWP(8,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp")); &add ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx"); #&mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esp")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(24,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(28,"esp")); &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ebx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"ecx"); &cmp ("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("grand_loop")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp")); # restore sp &function_end_A(); } if (!$i386 && $xmm) {{{ if ($shaext) { ###################################################################### # Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA256 update function. # my ($ctx,$inp,$end)=("esi","edi","eax"); my ($Wi,$ABEF,$CDGH,$TMP)=map("xmm$_",(0..2,7)); my @MSG=map("xmm$_",(3..6)); sub sha256op38 { my ($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &data_byte(0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2); } } sub sha256rnds2 { sha256op38(0xcb,@_); } sub sha256msg1 { sha256op38(0xcc,@_); } sub sha256msg2 { sha256op38(0xcd,@_); } &set_label("shaext",32); &sub ("esp",32); &movdqu ($ABEF,&QWP(0,$ctx)); # DCBA &lea ($K256,&DWP(0x80,$K256)); &movdqu ($CDGH,&QWP(16,$ctx)); # HGFE &movdqa ($TMP,&QWP(0x100-0x80,$K256)); # byte swap mask &pshufd ($Wi,$ABEF,0x1b); # ABCD &pshufd ($ABEF,$ABEF,0xb1); # CDAB &pshufd ($CDGH,$CDGH,0x1b); # EFGH &palignr ($ABEF,$CDGH,8); # ABEF &punpcklqdq ($CDGH,$Wi); # CDGH &jmp (&label("loop_shaext")); &set_label("loop_shaext",16); &movdqu (@MSG[0],&QWP(0,$inp)); &movdqu (@MSG[1],&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movdqu (@MSG[2],&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[0],$TMP); &movdqu (@MSG[3],&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &movdqa (&QWP(16,"esp"),$CDGH); # offload &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(0*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[0]); &pshufb (@MSG[1],$TMP); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 0-3 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &nop (); &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),$ABEF); # offload &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(1*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[1]); &pshufb (@MSG[2],$TMP); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 4-7 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x40,$inp)); &sha256msg1 (@MSG[0],@MSG[1]); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(2*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[2]); &pshufb (@MSG[3],$TMP); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 8-11 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &movdqa ($TMP,@MSG[3]); &palignr ($TMP,@MSG[2],4); &nop (); &paddd (@MSG[0],$TMP); &sha256msg1 (@MSG[1],@MSG[2]); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(3*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[3]); &sha256msg2 (@MSG[0],@MSG[3]); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 12-15 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &movdqa ($TMP,@MSG[0]); &palignr ($TMP,@MSG[3],4); &nop (); &paddd (@MSG[1],$TMP); &sha256msg1 (@MSG[2],@MSG[3]); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); for($i=4;$i<16-3;$i++) { &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP($i*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[0]); &sha256msg2 (@MSG[1],@MSG[0]); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 16-19... &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &movdqa ($TMP,@MSG[1]); &palignr ($TMP,@MSG[0],4); &nop (); &paddd (@MSG[2],$TMP); &sha256msg1 (@MSG[3],@MSG[0]); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); } &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(13*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[0]); &sha256msg2 (@MSG[1],@MSG[0]); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 52-55 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &movdqa ($TMP,@MSG[1]) &palignr ($TMP,@MSG[0],4); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &paddd (@MSG[2],$TMP); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(14*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[1]); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 56-59 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &sha256msg2 (@MSG[2],@MSG[1]); &movdqa ($TMP,&QWP(0x100-0x80,$K256)); # byte swap mask &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(15*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[2]); &nop (); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 60-63 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &cmp ($end,$inp); &nop (); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &paddd ($CDGH,&QWP(16,"esp")); &paddd ($ABEF,&QWP(0,"esp")); &jnz (&label("loop_shaext")); &pshufd ($CDGH,$CDGH,0xb1); # DCHG &pshufd ($TMP,$ABEF,0x1b); # FEBA &pshufd ($ABEF,$ABEF,0xb1); # BAFE &punpckhqdq ($ABEF,$CDGH); # DCBA &palignr ($CDGH,$TMP,8); # HGFE &mov ("esp",&DWP(32+12,"esp")); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$ctx),$ABEF); &movdqu (&QWP(16,$ctx),$CDGH); &function_end_A(); } my @X = map("xmm$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("xmm$_",(4..7)); my @AH = ($A,$T); &set_label("SSSE3",32); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp")); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"ecx"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(28,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi"); &movdqa ($t3,&QWP(256,$K256)); &jmp (&label("grand_ssse3")); &set_label("grand_ssse3",16); # load input, reverse byte order, add K256[0..15], save to stack &movdqu (@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi")); &movdqu (@X[1],&QWP(16,"edi")); &movdqu (@X[2],&QWP(32,"edi")); &movdqu (@X[3],&QWP(48,"edi")); &add ("edi",64); &pshufb (@X[0],$t3); &mov (&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi"); &pshufb (@X[1],$t3); &movdqa ($t0,&QWP(0,$K256)); &pshufb (@X[2],$t3); &movdqa ($t1,&QWP(16,$K256)); &paddd ($t0,@X[0]); &pshufb (@X[3],$t3); &movdqa ($t2,&QWP(32,$K256)); &paddd ($t1,@X[1]); &movdqa ($t3,&QWP(48,$K256)); &movdqa (&QWP(32+0,"esp"),$t0); &paddd ($t2,@X[2]); &movdqa (&QWP(32+16,"esp"),$t1); &paddd ($t3,@X[3]); &movdqa (&QWP(32+32,"esp"),$t2); &movdqa (&QWP(32+48,"esp"),$t3); &jmp (&label("ssse3_00_47")); &set_label("ssse3_00_47",16); &add ($K256,64); sub SSSE3_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 120 instructions eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t0,@X[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t3,@X[3]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &palignr ($t0,@X[0],4); # X[1..4] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &palignr ($t3,@X[2],4); # X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t1,$t0); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t2,$t0); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t0,3); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &paddd (@X[0],$t3); # X[0..3] += X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t2,7); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,@X[3],0b11111010); # X[14..15] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslld ($t1,32-18); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t0,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t2,18-7); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t0,$t1); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslld ($t1,18-7); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t0,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t2,$t3); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t0,$t1); # sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t3,10); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &paddd (@X[0],$t0); # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,17); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,19-17); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,$t3,0b10000000); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &psrldq ($t3,8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[0],$t3); # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,@X[0],0b01010000); # X[16..17] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t2,$t3); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &psrld ($t3,10); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,17); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,19-17); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,$t3,0b00001000); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &movdqa ($t2,&QWP(16*$j,$K256)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslldq ($t3,8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &paddd (@X[0],$t3); # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd ($t2,@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &movdqa (&QWP(32+16*$j,"esp"),$t2); } sub body_00_15 () { ( '&mov ("ecx",$E);', '&ror ($E,25-11);', '&mov ("esi",&off($f));', '&xor ($E,"ecx");', '&mov ("edi",&off($g));', '&xor ("esi","edi");', '&ror ($E,11-6);', '&and ("esi","ecx");', '&mov (&off($e),"ecx");', # save $E, modulo-scheduled '&xor ($E,"ecx");', '&xor ("edi","esi");', # Ch(e,f,g) '&ror ($E,6);', # T = Sigma1(e) '&mov ("ecx",$AH[0]);', '&add ($E,"edi");', # T += Ch(e,f,g) '&mov ("edi",&off($b));', '&mov ("esi",$AH[0]);', '&ror ("ecx",22-13);', '&mov (&off($a),$AH[0]);', # save $A, modulo-scheduled '&xor ("ecx",$AH[0]);', '&xor ($AH[0],"edi");', # a ^= b, (b^c) in next round '&add ($E,&off($h));', # T += h '&ror ("ecx",13-2);', '&and ($AH[1],$AH[0]);', # (b^c) &= (a^b) '&xor ("ecx","esi");', '&add ($E,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"));', # T += K[i]+X[i] '&xor ($AH[1],"edi");', # h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b) '&ror ("ecx",2);', # Sigma0(a) '&add ($AH[1],$E);', # h += T '&add ($E,&off($d));', # d += T '&add ($AH[1],"ecx");'. # h += Sigma0(a) '@AH = reverse(@AH); $i++;' # rotate(a,h) ); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &SSSE3_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmp (&DWP(16*$j,$K256),0x00010203); &jne (&label("ssse3_00_47")); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } &mov ("esi",&DWP(96,"esp")); #ctx #&mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp")); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); #&mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp")); #&mov ("edi", &DWP(8,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp")); &add ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx"); #&mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esp")); &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &add ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &movdqa ($t3,&QWP(64,$K256)); &sub ($K256,3*64); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("grand_ssse3")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp")); # restore sp &function_end_A(); if ($avx) { &set_label("AVX",32); if ($avx>1) { &and ("edx",1<<8|1<<3); # check for BMI2+BMI1 &cmp ("edx",1<<8|1<<3); &je (&label("AVX_BMI")); } &lea ("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp")); &vzeroall (); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"ecx"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(28,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi"); &vmovdqa ($t3,&QWP(256,$K256)); &jmp (&label("grand_avx")); &set_label("grand_avx",32); # load input, reverse byte order, add K256[0..15], save to stack &vmovdqu (@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[1],&QWP(16,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[2],&QWP(32,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[3],&QWP(48,"edi")); &add ("edi",64); &vpshufb (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); &mov (&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi"); &vpshufb (@X[1],@X[1],$t3); &vpshufb (@X[2],@X[2],$t3); &vpaddd ($t0,@X[0],&QWP(0,$K256)); &vpshufb (@X[3],@X[3],$t3); &vpaddd ($t1,@X[1],&QWP(16,$K256)); &vpaddd ($t2,@X[2],&QWP(32,$K256)); &vpaddd ($t3,@X[3],&QWP(48,$K256)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+0,"esp"),$t0); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+16,"esp"),$t1); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+32,"esp"),$t2); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+48,"esp"),$t3); &jmp (&label("avx_00_47")); &set_label("avx_00_47",16); &add ($K256,64); sub Xupdate_AVX () { ( '&vpalignr ($t0,@X[1],@X[0],4);', # X[1..4] '&vpalignr ($t3,@X[3],@X[2],4);', # X[9..12] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t0,7);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3);', # X[0..3] += X[9..16] '&vpsrld ($t3,$t0,3);', '&vpslld ($t1,$t0,14);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t3,$t2);', '&vpshufd ($t3,@X[3],0b11111010)',# X[14..15] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t2,18-7);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1);', '&vpslld ($t1,$t1,25-14);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t2);', '&vpsrld ($t2,$t3,10);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1);', # sigma0(X[1..4]) '&vpsrlq ($t1,$t3,17);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t0);', # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t1);', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,19);', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3);', # sigma1(X[14..15] '&vpshufd ($t3,$t2,0b10000100);', '&vpsrldq ($t3,$t3,8);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3);', # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) '&vpshufd ($t3,@X[0],0b01010000)',# X[16..17] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t3,10);', '&vpsrlq ($t1,$t3,17);', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t1);', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,19);', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3);', # sigma1(X[16..17] '&vpshufd ($t3,$t2,0b11101000);', '&vpslldq ($t3,$t3,8);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3);' # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) ); } local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; sub AVX_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 120 instructions my $insn; foreach (Xupdate_AVX()) { # 31 instructions eval; eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval($insn = shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if ($insn =~ /rorx/ && @insns[0] =~ /rorx/); } &vpaddd ($t2,@X[0],&QWP(16*$j,$K256)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+16*$j,"esp"),$t2); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &AVX_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmp (&DWP(16*$j,$K256),0x00010203); &jne (&label("avx_00_47")); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } &mov ("esi",&DWP(96,"esp")); #ctx #&mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp")); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); #&mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp")); #&mov ("edi", &DWP(8,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp")); &add ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx"); #&mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esp")); &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &add ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &vmovdqa ($t3,&QWP(64,$K256)); &sub ($K256,3*64); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("grand_avx")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp")); # restore sp &vzeroall (); &function_end_A(); if ($avx>1) { sub bodyx_00_15 () { # +10% ( '&rorx ("ecx",$E,6)', '&rorx ("esi",$E,11)', '&mov (&off($e),$E)', # save $E, modulo-scheduled '&rorx ("edi",$E,25)', '&xor ("ecx","esi")', '&andn ("esi",$E,&off($g))', '&xor ("ecx","edi")', # Sigma1(e) '&and ($E,&off($f))', '&mov (&off($a),$AH[0]);', # save $A, modulo-scheduled '&or ($E,"esi")', # T = Ch(e,f,g) '&rorx ("edi",$AH[0],2)', '&rorx ("esi",$AH[0],13)', '&lea ($E,&DWP(0,$E,"ecx"))', # T += Sigma1(e) '&rorx ("ecx",$AH[0],22)', '&xor ("esi","edi")', '&mov ("edi",&off($b))', '&xor ("ecx","esi")', # Sigma0(a) '&xor ($AH[0],"edi")', # a ^= b, (b^c) in next round '&add ($E,&off($h))', # T += h '&and ($AH[1],$AH[0])', # (b^c) &= (a^b) '&add ($E,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"))', # T += K[i]+X[i] '&xor ($AH[1],"edi")', # h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b) '&add ("ecx",$E)', # h += T '&add ($E,&off($d))', # d += T '&lea ($AH[1],&DWP(0,$AH[1],"ecx"));'. # h += Sigma0(a) '@AH = reverse(@AH); $i++;' # rotate(a,h) ); } &set_label("AVX_BMI",32); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp")); &vzeroall (); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"ecx"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(28,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi"); &vmovdqa ($t3,&QWP(256,$K256)); &jmp (&label("grand_avx_bmi")); &set_label("grand_avx_bmi",32); # load input, reverse byte order, add K256[0..15], save to stack &vmovdqu (@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[1],&QWP(16,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[2],&QWP(32,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[3],&QWP(48,"edi")); &add ("edi",64); &vpshufb (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); &mov (&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi"); &vpshufb (@X[1],@X[1],$t3); &vpshufb (@X[2],@X[2],$t3); &vpaddd ($t0,@X[0],&QWP(0,$K256)); &vpshufb (@X[3],@X[3],$t3); &vpaddd ($t1,@X[1],&QWP(16,$K256)); &vpaddd ($t2,@X[2],&QWP(32,$K256)); &vpaddd ($t3,@X[3],&QWP(48,$K256)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+0,"esp"),$t0); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+16,"esp"),$t1); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+32,"esp"),$t2); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+48,"esp"),$t3); &jmp (&label("avx_bmi_00_47")); &set_label("avx_bmi_00_47",16); &add ($K256,64); for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &AVX_00_47($j,\&bodyx_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmp (&DWP(16*$j,$K256),0x00010203); &jne (&label("avx_bmi_00_47")); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; } } &mov ("esi",&DWP(96,"esp")); #ctx #&mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp")); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); #&mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp")); #&mov ("edi", &DWP(8,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp")); &add ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx"); #&mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esp")); &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &add ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &vmovdqa ($t3,&QWP(64,$K256)); &sub ($K256,3*64); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("grand_avx_bmi")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp")); # restore sp &vzeroall (); &function_end_A(); } } }}} &function_end_B("sha256_block_data_order"); &asm_finish(); Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,734 +1,730 @@ /* crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c */ /* * Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) and others for the * OpenSSL project 2001. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /*- * The lowest level part of this file was previously in crypto/des/read_pwd.c, * Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include /* * need for #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE arises whenever you pass -ansi to gcc * [maybe others?], because it masks interfaces not discussed in standard, * sigaction and fileno included. -pedantic would be more appropriate for the * intended purposes, but we can't prevent users from adding -ansi. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VXWORKS) # include #endif #if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE # define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2 # endif #endif #include #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # ifdef OPENSSL_UNISTD # include OPENSSL_UNISTD # else # include # endif /* * If unistd.h defines _POSIX_VERSION, we conclude that we are on a POSIX * system and have sigaction and termios. */ # if defined(_POSIX_VERSION) # define SIGACTION # if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY) # define TERMIOS # endif # endif #endif #ifdef WIN16TTY # undef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 # undef WIN16 # undef _WINDOWS # include #endif /* 06-Apr-92 Luke Brennan Support for VMS */ #include "ui_locl.h" #include "cryptlib.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* prototypes for sys$whatever */ # include # ifdef __DECC # pragma message disable DOLLARID # endif #endif #ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG # include # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE # include # endif #endif /* * There are 5 types of terminal interface supported, TERMIO, TERMIOS, VMS, * MSDOS and SGTTY. * * If someone defines one of the macros TERMIO, TERMIOS or SGTTY, it will * remain respected. Otherwise, we default to TERMIOS except for a few * systems that require something different. * * Note: we do not use SGTTY unless it's defined by the configuration. We * may eventually opt to remove it's use entirely. */ #if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY) # if defined(_LIBC) # undef TERMIOS # define TERMIO # undef SGTTY /* * We know that VMS, MSDOS, VXWORKS, NETWARE use entirely other mechanisms. * MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE should probably go away, but that needs to be confirmed. */ # elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) \ && !defined(MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # define TERMIOS # undef TERMIO # undef SGTTY # endif #endif #ifdef TERMIOS # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct termios # define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag # define TTY_get(tty,data) tcgetattr(tty,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) tcsetattr(tty,TCSANOW,data) #endif #ifdef TERMIO # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct termio # define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag # define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCGETA,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCSETA,data) #endif #ifdef SGTTY # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct sgttyb # define TTY_FLAGS sg_flags # define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCGETP,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCSETP,data) #endif #if !defined(_LIBC) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS) # include #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # include #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include # include # include # include struct IOSB { short iosb$w_value; short iosb$w_count; long iosb$l_info; }; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS typedef int sig_atomic_t; #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) || defined(MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) /* * This one needs work. As a matter of fact the code is unoperational * and this is only a trick to get it compiled. * */ # define TTY_STRUCT int #endif #ifndef NX509_SIG # define NX509_SIG 32 #endif /* Define globals. They are protected by a lock */ #ifdef SIGACTION static struct sigaction savsig[NX509_SIG]; #else static void (*savsig[NX509_SIG]) (int); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS static struct IOSB iosb; static $DESCRIPTOR(terminal, "TT"); static long tty_orig[3], tty_new[3]; /* XXX Is there any guarantee that this * will always suffice for the actual * structures? */ static long status; static unsigned short channel = 0; #else # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(__DJGPP__) static TTY_STRUCT tty_orig, tty_new; # endif #endif static FILE *tty_in, *tty_out; static int is_a_tty; /* Declare static functions */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) static int read_till_nl(FILE *); static void recsig(int); static void pushsig(void); static void popsig(void); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty); #endif static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl); static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); static int open_console(UI *ui); static int echo_console(UI *ui); static int noecho_console(UI *ui); static int close_console(UI *ui); static UI_METHOD ui_openssl = { "OpenSSL default user interface", open_console, write_string, NULL, /* No flusher is needed for command lines */ read_string, close_console, NULL }; /* The method with all the built-in thingies */ UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void) { return &ui_openssl; } /* * The following function makes sure that info and error strings are printed * before any prompt. */ static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_ERROR: case UIT_INFO: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); break; default: break; } return 1; } static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { int ok = 0; switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_BOOLEAN: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fputs(UI_get0_action_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); return read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 0); case UIT_PROMPT: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); return read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 1); case UIT_VERIFY: fprintf(tty_out, "Verifying - %s", UI_get0_output_string(uis)); fflush(tty_out); if ((ok = read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 1)) <= 0) return ok; if (strcmp(UI_get0_result_string(uis), UI_get0_test_string(uis)) != 0) { fprintf(tty_out, "Verify failure\n"); fflush(tty_out); return 0; } break; default: break; } return 1; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) /* Internal functions to read a string without echoing */ static int read_till_nl(FILE *in) { # define SIZE 4 char buf[SIZE + 1]; do { if (!fgets(buf, SIZE, in)) return 0; } while (strchr(buf, '\n') == NULL); return 1; } static volatile sig_atomic_t intr_signal; #endif static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl) { static int ps; int ok; char result[BUFSIZ]; int maxsize = BUFSIZ - 1; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) char *p; intr_signal = 0; ok = 0; ps = 0; pushsig(); ps = 1; if (!echo && !noecho_console(ui)) goto error; ps = 2; result[0] = '\0'; # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS if (!echo) { noecho_fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); p = result; /* FIXME: noecho_fgets doesn't return errors */ } else p = fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); # else p = fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); # endif if (p == NULL) goto error; if (feof(tty_in)) goto error; if (ferror(tty_in)) goto error; if ((p = (char *)strchr(result, '\n')) != NULL) { if (strip_nl) *p = '\0'; } else if (!read_till_nl(tty_in)) goto error; if (UI_set_result(ui, uis, result) >= 0) ok = 1; error: if (intr_signal == SIGINT) ok = -1; if (!echo) fprintf(tty_out, "\n"); if (ps >= 2 && !echo && !echo_console(ui)) ok = 0; if (ps >= 1) popsig(); #else ok = 1; #endif OPENSSL_cleanse(result, BUFSIZ); return ok; } /* Internal functions to open, handle and close a channel to the console. */ static int open_console(UI *ui) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_UI); is_a_tty = 1; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS) tty_in = stdin; tty_out = stderr; #else # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # define DEV_TTY "con" # else # define DEV_TTY "/dev/tty" # endif if ((tty_in = fopen(DEV_TTY, "r")) == NULL) tty_in = stdin; if ((tty_out = fopen(DEV_TTY, "w")) == NULL) tty_out = stderr; #endif #if defined(TTY_get) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (TTY_get(fileno(tty_in), &tty_orig) == -1) { # ifdef ENOTTY if (errno == ENOTTY) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef EINVAL /* * Ariel Glenn ariel@columbia.edu reports that solaris can return * EINVAL instead. This should be ok */ if (errno == EINVAL) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef ENODEV /* * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device), * which seems appropriate. */ if (errno == ENODEV) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif return 0; } #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS status = sys$assign(&terminal, &channel, 0, 0); /* if there isn't a TT device, something is very wrong */ if (status != SS$_NORMAL) return 0; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SENSEMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_orig, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); /* If IO$_SENSEMODE doesn't work, this is not a terminal device */ if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) is_a_tty = 0; #endif return 1; } static int noecho_console(UI *ui) { #ifdef TTY_FLAGS memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig)); tty_new.TTY_FLAGS &= ~ECHO; #endif #if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1)) return 0; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (is_a_tty) { tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0]; tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] | TT$M_NOECHO; tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2]; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) return 0; } #endif return 1; } static int echo_console(UI *ui) { #if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig)); - tty_new.TTY_FLAGS |= ECHO; -#endif - -#if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1)) return 0; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (is_a_tty) { tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0]; - tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] & ~TT$M_NOECHO; + tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1]; tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2]; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) return 0; } #endif return 1; } static int close_console(UI *ui) { if (tty_in != stdin) fclose(tty_in); if (tty_out != stderr) fclose(tty_out); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS status = sys$dassgn(channel); if (status != SS$_NORMAL) return 0; #endif CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_UI); return 1; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) /* Internal functions to handle signals and act on them */ static void pushsig(void) { # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 int i; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION struct sigaction sa; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sa_handler = recsig; # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 savsig[SIGABRT] = signal(SIGABRT, recsig); savsig[SIGFPE] = signal(SIGFPE, recsig); savsig[SIGILL] = signal(SIGILL, recsig); savsig[SIGINT] = signal(SIGINT, recsig); savsig[SIGSEGV] = signal(SIGSEGV, recsig); savsig[SIGTERM] = signal(SIGTERM, recsig); # else for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) { # ifdef SIGUSR1 if (i == SIGUSR1) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGUSR2 if (i == SIGUSR2) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGKILL if (i == SIGKILL) /* We can't make any action on that. */ continue; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION sigaction(i, &sa, &savsig[i]); # else savsig[i] = signal(i, recsig); # endif } # endif # ifdef SIGWINCH signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); # endif } static void popsig(void) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 signal(SIGABRT, savsig[SIGABRT]); signal(SIGFPE, savsig[SIGFPE]); signal(SIGILL, savsig[SIGILL]); signal(SIGINT, savsig[SIGINT]); signal(SIGSEGV, savsig[SIGSEGV]); signal(SIGTERM, savsig[SIGTERM]); # else int i; for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) { # ifdef SIGUSR1 if (i == SIGUSR1) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGUSR2 if (i == SIGUSR2) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION sigaction(i, &savsig[i], NULL); # else signal(i, savsig[i]); # endif } # endif } static void recsig(int i) { intr_signal = i; } #endif /* Internal functions specific for Windows */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty) { int i; char *p; p = buf; for (;;) { if (size == 0) { *p = '\0'; break; } size--; # ifdef WIN16TTY i = _inchar(); # elif defined(_WIN32) i = _getch(); # else i = getch(); # endif if (i == '\r') i = '\n'; *(p++) = i; if (i == '\n') { *p = '\0'; break; } } # ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG /* * Win95 has several evil console bugs: one of these is that the last * character read using getch() is passed to the next read: this is * usually a CR so this can be trouble. No STDIO fix seems to work but * flushing the console appears to do the trick. */ { HANDLE inh; inh = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); FlushConsoleInputBuffer(inh); } # endif return (strlen(buf)); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,498 +1,498 @@ /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { int i; X509_CINF *ai, *bi; ai = a->cert_info; bi = b->cert_info; i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); if (i) return (i); return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) { unsigned long ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX ctx; unsigned char md[16]; char *f; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) goto err; OPENSSL_free(f); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) goto err; ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return (ret); } #endif int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); } int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); } int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); } #endif X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) { return (a->cert_info->issuer); } unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); } #endif X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) { return (a->cert_info->subject); } ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); } unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA /* * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. */ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { int rv; /* ensure hash is valid */ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); if (rv) return rv; /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); if (rv) return rv; return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, a->cert_info->enc.len); } return rv; } #endif int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { int ret; /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); if (ret < 0) return -2; } if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); if (ret < 0) return -2; } ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; - if (ret) + if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0) return ret; return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); } unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) { unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) return 0; ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 /* * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, * this is reasonably efficient. */ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) { EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char md[16]; /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (ret); } #endif /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { int i; X509_CINF cinf; X509 x, *x509 = NULL; if (!sk) return NULL; x.cert_info = &cinf; cinf.serialNumber = serial; cinf.issuer = name; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) return (x509); } return (NULL); } X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) { X509 *x509; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) return (x509); } return (NULL); } EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) { if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) return (NULL); return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); } ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) { if (!x) return NULL; return x->cert_info->key->public_key; } int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) { EVP_PKEY *xk; int ret; xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (xk) ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); else ret = -2; switch (ret) { case 1: break; case 0: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); break; case -1: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); break; case -2: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); } if (xk) EVP_PKEY_free(xk); if (ret > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) { const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; int curve_nid; if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); if (!grp) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ /* * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. */ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; } else return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; return X509_V_OK; } int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags) { int rv, i, sign_nid; EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; unsigned long tflags; if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; tflags = flags; /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ if (x == NULL) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); i = 1; } else i = 0; if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; /* Correct error depth */ i = 0; goto end; } pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); /* Check EE key only */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { /* Correct error depth */ i = 0; goto end; } for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; goto end; } EVP_PKEY_free(pk); pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) goto end; } /* Final check: root CA signature */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); end: if (pk) EVP_PKEY_free(pk); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) i--; /* * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. */ if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; if (perror_depth) *perror_depth = i; } return rv; } int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) { int sign_nid; if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); } #else int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags) { return 0; } int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) { return 0; } #endif /* * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of * each X509 structure. */ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(X509) *ret; int i; ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); } return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,727 +1,743 @@ /* crypto/x509/x509_lu.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include X509_LOOKUP *X509_LOOKUP_new(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method) { X509_LOOKUP *ret; ret = (X509_LOOKUP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_LOOKUP)); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; ret->init = 0; ret->skip = 0; ret->method = method; ret->method_data = NULL; ret->store_ctx = NULL; if ((method->new_item != NULL) && !method->new_item(ret)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void X509_LOOKUP_free(X509_LOOKUP *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; if ((ctx->method != NULL) && (ctx->method->free != NULL)) (*ctx->method->free) (ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int X509_LOOKUP_init(X509_LOOKUP *ctx) { if (ctx->method == NULL) return 0; if (ctx->method->init != NULL) return ctx->method->init(ctx); else return 1; } int X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(X509_LOOKUP *ctx) { if (ctx->method == NULL) return 0; if (ctx->method->shutdown != NULL) return ctx->method->shutdown(ctx); else return 1; } int X509_LOOKUP_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl, char **ret) { if (ctx->method == NULL) return -1; if (ctx->method->ctrl != NULL) return ctx->method->ctrl(ctx, cmd, argc, argl, ret); else return 1; } int X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret) { if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_subject == NULL)) return X509_LU_FAIL; if (ctx->skip) return 0; return ctx->method->get_by_subject(ctx, type, name, ret); } int X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_OBJECT *ret) { if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial == NULL)) return X509_LU_FAIL; return ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial(ctx, type, name, serial, ret); } int X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret) { if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint == NULL)) return X509_LU_FAIL; return ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint(ctx, type, bytes, len, ret); } int X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, char *str, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret) { if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_alias == NULL)) return X509_LU_FAIL; return ctx->method->get_by_alias(ctx, type, str, len, ret); } static int x509_object_cmp(const X509_OBJECT *const *a, const X509_OBJECT *const *b) { int ret; ret = ((*a)->type - (*b)->type); if (ret) return ret; switch ((*a)->type) { case X509_LU_X509: ret = X509_subject_name_cmp((*a)->data.x509, (*b)->data.x509); break; case X509_LU_CRL: ret = X509_CRL_cmp((*a)->data.crl, (*b)->data.crl); break; default: /* abort(); */ return 0; } return ret; } X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void) { X509_STORE *ret; if ((ret = (X509_STORE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ret->objs = sk_X509_OBJECT_new(x509_object_cmp)) == NULL) goto err0; ret->cache = 1; if ((ret->get_cert_methods = sk_X509_LOOKUP_new_null()) == NULL) goto err1; ret->verify = 0; ret->verify_cb = 0; if ((ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL) goto err2; ret->get_issuer = 0; ret->check_issued = 0; ret->check_revocation = 0; ret->get_crl = 0; ret->check_crl = 0; ret->cert_crl = 0; ret->lookup_certs = 0; ret->lookup_crls = 0; ret->cleanup = 0; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, ret, &ret->ex_data)) goto err3; ret->references = 1; return ret; err3: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ret->param); err2: sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(ret->get_cert_methods); err1: sk_X509_OBJECT_free(ret->objs); err0: OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } static void cleanup(X509_OBJECT *a) { if (!a) return; if (a->type == X509_LU_X509) { X509_free(a->data.x509); } else if (a->type == X509_LU_CRL) { X509_CRL_free(a->data.crl); } else { /* abort(); */ } OPENSSL_free(a); } void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *vfy) { int i; STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk; X509_LOOKUP *lu; if (vfy == NULL) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&vfy->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("X509_STORE", vfy); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "X509_STORE_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif sk = vfy->get_cert_methods; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) { lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i); X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(lu); X509_LOOKUP_free(lu); } sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(sk); sk_X509_OBJECT_pop_free(vfy->objs, cleanup); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, vfy, &vfy->ex_data); if (vfy->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vfy->param); OPENSSL_free(vfy); } X509_LOOKUP *X509_STORE_add_lookup(X509_STORE *v, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *m) { int i; STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk; X509_LOOKUP *lu; sk = v->get_cert_methods; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) { lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i); if (m == lu->method) { return lu; } } /* a new one */ lu = X509_LOOKUP_new(m); if (lu == NULL) return NULL; else { lu->store_ctx = v; if (sk_X509_LOOKUP_push(v->get_cert_methods, lu)) return lu; else { X509_LOOKUP_free(lu); return NULL; } } } int X509_STORE_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, int type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret) { X509_STORE *ctx = vs->ctx; X509_LOOKUP *lu; X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp; int i, j; + if (ctx == NULL) + return 0; + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + tmp = X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(ctx->objs, type, name); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); if (tmp == NULL || type == X509_LU_CRL) { for (i = vs->current_method; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(ctx->get_cert_methods); i++) { lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(ctx->get_cert_methods, i); j = X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(lu, type, name, &stmp); if (j < 0) { vs->current_method = j; return j; } else if (j) { tmp = &stmp; break; } } vs->current_method = 0; if (tmp == NULL) return 0; } /*- if (ret->data.ptr != NULL) X509_OBJECT_free_contents(ret); */ ret->type = tmp->type; ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr; X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(ret); return 1; } int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x) { X509_OBJECT *obj; int ret = 1; if (x == NULL) return 0; obj = (X509_OBJECT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT)); if (obj == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } obj->type = X509_LU_X509; obj->data.x509 = x; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) { X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); OPENSSL_free(obj); X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); ret = 0; } else if (!sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj)) { X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); OPENSSL_free(obj); X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); return ret; } int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x) { X509_OBJECT *obj; int ret = 1; if (x == NULL) return 0; obj = (X509_OBJECT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT)); if (obj == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } obj->type = X509_LU_CRL; obj->data.crl = x; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) { X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); OPENSSL_free(obj); X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); ret = 0; } else if (!sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj)) { X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); OPENSSL_free(obj); X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); return ret; } void X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(X509_OBJECT *a) { switch (a->type) { case X509_LU_X509: CRYPTO_add(&a->data.x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); break; case X509_LU_CRL: CRYPTO_add(&a->data.crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); break; } } void X509_OBJECT_free_contents(X509_OBJECT *a) { switch (a->type) { case X509_LU_X509: X509_free(a->data.x509); break; case X509_LU_CRL: X509_CRL_free(a->data.crl); break; } } static int x509_object_idx_cnt(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, int type, X509_NAME *name, int *pnmatch) { X509_OBJECT stmp; X509 x509_s; X509_CINF cinf_s; X509_CRL crl_s; X509_CRL_INFO crl_info_s; int idx; stmp.type = type; switch (type) { case X509_LU_X509: stmp.data.x509 = &x509_s; x509_s.cert_info = &cinf_s; cinf_s.subject = name; break; case X509_LU_CRL: stmp.data.crl = &crl_s; crl_s.crl = &crl_info_s; crl_info_s.issuer = name; break; default: /* abort(); */ return -1; } idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, &stmp); if (idx >= 0 && pnmatch) { int tidx; const X509_OBJECT *tobj, *pstmp; *pnmatch = 1; pstmp = &stmp; for (tidx = idx + 1; tidx < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); tidx++) { tobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, tidx); if (x509_object_cmp(&tobj, &pstmp)) break; (*pnmatch)++; } } return idx; } int X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, int type, X509_NAME *name) { return x509_object_idx_cnt(h, type, name, NULL); } X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, int type, X509_NAME *name) { int idx; idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(h, type, name); if (idx == -1) return NULL; return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx); } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { int i, idx, cnt; STACK_OF(X509) *sk; X509 *x; X509_OBJECT *obj; + + if (ctx->ctx == NULL) + return NULL; + sk = sk_X509_new_null(); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt); if (idx < 0) { /* * Nothing found in cache: do lookup to possibly add new objects to * cache */ X509_OBJECT xobj; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); if (!X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, nm, &xobj)) { sk_X509_free(sk); return NULL; } X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&xobj); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt); if (idx < 0) { CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); sk_X509_free(sk); return NULL; } } for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) { obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx); x = obj->data.x509; CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return NULL; } } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); return sk; } STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { int i, idx, cnt; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk; X509_CRL *x; X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj; + + + if (ctx->ctx == NULL) + return NULL; + sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); /* * Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache */ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); if (!X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj)) { sk_X509_CRL_free(sk); return NULL; } X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&xobj); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt); if (idx < 0) { CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); sk_X509_CRL_free(sk); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) { obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx); x = obj->data.crl; CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x)) { CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); X509_CRL_free(x); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(sk, X509_CRL_free); return NULL; } } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); return sk; } X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_OBJECT *x) { int idx, i; X509_OBJECT *obj; idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, x); if (idx == -1) return NULL; if ((x->type != X509_LU_X509) && (x->type != X509_LU_CRL)) return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx); for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); i++) { obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, i); if (x509_object_cmp ((const X509_OBJECT **)&obj, (const X509_OBJECT **)&x)) return NULL; if (x->type == X509_LU_X509) { if (!X509_cmp(obj->data.x509, x->data.x509)) return obj; } else if (x->type == X509_LU_CRL) { if (!X509_CRL_match(obj->data.crl, x->data.crl)) return obj; } else return obj; } return NULL; } /*- * Try to get issuer certificate from store. Due to limitations * of the API this can only retrieve a single certificate matching * a given subject name. However it will fill the cache with all * matching certificates, so we can examine the cache for all * matches. * * Return values are: * 1 lookup successful. * 0 certificate not found. * -1 some other error. */ int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { X509_NAME *xn; X509_OBJECT obj, *pobj; int i, ok, idx, ret; xn = X509_get_issuer_name(x); ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, xn, &obj); if (ok != X509_LU_X509) { if (ok == X509_LU_RETRY) { X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_GET1_ISSUER, X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY); return -1; } else if (ok != X509_LU_FAIL) { X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); /* not good :-(, break anyway */ return -1; } return 0; } /* If certificate matches all OK */ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, obj.data.x509)) { *issuer = obj.data.x509; return 1; } X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); + + if (ctx->ctx == NULL) + return 0; /* Else find index of first cert accepted by 'check_issued' */ ret = 0; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, xn); if (idx != -1) { /* should be true as we've had at least one * match */ /* Look through all matching certs for suitable issuer */ for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(ctx->ctx->objs); i++) { pobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, i); /* See if we've run past the matches */ if (pobj->type != X509_LU_X509) break; if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn, X509_get_subject_name(pobj->data.x509))) break; if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, pobj->data.x509)) { *issuer = pobj->data.x509; X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(pobj); ret = 1; break; } } } CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); return ret; } int X509_STORE_set_flags(X509_STORE *ctx, unsigned long flags) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); } int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); return 1; } int X509_STORE_set_purpose(X509_STORE *ctx, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose); } int X509_STORE_set_trust(X509_STORE *ctx, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust); } int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param); } void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx, int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; } void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(X509_STORE *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)) { ctx->lookup_crls = cb; } X509_STORE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->ctx; } IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,2629 +1,2578 @@ /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ +#include #include #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "vpm_int.h" /* CRL score values */ /* No unhandled critical extensions */ #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* CRL times valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons); static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) { return ok; } #if 0 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) { return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); } #endif /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) { X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) return 1; else return 0; } /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs; X509 *xtmp = NULL; int i; /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); if (certs == NULL) return NULL; /* Look for exact match */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) break; } if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); else xtmp = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); return xtmp; } int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; int bad_chain = 0; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; int depth, i, ok = 0; int num, j, retry; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; int err; if (ctx->cert == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } if (ctx->chain != NULL) { /* * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We * cannot do another one. */ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that * the first entry is in place */ if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); ctx->last_untrusted = 1; /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); depth = param->depth; for (;;) { /* If we have enough, we break */ if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take * note of it and, if appropriate, use the * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code * later. */ /* If we are self signed, we break */ if (cert_self_signed(x)) break; /* * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; goto err; } /* * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up * again later. */ if (ok > 0) { X509_free(xtmp); break; } } /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); if (xtmp != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); ctx->last_untrusted++; x = xtmp; num++; /* * reparse the full chain for the next one */ continue; } } break; } /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ j = num; /* * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we * complain. */ do { /* * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. */ i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); if (cert_self_signed(x)) { /* we have a self signed certificate */ if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { /* * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid * possible impersonation. */ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->error_depth = i - 1; if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); bad_chain = 1; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } else { /* * We have a match: replace certificate with store * version so we get any trust settings. */ X509_free(x); x = xtmp; (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); ctx->last_untrusted = 0; } } else { /* * extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); ctx->last_untrusted--; num--; j--; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); } } /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ for (;;) { /* If we have enough, we break */ if (depth < num) break; /* If we are self signed, we break */ if (cert_self_signed(x)) break; ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; goto err; } if (ok == 0) break; x = xtmp; if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ok = -1; goto err; } num++; } /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { /* Callback already issued */ ok = 0; goto err; } /* * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate * chain checking */ retry = 0; if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { while (j-- > 1) { xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); if (ok < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; goto err; } /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ if (ok > 0) { /* * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later */ X509_free(xtmp); /* * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an * alternate chain */ while (num > j) { xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); X509_free(xtmp); num--; } ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); retry = 1; break; } } } } while (retry); /* * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already * and set bad_chain == 1 */ if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; else ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; ctx->current_cert = x; } else { sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); num++; ctx->last_untrusted = num; ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; chain_ss = NULL; } ctx->error_depth = num - 1; bad_chain = 1; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; /* Check name constraints */ ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; ok = check_id(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); /* * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. */ ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, ctx->param->flags); if (err != X509_V_OK) { ctx->error = err; ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ if (ctx->verify != NULL) ok = ctx->verify(ctx); else ok = internal_verify(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; #endif /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); if (!ok) goto err; if (0) { err: /* Ensure we return an error */ if (ok > 0) ok = 0; X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); } if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */ if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return ok; } /* * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) */ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) { int i; X509 *issuer; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) return issuer; } return NULL; } /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) { int ret; ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); if (ret == X509_V_OK) return 1; /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) return 0; ctx->error = ret; ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->current_issuer = issuer; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); if (*issuer) { CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); return 1; } else return 0; } /* * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied * purpose */ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY return 1; #else int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; X509 *x; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); int proxy_path_length = 0; int purpose; int allow_proxy_certs; cb = ctx->verify_cb; /*- * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. */ must_be_ca = -1; /* CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) { allow_proxy_certs = 0; purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; } else { allow_proxy_certs = ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); /* * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software * happy */ if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) allow_proxy_certs = 1; purpose = ctx->param->purpose; } /* Check all untrusted certificates */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { int ret; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } ret = X509_check_ca(x); switch (must_be_ca) { case -1: if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; case 0: if (ret != 0) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; } else ret = 1; break; default: if ((ret == 0) || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1))) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; } if (ret == 0) { ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); if ((ret == 0) || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1))) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } } /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } /* Increment path length if not self issued */ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) plen++; /* * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { /* * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. * * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, * increment proxy_path_length. */ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; } proxy_path_length++; must_be_ca = 0; } else must_be_ca = 1; } ok = 1; end: return ok; #endif } static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *x; int i, j, rv; /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) continue; /* * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry * added. * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; int last_object_nid = 0; int err = X509_V_OK; int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ if (last_object_loc < 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as * there is in issuer. */ if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a * multivalued RDN */ if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly */ tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); if (tmpsubject == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc); last_object_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; } X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); proxy_name_done: if (err != X509_V_OK) { ctx->error = err; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } } /* * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them * to be obeyed. */ for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; if (nc) { rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); switch (rv) { case X509_V_OK: continue; case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: ctx->error = rv; return 0; default: ctx->error = rv; ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; break; } } } } return 1; } static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) { ctx->error = errcode; ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; ctx->error_depth = 0; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) { int i; int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); char *name; if (id->peername != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(id->peername); id->peername = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0) return 1; } return n == 0; } static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; X509 *x = ctx->cert; if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i, ok; X509 *x = NULL; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; /* * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not * overridden. */ if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { ctx->error_depth = i; ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; } } /* * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate * return success. */ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { X509 *mx; if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); if (mx) { (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); X509_free(x); ctx->last_untrusted = 0; return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; } } /* * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. */ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i, last, ok; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) return 1; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; else { /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ if (ctx->parent) return 1; last = 0; } for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { ctx->error_depth = i; ok = check_cert(ctx); if (!ok) return ok; } return 1; } static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; X509 *x; int ok, cnum; unsigned int last_reasons; cnum = ctx->error_depth; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) return 1; while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ if (ctx->get_crl) ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); else ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); /* * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */ if (!ok) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); goto err; } ctx->current_crl = crl; ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); if (!ok) goto err; if (dcrl) { ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); if (!ok) goto err; ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); if (!ok) goto err; } else ok = 1; /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ if (ok != 2) { ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); if (!ok) goto err; } X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); crl = NULL; dcrl = NULL; /* * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, * so exit loop. */ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); goto err; } } err: X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); ctx->current_crl = NULL; return ok; } /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (notify) ctx->current_crl = crl; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } if (i > 0) { if (!notify) return 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { if (!notify) return 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } } if (notify) ctx->current_crl = NULL; return 1; } static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); reasons = *preasons; crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) continue; /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { int day, sec; if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl), X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) continue; /* * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| * and |sec|. */ if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) continue; } best_crl = crl; best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; best_score = crl_score; best_reasons = reasons; } if (best_crl) { if (*pcrl) X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); *pcrl = best_crl; *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; *pscore = best_score; *preasons = best_reasons; CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); if (*pdcrl) { X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); *pdcrl = NULL; } get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); } if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) return 1; return 0; } /* * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. */ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; int i; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) return 0; exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); } else exta = NULL; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) return 0; extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); } else extb = NULL; if (!exta && !extb) return 1; if (!exta || !extb) return 0; if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) return 0; return 1; } /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) { /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ if (!delta->base_crl_number) return 0; /* Base must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number) return 0; /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) return 0; /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) return 0; if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) return 0; /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 0; /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or * retrieve a chain of deltas... */ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { X509_CRL *delta; int i; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) return; if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); *dcrl = delta; return; } } *dcrl = NULL; } /* * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. */ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { int crl_score = 0; unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) return 0; /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) return 0; } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; } /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ else if (crl->base_crl_number) return 0; /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) return 0; } else crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; /* Check expiry */ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) return 0; /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; } *preasons = tmp_reasons; return crl_score; } static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) { X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); int cidx = ctx->error_depth; int i; if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) cidx++; crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) return; /* * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of * untrusted certificates. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pissuer = crl_issuer; *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; return; } } } /* * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. */ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; int ret; /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) return 0; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) return -1; crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; /* Copy verify params across */ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); crl_ctx.parent = ctx; crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* Verify CRL issuer */ ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); if (ret <= 0) goto err; /* Check chain is acceptable */ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); err: X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); return ret; } /* * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the * RFC5280 version */ static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) { X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) return 1; return 0; } /*- * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. */ static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) { X509_NAME *nm = NULL; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; int i, j; if (!a || !b) return 1; if (a->type == 1) { if (!a->dpname) return 0; /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) return 1; else return 0; } /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ nm = a->dpname; gens = b->name.fullname; } else if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ gens = a->name.fullname; nm = b->dpname; } /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ if (nm) { for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) return 1; } } return 0; } static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) { int i; X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ if (!dp->CRLissuer) return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons) { int i; if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) return 0; } else { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) return 0; } *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; return 1; } } } if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) return 1; return 0; } /* * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try * to find a delta CRL too */ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) { int ok; X509 *issuer = NULL; int crl_score = 0; unsigned int reasons; X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); reasons = ctx->current_reasons; ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); if (ok) goto done; /* Lookup CRLs from store */ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ if (!skcrl && crl) goto done; get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); done: /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ if (crl) { ctx->current_issuer = issuer; ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; ctx->current_reasons = reasons; *pcrl = crl; *pdcrl = dcrl; return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRL validity */ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) { X509 *issuer = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; cnum = ctx->error_depth; chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ if (ctx->current_issuer) issuer = ctx->current_issuer; /* * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next * certificate in chain. */ else if (cnum < chnum) issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); else { issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } } if (issuer) { /* * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done */ if (!crl->base_crl_number) { /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } } if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } } if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); if (!ok) goto err; } /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); if (!ikey) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } else { int rv; rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { ctx->error = rv; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } /* Verify CRL signature */ if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) goto err; } } } ok = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); return ok; } /* Check certificate against CRL */ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { int ok; X509_REVOKED *rev; /* * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can * change the meaning of CRL entries. */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) return 0; } /* * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason * is not removeFromCRL. */ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) return 2; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (ctx->parent) return 1; ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); if (ret == 0) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ if (ret == -1) { /* * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ X509 *x; int i; for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) continue; ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } if (ret == -2) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; /* * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. */ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); if (i == 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } if (i > 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); if (i == 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } if (i < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; ctx->current_cert = x; if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int ok = 0, n; X509 *xs, *xi; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); cb = ctx->verify_cb; n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); ctx->error_depth = n - 1; n--; xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) xs = xi; else { if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { xs = xi; goto check_cert; } if (n <= 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; ctx->current_cert = xi; ok = cb(0, ctx); goto end; } else { n--; ctx->error_depth = n; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } } /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ while (n >= 0) { ctx->error_depth = n; /* * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes * time. */ if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; ctx->current_cert = xi; ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; ctx->current_cert = xs; ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); if (!ok) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); goto end; } } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); pkey = NULL; } xs->valid = 1; check_cert: ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); if (!ok) goto end; /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ ctx->current_issuer = xi; ctx->current_cert = xs; ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); if (!ok) goto end; n--; if (n >= 0) { xi = xs; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } } ok = 1; end: return ok; } int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) { return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); } int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) { - char *str; - ASN1_TIME atm; - long offset; - char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; - int i, j, remaining; + static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; + static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; + ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; + int i, day, sec, ret = 0; - p = buff1; - remaining = ctm->length; - str = (char *)ctm->data; /* - * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the - * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: + * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. + * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ + * + * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: + * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate + * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity + * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." */ - if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { - /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ - int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; - int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; - if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) + switch (ctm->type) { + case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: + if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) return 0; - memcpy(p, str, 10); - p += 10; - str += 10; - remaining -= 10; - } else { - /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ - int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; - int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; - if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) + break; + case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: + if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) return 0; - memcpy(p, str, 12); - p += 12; - str += 12; - remaining -= 12; + break; + default: + return 0; } - if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { - *(p++) = '0'; - *(p++) = '0'; - } else { - /* SS (seconds) */ - if (remaining < 2) + /** + * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more + * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. + * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. + */ + for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { + if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i])) return 0; - *(p++) = *(str++); - *(p++) = *(str++); - remaining -= 2; - /* - * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... - * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. - * Can we just kill them altogether? - */ - if (remaining && *str == '.') { - str++; - remaining--; - for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { - if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') - break; - } - } - } - *(p++) = 'Z'; - *(p++) = '\0'; - - /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ - if (!remaining) + if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z') return 0; - if (*str == 'Z') { - if (remaining != 1) - return 0; - offset = 0; - } else { - /* (+-)HHMM */ - if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) - return 0; - /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ - if (remaining != 5) - return 0; - if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || - str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') - return 0; - offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; - offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); - if (*str == '-') - offset = -offset; - } - atm.type = ctm->type; - atm.flags = 0; - atm.length = sizeof(buff2); - atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; - if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) - return 0; + /* + * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no + * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, + * so we go through ASN.1 + */ + asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); + if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time)) + goto err; - if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { - i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); - if (i < 50) - i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ - j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); - if (j < 50) - j += 100; + /* + * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. + * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. + */ + ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; - if (i < j) - return -1; - if (i > j) - return 1; - } - i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); - if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ - return -1; - else - return i; + err: + ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); + return ret; } ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) { return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { time_t t; if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; else time(&t); if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; int i, j; if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) break; else { EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); ktmp = NULL; } } if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); return 0; } /* first, populate the other certs */ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); } if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); return 1; } /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL; int i; STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; /* CRLs can't be delta already */ if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); return NULL; } /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); return NULL; } /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); return NULL; } if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); return NULL; } /* CRLs must verify */ if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* Create new CRL */ crl = X509_CRL_new(); if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) goto memerr; /* Set issuer name */ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) goto memerr; /* * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL * number to correct value too. */ for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { X509_EXTENSION *ext; ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) goto memerr; } /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); /* * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. */ if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) { rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); if (!rvtmp) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); goto memerr; } } } /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) goto memerr; return crl; memerr: X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if (crl) X509_CRL_free(crl); return NULL; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { /* * This function is (usually) called only once, by * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); } void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) { ctx->error = err; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error_depth; } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_cert; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->chain; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx->chain) return NULL; return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_issuer; } X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->parent; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->cert = x; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->untrusted = sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) { ctx->crls = sk; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) { return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) { return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); } /* * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL * client/server. */ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, int purpose, int trust) { int idx; /* If purpose not set use default */ if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ if (purpose) { X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); } /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; } if (trust) { idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); return 0; } } if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; return 1; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) { X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); if (!ctx) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); return ctx; } void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) return; X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int ret = 1; ctx->ctx = store; ctx->current_method = 0; ctx->cert = x509; ctx->untrusted = chain; ctx->crls = NULL; ctx->last_untrusted = 0; ctx->other_ctx = NULL; ctx->valid = 0; ctx->chain = NULL; ctx->error = 0; ctx->explicit_policy = 0; ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; ctx->tree = NULL; ctx->parent = NULL; /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!ctx->param) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */ if (store) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); else ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; if (store) { ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */ ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; } else ctx->cleanup = 0; if (ret) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); if (ret == 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (store && store->check_issued) ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; else ctx->check_issued = check_issued; if (store && store->get_issuer) ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; else ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; if (store && store->verify_cb) ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; else ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; if (store && store->verify) ctx->verify = store->verify; else ctx->verify = internal_verify; if (store && store->check_revocation) ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; else ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; if (store && store->get_crl) ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; else ctx->get_crl = NULL; if (store && store->check_crl) ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; else ctx->check_crl = check_crl; if (store && store->cert_crl) ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; else ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; if (store && store->lookup_certs) ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; else ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; if (store && store->lookup_crls) ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; else ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; ctx->check_policy = check_policy; if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &ctx->ex_data)) return 1; X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: /* * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. */ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return 0; } /* * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. */ void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->other_ctx = sk; ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { /* * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the * pointers below after they're freed! */ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { ctx->cleanup(ctx); ctx->cleanup = NULL; } if (ctx->param != NULL) { if (ctx->parent == NULL) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = NULL; } if (ctx->tree != NULL) { X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); ctx->tree = NULL; } if (ctx->chain != NULL) { sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); ctx->chain = NULL; } CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; } X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->tree; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->explicit_policy; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) { const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); if (!param) return 0; return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { if (ctx->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = param; } IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,853 +1,858 @@ /* v3_purp.c */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2001. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b); static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", NULL}, }; #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) { return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; } /* * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const * things. */ int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) { int idx; const X509_PURPOSE *pt; - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - x509v3_cache_extensions(x); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - } + + x509v3_cache_extensions(x); + + /* Return if side-effect only call */ if (id == -1) return 1; idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); if (idx == -1) return -1; pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); } int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) { if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); return 0; } *p = purpose; return 1; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) { if (!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; } X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) { if (idx < 0) return NULL; if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx; return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); } int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) { int i; X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i; } return -1; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) { X509_PURPOSE tmp; int idx; if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; tmp.purpose = purpose; if (!xptable) return -1; idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); if (idx == -1) return -1; return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; } int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), char *name, char *sname, void *arg) { int idx; X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; /* * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */ flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; /* Get existing entry if any */ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); /* Need a new entry */ if (idx == -1) { if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; } else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); } /* dup supplied name */ ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name); ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname); if (!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; /* Set all other flags */ ptmp->flags |= flags; ptmp->purpose = id; ptmp->trust = trust; ptmp->check_purpose = ck; ptmp->usr_data = arg; /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ if (idx == -1) { if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } return 1; } static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) { if (!p) return; if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { OPENSSL_free(p->name); OPENSSL_free(p->sname); } OPENSSL_free(p); } } void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) { unsigned int i; sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i); xptable = NULL; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->purpose; } char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->name; } char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->sname; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->trust; } static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b) { return *a - *b; } DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) { /* * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical * order because it will be searched using bsearch. */ static const int supported_nids[] = { NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ NID_crl_distribution_points, /* 103 */ NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */ NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */ #endif NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ }; int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); if (ex_nid == NID_undef) return 0; if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int))) return 1; return 0; } static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) { X509_NAME *iname = NULL; int i; if (dp->reasons) { if (dp->reasons->length > 0) dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; if (dp->reasons->length > 1) dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; } else dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { iname = gen->d.directoryName; break; } } if (!iname) iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); } static void setup_crldp(X509 *x) { int i; x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); } #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) { BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; X509_EXTENSION *ex; int i; + if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return; + + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + return; + } + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); #endif /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ if (!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; /* Handle basic constraints */ if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { if (bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; if (bs->pathlen) { if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || !bs->ca) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; x->ex_pathlen = 0; } else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); } else x->ex_pathlen = -1; BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; } /* Handle proxy certificates */ if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; } if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); } else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; } /* Handle key usage */ if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { if (usage->length > 0) { x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; if (usage->length > 1) x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; } else x->ex_kusage = 0; x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); } x->ex_xkusage = 0; if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { case NID_server_auth: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; break; case NID_client_auth: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; break; case NID_email_protect: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; break; case NID_code_sign: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; break; case NID_ms_sgc: case NID_ns_sgc: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; break; case NID_OCSP_sign: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; break; case NID_time_stamp: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; break; case NID_dvcs: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; break; case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; break; } } sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); } if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { if (ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; else x->ex_nscert = 0; x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); } x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */ if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; } x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); if (!x->nc && (i != -1)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; setup_crldp(x); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL); x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, NULL, NULL); #endif for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) { ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) == NID_freshest_crl) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) continue; if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; break; } } x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); } /*- * CA checks common to all purposes * return codes: * 0 not a CA * 1 is a CA * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. */ static int check_ca(const X509 *x) { /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1; /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ else return 0; } else { /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3; /* * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */ else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4; /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5; /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ return 0; } } int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) { - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - x509v3_cache_extensions(x); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - } + x509v3_cache_extensions(x); return check_ca(x); } /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) { int ca_ret; ca_ret = check_ca(x); if (!ca_ret) return 0; /* check nsCertType if present */ if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret; else return 0; } static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; if (ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) return 0; /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; return 1; } /* * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual * key types. */ #define KU_TLS \ KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) return 0; if (ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0; if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) return 0; return 1; } static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int ret; ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); if (!ret || ca) return ret; /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; return ret; } /* common S/MIME checks */ static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) return 0; if (ca) { int ca_ret; ca_ret = check_ca(x); if (!ca_ret) return 0; /* check nsCertType if present */ if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret; else return 0; } if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1; /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2; return 0; } return 1; } static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int ret; ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); if (!ret || ca) return ret; if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0; return ret; } static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int ret; ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); if (!ret || ca) return ret; if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; return ret; } static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { if (ca) { int ca_ret; if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret; else return 0; } if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0; return 1; } /* * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. */ static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { /* * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value * (2)? */ if (ca) return check_ca(x); /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ return 1; } static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int i_ext; /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ if (ca) return check_ca(x); /* * Check the optional key usage field: * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall * be rejected). */ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) return 0; /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) return 0; /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); if (i_ext >= 0) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) return 0; } return 1; } static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { return 1; } /*- * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by * subject name. * These are: * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match * codes for X509_verify_cert() */ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) { if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; + x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); if (subject->akid) { int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); if (ret != X509_V_OK) return ret; } if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; return X509_V_OK; } int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) { if (!akid) return X509_V_OK; /* Check key ids (if present) */ if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; /* Check serial number */ if (akid->serial && ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; /* Check issuer name */ if (akid->issuer) { /* * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but * we only take any notice of the first. */ GENERAL_NAMES *gens; GENERAL_NAME *gen; X509_NAME *nm = NULL; int i; gens = akid->issuer; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { nm = gen->d.dirn; break; } } if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; } return X509_V_OK; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/cms.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/cms.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/cms.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,665 +1,665 @@ =pod =head1 NAME openssl-cms, cms - CMS utility =head1 SYNOPSIS B B [B<-encrypt>] [B<-decrypt>] [B<-sign>] [B<-verify>] [B<-cmsout>] [B<-resign>] [B<-data_create>] [B<-data_out>] [B<-digest_create>] [B<-digest_verify>] [B<-compress>] [B<-uncompress>] [B<-EncryptedData_encrypt>] [B<-sign_receipt>] [B<-verify_receipt receipt>] [B<-in filename>] [B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER>] [B<-rctform SMIME|PEM|DER>] [B<-out filename>] [B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER>] [B<-stream -indef -noindef>] [B<-noindef>] [B<-content filename>] [B<-text>] [B<-noout>] [B<-print>] [B<-CAfile file>] [B<-CApath dir>] [B<-no_alt_chains>] [B<-md digest>] [B<-[cipher]>] [B<-nointern>] [B<-no_signer_cert_verify>] [B<-nocerts>] [B<-noattr>] [B<-nosmimecap>] [B<-binary>] [B<-nodetach>] [B<-certfile file>] [B<-certsout file>] [B<-signer file>] [B<-recip file>] [B<-keyid>] [B<-receipt_request_all -receipt_request_first>] [B<-receipt_request_from emailaddress>] [B<-receipt_request_to emailaddress>] [B<-receipt_request_print>] [B<-secretkey key>] [B<-secretkeyid id>] [B<-econtent_type type>] [B<-inkey file>] [B<-keyopt name:parameter>] [B<-passin arg>] [B<-rand file(s)>] [B] [B<-to addr>] [B<-from addr>] [B<-subject subj>] [cert.pem]... =head1 DESCRIPTION The B command handles S/MIME v3.1 mail. It can encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify, compress and uncompress S/MIME messages. =head1 COMMAND OPTIONS There are fourteen operation options that set the type of operation to be performed. The meaning of the other options varies according to the operation type. =over 4 =item B<-encrypt> encrypt mail for the given recipient certificates. Input file is the message to be encrypted. The output file is the encrypted mail in MIME format. The actual CMS type is EnvelopedData. Note that no revocation check is done for the recipient cert, so if that key has been compromised, others may be able to decrypt the text. =item B<-decrypt> decrypt mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Expects an encrypted mail message in MIME format for the input file. The decrypted mail is written to the output file. =item B<-debug_decrypt> this option sets the B flag. This option should be used with caution: see the notes section below. =item B<-sign> sign mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Input file is the message to be signed. The signed message in MIME format is written to the output file. =item B<-verify> verify signed mail. Expects a signed mail message on input and outputs the signed data. Both clear text and opaque signing is supported. =item B<-cmsout> takes an input message and writes out a PEM encoded CMS structure. =item B<-resign> resign a message: take an existing message and one or more new signers. =item B<-data_create> Create a CMS B type. =item B<-data_out> B type and output the content. =item B<-digest_create> Create a CMS B type. =item B<-digest_verify> Verify a CMS B type and output the content. =item B<-compress> Create a CMS B type. OpenSSL must be compiled with B support for this option to work, otherwise it will output an error. =item B<-uncompress> Uncompress a CMS B type and output the content. OpenSSL must be compiled with B support for this option to work, otherwise it will output an error. =item B<-EncryptedData_encrypt> Encrypt content using supplied symmetric key and algorithm using a CMS B type and output the content. =item B<-sign_receipt> Generate and output a signed receipt for the supplied message. The input message B contain a signed receipt request. Functionality is otherwise similar to the B<-sign> operation. =item B<-verify_receipt receipt> Verify a signed receipt in filename B. The input message B contain the original receipt request. Functionality is otherwise similar to the B<-verify> operation. =item B<-in filename> the input message to be encrypted or signed or the message to be decrypted or verified. =item B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER> this specifies the input format for the CMS structure. The default is B which reads an S/MIME format message. B and B format change this to expect PEM and DER format CMS structures instead. This currently only affects the input format of the CMS structure, if no CMS structure is being input (for example with B<-encrypt> or B<-sign>) this option has no effect. =item B<-rctform SMIME|PEM|DER> specify the format for a signed receipt for use with the B<-receipt_verify> operation. =item B<-out filename> the message text that has been decrypted or verified or the output MIME format message that has been signed or verified. =item B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER> this specifies the output format for the CMS structure. The default is B which writes an S/MIME format message. B and B format change this to write PEM and DER format CMS structures instead. This currently only affects the output format of the CMS structure, if no CMS structure is being output (for example with B<-verify> or B<-decrypt>) this option has no effect. =item B<-stream -indef -noindef> the B<-stream> and B<-indef> options are equivalent and enable streaming I/O for encoding operations. This permits single pass processing of data without the need to hold the entire contents in memory, potentially supporting very large files. Streaming is automatically set for S/MIME signing with detached data if the output format is B it is currently off by default for all other operations. =item B<-noindef> disable streaming I/O where it would produce and indefinite length constructed encoding. This option currently has no effect. In future streaming will be enabled by default on all relevant operations and this option will disable it. =item B<-content filename> This specifies a file containing the detached content, this is only useful with the B<-verify> command. This is only usable if the CMS structure is using the detached signature form where the content is not included. This option will override any content if the input format is S/MIME and it uses the multipart/signed MIME content type. =item B<-text> this option adds plain text (text/plain) MIME headers to the supplied message if encrypting or signing. If decrypting or verifying it strips off text headers: if the decrypted or verified message is not of MIME type text/plain then an error occurs. =item B<-noout> for the B<-cmsout> operation do not output the parsed CMS structure. This is useful when combined with the B<-print> option or if the syntax of the CMS structure is being checked. =item B<-print> for the B<-cmsout> operation print out all fields of the CMS structure. This is mainly useful for testing purposes. =item B<-CAfile file> a file containing trusted CA certificates, only used with B<-verify>. =item B<-CApath dir> a directory containing trusted CA certificates, only used with B<-verify>. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that is a hash of each subject name (using B) should be linked to each certificate. =item B<-md digest> digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning. If not present then the default digest algorithm for the signing key will be used (usually SHA1). =item B<-[cipher]> the encryption algorithm to use. For example triple DES (168 bits) - B<-des3> or 256 bit AES - B<-aes256>. Any standard algorithm name (as used by the EVP_get_cipherbyname() function) can also be used preceded by a dash, for example B<-aes_128_cbc>. See L|enc(1)> for a list of ciphers supported by your version of OpenSSL. If not specified triple DES is used. Only used with B<-encrypt> and B<-EncryptedData_create> commands. =item B<-nointern> when verifying a message normally certificates (if any) included in the message are searched for the signing certificate. With this option only the certificates specified in the B<-certfile> option are used. The supplied certificates can still be used as untrusted CAs however. =item B<-no_signer_cert_verify> do not verify the signers certificate of a signed message. =item B<-nocerts> when signing a message the signer's certificate is normally included with this option it is excluded. This will reduce the size of the signed message but the verifier must have a copy of the signers certificate available locally (passed using the B<-certfile> option for example). =item B<-noattr> normally when a message is signed a set of attributes are included which include the signing time and supported symmetric algorithms. With this option they are not included. =item B<-nosmimecap> exclude the list of supported algorithms from signed attributes, other options such as signing time and content type are still included. =item B<-binary> normally the input message is converted to "canonical" format which is effectively using CR and LF as end of line: as required by the S/MIME specification. When this option is present no translation occurs. This is useful when handling binary data which may not be in MIME format. =item B<-nodetach> when signing a message use opaque signing: this form is more resistant to translation by mail relays but it cannot be read by mail agents that do not support S/MIME. Without this option cleartext signing with the MIME type multipart/signed is used. =item B<-certfile file> allows additional certificates to be specified. When signing these will be included with the message. When verifying these will be searched for the signers certificates. The certificates should be in PEM format. =item B<-certsout file> any certificates contained in the message are written to B. =item B<-signer file> a signing certificate when signing or resigning a message, this option can be used multiple times if more than one signer is required. If a message is being verified then the signers certificates will be written to this file if the verification was successful. =item B<-recip file> when decrypting a message this specifies the recipients certificate. The certificate must match one of the recipients of the message or an error occurs. When encrypting a message this option may be used multiple times to specify each recipient. This form B be used if customised parameters are required (for example to specify RSA-OAEP). +Only certificates carrying RSA, Diffie-Hellman or EC keys are supported by this +option. + =item B<-keyid> use subject key identifier to identify certificates instead of issuer name and serial number. The supplied certificate B include a subject key identifier extension. Supported by B<-sign> and B<-encrypt> options. =item B<-receipt_request_all -receipt_request_first> for B<-sign> option include a signed receipt request. Indicate requests should be provided by all receipient or first tier recipients (those mailed directly and not from a mailing list). Ignored it B<-receipt_request_from> is included. =item B<-receipt_request_from emailaddress> for B<-sign> option include a signed receipt request. Add an explicit email address where receipts should be supplied. =item B<-receipt_request_to emailaddress> Add an explicit email address where signed receipts should be sent to. This option B but supplied if a signed receipt it requested. =item B<-receipt_request_print> For the B<-verify> operation print out the contents of any signed receipt requests. =item B<-secretkey key> specify symmetric key to use. The key must be supplied in hex format and be consistent with the algorithm used. Supported by the B<-EncryptedData_encrypt> B<-EncrryptedData_decrypt>, B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> options. When used with B<-encrypt> or B<-decrypt> the supplied key is used to wrap or unwrap the content encryption key using an AES key in the B type. =item B<-secretkeyid id> the key identifier for the supplied symmetric key for B type. This option B be present if the B<-secretkey> option is used with B<-encrypt>. With B<-decrypt> operations the B is used to locate the relevant key if it is not supplied then an attempt is used to decrypt any B structures. =item B<-econtent_type type> set the encapsulated content type to B if not supplied the B type is used. The B argument can be any valid OID name in either text or numerical format. =item B<-inkey file> the private key to use when signing or decrypting. This must match the corresponding certificate. If this option is not specified then the private key must be included in the certificate file specified with the B<-recip> or B<-signer> file. When signing this option can be used multiple times to specify successive keys. =item B<-keyopt name:opt> for signing and encryption this option can be used multiple times to set customised parameters for the preceding key or certificate. It can currently be used to set RSA-PSS for signing, RSA-OAEP for encryption or to modify default parameters for ECDH. =item B<-passin arg> the private key password source. For more information about the format of B see the B section in L. =item B<-rand file(s)> a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see L). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for all others. =item B one or more certificates of message recipients: used when encrypting a message. =item B<-to, -from, -subject> the relevant mail headers. These are included outside the signed portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email address matches that specified in the From: address. =item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains> Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the L|verify(1)> manual page for details. =back =head1 NOTES The MIME message must be sent without any blank lines between the headers and the output. Some mail programs will automatically add a blank line. Piping the mail directly to sendmail is one way to achieve the correct format. The supplied message to be signed or encrypted must include the necessary MIME headers or many S/MIME clients wont display it properly (if at all). You can use the B<-text> option to automatically add plain text headers. A "signed and encrypted" message is one where a signed message is then encrypted. This can be produced by encrypting an already signed message: see the examples section. This version of the program only allows one signer per message but it will verify multiple signers on received messages. Some S/MIME clients choke if a message contains multiple signers. It is possible to sign messages "in parallel" by signing an already signed message. The options B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> reflect common usage in S/MIME clients. Strictly speaking these process CMS enveloped data: CMS encrypted data is used for other purposes. The B<-resign> option uses an existing message digest when adding a new signer. This means that attributes must be present in at least one existing signer using the same message digest or this operation will fail. The B<-stream> and B<-indef> options enable experimental streaming I/O support. As a result the encoding is BER using indefinite length constructed encoding and no longer DER. Streaming is supported for the B<-encrypt> operation and the B<-sign> operation if the content is not detached. Streaming is always used for the B<-sign> operation with detached data but since the content is no longer part of the CMS structure the encoding remains DER. If the B<-decrypt> option is used without a recipient certificate then an attempt is made to locate the recipient by trying each potential recipient in turn using the supplied private key. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or not and if no recipients match the message is "decrypted" using a random key which will typically output garbage. The B<-debug_decrypt> option can be used to disable the MMA attack protection and return an error if no recipient can be found: this option should be used with caution. For a fuller description see L). =head1 EXIT CODES =over 4 =item Z<>0 the operation was completely successfully. =item Z<>1 an error occurred parsing the command options. =item Z<>2 one of the input files could not be read. =item Z<>3 an error occurred creating the CMS file or when reading the MIME message. =item Z<>4 an error occurred decrypting or verifying the message. =item Z<>5 the message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out the signers certificates. =back =head1 COMPATIBILITY WITH PKCS#7 format. The B utility can only process the older B format. The B utility supports Cryptographic Message Syntax format. Use of some features will result in messages which cannot be processed by applications which only support the older format. These are detailed below. The use of the B<-keyid> option with B<-sign> or B<-encrypt>. The B<-outform PEM> option uses different headers. The B<-compress> option. The B<-secretkey> option when used with B<-encrypt>. The use of PSS with B<-sign>. The use of OAEP or non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt>. Additionally the B<-EncryptedData_create> and B<-data_create> type cannot be processed by the older B command. =head1 EXAMPLES Create a cleartext signed message: openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \ -signer mycert.pem Create an opaque signed message openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg -nodetach \ -signer mycert.pem Create a signed message, include some additional certificates and read the private key from another file: openssl cms -sign -in in.txt -text -out mail.msg \ -signer mycert.pem -inkey mykey.pem -certfile mycerts.pem Create a signed message with two signers, use key identifier: openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \ -signer mycert.pem -signer othercert.pem -keyid Send a signed message under Unix directly to sendmail, including headers: openssl cms -sign -in in.txt -text -signer mycert.pem \ -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \ -subject "Signed message" | sendmail someone@somewhere Verify a message and extract the signer's certificate if successful: openssl cms -verify -in mail.msg -signer user.pem -out signedtext.txt Send encrypted mail using triple DES: openssl cms -encrypt -in in.txt -from steve@openssl.org \ -to someone@somewhere -subject "Encrypted message" \ -des3 user.pem -out mail.msg Sign and encrypt mail: openssl cms -sign -in ml.txt -signer my.pem -text \ | openssl cms -encrypt -out mail.msg \ -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \ -subject "Signed and Encrypted message" -des3 user.pem Note: the encryption command does not include the B<-text> option because the message being encrypted already has MIME headers. Decrypt mail: openssl cms -decrypt -in mail.msg -recip mycert.pem -inkey key.pem The output from Netscape form signing is a PKCS#7 structure with the detached signature format. You can use this program to verify the signature by line wrapping the base64 encoded structure and surrounding it with: -----BEGIN PKCS7----- -----END PKCS7----- and using the command, openssl cms -verify -inform PEM -in signature.pem -content content.txt alternatively you can base64 decode the signature and use openssl cms -verify -inform DER -in signature.der -content content.txt Create an encrypted message using 128 bit Camellia: openssl cms -encrypt -in plain.txt -camellia128 -out mail.msg cert.pem Add a signer to an existing message: openssl cms -resign -in mail.msg -signer newsign.pem -out mail2.msg Sign mail using RSA-PSS: openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \ -signer mycert.pem -keyopt rsa_padding_mode:pss Create encrypted mail using RSA-OAEP: openssl cms -encrypt -in plain.txt -out mail.msg \ -recip cert.pem -keyopt rsa_padding_mode:oaep Use SHA256 KDF with an ECDH certificate: openssl cms -encrypt -in plain.txt -out mail.msg \ -recip ecdhcert.pem -keyopt ecdh_kdf_md:sha256 =head1 BUGS The MIME parser isn't very clever: it seems to handle most messages that I've thrown at it but it may choke on others. The code currently will only write out the signer's certificate to a file: if the signer has a separate encryption certificate this must be manually extracted. There should be some heuristic that determines the correct encryption certificate. Ideally a database should be maintained of a certificates for each email address. The code doesn't currently take note of the permitted symmetric encryption algorithms as supplied in the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute. this means the user has to manually include the correct encryption algorithm. It should store the list of permitted ciphers in a database and only use those. No revocation checking is done on the signer's certificate. =head1 HISTORY The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first -added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 +added in OpenSSL 1.0.0. -The B option was first added in OpenSSL 1.1.0 +The B option was first added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. -The use of B<-recip> to specify the recipient when encrypting mail was first -added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 +Support for RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2. -Support for RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. - The use of non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> was first added -to OpenSSL 1.1.0. +to OpenSSL 1.0.2. The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/config.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/config.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/config.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,351 +1,351 @@ =pod =for comment openssl_manual_section:5 =head1 NAME config - OpenSSL CONF library configuration files =head1 DESCRIPTION The OpenSSL CONF library can be used to read configuration files. It is used for the OpenSSL master configuration file B and in a few other places like B files and certificate extension files for the B utility. OpenSSL applications can also use the CONF library for their own purposes. A configuration file is divided into a number of sections. Each section starts with a line B<[ section_name ]> and ends when a new section is started or end of file is reached. A section name can consist of alphanumeric characters and underscores. The first section of a configuration file is special and is referred -to as the B section this is usually unnamed and is from the +to as the B section. This section is usually unnamed and spans from the start of file until the first named section. When a name is being looked up it is first looked up in a named section (if any) and then the default section. The environment is mapped onto a section called B. Comments can be included by preceding them with the B<#> character Each section in a configuration file consists of a number of name and value pairs of the form B The B string can contain any alphanumeric characters as well as a few punctuation symbols such as B<.> B<,> B<;> and B<_>. The B string consists of the string following the B<=> character until end of line with any leading and trailing white space removed. The value string undergoes variable expansion. This can be done by including the form B<$var> or B<${var}>: this will substitute the value of the named variable in the current section. It is also possible to substitute a value from another section using the syntax B<$section::name> or B<${section::name}>. By using the form B<$ENV::name> environment variables can be substituted. It is also possible to assign values to environment variables by using the name B, this will work if the program looks up environment variables using the B library instead of calling B directly. The value string must not exceed 64k in length after variable expansion. Otherwise an error will occur. It is possible to escape certain characters by using any kind of quote or the B<\> character. By making the last character of a line a B<\> a B string can be spread across multiple lines. In addition the sequences B<\n>, B<\r>, B<\b> and B<\t> are recognized. =head1 OPENSSL LIBRARY CONFIGURATION In OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later applications can automatically configure certain aspects of OpenSSL using the master OpenSSL configuration file, or optionally an alternative configuration file. The B utility includes this functionality: any sub command uses the master OpenSSL configuration file unless an option is used in the sub command to use an alternative configuration file. To enable library configuration the default section needs to contain an appropriate line which points to the main configuration section. The default name is B which is used by the B utility. Other applications may use an alternative name such as B. The configuration section should consist of a set of name value pairs which contain specific module configuration information. The B represents the name of the I the meaning of the B is module specific: it may, for example, represent a further configuration section containing configuration module specific information. E.g. openssl_conf = openssl_init [openssl_init] oid_section = new_oids engines = engine_section [new_oids] ... new oids here ... [engine_section] ... engine stuff here ... The features of each configuration module are described below. =head2 ASN1 OBJECT CONFIGURATION MODULE This module has the name B. The value of this variable points to a section containing name value pairs of OIDs: the name is the OID short and long name, the value is the numerical form of the OID. Although some of the B utility sub commands already have their own ASN1 OBJECT section functionality not all do. By using the ASN1 OBJECT configuration module B the B utility sub commands can see the new objects as well as any compliant applications. For example: [new_oids] some_new_oid = 1.2.3.4 some_other_oid = 1.2.3.5 In OpenSSL 0.9.8 it is also possible to set the value to the long name followed by a comma and the numerical OID form. For example: shortName = some object long name, 1.2.3.4 =head2 ENGINE CONFIGURATION MODULE This ENGINE configuration module has the name B. The value of this variable points to a section containing further ENGINE configuration information. The section pointed to by B is a table of engine names (though see B below) and further sections containing configuration information specific to each ENGINE. Each ENGINE specific section is used to set default algorithms, load dynamic, perform initialization and send ctrls. The actual operation performed depends on the I name which is the name of the name value pair. The currently supported commands are listed below. For example: [engine_section] # Configure ENGINE named "foo" foo = foo_section # Configure ENGINE named "bar" bar = bar_section [foo_section] ... foo ENGINE specific commands ... [bar_section] ... "bar" ENGINE specific commands ... The command B is used to give the ENGINE name. If used this command must be first. For example: [engine_section] # This would normally handle an ENGINE named "foo" foo = foo_section [foo_section] # Override default name and use "myfoo" instead. engine_id = myfoo The command B loads and adds an ENGINE from the given path. It is equivalent to sending the ctrls B with the path argument followed by B with value 2 and B to the dynamic ENGINE. If this is not the required behaviour then alternative ctrls can be sent directly to the dynamic ENGINE using ctrl commands. The command B determines whether to initialize the ENGINE. If the value is B<0> the ENGINE will not be initialized, if B<1> and attempt it made to initialized the ENGINE immediately. If the B command is not present then an attempt will be made to initialize the ENGINE after all commands in its section have been processed. The command B sets the default algorithms an ENGINE will supply using the functions B If the name matches none of the above command names it is assumed to be a ctrl command which is sent to the ENGINE. The value of the command is the argument to the ctrl command. If the value is the string B then no value is sent to the command. For example: [engine_section] # Configure ENGINE named "foo" foo = foo_section [foo_section] # Load engine from DSO dynamic_path = /some/path/fooengine.so # A foo specific ctrl. some_ctrl = some_value # Another ctrl that doesn't take a value. other_ctrl = EMPTY # Supply all default algorithms default_algorithms = ALL =head2 EVP CONFIGURATION MODULE This modules has the name B which points to a section containing algorithm commands. Currently the only algorithm command supported is B whose value should be a boolean string such as B or B. If the value is B this attempt to enter FIPS mode. If the call fails or the library is not FIPS capable then an error occurs. For example: alg_section = evp_settings [evp_settings] fips_mode = on =head1 NOTES If a configuration file attempts to expand a variable that doesn't exist then an error is flagged and the file will not load. This can happen if an attempt is made to expand an environment variable that doesn't exist. For example in a previous version of OpenSSL the default OpenSSL master configuration file used the value of B which may not be defined on non Unix systems and would cause an error. This can be worked around by including a B section to provide a default value: then if the environment lookup fails the default value will be used instead. For this to work properly the default value must be defined earlier in the configuration file than the expansion. See the B section for an example of how to do this. If the same variable exists in the same section then all but the last value will be silently ignored. In certain circumstances such as with DNs the same field may occur multiple times. This is usually worked around by ignoring any characters before an initial B<.> e.g. 1.OU="My first OU" 2.OU="My Second OU" =head1 EXAMPLES Here is a sample configuration file using some of the features mentioned above. # This is the default section. HOME=/temp RANDFILE= ${ENV::HOME}/.rnd configdir=$ENV::HOME/config [ section_one ] # We are now in section one. # Quotes permit leading and trailing whitespace any = " any variable name " other = A string that can \ cover several lines \ by including \\ characters message = Hello World\n [ section_two ] greeting = $section_one::message This next example shows how to expand environment variables safely. Suppose you want a variable called B to refer to a temporary filename. The directory it is placed in can determined by the the B or B environment variables but they may not be set to any value at all. If you just include the environment variable names and the variable doesn't exist then this will cause an error when an attempt is made to load the configuration file. By making use of the default section both values can be looked up with B taking priority and B used if neither is defined: TMP=/tmp # The above value is used if TMP isn't in the environment TEMP=$ENV::TMP # The above value is used if TEMP isn't in the environment tmpfile=${ENV::TEMP}/tmp.filename Simple OpenSSL library configuration example to enter FIPS mode: # Default appname: should match "appname" parameter (if any) # supplied to CONF_modules_load_file et al. openssl_conf = openssl_conf_section [openssl_conf_section] # Configuration module list alg_section = evp_sect [evp_sect] # Set to "yes" to enter FIPS mode if supported fips_mode = yes Note: in the above example you will get an error in non FIPS capable versions of OpenSSL. More complex OpenSSL library configuration. Add OID and don't enter FIPS mode: # Default appname: should match "appname" parameter (if any) # supplied to CONF_modules_load_file et al. openssl_conf = openssl_conf_section [openssl_conf_section] # Configuration module list alg_section = evp_sect oid_section = new_oids [evp_sect] # This will have no effect as FIPS mode is off by default. # Set to "yes" to enter FIPS mode, if supported fips_mode = no [new_oids] # New OID, just short name newoid1 = 1.2.3.4.1 # New OID shortname and long name newoid2 = New OID 2 long name, 1.2.3.4.2 The above examples can be used with with any application supporting library configuration if "openssl_conf" is modified to match the appropriate "appname". For example if the second sample file above is saved to "example.cnf" then the command line: OPENSSL_CONF=example.cnf openssl asn1parse -genstr OID:1.2.3.4.1 will output: 0:d=0 hl=2 l= 4 prim: OBJECT :newoid1 showing that the OID "newoid1" has been added as "1.2.3.4.1". =head1 BUGS Currently there is no way to include characters using the octal B<\nnn> form. Strings are all null terminated so nulls cannot form part of the value. The escaping isn't quite right: if you want to use sequences like B<\n> you can't use any quote escaping on the same line. Files are loaded in a single pass. This means that an variable expansion will only work if the variables referenced are defined earlier in the file. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/genpkey.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/genpkey.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/genpkey.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,229 +1,300 @@ =pod =head1 NAME openssl-genpkey, genpkey - generate a private key =head1 SYNOPSIS B B [B<-out filename>] [B<-outform PEM|DER>] [B<-pass arg>] -[B<-cipher>] +[B<-I>] [B<-engine id>] [B<-paramfile file>] [B<-algorithm alg>] [B<-pkeyopt opt:value>] [B<-genparam>] [B<-text>] =head1 DESCRIPTION The B command generates a private key. =head1 OPTIONS =over 4 =item B<-out filename> the output filename. If this argument is not specified then standard output is used. =item B<-outform DER|PEM> -This specifies the output format DER or PEM. +This specifies the output format DER or PEM. The default format is PEM. =item B<-pass arg> -the output file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +The output file password source. For more information about the format of B +see the B section in L. -=item B<-cipher> +=item B<-I> This option encrypts the private key with the supplied cipher. Any algorithm name accepted by EVP_get_cipherbyname() is acceptable such as B. =item B<-engine id> -specifying an engine (by its unique B string) will cause B +Specifying an engine (by its unique B string) will cause B to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms. If used this option should precede all other options. =item B<-algorithm alg> -public key algorithm to use such as RSA, DSA or DH. If used this option must +Public key algorithm to use such as RSA, DSA or DH. If used this option must precede any B<-pkeyopt> options. The options B<-paramfile> and B<-algorithm> -are mutually exclusive. +are mutually exclusive. Engines may add algorithms in addition to the standard +built-in ones. +Valid built-in algorithm names for private key generation are RSA and EC. + +Valid built-in algorithm names for parameter generation (see the B<-genparam> +option) are DH, DSA and EC. + +Note that the algorithm name X9.42 DH may be used as a synonym for the DH +algorithm. These are identical and do not indicate the type of parameters that +will be generated. Use the B option to indicate whether PKCS#3 +or X9.42 DH parameters are required. See L +below for more details. + =item B<-pkeyopt opt:value> -set the public key algorithm option B to B. The precise set of +Set the public key algorithm option B to B. The precise set of options supported depends on the public key algorithm used and its -implementation. See B below for more details. +implementation. See L and +L below for more details. =item B<-genparam> -generate a set of parameters instead of a private key. If used this option must -precede and B<-algorithm>, B<-paramfile> or B<-pkeyopt> options. +Generate a set of parameters instead of a private key. If used this option must +precede any B<-algorithm>, B<-paramfile> or B<-pkeyopt> options. =item B<-paramfile filename> Some public key algorithms generate a private key based on a set of parameters. They can be supplied using this option. If this option is used the public key algorithm used is determined by the parameters. If used this option must precede and B<-pkeyopt> options. The options B<-paramfile> and B<-algorithm> are mutually exclusive. =item B<-text> Print an (unencrypted) text representation of private and public keys and parameters along with the PEM or DER structure. =back =head1 KEY GENERATION OPTIONS The options supported by each algorith and indeed each implementation of an algorithm can vary. The options for the OpenSSL implementations are detailed below. -=head1 RSA KEY GENERATION OPTIONS +=head2 RSA Key Generation Options =over 4 =item B The number of bits in the generated key. If not specified 1024 is used. =item B The RSA public exponent value. This can be a large decimal or hexadecimal value if preceded by B<0x>. Default value is 65537. =back -=head1 DSA PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS +=head2 EC Key Generation Options +The EC key generation options can also be used for parameter generation. + =over 4 +=item B + +The EC curve to use. OpenSSL supports NIST curve names such as "P-256". + +=item B + +The encoding to use for parameters. The "encoding" parameter must be either +"named_curve" or "explicit". The default value is "named_curve". + +=back + +=head1 PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS + +The options supported by each algorithm and indeed each implementation of an +algorithm can vary. The options for the OpenSSL implementations are detailed +below. + +=head2 DSA Parameter Generation Options + +=over 4 + =item B -The number of bits in the generated parameters. If not specified 1024 is used. +The number of bits in the generated prime. If not specified 1024 is used. +=item B + +The number of bits in the q parameter. Must be one of 160, 224 or 256. If not +specified 160 is used. + +=item B + +The digest to use during parameter generation. Must be one of B, B +or B. If set, then the number of bits in B will match the output size +of the specified digest and the B parameter will be +ignored. If not set, then a digest will be used that gives an output matching +the number of bits in B, i.e. B if q length is 160, B if it 224 +or B if it is 256. + =back -=head1 DH PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS +=head2 DH Parameter Generation Options =over 4 =item B -The number of bits in the prime parameter B

. +The number of bits in the prime parameter B

. The default is 1024. +=item B + +The number of bits in the sub prime parameter B. The default is 256 if the +prime is at least 2048 bits long or 160 otherwise. Only relevant if used in +conjunction with the B option to generate X9.42 DH parameters. + =item B -The value to use for the generator B. +The value to use for the generator B. The default is 2. +=item B + +The type of DH parameters to generate. Use 0 for PKCS#3 DH and 1 for X9.42 DH. +The default is 0. + =item B -If this option is set then the appropriate RFC5114 parameters are used +If this option is set, then the appropriate RFC5114 parameters are used instead of generating new parameters. The value B can take the values 1, 2 or 3 corresponding to RFC5114 DH parameters consisting of 1024 bit group with 160 bit subgroup, 2048 bit group with 224 bit subgroup and 2048 bit group with 256 bit subgroup as mentioned in RFC5114 sections -2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. +2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. If present this overrides all other DH parameter +options. =back -=head1 EC PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS +=head2 EC Parameter Generation Options -=over 4 +The EC parameter generation options are the same as for key generation. See +L above. -=item B - -the EC curve to use. - -=back - =head1 GOST2001 KEY GENERATION AND PARAMETER OPTIONS Gost 2001 support is not enabled by default. To enable this algorithm, one should load the ccgost engine in the OpenSSL configuration file. See README.gost file in the engines/ccgost directiry of the source distribution for more details. Use of a parameter file for the GOST R 34.10 algorithm is optional. Parameters can be specified during key generation directly as well as during generation of parameter file. =over 4 =item B Specifies GOST R 34.10-2001 parameter set according to RFC 4357. Parameter set can be specified using abbreviated name, object short name or numeric OID. Following parameter sets are supported: paramset OID Usage A 1.2.643.2.2.35.1 Signature B 1.2.643.2.2.35.2 Signature C 1.2.643.2.2.35.3 Signature XA 1.2.643.2.2.36.0 Key exchange XB 1.2.643.2.2.36.1 Key exchange test 1.2.643.2.2.35.0 Test purposes =back - - =head1 NOTES The use of the genpkey program is encouraged over the algorithm specific utilities because additional algorithm options and ENGINE provided algorithms can be used. =head1 EXAMPLES Generate an RSA private key using default parameters: openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem Encrypt output private key using 128 bit AES and the passphrase "hello": openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -aes-128-cbc -pass pass:hello Generate a 2048 bit RSA key using 3 as the public exponent: openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 \ -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:3 -Generate 1024 bit DSA parameters: +Generate 2048 bit DSA parameters: openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DSA -out dsap.pem \ - -pkeyopt dsa_paramgen_bits:1024 + -pkeyopt dsa_paramgen_bits:2048 Generate DSA key from parameters: openssl genpkey -paramfile dsap.pem -out dsakey.pem -Generate 1024 bit DH parameters: +Generate 2048 bit DH parameters: openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -out dhp.pem \ - -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_prime_len:1024 + -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_prime_len:2048 +Generate 2048 bit X9.42 DH parameters: + + openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -out dhpx.pem \ + -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_prime_len:2048 \ + -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_type:1 + Output RFC5114 2048 bit DH parameters with 224 bit subgroup: openssl genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -out dhp.pem -pkeyopt dh_rfc5114:2 Generate DH key from parameters: openssl genpkey -paramfile dhp.pem -out dhkey.pem +Generate EC key directly: + + openssl genpkey -algorithm EC -out eckey.pem \ + -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-384 \ + -pkeyopt ec_param_enc:named_curve + +=head1 HISTORY + +The ability to use NIST curve names, and to generate an EC key directly, +were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/s_client.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/s_client.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/apps/s_client.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,388 +1,390 @@ =pod =head1 NAME openssl-s_client, s_client - SSL/TLS client program =head1 SYNOPSIS B B [B<-connect host:port>] [B<-servername name>] [B<-verify depth>] [B<-verify_return_error>] [B<-cert filename>] [B<-certform DER|PEM>] [B<-key filename>] [B<-keyform DER|PEM>] [B<-pass arg>] [B<-CApath directory>] [B<-CAfile filename>] [B<-no_alt_chains>] [B<-reconnect>] [B<-pause>] [B<-showcerts>] [B<-debug>] [B<-msg>] [B<-nbio_test>] [B<-state>] [B<-nbio>] [B<-crlf>] [B<-ign_eof>] [B<-no_ign_eof>] [B<-quiet>] [B<-ssl2>] [B<-ssl3>] [B<-tls1>] [B<-no_ssl2>] [B<-no_ssl3>] [B<-no_tls1>] [B<-no_tls1_1>] [B<-no_tls1_2>] [B<-fallback_scsv>] [B<-bugs>] [B<-sigalgs sigalglist>] [B<-curves curvelist>] [B<-cipher cipherlist>] [B<-serverpref>] [B<-starttls protocol>] [B<-engine id>] [B<-tlsextdebug>] [B<-no_ticket>] [B<-sess_out filename>] [B<-sess_in filename>] [B<-rand file(s)>] [B<-serverinfo types>] [B<-status>] [B<-alpn protocols>] [B<-nextprotoneg protocols>] =head1 DESCRIPTION The B command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects to a remote host using SSL/TLS. It is a I useful diagnostic tool for SSL servers. =head1 OPTIONS =over 4 =item B<-connect host:port> This specifies the host and optional port to connect to. If not specified then an attempt is made to connect to the local host on port 4433. =item B<-servername name> Set the TLS SNI (Server Name Indication) extension in the ClientHello message. =item B<-cert certname> The certificate to use, if one is requested by the server. The default is not to use a certificate. =item B<-certform format> The certificate format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default. =item B<-key keyfile> The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will be used. =item B<-keyform format> The private format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default. =item B<-pass arg> the private key password source. For more information about the format of B see the B section in L. =item B<-verify depth> The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the server certificate chain and turns on server certificate verification. Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure. =item B<-verify_return_error> Return verification errors instead of continuing. This will typically abort the handshake with a fatal error. =item B<-CApath directory> The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory must be in "hash format", see B for more information. These are also used when building the client certificate chain. =item B<-CAfile file> A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain. =item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains> Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the L|verify(1)> manual page for details. =item B<-reconnect> reconnects to the same server 5 times using the same session ID, this can be used as a test that session caching is working. =item B<-pause> pauses 1 second between each read and write call. =item B<-showcerts> -display the whole server certificate chain: normally only the server -certificate itself is displayed. +Displays the server certificate list as sent by the server: it only consists of +certificates the server has sent (in the order the server has sent them). It is +B a verified chain. =item B<-prexit> print session information when the program exits. This will always attempt to print out information even if the connection fails. Normally information will only be printed out once if the connection succeeds. This option is useful because the cipher in use may be renegotiated or the connection may fail because a client certificate is required or is requested only after an attempt is made to access a certain URL. Note: the output produced by this option is not always accurate because a connection might never have been established. =item B<-state> prints out the SSL session states. =item B<-debug> print extensive debugging information including a hex dump of all traffic. =item B<-msg> show all protocol messages with hex dump. =item B<-nbio_test> tests non-blocking I/O =item B<-nbio> turns on non-blocking I/O =item B<-crlf> this option translated a line feed from the terminal into CR+LF as required by some servers. =item B<-ign_eof> inhibit shutting down the connection when end of file is reached in the input. =item B<-quiet> inhibit printing of session and certificate information. This implicitly turns on B<-ign_eof> as well. =item B<-no_ign_eof> shut down the connection when end of file is reached in the input. Can be used to override the implicit B<-ign_eof> after B<-quiet>. =item B<-psk_identity identity> Use the PSK identity B when using a PSK cipher suite. The default value is "Client_identity" (without the quotes). =item B<-psk key> Use the PSK key B when using a PSK cipher suite. The key is given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk 1a2b3c4d. This option must be provided in order to use a PSK cipher. =item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2> These options require or disable the use of the specified SSL or TLS protocols. By default the initial handshake uses a I method which will negotiate the highest mutually supported protocol version. =item B<-fallback_scsv> Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. =item B<-bugs> there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this option enables various workarounds. =item B<-sigalgs sigalglist> Specifies the list of signature algorithms that are sent by the client. The server selects one entry in the list based on its preferences. For example strings, see L =item B<-curves curvelist> Specifies the list of supported curves to be sent by the client. The curve is is ultimately selected by the server. For a list of all curves, use: $ openssl ecparam -list_curves =item B<-cipher cipherlist> this allows the cipher list sent by the client to be modified. Although the server determines which cipher suite is used it should take the first supported cipher in the list sent by the client. See the B command for more information. =item B<-serverpref> use the server's cipher preferences; only used for SSLV2. =item B<-starttls protocol> send the protocol-specific message(s) to switch to TLS for communication. B is a keyword for the intended protocol. Currently, the only supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", "ftp" and "xmpp". =item B<-tlsextdebug> print out a hex dump of any TLS extensions received from the server. =item B<-no_ticket> disable RFC4507bis session ticket support. =item B<-sess_out filename> output SSL session to B =item B<-sess_in sess.pem> load SSL session from B. The client will attempt to resume a connection from this session. =item B<-engine id> specifying an engine (by its unique B string) will cause B to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms. =item B<-rand file(s)> a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see L). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for all others. =item B<-serverinfo types> a list of comma-separated TLS Extension Types (numbers between 0 and 65535). Each type will be sent as an empty ClientHello TLS Extension. The server's response (if any) will be encoded and displayed as a PEM file. =item B<-status> sends a certificate status request to the server (OCSP stapling). The server response (if any) is printed out. =item B<-alpn protocols>, B<-nextprotoneg protocols> these flags enable the Enable the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation or Next Protocol Negotiation extension, respectively. ALPN is the IETF standard and replaces NPN. The B list is a comma-separated protocol names that the client should advertise support for. The list should contain most wanted protocols first. Protocol names are printable ASCII strings, for example "http/1.1" or "spdy/3". Empty list of protocols is treated specially and will cause the client to advertise support for the TLS extension but disconnect just after reciving ServerHello with a list of server supported protocols. =back =head1 CONNECTED COMMANDS If a connection is established with an SSL server then any data received from the server is displayed and any key presses will be sent to the server. When used interactively (which means neither B<-quiet> nor B<-ign_eof> have been given), the session will be renegotiated if the line begins with an B, and if the line begins with a B or if end of file is reached, the connection will be closed down. =head1 NOTES B can be used to debug SSL servers. To connect to an SSL HTTP server the command: openssl s_client -connect servername:443 would typically be used (https uses port 443). If the connection succeeds then an HTTP command can be given such as "GET /" to retrieve a web page. If the handshake fails then there are several possible causes, if it is nothing obvious like no client certificate then the B<-bugs>, B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1> options can be tried in case it is a buggy server. In particular you should play with these options B submitting a bug report to an OpenSSL mailing list. A frequent problem when attempting to get client certificates working is that a web client complains it has no certificates or gives an empty list to choose from. This is normally because the server is not sending the clients certificate authority in its "acceptable CA list" when it requests a certificate. By using B the CA list can be viewed and checked. However some servers only request client authentication after a specific URL is requested. To obtain the list in this case it is necessary to use the B<-prexit> option and send an HTTP request for an appropriate page. If a certificate is specified on the command line using the B<-cert> option it will not be used unless the server specifically requests a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works. If there are problems verifying a server certificate then the -B<-showcerts> option can be used to show the whole chain. +B<-showcerts> option can be used to show all the certificates sent by the +server. Since the SSLv23 client hello cannot include compression methods or extensions these will only be supported if its use is disabled, for example by using the B<-no_sslv2> option. The B utility is a test tool and is designed to continue the handshake after any certificate verification errors. As a result it will accept any certificate chain (trusted or not) sent by the peer. None test applications should B do this as it makes them vulnerable to a MITM attack. This behaviour can be changed by with the B<-verify_return_error> option: any verify errors are then returned aborting the handshake. =head1 BUGS Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of the techniques used are rather old, the C source of s_client is rather hard to read and not a model of how things should be done. A typical SSL client program would be much simpler. The B<-prexit> option is a bit of a hack. We should really report information whenever a session is renegotiated. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,89 +1,89 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BIO_s_fd, BIO_set_fd, BIO_get_fd, BIO_new_fd - file descriptor BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_fd(void); #define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd) #define BIO_get_fd(b,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c) BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_s_fd() returns the file descriptor BIO method. This is a wrapper round the platforms file descriptor routines such as read() and write(). BIO_read() and BIO_write() read or write the underlying descriptor. BIO_puts() is supported but BIO_gets() is not. If the close flag is set then then close() is called on the underlying file descriptor when the BIO is freed. BIO_reset() attempts to change the file pointer to the start of file using lseek(fd, 0, 0). BIO_seek() sets the file pointer to position B from start of file using lseek(fd, ofs, 0). BIO_tell() returns the current file position by calling lseek(fd, 0, 1). BIO_set_fd() sets the file descriptor of BIO B to B and the close flag to B. BIO_get_fd() places the file descriptor in B if it is not NULL, it also returns the file descriptor. If B is not NULL it should be of type (int *). BIO_new_fd() returns a file descriptor BIO using B and B. =head1 NOTES The behaviour of BIO_read() and BIO_write() depends on the behavior of the platforms read() and write() calls on the descriptor. If the underlying file descriptor is in a non blocking mode then the BIO will behave in the manner described in the L and L manual pages. File descriptor BIOs should not be used for socket I/O. Use socket BIOs instead. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_s_fd() returns the file descriptor BIO method. BIO_reset() returns zero for success and -1 if an error occurred. BIO_seek() and BIO_tell() return the current file position or -1 -is an error occurred. These values reflect the underlying lseek() +if an error occurred. These values reflect the underlying lseek() behaviour. BIO_set_fd() always returns 1. BIO_get_fd() returns the file descriptor or -1 if the BIO has not been initialized. BIO_new_fd() returns the newly allocated BIO or NULL is an error occurred. =head1 EXAMPLE This is a file descriptor BIO version of "Hello World": BIO *out; out = BIO_new_fd(fileno(stdout), BIO_NOCLOSE); BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n"); BIO_free(out); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,126 +1,128 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BN_add, BN_sub, BN_mul, BN_sqr, BN_div, BN_mod, BN_nnmod, BN_mod_add, BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd - arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_add() adds I and I and places the result in I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. BN_sub() subtracts I from I and places the result in I (C). BN_mul() multiplies I and I and places the result in I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. For multiplication by powers of 2, use L. BN_sqr() takes the square of I and places the result in I (C). I and I may be the same B. This function is faster than BN_mul(r,a,a). BN_div() divides I by I and places the result in I and the remainder in I (C). Either of I and I may be B, in which case the respective value is not returned. The result is rounded towards zero; thus if I is negative, the remainder will be zero or negative. For division by powers of 2, use BN_rshift(3). BN_mod() corresponds to BN_div() with I set to B. BN_nnmod() reduces I modulo I and places the non-negative remainder in I. BN_mod_add() adds I to I modulo I and places the non-negative result in I. BN_mod_sub() subtracts I from I modulo I and places the non-negative result in I. BN_mod_mul() multiplies I by I and finds the non-negative remainder respective to modulus I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. For more efficient algorithms for repeated computations using the same modulus, see L and L. BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I modulo B and places the result in I. BN_exp() raises I to the I

-th power and places the result in I (C). This function is faster than repeated applications of BN_mul(). BN_mod_exp() computes I to the I

-th power modulo I (C). This function uses less time and space than BN_exp(). +m>). This function uses less time and space than BN_exp(). Do not call this +function when B is even and any of the parameters have the +B flag set. BN_gcd() computes the greatest common divisor of I and I and places the result in I. I may be the same B as I or I. For all functions, I is a previously allocated B used for temporary variables; see L. Unless noted otherwise, the result B must be different from the arguments. =head1 RETURN VALUES For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return value should always be checked (e.g., C). The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY BN_add(), BN_sub(), BN_sqr(), BN_div(), BN_mod(), BN_mod_mul(), BN_mod_exp() and BN_gcd() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. The I argument to BN_mul() was added in SSLeay 0.9.1b. BN_exp() appeared in SSLeay 0.9.0. BN_nnmod(), BN_mod_add(), BN_mod_sub(), and BN_mod_sqr() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,98 +1,98 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BN_bn2bin, BN_bin2bn, BN_bn2hex, BN_bn2dec, BN_hex2bn, BN_dec2bn, BN_print, BN_print_fp, BN_bn2mpi, BN_mpi2bn - format conversions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a); char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_print(BIO *fp, const BIGNUM *a); int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a); int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_bn2bin() converts the absolute value of B into big-endian form and stores it at B. B must point to BN_num_bytes(B) bytes of memory. BN_bin2bn() converts the positive integer in big-endian form of length B at B into a B and places it in B. If B is NULL, a new B is created. BN_bn2hex() and BN_bn2dec() return printable strings containing the hexadecimal and decimal encoding of B respectively. For negative numbers, the string is prefaced with a leading '-'. The string must be freed later using OPENSSL_free(). BN_hex2bn() converts the string B containing a hexadecimal number -to a B and stores it in **B. If *B is NULL, a new -B is created. If B is NULL, it only computes the number's +to a B and stores it in **B. If *B is NULL, a new +B is created. If B is NULL, it only computes the number's length in hexadecimal digits. If the string starts with '-', the number is negative. A "negative zero" is converted to zero. BN_dec2bn() is the same using the decimal system. BN_print() and BN_print_fp() write the hexadecimal encoding of B, with a leading '-' for negative numbers, to the B or B B. BN_bn2mpi() and BN_mpi2bn() convert Bs from and to a format that consists of the number's length in bytes represented as a 4-byte big-endian number, and the number itself in big-endian format, where the most significant bit signals a negative number (the representation of numbers with the MSB set is prefixed with null byte). BN_bn2mpi() stores the representation of B at B, where B must be large enough to hold the result. The size can be determined by calling BN_bn2mpi(B, NULL). BN_mpi2bn() converts the B bytes long representation at B to a B and stores it at B, or in a newly allocated B if B is NULL. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_bn2bin() returns the length of the big-endian number placed at B. BN_bin2bn() returns the B, NULL on error. BN_bn2hex() and BN_bn2dec() return a null-terminated string, or NULL on error. BN_hex2bn() and BN_dec2bn() return the number of characters used in parsing, or 0 on error, in which case no new B will be created. BN_print_fp() and BN_print() return 1 on success, 0 on write errors. BN_bn2mpi() returns the length of the representation. BN_mpi2bn() returns the B, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY BN_bn2bin(), BN_bin2bn(), BN_print_fp() and BN_print() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. BN_bn2hex(), BN_bn2dec(), BN_hex2bn(), BN_dec2bn(), BN_bn2mpi() and BN_mpi2bn() were added in SSLeay 0.9.0. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,150 +1,160 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BN_generate_prime_ex, BN_is_prime_ex, BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex, BN_GENCB_call, BN_GENCB_set_old, BN_GENCB_set, BN_generate_prime, BN_is_prime, BN_is_prime_fasttest - generate primes and test for primality =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p,int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *p,int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b); #define BN_GENCB_set_old(gencb, callback, cb_arg) ... #define BN_GENCB_set(gencb, callback, cb_arg) ... Deprecated: BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int num, int safe, BIGNUM *add, BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg); int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg, int do_trial_division); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_generate_prime_ex() generates a pseudo-random prime number of bit length B. If B is not B, it will be used to store the number. If B is not B, it is used as follows: =over 4 =item * B is called after generating the i-th potential prime number. =item * While the number is being tested for primality, B is called as described below. =item * When a prime has been found, B is called. =back The prime may have to fulfill additional requirements for use in Diffie-Hellman key exchange: If B is not B, the prime will fulfill the condition p % B == B (p % B == 1 if B == B) in order to suit a given generator. If B is true, it will be a safe prime (i.e. a prime p so that (p-1)/2 is also prime). The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_generate_prime_ex(). The prime number generation has a negligible error probability. BN_is_prime_ex() and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex() test if the number B

is prime. The following tests are performed until one of them shows that B

is composite; if B

passes all these tests, it is considered prime. BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(), when called with B, first attempts trial division by a number of small primes; if no divisors are found by this test and B is not B, B is called. If B, this test is skipped. Both BN_is_prime_ex() and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex() perform a Miller-Rabin probabilistic primality test with B iterations. If B, a number of iterations is used that -yields a false positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input. +yields a false positive rate of at most 2^-64 for random input. +The error rate depends on the size of the prime and goes down for bigger primes. +The rate is 2^-80 starting at 308 bits, 2^-112 at 852 bits, 2^-128 at 1080 bits, +2^-192 at 3747 bits and 2^-256 at 6394 bits. + +When the source of the prime is not random or not trusted, the number +of checks needs to be much higher to reach the same level of assurance: +It should equal half of the targeted security level in bits (rounded up to the +next integer if necessary). +For instance, to reach the 128 bit security level, B should be set to +64. If B is not B, B is called after the j-th iteration (j = 0, 1, ...). B is a pre-allocated B (to save the overhead of allocating and freeing the structure in a loop), or B. BN_GENCB_call calls the callback function held in the B structure and passes the ints B and B as arguments. There are two types of B structure that are supported: "new" style and "old" style. New programs should prefer the "new" style, whilst the "old" style is provided for backwards compatibility purposes. For "new" style callbacks a BN_GENCB structure should be initialised with a call to BN_GENCB_set, where B is a B, B is of type B and B is a B. "Old" style callbacks are the same except they are initialised with a call to BN_GENCB_set_old and B is of type B. A callback is invoked through a call to B. This will check the type of the callback and will invoke B for new style callbacks or B for old style. BN_generate_prime (deprecated) works in the same way as BN_generate_prime_ex but expects an old style callback function directly in the B parameter, and an argument to pass to it in the B. Similarly BN_is_prime and BN_is_prime_fasttest are deprecated and can be compared to BN_is_prime_ex and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex respectively. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_generate_prime_ex() return 1 on success or 0 on error. BN_is_prime_ex(), BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(), BN_is_prime() and BN_is_prime_fasttest() return 0 if the number is composite, 1 if it is prime with an error probability of less than 0.25^B, and -1 on error. BN_generate_prime() returns the prime number on success, B otherwise. Callback functions should return 1 on success or 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The B arguments to BN_generate_prime() and to BN_is_prime() were added in SSLeay 0.9.0. The B argument to BN_generate_prime() was added in SSLeay 0.9.1. BN_is_prime_fasttest() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,96 +1,95 @@ =pod =head1 NAME CMS_encrypt - create a CMS envelopedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_encrypt() creates and returns a CMS EnvelopedData structure. B is a list of recipient certificates. B is the content to be encrypted. B is the symmetric cipher to use. B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES -Only certificates carrying RSA keys are supported so the recipient certificates -supplied to this function must all contain RSA public keys, though they do not -have to be signed using the RSA algorithm. +Only certificates carrying RSA, Diffie-Hellman or EC keys are supported by this +function. EVP_des_ede3_cbc() (triple DES) is the algorithm of choice for S/MIME use because most clients will support it. The algorithm passed in the B parameter must support ASN1 encoding of its parameters. Many browsers implement a "sign and encrypt" option which is simply an S/MIME envelopedData containing an S/MIME signed message. This can be readily produced by storing the S/MIME signed message in a memory BIO and passing it to CMS_encrypt(). The following flags can be passed in the B parameter. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are prepended to the data. Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required by the S/MIME specifications) if B is set no translation occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation will corrupt it. If B is set then B is ignored. OpenSSL will by default identify recipient certificates using issuer name and serial number. If B is set it will use the subject key identifier value instead. An error occurs if all recipient certificates do not have a subject key identifier extension. If the B flag is set a partial B structure is returned suitable for streaming I/O: no data is read from the BIO B. If the B flag is set a partial B structure is returned to which additional recipients and attributes can be added before finalization. The data being encrypted is included in the CMS_ContentInfo structure, unless B is set in which case it is omitted. This is rarely used in practice and is not supported by SMIME_write_CMS(). =head1 NOTES If the flag B is set the returned B structure is B complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not properly finalize the B structure will give unpredictable results. Several functions including SMIME_write_CMS(), i2d_CMS_bio_stream(), PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B directly using BIO_new_CMS(). The recipients specified in B use a CMS KeyTransRecipientInfo info structure. KEKRecipientInfo is also supported using the flag B and CMS_add0_recipient_key(). The parameter B may be NULL if B is set and recipients added later using CMS_add1_recipient_cert() or CMS_add0_recipient_key(). =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_encrypt() returns either a CMS_ContentInfo structure or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY CMS_decrypt() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.8 The B flag was first supported in OpenSSL 1.0.0. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_SignerInfos.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,81 +1,81 @@ =pod =head1 NAME CMS_get0_SignerInfos, CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id, CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature, CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp, CMS_set1_signer_cert - CMS signedData signer functions. =head1 SYNOPSIS #include STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *CMS_get0_SignerInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature(CMS_SignerInfo *si); int CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *cert); void CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signer); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function CMS_get0_SignerInfos() returns all the CMS_SignerInfo structures associated with a CMS signedData structure. CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id() retrieves the certificate signer identifier associated with a specific CMS_SignerInfo structure B. Either the keyidentifier will be set in B or B issuer name and serial number in B and B. CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature() retrieves the signature associated with B in a pointer to an ASN1_OCTET_STRING structure. This pointer returned corresponds to the internal signature value if B so it may be read or modified. CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp() compares the certificate B against the signer identifier B. It returns zero if the comparison is successful and non zero if not. CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert() sets the signers certificate of B to B. =head1 NOTES The main purpose of these functions is to enable an application to lookup signers certificates using any appropriate technique when the simpler method of CMS_verify() is not appropriate. In typical usage and application will retrieve all CMS_SignerInfo structures using CMS_get0_SignerInfo() and retrieve the identifier information using CMS. It will then obtain the signer certificate by some unspecified means (or return and error if it cannot be found) and set it using CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(). Once all signer certificates have been set CMS_verify() can be used. -Although CMS_get0_SignerInfos() can return NULL is an error occur B if +Although CMS_get0_SignerInfos() can return NULL if an error occurs B if there are no signers this is not a problem in practice because the only error which can occur is if the B structure is not of type signedData due to application error. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_get0_SignerInfos() returns all CMS_SignerInfo structures, or NULL there are no signers or an error occurs. CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp() returns 0 for a successful comparison and non zero otherwise. CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert() does not return a value. Any error can be obtained from L =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first was added to OpenSSL 0.9.8 =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,69 +1,69 @@ =pod =head1 NAME CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0, CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest, CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest, CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values - CMS signed receipt request functions. =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen, int allorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptList, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptsTo); int CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr); int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest **prr); void CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values(CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr, ASN1_STRING **pcid, int *pallorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **plist, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **prto); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0() creates a signed receipt request structure. The B field is set using B and B, or it is set to 32 bytes of pseudo random data if B is NULL. If B is NULL the allOrFirstTier option in B is used and set to the value of the B parameter. If B is not NULL the B option in B is used. The B parameter specifies the B field value. The CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest() function adds a signed receipt request B to SignerInfo structure B. int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest() looks for a signed receipt request in B, if any is found it is decoded and written to B. CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values() retrieves the values of a receipt request. The signedContentIdentifier is copied to B. If the B option of B is used its value is copied to B otherwise the B field is copied to B. The B parameter is copied to B. =head1 NOTES For more details of the meaning of the fields see RFC2634. The contents of a signed receipt should only be considered meaningful if the corresponding CMS_ContentInfo structure can be successfully verified using CMS_verify(). =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0() returns a signed receipt request structure or NULL if an error occurred. -CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 for success or 0 is an error occurred. +CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred. CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 is a signed receipt request is found and decoded. It returns 0 if a signed receipt request is not present and -1 if it is present but malformed. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L =head1 HISTORY CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(), CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(), CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest() and CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values() were added to OpenSSL 0.9.8 =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,47 +1,47 @@ =pod =head1 NAME DSA_do_sign, DSA_do_verify - raw DSA signature operations =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_do_sign() computes a digital signature on the B byte message digest B using the private key B and returns it in a newly allocated B structure. L may be used to precompute part -of the signing operation in case signature generation is -time-critical. +of the signing operation for each signature in case signature generation +is time-critical. DSA_do_verify() verifies that the signature B matches a given message digest B of size B. B is the signer's public key. =head1 RETURN VALUES DSA_do_sign() returns the signature, NULL on error. DSA_do_verify() returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY DSA_do_sign() and DSA_do_verify() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.3. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,66 +1,70 @@ =pod =head1 NAME DSA_sign, DSA_sign_setup, DSA_verify - DSA signatures =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa); int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len, unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_sign() computes a digital signature on the B byte message digest B using the private key B and places its ASN.1 DER encoding at B. The length of the signature is places in *B. B must point to DSA_size(B) bytes of memory. DSA_sign_setup() may be used to precompute part of the signing operation in case signature generation is time-critical. It expects B to contain DSA parameters. It places the precomputed values in newly allocated Bs at *B and *B, after freeing the old ones unless *B and *B are NULL. These values may be passed to DSA_sign() in Bkinv> and Br>. B is a pre-allocated B or NULL. +The precomputed values from DSA_sign_setup() B for +more than one signature: using the same Bkinv> and +Br> pair twice under the same private key on different +plaintexts will result in permanently exposing the DSA private key. DSA_verify() verifies that the signature B of size B matches a given message digest B of size B. B is the signer's public key. The B parameter is ignored. The PRNG must be seeded before DSA_sign() (or DSA_sign_setup()) is called. =head1 RETURN VALUES DSA_sign() and DSA_sign_setup() return 1 on success, 0 on error. DSA_verify() returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 CONFORMING TO US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186 (Digital Signature Standard, DSS), ANSI X9.30 =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY DSA_sign() and DSA_verify() are available in all versions of SSLeay. DSA_sign_setup() was added in SSLeay 0.8. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,170 +1,170 @@ =pod =head1 NAME OBJ_nid2obj, OBJ_nid2ln, OBJ_nid2sn, OBJ_obj2nid, OBJ_txt2nid, OBJ_ln2nid, OBJ_sn2nid, OBJ_cmp, OBJ_dup, OBJ_txt2obj, OBJ_obj2txt, OBJ_create, OBJ_cleanup - ASN1 object utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_nid2obj(int n); const char * OBJ_nid2ln(int n); const char * OBJ_nid2sn(int n); int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *ln); int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *sn); int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s); ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name); int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name); int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a,const ASN1_OBJECT *b); ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); int OBJ_create(const char *oid,const char *sn,const char *ln); void OBJ_cleanup(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION The ASN1 object utility functions process ASN1_OBJECT structures which are a representation of the ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) type. For convenience, OIDs are usually represented in source code as numeric identifiers, or Bs. OpenSSL has an internal table of OIDs that are generated when the library is built, and their corresponding NIDs are available as defined constants. For the functions below, application code should treat all returned values -- OIDs, NIDs, or names -- as constants. OBJ_nid2obj(), OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() convert the NID B to an ASN1_OBJECT structure, its long name and its short name respectively, -or B is an error occurred. +or B if an error occurred. OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() return the corresponding NID for the object B, the long name or the short name respectively or NID_undef if an error occurred. OBJ_txt2nid() returns NID corresponding to text string . B can be a long name, a short name or the numerical respresentation of an object. OBJ_txt2obj() converts the text string B into an ASN1_OBJECT structure. If B is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted as well as numerical forms. If B is 1 only the numerical form is acceptable. OBJ_obj2txt() converts the B B into a textual representation. The representation is written as a null terminated string to B at most B bytes are written, truncating the result if necessary. The total amount of space required is returned. If B is 0 then if the object has a long or short name then that will be used, otherwise the numerical form will be used. If B is 1 then the numerical form will always be used. OBJ_cmp() compares B to B. If the two are identical 0 is returned. OBJ_dup() returns a copy of B. OBJ_create() adds a new object to the internal table. B is the numerical form of the object, B the short name and B the long name. A new NID is returned for the created object. OBJ_cleanup() cleans up OpenSSLs internal object table: this should be called before an application exits if any new objects were added using OBJ_create(). =head1 NOTES Objects in OpenSSL can have a short name, a long name and a numerical identifier (NID) associated with them. A standard set of objects is represented in an internal table. The appropriate values are defined in the header file B. For example the OID for commonName has the following definitions: #define SN_commonName "CN" #define LN_commonName "commonName" #define NID_commonName 13 New objects can be added by calling OBJ_create(). Table objects have certain advantages over other objects: for example their NIDs can be used in a C language switch statement. They are also static constant structures which are shared: that is there is only a single constant structure for each table object. Objects which are not in the table have the NID value NID_undef. Objects do not need to be in the internal tables to be processed, the functions OBJ_txt2obj() and OBJ_obj2txt() can process the numerical form of an OID. Some objects are used to represent algorithms which do not have a corresponding ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER encoding (for example no OID currently exists for a particular algorithm). As a result they B be encoded or decoded as part of ASN.1 structures. Applications can determine if there is a corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER by checking OBJ_length() is not zero. These functions cannot return B because an B can represent both an internal, constant, OID and a dynamically-created one. The latter cannot be constant because it needs to be freed after use. =head1 EXAMPLES Create an object for B: ASN1_OBJECT *o; o = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_commonName); Check if an object is B if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_commonName) /* Do something */ Create a new NID and initialize an object from it: int new_nid; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; new_nid = OBJ_create("1.2.3.4", "NewOID", "New Object Identifier"); obj = OBJ_nid2obj(new_nid); Create a new object directly: obj = OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.3.4", 1); =head1 BUGS OBJ_obj2txt() is awkward and messy to use: it doesn't follow the convention of other OpenSSL functions where the buffer can be set to B to determine the amount of data that should be written. Instead B must point to a valid buffer and B should be set to a positive value. A buffer length of 80 should be more than enough to handle any OID encountered in practice. =head1 RETURN VALUES OBJ_nid2obj() returns an B structure or B is an error occurred. It returns a pointer to an internal table and does not allocate memory; ASN1_OBJECT_free() will have no effect. OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() returns a valid string or B on error. OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() and OBJ_txt2nid() return a NID or B on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY TBA =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,73 +1,73 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SMIME_read_PKCS7 - parse S/MIME message. =head1 SYNOPSIS #include PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *in, BIO **bcont); =head1 DESCRIPTION SMIME_read_PKCS7() parses a message in S/MIME format. B is a BIO to read the message from. If cleartext signing is used then the content is saved in a memory bio which is written to B<*bcont>, otherwise B<*bcont> is set to B. The parsed PKCS#7 structure is returned or B if an error occurred. =head1 NOTES If B<*bcont> is not B then the message is clear text signed. B<*bcont> can then be passed to PKCS7_verify() with the B flag set. Otherwise the type of the returned structure can be determined using PKCS7_type(). To support future functionality if B is not B B<*bcont> should be initialized to B. For example: BIO *cont = NULL; PKCS7 *p7; p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &cont); =head1 BUGS The MIME parser used by SMIME_read_PKCS7() is somewhat primitive. While it will handle most S/MIME messages more complex compound formats may not work. The parser assumes that the PKCS7 structure is always base64 encoded and will not handle the case where it is in binary format or uses quoted printable format. The use of a memory BIO to hold the signed content limits the size of message which can be processed due to memory restraints: a streaming single pass option should be available. =head1 RETURN VALUES SMIME_read_PKCS7() returns a valid B structure or B -is an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). +if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L L, L, L, L L =head1 HISTORY SMIME_read_PKCS7() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5 =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,206 +1,208 @@ =pod =head1 NAME ECDSA_SIG_new, ECDSA_SIG_free, i2d_ECDSA_SIG, d2i_ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_size, ECDSA_sign_setup, ECDSA_sign, ECDSA_sign_ex, ECDSA_verify, ECDSA_do_sign, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ECDSA_do_verify - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ECDSA_SIG* ECDSA_SIG_new(void); void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig); int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, unsigned char **pp); ECDSA_SIG* d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **sig, const unsigned char **pp, long len); ECDSA_SIG* ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, EC_KEY *eckey); ECDSA_SIG* ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey); int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY* eckey); int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv, BIGNUM **rp); int ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey); int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *eckey); const ECDSA_METHOD* ECDSA_OpenSSL(void); void ECDSA_set_default_method(const ECDSA_METHOD *meth); const ECDSA_METHOD* ECDSA_get_default_method(void); int ECDSA_set_method(EC_KEY *eckey,const ECDSA_METHOD *meth); int ECDSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int ECDSA_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx, void *arg); void* ECDSA_get_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B structure consists of two BIGNUMs for the r and s value of a ECDSA signature (see X9.62 or FIPS 186-2). struct { BIGNUM *r; BIGNUM *s; } ECDSA_SIG; ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates a new B structure (note: this function also allocates the BIGNUMs) and initialize it. ECDSA_SIG_free() frees the B structure B. i2d_ECDSA_SIG() creates the DER encoding of the ECDSA signature B and writes the encoded signature to B<*pp> (note: if B is NULL B returns the expected length in bytes of the DER encoded signature). B returns the length of the DER encoded signature (or 0 on error). d2i_ECDSA_SIG() decodes a DER encoded ECDSA signature and returns the decoded signature in a newly allocated B structure. B<*sig> points to the buffer containing the DER encoded signature of size B. ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length of a DER encoded ECDSA signature created with the private EC key B. ECDSA_sign_setup() may be used to precompute parts of the signing operation. B is the private EC key and B is a pointer to B structure (or NULL). The precomputed values or returned in B and B and can be used in a later call to B or B. ECDSA_sign() is wrapper function for ECDSA_sign_ex with B and B set to NULL. ECDSA_sign_ex() computes a digital signature of the B bytes hash value B using the private EC key B and the optional pre-computed values B and B. The DER encoded signatures is stored in B and it's length is returned in B. Note: B must point to B bytes of memory. The parameter B is ignored. ECDSA_verify() verifies that the signature in B of size B is a valid ECDSA signature of the hash value B of size B using the public key B. The parameter B is ignored. ECDSA_do_sign() is wrapper function for ECDSA_do_sign_ex with B and B set to NULL. ECDSA_do_sign_ex() computes a digital signature of the B bytes hash value B using the private key B and the optional pre-computed values B and B. The signature is returned in a newly allocated B structure (or NULL on error). ECDSA_do_verify() verifies that the signature B is a valid ECDSA signature of the hash value B of size B using the public key B. =head1 RETURN VALUES +ECDSA_SIG_new() returns NULL if the allocation fails. + ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length signature or 0 on error. ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or 0 on error. ECDSA_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() return 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an invalid signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 EXAMPLES Creating a ECDSA signature of given SHA-1 hash value using the named curve secp192k1. First step: create a EC_KEY object (note: this part is B ECDSA specific) int ret; ECDSA_SIG *sig; EC_KEY *eckey; eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp192k1); if (eckey == NULL) { /* error */ } if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) { /* error */ } Second step: compute the ECDSA signature of a SHA-1 hash value using B sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, eckey); if (sig == NULL) { /* error */ } or using B unsigned char *buffer, *pp; int buf_len; buf_len = ECDSA_size(eckey); buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len); pp = buffer; if (!ECDSA_sign(0, dgst, dgstlen, pp, &buf_len, eckey); { /* error */ } Third step: verify the created ECDSA signature using B ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, sig, eckey); or using B ret = ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, buffer, buf_len, eckey); and finally evaluate the return value: if (ret == -1) { /* error */ } else if (ret == 0) { /* incorrect signature */ } else /* ret == 1 */ { /* signature ok */ } =head1 CONFORMING TO ANSI X9.62, US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186-2 (Digital Signature Standard, DSS) =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY The ecdsa implementation was first introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.8 =head1 AUTHOR Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project (http://www.openssl.org). =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/pem.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/pem.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/crypto/pem.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,503 +1,496 @@ =pod =head1 NAME PEM, PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey, PEM_read_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey, PEM_write_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_read_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_write_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_RSAPublicKey, PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey, PEM_write_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAparams, PEM_read_DSAparams, PEM_write_bio_DSAparams, PEM_write_DSAparams, PEM_read_bio_DHparams, PEM_read_DHparams, PEM_write_bio_DHparams, PEM_write_DHparams, PEM_read_bio_X509, PEM_read_X509, PEM_write_bio_X509, PEM_write_X509, PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX, PEM_read_X509_AUX, PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX, PEM_write_X509_AUX, PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_read_X509_REQ, PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_write_X509_REQ, PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW, PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW, PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_read_X509_CRL, PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_write_X509_CRL, PEM_read_bio_PKCS7, PEM_read_PKCS7, PEM_write_bio_PKCS7, PEM_write_PKCS7, PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE - PEM routines =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x); int PEM_write_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x); RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); RSA *PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(BIO *bp, RSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); RSA *PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(FILE *fp, RSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(BIO *bp, RSA *x); int PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(FILE *fp, RSA *x); RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, RSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); RSA *PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, RSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, RSA *x); int PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, RSA *x); DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); DSA *PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); DSA *PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, DSA *x); int PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, DSA *x); DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(BIO *bp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); DSA *PEM_read_DSAparams(FILE *fp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_DSAparams(BIO *bp, DSA *x); int PEM_write_DSAparams(FILE *fp, DSA *x); DH *PEM_read_bio_DHparams(BIO *bp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); DH *PEM_read_DHparams(FILE *fp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_DHparams(BIO *bp, DH *x); int PEM_write_DHparams(FILE *fp, DH *x); X509 *PEM_read_bio_X509(BIO *bp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); X509 *PEM_read_X509(FILE *fp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_X509(BIO *bp, X509 *x); int PEM_write_X509(FILE *fp, X509 *x); X509 *PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(BIO *bp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); X509 *PEM_read_X509_AUX(FILE *fp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX(BIO *bp, X509 *x); int PEM_write_X509_AUX(FILE *fp, X509 *x); X509_REQ *PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); X509_REQ *PEM_read_X509_REQ(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x); int PEM_write_X509_REQ(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x); int PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x); int PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x); X509_CRL *PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); X509_CRL *PEM_read_X509_CRL(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *x); int PEM_write_X509_CRL(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *x); PKCS7 *PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(BIO *bp, PKCS7 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); PKCS7 *PEM_read_PKCS7(FILE *fp, PKCS7 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(BIO *bp, PKCS7 *x); int PEM_write_PKCS7(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *x); NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(BIO *bp, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(FILE *fp, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(BIO *bp, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *x); int PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(FILE *fp, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *x); =head1 DESCRIPTION The PEM functions read or write structures in PEM format. In this sense PEM format is simply base64 encoded data surrounded by header lines. For more details about the meaning of arguments see the B section. Each operation has four functions associated with it. For clarity the term "B functions" will be used to collectively refer to the PEM_read_bio_foobar(), PEM_read_foobar(), PEM_write_bio_foobar() and PEM_write_foobar() functions. The B functions read or write a private key in PEM format using an EVP_PKEY structure. The write routines use "traditional" private key format and can handle both RSA and DSA private keys. The read functions can additionally transparently handle PKCS#8 format encrypted and unencrypted keys too. PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() write a private key in an EVP_PKEY structure in PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo format using PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption algorithms. The B argument specifies the encryption algorithm to use: unlike all other PEM routines the encryption is applied at the PKCS#8 level and not in the PEM headers. If B is NULL then no encryption is used and a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo structure is used instead. PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid() and PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid() also write out a private key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo however it uses PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 encryption algorithms instead. The algorithm to use is specified in the B parameter and should be the NID of the corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER (see NOTES section). The B functions process a public key using an EVP_PKEY structure. The public key is encoded as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure. The B functions process an RSA private key using an RSA structure. It handles the same formats as the B functions but an error occurs if the private key is not RSA. The B functions process an RSA public key using an RSA structure. The public key is encoded using a PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey structure. The B functions also process an RSA public key using an RSA structure. However the public key is encoded using a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure and an error occurs if the public key is not RSA. The B functions process a DSA private key using a DSA structure. It handles the same formats as the B functions but an error occurs if the private key is not DSA. The B functions process a DSA public key using a DSA structure. The public key is encoded using a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure and an error occurs if the public key is not DSA. The B functions process DSA parameters using a DSA structure. The parameters are encoded using a Dss-Parms structure as defined in RFC2459. The B functions process DH parameters using a DH structure. The parameters are encoded using a PKCS#3 DHparameter structure. The B functions process an X509 certificate using an X509 structure. They will also process a trusted X509 certificate but any trust settings are discarded. The B functions process a trusted X509 certificate using an X509 structure. The B and B functions process a PKCS#10 certificate request using an X509_REQ structure. The B write functions use B in the header whereas the B functions use B (as required by some CAs). The B read functions will handle either form so there are no B read functions. The B functions process an X509 CRL using an X509_CRL structure. The B functions process a PKCS#7 ContentInfo using a PKCS7 structure. The B functions process a Netscape Certificate Sequence using a NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE structure. =head1 PEM FUNCTION ARGUMENTS The PEM functions have many common arguments. The B BIO parameter (if present) specifies the BIO to read from or write to. The B FILE parameter (if present) specifies the FILE pointer to read from or write to. The PEM read functions all take an argument B and return a B pointer. Where B is whatever structure the function uses. If B is NULL then the parameter is ignored. If B is not NULL but B<*x> is NULL then the structure returned will be written to B<*x>. If neither B nor B<*x> is NULL then an attempt is made to reuse the structure at B<*x> (but see BUGS and EXAMPLES sections). Irrespective of the value of B a pointer to the structure is always returned (or NULL if an error occurred). The PEM functions which write private keys take an B parameter which specifies the encryption algorithm to use, encryption is done at the PEM level. If this parameter is set to NULL then the private key is written in unencrypted form. The B argument is the callback to use when querying for the pass phrase used for encrypted PEM structures (normally only private keys). For the PEM write routines if the B parameter is not NULL then B bytes at B are used as the passphrase and B is ignored. If the B parameters is set to NULL and the B parameter is not NULL then the B parameter is interpreted as a null terminated string to use as the passphrase. If both B and B are NULL then the default callback routine is used which will typically prompt for the passphrase on the current terminal with echoing turned off. The default passphrase callback is sometimes inappropriate (for example in a GUI application) so an alternative can be supplied. The callback routine has the following form: int cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u); B is the buffer to write the passphrase to. B is the maximum length of the passphrase (i.e. the size of buf). B is a flag which is set to 0 when reading and 1 when writing. A typical routine will ask the user to verify the passphrase (for example by prompting for it twice) if B is 1. The B parameter has the same value as the B parameter passed to the PEM routine. It allows arbitrary data to be passed to the callback by the application (for example a window handle in a GUI application). The callback -B return the number of characters in the passphrase or 0 if +B return the number of characters in the passphrase or -1 if an error occurred. =head1 EXAMPLES Although the PEM routines take several arguments in almost all applications most of them are set to 0 or NULL. Read a certificate in PEM format from a BIO: X509 *x; x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL); - if (x == NULL) - { - /* Error */ - } + if (x == NULL) { + /* Error */ + } Alternative method: X509 *x = NULL; - if (!PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL)) - { - /* Error */ - } + if (!PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL)) { + /* Error */ + } Write a certificate to a BIO: - if (!PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x)) - { - /* Error */ - } + if (!PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x)) { + /* Error */ + } Write an unencrypted private key to a FILE pointer: - if (!PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, key, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL)) - { - /* Error */ - } + if (!PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, key, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL)) { + /* Error */ + } Write a private key (using traditional format) to a BIO using triple DES encryption, the pass phrase is prompted for: - if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, NULL)) - { - /* Error */ - } + if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, NULL)) { + /* Error */ + } Write a private key (using PKCS#8 format) to a BIO using triple DES encryption, using the pass phrase "hello": - if (!PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, "hello")) - { - /* Error */ - } + if (!PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, "hello")) { + /* Error */ + } Read a private key from a BIO using the pass phrase "hello": key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, 0, "hello"); - if (key == NULL) - { - /* Error */ - } + if (key == NULL) { + /* Error */ + } Read a private key from a BIO using a pass phrase callback: key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, pass_cb, "My Private Key"); - if (key == NULL) - { - /* Error */ - } + if (key == NULL) { + /* Error */ + } Skeleton pass phrase callback: - int pass_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u); - { - int len; - char *tmp; - /* We'd probably do something else if 'rwflag' is 1 */ - printf("Enter pass phrase for \"%s\"\n", u); + int pass_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) + { - /* get pass phrase, length 'len' into 'tmp' */ - tmp = "hello"; - len = strlen(tmp); + /* We'd probably do something else if 'rwflag' is 1 */ + printf("Enter pass phrase for \"%s\"\n", u); - if (len <= 0) return 0; - /* if too long, truncate */ - if (len > size) len = size; - memcpy(buf, tmp, len); - return len; - } + /* get pass phrase, length 'len' into 'tmp' */ + char *tmp = "hello"; + if (tmp == NULL) /* An error occurred */ + return -1; + + size_t len = strlen(tmp); + + if (len > size) + len = size; + memcpy(buf, tmp, len); + return len; + } =head1 NOTES The old B write routines are retained for compatibility. New applications should write private keys using the PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() or PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() routines because they are more secure (they use an iteration count of 2048 whereas the traditional routines use a count of 1) unless compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL is important. The B read routines can be used in all applications because they handle all formats transparently. A frequent cause of problems is attempting to use the PEM routines like this: X509 *x; PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL); this is a bug because an attempt will be made to reuse the data at B which is an uninitialised pointer. =head1 PEM ENCRYPTION FORMAT This old B routines use a non standard technique for encryption. The private key (or other data) takes the following form: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,3F17F5316E2BAC89 ...base64 encoded data... -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- The line beginning DEK-Info contains two comma separated pieces of information: the encryption algorithm name as used by EVP_get_cipherbyname() and an 8 byte B encoded as a set of hexadecimal digits. After this is the base64 encoded encrypted data. The encryption key is determined using EVP_BytesToKey(), using B and an iteration count of 1. The IV used is the value of B and *not* the IV returned by EVP_BytesToKey(). =head1 BUGS The PEM read routines in some versions of OpenSSL will not correctly reuse an existing structure. Therefore the following: PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL); where B already contains a valid certificate, may not work, whereas: X509_free(x); x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL); is guaranteed to work. =head1 RETURN CODES The read routines return either a pointer to the structure read or NULL if an error occurred. The write routines return 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/fingerprints.txt =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/fingerprints.txt (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/fingerprints.txt (revision 337764) @@ -1,63 +1,24 @@ - Fingerprints +Fingerprints for Signing Releases -OpenSSL releases are signed with PGP/GnuPG keys. You can find the -signatures in separate files in the same location you find the -distributions themselves. The normal file name is the same as the -distribution file, with '.asc' added. For example, the signature for -the distribution of OpenSSL 1.0.1h, openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz, is found in -the file openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz.asc. +OpenSSL releases are signed with PGP/GnuPG keys. This file contains +the fingerprints of team members who are "authorized" to sign the +next release. +The signature is a detached cleartxt signature, with the same name +as the release but with ".asc" appended. For example, release +1.0.1h can be found in openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz with the signature +in the file named openssl-1.0.1h.tar.gz.asc. + The following is the list of fingerprints for the keys that are currently in use to sign OpenSSL distributions: -pub 1024D/F709453B 2003-10-20 - Key fingerprint = C4CA B749 C34F 7F4C C04F DAC9 A7AF 9E78 F709 453B -uid Richard Levitte +pub 4096R/7DF9EE8C 2014-10-04 + Key fingerprint = 7953 AC1F BC3D C8B3 B292 393E D5E9 E43F 7DF9 EE8C +uid Richard Levitte uid Richard Levitte -uid Richard Levitte +uid Richard Levitte -pub 2048R/F295C759 1998-12-13 - Key fingerprint = D0 5D 8C 61 6E 27 E6 60 41 EC B1 B8 D5 7E E5 97 -uid Dr S N Henson - -pub 4096R/FA40E9E2 2005-03-19 - Key fingerprint = 6260 5AA4 334A F9F0 DDE5 D349 D357 7507 FA40 E9E2 -uid Dr Stephen Henson -uid Dr Stephen Henson -uid Dr Stephen N Henson -sub 4096R/8811F530 2005-03-19 - -pub 1024R/49A563D9 1997-02-24 - Key fingerprint = 7B 79 19 FA 71 6B 87 25 0E 77 21 E5 52 D9 83 BF -uid Mark Cox -uid Mark Cox -uid Mark Cox - -pub 1024R/9C58A66D 1997-04-03 - Key fingerprint = 13 D0 B8 9D 37 30 C3 ED AC 9C 24 7D 45 8C 17 67 -uid jaenicke@openssl.org -uid Lutz Jaenicke - -pub 1024D/2118CF83 1998-07-13 - Key fingerprint = 7656 55DE 62E3 96FF 2587 EB6C 4F6D E156 2118 CF83 -uid Ben Laurie -uid Ben Laurie -uid Ben Laurie -sub 4096g/1F5143E7 1998-07-13 - -pub 1024R/5A6A9B85 1994-03-22 - Key fingerprint = C7 AC 7E AD 56 6A 65 EC F6 16 66 83 7E 86 68 28 -uid Bodo Moeller <2005@bmoeller.de> -uid Bodo Moeller <2003@bmoeller.de> -uid Bodo Moeller <2004@bmoeller.de> -uid Bodo Moeller -uid Bodo Moeller -uid Bodo Moeller -uid Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de> -uid Bodo Moeller -uid Bodo Moeller <3moeller@rzdspc5.informatik.uni-hamburg.de> - pub 2048R/0E604491 2013-04-30 Key fingerprint = 8657 ABB2 60F0 56B1 E519 0839 D9C4 D26D 0E60 4491 +uid Matt Caswell uid Matt Caswell - Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/man3/X509_cmp_time.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/man3/X509_cmp_time.pod (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/man3/X509_cmp_time.pod (revision 337764) @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +X509_cmp_time - X509 time functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *asn1_time, time_t *cmp_time); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +X509_cmp_time() compares the ASN1_TIME in B with the time in +. + +B must satisfy the ASN1_TIME format mandated by RFC 5280, i.e., +its format must be either YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ. + +If B is NULL the current time is used. + +=head1 BUGS + +Unlike many standard comparison functions, X509_cmp_time returns 0 on error. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +X509_cmp_time() returns -1 if B is earlier than, or equal to, +B, and 1 otherwise. It returns 0 on error. + +=head1 COPYRIGHT + +Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + +Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use +this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy +in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +L. + +=cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,165 +1,172 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_use_certificate, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file, SSL_use_certificate, SSL_use_certificate_ASN1, SSL_use_certificate_file, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file, SSL_use_PrivateKey_file, SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_use_PrivateKey, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_check_private_key - load certificate and key data =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, unsigned char *d); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, int len); int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions load the certificates and private keys into the SSL_CTX or SSL object, respectively. The SSL_CTX_* class of functions loads the certificates and keys into the SSL_CTX object B. The information is passed to SSL objects B created from B with L by copying, so that changes applied to B do not propagate to already existing SSL objects. The SSL_* class of functions only loads certificates and keys into a specific SSL object. The specific information is kept, when L is called for this SSL object. SSL_CTX_use_certificate() loads the certificate B into B, SSL_use_certificate() loads B into B. The rest of the certificates needed to form the complete certificate chain can be specified using the L function. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1() loads the ASN1 encoded certificate from the memory location B (with length B) into B, SSL_use_certificate_ASN1() loads the ASN1 encoded certificate into B. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() loads the first certificate stored in B into B. The formatting B of the certificate must be specified from the known types SSL_FILETYPE_PEM, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1. SSL_use_certificate_file() loads the certificate from B into B. See the NOTES section on why SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() should be preferred. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() loads a certificate chain from B into B. The certificates must be in PEM format and must be sorted starting with the subject's certificate (actual client or server certificate), followed by intermediate CA certificates if applicable, and ending at the highest level (root) CA. There is no corresponding function working on a single SSL object. SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() adds B as private key to B. SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey() adds the private key B of type RSA to B. SSL_use_PrivateKey() adds B as private key to B; SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey() adds B as private key of type RSA to B. If a certificate has already been set and the private does not belong to the certificate an error is returned. To change a certificate, private key pair the new certificate needs to be set with SSL_use_certificate() or SSL_CTX_use_certificate() before setting the private key with SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() or SSL_use_PrivateKey(). SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1() adds the private key of type B stored at memory location B (length B) to B. SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1() adds the private key of type RSA stored at memory location B (length B) to B. SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1() and SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1() add the private key to B. SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() adds the first private key found in B to B. The formatting B of the certificate must be specified from the known types SSL_FILETYPE_PEM, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1. SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file() adds the first private RSA key found in B to B. SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() adds the first private key found in B to B; SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file() adds the first private RSA key found to B. SSL_CTX_check_private_key() checks the consistency of a private key with the corresponding certificate loaded into B. If more than one key/certificate pair (RSA/DSA) is installed, the last item installed will be checked. If e.g. the last item was a RSA certificate or key, the RSA key/certificate pair will be checked. SSL_check_private_key() performs the same check for B. If no key/certificate was explicitly added for this B, the last item added into B will be checked. =head1 NOTES The internal certificate store of OpenSSL can hold several private key/certificate pairs at a time. The certificate used depends on the cipher selected, see also L. When reading certificates and private keys from file, files of type SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 (also known as B, binary encoding) can only contain one certificate or private key, consequently SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() is only applicable to PEM formatting. Files of type SSL_FILETYPE_PEM can contain more than one item. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() adds the first certificate found in the file to the certificate store. The other certificates are added to the store of chain certificates using L. Note: versions of OpenSSL before 1.0.2 only had a single certificate chain store for all certificate types, OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later have a separate chain store for each type. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() should be used instead of the SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() function in order to allow the use of complete certificate chains even when no trusted CA storage is used or when the CA issuing the certificate shall not be added to the trusted CA storage. If additional certificates are needed to complete the chain during the TLS negotiation, CA certificates are additionally looked up in the locations of trusted CA certificates, see L. The private keys loaded from file can be encrypted. In order to successfully load encrypted keys, a function returning the passphrase must have been supplied, see L. (Certificate files might be encrypted as well from the technical point of view, it however does not make sense as the data in the certificate is considered public anyway.) +All of the functions to set a new certificate will replace any existing +certificate of the same type that has already been set. Similarly all of the +functions to set a new private key will replace any private key that has already +been set. Applications should call L or +L as appropriate after loading a new certificate and +private key to confirm that the certificate and key match. + =head1 RETURN VALUES On success, the functions return 1. Otherwise check out the error stack to find out the reason. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY Support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) in SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() was added in 0.9.8 . =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,42 +1,59 @@ =pod =head1 NAME -SSL_get_ciphers, SSL_get_cipher_list - get list of available SSL_CIPHERs +SSL_get_ciphers, +SSL_get_cipher_list, +SSL_get_shared_ciphers +- get list of available SSL_CIPHERs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl); const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int priority); + char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_ciphers() returns the stack of available SSL_CIPHERs for B, sorted by preference. If B is NULL or no ciphers are available, NULL is returned. SSL_get_cipher_list() returns a pointer to the name of the SSL_CIPHER listed for B with B. If B is NULL, no ciphers are available, or there are less ciphers than B available, NULL is returned. + +SSL_get_shared_ciphers() creates a colon separated and NUL terminated list of +SSL_CIPHER names that are available in both the client and the server. B is +the buffer that should be populated with the list of names and B is the +size of that buffer. A pointer to B is returned on success or NULL on +error. If the supplied buffer is not large enough to contain the complete list +of names then a truncated list of names will be returned. Note that just because +a ciphersuite is available (i.e. it is configured in the cipher list) and shared +by both the client and the server it does not mean that it is enabled (for +example some ciphers may not be usable by a server if there is not a suitable +certificate configured). This function will return available shared ciphersuites +whether or not they are enabled. This is a server side function only and must +only be called after the completion of the initial handshake. =head1 NOTES The details of the ciphers obtained by SSL_get_ciphers() can be obtained using the L family of functions. Call SSL_get_cipher_list() with B starting from 0 to obtain the sorted list of available ciphers, until NULL is returned. =head1 RETURN VALUES See DESCRIPTION =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,73 +1,78 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_session - retrieve TLS/SSL session data =head1 SYNOPSIS #include SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get0_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_session() returns a pointer to the B actually used in B. The reference count of the B is not incremented, so that the pointer can become invalid by other operations. SSL_get0_session() is the same as SSL_get_session(). SSL_get1_session() is the same as SSL_get_session(), but the reference count of the B is incremented by one. =head1 NOTES The ssl session contains all information required to re-establish the connection without a new handshake. +A session will be automatically removed from the session cache and marked as +non-resumable if the connection is not closed down cleanly, e.g. if a fatal +error occurs on the connection or L is not called prior to +L. + SSL_get0_session() returns a pointer to the actual session. As the reference counter is not incremented, the pointer is only valid while the connection is in use. If L or L is called, the session may be removed completely (if considered bad), and the pointer obtained will become invalid. Even if the session is valid, it can be removed at any time due to timeout during L. If the data is to be kept, SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference count, so that the session will not be implicitly removed by other operations but stays in memory. In order to remove the session L must be explicitly called once to decrement the reference count again. SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache. One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created from this SSL_CTX object). =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item NULL There is no session available in B. =item Pointer to an SSL The return value points to the data of an SSL session. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,54 +1,56 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_version - get the protocol version of a connection. =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_version() returns the name of the protocol used for the -connection B. +connection B. It should only be called after the initial handshake has been +completed. Prior to that the results returned from this function may be +unreliable. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following strings can be returned: =over 4 =item SSLv2 The connection uses the SSLv2 protocol. =item SSLv3 The connection uses the SSLv3 protocol. =item TLSv1 The connection uses the TLSv1.0 protocol. =item TLSv1.1 The connection uses the TLSv1.1 protocol. =item TLSv1.2 The connection uses the TLSv1.2 protocol. =item unknown -This indicates that no version has been set (no connection established). +This indicates an unknown protocol version. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/ssl.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/ssl.pod (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/doc/ssl/ssl.pod (revision 337764) @@ -1,814 +1,814 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL - OpenSSL SSL/TLS library =head1 SYNOPSIS =head1 DESCRIPTION The OpenSSL B library implements the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols. It provides a rich API which is documented here. At first the library must be initialized; see L. Then an B object is created as a framework to establish TLS/SSL enabled connections (see L). Various options regarding certificates, algorithms etc. can be set in this object. When a network connection has been created, it can be assigned to an B object. After the B object has been created using L, L or L can be used to associate the network connection with the object. Then the TLS/SSL handshake is performed using L or L respectively. L and L are used to read and write data on the TLS/SSL connection. L can be used to shut down the TLS/SSL connection. =head1 DATA STRUCTURES Currently the OpenSSL B library functions deals with the following data structures: =over 4 =item B (SSL Method) That's a dispatch structure describing the internal B library methods/functions which implement the various protocol versions (SSLv1, SSLv2 and TLSv1). It's needed to create an B. =item B (SSL Cipher) This structure holds the algorithm information for a particular cipher which are a core part of the SSL/TLS protocol. The available ciphers are configured on a B basis and the actually used ones are then part of the B. =item B (SSL Context) That's the global context structure which is created by a server or client once per program life-time and which holds mainly default values for the B structures which are later created for the connections. =item B (SSL Session) This is a structure containing the current TLS/SSL session details for a connection: Bs, client and server certificates, keys, etc. =item B (SSL Connection) That's the main SSL/TLS structure which is created by a server or client per established connection. This actually is the core structure in the SSL API. Under run-time the application usually deals with this structure which has links to mostly all other structures. =back =head1 HEADER FILES Currently the OpenSSL B library provides the following C header files containing the prototypes for the data structures and and functions: =over 4 =item B That's the common header file for the SSL/TLS API. Include it into your program to make the API of the B library available. It internally includes both more private SSL headers and headers from the B library. Whenever you need hard-core details on the internals of the SSL API, look inside this header file. =item B That's the sub header file dealing with the SSLv2 protocol only. I. =item B That's the sub header file dealing with the SSLv3 protocol only. I. =item B That's the sub header file dealing with the combined use of the SSLv2 and SSLv3 protocols. I. =item B That's the sub header file dealing with the TLSv1 protocol only. I. =back =head1 API FUNCTIONS Currently the OpenSSL B library exports 214 API functions. They are documented in the following: =head2 DEALING WITH PROTOCOL METHODS Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS protocol methods defined in B structures. =over 4 =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the I SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. See L for details. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the I SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the I SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =back =head2 DEALING WITH CIPHERS Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS ciphers defined in B structures. =over 4 =item char *B(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len); Write a string to I (with a maximum size of I) containing a human readable description of I. Returns I. =item int B(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *alg_bits); Determine the number of bits in I. Because of export crippled ciphers there are two bits: The bits the algorithm supports in general (stored to I) and the bits which are actually used (the return value). =item const char *B(SSL_CIPHER *cipher); Return the internal name of I as a string. These are the various strings defined by the I, I and I definitions in the header files. =item char *B(SSL_CIPHER *cipher); Returns a string like "C" or "C" which indicates the SSL/TLS protocol version to which I belongs (i.e. where it was defined in the specification the first time). =back =head2 DEALING WITH PROTOCOL CONTEXTS Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS protocol context defined in the B structure. =over 4 =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); =item long B(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); =item int B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item long B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, char *parg); =item void B(SSL_CTX *s, long t); =item void B(SSL_CTX *a); =item char *B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item X509_STORE *B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item STACK *B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int (*B(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item char *B(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx); =item int B(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) =item void (*B(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, int cb, int ret); =item int B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item long B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int (*B(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *CAfile, char *CApath); =item long B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item SSL_CTX *B(const SSL_METHOD *meth); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item SSL_SESSION *(*B(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); =item int (*B(SSL_CTX *ctx)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); =item void (*B(SSL_CTX *ctx)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx,t); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item LHASH *B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *cs); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(), char *arg) =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *str); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK *list); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb);(void)) =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int m); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, char *arg); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int cb, int ret)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int m); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); =item long B(SSL_CTX* ctx, DH *dh); =item long B(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*cb)(void)); =item long B(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); =item SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback C(SSL_CTX *B, RSA *(*B)(SSL *B, int B, int B));> Sets the callback which will be called when a temporary private key is required. The B> flag will be set if the reason for needing a temp key is that an export ciphersuite is in use, in which case, B> will contain the required keylength in bits. Generate a key of appropriate size (using ???) and return it. =item SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback long B(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylength)); The same as B, except it operates on an SSL session instead of a context. =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*cb);(void)) =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); =item int B(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file, int type); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file, int type); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, unsigned char *d); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file, int type); =item X509 *B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item EVP_PKEY *B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *hint); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len)); =back =head2 DEALING WITH SESSIONS Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS sessions defined in the B structures. =over 4 =item int B(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b); =item void B(SSL_SESSION *ss); =item char *B(SSL_SESSION *s); =item char *B(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx); =item int B(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) =item long B(const SSL_SESSION *s); =item long B(const SSL_SESSION *s); =item unsigned long B(const SSL_SESSION *a); =item SSL_SESSION *B(void); =item int B(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x); =item int B(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *x); =item void B(SSL_SESSION *s, char *a); =item int B(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, char *arg); =item long B(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); =item long B(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); =back =head2 DEALING WITH CONNECTIONS Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS connection defined in the B structure. =over 4 =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(STACK *stack, const char *dir); =item int B(STACK *stack, const char *file); =item int B(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); =item char *B(int value); =item char *B(int value); =item char *B(int value); =item char *B(int value); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item void B(SSL *ssl); =item long B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item void B(SSL *t, const SSL *f); =item long B(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, char *parg); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item SSL *B(SSL *ssl); =item STACK *B(STACK *sk); =item void B(SSL *ssl); =item SSL_CTX *B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(SSL *ssl); =item X509 *B(const SSL *ssl); =item const char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl, int *alg_bits); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl, int n); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item STACK *B(const SSL *ssl); =item STACK *B(const SSL *ssl); =item SSL_CIPHER *B(SSL *ssl); =item long B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl, int i); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl, int idx); =item int B(void); =item int B(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item void (*B(const SSL *ssl);)() =item STACK *B(const SSL *ssl); =item X509 *B(const SSL *ssl); =item EVP_PKEY *B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item BIO *B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item SSL_SESSION *B(const SSL *ssl); -=item char *B(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len); +=item char *B(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int size); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item const SSL_METHOD *B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item long B(const SSL *ssl); =item long B(const SSL *ssl); =item int (*B(const SSL *ssl))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item long B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item BIO *B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item STACK *B(char *file); =item void B(void); =item SSL *B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item long B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item char *B(SSL *ssl); =item char *B(SSL *ssl); =item long B(SSL *ssl); =item void B(SSL *ssl); =item void B(SSL *ssl, char *arg); =item void B(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); =item int B(SSL *ssl, char *str); =item void B(SSL *ssl, STACK *list); =item void B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int idx, char *arg); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int fd); =item void B(SSL *ssl, void (*cb);(void)) =item void B(SSL *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); =item void B(SSL *ctx, void *arg); =item void B(SSL *ssl, unsigned long op); =item void B(SSL *ssl, int mode); =item void B(SSL *ssl, int yes); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int fd); =item int B(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session); =item void B(SSL *ssl, int mode); =item int B(SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *meth); =item void B(SSL *ssl, long t); =item void B(SSL *ssl, long t); =item void B(SSL *ssl, int mode, int (*callback);(void)) =item void B(SSL *ssl, long arg); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int fd); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item long B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); =item int B(int type, SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); =item int B(SSL *ssl, char *file, int type); =item int B(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); =item int B(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); =item int B(SSL *ssl, char *file, int type); =item int B(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int len, unsigned char *d); =item int B(SSL *ssl, char *file, int type); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); =item void B(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); =item int B(SSL *ssl, const char *hint); =item void B(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len)); =item const char *B(SSL *ssl); =item const char *B(SSL *ssl); =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The L document appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.2 =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/d1_both.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,1598 +1,1599 @@ /* ssl/d1_both.c */ /* * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8) #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \ if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \ long ii; \ for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \ } else { \ long ii; \ bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \ for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \ bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \ } } #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \ long ii; \ OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \ is_complete = 1; \ if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \ if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \ if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } } #if 0 # define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \ long ii; \ printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \ printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \ printf("\n"); } #endif static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 }; static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = { 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f }; /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */ static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 }; static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok); static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly) { hm_fragment *frag = NULL; unsigned char *buf = NULL; unsigned char *bitmask = NULL; frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment)); if (frag == NULL) return NULL; if (frag_len) { buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len); if (buf == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(frag); return NULL; } } /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */ frag->fragment = buf; /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */ if (reassembly) { bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len)); if (bitmask == NULL) { if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf); OPENSSL_free(frag); return NULL; } memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len)); } frag->reassembly = bitmask; return frag; } void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) { if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header. saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header. saved_retransmit_state.write_hash); } if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); OPENSSL_free(frag); } static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s) { if (s->d1->link_mtu) { s->d1->mtu = s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s)); s->d1->link_mtu = 0; } /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) { if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); /* * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) { /* Set to min mtu */ s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s); BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, s->d1->mtu, NULL); } } else return 0; } return 1; } /* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; unsigned int curr_mtu; int retry = 1; unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len; if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s)) return -1; OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s)); /* should have something * reasonable now */ if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); if (s->write_hash) { if (s->enc_write_ctx && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) mac_size = 0; else mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); } else mac_size = 0; if (s->enc_write_ctx && (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)) blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher); else blocksize = 0; frag_off = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */ while (s->init_num > 0) { if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) { /* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */ if (frag_off > 0) { /* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */ if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * Each fragment that was already sent must at least have * contained the message header plus one other byte. * Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least * |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went * wrong. */ return -1; } /* * Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new * message header for this fragment. */ s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { /* * We must have been called again after a retry so use the * fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need * to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because * that should already have been done before the retry. */ frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off; } } used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize; if (s->d1->mtu > used_len) curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len; else curr_mtu = 0; if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */ ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); if (ret <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; return ret; } used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize; if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len; } else { /* Shouldn't happen */ return -1; } } /* * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */ if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu) len = curr_mtu; else len = s->init_num; /* Shouldn't ever happen */ if (len > INT_MAX) len = INT_MAX; /* * XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible * so fail */ return -1; } dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf-> data[s->init_off]); } ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len); if (ret < 0) { /* * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which * previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really * retransmit anything. continue as if everything is fine and * wait for an alert to handle the retransmit */ if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) { if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s)) return -1; /* Have one more go */ retry = 0; } else return -1; } else { return (-1); } } else { /* * bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message * got sent. but why would this happen? */ OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) { /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case * we'll ignore the result anyway */ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]; const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; int xlen; if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* * reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in * single fragment */ *p++ = msg_hdr->type; l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); l2n3(0, p); l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; xlen = ret; } else { p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen); } if (ret == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */ s->init_num = 0; return (1); } s->init_off += ret; s->init_num -= ret; ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; frag_off += ret; /* * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it * available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the * next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be * updated again later. */ dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0); } } return (0); } /* * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), maximum * acceptable body length 'max'. Read an entire handshake message. Handshake * messages arrive in fragments. */ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) { int i, al; struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr; unsigned char *p; unsigned long msg_len; /* * s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused by the * absence of an optional handshake message */ if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0; if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } *ok = 1; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; return s->init_num; } msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr; memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); again: i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok); if (i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) { /* bad fragment received */ goto again; } else if (i <= 0 && !*ok) { return i; } /* * Don't change the *message* read sequence number while listening. For * the *record* write sequence we reflect the ClientHello sequence number * when listening. */ if (s->d1->listen) memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); else s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; if (mt >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; /* reconstruct message header */ *(p++) = msg_hdr->type; l2n3(msg_len, p); s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); l2n3(0, p); l2n3(msg_len, p); if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; return s->init_num; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); *ok = 0; return -1; } static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int max) { size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len; msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off; frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; /* sanity checking */ if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } if ((frag_off + frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */ /* * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against max * above * * Make buffer slightly larger than message length as a precaution * against small OOB reads e.g. CVE-2016-6306 */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean (s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 16)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len; s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len; s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type; s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type; s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq; } else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) { /* * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit * would open possibility for buffer overrun. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } return 0; /* no error */ } static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok) { /*- * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available * if so: * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[] * (2) update s->init_num */ pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; int al; *ok = 0; do { item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); if (item == NULL) return 0; frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; if (frag->msg_header.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) { /* This is a stale message that has been buffered so clear it */ pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); pitem_free(item); item = NULL; frag = NULL; } } while (item == NULL); /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */ if (frag->reassembly != NULL) return 0; if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) { unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len; pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header, max); - if (al == 0) { /* no alert */ + /* al will be 0 if no alert */ + if (al == 0 && frag->msg_header.frag_len > 0) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment, frag->msg_header.frag_len); } dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); pitem_free(item); if (al == 0) { *ok = 1; return frag_len; } ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); s->init_num = 0; *ok = 0; return -1; } else return 0; } /* * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */ static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) { unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list) return s->max_cert_list; return max_len; } static int dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) { hm_fragment *frag = NULL; pitem *item = NULL; int i = -1, is_complete; unsigned char seq64be[8]; unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len || msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) goto err; if (frag_len == 0) return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; /* Try to find item in queue */ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8); seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq; item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); if (item == NULL) { frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1); if (frag == NULL) goto err; memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len; frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; } else { frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) { item = NULL; frag = NULL; goto err; } } /* * If message is already reassembled, this must be a retransmit and can * be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag does not need to be * freed. */ if (frag->reassembly == NULL) { unsigned char devnull[256]; while (frag_len) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, devnull, frag_len > sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) : frag_len, 0); if (i <= 0) goto err; frag_len -= i; } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; } /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off, frag_len, 0); if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len) i = -1; if (i <= 0) goto err; RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off, (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len)); RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len, is_complete); if (is_complete) { OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); frag->reassembly = NULL; } if (item == NULL) { item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if (item == NULL) { i = -1; goto err; } item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); /* * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However, * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above, * would have returned it and control would never have reached this * branch. */ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } static int dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) { int i = -1; hm_fragment *frag = NULL; pitem *item = NULL; unsigned char seq64be[8]; unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) goto err; /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8); seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq; item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); /* * If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, don't discard * it and rather try to reassemble it. */ if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) item = NULL; /* * Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is too far * in the future, already in the queue or if we received a FINISHED * before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale retransmit. */ if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq || msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL || (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) { unsigned char devnull[256]; while (frag_len) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, devnull, frag_len > sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) : frag_len, 0); if (i <= 0) goto err; frag_len -= i; } } else { if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok); if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) goto err; frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0); if (frag == NULL) goto err; memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); if (frag_len) { /* * read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment, frag_len, 0); if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len) i = -1; if (i <= 0) goto err; } item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if (item == NULL) goto err; item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); /* * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However, * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above, * would have returned it. Then, either |frag_len| != * |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set to NULL and it will * have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or * the record will have been discarded. */ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) { unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len; int i, al; struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; redo: /* see if we have the required fragment already */ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, max, ok)) || *ok) { if (*ok) s->init_num = frag_len; return frag_len; } /* read handshake message header */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); if (i <= 0) { /* nbio, or an error */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *ok = 0; return i; } /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */ if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } /* parse the message fragment header */ dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr); len = msg_hdr.msg_len; frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; /* * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read. * Fragments must not span records. */ if (frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) { al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto f_err; } /* * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie) * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello) */ if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1)) return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok); if (frag_len && frag_len < len) return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok); if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 && wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are * doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is * correct. Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */ if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->init_num = 0; goto redo; } else { /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } } if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, max))) goto f_err; if (frag_len > 0) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0); /* * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked * that we have enough data in the record */ if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *ok = 0; return i; } } else i = 0; /* * XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the handshake * to fail */ if (i != (int)frag_len) { al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); goto f_err; } *ok = 1; s->state = stn; /* * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' lengths: as * soon as they sum up to handshake packet length, we assume we have got * all the fragments. */ s->init_num = frag_len; return frag_len; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); s->init_num = 0; *ok = 0; return (-1); } /*- * for these 2 messages, we need to * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign * ssl->session->read_compression assign * ssl->session->read_hash assign */ int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == a) { p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *p++ = SSL3_MT_CCS; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, p); s->init_num += 2; } s->init_off = 0; dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0); /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1); s->state = b; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)); } int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code) { if (code > 0) { #ifdef TLS_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__); #endif return 1; } if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) { /* * not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle * this. in fact it's probably an error */ return code; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending) #else /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ if (!SSL_in_init(s)) #endif { BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ); return code; } #if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one * record number */ item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records); if (item) { /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */ } else #endif #if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the * last set of messages */ if (state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); #endif return dtls1_handle_timeout(s); } int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs) { /* * The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence * number, since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. * However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so * using only the sequence will result in the CCS and Finished having the * same index. To prevent this, the sequence number is multiplied by 2. * In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and * Finished, it also maintains the order of the index (important for * priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable. */ return seq * 2 - is_ccs; } int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s) { pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages; piterator iter; pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; int found = 0; iter = pqueue_iterator(sent); for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) { frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, (unsigned short) dtls1_get_queue_priority (frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs), 0, &found) <= 0 && found) { #ifdef TLS_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n"); #endif return -1; } } return 1; } int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) { pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; unsigned char seq64be[8]; /* * this function is called immediately after a message has been * serialized */ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0); if (!frag) return 0; memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); if (is_ccs) { /* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + ((s->version==DTLS1_BAD_VER)?3:DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) == (unsigned int)s->init_num); } else { OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); } frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq; frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type; frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs; /* save current state */ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress; frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session; frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> 8); seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs)); item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if (item == NULL) { dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); return 0; } #if 0 fprintf(stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type); fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len); fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num); #endif pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item); return 1; } int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off, int *found) { int ret; /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */ pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; unsigned long header_length; unsigned char seq64be[8]; struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state; unsigned char save_write_sequence[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; /*- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); */ /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8); seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq; item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be); if (item == NULL) { #ifdef TLS_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq); #endif *found = 0; return 0; } *found = 1; frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; else header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length); s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length; dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type, frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, frag->msg_header.frag_len); /* save current state */ saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; saved_state.compress = s->compress; saved_state.session = s->session; saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; s->d1->retransmitting = 1; /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */ s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx; s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash; s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress; s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session; s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch; if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1) { memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); } ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); /* restore current state */ s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx; s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash; s->compress = saved_state.compress; s->session = saved_state.session; s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch; if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1) { memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); } s->d1->retransmitting = 0; (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); return ret; } unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) { /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */ if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen) { s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; } dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, frag_off, frag_len); return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */ static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; msg_hdr->type = mt; msg_hdr->msg_len = len; msg_hdr->seq = seq_num; msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; } static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; } static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; *p++ = msg_hdr->type; l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p); l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p); return p; } unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void) { return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]); } unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s) { return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s)); } void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) { memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); msg_hdr->type = *(data++); n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len); n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq); n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off); n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len); } void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr) { memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st)); ccs_hdr->type = *(data++); } int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s) { int ret; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP BIO *wbio; wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (ret == 0) BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL); } #endif ret = ssl3_shutdown(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL); #endif return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; unsigned short hbtype; unsigned int payload; unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Read type and payload length first */ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) return 0; /* silently discard */ if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ hbtype = *p++; n2s(p, payload); if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ pl = p; if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { unsigned char *buffer, *bp; unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ + 2 /* heartbeat length */ + payload + padding; int r; if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; /* * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type, * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding */ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length); if (buffer == NULL) return -1; bp = buffer; /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; s2n(payload, bp); memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); return -1; } r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length); if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); OPENSSL_free(buffer); if (r < 0) return r; } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { unsigned int seq; /* * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number */ n2s(pl, seq); if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); s->tlsext_hb_seq++; s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; } } return 0; } int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf, *p; int ret = -1; unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); return -1; } /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); return -1; } /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return -1; } /* * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. */ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); /*- * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number * as payload to distuingish different messages and add * some random stuff. * - Message Type, 1 byte * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) * - Padding */ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); if (buf == NULL) goto err; p = buf; /* Message Type */ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ s2n(payload, p); /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) goto err; p += 16; /* Random padding */ if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) goto err; ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); if (ret >= 0) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding, s, s->msg_callback_arg); dtls1_start_timer(s); s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; } err: OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/s3_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/s3_lib.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/s3_lib.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,4539 +1,4549 @@ /* ssl/s3_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif const char ssl3_version_str[] = "SSLv3" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; #define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS (sizeof(ssl3_ciphers)/sizeof(SSL_CIPHER)) /* list of available SSLv3 ciphers (sorted by id) */ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = { /* The RSA ciphers */ /* Cipher 01 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5, SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher 02 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher 03 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5, SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 128, }, #endif /* Cipher 04 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 05 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 06 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5, SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC2, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 128, }, #endif /* Cipher 07 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_IDEA, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif /* Cipher 08 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 09 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 0A */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* The DH ciphers */ /* Cipher 0B */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 0, SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 0C */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 0D */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher 0E */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 0, SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 0F */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 10 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* The Ephemeral DH ciphers */ /* Cipher 11 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 12 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 13 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher 14 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 15 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 16 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher 17 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5, SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 128, }, #endif /* Cipher 18 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 19 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 128, }, #endif /* Cipher 1A */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, #endif /* Cipher 1B */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Fortezza ciphersuite from SSL 3.0 spec */ #if 0 /* Cipher 1C */ { 0, SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA, SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA, SSL_kFZA, SSL_aFZA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher 1D */ { 0, SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA, SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA, SSL_kFZA, SSL_aFZA, SSL_eFZA, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher 1E */ { 0, SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA, SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA, SSL_kFZA, SSL_aFZA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 /* The Kerberos ciphers*/ /* Cipher 1E */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, # endif /* Cipher 1F */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher 20 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA, SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 21 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_IDEA, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 22 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5, SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_DES, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, # endif /* Cipher 23 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5, SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_3DES, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher 24 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 25 */ { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5, SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_IDEA, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 26 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 56, }, # endif /* Cipher 27 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_RC2, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 128, }, # endif /* Cipher 28 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA, SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 128, }, # endif /* Cipher 29 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5, SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_DES, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 56, }, # endif /* Cipher 2A */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5, SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_RC2, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 128, }, # endif /* Cipher 2B */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5, SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL_SSLV3, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 40, 128, }, # endif #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ /* New AES ciphersuites */ /* Cipher 2F */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 30 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 31 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 32 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 33 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 34 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 35 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 36 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 37 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 38 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 39 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 3A */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */ /* Cipher 3B */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher 3C */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 3D */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 3E */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 3F */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 40 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (128-bit portion) */ /* Cipher 41 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 42 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 43 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 44 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 45 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 46 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */ #if TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES /* New TLS Export CipherSuites from expired ID */ # if 0 /* Cipher 60 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5, TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 128, }, /* Cipher 61 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5, TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC2, SSL_MD5, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 128, }, # endif /* Cipher 62 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, # endif /* Cipher 63 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 56, }, # endif /* Cipher 64 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 128, }, # endif /* Cipher 65 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 56, 128, }, # endif /* Cipher 66 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */ /* Cipher 67 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 68 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 69 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 6A */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 6B */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 6C */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 6D */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* GOST Ciphersuites */ { 1, "GOST94-GOST89-GOST89", 0x3000080, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST94, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, SSL_GOST89MAC, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 256, 256}, { 1, "GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89", 0x3000081, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, SSL_GOST89MAC, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 256, 256}, { 1, "GOST94-NULL-GOST94", 0x3000082, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST94, SSL_eNULL, SSL_GOST94, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94, 0, 0}, { 1, "GOST2001-NULL-GOST94", 0x3000083, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eNULL, SSL_GOST94, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94, 0, 0}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (256-bit portion) */ /* Cipher 84 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 85 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 86 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 87 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 88 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 89 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* Cipher 8A */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 8B */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher 8C */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 8D */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED /* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */ /* Cipher 96 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 97 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 98 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 99 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 9A */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 9B */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */ /* GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */ /* Cipher 9C */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 9D */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher 9E */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher 9F */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher A0 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher A1 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHr, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher A2 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher A3 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher A4 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher A5 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHd, SSL_aDH, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher A6 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher A7 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL { 1, "SCSV", SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH /* Cipher C001 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHe, SSL_aECDH, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher C002 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHe, SSL_aECDH, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C003 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kECDHe, SSL_aECDH, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher C004 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHe, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C005 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHe, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C006 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher C007 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C008 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher C009 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C00A */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C00B */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHr, SSL_aECDH, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher C00C */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHr, SSL_aECDH, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C00D */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kECDHr, SSL_aECDH, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher C00E */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHr, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C00F */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHr, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C010 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher C011 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C012 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher C013 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C014 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C015 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, /* Cipher C016 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C017 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher C018 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C019 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Cipher C01A */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aSRP, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher C01B */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher C01C */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, /* Cipher C01D */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aSRP, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C01E */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C01F */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C020 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aSRP, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C021 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C022 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH /* HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */ /* Cipher C023 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C024 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C025 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kECDHe, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C026 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, SSL_kECDHe, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C027 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C028 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C029 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kECDHr, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C02A */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, SSL_kECDHr, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */ /* Cipher C02B */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C02C */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C02D */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kECDHe, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C02E */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kECDHe, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C02F */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C030 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, /* Cipher C031 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kECDHr, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, /* Cipher C032 */ { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kECDHr, SSL_aECDH, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, SSL_TLSV1_2, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #ifdef TEMP_GOST_TLS /* Cipher FF00 */ { 1, "GOST-MD5", 0x0300ff00, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, SSL_MD5, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, "GOST-GOST94", 0x0300ff01, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, SSL_GOST94, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256}, { 1, "GOST-GOST89MAC", 0x0300ff02, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, SSL_GOST89MAC, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256}, { 1, "GOST-GOST89STREAM", 0x0300ff03, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, SSL_GOST89MAC, SSL_TLSV1, SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 256, 256}, #endif /* end of list */ }; SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data = { ssl3_enc, n_ssl3_mac, ssl3_setup_key_block, ssl3_generate_master_secret, ssl3_change_cipher_state, ssl3_final_finish_mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, ssl3_cert_verify_mac, SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST, 4, SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST, 4, ssl3_alert_code, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context))ssl_undefined_function, 0, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, ssl3_handshake_write }; long ssl3_default_timeout(void) { /* * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the SSLv3 spec is way too long for * http, the cache would over fill */ return (60 * 60 * 2); } int ssl3_num_ciphers(void) { return (SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS); } const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u) { if (u < SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS) return (&(ssl3_ciphers[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS - 1 - u])); else return (NULL); } int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) { if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) return 0; return (s->s3->rrec.type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) ? s->s3->rrec.length : 0; } void ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *(p++) = htype; l2n3(len, p); s->init_num = (int)len + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; } int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s) { return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); } int ssl3_new(SSL *s) { SSL3_STATE *s3; if ((s3 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*s3))) == NULL) goto err; memset(s3, 0, sizeof(*s3)); memset(s3->rrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->rrec.seq_num)); memset(s3->wrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->wrec.seq_num)); s->s3 = s3; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s); #endif s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); err: return (0); } void ssl3_free(SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->s3 == NULL) return; #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); #endif ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); #endif if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); } if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) ssl3_free_digest_list(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->s3->alpn_selected) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s); #endif OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3, sizeof(*s->s3)); OPENSSL_free(s->s3); s->s3 = NULL; } void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) { unsigned char *rp, *wp; size_t rlen, wlen; int init_extra; #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = NULL; if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; #endif ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp); s->s3->rrec.comp = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0; # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf; wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf; rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len; wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len; init_extra = s->s3->init_extra; if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; } if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) { ssl3_free_digest_list(s); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; } #endif memset(s->s3, 0, sizeof(*s->s3)); s->s3->rbuf.buf = rp; s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp; s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen; s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen; s->s3->init_extra = init_extra; ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->packet_length = 0; s->s3->renegotiate = 0; s->s3->total_renegotiations = 0; s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0; s->s3->in_read_app_data = 0; s->version = SSL3_VERSION; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (s->next_proto_negotiated) { OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; } #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static char *MS_CALLBACK srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { return BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info); } #endif static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len); long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { int ret = 0; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) if ( # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB || # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB || # endif 0) { if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } } #endif switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED: ret = s->hit; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST: break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS: ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations; break; case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS: ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations; s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS: ret = s->s3->total_renegotiations; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS: ret = (int)(s->s3->flags); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA: if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) && ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) || (EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) > (512 / 8)))) ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA: { RSA *rsa = (RSA *)parg; if (rsa == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (ret); } if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); return (ret); } if (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) RSA_free(s->cert->rsa_tmp); s->cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; ret = 1; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (ret); } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH: { DH *dh = (DH *)parg; if (dh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (ret); } if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); return (ret); } if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL) DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp); s->cert->dh_tmp = dh; ret = 1; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (ret); } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH: { EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; if (parg == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (ret); } if (!EC_KEY_up_ref((EC_KEY *)parg)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); return (ret); } ecdh = (EC_KEY *)parg; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { EC_KEY_free(ecdh); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); return (ret); } } if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL) EC_KEY_free(s->cert->ecdh_tmp); s->cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh; ret = 1; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (ret); } break; #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME: if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) { size_t len; if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); s->tlsext_hostname = NULL; ret = 1; if (parg == NULL) break; len = strlen((char *)parg); if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME); return 0; } if ((s->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG: s->tlsext_debug_arg = parg; ret = 1; break; # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT: if (larg > 12288) { /* actual internal limit is 2^16 for the * complete hello message * (including the * cert chain and everything) */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG); break; } if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input); if ((size_t)larg == 0) s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte * just to get * non-NULL */ else s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(parg, (size_t)larg); if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = (size_t)larg; ret = 1; } else s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = 0; break; # endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: s->tlsext_status_type = larg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS: *(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_exts; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS: s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = parg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS: *(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_ids; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS: s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = parg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP: *(unsigned char **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp; return s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP: if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = parg; s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = larg; ret = 1; break; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS case SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ret = dtls1_heartbeat(s); else ret = tls1_heartbeat(s); break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING: ret = s->tlsext_hb_pending; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS: if (larg) s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS; else s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS; ret = 1; break; # endif #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN: if (larg) return ssl_cert_set1_chain(s->cert, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); else return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s->cert, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT: if (larg) return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(s->cert, (X509 *)parg); else return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s->cert, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS: *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = s->cert->key->chain; break; case SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT: return ssl_cert_select_current(s->cert, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT: if (larg == SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; if (!s->server) return 0; cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!cipher) return 0; /* * No certificate for unauthenticated ciphersuites or using SRP * authentication */ if (cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) return 2; cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (!cpk) return 0; s->cert->key = cpk; return 1; } return ssl_cert_set_current(s->cert, larg); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES: { unsigned char *clist; size_t clistlen; if (!s->session) return 0; clist = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; clistlen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2; if (parg) { size_t i; int *cptr = parg; unsigned int cid, nid; for (i = 0; i < clistlen; i++) { n2s(clist, cid); nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(cid); if (nid != 0) cptr[i] = nid; else cptr[i] = TLSEXT_nid_unknown | cid; } } return (int)clistlen; } case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES: return tls1_set_curves(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST: return tls1_set_curves_list(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE: return tls1_shared_curve(s, larg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH case SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO: s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto = larg; return 1; # endif #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(s->cert, parg, larg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->cert, parg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(s->cert, parg, larg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->cert, parg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES: { const unsigned char **pctype = parg; if (s->server || !s->s3->tmp.cert_req) return 0; if (s->cert->ctypes) { if (pctype) *pctype = s->cert->ctypes; return (int)s->cert->ctype_num; } if (pctype) *pctype = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; return s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; } case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES: if (!s->server) return 0; return ssl3_set_req_cert_type(s->cert, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN: return ssl_build_cert_chain(s->cert, s->ctx->cert_store, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(s->cert, parg, 0, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(s->cert, parg, 1, larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID: if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert) { const EVP_MD *sig; sig = s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest; if (sig) { *(int *)parg = EVP_MD_type(sig); return 1; } } return 0; } /* Might want to do something here for other versions */ else return 0; case SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY: if (s->server || !s->session || !s->session->sess_cert) return 0; else { SESS_CERT *sc; EVP_PKEY *ptmp; int rv = 0; sc = s->session->sess_cert; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) if (!sc->peer_rsa_tmp && !sc->peer_dh_tmp && !sc->peer_ecdh_tmp) return 0; #endif ptmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (!ptmp) return 0; if (0) ; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp) rv = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(ptmp, sc->peer_rsa_tmp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (sc->peer_dh_tmp) rv = EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(ptmp, sc->peer_dh_tmp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH else if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp) rv = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(ptmp, sc->peer_ecdh_tmp); #endif if (rv) { *(EVP_PKEY **)parg = ptmp; return 1; } EVP_PKEY_free(ptmp); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS: { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; const unsigned char **pformat = parg; if (!sess || !sess->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) return 0; *pformat = sess->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; return (int)sess->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } #endif case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION: /* * For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol is the * highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, as version * negotiation may have changed s->method). */ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) return 1; /* * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its * highest protocol version). */ if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version) { #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION # error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. #endif if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) return s->version == TLS1_VERSION; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) return s->version == SSL3_VERSION; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)) return s->version == SSL2_VERSION; } return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ default: break; } return (ret); } long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { int ret = 0; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) if ( # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB || # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB || # endif 0) { if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } } #endif switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB: { s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { s->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB: { s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB: s->tlsext_debug_cb = (void (*)(SSL *, int, int, unsigned char *, int, void *))fp; break; #endif default: break; } return (ret); } long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { CERT *cert; cert = ctx->cert; switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA: if ((cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) && ((cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) || (EVP_PKEY_size(cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) > (512 / 8))) ) return (1); else return (0); /* break; */ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA: { RSA *rsa; int i; rsa = (RSA *)parg; i = 1; if (rsa == NULL) i = 0; else { if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL) i = 0; } if (!i) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); return (0); } else { if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) RSA_free(cert->rsa_tmp); cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; return (1); } } /* break; */ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH: { DH *new = NULL, *dh; dh = (DH *)parg; if ((new = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); return 0; } if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) DH_free(cert->dh_tmp); cert->dh_tmp = new; return 1; } /* * break; */ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH: { EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; if (parg == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); return 0; } ecdh = EC_KEY_dup((EC_KEY *)parg); if (ecdh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { EC_KEY_free(ecdh); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); return 0; } } if (cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL) { EC_KEY_free(cert->ecdh_tmp); } cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh; return 1; } /* break; */ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } break; #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG: ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = parg; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS: case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS: { unsigned char *keys = parg; if (!keys) return 48; if (larg != 48) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH); return 0; } if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS) { memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, keys, 16); memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, keys + 16, 16); memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, keys + 32, 16); } else { memcpy(keys, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); memcpy(keys + 16, ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16); memcpy(keys + 32, ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16); } return 1; } # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG: ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg = parg; return 1; # endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG: ctx->tlsext_status_arg = parg; return 1; break; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; if (ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login); ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL; if (parg == NULL) break; if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME); return 0; } if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD: ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = srp_password_from_info_cb; ctx->srp_ctx.info = parg; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = parg; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH: ctx->srp_ctx.strength = larg; break; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES: return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST: return tls1_set_curves_list(&ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH case SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO: ctx->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto = larg; return 1; # endif # endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES: return ssl3_set_req_cert_type(ctx->cert, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN: return ssl_build_cert_chain(ctx->cert, ctx->cert_store, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(ctx->cert, parg, 0, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(ctx->cert, parg, 1, larg); #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ /* A Thawte special :-) */ case SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT: if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL) { if ((ctx->extra_certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) return (0); } sk_X509_push(ctx->extra_certs, (X509 *)parg); break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS: if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL && larg == 0) *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->cert->key->chain; else *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->extra_certs; break; case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS: if (ctx->extra_certs) { sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free); ctx->extra_certs = NULL; } break; case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN: if (larg) return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ctx->cert, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); else return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ctx->cert, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT: if (larg) return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ctx->cert, (X509 *)parg); else return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ctx->cert, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS: *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->cert->key->chain; break; case SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT: return ssl_cert_select_current(ctx->cert, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT: return ssl_cert_set_current(ctx->cert, larg); default: return (0); } return (1); } long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { CERT *cert; cert = ctx->cert; switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB: { cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB: { cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB: ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp; break; # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB: ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, void *, size_t, void *))fp; break; # endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB: ctx->tlsext_status_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB: ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, HMAC_CTX *, int))fp; break; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = (char *(*)(SSL *, void *))fp; break; # endif #endif default: return (0); } return (1); } /* * This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually * available */ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p) { SSL_CIPHER c; const SSL_CIPHER *cp; unsigned long id; id = 0x03000000L | ((unsigned long)p[0] << 8L) | (unsigned long)p[1]; c.id = id; cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS); #ifdef DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES if (cp == NULL) fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher ID %x\n", (p[0] << 8) | p[1]); #endif return cp; } int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p) { long l; if (p != NULL) { l = c->id; if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x03000000) return (0); p[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xFF; p[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xFF; } return (2); } SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr) { SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow; int i, ii, ok; CERT *cert; unsigned long alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a; /* Let's see which ciphers we can support */ cert = s->cert; #if 0 /* * Do not set the compare functions, because this may lead to a * reordering by "id". We want to keep the original ordering. We may pay * a price in performance during sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(), but would have to * pay with the price of sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(). */ sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(srvr, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(clnt, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); #endif #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr); ++i) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr, i); fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name); } fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt); ++i) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt, i); fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name); } #endif if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || tls1_suiteb(s)) { prio = srvr; allow = clnt; } else { prio = clnt; allow = srvr; } tls1_set_cert_validity(s); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i); /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if not supported */ if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && !SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) continue; ssl_set_cert_masks(cert, c); mask_k = cert->mask_k; mask_a = cert->mask_a; emask_k = cert->export_mask_k; emask_a = cert->export_mask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP) { mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; emask_k |= SSL_kSRP; mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; emask_a |= SSL_aSRP; } #endif #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG /* * fprintf(stderr,"ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", * i,c->algorithms); */ #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { if (!kssl_keytab_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) continue; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be server callback set */ if ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL) continue; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) { ok = (alg_k & emask_k) && (alg_a & emask_a); #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n", ok, alg_k, alg_a, emask_k, emask_a, (void *)c, c->name); #endif } else { ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a); #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n", ok, alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, (void *)c, c->name); #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH /* * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral * EC key check it */ if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s, c->id); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ if (!ok) continue; ii = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, c); if (ii >= 0) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari) { if (!ret) ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii); continue; } #endif ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii); break; } } return (ret); } int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) { int ret = 0; const unsigned char *sig; size_t i, siglen; int have_rsa_sign = 0, have_dsa_sign = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA int have_ecdsa_sign = 0; #endif +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) int nostrict = 1; +#endif +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || \ + !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) unsigned long alg_k; +#endif /* If we have custom certificate types set, use them */ if (s->cert->ctypes) { memcpy(p, s->cert->ctypes, s->cert->ctype_num); return (int)s->cert->ctype_num; } /* get configured sigalgs */ siglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sig); +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) nostrict = 0; +#endif for (i = 0; i < siglen; i += 2, sig += 2) { switch (sig[1]) { case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: have_rsa_sign = 1; break; case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: have_dsa_sign = 1; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: have_ecdsa_sign = 1; break; #endif } } +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || \ + !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN; p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN; return (ret); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kEDH)) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA /* * Since this refers to a certificate signed with an RSA algorithm, * only check for rsa signing in strict mode. */ if (nostrict || have_rsa_sign) p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (nostrict || have_dsa_sign) p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; # endif } if ((s->version == SSL3_VERSION) && (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHr))) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH; # endif } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (have_rsa_sign) p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (have_dsa_sign) p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)) { if (nostrict || have_rsa_sign) p[ret++] = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH; if (nostrict || have_ecdsa_sign) p[ret++] = TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA /* * ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites as well so we don't * need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kEECDH */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { if (have_ecdsa_sign) p[ret++] = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; } #endif return (ret); } static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) { if (c->ctypes) { OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes); c->ctypes = NULL; } if (!p || !len) return 1; if (len > 0xff) return 0; c->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (!c->ctypes) return 0; memcpy(c->ctypes, p, len); c->ctype_num = len; return 1; } int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s) { int ret; /* * Don't do anything much if we have not done the handshake or we don't * want to send messages :-) */ if ((s->quiet_shutdown) || (s->state == SSL_ST_BEFORE)) { s->shutdown = (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); return (1); } if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { s->shutdown |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN; #if 1 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); #endif /* * our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs to be * written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) return (-1); /* return WANT_WRITE */ } else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { /* resend it if not sent */ #if 1 ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (ret == -1) { /* * we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invoation, * return WANT_WRITE */ return (ret); } #endif } else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { /* * If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */ s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, 0, NULL, 0, 0); if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { return (-1); /* return WANT_READ */ } } if ((s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) && !s->s3->alert_dispatch) return (1); else return (0); } int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len) { int ret, n; #if 0 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SEND_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } #endif clear_sys_error(); if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s); /* * This is an experimental flag that sends the last handshake message in * the same packet as the first use data - used to see if it helps the * TCP protocol during session-id reuse */ /* The second test is because the buffer may have been removed */ if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio)) { /* First time through, we write into the buffer */ if (s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret == 0) { ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = ret; } s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; n = BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (n <= 0) return (n); s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /* We have flushed the buffer, so remove it */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; ret = s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret; s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0; } else { ret = s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); } return (ret); } static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek) { int ret; clear_sys_error(); if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s); s->s3->in_read_app_data = 1; ret = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len, peek); if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2)) { /* * ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which called * ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data. However, ssl3_read_bytes * actually found application data and thinks that application data * makes sense here; so disable handshake processing and try to read * application data again. */ s->in_handshake++; ret = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len, peek); s->in_handshake--; } else s->s3->in_read_app_data = 0; return (ret); } int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len) { return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0); } int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len) { return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1); } int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) return (1); if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) return (0); s->s3->renegotiate = 1; return (1); } int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s) { int ret = 0; if (s->s3->renegotiate) { if ((s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) && (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) && !SSL_in_init(s)) { /* * if we are the server, and we have sent a 'RENEGOTIATE' * message, we need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT. */ /* SSL_ST_ACCEPT */ s->state = SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE; s->s3->renegotiate = 0; s->s3->num_renegotiations++; s->s3->total_renegotiations++; ret = 1; } } return (ret); } /* * If we are using default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch to new SHA256 PRF and * handshake macs if required. */ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s) { long alg2; if (s->s3 == NULL || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return -1; alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2; if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF && alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF)) return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256; return alg2; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/s3_srvr.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,3699 +1,3715 @@ /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) { if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return (SSLv3_server_method()); else return (NULL); } IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, ssl3_accept, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) { int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { /* * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp * login name */ ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; } else { ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); } } return ret; } #endif int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; int ret = -1; int new_state, state, skip = 0; RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; /* init things to blank */ s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); if (s->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); return (-1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during * handshakes anyway. */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; s->tlsext_hb_seq++; } #endif for (;;) { state = s->state; switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->renegotiate = 1; /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: s->server = 1; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { BUF_MEM_free(buf); ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } s->init_num = 0; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; /* * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { /* * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /* * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't * support secure renegotiation. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } else { /* * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a * HelloRequest */ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: s->shutdown = 0; ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num = 0; if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: s->state = SSL_ST_OK; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: s->shutdown = 0; ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: { int al; if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { /* * callback indicates firther work to be done */ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; goto end; } if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); /* * This is not really an error but the only means to for * a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } } #endif s->renegotiate = 2; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; } #else if (s->hit) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; #endif else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ if (! (s->s3->tmp. new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } #else } else skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* * clear this, it may get reset by * send_server_key_exchange */ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; /* * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, * the server certificate contains the server's public key for * key exchange. */ if (0 /* * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if * provided */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) #endif || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ) ) ) ) { ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } else skip = 1; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || /* * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert * during re-negotiation: */ (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || /* * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in * RFC 2246): */ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && /* * ... except when the application insists on * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts * this for SSL 3) */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || /* * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) /* * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests * are omitted */ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { /* no cert request */ skip = 1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } } } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; #endif s->init_num = 0; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: /* * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush * unconditionally. */ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { ret = -1; goto end; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } s->init_num = 0; s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { /* * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses * its key from the certificate for key exchange. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif s->init_num = 0; } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num = 0; if (!s->session->peer) break; /* * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and * digest cached records. */ if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } } else { int offset = 0; int dgst_num; s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num = 0; /* * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next * step */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } } for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { int dgst_size; s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, EVP_MD_CTX_type (s-> s3->handshake_dgst [dgst_num]), &(s->s3-> tmp.cert_verify_md [offset])); dgst_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); if (dgst_size < 0) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; ret = -1; goto end; } offset += dgst_size; } } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif s->init_num = 0; break; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: /* * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be * cautious. * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until * the client's Finished message is read. */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->init_num = 0; s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: /* * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until * the client's Finished message is read. */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) s->state = SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; #endif else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num = 0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num = 0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret = -1; s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, s->method-> ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method-> ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) { #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; } else s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif } else s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; /* remove buffering on output */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num = 0; if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a * HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; /* s->server=1; */ s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); } ret = 1; goto end; /* break; */ case SSL_ST_ERR: default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; goto end; /* break; */ } if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state = s->state; s->state = state; cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); s->state = new_state; } } skip = 0; } end: /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ s->in_handshake--; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); return (ret); } int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) { int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; unsigned int cookie_len; long n; unsigned long id; unsigned char *p, *d; SSL_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP unsigned char *q; SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; #endif STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet) goto retry_cert; /* * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; } s->first_packet = 1; n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); s->first_packet = 0; d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte * for session id length */ if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } /* * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; p += 2; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version && s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) : (s->client_version < s->version)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { /* * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version * number */ s->version = s->client_version; } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } /* * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check * cookie length... */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (unsigned int)((d + n) - p)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); if (cookie_length == 0) return 1; } /* load the client random */ memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* get the session-id */ j = *(p++); if ((d + n) - p < j) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->hit = 0; /* * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally * ignore resumption requests with flag * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this * for security won't even compile against older library versions). * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. */ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) goto err; } else { i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); /* * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated * version. * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and * will abort the handshake with an error. */ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous * session */ s->hit = 1; } else if (i == -1) goto err; else { /* i == 0 */ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) goto err; } } p += j; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* cookie stuff */ if ((d + n) - p < 1) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } cookie_len = *(p++); if ((unsigned int)((d + n ) - p) < cookie_len) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } /* * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it * does not cause an overflow. */ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { /* too much data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } /* default verification */ else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } cookie_valid = 1; } p += cookie_len; if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { /* Select version to use */ if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); s->version = s->client_version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) { s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; s->method = DTLSv1_server_method(); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); s->version = s->client_version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } s->session->ssl_version = s->version; } } if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } n2s(p, i); if (i == 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { /* not enough data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { goto err; } p += i; /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ if (s->hit) { j = 0; id = s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); #endif for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); #endif if (c->id == id) { j = 1; break; } } /* * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: * CVE-2010-4180. */ #if 0 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { /* * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. */ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { s->session->cipher = c; j = 1; } } #endif if (j == 0) { /* * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked * to reuse it */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); goto f_err; } } /* compression */ i = *(p++); if ((d + n) - p < i) { /* not enough data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP q = p; #endif for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { if (p[j] == 0) break; } p += i; if (j >= i) { /* no compress */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto err; } } /* * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket * processing to use it in key derivation. */ { unsigned char *pos; pos = s->s3->server_random; if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { goto f_err; } } if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->hit = 1; s->session->ciphers = ciphers; s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; ciphers = NULL; /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s-> session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers (s)); if (pref_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; if (s->cipher_list) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); } } #endif /* * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ /* Can't disable compression */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed compression method */ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); if (comp_id == comp->id) { s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; break; } } if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { if (q[m] == comp_id) break; } if (m >= i) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); goto f_err; } } else if (s->hit) comp = NULL; else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { /* See if we have a match */ int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); v = comp->id; for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { if (v == q[o]) { done = 1; break; } } if (done) break; } if (done) s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; else comp = NULL; } #else /* * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } #endif /* * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */ if (!s->hit) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; #endif if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers = ciphers; if (ciphers == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } ciphers = NULL; if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ retry_cert: if (s->cert->cert_cb) { int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (rv < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return -1; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (c == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; } else { /* Session-id reuse */ #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { sk = s->session->ciphers; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) nc = c; if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) ec = c; } if (nc != NULL) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; else if (ec != NULL) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; else s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; } else #endif s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; } if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) goto f_err; } /*- * we now have the following setup. * client_random * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers * compression - basically ignored right now * ssl version is set - sslv3 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. * s->hit - session reuse flag * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } } ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; } if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return ret; } int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; int i, sl; int al = 0; unsigned long l; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT p = s->s3->server_random; if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } #endif /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /*- * There are several cases for the session ID to send * back in the server hello: * - For session reuse from the session cache, * we send back the old session ID. * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" * (which doesn't actually identify the session). * - If it is a new session, we send back the new * session ID. * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, * we send back a 0-length session ID. * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed * to send back. */ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit) s->session->session_id_length = 0; sl = s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } *(p++) = sl; memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); p += sl; /* put the cipher */ i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); p += i; /* put the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++) = 0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) *(p++) = 0; else *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } #endif /* do the header */ l = (p - d); ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; int j, num; RSA *rsa; unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned int u; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int j; # endif DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; unsigned char *p, *d; int al, i; unsigned long type; int n; CERT *cert; BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4], kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; cert = s->cert; buf = s->init_buf; r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; n = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (type & SSL_kRSA) { rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher)); if (rsa == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } RSA_up_ref(rsa); cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; } if (rsa == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } r[0] = rsa->n; r[1] = rsa->e; s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (type & SSL_kEDH) { dhp = cert->dh_tmp; if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher)); if (dhp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } r[0] = dh->p; r[1] = dh->g; r[2] = dh->pub_key; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { const EC_GROUP *group; if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); if (nid != NID_undef) ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) { ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> s3->tmp.new_cipher)); } if (ecdhp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) ecdh = ecdhp; else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto err; } /* * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is * non-zero. */ if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } /* * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx = NULL; /* * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams * structure. */ n = 4 + encodedlen; /* * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we * can set these to NULLs */ r[0] = NULL; r[1] = NULL; r[2] = NULL; r[3] = NULL; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_kPSK) { /* * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint */ n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (type & SSL_kSRP) { if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); goto err; } r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; } else #endif { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) n += 1 + nr[i]; else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here */ if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) n += 2 + nr[0]; else #endif n += 2 + nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); /* Allow space for signature algorithm */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) kn += 2; /* Allow space for signature length */ kn += 2; } else { pkey = NULL; kn = 0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { *p = nr[i]; p++; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length * as the prime */ if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) { s2n(nr[0], p); for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) { *p = 0; ++p; } } else #endif s2n(nr[i], p); BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); p += nr[i]; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { /* * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; *p = 0; p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; p += 1; memcpy((unsigned char *)p, (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_kPSK) { + size_t len = strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + /* copy PSK identity hint */ - s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); - strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, - strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); - p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + s2n(len, p); + memcpy(p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, len); + p += len; } #endif /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p * points to the space at the end. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { q = md_buf; j = 0; for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } q += i; j += i; } if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); goto err; } s2n(u, p); n += u + 2; } else #endif if (md) { /* send signature algorithm */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { /* Should never happen */ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } p += 2; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } s2n(i, p); n += i + 2; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) n += 2; } else { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return ssl_do_write(s); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p, *d; int i, j, nl, off, n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { buf = s->init_buf; d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); d[0] = n; p += n; n++; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { const unsigned char *psigs; nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); + if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } s2n(nl, p); memcpy(p, psigs, nl); p += nl; n += nl + 2; } off = n; p += 2; n += 2; sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl = 0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); + if (j > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { s2n(j, p); i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); n += 2 + j; nl += 2 + j; } else { d = p; i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); j -= 2; s2n(j, d); j += 2; n += j; nl += j; + } + if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; } } } /* else no CA names */ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; s2n(nl, p); ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n); #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; /* do the header */ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 0; s->init_num += 4; } #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); err: s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { int i, al, ok; long n; unsigned long alg_k; unsigned char *p; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH BIGNUM *pub = NULL; DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; int decrypt_len; unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; size_t j, padding_len; /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; /* * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already */ if (rsa == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); goto f_err; } } else { pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); goto f_err; } rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; } /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { n2s(p, i); if (n != i + 2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } else p -= 2; } else n = i; } /* * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the * bound is sufficient to be safe. */ if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } /* * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) goto err; /* * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of * the timing-sensitive code below. */ decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); if (decrypt_len < 0) goto err; /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ /* * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures * PS is at least 8 bytes. */ if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto f_err; } padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(p[0], 0) & constant_time_eq_int_8(p[1], 2); for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(p[j]); } decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(p[padding_len - 1]); p += padding_len; /* * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. */ version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); /* * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol * version instead if the server does not support the requested * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such * clients. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { unsigned char workaround_good; workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); version_good |= workaround_good; } /* * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to * remain non-zero (0xff). */ decrypt_good &= version_good; /* * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees * it is still sufficiently large to read from. */ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], rand_premaster_secret[j]); } s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, p, sizeof (rand_premaster_secret)); OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { int idx = -1; EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; if (n > 1) { n2s(p, i); } else { if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } i = 0; } if (n && n != i + 2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } else { p -= 2; i = (int)n; } } if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; if (idx >= 0) { skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey; if ((skey == NULL) || (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); goto f_err; } dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh; } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } else dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; if (n == 0L) { /* Get pubkey from cert */ EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (clkey) { if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1) dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); } if (dh_clnt == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_free(clkey); pub = dh_clnt->pub_key; } else pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); if (pub == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); if (i <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); BN_clear_free(pub); goto f_err; } DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; if (dh_clnt) DH_free(dh_clnt); else BN_clear_free(pub); pub = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, p, i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); if (dh_clnt) return 2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { krb5_error_code krb5rc; krb5_data enc_ticket; krb5_data authenticator; krb5_data enc_pms; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; int padl, outl; krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; krb5_ticket_times ttimes; int kerr = 0; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); n2s(p, i); enc_ticket.length = i; if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; p += enc_ticket.length; n2s(p, i); authenticator.length = i; if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } authenticator.data = (char *)p; p += authenticator.length; n2s(p, i); enc_pms.length = i; enc_pms.data = (char *)p; p += enc_pms.length; /* * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption */ if (enc_pms.length > sizeof(pms)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + enc_pms.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, &kssl_err)) != 0) { # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); if (kssl_err.text) fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } /* * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will * return authtime == 0. */ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); if (kssl_err.text) fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); goto err; } # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); if (enc == NULL) goto err; memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); /* per RFC 1510 */ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); kerr = 1; goto kclean; } if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); kerr = 1; goto kclean; } if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); kerr = 1; goto kclean; } outl += padl; if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); kerr = 1; goto kclean; } if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { /* * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random * bytes instead of the protocol version. If * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos * cipher) */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); kerr = 1; goto kclean; } } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, pms, outl); if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, len); } } /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, * but it caused problems for apache. * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; */ kclean: OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); if (kerr) goto err; } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { int ret = 1; int field_size = 0; const EC_KEY *tkey; const EC_GROUP *group; const BIGNUM *priv_key; /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Let's get server private key and group information */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { /* use the certificate */ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; } else { /* * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the * ServerKeyExchange msg. */ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* Let's get client's public key */ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (n == 0L) { /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the * code is never executed. When that support is added, we * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. */ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); goto f_err; } if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> pkey.ec)) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ } else { /* * Get client's public key from encoded point in the * ClientKeyExchange message. */ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Get encoded point length */ i = *p; p += 1; if (n != 1 + i) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it * to the start */ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; } /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); if (field_size <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; /* Compute the master secret */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, p, i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); return (ret); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { unsigned char *t = NULL; unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; int psk_err = 1; char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; n2s(p, i); if (n != i + 2) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto psk_err; } if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto psk_err; } if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); goto psk_err; } /* * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback */ memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto psk_err; } else if (psk_len == 0) { /* * PSK related to the given identity not found */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; goto psk_err; } /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; t = psk_or_pre_ms; memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); s2n(psk_len, t); memset(t, 0, psk_len); t += psk_len; s2n(psk_len, t); if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); psk_err = 0; psk_err: OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); if (psk_err != 0) goto f_err; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { int param_len; n2s(p, i); param_len = i + 2; if (param_len > n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key)) < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += i; } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { int ret = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; size_t outlen = 32, inlen; unsigned long alg_a; int Ttag, Tclass; long Tlen; /* Get our certificate private key */ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto gerr; } /* * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a * client certificate for authorization only. */ client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (client_pub_pkey) { if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) ERR_clear_error(); } /* Decrypt session key */ if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto gerr; } start = p; inlen = Tlen; if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto gerr; } /* Generate master secret */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s-> session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) ret = 2; else ret = 1; gerr: EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); if (ret) return ret; else goto err; } else { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto f_err; } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) err: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (-1); } int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; unsigned char *p; int al, ok, ret = 0; long n; int type = 0, i, j; X509 *peer; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); /* * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. */ if (s->session->peer == NULL) { ret = 1; goto end; } n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); peer = s->session->peer; pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); if (pkey == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto f_err; } /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without * length field */ if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { i = 64; } else { if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); if (rv == -1) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } else if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif p += 2; n -= 2; } n2s(p, i); n -= 2; if (i > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } } j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.rsa); if (i < 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (i == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { unsigned char signature[64]; int idx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (pctx == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (i != 64) { #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); #endif } for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; } j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 32); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); if (j <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; goto f_err; } ret = 1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; } end: if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return (ret); } int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) { int i, ok, al, ret = -1; X509 *x = NULL; unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; const unsigned char *p, *q; unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } n2l3(p, llen); if (llen + 3 != n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { if (nc + 3 > llen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } n2l3(p, l); if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q = p; x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (p != (q + l)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x = NULL; nc += l + 3; } if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } else { i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if (i <= 0) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } } if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; /* * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we * arrive here. */ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ sk = NULL; ret = 1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; } if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return (ret); } int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (cpk == NULL) { /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (0); } } if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return (0); } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { unsigned char *senc = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; HMAC_CTX hctx; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { unsigned char *p, *macstart; const unsigned char *const_p; int len, slen_full, slen; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int hlen; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; /* get session encoding length */ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too * long */ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); if (!senc) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) goto err; /* * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ const_p = senc; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); if (sess == NULL) goto err; sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); /*- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows handshake_header_length + * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) goto err; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { /* if 0 is returned, write en empty ticket */ int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1); if (ret == 0) { l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ s2n(0, p); /* length */ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); return ssl_do_write(s); } if (ret < 0) goto err; } else { if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) goto err; memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } /* * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. */ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, 16); p += 16; /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) goto err; p += len; if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) goto err; p += len; if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) goto err; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; s2n(len - 6, p); ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; OPENSSL_free(senc); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); err: if (senc) OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { unsigned char *p; size_t msglen; /*- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows handshake_header_length + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) * + (ocsp response) */ msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* status type */ *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; /* length of OCSP response */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); /* actual response */ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ return (ssl_do_write(s)); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. * It sets the next_proto member in s if found */ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) { int ok; int proto_len, padding_len; long n; const unsigned char *p; /* * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the * extension in their ClientHello */ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } /* See the payload format below */ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); /* * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by * ssl3_get_finished). */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return -1; } if (n < 2) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ } p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /*- * The payload looks like: * uint8 proto_len; * uint8 proto[proto_len]; * uint8 padding_len; * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */ proto_len = p[0]; if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; } padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; } s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; return 0; } memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; return 1; } # endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/ssl.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/ssl.h (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/ssl.h (revision 337764) @@ -1,3163 +1,3164 @@ /* ssl/ssl.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_H # define HEADER_SSL_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509 # include # endif # include # include # include # endif # include # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */ /*- * Version 0 - initial version * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate */ # define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001 /* text strings for the ciphers */ # define SSL_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA # define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA /* * VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries */ # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 # define SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH 256 # define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH 32 # define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES (512/8) # define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH 8 # define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48 /* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */ # define SSL_TXT_EXP40 "EXPORT40" # define SSL_TXT_EXP56 "EXPORT56" # define SSL_TXT_LOW "LOW" # define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM "MEDIUM" # define SSL_TXT_HIGH "HIGH" # define SSL_TXT_FIPS "FIPS" # define SSL_TXT_kFZA "kFZA"/* unused! */ # define SSL_TXT_aFZA "aFZA"/* unused! */ # define SSL_TXT_eFZA "eFZA"/* unused! */ # define SSL_TXT_FZA "FZA"/* unused! */ # define SSL_TXT_aNULL "aNULL" # define SSL_TXT_eNULL "eNULL" # define SSL_TXT_NULL "NULL" # define SSL_TXT_kRSA "kRSA" # define SSL_TXT_kDHr "kDHr" # define SSL_TXT_kDHd "kDHd" # define SSL_TXT_kDH "kDH" # define SSL_TXT_kEDH "kEDH" # define SSL_TXT_kDHE "kDHE"/* alias for kEDH */ # define SSL_TXT_kKRB5 "kKRB5" # define SSL_TXT_kECDHr "kECDHr" # define SSL_TXT_kECDHe "kECDHe" # define SSL_TXT_kECDH "kECDH" # define SSL_TXT_kEECDH "kEECDH" # define SSL_TXT_kECDHE "kECDHE"/* alias for kEECDH */ # define SSL_TXT_kPSK "kPSK" # define SSL_TXT_kGOST "kGOST" # define SSL_TXT_kSRP "kSRP" # define SSL_TXT_aRSA "aRSA" # define SSL_TXT_aDSS "aDSS" # define SSL_TXT_aDH "aDH" # define SSL_TXT_aECDH "aECDH" # define SSL_TXT_aKRB5 "aKRB5" # define SSL_TXT_aECDSA "aECDSA" # define SSL_TXT_aPSK "aPSK" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST94 "aGOST94" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST "aGOST" # define SSL_TXT_aSRP "aSRP" # define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS" # define SSL_TXT_DH "DH" # define SSL_TXT_EDH "EDH"/* same as "kEDH:-ADH" */ # define SSL_TXT_DHE "DHE"/* alias for EDH */ # define SSL_TXT_ADH "ADH" # define SSL_TXT_RSA "RSA" # define SSL_TXT_ECDH "ECDH" # define SSL_TXT_EECDH "EECDH"/* same as "kEECDH:-AECDH" */ # define SSL_TXT_ECDHE "ECDHE"/* alias for ECDHE" */ # define SSL_TXT_AECDH "AECDH" # define SSL_TXT_ECDSA "ECDSA" # define SSL_TXT_KRB5 "KRB5" # define SSL_TXT_PSK "PSK" # define SSL_TXT_SRP "SRP" # define SSL_TXT_DES "DES" # define SSL_TXT_3DES "3DES" # define SSL_TXT_RC4 "RC4" # define SSL_TXT_RC2 "RC2" # define SSL_TXT_IDEA "IDEA" # define SSL_TXT_SEED "SEED" # define SSL_TXT_AES128 "AES128" # define SSL_TXT_AES256 "AES256" # define SSL_TXT_AES "AES" # define SSL_TXT_AES_GCM "AESGCM" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128 "CAMELLIA128" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256 "CAMELLIA256" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA "CAMELLIA" # define SSL_TXT_MD5 "MD5" # define SSL_TXT_SHA1 "SHA1" # define SSL_TXT_SHA "SHA"/* same as "SHA1" */ # define SSL_TXT_GOST94 "GOST94" # define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC "GOST89MAC" # define SSL_TXT_SHA256 "SHA256" # define SSL_TXT_SHA384 "SHA384" # define SSL_TXT_SSLV2 "SSLv2" # define SSL_TXT_SSLV3 "SSLv3" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1 "TLSv1" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1 "TLSv1.1" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2 "TLSv1.2" # define SSL_TXT_EXP "EXP" # define SSL_TXT_EXPORT "EXPORT" # define SSL_TXT_ALL "ALL" /*- * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select) * ciphers normally not being used. * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection. * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments * to the default cipher setup will also be included here. * * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed * for DEFAULT. */ # define SSL_TXT_CMPALL "COMPLEMENTOFALL" # define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" /* * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'. */ # define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" /* * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites! (The latter are not * actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable some of them.) */ /* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */ # define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN 1 # define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN 2 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # if (defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) # define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 # endif # define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 X509_FILETYPE_ASN1 # define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM X509_FILETYPE_PEM /* * This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the 'struct ssl_st *' * function parameters used to prototype callbacks in SSL_CTX. */ typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st; typedef struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT; typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD; typedef struct ssl_cipher_st SSL_CIPHER; typedef struct ssl_session_st SSL_SESSION; typedef struct tls_sigalgs_st TLS_SIGALGS; typedef struct ssl_conf_ctx_st SSL_CONF_CTX; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) /* SRTP protection profiles for use with the use_srtp extension (RFC 5764)*/ typedef struct srtp_protection_profile_st { const char *name; unsigned long id; } SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn) (SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn) (SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* Typedefs for handling custom extensions */ typedef int (*custom_ext_add_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *add_arg); typedef void (*custom_ext_free_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *out, void *add_arg); typedef int (*custom_ext_parse_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *parse_arg); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN /* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */ struct ssl_cipher_st { int valid; const char *name; /* text name */ unsigned long id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */ /* * changed in 0.9.9: these four used to be portions of a single value * 'algorithms' */ unsigned long algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */ unsigned long algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */ unsigned long algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */ unsigned long algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */ unsigned long algorithm_ssl; /* (major) protocol version */ unsigned long algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */ unsigned long algorithm2; /* Extra flags */ int strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */ int alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */ }; /* Used to hold functions for SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1 functions */ struct ssl_method_st { int version; int (*ssl_new) (SSL *s); void (*ssl_clear) (SSL *s); void (*ssl_free) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_accept) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_connect) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_read) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_peek) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_write) (SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_shutdown) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate_check) (SSL *s); long (*ssl_get_message) (SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int (*ssl_read_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int (*ssl_write_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len); int (*ssl_dispatch_alert) (SSL *s); long (*ssl_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char) (const unsigned char *ptr); int (*put_cipher_by_char) (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned char *ptr); int (*ssl_pending) (const SSL *s); int (*num_ciphers) (void); const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher) (unsigned ncipher); const struct ssl_method_st *(*get_ssl_method) (int version); long (*get_timeout) (void); struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */ int (*ssl_version) (void); long (*ssl_callback_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); }; /*- * Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER, -- structure version number * SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number * Cipher OCTET STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID * Session_ID OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID * Master_key OCTET STRING, -- the master key * KRB5_principal OCTET STRING -- optional Kerberos principal * Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the optional Key argument * Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time * Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds * Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate * Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID context * Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- X509_V_... code for `Peer' * HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension * PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint * PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity * Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket * Ticket [10] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only) * Compression_meth [11] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method * SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username * } * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-). */ struct ssl_session_st { int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being * kept in here? */ /* only really used in SSLv2 */ unsigned int key_arg_length; unsigned char key_arg[SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH]; int master_key_length; unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; /* session_id - valid? */ unsigned int session_id_length; unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; /* * this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in the * appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, via * SSL_new */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len; unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH]; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK char *psk_identity_hint; char *psk_identity; # endif /* * Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed. Applications * can also set this bit for a new session via not_resumable_session_cb * to disable session caching and tickets. */ int not_resumable; /* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */ struct sess_cert_st /* SESS_CERT */ *sess_cert; /* * This is the cert for the other end. On clients, it will be the same as * sess_cert->peer_key->x509 (the latter is not enough as sess_cert is * not retained in the external representation of sessions, see * ssl_asn1.c). */ X509 *peer; /* * when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's * certificate is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse: */ long verify_result; /* only for servers */ int references; long timeout; long time; unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used * to load the 'cipher' structure */ - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* ciphers offered by the client */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */ /* * These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to * implement a maximum cache size. */ struct ssl_session_st *prev, *next; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT char *tlsext_hostname; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* peer's list */ size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* peer's list */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* RFC4507 info */ unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */ size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */ long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srp_username; # endif }; # endif # define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0x00000001L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0x00000002L /* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */ # define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L # define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING 0x00000010L # define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L # define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L # define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L # define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L # define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L /* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */ # define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0 /* Refers to ancient SSLREF and SSLv2, retained for compatibility */ # define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x0 /* * Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added in * OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol) the * workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include it in * SSL_OP_ALL. */ /* added in 0.9.6e */ # define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0x00000800L /* * SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless. This * used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7. */ # define SSL_OP_ALL 0x80000BFFL /* DTLS options */ # define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000L /* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */ # define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000L /* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */ # define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L /* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client) */ # define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT 0x00008000L /* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */ # define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L /* Don't use compression even if supported */ # define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0x00020000L /* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */ # define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L /* Does nothing: retained for compatibility */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L /* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */ # define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0 /* * Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's preferences */ # define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000L /* * If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number as * latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0 * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks. */ # define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0x00800000L # define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 0x01000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0x02000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 0x08000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 0x10000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 0x04000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2 0x08000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_SSL_MASK (SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|\ SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1|SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) /* * These next two were never actually used for anything since SSLeay zap so * we have some more flags. */ /* * The next flag deliberately changes the ciphertest, this is a check for the * PKCS#1 attack */ # define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 0x0 # define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 0x0 # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG 0x20000000L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x40000000L /* * Make server add server-hello extension from early version of cryptopro * draft, when GOST ciphersuite is negotiated. Required for interoperability * with CryptoPro CSP 3.x */ # define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG 0x80000000L /* * Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success * when just a single record has been written): */ # define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE 0x00000001L /* * Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location (buffer * contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid the * misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like non-blocking * write(): */ # define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002L /* * Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking: */ # define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004L /* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */ # define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L /* * Save RAM by releasing read and write buffers when they're empty. (SSL3 and * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context or * just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */ # define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L /* * Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations * that require it. */ # define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L # define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L /* * Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. To be set only by applications * that reconnect with a downgraded protocol version; see * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your * application attempts a normal handshake. Only use this in explicit * fallback retries, following the guidance in * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00. */ # define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L /* Cert related flags */ /* * Many implementations ignore some aspects of the TLS standards such as * enforcing certifcate chain algorithms. When this is set we enforce them. */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT 0x00000001L /* Suite B modes, takes same values as certificate verify flags */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY 0x10000 /* Suite B 192 bit only mode */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS 0x20000 /* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS 0x30000 /* Perform all sorts of protocol violations for testing purposes */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 0x10000000 /* Flags for building certificate chains */ /* Treat any existing certificates as untrusted CAs */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED 0x1 /* Don't include root CA in chain */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT 0x2 /* Just check certificates already there */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK 0x4 /* Ignore verification errors */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR 0x8 /* Clear verification errors from queue */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR 0x10 /* Flags returned by SSL_check_chain */ /* Certificate can be used with this session */ # define CERT_PKEY_VALID 0x1 /* Certificate can also be used for signing */ # define CERT_PKEY_SIGN 0x2 /* EE certificate signing algorithm OK */ # define CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE 0x10 /* CA signature algorithms OK */ # define CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE 0x20 /* EE certificate parameters OK */ # define CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM 0x40 /* CA certificate parameters OK */ # define CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM 0x80 /* Signing explicitly allowed as opposed to SHA1 fallback */ # define CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN 0x100 /* Client CA issuer names match (always set for server cert) */ # define CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME 0x200 /* Cert type matches client types (always set for server cert) */ # define CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE 0x400 /* Cert chain suitable to Suite B */ # define CERT_PKEY_SUITEB 0x800 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE 0x1 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE 0x2 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT 0x4 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER 0x8 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS 0x10 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE 0x20 /* Configuration value types */ # define SSL_CONF_TYPE_UNKNOWN 0x0 # define SSL_CONF_TYPE_STRING 0x1 # define SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE 0x2 # define SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR 0x3 /* * Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, they * cannot be used to clear bits. */ # define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_get_options(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL) # define DTLS_set_link_mtu(ssl, mtu) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU,(mtu),NULL) # define DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU,0,NULL) # define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS # define SSL_heartbeat(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT,0,NULL) # endif # define SSL_CTX_set_cert_flags(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_set_cert_flags(s,op) \ SSL_ctrl((s),SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_clear_cert_flags(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_clear_cert_flags(s,op) \ SSL_ctrl((s),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL) void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); # define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) # define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN typedef struct srp_ctx_st { /* param for all the callbacks */ void *SRP_cb_arg; /* set client Hello login callback */ int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *); /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */ int (*SRP_verify_param_callback) (SSL *, void *); /* set SRP client passwd callback */ char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback) (SSL *, void *); char *login; BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A; BIGNUM *a, *b, *v; char *info; int strength; unsigned long srp_Mask; } SRP_CTX; # endif /* see tls_srp.c */ int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s); int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx); int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad); int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key); int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s); int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key); # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*30 /* 30k max cert list :-) */ # else # define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 /* 100k max cert list :-) */ # endif # define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (1024*20) /* * This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that * set them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in * a server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed. * Also, callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique * otherwise the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do * this using the 'ssl' value they're passed by; * SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) The length value passed in * is set at the maximum size the session ID can be. In SSLv2 this is 16 * bytes, whereas SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32 bytes. The callback can alter this * length to be less if desired, but under SSLv2 session IDs are supposed to * be fixed at 16 bytes so the id will be padded after the callback returns * in this case. It is also an error for the callback to set the size to * zero. */ typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB) (const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); typedef struct ssl_comp_st SSL_COMP; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN struct ssl_comp_st { int id; const char *name; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_METHOD *method; # else char *method; # endif }; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) DECLARE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION); struct ssl_ctx_st { const SSL_METHOD *method; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; /* same as above but sorted for lookup */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store; LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions; /* * Most session-ids that will be cached, default is * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited. */ unsigned long session_cache_size; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail; /* * This can have one of 2 values, ored together, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT, * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which * means only SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS. */ int session_cache_mode; /* * If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when * SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make life easier to set * things up */ long session_timeout; /* * If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id * is added to the cache. If this function returns 1, it means that the * callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it. * Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If * remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is * removed from the cache. After the call, OpenSSL will * SSL_SESSION_free() it. */ int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); struct { int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */ int sess_connect_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */ int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */ int sess_accept_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */ int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */ int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */ int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */ int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */ int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not in the cache was * passed back via the callback. This * indicates that the application is * supplying session-id's from other * processes - spooky :-) */ } stats; int references; /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */ int (*app_verify_callback) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *); void *app_verify_arg; /* * before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument) */ /* Default password callback. */ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback; /* Default password callback user data. */ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata; /* get client cert callback */ int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); /* cookie generate callback */ int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len); /* verify cookie callback */ int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len); CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; const EVP_MD *rsa_md5; /* For SSLv2 - name is 'ssl2-md5' */ const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */ const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */ /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */ /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* what we put in client cert requests */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; /* * Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by * SSL_new) */ unsigned long options; unsigned long mode; long max_cert_list; struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; int read_ahead; /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int verify_mode; unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */ int (*default_verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; # if 0 int purpose; /* Purpose setting */ int trust; /* Trust setting */ # endif int quiet_shutdown; /* * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads. */ unsigned int max_send_fragment; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* * Engine to pass requests for client certs to */ ENGINE *client_cert_engine; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions servername callback */ int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *); void *tlsext_servername_arg; /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */ unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[16]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[16]; /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */ int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc); /* certificate status request info */ /* Callback for status request */ int (*tlsext_status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *tlsext_status_arg; /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */ int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback) (SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK char *psk_identity_hint; unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS # define SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT 32 unsigned int freelist_max_len; struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *wbuf_freelist; struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *rbuf_freelist; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* Next protocol negotiation information */ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */ /* * For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of * advertised protocols can be provided. */ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb) (SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, unsigned int *len, void *arg); void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; /* * For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the next * protocol from the list provided by the server. */ int (*next_proto_select_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg); void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; # endif /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles; /* * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to * ALPN.) */ /*- * For a server, this contains a callback function that allows the * server to select the protocol for the connection. * out: on successful return, this must point to the raw protocol * name (without the length prefix). * outlen: on successful return, this contains the length of |*out|. * in: points to the client's list of supported protocols in * wire-format. * inlen: the length of |in|. */ int (*alpn_select_cb) (SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg); void *alpn_select_cb_arg; /* * For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire * format. */ unsigned char *alpn_client_proto_list; unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* EC extension values inherited by SSL structure */ size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # endif }; # endif # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT 0x0001 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER 0x0002 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR 0x0080 /* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */ # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP 0x0100 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0x0200 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \ (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx); # define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL) void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)); int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)); void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)); SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *Data, int len, int *copy); void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)); void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e); # endif void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); # endif # define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 # define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 # define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned protos_len); int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned protos_len); void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* * the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the * resulting identity/psk */ # define PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 128 # define PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN 256 void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint); int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint); const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* Register callbacks to handle custom TLS Extensions for client or server. */ int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg); int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg); int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type); # endif # define SSL_NOTHING 1 # define SSL_WRITING 2 # define SSL_READING 3 # define SSL_X509_LOOKUP 4 /* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */ # define SSL_want_nothing(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING) # define SSL_want_read(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING) # define SSL_want_write(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING) # define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP) # define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1 # define SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM 2 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN struct ssl_st { /* * protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION, * DTLS1_VERSION) */ int version; /* SSL_ST_CONNECT or SSL_ST_ACCEPT */ int type; /* SSLv3 */ const SSL_METHOD *method; /* * There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This * is so data can be read and written to different handlers */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO /* used by SSL_read */ BIO *rbio; /* used by SSL_write */ BIO *wbio; /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate messages */ BIO *bbio; # else /* used by SSL_read */ char *rbio; /* used by SSL_write */ char *wbio; char *bbio; # endif /* * This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1 * is returned. This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what * request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect */ int rwstate; /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */ int in_handshake; int (*handshake_func) (SSL *); /* * Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon * as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state is called for the first time, so * that "state" and "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this test instead of an * "init" member. */ /* are we the server side? - mostly used by SSL_clear */ int server; /* * Generate a new session or reuse an old one. * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously * cached session or even the previous session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ int new_session; /* don't send shutdown packets */ int quiet_shutdown; /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 for received */ int shutdown; /* where we are */ int state; /* where we are when reading */ int rstate; BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */ void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by * ssl3_get_message() */ int init_num; /* amount read/written */ int init_off; /* amount read/written */ /* used internally to point at a raw packet */ unsigned char *packet; unsigned int packet_length; struct ssl2_state_st *s2; /* SSLv2 variables */ struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */ struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */ int read_ahead; /* Read as many input bytes as possible (for * non-blocking reads) */ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int hit; /* reusing a previous session */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; # if 0 int purpose; /* Purpose setting */ int trust; /* Trust setting */ # endif /* crypto */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; /* * These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to * be 'copied' into these ones */ int mac_flags; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */ # else char *expand; # endif EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */ # else char *compress; # endif /* session info */ /* client cert? */ /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; /* * the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused in * the appropriate context */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */ SSL_SESSION *session; /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; /* Used in SSL2 and SSL3 */ /* * 0 don't care about verify failure. * 1 fail if verify fails */ int verify_mode; /* fail if callback returns 0 */ int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* optional informational callback */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* error bytes to be written */ int error; /* actual code */ int error_code; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 /* Kerberos 5 context */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); # endif SSL_CTX *ctx; /* * set this flag to 1 and a sleep(1) is put into all SSL_read() and * SSL_write() calls, good for nbio debuging :-) */ int debug; /* extra application data */ long verify_result; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; int references; /* protocol behaviour */ unsigned long options; /* API behaviour */ unsigned long mode; long max_cert_list; int first_packet; /* what was passed, used for SSLv3/TLS rollback check */ int client_version; unsigned int max_send_fragment; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extension debug callback */ void (*tlsext_debug_cb) (SSL *s, int client_server, int type, unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); void *tlsext_debug_arg; char *tlsext_hostname; /*- * no further mod of servername * 0 : call the servername extension callback. * 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback. * 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello */ int servername_done; /* certificate status request info */ /* Status type or -1 if no status type */ int tlsext_status_type; /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */ int tlsext_status_expected; /* OCSP status request only */ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids; X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts; /* OCSP response received or to be sent */ unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp; int tlsext_ocsp_resplen; /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */ int tlsext_ticket_expected; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; /* our list */ unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; /* our list */ unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* * draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information to be used for * handshakes */ void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input; size_t tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; /* TLS Session Ticket extension override */ TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *tlsext_session_ticket; /* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */ tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn tls_session_ticket_ext_cb; void *tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg; /* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */ tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb; void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; SSL_CTX *initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello * extensions. For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before * the Finished message. */ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; # endif # define session_ctx initial_ctx /* What we'll do */ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles; /* What's been chosen */ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile; /*- * Is use of the Heartbeat extension negotiated? * 0: disabled * 1: enabled * 2: enabled, but not allowed to send Requests */ unsigned int tlsext_heartbeat; /* Indicates if a HeartbeatRequest is in flight */ unsigned int tlsext_hb_pending; /* HeartbeatRequest sequence number */ unsigned int tlsext_hb_seq; # else # define session_ctx ctx # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ /*- * 1 if we are renegotiating. * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */ int renegotiate; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* ctx for SRP authentication */ SRP_CTX srp_ctx; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* * For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire * format. */ unsigned char *alpn_client_proto_list; unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ }; # endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif # include # include # include /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */ # include /* Datagram TLS */ # include # include /* Support for the use_srtp extension */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* compatibility */ # define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg) (SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg)) # define SSL_get_app_data(s) (SSL_get_ex_data(s,0)) # define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a) (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a)) # define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s) (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0)) # define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0)) # define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg) (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg)) /* * The following are the possible values for ssl->state are are used to * indicate where we are up to in the SSL connection establishment. The * macros that follow are about the only things you should need to use and * even then, only when using non-blocking IO. It can also be useful to work * out where you were when the connection failed */ # define SSL_ST_CONNECT 0x1000 # define SSL_ST_ACCEPT 0x2000 # define SSL_ST_MASK 0x0FFF # define SSL_ST_INIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL_ST_BEFORE 0x4000 # define SSL_ST_OK 0x03 # define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT) # define SSL_ST_ERR (0x05|SSL_ST_INIT) # define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01 # define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02 # define SSL_CB_READ 0x04 # define SSL_CB_WRITE 0x08 # define SSL_CB_ALERT 0x4000/* used in callback */ # define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ) # define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE) # define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP) # define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT) # define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP) # define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT) # define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START 0x10 # define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20 /* Is the SSL_connection established? */ # define SSL_get_state(a) SSL_state(a) # define SSL_is_init_finished(a) (SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK) # define SSL_in_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) # define SSL_in_before(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE) # define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* * The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail, you should * not need these */ # define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER 0xF0 # define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1 # define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2 /*- * Obtain latest Finished message * -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished) * -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished). * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes. */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); /* * use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options are * 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired */ # define SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0x00 # define SSL_VERIFY_PEER 0x01 # define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02 # define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0x04 # define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() # define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() /* this is for backward compatibility */ # if 0 /* NEW_SSLEAY */ # define SSL_CTX_set_default_verify(a,b,c) SSL_CTX_set_verify(a,b,c) # define SSL_set_pref_cipher(c,n) SSL_set_cipher_list(c,n) # define SSL_add_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_add_session((a),(b)) # define SSL_remove_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_remove_session((a),(b)) # define SSL_flush_sessions(a,b) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions((a),(b)) # endif /* More backward compatibility */ # define SSL_get_cipher(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np) # define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_time(a) SSL_SESSION_get_time(a) # define SSL_set_time(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b)) # define SSL_get_timeout(a) SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a) # define SSL_set_timeout(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b)) # define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) # define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) # define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET 1000/* offset to get SSL_R_... value * from SSL_AD_... */ /* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */ # define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC # define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED # define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE /* Not for TLS */ # define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR # define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR # define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED # define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION # define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE # define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK # define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 # define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE 3 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP 4 # define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 5/* look at error stack/return * value/errno */ # define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN 6 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT 7 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8 # define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA 1 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA 2 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH 3 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH 4 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB 5 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB 6 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB 7 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED 8 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST 9 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 10 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 11 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS 12 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS 13 # define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT 14 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK 15 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG 16 /* only applies to datagram connections */ # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU 17 /* Stats */ # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER 20 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT 21 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD 22 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE 23 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT 24 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD 25 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE 26 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT 27 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT 28 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES 29 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS 30 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL 31 # define SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS 32 # define SSL_CTRL_MODE 33 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD 40 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD 41 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 42 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 43 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 44 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 45 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST 50 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST 51 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT 52 /* see tls1.h for macros based on these */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB 53 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG 54 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME 55 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB 56 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG 57 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 58 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 59 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT 60 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB 61 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG 62 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 63 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 64 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 65 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 66 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 67 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 68 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 69 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 70 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 71 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB 72 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB 75 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB 76 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB 77 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG 78 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME 79 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH 80 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD 81 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS # define SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT 85 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 86 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS 87 # endif # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ # define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT 73 # define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 74 # define DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN 75 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT 76 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS 77 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83 # define SSL_CTRL_CHAIN 88 # define SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT 89 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES 90 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES 91 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST 92 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE 93 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO 94 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS 97 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST 98 # define SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS 99 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS 100 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS 101 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST 102 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES 103 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES 104 # define SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN 105 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE 106 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE 107 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID 108 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY 109 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST 110 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS 111 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS 115 # define SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT 116 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT 117 # define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119 # define DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU 120 # define DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU 121 # define SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST 1 # define SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT 2 # define SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER 3 # define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg) # define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL) # define DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN,0, (void *)peer) # define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL) # define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) # define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa) # define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) # define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) # define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509) # define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs_only(ctx,px509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,1,px509) # define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx,sk) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,0,(char *)sk) # define SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ctx,sk) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,1,(char *)sk) # define SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,1,(char *)x509) # define SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509) # define SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ctx, flags) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, flags, NULL) # define SSL_CTX_select_current_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT, op, NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(ctx,st) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st) # define SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(ctx,st) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st) # define SSL_CTX_set0_chain_cert_store(ctx,st) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st) # define SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx,st) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st) # define SSL_set0_chain(ctx,sk) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,0,(char *)sk) # define SSL_set1_chain(ctx,sk) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,1,(char *)sk) # define SSL_add0_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_add1_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,1,(char *)x509) # define SSL_get0_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509) # define SSL_clear_chain_certs(ctx) \ SSL_set0_chain(ctx,NULL) # define SSL_build_cert_chain(s, flags) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, flags, NULL) # define SSL_select_current_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_set_current_cert(ctx,op) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT, op, NULL) # define SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(s,st) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st) # define SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(s,st) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st) # define SSL_set0_chain_cert_store(s,st) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st) # define SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(s,st) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st) # define SSL_get1_curves(ctx, s) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_CTX_set1_curves(ctx, clist, clistlen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES,clistlen,(char *)clist) # define SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_set1_curves(ctx, clist, clistlen) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES,clistlen,(char *)clist) # define SSL_set1_curves_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_get_shared_curve(s, n) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE,n,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, onoff) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO,onoff,NULL) # define SSL_set_ecdh_auto(s, onoff) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO,onoff,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist) # define SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist) # define SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist) # define SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS,clistlen,(int *)slist) # define SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_get0_certificate_types(s, clist) \ SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES, 0, (char *)clist) # define SSL_CTX_set1_client_certificate_types(ctx, clist, clistlen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES,clistlen,(char *)clist) # define SSL_set1_client_certificate_types(s, clist, clistlen) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES,clistlen,(char *)clist) # define SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, pn) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID,0,pn) # define SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, pk) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY,0,pk) # define SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, plst) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST,0,(char *)plst) # define SSL_get0_ec_point_formats(s, plst) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS,0,(char *)plst) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client); BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from); void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio); # endif int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *, const char *str); SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth); void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *); long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *, X509_STORE *); int SSL_want(const SSL *s); int SSL_clear(SSL *s); void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm); const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s); int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits); char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c); const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c); unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c); int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n); -char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len); +char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size); int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s); int SSL_pending(const SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd); int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd); int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s); BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s); # endif int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str); void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes); int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s); int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *); void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)); void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth); void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); # endif int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* Set serverinfo data for the current active cert. */ int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *serverinfo, size_t serverinfo_length); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); # endif /* NO_STDIO */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); /* PEM type */ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file); int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *file); # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! [was: #ifndef MAC_OS_pre_X] */ # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *dir); # endif # endif # endif void SSL_load_error_strings(void); const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s); long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to, const SSL *from); X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s); int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void); const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len); unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); # endif void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses); int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp); int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session); int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB); int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB); int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len); SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); # ifdef HEADER_X509_H X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s); # endif STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s); int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *); void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*callback) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)); void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); # endif int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u); int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx); int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose); int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose); int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust); int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust); int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx); X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb) (SSL *, void *)); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *, void *)); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *, int *, void *)); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info); int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp); BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s); BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s); char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s); char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s); # endif void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s); void SSL_free(SSL *ssl); int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl); int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl); int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void)); long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void)); int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int ret_code); const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s); /* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ # endif const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS * version */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available * SSL/TLS version */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available * SSL/TLS version */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void); /* DTLSv1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void); /* DTLSv1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void); /* DTLSv1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_method(void); /* DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_server_method(void); /* DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_client_method(void); /* DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s); int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s); int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s); const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx); const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s); int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method); const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value); void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s); int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s); void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s); long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s); int SSL_library_init(void); char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *, char *buf, int size); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk); SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl); X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl); /* * EVP_PKEY */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl); X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx); EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath); # define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session/* just peek at pointer */ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl); SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)); void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state); void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long v); long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx); int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx); int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx); int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void); # define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) # define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) # define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) # define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL) # define SSL_set_max_send_fragment(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL) /* NB: the keylength is only applicable when is_export is true */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s); const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s); const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp); STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *meths); void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void); int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm); const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr); /* TLS extensions functions */ int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len); int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb, void *arg); /* Pre-shared secret session resumption functions */ int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb, void *arg); void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug); int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s); int SSL_is_server(SSL *s); SSL_CONF_CTX *SSL_CONF_CTX_new(void); int SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx); void SSL_CONF_CTX_free(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx); unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags); unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags); int SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *pre); void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL *ssl); void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CONF_cmd(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd, const char *value); int SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, int *pargc, char ***pargv); int SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE void SSL_trace(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void); # endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); /* Error codes for the SSL functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST 331 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 100 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED 167 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO 101 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 102 # define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION 103 # define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE 245 # define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE 104 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT 246 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 295 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD 247 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM 316 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO 248 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT 249 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC 250 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY 251 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE 252 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 297 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT 305 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS 424 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED 259 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 260 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 261 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 262 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 263 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 264 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 265 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 266 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 267 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES 268 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED 105 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 106 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 107 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED 108 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO 109 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY 340 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY 110 # define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION 111 # define SSL_F_READ_N 112 # define SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 113 # define SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH 239 # define SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO 114 # define SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY 240 # define SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT 115 # define SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO 116 # define SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT 117 # define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 118 # define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO 119 # define SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK 237 # define SSL_F_SSL23_READ 120 # define SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE 121 # define SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT 122 # define SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT 123 # define SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT 124 # define SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL 241 # define SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK 234 # define SSL_F_SSL2_READ 125 # define SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL 236 # define SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE 126 # define SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE 127 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT 128 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 296 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 304 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED 339 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL 133 # define SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS 293 # define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET 388 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 289 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 137 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 138 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 139 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED 140 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 306 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO 146 # define SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC 285 # define SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 287 # define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 147 # define SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK 235 # define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES 148 # define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N 149 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 150 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 151 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 152 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 153 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 154 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 242 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 155 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER 156 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER 291 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN 318 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 319 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 298 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 277 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 307 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 299 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 278 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 308 # define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160 # define SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN 332 # define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP 221 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST 222 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE 214 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW 162 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 163 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 280 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG 279 # define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR 230 # define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT 231 # define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR 164 # define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD 165 # define SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD 334 # define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST 166 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL 232 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 168 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES 309 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW 169 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST 269 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE 290 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE 226 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 219 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION 170 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST 229 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE 171 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 172 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE 220 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 173 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY 174 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 175 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 176 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 272 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 177 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 178 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 179 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO 336 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE 337 # define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE 180 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX 322 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT 182 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY 317 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183 # define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184 # define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 # define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 300 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 302 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 310 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 301 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 303 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 311 # define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270 # define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 281 # define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 282 # define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223 # define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187 # define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188 # define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 320 # define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 321 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW 225 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT 191 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST 271 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD 192 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY 193 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE 227 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD 194 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION 195 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 218 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT 294 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST 228 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD 196 # define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN 224 # define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT 313 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION 243 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION 197 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 203 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 273 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 204 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 205 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 206 # define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN 207 # define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE 208 # define SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG 333 # define SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC 286 # define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 209 # define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 274 # define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 210 # define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL 314 # define SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST 338 # define SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT 315 # define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275 # define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276 # define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF 284 # define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 211 # define SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS 335 # define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING 212 /* Reason codes. */ # define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100 # define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272 # define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD 101 # define SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE 102 # define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 103 # define SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM 104 # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA 390 # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106 # define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE 375 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE 393 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE 395 # define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111 # define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE 305 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT 306 # define SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH 332 # define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST 105 # define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH 271 # define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE 113 # define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH 333 # define SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE 114 # define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH 115 # define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER 116 # define SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH 316 # define SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT 117 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT 118 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT 119 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH 120 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH 121 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE 122 # define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 123 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH 347 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH 348 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH 349 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH 350 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS 371 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH 351 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 352 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 353 # define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 124 # define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 125 # define SSL_R_BAD_STATE 126 # define SSL_R_BAD_VALUE 384 # define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY 127 # define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET 128 # define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG 129 # define SSL_R_BN_LIB 130 # define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH 131 # define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG 132 # define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY 133 # define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED 134 # define SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR 377 # define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 135 # define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT 136 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH 137 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 138 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR 139 # define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 226 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 140 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED 343 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE 141 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR 142 # define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 143 # define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 144 # define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH 308 # define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED 145 # define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281 # define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL 372 # define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148 # define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149 # define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334 # define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID 309 # define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT 317 # define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING 318 # define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE 322 # define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE 323 # define SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE 374 # define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER 310 # define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 354 # define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150 # define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY 282 # define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151 # define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 # define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 # define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 # define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 355 # define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 356 # define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 # define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 # define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 # define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST 380 # define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373 # define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340 # define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158 # define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280 # define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 341 # define SSL_R_INVALID_NULL_CMD_NAME 385 # define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278 # define SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA 388 # define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME 357 # define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 328 # define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 325 # define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279 # define SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG 284 # define SSL_R_KRB5 285 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC 286 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED 287 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT 288 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ 289 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET 290 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT 291 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ 292 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED 293 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 294 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 295 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159 +# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 404 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161 # define SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG 296 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT 162 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY 163 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT 164 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT 165 # define SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT 382 # define SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT 381 # define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY 166 # define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY 167 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 168 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT 169 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT 170 # define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM 358 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 171 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 311 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173 # define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174 # define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS 346 # define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED 178 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET 179 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED 180 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE 181 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED 182 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED 183 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST 184 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH 185 # define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD 331 # define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED 186 # define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED 187 # define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER 330 # define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED 188 # define SSL_R_NO_PEM_EXTENSIONS 389 # define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY 189 # define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 190 # define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE 191 # define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY 192 # define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 339 # define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST 324 # define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193 # define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS 376 # define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES 359 # define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK 194 # define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195 # define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196 # define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197 # define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344 # define SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE 387 # define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE 379 # define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297 # define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG 327 # define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198 # define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 227 # define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 270 # define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 199 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR 200 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE 201 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE 202 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER 203 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 204 # define SSL_R_PEM_NAME_BAD_PREFIX 391 # define SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT 392 # define SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 205 # define SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS 206 # define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN 207 # define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 223 # define SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB 224 # define SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB 225 # define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR 208 # define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA 209 # define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 210 # define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET 211 # define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED 312 # define SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE 212 # define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 213 # define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE 214 # define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL 298 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG 335 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 336 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 337 # define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 215 # define SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING 342 # define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO 216 # define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO 217 # define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO 218 # define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 345 # define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275 # define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277 # define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219 # define SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT 407 # define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 360 # define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220 # define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 361 # define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES 362 # define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG 363 # define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE 364 # define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221 # define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG 299 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT 321 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 319 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE 320 # define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 300 # define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT 222 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043 # define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION 228 # define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 229 # define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 230 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED 301 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT 302 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG 273 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH 303 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 231 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110 # define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232 # define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT 365 # define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 366 # define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL 367 # define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 157 # define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233 # define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234 # define SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS 409 # define SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 235 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS 236 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS 313 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY 237 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS 238 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS 314 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS 239 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD 240 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES 241 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES 242 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES 243 # define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 244 # define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD 245 # define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED 276 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE 246 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 247 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 248 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 249 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CMD_NAME 386 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 368 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 250 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE 251 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 252 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE 253 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 254 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 255 # define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 338 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 256 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 257 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE 326 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329 # define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED 369 # define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260 # define SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 383 # define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261 # define SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE 378 # define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262 # define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS 263 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 264 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE 265 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE 370 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 266 # define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267 # define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268 # define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 269 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/ssl_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/ssl_lib.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/ssl_lib.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,3584 +1,3593 @@ /* * ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions. */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #ifdef REF_CHECK # include #endif #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { /* * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library * bug */ (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int)) ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *)) ssl_undefined_function, 0, /* finish_mac_length */ (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, NULL, /* client_finished_label */ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ NULL, /* server_finished_label */ 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context))ssl_undefined_function, }; int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { if (s->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); return (0); } if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = NULL; } s->error = 0; s->hit = 0; s->shutdown = 0; #if 0 /* * Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */ /* * This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */ if (s->renegotiate) return (1); #else if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #endif s->type = 0; s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT); s->version = s->method->version; s->client_version = s->version; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; #if 0 s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead; #endif if (s->init_buf != NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); s->first_packet = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->cert != NULL) { if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) { OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL; } s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0; s->cert->alpn_sent = 0; } #endif #if 1 /* * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert * back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method = s->ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) return (0); } else #endif s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); } /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; ctx->method = meth; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list), &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return (0); } return (1); } SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s; if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); return (NULL); } if (ctx->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); return (NULL); } s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); if (s == NULL) goto err; memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL)); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ s->options = ctx->options; s->mode = ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; s->references = 1; if (ctx->cert != NULL) { /* * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once. */ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (s->cert == NULL) goto err; } else s->cert = NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead; s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; #if 0 s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth; #endif s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id; s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!s->param) goto err; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); #if 0 s->purpose = ctx->purpose; s->trust = ctx->trust; #endif s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->ctx = ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->initial_ctx = ctx; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) goto err; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) goto err; s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; # endif if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { s->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) goto err; memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; } #endif s->verify_result = X509_V_OK; s->method = ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; SSL_clear(s); CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; #endif return (s); err: if (s != NULL) SSL_free(s); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(ctx->sid_ctx)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); ctx->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return 1; } int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); ssl->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); return 1; } int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len) { /* * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use * by this SSL. */ SSL_SESSION r, *p; if (id_len > sizeof(r.session_id)) return 0; r.ssl_version = ssl->version; r.session_id_length = id_len; memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); /* * NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ if ((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return (p != NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); } int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->param; } void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert); } void SSL_free(SSL *s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL", s); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif if (s->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio = NULL; } if (s->rbio != NULL) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio)) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); /* add extra stuff */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); /* Make the next call work :-) */ if (s->session != NULL) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); /* Free up if allocated */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_hostname) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids) sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); if (s->alpn_client_proto_list) OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list); #endif if (s->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (s->next_proto_negotiated) OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (s->srtp_profiles) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); #endif OPENSSL_free(s); } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { /* * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it */ if (s->bbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio; s->bbio->next_bio = NULL; } } if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio)) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio)) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); s->rbio = rbio; s->wbio = wbio; } BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return (s->rbio); } BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { return (s->wbio); } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return (SSL_get_rfd(s)); } int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_rbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return (ret); } int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_wbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio); } else SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s)); } else SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s)); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } #endif /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); } return ret; } /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); } return ret; } int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return (s->verify_mode); } int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); } int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return (s->verify_callback); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->verify_mode); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); } int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return (ctx->default_verify_callback); } void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { s->verify_mode = mode; if (callback != NULL) s->verify_callback = callback; } void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) { s->read_ahead = yes; } int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return (s->read_ahead); } int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { /* * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.) */ return (s->method->ssl_pending(s)); } X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { X509 *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->peer; if (r == NULL) return (r); CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); return (r); } STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509) *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; /* * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if * we are a server, it does not. */ return (r); } /* * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) { CERT *tmp; /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f)); /* * what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa */ if (t->method != f->method) { t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */ t->method = f->method; /* change method */ t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */ } tmp = t->cert; if (f->cert != NULL) { CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); t->cert = f->cert; } else t->cert = NULL; if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp); SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length); } /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { if (ssl == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if (ssl->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return 0; } if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); } int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_accept_state(s); return (s->method->ssl_accept(s)); } int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_connect_state(s); return (s->method->ssl_connect(s)); } long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return (s->method->get_timeout()); } int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num)); } int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return (0); } return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num)); } int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); return (-1); } return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num)); } int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { /* * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used * (see ssl3_shutdown). */ if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (!SSL_in_init(s)) { return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT); return -1; } } int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 0; return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) { /* * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a * handshake has finished */ return (s->renegotiate != 0); } long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return (s->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = s->read_ahead; s->read_ahead = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: s->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return (s->options |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return (s->options &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (s->mode |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (s->mode &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (s->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l = s->max_cert_list; s->max_cert_list = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; s->max_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: if (s->s3) return s->s3->send_connection_binding; else return 0; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return (s->cert->cert_flags |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return (s->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST: if (parg) { if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) return 0; *(unsigned char **)parg = s->cert->ciphers_raw; return (int)s->cert->ciphers_rawlen; } else return ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL); default: return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg)); } } long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: s->msg_callback = (void (*) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp)); } } LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; /* For some cases with ctx == NULL perform syntax checks */ if (ctx == NULL) { switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST: return tls1_set_curves_list(NULL, NULL, parg); #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0); default: return 0; } } switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return (ctx->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (ctx->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l = ctx->max_cert_list; ctx->max_cert_list = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: l = ctx->session_cache_size; ctx->session_cache_size = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: return (ctx->session_cache_size); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: l = ctx->session_cache_mode; ctx->session_cache_mode = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: return (ctx->session_cache_mode); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions)); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: return (ctx->stats.sess_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: return (ctx->stats.sess_miss); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return (ctx->options |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return (ctx->options &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (ctx->mode |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (ctx->mode &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); default: return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg)); } } long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: ctx->msg_callback = (void (*) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp)); } } int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) { long l; l = a->id - b->id; if (l == 0L) return (0); else return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1); } int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp) { long l; l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id; if (l == 0L) return (0); else return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { return (s->cipher_list); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { return (s->ctx->cipher_list); } } return (NULL); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { return (s->cipher_list_by_id); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); } } return (NULL); } /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) { SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; if (s == NULL) return (NULL); sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) return (NULL); c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); if (c == NULL) return (NULL); return (c->name); } /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str, ctx->cert); /* * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated. */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, str, s->cert); /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ -char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len) +char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size) { char *p; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clntsk, *srvrsk; SSL_CIPHER *c; int i; - if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2)) - return (NULL); + if (!s->server + || s->session == NULL + || s->session->ciphers == NULL + || size < 2) + return NULL; p = buf; - sk = s->session->ciphers; + clntsk = s->session->ciphers; + srvrsk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); + if (clntsk == NULL || srvrsk == NULL) + return NULL; - if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk) == 0 || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvrsk) == 0) return NULL; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk); i++) { int n; - c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clntsk, i); + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(srvrsk, c) < 0) + continue; + n = strlen(c->name); - if (n + 1 > len) { + if (n + 1 > size) { if (p != buf) --p; *p = '\0'; return buf; } strcpy(p, c->name); p += n; *(p++) = ':'; - len -= n + 1; + size -= n + 1; } p[-1] = '\0'; return (buf); } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p, int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)) { int i, j = 0; SSL_CIPHER *c; CERT *ct = s->cert; unsigned char *q; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; /* Set disabled masks for this session */ ssl_set_client_disabled(s); if (sk == NULL) return (0); q = p; if (put_cb == NULL) put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip disabled ciphers */ if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) continue; #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv) continue; else empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0; } #endif j = put_cb(c, p); p += j; } /* * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add * applicable SCSVs. */ if (p != q) { if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; j = put_cb(&scsv, p); p += j; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); #endif } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; j = put_cb(&scsv, p); p += j; } } return (p - q); } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; int i, n; if (s->s3) s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL); if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return (NULL); } if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) { sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ if(sk == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } } else { sk = *skp; sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); } if (s->cert->ciphers_raw) OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ciphers_raw); s->cert->ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num); if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } s->cert->ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num; for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) { /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) && (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; p += n; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n"); #endif continue; } /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) && (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected * downgrade. */ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); if (s->s3) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto err; } p += n; continue; } c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p); p += n; if (c != NULL) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } if (skp != NULL) *skp = sk; return (sk); err: if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return (NULL); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). */ const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) { if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) return NULL; return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname; } int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) { if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session-> tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; return -1; } /* * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is * expected that this function is called from the callback set by * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client * selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol. * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. */ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) { unsigned int i, j; const unsigned char *result; int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; /* * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ for (i = 0; i < server_len;) { for (j = 0; j < client_len;) { if (server[i] == client[j] && memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { /* We found a match */ result = &server[i]; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; goto found; } j += client[j]; j++; } i += server[i]; i++; } /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ result = client; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; found: *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1; *outlen = result[0]; return status; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols * provided by the callback. */ void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; if (!*data) { *len = 0; } else { *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; } } /* * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the * ServerHello. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; } # endif /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned protos_len) { if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len); if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) return 1; memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len); ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* * SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned protos_len) { if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len); if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) return 1; memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len); ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is * called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol * from the client's list of offered protocols. */ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from * |ssl|. On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name * (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't * respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { *data = NULL; if (ssl->s3) *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; if (*data == NULL) *len = 0; else *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context) { if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) return -1; return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen, use_context); } static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { const unsigned char *session_id = a->session_id; unsigned long l; unsigned char tmp_storage[4]; if (a->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) { memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage)); memcpy(tmp_storage, a->session_id, a->session_id_length); session_id = tmp_storage; } l = (unsigned long) ((unsigned long)session_id[0]) | ((unsigned long)session_id[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)session_id[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)session_id[3] << 24L); return (l); } /* * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing * session with a matching session ID. */ static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return (1); if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) return (1); return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length)); } /* * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed * via ssl.h. */ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION) SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; if (meth == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); return (NULL); } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); return NULL; } #endif if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); goto err; } ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); ret->method = meth; ret->cert_store = NULL; ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; ret->session_cache_head = NULL; ret->session_cache_tail = NULL; /* We take the system default */ ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout(); ret->new_session_cb = 0; ret->remove_session_cb = 0; ret->get_session_cb = 0; ret->generate_session_id = 0; memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats)); ret->references = 1; ret->quiet_shutdown = 0; /* ret->cipher=NULL;*/ /*- ret->s2->challenge=NULL; ret->master_key=NULL; ret->key_arg=NULL; ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */ ret->info_callback = NULL; ret->app_verify_callback = 0; ret->app_verify_arg = NULL; ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->read_ahead = 0; ret->msg_callback = 0; ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL; ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; #if 0 ret->verify_depth = -1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ #endif ret->sid_ctx_length = 0; ret->default_verify_callback = NULL; if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->default_passwd_callback = 0; ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL; ret->client_cert_cb = 0; ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0; ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0; ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert); if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!ret->param) goto err; if ((ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); ret->extra_certs = NULL; /* No compression for DTLS */ if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS)) ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL; ret->psk_client_callback = NULL; ret->psk_server_callback = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT; ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST)); if (!ret->rbuf_freelist) goto err; ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0; ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0; ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL; ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST)); if (!ret->wbuf_freelist) goto err; ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0; ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0; ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO # define eng_strx(x) #x # define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ { ENGINE *eng; eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); if (!eng) { ERR_clear_error(); ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); } if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) ERR_clear_error(); } # endif #endif /* * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely * deployed might change this. */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; /* * Disable SSLv2 by default, callers that want to enable SSLv2 will have to * explicitly clear this option via either of SSL_CTX_clear_options() or * SSL_clear_options(). */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; return (ret); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret); return (NULL); } #if 0 static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp) { OPENSSL_free(comp); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS static void ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list) { SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next; for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) { next = ent->next; OPENSSL_free(ent); } OPENSSL_free(list); } #endif void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif if (a->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); /* * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed * after the sessions were flushed. * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) */ if (a->sessions != NULL) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); if (a->sessions != NULL) lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); if (a->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); if (a->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); if (a->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(a->cert); if (a->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); if (a->extra_certs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free); #if 0 /* This should never be done, since it * removes a global database */ if (a->comp_methods != NULL) sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free); #else a->comp_methods = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (a->srtp_profiles) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (a->psk_identity_hint) OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (a->client_cert_engine) ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS if (a->wbuf_freelist) ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist); if (a->rbuf_freelist) ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if (a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL) OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list); #endif OPENSSL_free(a); } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) { ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode = mode; ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); } void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg); } void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign; int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export; int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl; unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC X509 *x = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0; #endif if (c == NULL) return; kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl)); #else rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); dh_tmp_export = (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl)); #else dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto); #endif cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); rsa_enc = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); rsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN; cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]); dsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN; cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]); dh_rsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]); /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ dh_dsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC have_ecc_cert = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; #endif mask_k = 0; mask_a = 0; emask_k = 0; emask_a = 0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc, rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa); #endif cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]); if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01; } cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]); if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94; } if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign)) mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc))) emask_k |= SSL_kRSA; #if 0 /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */ if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) mask_k |= SSL_kEDH; if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) emask_k |= SSL_kEDH; #endif if (dh_tmp_export) emask_k |= SSL_kEDH; if (dh_tmp) mask_k |= SSL_kEDH; if (dh_rsa) mask_k |= SSL_kDHr; if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k |= SSL_kDHr; if (dh_dsa) mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k |= SSL_kDHd; if (mask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) mask_a |= SSL_aDH; if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; emask_a |= SSL_aRSA; } if (dsa_sign) { mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; emask_a |= SSL_aDSS; } mask_a |= SSL_aNULL; emask_a |= SSL_aNULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; #endif /* * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites * depending on the key usage extension. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (have_ecc_cert) { cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]; x = cpk->x509; /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; # endif ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN)) ecdsa_ok = 0; ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) { signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (ecdh_ok) { if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) { mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr; mask_a |= SSL_aECDH; if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) { emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr; emask_a |= SSL_aECDH; } } if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) { mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; mask_a |= SSL_aECDH; if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) { emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; emask_a |= SSL_aECDH; } } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (ecdsa_ok) { mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; } # endif } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (have_ecdh_tmp) { mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH; emask_k |= SSL_kEECDH; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; emask_k |= SSL_kPSK; emask_a |= SSL_aPSK; #endif c->mask_k = mask_k; c->mask_a = mask_a; c->export_mask_k = emask_k; c->export_mask_a = emask_a; c->valid = 1; } /* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) { unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int keysize = 0; int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0; const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth; if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) { /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL) return 0; keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (keysize > 163) return 0; } /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) { signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); } if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) { /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT); return 0; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { /* signature alg must be ECDSA */ if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE); return 0; } } if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { /* signature alg must be RSA */ if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE); return 0; } } } if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); return 0; } } return 1; /* all checks are ok */ } #endif static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s) { int idx; idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; if (idx == -1) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return idx; } CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) { CERT *c; int i; c = s->cert; if (!s->s3 || !s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) return NULL; ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL /* * Broken protocol test: return last used certificate: which may mismatch * the one expected. */ if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) return c->key; #endif i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); /* This may or may not be an error. */ if (i < 0) return NULL; /* May be NULL. */ return &c->pkeys[i]; } EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd) { unsigned long alg_a; CERT *c; int idx = -1; alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; c = s->cert; #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL /* * Broken protocol test: use last key: which may mismatch the one * expected. */ if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) idx = c->key - c->pkeys; else #endif if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; if (idx == -1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (NULL); } if (pmd) *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest; return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo, size_t *serverinfo_length) { CERT *c = NULL; int i = 0; *serverinfo_length = 0; c = s->cert; i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); if (i == -1) return 0; if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) return 0; *serverinfo = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo; *serverinfo_length = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; return 1; } #endif void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) { int i; /* * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session)) && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session)) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL)); } } } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->method; } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) { return (s->method); } int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { int conn = -1; int ret = 1; if (s->method != meth) { if (s->handshake_func != NULL) conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); if (s->method->version == meth->version) s->method = meth; else { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method = meth; ret = s->method->ssl_new(s); } if (conn == 1) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect; else if (conn == 0) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept; } return (ret); } int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i) { int reason; unsigned long l; BIO *bio; if (i > 0) return (SSL_ERROR_NONE); /* * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, * where we do encode the error */ if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); else return (SSL_ERROR_SSL); } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) { bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); if (BIO_should_read(bio)) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) /* * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for. * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it * might be safer to keep it. */ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) { bio = SSL_get_wbio(s); if (BIO_should_write(bio)) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) /* * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); } if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) { /* assume it is the socket being closed */ return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } else { if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } } return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { int ret = 1; if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); return (-1); } s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { ret = s->handshake_func(s); } return (ret); } /* * For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these * calls will reset it */ void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 1; s->shutdown = 0; s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 0; s->shutdown = 0; s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (NULL); } const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) return ("TLSv1.2"); else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) return ("TLSv1.1"); else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) return ("TLSv1"); else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) return ("SSLv3"); else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) return ("SSLv2"); else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) return ("DTLSv0.9"); else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) return ("DTLSv1"); else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) return ("DTLSv1.2"); else return ("unknown"); } SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; X509_NAME *xn; SSL *ret; int i; if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) return (NULL); ret->version = s->version; ret->type = s->type; ret->method = s->method; if (s->session != NULL) { /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s); } else { /* * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both * point to the same object, and thus we can't use * SSL_copy_session_id. */ ret->method->ssl_free(ret); ret->method = s->method; ret->method->ssl_new(ret); if (s->cert != NULL) { if (ret->cert != NULL) { ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); } ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; } SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); } ret->options = s->options; ret->mode = s->mode; SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s)); ret->debug = s->debug; /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; /* setup rbio, and wbio */ if (s->rbio != NULL) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio)) goto err; } if (s->wbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio)) goto err; } else ret->wbio = ret->rbio; } ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; ret->server = s->server; ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate; ret->new_session = s->new_session; ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; ret->shutdown = s->shutdown; ret->state = s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, * though */ ret->rstate = s->rstate; ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, * ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, * ret->init_off */ ret->hit = s->hit; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) goto err; } if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) == NULL) goto err; /* Dup the client_CA list */ if (s->client_CA != NULL) { if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err; ret->client_CA = sk; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) { X509_NAME_free(xn); goto err; } } } if (0) { err: if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return (ret); } void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) { if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; } if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->expand != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); s->expand = NULL; } if (s->compress != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress = NULL; } #endif } X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return (s->cert->key->x509); else return (NULL); } EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return (s->cert->key->privatekey); else return (NULL); } X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->x509; else return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->privatekey; else return NULL; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) return (s->session->cipher); return (NULL); } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { return NULL; } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { return NULL; } #else const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { if (s->compress != NULL) return (s->compress->meth); return (NULL); } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { if (s->expand != NULL) return (s->expand->meth); return (NULL); } #endif int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push) { BIO *bbio; if (s->bbio == NULL) { bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bbio == NULL) return (0); s->bbio = bbio; } else { bbio = s->bbio; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); } (void)BIO_reset(bbio); /* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } if (push) { if (s->wbio != bbio) s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); } else { if (s->wbio == bbio) s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio); } return (1); } void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { if (s->bbio == NULL) return; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { /* remove buffering */ s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); #ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids * adding one more preprocessor symbol */ assert(s->wbio != NULL); #endif } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio = NULL; } void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return (s->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return (s->shutdown); } int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return (s->version); } SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->ctx); } SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) { CERT *ocert = ssl->cert; if (ssl->ctx == ctx) return ssl->ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx == NULL) ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; #endif ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (ocert) { int i; /* Preserve any already negotiated parameters */ if (ssl->server) { ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = ocert->peer_sigalgs; ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen = ocert->peer_sigalgslen; ocert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; ssl->cert->ciphers_raw = ocert->ciphers_raw; ssl->cert->ciphers_rawlen = ocert->ciphers_rawlen; ocert->ciphers_raw = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { ssl->cert->pkeys[i].digest = ocert->pkeys[i].digest; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ssl->cert->alpn_proposed = ocert->alpn_proposed; ssl->cert->alpn_proposed_len = ocert->alpn_proposed_len; ocert->alpn_proposed = NULL; ssl->cert->alpn_sent = ocert->alpn_sent; if (!custom_exts_copy_flags(&ssl->cert->srv_ext, &ocert->srv_ext)) return NULL; #endif ssl_cert_free(ocert); } /* * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH), * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system. */ OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); /* * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX, * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context), * leave it unchanged. */ if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) && (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) && (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) { ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); } CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); if (ssl->ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ ssl->ctx = ctx; return (ssl->ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); } int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath) { return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath)); } #endif void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { ssl->info_callback = cb; } /* * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function * pointer. */ void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ , int /* type */ , int /* val */ ) { return ssl->info_callback; } int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->state); } void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { ssl->state = state; } void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) { ssl->verify_result = arg; } long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->verify_result); } int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); } int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); } int ssl_ok(SSL *s) { return (1); } X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->cert_store); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); ctx->cert_store = store; } int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return (s->rwstate); } /** * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param cb the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } #endif #ifdef DOXYGEN /** * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. * \param ssl the SSL session. * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size * of the required key in bits. * \return the temporary RSA key. * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback */ RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) { } #endif /** * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param dh the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh); } void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); if (identity_hint != NULL) { ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; return 1; } int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) { if (s == NULL) return 0; if (s->session == NULL) return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */ if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); if (identity_hint != NULL) { s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; return 1; } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) return NULL; return (s->session->psk_identity_hint); } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) return NULL; return (s->session->psk_identity); } void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_server_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; } #endif void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } /* * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any. * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly * allocated ctx; */ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) { ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) { EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); *hash = NULL; return NULL; } return *hash; } void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) { if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); *hash = NULL; } void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) { s->debug = debug; } int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s) { return s->hit; } int SSL_is_server(SSL *s) { return s->server; } #if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) # include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" #endif IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/ssl_locl.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 337764) @@ -1,1497 +1,1499 @@ /* ssl/ssl_locl.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H # define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H # include # include # include # include # include "e_os.h" # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include # endif # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include # endif # include # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif # undef PKCS1_CHECK # define c2l(c,l) (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ # define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ } \ } # define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff)) # define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) # define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define n2l6(c,l) (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ # define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ } \ } # define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned int)(c[1])) )),c+=2) # define s2n(s,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),c+=2) # define n2l3(c,l) ((l =(((unsigned long)(c[0]))<<16)| \ (((unsigned long)(c[1]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned long)(c[2])) )),c+=3) # define l2n3(l,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),c+=3) + +# define SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN (0xffff) /* LOCAL STUFF */ # define SSL_DECRYPT 0 # define SSL_ENCRYPT 1 # define TWO_BYTE_BIT 0x80 # define SEC_ESC_BIT 0x40 # define TWO_BYTE_MASK 0x7fff # define THREE_BYTE_MASK 0x3fff # define INC32(a) ((a)=((a)+1)&0xffffffffL) # define DEC32(a) ((a)=((a)-1)&0xffffffffL) # define MAX_MAC_SIZE 20 /* up from 16 for SSLv3 */ /* * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms. * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms * can be publicly accessed. * Use the according functions for cipher management instead. * * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive: * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME. */ /* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */ /* RSA key exchange */ # define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001L /* DH cert, RSA CA cert */ # define SSL_kDHr 0x00000002L /* DH cert, DSA CA cert */ # define SSL_kDHd 0x00000004L /* tmp DH key no DH cert */ # define SSL_kEDH 0x00000008L /* forward-compatible synonym */ # define SSL_kDHE SSL_kEDH /* Kerberos5 key exchange */ # define SSL_kKRB5 0x00000010L /* ECDH cert, RSA CA cert */ # define SSL_kECDHr 0x00000020L /* ECDH cert, ECDSA CA cert */ # define SSL_kECDHe 0x00000040L /* ephemeral ECDH */ # define SSL_kEECDH 0x00000080L /* forward-compatible synonym */ # define SSL_kECDHE SSL_kEECDH /* PSK */ # define SSL_kPSK 0x00000100L /* GOST key exchange */ # define SSL_kGOST 0x00000200L /* SRP */ # define SSL_kSRP 0x00000400L /* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */ /* RSA auth */ # define SSL_aRSA 0x00000001L /* DSS auth */ # define SSL_aDSS 0x00000002L /* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */ # define SSL_aNULL 0x00000004L /* Fixed DH auth (kDHd or kDHr) */ # define SSL_aDH 0x00000008L /* Fixed ECDH auth (kECDHe or kECDHr) */ # define SSL_aECDH 0x00000010L /* KRB5 auth */ # define SSL_aKRB5 0x00000020L /* ECDSA auth*/ # define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000040L /* PSK auth */ # define SSL_aPSK 0x00000080L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */ # define SSL_aGOST94 0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */ # define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000200L /* SRP auth */ # define SSL_aSRP 0x00000400L /* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */ # define SSL_DES 0x00000001L # define SSL_3DES 0x00000002L # define SSL_RC4 0x00000004L # define SSL_RC2 0x00000008L # define SSL_IDEA 0x00000010L # define SSL_eNULL 0x00000020L # define SSL_AES128 0x00000040L # define SSL_AES256 0x00000080L # define SSL_CAMELLIA128 0x00000100L # define SSL_CAMELLIA256 0x00000200L # define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 0x00000400L # define SSL_SEED 0x00000800L # define SSL_AES128GCM 0x00001000L # define SSL_AES256GCM 0x00002000L # define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AES128GCM|SSL_AES256GCM) # define SSL_CAMELLIA (SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256) /* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */ # define SSL_MD5 0x00000001L # define SSL_SHA1 0x00000002L # define SSL_GOST94 0x00000004L # define SSL_GOST89MAC 0x00000008L # define SSL_SHA256 0x00000010L # define SSL_SHA384 0x00000020L /* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */ # define SSL_AEAD 0x00000040L /* Bits for algorithm_ssl (protocol version) */ # define SSL_SSLV2 0x00000001UL # define SSL_SSLV3 0x00000002UL # define SSL_TLSV1 SSL_SSLV3/* for now */ # define SSL_TLSV1_2 0x00000004UL /* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */ # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 0x10 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA 0x20 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 0x40 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 0x80 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 0x100 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 | SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA) /* * When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSM_MD_NUM_IDX make * sure to update this constant too */ # define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 6 # define TLS1_PRF_DGST_MASK (0xff << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 10 # define TLS1_PRF_MD5 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA1 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF (TLS1_PRF_MD5 | TLS1_PRF_SHA1) /* * Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft (currently this also * goes into algorithm2) */ # define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x04 /* * Export and cipher strength information. For each cipher we have to decide * whether it is exportable or not. This information is likely to change * over time, since the export control rules are no static technical issue. * * Independent of the export flag the cipher strength is sorted into classes. * SSL_EXP40 was denoting the 40bit US export limit of past times, which now * is at 56bit (SSL_EXP56). If the exportable cipher class is going to change * again (eg. to 64bit) the use of "SSL_EXP*" becomes blurred even more, * since SSL_EXP64 could be similar to SSL_LOW. * For this reason SSL_MICRO and SSL_MINI macros are included to widen the * namespace of SSL_LOW-SSL_HIGH to lower values. As development of speed * and ciphers goes, another extension to SSL_SUPER and/or SSL_ULTRA would * be possible. */ # define SSL_EXP_MASK 0x00000003L # define SSL_STRONG_MASK 0x000001fcL # define SSL_NOT_EXP 0x00000001L # define SSL_EXPORT 0x00000002L # define SSL_STRONG_NONE 0x00000004L # define SSL_EXP40 0x00000008L # define SSL_MICRO (SSL_EXP40) # define SSL_EXP56 0x00000010L # define SSL_MINI (SSL_EXP56) # define SSL_LOW 0x00000020L # define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000040L # define SSL_HIGH 0x00000080L # define SSL_FIPS 0x00000100L # define SSL_NOT_DEFAULT 0x00000200L /* we have used 000003ff - 22 bits left to go */ /*- * Macros to check the export status and cipher strength for export ciphers. * Even though the macros for EXPORT and EXPORT40/56 have similar names, * their meaning is different: * *_EXPORT macros check the 'exportable' status. * *_EXPORT40/56 macros are used to check whether a certain cipher strength * is given. * Since the SSL_IS_EXPORT* and SSL_EXPORT* macros depend on the correct * algorithm structure element to be passed (algorithms, algo_strength) and no * typechecking can be done as they are all of type unsigned long, their * direct usage is discouraged. * Use the SSL_C_* macros instead. */ # define SSL_IS_EXPORT(a) ((a)&SSL_EXPORT) # define SSL_IS_EXPORT56(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP56) # define SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP40) # define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT56(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT56((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT40(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT40((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(a,s) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(s) ? 5 : \ (a) == SSL_DES ? 8 : 7) # define SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(a) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ? 512 : 1024) # define SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH((c)->algorithm_enc, \ (c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH((c)->algo_strength) /* Check if an SSL structure is using DTLS */ # define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) /* See if we need explicit IV */ # define SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) \ (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV) /* * See if we use signature algorithms extension and signature algorithm * before signatures. */ # define SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) \ (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS) /* * Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may * apply to others in future. */ # define SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) \ (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS) /* * Determine if a client can use TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: can't rely on method * flags because it may not be set to correct version yet. */ # define SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) \ ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION) || \ (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)) /* * Determine if a client should send signature algorithms extension: * as with TLS1.2 cipher we can't rely on method flags. */ # define SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s) \ SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) /* Mostly for SSLv3 */ # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC 0 # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 1 # define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN 2 # define SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA 3 # define SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA 4 # define SSL_PKEY_ECC 5 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST94 6 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST01 7 # define SSL_PKEY_NUM 8 /*- * SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC | (RSA_TMP & RSA_SIGN) | * <- (EXPORT & (RSA_ENC | RSA_TMP) & RSA_SIGN) * SSL_kDH <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN) * SSL_kEDH <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN */ /*- #define CERT_INVALID 0 #define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters */ # define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE 1 # define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE 2 # define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ typedef struct cert_pkey_st { X509 *x509; EVP_PKEY *privatekey; /* Digest to use when signing */ const EVP_MD *digest; /* Chain for this certificate */ STACK_OF(X509) *chain; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /*- * serverinfo data for this certificate. The data is in TLS Extension * wire format, specifically it's a series of records like: * uint16_t extension_type; // (RFC 5246, 7.4.1.4, Extension) * uint16_t length; * uint8_t data[length]; */ unsigned char *serverinfo; size_t serverinfo_length; # endif /* * Set if CERT_PKEY can be used with current SSL session: e.g. * appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc. If zero it can't be used * at all. */ int valid_flags; } CERT_PKEY; /* Retrieve Suite B flags */ # define tls1_suiteb(s) (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS) /* Uses to check strict mode: suite B modes are always strict */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT \ (SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS|SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT) typedef struct { unsigned short ext_type; /* * Per-connection flags relating to this extension type: not used if * part of an SSL_CTX structure. */ unsigned short ext_flags; custom_ext_add_cb add_cb; custom_ext_free_cb free_cb; void *add_arg; custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb; void *parse_arg; } custom_ext_method; /* ext_flags values */ /* * Indicates an extension has been received. Used to check for unsolicited or * duplicate extensions. */ # define SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED 0x1 /* * Indicates an extension has been sent: used to enable sending of * corresponding ServerHello extension. */ # define SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT 0x2 # define MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT 5 typedef struct { custom_ext_method *meths; size_t meths_count; } custom_ext_methods; typedef struct cert_st { /* Current active set */ /* * ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array * Probably it would make more sense to store * an index, not a pointer. */ CERT_PKEY *key; /* * For servers the following masks are for the key and auth algorithms * that are supported by the certs below. For clients they are masks of * *disabled* algorithms based on the current session. */ int valid; unsigned long mask_k; unsigned long mask_a; unsigned long export_mask_k; unsigned long export_mask_a; /* Client only */ unsigned long mask_ssl; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa_tmp; RSA *(*rsa_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh_tmp; DH *(*dh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh_tmp; /* Callback for generating ephemeral ECDH keys */ EC_KEY *(*ecdh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); /* Select ECDH parameters automatically */ int ecdh_tmp_auto; # endif /* Flags related to certificates */ unsigned int cert_flags; CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* * Certificate types (received or sent) in certificate request message. * On receive this is only set if number of certificate types exceeds * SSL3_CT_NUMBER. */ unsigned char *ctypes; size_t ctype_num; /* * signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature algorithms * extension for server or as part of a certificate request for client. */ unsigned char *peer_sigalgs; /* Size of above array */ size_t peer_sigalgslen; /* * suppported signature algorithms. When set on a client this is sent in * the client hello as the supported signature algorithms extension. For * servers it represents the signature algorithms we are willing to use. */ unsigned char *conf_sigalgs; /* Size of above array */ size_t conf_sigalgslen; /* * Client authentication signature algorithms, if not set then uses * conf_sigalgs. On servers these will be the signature algorithms sent * to the client in a cerificate request for TLS 1.2. On a client this * represents the signature algortithms we are willing to use for client * authentication. */ unsigned char *client_sigalgs; /* Size of above array */ size_t client_sigalgslen; /* * Signature algorithms shared by client and server: cached because these * are used most often. */ TLS_SIGALGS *shared_sigalgs; size_t shared_sigalgslen; /* * Certificate setup callback: if set is called whenever a certificate * may be required (client or server). the callback can then examine any * appropriate parameters and setup any certificates required. This * allows advanced applications to select certificates on the fly: for * example based on supported signature algorithms or curves. */ int (*cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *cert_cb_arg; /* * Optional X509_STORE for chain building or certificate validation If * NULL the parent SSL_CTX store is used instead. */ X509_STORE *chain_store; X509_STORE *verify_store; /* Raw values of the cipher list from a client */ unsigned char *ciphers_raw; size_t ciphers_rawlen; /* Custom extension methods for server and client */ custom_ext_methods cli_ext; custom_ext_methods srv_ext; int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */ /* non-optimal, but here due to compatibility */ unsigned char *alpn_proposed; /* server */ unsigned int alpn_proposed_len; int alpn_sent; /* client */ /* Count of the number of consecutive warning alerts received */ unsigned int alert_count; } CERT; typedef struct sess_cert_st { STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; /* as received from peer (not for SSL2) */ /* The 'peer_...' members are used only by clients. */ int peer_cert_type; CERT_PKEY *peer_key; /* points to an element of peer_pkeys (never * NULL!) */ CERT_PKEY peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* * Obviously we don't have the private keys of these, so maybe we * shouldn't even use the CERT_PKEY type here. */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *peer_rsa_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *peer_dh_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *peer_ecdh_tmp; # endif int references; /* actually always 1 at the moment */ } SESS_CERT; /* Structure containing decoded values of signature algorithms extension */ struct tls_sigalgs_st { /* NID of hash algorithm */ int hash_nid; /* NID of signature algorithm */ int sign_nid; /* Combined hash and signature NID */ int signandhash_nid; /* Raw values used in extension */ unsigned char rsign; unsigned char rhash; }; /* * #define MAC_DEBUG */ /* * #define ERR_DEBUG */ /* * #define ABORT_DEBUG */ /* * #define PKT_DEBUG 1 */ /* * #define DES_DEBUG */ /* * #define DES_OFB_DEBUG */ /* * #define SSL_DEBUG */ /* * #define RSA_DEBUG */ /* * #define IDEA_DEBUG */ # define FP_ICC (int (*)(const void *,const void *)) # define ssl_put_cipher_by_char(ssl,ciph,ptr) \ ((ssl)->method->put_cipher_by_char((ciph),(ptr))) /* * This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit * of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-) */ typedef struct ssl3_enc_method { int (*enc) (SSL *, int); int (*mac) (SSL *, unsigned char *, int); int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *); int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int); int (*change_cipher_state) (SSL *, int); int (*final_finish_mac) (SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *); int finish_mac_length; int (*cert_verify_mac) (SSL *, int, unsigned char *); const char *client_finished_label; int client_finished_label_len; const char *server_finished_label; int server_finished_label_len; int (*alert_value) (int); int (*export_keying_material) (SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context); /* Various flags indicating protocol version requirements */ unsigned int enc_flags; /* Handshake header length */ unsigned int hhlen; /* Set the handshake header */ void (*set_handshake_header) (SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len); /* Write out handshake message */ int (*do_write) (SSL *s); } SSL3_ENC_METHOD; # define SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) s->method->ssl3_enc->hhlen # define ssl_handshake_start(s) \ (((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) + s->method->ssl3_enc->hhlen) # define ssl_set_handshake_header(s, htype, len) \ s->method->ssl3_enc->set_handshake_header(s, htype, len) # define ssl_do_write(s) s->method->ssl3_enc->do_write(s) /* Values for enc_flags */ /* Uses explicit IV for CBC mode */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV 0x1 /* Uses signature algorithms extension */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS 0x2 /* Uses SHA256 default PRF */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 0x4 /* Is DTLS */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS 0x8 /* * Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may * apply to others in future. */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS 0x10 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */ typedef struct ssl3_comp_st { int comp_id; /* The identifier byte for this compression * type */ char *name; /* Text name used for the compression type */ COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */ } SSL3_COMP; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st { size_t chunklen; unsigned int len; struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *head; } SSL3_BUF_FREELIST; typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st { struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *next; } SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY; # endif extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method; OPENSSL_EXTERN const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]; OPENSSL_EXTERN SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]; SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver); extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data; # define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \ s_get_meth, enc_data) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ version, \ tls1_new, \ tls1_clear, \ tls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_get_message, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ tls1_default_timeout, \ &enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ SSL3_VERSION, \ ssl3_new, \ ssl3_clear, \ ssl3_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_get_message, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ ssl3_default_timeout, \ &SSLv3_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ TLS1_2_VERSION, \ tls1_new, \ tls1_clear, \ tls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl23_read, \ ssl23_peek, \ ssl23_write, \ ssl_undefined_function, \ ssl_undefined_function, \ ssl_ok, \ ssl3_get_message, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl23_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl23_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl_undefined_const_function, \ ssl23_num_ciphers, \ ssl23_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ ssl23_default_timeout, \ &TLSv1_2_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ SSL2_VERSION, \ ssl2_new, /* local */ \ ssl2_clear, /* local */ \ ssl2_free, /* local */ \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl2_read, \ ssl2_peek, \ ssl2_write, \ ssl2_shutdown, \ ssl_ok, /* NULL - renegotiate */ \ ssl_ok, /* NULL - check renegotiate */ \ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_message */ \ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_record */ \ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_write_bytes */ \ NULL, /* NULL - dispatch_alert */ \ ssl2_ctrl, /* local */ \ ssl2_ctx_ctrl, /* local */ \ ssl2_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl2_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl2_pending, \ ssl2_num_ciphers, \ ssl2_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ ssl2_default_timeout, \ &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl2_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \ ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \ s_get_meth, enc_data) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ version, \ dtls1_new, \ dtls1_clear, \ dtls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ dtls1_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ dtls1_get_message, \ dtls1_read_bytes, \ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \ dtls1_dispatch_alert, \ dtls1_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ dtls1_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ dtls1_default_timeout, \ &enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } struct openssl_ssl_test_functions { int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer) (SSL *s, int push); int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers) (SSL *s); int (*p_tls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s); int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s); }; # ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s); int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s); CERT *ssl_cert_new(void); CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert); void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert); int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o); void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c); void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c); SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void); void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc); int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type); int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session); int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session, int len, const unsigned char *limit); SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket); int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp); int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p, int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted, const char *rule_str, CERT *c); void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode); int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp); int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int i, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md); int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr); int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x); int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x); int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x); int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long arg); X509 *ssl_cert_get0_next_certificate(CERT *c, int first); void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l); int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags); int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref); int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s); int ssl_undefined_void_function(void); int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s); CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo, size_t *serverinfo_length); # endif EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd); int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s); int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type); void ssl_load_ciphers(void); int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len); int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client); int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s); int ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send_data); void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *mac, int send_data); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i); int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s); int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data); void ssl2_return_error(SSL *s, int reason); void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s); int ssl2_num_ciphers(void); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl2_new(SSL *s); void ssl2_free(SSL *s); int ssl2_accept(SSL *s); int ssl2_connect(SSL *s); int ssl2_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl2_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s); void ssl2_clear(SSL *s); long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl2_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); long ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); int ssl2_pending(const SSL *s); long ssl2_default_timeout(void); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); int ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b); int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b); int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s); int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type); int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc); int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len); int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen); int ssl3_num_ciphers(void); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen, unsigned char *p); int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p); void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len); int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send_data); int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send_data); void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s); unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk); SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr); int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s); int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s); int ssl3_new(SSL *s); void ssl3_free(SSL *s); int ssl3_accept(SSL *s); int ssl3_connect(SSL *s); int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s); void ssl3_clear(SSL *s); long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s); void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq); int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl); long ssl3_default_timeout(void); void ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len); int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s); int ssl23_num_ciphers(void); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl23_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl23_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl23_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); long ssl23_default_timeout(void); long tls1_default_timeout(void); int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type); int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend); int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len); unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b); int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code); int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs); int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off, int *found); int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs); int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr); void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr); void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw); long dtls1_default_timeout(void); struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft); int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s); int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s); const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u); void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s); void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s); int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s); void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s); unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void); void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag); /* some client-only functions */ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s); # endif # endif int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s); /* some server-only functions */ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s); # endif int ssl23_accept(SSL *s); int ssl23_connect(SSL *s); int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n); int ssl23_write_bytes(SSL *s); int tls1_new(SSL *s); void tls1_free(SSL *s); void tls1_clear(SSL *s); long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); int dtls1_new(SSL *s); int dtls1_accept(SSL *s); int dtls1_connect(SSL *s); void dtls1_free(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear(SSL *s); long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s); long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s); int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement); int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push); void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s); int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s); int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd); int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p); int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p); int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd); int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len); int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context); int tls1_alert_code(int code); int ssl3_alert_code(int code); int ssl_ok(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s); # endif SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id); int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid); int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len); int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch); int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, int *curves, size_t ncurves); int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int tls1_shared_list(SSL *s, const unsigned char *l1, size_t l1len, const unsigned char *l2, size_t l2len, int nmatch); unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al); unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al); int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *limit); int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s); int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al); int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n); int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s); int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s); int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s); int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s); # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 # define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha1 # else # define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha256 # endif int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret); int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md); int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk); const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg); int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client); int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *salg, size_t salglen, int client); int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx); void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s); # endif EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md); void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash); int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s); int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize); int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s); size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs); int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey); void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s); int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); /* s3_cbc.c */ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size, unsigned orig_len); int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md_out, size_t *md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13], const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size, size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3); void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len); int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al); /* t1_ext.c */ void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *meths); int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, int server, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, int *al); int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char **pret, unsigned char *limit, int *al); int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src); int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src); void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts); # else # define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer # define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers # define tls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_tls1_process_heartbeat # define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat # endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/t1_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/t1_lib.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/t1_lib.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,4576 +1,4575 @@ /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M # include #endif #endif #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess); static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); #endif #define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \ (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val)) SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, tls1_cert_verify_mac, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, 0, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, ssl3_handshake_write }; SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, tls1_cert_verify_mac, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, ssl3_handshake_write }; SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, tls1_cert_verify_mac, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, ssl3_handshake_write }; long tls1_default_timeout(void) { /* * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for * http, the cache would over fill */ return (60 * 60 * 2); } int tls1_new(SSL *s) { if (!ssl3_new(s)) return (0); s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); } void tls1_free(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ ssl3_free(s); } void tls1_clear(SSL *s) { ssl3_clear(s); s->version = s->method->version; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int nid_list[] = { NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ }; static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 }; /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */ static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = { /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ # endif }; static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ # endif /* * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set * via an explicit callback or parameters. */ 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ # endif }; static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 }; # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */ static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ # endif 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ # endif 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ # endif 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ # endif 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ # endif 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ # endif 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ }; # endif int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) { /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) return 0; return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; } int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) { /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ switch (nid) { case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ return 1; case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ return 2; case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ return 3; case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ return 4; case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ return 5; case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ return 6; case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ return 7; case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ return 8; case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ return 9; case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ return 10; case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ return 11; case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ return 12; case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ return 13; case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ return 14; case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ return 15; case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ return 16; case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ return 17; case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ return 18; case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ return 19; case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ return 20; case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ return 21; case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ return 22; case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ return 23; case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ return 24; case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ return 25; case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ return 26; case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ return 27; case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ return 28; default: return 0; } } /* * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise * preferred list. * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e., * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves. * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format. * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such * lists in the first place. * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) */ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves) { size_t pcurveslen = 0; if (sess) { *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } else { /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: *pcurves = suiteb_curves; pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: *pcurves = suiteb_curves; pcurveslen = 2; break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; pcurveslen = 2; break; default: *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } if (!*pcurves) { # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode()) { *pcurves = fips_curves_default; pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default); } else # endif { if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { *pcurves = eccurves_auto; pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto); } else { *pcurves = eccurves_all; pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all); } } } } /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */ if (pcurveslen & 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *num_curves = 0; return 0; } else { *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; return 1; } } /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) { const unsigned char *curves; size_t num_curves, i; unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) return 0; /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */ if (suiteb_flags) { unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; if (p[1]) return 0; if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) return 0; } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) return 0; } else /* Should never happen */ return 0; } if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) return 0; for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) { if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1]) return 1; } return 0; } /*- * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match. * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. */ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) { const unsigned char *pref, *supp; size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; int k; /* Can't do anything on client side */ if (s->server == 0) return -1; if (nmatch == -2) { if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { /* * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know * these are acceptable due to previous checks. */ unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ /* Should never happen */ return NID_undef; } /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ nmatch = 0; } /* * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int * but s->options is a long... */ if (!tls1_get_curvelist (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, &num_supp)) /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; if (!tls1_get_curvelist (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref)) return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; /* * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them * are allowed. */ if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { supp = eccurves_all; num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; } else if (num_pref == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { pref = eccurves_all; num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; } k = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { if (nmatch == k) { int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); } k++; } } } if (nmatch == -1) return k; /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ return NID_undef; } int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, int *curves, size_t ncurves) { unsigned char *clist, *p; size_t i; /* * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve * ids < 32 */ unsigned long dup_list = 0; # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M EC_GROUP *curve; # endif clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); if (!clist) return 0; for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { unsigned long idmask; int id; id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */ if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) { OPENSSL_free(clist); return 0; } # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]); if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve)) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { if (curve) EC_GROUP_free(curve); OPENSSL_free(clist); return 0; } else EC_GROUP_free(curve); # endif idmask = 1L << id; if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { OPENSSL_free(clist); return 0; } dup_list |= idmask; s2n(id, p); } if (*pext) OPENSSL_free(*pext); *pext = clist; *pextlen = ncurves * 2; return 1; } # define MAX_CURVELIST 28 typedef struct { size_t nidcnt; int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; } nid_cb_st; static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) { nid_cb_st *narg = arg; size_t i; int nid; char etmp[20]; if (elem == NULL) return 0; if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) return 0; if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) return 0; memcpy(etmp, elem, len); etmp[len] = 0; nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); if (nid == NID_undef) return 0; for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) return 0; narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; return 1; } /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str) { nid_cb_st ncb; ncb.nidcnt = 0; if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) return 0; if (pext == NULL) return 1; return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); } /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) { int is_prime, id; const EC_GROUP *grp; const EC_METHOD *meth; if (!ec) return 0; /* Determine if it is a prime field */ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); if (!grp) return 0; meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); if (!meth) return 0; if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) is_prime = 1; else is_prime = 0; /* Determine curve ID */ id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ if (id) { curve_id[0] = 0; curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; } else { curve_id[0] = 0xff; if (is_prime) curve_id[1] = 0x01; else curve_id[1] = 0x02; } if (comp_id) { if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) return 0; if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { if (is_prime) *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; else *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; } else *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; } return 1; } /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) { const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves; size_t num_formats, num_curves, i; int j; /* * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is * supported (see RFC4492). */ if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { if (*comp_id == *pformats) break; } if (i == num_formats) return 0; } if (!curve_id) return 1; /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves)) return 0; if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) { /* * If we've not received any curves then skip this check. * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension. */ break; } for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1]) break; } if (i == num_curves) return 0; /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ if (!s->server) return 1; } return 1; } static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, size_t *num_formats) { /* * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default */ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } else { *pformats = ecformats_default; /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; else *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); } } /* * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC * certificates have compatible curves and compression. */ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) { unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; EVP_PKEY *pkey; int rv; pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (!pkey) return 0; /* If not EC nothing to do */ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 1; } rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (!rv) return 0; /* * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported * curves extension. */ rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); if (!rv) return 0; /* * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary. */ if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { int check_md; size_t i; CERT *c = s->cert; if (curve_id[0]) return 0; /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; else return 0; /* Should never happen */ for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) break; if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen) return 0; if (set_ee_md == 2) { if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256(); else c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384(); } } return rv; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) { unsigned char curve_id[2]; EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) return 1; # endif /* * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other * curves permitted. */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; else return 0; curve_id[0] = 0; /* Check this curve is acceptable */ if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) return 0; /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) return 1; /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */ else { unsigned char curve_tmp[2]; if (!ec) return 0; if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) return 0; if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1]) return 1; return 0; } } if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { /* Need a shared curve */ if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) return 1; else return 0; } if (!ec) { if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) return 1; else return 0; } if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec)) return 0; /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ # if 0 return 1; # else return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); # endif } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #else static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) { return 1; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */ # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ # else # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ # else # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ # else # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, # endif # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) # endif }; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) }; # endif size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs) { /* * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other * preferences. */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; return 2; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; return 2; } # endif /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; } else { *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); } } /* * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. */ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { const unsigned char *sent_sigs; size_t sent_sigslen, i; int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); /* Should never happen */ if (sigalg == -1) return -1; /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) return 0; if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return 0; } /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { if (curve_id[0]) return 0; if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); return 0; } } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); return 0; } } else return 0; } } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) return 0; # endif /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs); for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) break; } /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); if (*pmd == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); return 0; } /* * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. */ if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert) s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd; return 1; } /* * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global * settings. */ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) { CERT *c = s->cert; const unsigned char *sigalgs; size_t i, sigalgslen; int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; c->mask_a = 0; c->mask_k = 0; /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; else c->mask_ssl = 0; /* * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */ sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs); for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { switch (sigalgs[1]) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: have_rsa = 1; break; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: have_dsa = 1; break; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: have_ecdsa = 1; break; # endif } } /* * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate * signature algorithms. */ if (!have_rsa) { c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr; } if (!have_dsa) { c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; } if (!have_ecdsa) { c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) { c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ if (!s->psk_client_callback) { c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; } # endif c->valid = 1; } unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al) { int extdatalen = 0; unsigned char *orig = buf; unsigned char *ret = buf; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ int using_ecc = 0; if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { int i; unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { using_ecc = 1; break; } } } # endif /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) return orig; ret += 2; if (ret >= limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ size_t size_str; /*- * check for enough space. * 4 for the servername type and entension length * 2 for servernamelist length * 1 for the hostname type * 2 for hostname length * + hostname length */ size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname); if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit)) return NULL; /* extension type and length */ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); s2n(size_str + 5, ret); /* length of servername list */ s2n(size_str + 3, ret); /* hostname type, length and hostname */ *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; s2n(size_str, ret); memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); ret += size_str; } /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (s->renegotiate) { int el; if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the * Client Hello message */ size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 for the srp type type and entension length * 1 for the srp user identity * + srp user identity length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit)) return NULL; /* fill in the extension */ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); s2n(login_len + 1, ret); (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); ret += login_len; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (using_ecc) { /* * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); if (num_formats > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length * 1 byte for the length of the formats * + formats length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); ret += num_formats; /* * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) return NULL; if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves; /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length * 2 bytes for the curve list length * + curve list length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + curves_list_len, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); s2n(curves_list_len, ret); memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len); ret += curves_list_len; } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { size_t ticklen; if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) return NULL; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; } else ticklen = 0; if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) goto skip_ext; /* * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for * ticket */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); s2n(ticklen, ret); if (ticklen > 0) { memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); ret += ticklen; } } skip_ext: if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { size_t salglen; const unsigned char *salg; salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length * + sigalg list length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); s2n(salglen + 2, ret); s2n(salglen, ret); memcpy(ret, salg, salglen); ret += salglen; } # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) return NULL; if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); s2n(col + 2, ret); s2n(col, ret); memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); ret += col; } # endif if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { int i; size_t extlen, idlen; int lentmp; OCSP_RESPID *id; idlen = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); if (lentmp <= 0) return NULL; idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2; } if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); if (lentmp < 0) return NULL; extlen = (size_t)lentmp; } else extlen = 0; if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) return NULL; /* * 2 bytes for status request type * 2 bytes for status request len * 1 byte for OCSP request type * 2 bytes for length of ids * 2 bytes for length of extensions * + length of ids * + length of extensions */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; s2n(idlen, ret); for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { /* save position of id len */ unsigned char *q = ret; id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); /* skip over id len */ ret += 2; lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); /* write id len */ s2n(lentmp, q); } s2n(extlen, ret); if (extlen > 0) i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* Add Heartbeat extension */ /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length * 1 byte for the mode */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); s2n(1, ret); /*- * Set mode: * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { /* * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support * for Next Protocol Negotiation */ /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); s2n(0, ret); } # endif if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length * + ALPN protocol list length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; s->cert->alpn_sent = 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { int el; ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length * + SRTP profiles length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } # endif custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) return NULL; /* * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always * appear last. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c * does not. */ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) hlen -= 5; if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { hlen = 0x200 - hlen; if (hlen >= 4) hlen -= 4; else hlen = 0; /*- * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200, * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway. * * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length * + padding length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); s2n(hlen, ret); memset(ret, 0, hlen); ret += hlen; } } if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) return orig; s2n(extdatalen, orig); return ret; } unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al) { int extdatalen = 0; unsigned char *orig = buf; unsigned char *ret = buf; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int next_proto_neg_seen; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); # endif /* * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) return orig; ret += 2; if (ret >= limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); s2n(0, ret); } if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { int el; if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length * + reneg data length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (using_ecc) { const unsigned char *plist; size_t plistlen; /* * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); if (plistlen > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length * 1 byte for the points format list length * + length of points format list */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); ret += plistlen; } /* * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves * extension */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); s2n(0, ret); } else { /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); s2n(0, ret); } # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) return NULL; if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); s2n(sol + 2, ret); s2n(sol, ret); memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); ret += sol; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { int el; ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length * + length of the SRTP profiles list */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } # endif if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 }; /* check for enough space. */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit)) return NULL; memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext)); ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length * 1 byte for the mode */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); s2n(1, ret); /*- * Set mode: * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { const unsigned char *npa; unsigned int npalen; int r; r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s-> ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length * + length of protocols list */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); s2n(npalen, ret); memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); ret += npalen; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } } # endif if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) return NULL; if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length * 2 bytes for ALPN data length * 1 byte for selected protocol length * + length of the selected protocol */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); s2n(3 + len, ret); s2n(1 + len, ret); *ret++ = (unsigned char)len; memcpy(ret, selected, len); ret += len; } if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) return orig; s2n(extdatalen, orig); return ret; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /*- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: * SNI, * elliptic_curves * ec_point_formats * * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). */ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *limit) { unsigned short type, size; static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 0x00, /* uncompressed */ }; /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; if (limit - data <= 2) return; data += 2; if (limit - data < 4) return; n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; if (limit - data < size) return; data += size; if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) return; if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) return; } else { const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); if (limit - data != (int)(len)) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) return; } s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; } # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on * success. */ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, unsigned data_len, int *al) { unsigned i; unsigned proto_len; if (data_len < 2) goto parse_error; /* * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, * length-prefixed strings. */ i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]); data_len -= 2; data += 2; if (data_len != i) goto parse_error; if (data_len < 2) goto parse_error; for (i = 0; i < data_len;) { proto_len = data[i]; i++; if (proto_len == 0) goto parse_error; if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len) goto parse_error; i += proto_len; } if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len); if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return -1; } memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len); s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len; return 0; parse_error: *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return -1; } /* * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al set only on failure */ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al) { const unsigned char *selected = NULL; unsigned char selected_len = 0; if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) { int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, s->cert->alpn_proposed, s->cert->alpn_proposed_len, s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; # endif } } return 1; } static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *limit, int *al) { unsigned short type; unsigned short size; unsigned short len; unsigned char *data = *p; int renegotiate_seen = 0; s->servername_done = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; # endif if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; } s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) { OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL; } s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs); s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; } # endif s->srtp_profile = NULL; if (data == limit) goto ri_check; if (limit - data < 2) goto err; n2s(data, len); if (limit - data != len) goto err; while (limit - data >= 4) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); if (limit - data < size) goto err; # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); # endif if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); /*- * The servername extension is treated as follows: * * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, * in which case an fatal alert is generated. * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches * the value of the Host: field. * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername * extension. * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. * */ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { unsigned char *sdata; int servname_type; int dsize; if (size < 2) goto err; n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; if (dsize > size) goto err; sdata = data; while (dsize > 3) { servname_type = *(sdata++); n2s(sdata, len); dsize -= 3; if (len > dsize) goto err; if (s->servername_done == 0) switch (servname_type) { case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) goto err; if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } s->servername_done = 1; } else s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; break; default: break; } dsize -= len; } if (dsize != 0) goto err; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) goto err; if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) goto err; if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) return -1; memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) goto err; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { unsigned char *sdata = data; int ecpointformatlist_length; if (size == 0) goto err; ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || ecpointformatlist_length < 1) goto err; if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; } s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); } # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); # endif } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { unsigned char *sdata = data; int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) goto err; if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) goto err; s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); } # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); # endif } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { unsigned char *sdata = data; if (size < 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { /* shouldn't really happen */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); } /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); else s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } # endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { int dsize; if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) goto err; n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) goto err; if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) goto err; - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { - + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && !s->hit) { if (size < 5) goto err; s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; size--; if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { const unsigned char *sdata; int dsize; /* Read in responder_id_list */ n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; if (dsize > size) goto err; /* * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 */ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); if (dsize > 0) { s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } else { s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; } while (dsize > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; int idsize; if (dsize < 4) goto err; n2s(data, idsize); dsize -= 2 + idsize; size -= 2 + idsize; if (dsize < 0) goto err; sdata = data; data += idsize; id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); if (!id) goto err; if (data != sdata) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); goto err; } if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } /* Read in request_extensions */ if (size < 2) goto err; n2s(data, dsize); size -= 2; if (dsize != size) goto err; sdata = data; if (dsize > 0) { if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); } s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) goto err; } } /* * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. */ else s->tlsext_status_type = -1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { switch (data[0]) { case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { /*- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a * renegotiation. * * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing * anything like that, but this might change). * * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new * Finished message could have been computed.) */ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } # endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0) return 0; } /* session ticket processed earlier */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) return 0; } # endif data += size; } /* Spurious data on the end */ if (data != limit) goto err; *p = data; ri_check: /* Need RI if renegotiating */ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); return 0; } return 1; err: *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } /* * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking. */ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *limit, int *al) { unsigned short type, size, len; /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */ if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) return 1; if (limit - data <= 2) return 1; n2s(data, len); if (limit - data < len) return 1; while (limit - data >= 4) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); if (limit - data < size) return 1; if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) return 0; data += size; } return 1; } int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *limit) { int al = -1; unsigned char *ptmp = *p; /* * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure. */ if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); return 0; } custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } return 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly * fill the length of the block. */ static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) { unsigned int off = 0; while (off < len) { if (d[off] == 0) return 0; off += d[off]; off++; } return off == len; } # endif static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) { unsigned short length; unsigned short type; unsigned short size; unsigned char *data = *p; int tlsext_servername = 0; int renegotiate_seen = 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; # endif s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); # endif if ((d + n) - data <= 2) goto ri_check; n2s(data, length); if ((d + n) - data != length) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { n2s(data, type); n2s(data, size); if ((d + n) - data < size) goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } tlsext_servername = 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { unsigned char *sdata = data; int ecpointformatlist_length; if (size == 0) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); } # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); # endif } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || (size > 0)) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; } # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { unsigned char *sdata = data; if (size < 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { /* shouldn't really happen */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); } else { s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } # endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { /* * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status * request message. */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; /* We must have requested it. */ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } /* The data must be valid */ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s-> ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } /* * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in * a single Serverhello */ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } # endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { unsigned len; /* We must have requested it. */ if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } if (size < 4) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } /*- * The extension data consists of: * uint16 list_length * uint8 proto_length; * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */ len = data[0]; len <<= 8; len |= data[1]; if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } len = data[2]; if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s->s3->alpn_selected) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { switch (data[0]) { case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) return 0; } # endif /* * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback */ else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) return 0; data += size; } if (data != d + n) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { if (s->tlsext_hostname) { if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } } else { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } } *p = data; ri_check: /* * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on * initial connect only. */ if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input { int r = 1; if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s-> ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); if (!r) return -1; } if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { /* shouldn't really happen */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); } if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); } else { s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); } if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; } if (r == 2) /* * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate * server opaque PRF input */ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; } # endif s->cert->alpn_sent = 0; return 1; } int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; } static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) { int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */ /* * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */ # endif if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s-> initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input { /* * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ int r = 1; if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s-> ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); if (!r) { ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { /* shouldn't really happen */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); } s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { /* * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); } else { s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); } if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; } } if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { /* * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the * handshake. */ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } } err: # endif switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return -1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); return 1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->servername_done = 0; default: return 1; } } int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) { int al; size_t i; /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; } /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; } /* If sigalgs received process it. */ if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto err; } } else ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert); return 1; err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } /* * Upon success, returns 1. * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert. */ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al) { /* * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may * influence which certificate is sent */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int ret; CERT_PKEY *certpkey; certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ if (certpkey != NULL) { /* * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate * et al can pick it up. */ s->cert->key = certpkey; ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); switch (ret) { /* We don't want to send a status request response */ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; break; /* status request response should be sent */ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; break; /* something bad happened */ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: default: *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } } if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) { return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it * must contain uncompressed. */ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { /* we are using an ECC cipher */ size_t i; unsigned char *list; int found_uncompressed = 0; list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { found_uncompressed = 1; break; } } if (!found_uncompressed) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); return -1; } } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s-> initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { /* * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a * value from the server too. */ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } /* * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } } # endif OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; /* * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the * callback */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int r; /* * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback * knows there is no response */ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (r == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } if (r < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } } switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return -1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); return 1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->servername_done = 0; default: return 1; } } int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) { int al = -1; if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) return 1; if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); return 0; } return 1; } /*- * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. * * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket * extension, if any. * len: the length of the session ID. * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. * * Returns: * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. * * Side effects: * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. */ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) { /* Point after session ID in client hello */ const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; unsigned short i; *ret = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; /* * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful * resumption. */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) return 0; if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) return 0; if (p >= limit) return -1; /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { i = *(p++); if (limit - p <= i) return -1; p += i; } /* Skip past cipher list */ n2s(p, i); if (limit - p <= i) return -1; p += i; /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ i = *(p++); if (limit - p < i) return -1; p += i; /* Now at start of extensions */ if (limit - p <= 2) return 0; n2s(p, i); while (limit - p >= 4) { unsigned short type, size; n2s(p, type); n2s(p, size); if (limit - p < size) return 0; if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { int r; if (size == 0) { /* * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have * one. */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; return 1; } if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { /* * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than * generating the session from ticket now, trigger * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to * calculate the master secret later. */ return 2; } r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); switch (r) { case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; return 2; case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ return r; case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; return 3; default: /* fatal error */ return -1; } } p += size; } return 0; } /*- * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. * * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. * sess_id: points at the session ID. * sesslen: the length of the session ID. * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * * Returns: * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. */ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) { SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *sdec; const unsigned char *p; int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; HMAC_CTX hctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; /* Need at least keyname + iv */ if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) return 2; /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, &ctx, &hctx, 0); if (rv < 0) goto err; if (rv == 0) { HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return 2; } if (rv == 2) renew_ticket = 1; } else { /* Check key name matches */ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) return 2; if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16) <= 0) { goto err; } } /* * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity * checks on ticket. */ mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); if (mlen < 0) { goto err; } /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return 2; } eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { goto err; } HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return 2; } /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return -1; } if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return 2; } slen += mlen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); p = sdec; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); slen -= p - sdec; OPENSSL_free(sdec); if (sess) { /* Some additional consistency checks */ if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) { SSL_SESSION_free(sess); return 2; } /* * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by * standard. */ if (sesslen) memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); sess->session_id_length = sesslen; *psess = sess; if (renew_ticket) return 4; else return 3; } ERR_clear_error(); /* * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ return 2; err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); return -1; } /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ typedef struct { int nid; int id; } tls12_lookup; static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} }; static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} }; static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { if (table[i].nid == nid) return table[i].id; } return -1; } static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { if ((table[i].id) == id) return table[i].nid; } return NID_undef; } int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) { int sig_id, md_id; if (!md) return 0; md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); if (md_id == -1) return 0; sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); if (sig_id == -1) return 0; p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; return 1; } int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) { return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); } const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) { switch (hash_alg) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode()) return NULL; # endif return EVP_md5(); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: return EVP_sha1(); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: return EVP_sha224(); case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: return EVP_sha256(); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: return EVP_sha384(); case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: return EVP_sha512(); # endif default: return NULL; } } static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) { switch (sig_alg) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: return SSL_PKEY_ECC; # endif } return -1; } /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) { int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) return; if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); if (phash_nid) *phash_nid = hash_nid; } if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); if (psign_nid) *psign_nid = sign_nid; } if (psignhash_nid) { if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0) *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; } } /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen) { const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL) continue; if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) continue; for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { nmatch++; if (shsig) { shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, &shsig->sign_nid, &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); shsig++; } break; } } } return nmatch; } /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) { const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; size_t nmatch; TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; CERT *c = s->cert; unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); if (c->shared_sigalgs) { OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; } /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { conf = c->client_sigalgs; conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { conf = c->conf_sigalgs; conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; } else conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf); if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { pref = conf; preflen = conflen; allow = c->peer_sigalgs; allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen; } else { allow = conf; allowlen = conflen; pref = c->peer_sigalgs; preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; } nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); if (nmatch) { salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); if (!salgs) return 0; nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); } else { salgs = NULL; } c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; return 1; } /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) { CERT *c = s->cert; /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) return 1; /* Should never happen */ if (!c) return 0; if (c->peer_sigalgs) OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); if (!c->peer_sigalgs) return 0; c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize; memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); return 1; } int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) { int idx; size_t i; const EVP_MD *md; CERT *c = s->cert; TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) return 0; # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { /* * Use first set signature preference to force message digest, * ignoring any peer preferences. */ const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; if (s->server) sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; else sigs = c->client_sigalgs; if (sigs) { idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; } } } # endif for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; } } } /* * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use * the certificate for signing. */ if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { /* * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not * supported it stays as NULL. */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); # endif } return 1; } int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) { const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs; if (psig == NULL) return 0; if (idx >= 0) { idx <<= 1; if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) return 0; psig += idx; if (rhash) *rhash = psig[0]; if (rsig) *rsig = psig[1]; tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); } return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2; } int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) { TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) return 0; shsigalgs += idx; if (phash) *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; if (psign) *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; if (psignhash) *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; if (rsig) *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; if (rhash) *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; unsigned short hbtype; unsigned int payload; unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Read type and payload length first */ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) return 0; /* silently discard */ hbtype = *p++; n2s(p, payload); if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ pl = p; if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { unsigned char *buffer, *bp; int r; /* * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding */ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); if (buffer == NULL) return -1; bp = buffer; /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; s2n(payload, bp); memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); return -1; } r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding, s, s->msg_callback_arg); OPENSSL_free(buffer); if (r < 0) return r; } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { unsigned int seq; /* * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number */ n2s(pl, seq); if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { s->tlsext_hb_seq++; s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; } } return 0; } int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf, *p; int ret = -1; unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); return -1; } /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); return -1; } /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return -1; } /* * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. */ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); /*- * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number * as payload to distuingish different messages and add * some random stuff. * - Message Type, 1 byte * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) * - Padding */ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); if (buf == NULL) return -1; p = buf; /* Message Type */ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ s2n(payload, p); /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += 16; /* Random padding */ if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); if (ret >= 0) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; } err: OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } # endif # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) typedef struct { size_t sigalgcnt; int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; } sig_cb_st; static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) { sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; size_t i; char etmp[20], *p; int sig_alg, hash_alg; if (elem == NULL) return 0; if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) return 0; if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) return 0; memcpy(etmp, elem, len); etmp[len] = 0; p = strchr(etmp, '+'); if (!p) return 0; *p = 0; p++; if (!*p) return 0; if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA")) sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA; else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA")) sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA; else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA")) sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC; else return 0; hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p); if (hash_alg == NID_undef) hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p); if (hash_alg == NID_undef) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg) return 0; } sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg; sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg; return 1; } /* * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) { sig_cb_st sig; sig.sigalgcnt = 0; if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) return 0; if (c == NULL) return 1; return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); } int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client) { unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; int rhash, rsign; size_t i; if (salglen & 1) return 0; sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); if (sigalgs == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) goto err; *sptr++ = rhash; *sptr++ = rsign; } if (client) { if (c->client_sigalgs) OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; } else { if (c->conf_sigalgs) OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; } return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); return 0; } static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) { int sig_nid; size_t i; if (default_nid == -1) return 1; sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); if (default_nid) return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) return 1; return 0; } /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) { X509_NAME *nm; int i; nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) return 1; } return 0; } /* * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before * attempting to use them. */ /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) /* Strict mode flags */ # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx) { int i; int rv = 0; int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; CERT *c = s->cert; unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ if (idx != -1) { /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ if (idx == -2) { cpk = c->key; idx = cpk - c->pkeys; } else cpk = c->pkeys + idx; x = cpk->x509; pk = cpk->privatekey; chain = cpk->chain; strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; /* If no cert or key, forget it */ if (!x || !pk) goto end; # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; cpk->valid_flags = rv; return rv; } # endif } else { if (!x || !pk) return 0; idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); if (idx == -1) return 0; cpk = c->pkeys + idx; if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; else check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; strict_mode = 1; } if (suiteb_flags) { int ok; if (check_flags) check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); if (ok == X509_V_OK) rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; else if (!check_flags) goto end; } /* * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { int default_nid; unsigned char rsign = 0; if (c->peer_sigalgs) default_nid = 0; /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ else { switch (idx) { case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; break; case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; break; case SSL_PKEY_ECC: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; break; default: default_nid = -1; break; } } /* * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. */ if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { size_t j; const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) break; } if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { if (check_flags) goto skip_sigs; else goto end; } } /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { if (!check_flags) goto end; } else rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { if (check_flags) { rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; break; } else goto end; } } } /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ else if (check_flags) rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; skip_sigs: /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; else if (!check_flags) goto end; if (!s->server) rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ else if (strict_mode) { rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { if (check_flags) { rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; break; } else goto end; } } } if (!s->server && strict_mode) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; int check_type = 0; switch (pk->type) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; break; case EVP_PKEY_EC: check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; break; case EVP_PKEY_DH: case EVP_PKEY_DHX: { int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA) check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA) check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; } } if (check_type) { const unsigned char *ctypes; int ctypelen; if (c->ctypes) { ctypes = c->ctypes; ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num; } else { ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; } for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) { if (ctypes[i] == check_type) { rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; break; } } if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) goto end; } else rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; } if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; break; } } } if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) goto end; } else rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; end: if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; else if (cpk->digest) rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; } else rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; /* * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the * chain is invalid. */ if (!check_flags) { if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) cpk->valid_flags = rv; else { /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; return 0; } } return rv; } /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) { tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); } /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/t1_trce.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/t1_trce.c (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/ssl/t1_trce.c (revision 337764) @@ -1,1268 +1,1280 @@ /* ssl/t1_trce.c */ /* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * */ #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE /* Packet trace support for OpenSSL */ typedef struct { int num; const char *name; } ssl_trace_tbl; # define ssl_trace_str(val, tbl) \ do_ssl_trace_str(val, tbl, sizeof(tbl)/sizeof(ssl_trace_tbl)) # define ssl_trace_list(bio, indent, msg, msglen, value, table) \ do_ssl_trace_list(bio, indent, msg, msglen, value, \ table, sizeof(table)/sizeof(ssl_trace_tbl)) static const char *do_ssl_trace_str(int val, ssl_trace_tbl *tbl, size_t ntbl) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < ntbl; i++, tbl++) { if (tbl->num == val) return tbl->name; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static int do_ssl_trace_list(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen, size_t vlen, ssl_trace_tbl *tbl, size_t ntbl) { int val; if (msglen % vlen) return 0; while (msglen) { val = msg[0]; if (vlen == 2) val = (val << 8) | msg[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s (%d)\n", do_ssl_trace_str(val, tbl, ntbl), val); msg += vlen; msglen -= vlen; } return 1; } /* Version number */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_version_tbl[] = { {SSL2_VERSION, "SSL 2.0"}, {SSL3_VERSION, "SSL 3.0"}, {TLS1_VERSION, "TLS 1.0"}, {TLS1_1_VERSION, "TLS 1.1"}, {TLS1_2_VERSION, "TLS 1.2"}, {DTLS1_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0"}, {DTLS1_2_VERSION, "DTLS 1.2"}, {DTLS1_BAD_VER, "DTLS 1.0 (bad)"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_content_tbl[] = { {SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, "ChangeCipherSpec"}, {SSL3_RT_ALERT, "Alert"}, {SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, "Handshake"}, {SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, "ApplicationData"}, {TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, "HeartBeat"} }; /* Handshake types */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_handshake_tbl[] = { {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, "HelloRequest"}, {SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, "ClientHello"}, {SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, "ServerHello"}, {DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, "HelloVerifyRequest"}, {SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, "NewSessionTicket"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate"}, {SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ServerKeyExchange"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, "CertificateRequest"}, {SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ClientKeyExchange"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, "CertificateStatus"}, {SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, "ServerHelloDone"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, "CertificateVerify"}, {SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ClientKeyExchange"}, {SSL3_MT_FINISHED, "Finished"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, "CertificateStatus"} }; /* Cipher suites */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_ciphers_tbl[] = { {0x0000, "SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL"}, {0x0001, "SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5"}, {0x0002, "SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0x0003, "SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5"}, {0x0004, "SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5"}, {0x0005, "SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x0006, "SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5"}, {0x0007, "SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0008, "SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0009, "SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000A, "SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000B, "SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000C, "SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000D, "SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000E, "SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000F, "SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0010, "SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0011, "SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0012, "SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0013, "SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0014, "SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0015, "SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0016, "SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0017, "SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5"}, {0x0018, "SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5"}, {0x0019, "SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x001A, "SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x001B, "SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x001D, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA"}, {0x001E, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x0021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5"}, {0x0023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5"}, {0x0024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5"}, {0x0025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5"}, {0x0026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA"}, {0x0027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA"}, {0x0028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA"}, {0x0029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5"}, {0x002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5"}, {0x002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5"}, {0x002F, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256"}, {0x003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x0093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0x00B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"}, {0x00B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"}, {0x00B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0x00B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"}, {0x00B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"}, {0x00B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0x00B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"}, {0x00B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"}, {0x00BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV"}, {0xC001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC00A, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC00B, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC00C, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC00D, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC00E, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC00F, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xFEFE, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0xFEFF, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, }; /* Compression methods */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_comp_tbl[] = { {0x0000, "No Compression"}, {0x0001, "Zlib Compression"} }; /* Extensions */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_exts_tbl[] = { {TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, "server_name"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length, "max_fragment_length"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url, "client_certificate_url"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys, "trusted_ca_keys"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac, "truncated_hmac"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, "status_request"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping, "user_mapping"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz, "client_authz"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, "server_authz"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type, "cert_type"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, "elliptic_curves"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, "ec_point_formats"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, "srp"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, "signature_algorithms"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, "use_srtp"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, "heartbeat"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, "session_ticket"}, # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input {TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, "opaque_prf_input"}, # endif {TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, "renegotiate"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, "next_proto_neg"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, "padding"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_curve_tbl[] = { {1, "sect163k1 (K-163)"}, {2, "sect163r1"}, {3, "sect163r2 (B-163)"}, {4, "sect193r1"}, {5, "sect193r2"}, {6, "sect233k1 (K-233)"}, {7, "sect233r1 (B-233)"}, {8, "sect239k1"}, {9, "sect283k1 (K-283)"}, {10, "sect283r1 (B-283)"}, {11, "sect409k1 (K-409)"}, {12, "sect409r1 (B-409)"}, {13, "sect571k1 (K-571)"}, {14, "sect571r1 (B-571)"}, {15, "secp160k1"}, {16, "secp160r1"}, {17, "secp160r2"}, {18, "secp192k1"}, {19, "secp192r1 (P-192)"}, {20, "secp224k1"}, {21, "secp224r1 (P-224)"}, {22, "secp256k1"}, {23, "secp256r1 (P-256)"}, {24, "secp384r1 (P-384)"}, {25, "secp521r1 (P-521)"}, {26, "brainpoolP256r1"}, {27, "brainpoolP384r1"}, {28, "brainpoolP512r1"}, {0xFF01, "arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves"}, {0xFF02, "arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_point_tbl[] = { {0, "uncompressed"}, {1, "ansiX962_compressed_prime"}, {2, "ansiX962_compressed_char2"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_md_tbl[] = { {0, "none"}, {1, "md5"}, {2, "sha1"}, {3, "sha224"}, {4, "sha256"}, {5, "sha384"}, {6, "sha512"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_sig_tbl[] = { {0, "anonymous"}, {1, "rsa"}, {2, "dsa"}, {3, "ecdsa"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_hb_tbl[] = { {1, "peer_allowed_to_send"}, {2, "peer_not_allowed_to_send"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_hb_type_tbl[] = { {1, "heartbeat_request"}, {2, "heartbeat_response"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_ctype_tbl[] = { {1, "rsa_sign"}, {2, "dss_sign"}, {3, "rsa_fixed_dh"}, {4, "dss_fixed_dh"}, {5, "rsa_ephemeral_dh"}, {6, "dss_ephemeral_dh"}, {20, "fortezza_dms"}, {64, "ecdsa_sign"}, {65, "rsa_fixed_ecdh"}, {66, "ecdsa_fixed_ecdh"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_crypto_tbl[] = { {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER, "Premaster Secret"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM, "Client Random"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM, "Server Random"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER, "Master Secret"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE, "Write Mac Secret"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_READ, "Read Mac Secret"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE, "Write Key"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_READ, "Read Key"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE, "Write IV"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_READ, "Read IV"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE, "Write IV (fixed part)"}, {TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_READ, "Read IV (fixed part)"} }; static void ssl_print_hex(BIO *bio, int indent, const char *name, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t i; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s (len=%d): ", name, (int)msglen); for (i = 0; i < msglen; i++) BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", msg[i]); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } static int ssl_print_hexbuf(BIO *bio, int indent, const char *name, size_t nlen, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { size_t blen; const unsigned char *p = *pmsg; if (*pmsglen < nlen) return 0; blen = p[0]; if (nlen > 1) blen = (blen << 8) | p[1]; if (*pmsglen < nlen + blen) return 0; p += nlen; ssl_print_hex(bio, indent, name, p, blen); *pmsg += blen + nlen; *pmsglen -= blen + nlen; return 1; } static int ssl_print_version(BIO *bio, int indent, const char *name, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { int vers; if (*pmsglen < 2) return 0; vers = ((*pmsg)[0] << 8) | (*pmsg)[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s=0x%x (%s)\n", name, vers, ssl_trace_str(vers, ssl_version_tbl)); *pmsg += 2; *pmsglen -= 2; return 1; } static int ssl_print_random(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { unsigned int tm; const unsigned char *p = *pmsg; if (*pmsglen < 32) return 0; tm = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; p += 4; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "Random:\n"); BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "gmt_unix_time=0x%08X\n", tm); ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "random_bytes", p, 28); *pmsg += 32; *pmsglen -= 32; return 1; } static int ssl_print_signature(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *s, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { if (*pmsglen < 2) return 0; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { const unsigned char *p = *pmsg; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "Signature Algorithm %s+%s (%d+%d)\n", ssl_trace_str(p[0], ssl_md_tbl), ssl_trace_str(p[1], ssl_sig_tbl), p[0], p[1]); *pmsg += 2; *pmsglen -= 2; } return ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "Signature", 2, pmsg, pmsglen); } static int ssl_print_extension(BIO *bio, int indent, int server, int extype, const unsigned char *ext, size_t extlen) { size_t xlen; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "extension_type=%s(%d), length=%d\n", ssl_trace_str(extype, ssl_exts_tbl), extype, (int)extlen); switch (extype) { case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats: if (extlen < 1) return 0; xlen = ext[0]; if (extlen != xlen + 1) return 0; return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, ext + 1, xlen, 1, ssl_point_tbl); case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves: if (extlen < 2) return 0; xlen = (ext[0] << 8) | ext[1]; if (extlen != xlen + 2) return 0; return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, ext + 2, xlen, 2, ssl_curve_tbl); case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms: if (extlen < 2) return 0; xlen = (ext[0] << 8) | ext[1]; if (extlen != xlen + 2) return 0; if (xlen & 1) return 0; ext += 2; while (xlen > 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s+%s (%d+%d)\n", ssl_trace_str(ext[0], ssl_md_tbl), ssl_trace_str(ext[1], ssl_sig_tbl), ext[0], ext[1]); xlen -= 2; ext += 2; } break; case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate: if (extlen < 1) return 0; xlen = ext[0]; if (xlen + 1 != extlen) return 0; ext++; if (xlen) { if (server) { if (xlen & 1) return 0; xlen >>= 1; } ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "client_verify_data", ext, xlen); if (server) { ext += xlen; ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "server_verify_data", ext, xlen); } } else { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 4, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } break; case TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat: if (extlen != 1) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "HeartbeatMode: %s\n", ssl_trace_str(ext[0], ssl_hb_tbl)); break; case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket: if (extlen != 0) ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "ticket", ext, extlen); break; default: BIO_dump_indent(bio, (char *)ext, extlen, indent + 2); } return 1; } static int ssl_print_extensions(BIO *bio, int indent, int server, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t extslen; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); if (msglen == 0) { BIO_puts(bio, "No Extensions\n"); return 1; } + if (msglen < 2) + return 0; extslen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; if (extslen != msglen - 2) return 0; msg += 2; msglen = extslen; BIO_printf(bio, "extensions, length = %d\n", (int)msglen); while (msglen > 0) { int extype; size_t extlen; if (msglen < 4) return 0; extype = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; extlen = (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3]; if (msglen < extlen + 4) return 0; msg += 4; if (!ssl_print_extension(bio, indent + 2, server, extype, msg, extlen)) return 0; msg += extlen; msglen -= extlen + 4; } return 1; } static int ssl_print_client_hello(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t len; unsigned int cs; if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "client_version", &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_random(bio, indent, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "session_id", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "cookie", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; } if (msglen < 2) return 0; len = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; msg += 2; msglen -= 2; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "cipher_suites (len=%d)\n", (int)len); if (msglen < len || len & 1) return 0; while (len > 0) { cs = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "{0x%02X, 0x%02X} %s\n", msg[0], msg[1], ssl_trace_str(cs, ssl_ciphers_tbl)); msg += 2; msglen -= 2; len -= 2; } if (msglen < 1) return 0; len = msg[0]; msg++; msglen--; if (msglen < len) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "compression_methods (len=%d)\n", (int)len); while (len > 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s (0x%02X)\n", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_comp_tbl), msg[0]); msg++; msglen--; len--; } if (!ssl_print_extensions(bio, indent, 0, msg, msglen)) return 0; return 1; } static int dtls_print_hello_vfyrequest(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "server_version", &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "cookie", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; return 1; } static int ssl_print_server_hello(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { unsigned int cs; if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "server_version", &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_random(bio, indent, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "session_id", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (msglen < 2) return 0; cs = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "cipher_suite {0x%02X, 0x%02X} %s\n", msg[0], msg[1], ssl_trace_str(cs, ssl_ciphers_tbl)); msg += 2; msglen -= 2; if (msglen < 1) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "compression_method: %s (0x%02X)\n", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_comp_tbl), msg[0]); msg++; msglen--; if (!ssl_print_extensions(bio, indent, 1, msg, msglen)) return 0; return 1; } static int ssl_get_keyex(const char **pname, SSL *ssl) { unsigned long alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { *pname = "rsa"; return SSL_kRSA; } if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) { *pname = "dh_rsa"; return SSL_kDHr; } if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) { *pname = "dh_dss"; return SSL_kDHd; } if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { *pname = "krb5"; return SSL_kKRB5; } if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) { *pname = "edh"; return SSL_kEDH; } if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { *pname = "EECDH"; return SSL_kEECDH; } if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) { *pname = "ECDH RSA"; return SSL_kECDHr; } if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) { *pname = "ECDH ECDSA"; return SSL_kECDHe; } if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { *pname = "PSK"; return SSL_kPSK; } if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { *pname = "SRP"; return SSL_kSRP; } if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { *pname = "GOST"; return SSL_kGOST; } *pname = "UNKNOWN"; return 0; } static int ssl_print_client_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { const char *algname; int id; id = ssl_get_keyex(&algname, ssl); BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "KeyExchangeAlgorithm=%s\n", algname); switch (id) { case SSL_kRSA: if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) { ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", msg, msglen); } else { if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; } break; /* Implicit parameters only allowed for static DH */ case SSL_kDHd: case SSL_kDHr: if (msglen == 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "implicit\n"); break; } case SSL_kEDH: if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_Yc", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL_kECDHr: case SSL_kECDHe: if (msglen == 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "implicit\n"); break; } case SSL_kEECDH: if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "ecdh_Yc", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; } return 1; } static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { const char *algname; int id; id = ssl_get_keyex(&algname, ssl); BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "KeyExchangeAlgorithm=%s\n", algname); switch (id) { /* Should never happen */ case SSL_kDHd: case SSL_kDHr: case SSL_kECDHr: case SSL_kECDHe: BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "Unexpected Message\n"); break; case SSL_kRSA: if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "rsa_modulus", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "rsa_exponent", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL_kEDH: if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_p", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_g", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_Ys", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL_kEECDH: if (msglen < 1) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); if (msg[0] == EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE) BIO_puts(bio, "explicit_prime\n"); else if (msg[0] == EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE) BIO_puts(bio, "explicit_char2\n"); else if (msg[0] == NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) { int curve; if (msglen < 3) return 0; curve = (msg[1] << 8) | msg[2]; BIO_printf(bio, "named_curve: %s (%d)\n", ssl_trace_str(curve, ssl_curve_tbl), curve); msg += 3; msglen -= 3; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "point", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; } break; } return ssl_print_signature(bio, indent, ssl, &msg, &msglen); } static int ssl_print_certificate(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { size_t msglen = *pmsglen; size_t clen; X509 *x; const unsigned char *p = *pmsg, *q; if (msglen < 3) return 0; clen = (p[0] << 16) | (p[1] << 8) | p[2]; if (msglen < clen + 3) return 0; q = p + 3; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "ASN.1Cert, length=%d", (int)clen); x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, clen); if (!x) BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); else { BIO_puts(bio, "\n------details-----\n"); X509_print_ex(bio, x, XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0); PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, x); /* Print certificate stuff */ BIO_puts(bio, "------------------\n"); X509_free(x); } if (q != p + 3 + clen) { BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } *pmsg += clen + 3; *pmsglen -= clen + 3; return 1; } static int ssl_print_certificates(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t clen; if (msglen < 3) return 0; clen = (msg[0] << 16) | (msg[1] << 8) | msg[2]; if (msglen != clen + 3) return 0; msg += 3; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "certificate_list, length=%d\n", (int)clen); while (clen > 0) { if (!ssl_print_certificate(bio, indent + 2, &msg, &clen)) return 0; } return 1; } static int ssl_print_cert_request(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *s, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t xlen; if (msglen < 1) return 0; xlen = msg[0]; if (msglen < xlen + 1) return 0; msg++; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "certificate_types (len=%d)\n", (int)xlen); if (!ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, msg, xlen, 1, ssl_ctype_tbl)) return 0; msg += xlen; msglen -= xlen + 1; if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) goto skip_sig; if (msglen < 2) return 0; xlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; if (msglen < xlen + 2 || (xlen & 1)) return 0; msg += 2; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "signature_algorithms (len=%d)\n", (int)xlen); while (xlen > 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s+%s (%d+%d)\n", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_md_tbl), ssl_trace_str(msg[1], ssl_sig_tbl), msg[0], msg[1]); xlen -= 2; msg += 2; } msg += xlen; msglen -= xlen + 2; skip_sig: + if (msglen < 2) + return 0; xlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); if (msglen < xlen + 2) return 0; msg += 2; msglen -= 2; BIO_printf(bio, "certificate_authorities (len=%d)\n", (int)xlen); while (xlen > 0) { size_t dlen; X509_NAME *nm; const unsigned char *p; if (xlen < 2) return 0; dlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; if (xlen < dlen + 2) return 0; msg += 2; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "DistinguishedName (len=%d): ", (int)dlen); p = msg; nm = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &p, dlen); if (!nm) { BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } else { X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, nm, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); X509_NAME_free(nm); } xlen -= dlen + 2; msg += dlen; } return 1; } static int ssl_print_ticket(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { unsigned int tick_life; if (msglen == 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "No Ticket\n"); return 1; } if (msglen < 4) return 0; tick_life = (msg[0] << 24) | (msg[1] << 16) | (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3]; msglen -= 4; msg += 4; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "ticket_lifetime_hint=%u\n", tick_life); if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "ticket", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (msglen) return 0; return 1; } static int ssl_print_handshake(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen, int indent) { size_t hlen; unsigned char htype; if (msglen < 4) return 0; htype = msg[0]; hlen = (msg[1] << 16) | (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Length=%d\n", ssl_trace_str(htype, ssl_handshake_tbl), (int)hlen); msg += 4; msglen -= 4; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { if (msglen < 8) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "message_seq=%d, fragment_offset=%d, " "fragment_length=%d\n", (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1], (msg[2] << 16) | (msg[3] << 8) | msg[4], (msg[5] << 16) | (msg[6] << 8) | msg[7]); msg += 8; msglen -= 8; } if (msglen < hlen) return 0; switch (htype) { case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO: if (!ssl_print_client_hello(bio, ssl, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (!dtls_print_hello_vfyrequest(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO: if (!ssl_print_server_hello(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: if (!ssl_print_server_keyex(bio, indent + 2, ssl, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: if (!ssl_print_client_keyex(bio, indent + 2, ssl, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE: if (!ssl_print_certificates(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: if (!ssl_print_signature(bio, indent + 2, ssl, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: if (!ssl_print_cert_request(bio, indent + 2, ssl, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_FINISHED: ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "verify_data", msg, msglen); break; case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE: if (msglen != 0) ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "unexpected value", msg, msglen); break; case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET: if (!ssl_print_ticket(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; default: BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "Unsupported, hex dump follows:\n"); BIO_dump_indent(bio, (char *)msg, msglen, indent + 4); } return 1; } static int ssl_print_heartbeat(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { if (msglen < 3) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "HeartBeatMessageType: %s\n", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_hb_type_tbl)); msg++; msglen--; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "payload", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; ssl_print_hex(bio, indent, "padding", msg, msglen); return 1; } const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { if (c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_SSLV2) return NULL; return ssl_trace_str(c->id & 0xFFFF, ssl_ciphers_tbl); } void SSL_trace(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t msglen, SSL *ssl, void *arg) { const unsigned char *msg = buf; BIO *bio = arg; if (write_p == 2) { BIO_puts(bio, "Session "); ssl_print_hex(bio, 0, ssl_trace_str(content_type, ssl_crypto_tbl), msg, msglen); return; } switch (content_type) { case SSL3_RT_HEADER: { - int hvers = msg[1] << 8 | msg[2]; + int hvers; + + /* avoid overlapping with length at the end of buffer */ + if (msglen < (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) ? 13 : 5)) { + BIO_puts(bio, write_p ? "Sent" : "Received"); + ssl_print_hex(bio, 0, " too short message", msg, msglen); + break; + } + hvers = msg[1] << 8 | msg[2]; BIO_puts(bio, write_p ? "Sent" : "Received"); BIO_printf(bio, " Record\nHeader:\n Version = %s (0x%x)\n", ssl_trace_str(hvers, ssl_version_tbl), hvers); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { BIO_printf(bio, " epoch=%d, sequence_number=%04x%04x%04x\n", (msg[3] << 8 | msg[4]), (msg[5] << 8 | msg[6]), (msg[7] << 8 | msg[8]), (msg[9] << 8 | msg[10])); # if 0 /* * Just print handshake type so we can see what is going on * during fragmentation. */ BIO_printf(bio, "(%s)\n", ssl_trace_str(msg[msglen], ssl_handshake_tbl)); # endif } BIO_printf(bio, " Content Type = %s (%d)\n Length = %d", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_content_tbl), msg[0], msg[msglen - 2] << 8 | msg[msglen - 1]); } break; case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: if (!ssl_print_handshake(bio, ssl, msg, msglen, 4)) BIO_printf(bio, "Message length parse error!\n"); break; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: if (msglen == 1 && msg[0] == 1) BIO_puts(bio, " change_cipher_spec (1)\n"); else ssl_print_hex(bio, 4, "unknown value", msg, msglen); break; case SSL3_RT_ALERT: if (msglen != 2) { BIO_puts(bio, " Illegal Alert Length\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio, " Level=%s(%d), description=%s(%d)\n", SSL_alert_type_string_long(msg[0] << 8), msg[0], SSL_alert_desc_string_long(msg[1]), msg[1]); } break; case TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT: ssl_print_heartbeat(bio, 4, msg, msglen); break; } BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/util/domd =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/util/domd (revision 337763) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-1.0.2/util/domd (revision 337764) @@ -1,46 +1,49 @@ #!/bin/sh # Do a makedepend, only leave out the standard headers # Written by Ben Laurie 19 Jan 1999 TOP=$1 shift if [ "$1" = "-MD" ]; then shift - MAKEDEPEND=$1 + MAKEDEPEND="" + while [ "$1" != "--" ]; do + MAKEDEPEND="$MAKEDEPEND $1" + shift + done shift fi if [ "$MAKEDEPEND" = "" ]; then MAKEDEPEND=makedepend; fi # Preserve Makefile timestamp by moving instead of copying (cp -p is GNU only) mv Makefile Makefile.save cp Makefile.save Makefile # fake the presence of Kerberos touch $TOP/krb5.h -if ${MAKEDEPEND} --version 2>&1 | grep "clang" > /dev/null || - echo $MAKEDEPEND | grep "gcc" > /dev/null; then +if expr "$MAKEDEPEND" : ".*makedepend" > /dev/null; then + ${MAKEDEPEND} -D OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND $@ && \ + ${PERL} $TOP/util/clean-depend.pl < Makefile > Makefile.new + RC=$? +else args="" while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do if [ "$1" != "--" ]; then args="$args $1"; fi shift done sed -e '/^# DO NOT DELETE.*/,$d' < Makefile > Makefile.tmp echo '# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.' >> Makefile.tmp ${MAKEDEPEND} -Werror -D OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND -M $args >> Makefile.tmp || exit 1 ${PERL} $TOP/util/clean-depend.pl < Makefile.tmp > Makefile.new RC=$? rm -f Makefile.tmp -else - ${MAKEDEPEND} -D OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND $@ && \ - ${PERL} $TOP/util/clean-depend.pl < Makefile > Makefile.new - RC=$? fi if cmp -s Makefile.save Makefile.new; then mv Makefile.save Makefile rm -f Makefile.new else mv Makefile.new Makefile fi # unfake the presence of Kerberos rm $TOP/krb5.h exit $RC