Index: head/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c =================================================================== --- head/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c (revision 329993) +++ head/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c (revision 329994) @@ -1,489 +1,490 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2006 SPARTA, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Network * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), * as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. * * This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract * N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS"). * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * $FreeBSD$ */ /* * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project. * * Administratively limit access to local UDP/TCP ports for binding purposes. * Intended to be combined with net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh to allow * specific uids and gids to bind specific ports for specific purposes, * while not opening the door to any user replacing an "official" service * while you're restarting it. This only affects ports explicitly bound by * the user process (either for listen/outgoing socket for TCP, or send/ * receive for UDP). This module will not limit ports bound implicitly for * out-going connections where the process hasn't explicitly selected a port: * these are automatically selected by the IP stack. * * To use this module, security.mac.enforce_socket must be enabled, and you * will probably want to twiddle the net.inet sysctl listed above. Then use * sysctl(8) to modify the rules string: * * # sysctl security.mac.portacl.rules="uid:425:tcp:80,uid:425:tcp:79" * * This ruleset, for example, permits uid 425 to bind TCP ports 80 (http) and * 79 (finger). User names and group names can't be used directly because * the kernel only knows about uids and gids. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac); static SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, portacl, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "TrustedBSD mac_portacl policy controls"); static int portacl_enabled = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &portacl_enabled, 0, "Enforce portacl policy"); static int portacl_suser_exempt = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, suser_exempt, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &portacl_suser_exempt, 0, "Privilege permits binding of any port"); static int portacl_autoport_exempt = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, autoport_exempt, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &portacl_autoport_exempt, 0, "Allow automatic allocation through " "binding port 0 if not IP_PORTRANGELOW"); static int portacl_port_high = 1023; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, port_high, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &portacl_port_high, 0, "Highest port to enforce for"); static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PORTACL, "portacl_rule", "Rules for mac_portacl"); #define MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN 1024 #define RULE_GID 1 #define RULE_UID 2 #define RULE_PROTO_TCP 1 #define RULE_PROTO_UDP 2 struct rule { id_t r_id; int r_idtype; u_int16_t r_port; int r_protocol; TAILQ_ENTRY(rule) r_entries; }; #define GID_STRING "gid" #define TCP_STRING "tcp" #define UID_STRING "uid" #define UDP_STRING "udp" /* * Text format for the rule string is that a rule consists of a * comma-separated list of elements. Each element is in the form * idtype:id:protocol:portnumber, and constitutes granting of permission * for the specified binding. */ static struct mtx rule_mtx; static TAILQ_HEAD(rulehead, rule) rule_head; static char rule_string[MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN]; static void toast_rules(struct rulehead *head) { struct rule *rule; while ((rule = TAILQ_FIRST(head)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(head, rule, r_entries); free(rule, M_PORTACL); } } /* * Note that there is an inherent race condition in the unload of modules * and access via sysctl. */ static void destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc) { mtx_destroy(&rule_mtx); toast_rules(&rule_head); } static void init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc) { mtx_init(&rule_mtx, "rule_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF); TAILQ_INIT(&rule_head); } /* * Note: parsing routines are destructive on the passed string. */ static int parse_rule_element(char *element, struct rule **rule) { char *idtype, *id, *protocol, *portnumber, *p; struct rule *new; int error; error = 0; new = malloc(sizeof(*new), M_PORTACL, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK); idtype = strsep(&element, ":"); if (idtype == NULL) { error = EINVAL; goto out; } id = strsep(&element, ":"); if (id == NULL) { error = EINVAL; goto out; } new->r_id = strtol(id, &p, 10); if (*p != '\0') { error = EINVAL; goto out; } if (strcmp(idtype, UID_STRING) == 0) new->r_idtype = RULE_UID; else if (strcmp(idtype, GID_STRING) == 0) new->r_idtype = RULE_GID; else { error = EINVAL; goto out; } protocol = strsep(&element, ":"); if (protocol == NULL) { error = EINVAL; goto out; } if (strcmp(protocol, TCP_STRING) == 0) new->r_protocol = RULE_PROTO_TCP; else if (strcmp(protocol, UDP_STRING) == 0) new->r_protocol = RULE_PROTO_UDP; else { error = EINVAL; goto out; } portnumber = element; if (portnumber == NULL) { error = EINVAL; goto out; } new->r_port = strtol(portnumber, &p, 10); if (*p != '\0') { error = EINVAL; goto out; } out: if (error != 0) { free(new, M_PORTACL); *rule = NULL; } else *rule = new; return (error); } static int parse_rules(char *string, struct rulehead *head) { struct rule *new; char *element; int error; error = 0; while ((element = strsep(&string, ",")) != NULL) { if (strlen(element) == 0) continue; error = parse_rule_element(element, &new); if (error) goto out; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, new, r_entries); } out: if (error != 0) toast_rules(head); return (error); } /* * rule_printf() and rules_to_string() are unused currently because they rely * on sbufs with auto-extension, which may sleep while holding a mutex. * Instead, the non-canonical user-generated rule string is returned to the * user when the rules are queried, which is faster anyway. */ #if 0 static void rule_printf(struct sbuf *sb, struct rule *rule) { const char *idtype, *protocol; switch(rule->r_idtype) { case RULE_GID: idtype = GID_STRING; break; case RULE_UID: idtype = UID_STRING; break; default: panic("rule_printf: unknown idtype (%d)\n", rule->r_idtype); } switch (rule->r_protocol) { case RULE_PROTO_TCP: protocol = TCP_STRING; break; case RULE_PROTO_UDP: protocol = UDP_STRING; break; default: panic("rule_printf: unknown protocol (%d)\n", rule->r_protocol); } sbuf_printf(sb, "%s:%jd:%s:%d", idtype, (intmax_t)rule->r_id, protocol, rule->r_port); } static char * rules_to_string(void) { struct rule *rule; struct sbuf *sb; int needcomma; char *temp; sb = sbuf_new_auto(); needcomma = 0; mtx_lock(&rule_mtx); for (rule = TAILQ_FIRST(&rule_head); rule != NULL; rule = TAILQ_NEXT(rule, r_entries)) { if (!needcomma) needcomma = 1; else sbuf_printf(sb, ","); rule_printf(sb, rule); } mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx); sbuf_finish(sb); temp = strdup(sbuf_data(sb), M_PORTACL); sbuf_delete(sb); return (temp); } #endif /* * Note: due to races, there is not a single serializable order * between parallel calls to the sysctl. */ static int sysctl_rules(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { char *string, *copy_string, *new_string; struct rulehead head, save_head; int error; new_string = NULL; if (req->newptr != NULL) { new_string = malloc(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, M_PORTACL, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); mtx_lock(&rule_mtx); strcpy(new_string, rule_string); mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx); string = new_string; } else string = rule_string; error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, req); if (error) goto out; if (req->newptr != NULL) { copy_string = strdup(string, M_PORTACL); TAILQ_INIT(&head); error = parse_rules(copy_string, &head); free(copy_string, M_PORTACL); if (error) goto out; TAILQ_INIT(&save_head); mtx_lock(&rule_mtx); TAILQ_CONCAT(&save_head, &rule_head, r_entries); TAILQ_CONCAT(&rule_head, &head, r_entries); strcpy(rule_string, string); mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx); toast_rules(&save_head); } out: if (new_string != NULL) free(new_string, M_PORTACL); return (error); } SYSCTL_PROC(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, rules, CTLTYPE_STRING|CTLFLAG_RW, 0, 0, sysctl_rules, "A", "Rules"); static int rules_check(struct ucred *cred, int family, int type, u_int16_t port) { struct rule *rule; int error; #if 0 printf("Check requested for euid %d, family %d, type %d, port %d\n", cred->cr_uid, family, type, port); #endif if (port > portacl_port_high) return (0); error = EPERM; mtx_lock(&rule_mtx); for (rule = TAILQ_FIRST(&rule_head); rule != NULL; rule = TAILQ_NEXT(rule, r_entries)) { if (type == SOCK_DGRAM && rule->r_protocol != RULE_PROTO_UDP) continue; if (type == SOCK_STREAM && rule->r_protocol != RULE_PROTO_TCP) continue; if (port != rule->r_port) continue; if (rule->r_idtype == RULE_UID) { if (cred->cr_uid == rule->r_id) { error = 0; break; } } else if (rule->r_idtype == RULE_GID) { if (cred->cr_gid == rule->r_id) { error = 0; break; } else if (groupmember(rule->r_id, cred)) { error = 0; break; } } else panic("rules_check: unknown rule type %d", rule->r_idtype); } mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx); if (error != 0 && portacl_suser_exempt != 0) error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT, 0); return (error); } /* * Note, this only limits the ability to explicitly bind a port, it * doesn't limit implicitly bound ports for outgoing connections where * the source port is left up to the IP stack to determine automatically. */ static int socket_check_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so, struct label *solabel, struct sockaddr *sa) { struct sockaddr_in *sin; struct inpcb *inp; int family, type; u_int16_t port; /* Only run if we are enabled. */ if (portacl_enabled == 0) return (0); /* Only interested in IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. */ if (so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family != PF_INET && so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family != PF_INET6) return (0); /* Currently, we don't attempt to deal with SOCK_RAW, etc. */ if (so->so_type != SOCK_DGRAM && so->so_type != SOCK_STREAM) return (0); /* Reject addresses we don't understand; fail closed. */ if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET && sa->sa_family != AF_INET6) return (EINVAL); family = so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family; type = so->so_type; sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa; port = ntohs(sin->sin_port); /* * Sockets are frequently bound with a specific IP address but a port * number of '0' to request automatic port allocation. This is often * desirable as long as IP_PORTRANGELOW isn't set, which might permit * automatic allocation of a "privileged" port. The autoport exempt * flag exempts port 0 allocation from rule checking as long as a low * port isn't required. */ if (portacl_autoport_exempt && port == 0) { inp = sotoinpcb(so); if ((inp->inp_flags & INP_LOWPORT) == 0) return (0); } return (rules_check(cred, family, type, port)); } static struct mac_policy_ops portacl_ops = { .mpo_destroy = destroy, .mpo_init = init, .mpo_socket_check_bind = socket_check_bind, }; MAC_POLICY_SET(&portacl_ops, mac_portacl, "TrustedBSD MAC/portacl", MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL); +MODULE_VERSION(mac_portacl, 1);