Index: stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c =================================================================== --- stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c (revision 308199) +++ stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c (revision 308200) @@ -1,1967 +1,1982 @@ /* ssl/d1_pkt.c */ /* * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */ static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2) { int ret, sat, brw, i; if (sizeof(long) == 8) do { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; long l; if (is_endian.little) break; /* not reached on little-endians */ /* * following test is redundant, because input is always aligned, * but I take no chances... */ if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7) break; l = *((long *)v1); l -= *((long *)v2); if (l > 128) return 128; else if (l < -128) return -128; else return (int)l; } while (0); ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7]; sat = 0; brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */ if (ret & 0x80) { for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) { brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i]; sat |= ~brw; brw >>= 8; } } else { for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) { brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i]; sat |= brw; brw >>= 8; } } brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */ if (sat & 0xff) return brw | 0x80; else return brw + (ret & 0xFF); } static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch); #if 0 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset); #endif static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, unsigned char *priority); static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); s->packet = rdata->packet; s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); return (1); } static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; pitem *item; /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) return 0; rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA)); item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata); if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } rdata->packet = s->packet; rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length; memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); item->data = rdata; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) { BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); } #endif s->packet = NULL; s->packet_length = 0; memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return (-1); } /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return (-1); } return (1); } static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) { pitem *item; item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); if (item) { dtls1_copy_record(s, item); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); return (1); } return (0); } /* * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not * processed yet */ #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds)) /* * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, * processed */ #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &((s)->d1->processed_rcds)) static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) { pitem *item; SSL3_BUFFER *rb; SSL3_RECORD *rr; DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; unsigned int is_next_epoch; int replayok = 1; item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); if (item) { /* Check if epoch is current. */ if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) return 1; /* Nothing to do. */ rr = &s->s3->rrec; rb = &s->s3->rbuf; if (rb->left > 0) { /* * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've * finished reading the current packet). */ return 1; } /* Process all the records. */ while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) { dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { /* * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot * be the case because we already checked the epoch above */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) #endif { /* * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this * check once already when we first received the record - but * we might have updated the window since then due to * records we subsequently processed. */ replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap); } if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { /* dump this record */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; continue; } if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0) return 0; } } /* * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been * processed */ s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch; s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1; return 1; } #if 0 static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) { pitem *item; PQ_64BIT priority = (((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) | ((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off); /* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */ if (!SSL_in_init(s)) return 0; item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records); if (item && item->priority == priority) { /* * Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be a * handshake record, since data records as passed up without * buffering */ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records); rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); s->packet = rdata->packet; s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */ return (1); } return 0; } #endif static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int i, al; int enc_err; SSL_SESSION *sess; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned int mac_size, orig_len; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; rr = &(s->s3->rrec); sess = s->session; /* * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data = rr->input; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in * constant time from within the record, without leaking the * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto err; } /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr->off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->packet_length = 0; /* Mark receipt of record. */ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (0); } /*- * Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor; int i, n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned short version; DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; unsigned int is_next_epoch; rr = &(s->s3->rrec); again: /* * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. * This is a non-blocking operation. */ if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) return -1; /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) return 1; /* get something from the wire */ /* check if we have the header */ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; p = s->packet; /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ rr->type = *(p++); ssl_major = *(p++); ssl_minor = *(p++); version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ n2s(p, rr->epoch); memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6); p += 6; n2s(p, rr->length); /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet) { if (version != s->version) { /* unexpected version, silently discard */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } } if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { /* wrong version, silently discard record */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { /* record too long, silently discard it */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ i = rr->length; n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (n != i) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } /* * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ } s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { #endif /* * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily. */ if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH && s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP } #endif /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr->length == 0) goto again; /* * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while * listening. */ if (is_next_epoch) { if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) { if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0) return -1; } rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } return (1); } /*- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { int al, i, j, ret; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) return (-1); /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */ if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek))) return ret; /* * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with * SCTP. */ if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) || (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2)) #else if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) #endif { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } } start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /*- * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * s->s3->rrec.data, - data * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered * during the last handshake in advance, if any. */ if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) { pitem *item; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); if (item) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); } #endif dtls1_copy_record(s, item); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } } /* Check for timeout */ if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) goto start; /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret = dtls1_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) { ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ if (ret <= 0) return (ret); else goto start; } } if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) + s->s3->alert_count = 0; + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { /* * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. */ if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num) < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in * 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { rr->length = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ /* * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are * doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (len <= 0) return (len); if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); if (!peek) { rr->length -= n; rr->off += n; if (rr->length == 0) { s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->off = 0; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application * data first, so retry. */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); } /* * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read * anymore, finally set shutdown. */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } #endif return (n); } /* * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ /* * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ { unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment; dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment); dest = s->d1->alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { dtls1_process_heartbeat(s); /* Exit and notify application to read again */ rr->length = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); return (-1); } #endif /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again * reading. */ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { BIO *bio; s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } if (dest_maxlen > 0) { /* * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */ if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) { #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE /* * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this * non-existing alert... */ FIX ME #endif s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* now move 'n' bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) { dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++]; rr->length--; } *dest_len = dest_maxlen; } } /*- * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto f_err; } /* * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !s->s3->renegotiate) { s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; s->new_session = 1; ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } } } /* * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) { int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1]; s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; + + s->s3->alert_count++; + if (s->s3->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + goto f_err; + } + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so * that nothing gets discarded. */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->d1->shutdown_received = 1; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); return -1; } #endif s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } #if 0 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ /* now check if it's a missing record */ if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { unsigned short seq; unsigned int frag_off; unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]); n2s(p, seq); n2l3(p, frag_off); dtls1_retransmit_message(s, dtls1_get_queue_priority (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off, &found); if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */ /* * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert * ourselves */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); } } #endif } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { char tmp[16]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); return (0); } else { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a * shutdown */ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; rr->length = 0; return (0); } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ccs_hdr_len = 3; /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly * what the record payload has to look like */ /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto err; } rr->length = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages * are still missing, so just drop it. */ if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) { goto start; } s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) goto err; /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no * SCTP is used */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); #endif goto start; } /* * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && !s->in_handshake) { struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. */ if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) return -1; dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); rr->length = 0; goto start; } if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences * are not as expected (and because this is * not really needed for clients except for * detecting protocol violations): */ s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #else s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #endif s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; } i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, but we * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty * problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } goto start; } switch (rr->type) { default: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } #endif al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not * happen when type != rr->type */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet * started), we will indulge it. */ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) ) )) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; return (-1); } else { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { int i; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading * belated app data with SCTP. */ if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) || (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))) #else if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) #endif { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); return -1; } i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); return i; } /* * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake * is started. */ static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k, n; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; return n; } return 0; } /* * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) { int i; OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); return i; } int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *p, *pseq; int i, mac_size, clear = 0; int prefix_len = 0; SSL3_RECORD *wr; SSL3_BUFFER *wb; SSL_SESSION *sess; int bs; /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) { OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); } /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return (i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; wr = &(s->s3->wrec); wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) clear = 1; if (clear) mac_size = 0; else { mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); if (mac_size < 0) goto err; } /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */ #if 0 /* * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual * payload) */ prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); if (prefix_len <= 0) goto err; if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; } #endif p = wb->buf + prefix_len; /* write the header */ *(p++) = type & 0xff; wr->type = type; *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ pseq = p; p += 10; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ /* * Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC. (this is a bit of a * boundary violation, but what the heck). */ if (s->enc_write_ctx && (EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)) bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher); else bs = 0; wr->data = p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ wr->length = (int)len; wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; /* * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); wr->input = wr->data; } /* * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the * wb->buf */ if (mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + bs]), 1) < 0) goto err; wr->length += mac_size; } /* this is true regardless of mac size */ wr->input = p; wr->data = p; /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ if (bs) { /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */ if (RAND_bytes(p, bs) <= 0) goto err; /* * master IV and last CBC residue stand for the rest of randomness */ wr->length += bs; } if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1) goto err; /* record length after mac and block padding */ /* * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! * SSL_in_init(s))) */ /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq); /* XDTLS: ?? */ /* * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */ memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6); pseq += 6; s2n(wr->length, pseq); /* * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */ /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length, *((PQ_64BIT *) & (s->s3->write_sequence[0]))); #endif ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])); if (create_empty_fragment) { /* * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write * out anything here */ return wr->length; } /* now let's set up wb */ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; wb->offset = 0; /* * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write * retries later */ s->s3->wpend_tot = len; s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; s->s3->wpend_type = type; s->s3->wpend_ret = len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); err: return -1; } static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int cmp; unsigned int shift; const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); if (cmp > 0) { memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8); return 1; /* this record in new */ } shift = -cmp; if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift)) return 0; /* record previously received */ memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8); return 1; } static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int cmp; unsigned int shift; const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); if (cmp > 0) { shift = cmp; if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL; else bitmap->map = 1UL; memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8); } else { shift = -cmp; if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift; } } int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i, j; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0]; s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0]; *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1]; #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr); # if 0 if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* * waiting for a new msg */ else s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */ # endif # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n", s->d1->handshake_read_seq, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq); # endif l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr); } #endif i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */ } else { if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE #endif ) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); } } return (i); } static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch) { *is_next_epoch = 0; /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch) return &s->d1->bitmap; /* * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last * epoch */ else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) && s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch && (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { *is_next_epoch = 1; return &s->d1->next_bitmap; } return NULL; } #if 0 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset) { /* alerts are passed up immediately */ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) return 0; /* * Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. (this implies that * Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up immediately) */ if (SSL_in_init(s)) { unsigned char *data = rr->data; /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { unsigned short seq_num; struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr); seq_num = msg_hdr.seq; *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off; } else { dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr); seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq; *offset = 0; } /* * this is either a record we're waiting for, or a retransmit of * something we happened to previously receive (higher layers * will drop the repeat silently */ if (seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) return 0; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off) return 0; else if (seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)) return 0; else { *priority = seq_num; return 1; } } else /* unknown record type */ return 0; } return 0; } #endif void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) { unsigned char *seq; unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence); if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { seq = s->s3->read_sequence; s->d1->r_epoch++; memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); /* * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous * epoch */ dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); } else { seq = s->s3->write_sequence; memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); s->d1->w_epoch++; } memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes); } Index: stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c =================================================================== --- stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 308199) +++ stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 308200) @@ -1,1576 +1,1591 @@ /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) { /* * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) */ int i, len, left; long align = 0; unsigned char *pkt; SSL3_BUFFER *rb; if (n <= 0) return n; rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); if (rb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return -1; left = rb->left; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif if (!extend) { /* start with empty packet ... */ if (left == 0) rb->offset = align; else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload * alignment... */ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { /* * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer * overrun can be triggered. */ memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); rb->offset = align; } } s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; s->packet_length = 0; /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ } /* * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into * the buffer). */ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { if (left == 0 && extend) return 0; if (left > 0 && n > left) n = left; } /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ if (left >= n) { s->packet_length += n; rb->left = left - n; rb->offset += n; return (n); } /* else we need to read more data */ len = s->packet_length; pkt = rb->buf + align; /* * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end */ if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */ memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left); s->packet = pkt; rb->offset = len + align; } if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) /* ignore max parameter */ max = n; else { if (max < n) max = n; if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) max = rb->len - rb->offset; } while (left < n) { /* * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if * possible) */ clear_sys_error(); if (s->rbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i <= 0) { rb->left = left; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) if (len + left == 0) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); return (i); } left += i; /* * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to * byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { if (n > left) n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ } } /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ rb->offset += n; rb->left = left - n; s->packet_length += n; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (n); } /* * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */ #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 /*- * Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; short version; unsigned mac_size, orig_len; size_t extra; unsigned empty_record_count = 0; rr = &(s->s3->rrec); sess = s->session; if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; else extra = 0; if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) { /* * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } again: /* check if we have the header */ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; p = s->packet; /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ rr->type = *(p++); ssl_major = *(p++); ssl_minor = *(p++); version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; n2s(p, rr->length); #if 0 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); #endif /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet) { if (version != s->version) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { /* * The record is using an incorrect version number, but * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end. */ goto err; } /* * Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ s->version = (unsigned short)version; } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } } if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); goto err; } if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ i = rr->length; n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ /* * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH * + rr->length */ } s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ /* * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data = rr->input; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in * constant time from within the record, without leaking the * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto f_err; } /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr->off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->packet_length = 0; /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr->length == 0) { empty_record_count++; if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } goto again; } #if 0 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); #endif return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (ret); } int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *rr; rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); if (i < 0) return (0); else rr->length = i; rr->data = rr->comp; #endif return (1); } int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *wr; wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, wr->input, (int)wr->length); if (i < 0) return (0); else wr->length = i; wr->input = wr->data; #endif return (1); } /* * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { const unsigned char *buf = buf_; unsigned int n, nw; int i, tot; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); tot = s->s3->wnum; s->s3->wnum = 0; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } /* * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and * report the error in a way the user will notice */ if (len < tot) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return (-1); } n = (len - tot); for (;;) { if (n > s->max_send_fragment) nw = s->max_send_fragment; else nw = n; i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { /* * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; return tot + i; } n -= i; tot += i; } } static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *p, *plen; int i, mac_size, clear = 0; int prefix_len = 0; int eivlen; long align = 0; SSL3_RECORD *wr; SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); SSL_SESSION *sess; /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (wb->left != 0) return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return (i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (wb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) return -1; if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; wr = &(s->s3->wrec); sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { #if 1 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ #else clear = 1; #endif mac_size = 0; } else { mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); if (mac_size < 0) goto err; } /* * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { /* * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual * payload) */ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); if (prefix_len <= 0) goto err; if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; } if (create_empty_fragment) { #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 /* * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers. */ align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif p = wb->buf + align; wb->offset = align; } else if (prefix_len) { p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; } else { #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif p = wb->buf + align; wb->offset = align; } /* write the header */ *(p++) = type & 0xff; wr->type = type; *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); /* * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes * and record version number > TLS 1.0 */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) *(p++) = 0x1; else *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet length */ plen = p; p += 2; /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */ if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); if (eivlen <= 1) eivlen = 0; } /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; else eivlen = 0; } else eivlen = 0; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ wr->data = p + eivlen; wr->length = (int)len; wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; /* * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); wr->input = wr->data; } /* * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the * wb->buf */ if (mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) goto err; wr->length += mac_size; } wr->input = p; wr->data = p; if (eivlen) { /* * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; */ wr->length += eivlen; } if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1) goto err; /* record length after mac and block padding */ s2n(wr->length, plen); /* * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; if (create_empty_fragment) { /* * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write * out anything here */ return wr->length; } /* now let's set up wb */ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; /* * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write * retries later */ s->s3->wpend_tot = len; s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; s->s3->wpend_type = type; s->s3->wpend_ret = len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); err: return -1; } /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) { int i; SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); /* XXXX */ if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); return (-1); } for (;;) { clear_sys_error(); if (s->wbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), (unsigned int)wb->left); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i == wb->left) { wb->left = 0; wb->offset += i; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (s->s3->wpend_ret); } else if (i <= 0) { if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in * using a datagram service */ wb->left = 0; } return (i); } wb->offset += i; wb->left -= i; } } /*- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { int al, i, j, ret; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return (-1); if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; return n; } /* * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } } start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /*- * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * s->s3->rrec.data, - data * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret = ssl3_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); } + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) + s->s3->alert_count = 0; + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); goto f_err; } /* * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in * 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { rr->length = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ /* * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are * doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (len <= 0) return (len); if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); if (!peek) { rr->length -= n; rr->off += n; if (rr->length == 0) { s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->off = 0; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); } } return (n); } /* * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ /* * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ { unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { tls1_process_heartbeat(s); /* Exit and notify application to read again */ rr->length = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); return (-1); } #endif if (dest_maxlen > 0) { n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ if (rr->length < n) n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ /* now move 'n' bytes: */ while (n-- > 0) { dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; rr->length--; } if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) goto start; /* fragment was too small */ } } /*- * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto f_err; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !s->s3->renegotiate) { ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } } } /* * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } /* * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) */ if (s->server && SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !s->s3->send_connection_binding && (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /* * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; */ rr->length = 0; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto start; } if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; + + s->s3->alert_count++; + if (s->s3->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + goto f_err; + } + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } /* * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if * the peer refused it where we carry on. */ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) return (0); #endif } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { char tmp[16]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); return (0); } else { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a * shutdown */ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; rr->length = 0; return (0); } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly * what the record payload has to look like */ if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; rr->length = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) goto err; else goto start; } /* * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences * are not as expected (and because this is * not really needed for clients except for * detecting protocol violations): */ s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #else s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #endif s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; } i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, but we * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty * problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } goto start; } switch (rr->type) { default: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS /* * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give * an unexpected message alert. */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } #endif al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not * happen when type != rr->type */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet * started), we will indulge it. */ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) ) )) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; return (-1); } else { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { int i; const char *sender; int slen; if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; else i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return (0); } s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return (0); } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) return (0); /* * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it * before we read the finished message */ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; return (1); } int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have * protocol_version alerts */ if (desc < 0) return -1; /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); /* * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in * the future */ return -1; } int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i, j; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; } else { /* * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not * worry too much. */ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); } } return (i); } Index: stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h =================================================================== --- stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (revision 308199) +++ stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (revision 308200) @@ -1,2771 +1,2772 @@ /* ssl/ssl.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_H # define HEADER_SSL_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509 # include # endif # include # include # include # endif # include # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */ /*- * Version 0 - initial version * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate */ # define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001 /* text strings for the ciphers */ # define SSL_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA # define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA /* * VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries */ # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 # define SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH 256 # define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH 32 # define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES (512/8) # define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH 8 # define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48 /* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */ # define SSL_TXT_EXP40 "EXPORT40" # define SSL_TXT_EXP56 "EXPORT56" # define SSL_TXT_LOW "LOW" # define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM "MEDIUM" # define SSL_TXT_HIGH "HIGH" # define SSL_TXT_FIPS "FIPS" # define SSL_TXT_kFZA "kFZA"/* unused! */ # define SSL_TXT_aFZA "aFZA"/* unused! */ # define SSL_TXT_eFZA "eFZA"/* unused! */ # define SSL_TXT_FZA "FZA"/* unused! */ # define SSL_TXT_aNULL "aNULL" # define SSL_TXT_eNULL "eNULL" # define SSL_TXT_NULL "NULL" # define SSL_TXT_kRSA "kRSA" # define SSL_TXT_kDHr "kDHr"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */ # define SSL_TXT_kDHd "kDHd"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */ # define SSL_TXT_kDH "kDH"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */ # define SSL_TXT_kEDH "kEDH" # define SSL_TXT_kKRB5 "kKRB5" # define SSL_TXT_kECDHr "kECDHr" # define SSL_TXT_kECDHe "kECDHe" # define SSL_TXT_kECDH "kECDH" # define SSL_TXT_kEECDH "kEECDH" # define SSL_TXT_kPSK "kPSK" # define SSL_TXT_kGOST "kGOST" # define SSL_TXT_kSRP "kSRP" # define SSL_TXT_aRSA "aRSA" # define SSL_TXT_aDSS "aDSS" # define SSL_TXT_aDH "aDH"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */ # define SSL_TXT_aECDH "aECDH" # define SSL_TXT_aKRB5 "aKRB5" # define SSL_TXT_aECDSA "aECDSA" # define SSL_TXT_aPSK "aPSK" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST94 "aGOST94" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST "aGOST" # define SSL_TXT_aSRP "aSRP" # define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS" # define SSL_TXT_DH "DH" # define SSL_TXT_EDH "EDH"/* same as "kEDH:-ADH" */ # define SSL_TXT_ADH "ADH" # define SSL_TXT_RSA "RSA" # define SSL_TXT_ECDH "ECDH" # define SSL_TXT_EECDH "EECDH"/* same as "kEECDH:-AECDH" */ # define SSL_TXT_AECDH "AECDH" # define SSL_TXT_ECDSA "ECDSA" # define SSL_TXT_KRB5 "KRB5" # define SSL_TXT_PSK "PSK" # define SSL_TXT_SRP "SRP" # define SSL_TXT_DES "DES" # define SSL_TXT_3DES "3DES" # define SSL_TXT_RC4 "RC4" # define SSL_TXT_RC2 "RC2" # define SSL_TXT_IDEA "IDEA" # define SSL_TXT_SEED "SEED" # define SSL_TXT_AES128 "AES128" # define SSL_TXT_AES256 "AES256" # define SSL_TXT_AES "AES" # define SSL_TXT_AES_GCM "AESGCM" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128 "CAMELLIA128" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256 "CAMELLIA256" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA "CAMELLIA" # define SSL_TXT_MD5 "MD5" # define SSL_TXT_SHA1 "SHA1" # define SSL_TXT_SHA "SHA"/* same as "SHA1" */ # define SSL_TXT_GOST94 "GOST94" # define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC "GOST89MAC" # define SSL_TXT_SHA256 "SHA256" # define SSL_TXT_SHA384 "SHA384" # define SSL_TXT_SSLV2 "SSLv2" # define SSL_TXT_SSLV3 "SSLv3" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1 "TLSv1" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1 "TLSv1.1" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2 "TLSv1.2" # define SSL_TXT_EXP "EXP" # define SSL_TXT_EXPORT "EXPORT" # define SSL_TXT_ALL "ALL" /*- * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select) * ciphers normally not being used. * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection. * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments * to the default cipher setup will also be included here. * * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed * for DEFAULT. */ # define SSL_TXT_CMPALL "COMPLEMENTOFALL" # define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" /* * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'. */ # define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2" /* * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites! (The latter are not * actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable some of them.) */ /* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */ # define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN 1 # define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN 2 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # if (defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) # define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 # endif # define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 X509_FILETYPE_ASN1 # define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM X509_FILETYPE_PEM /* * This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the 'struct ssl_st *' * function parameters used to prototype callbacks in SSL_CTX. */ typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st; typedef struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT; typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD; typedef struct ssl_cipher_st SSL_CIPHER; typedef struct ssl_session_st SSL_SESSION; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) /* SRTP protection profiles for use with the use_srtp extension (RFC 5764)*/ typedef struct srtp_protection_profile_st { const char *name; unsigned long id; } SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn) (SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn) (SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN /* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */ struct ssl_cipher_st { int valid; const char *name; /* text name */ unsigned long id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */ /* * changed in 0.9.9: these four used to be portions of a single value * 'algorithms' */ unsigned long algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */ unsigned long algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */ unsigned long algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */ unsigned long algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */ unsigned long algorithm_ssl; /* (major) protocol version */ unsigned long algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */ unsigned long algorithm2; /* Extra flags */ int strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */ int alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */ }; /* Used to hold functions for SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1 functions */ struct ssl_method_st { int version; int (*ssl_new) (SSL *s); void (*ssl_clear) (SSL *s); void (*ssl_free) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_accept) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_connect) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_read) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_peek) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_write) (SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_shutdown) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate_check) (SSL *s); long (*ssl_get_message) (SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int (*ssl_read_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int (*ssl_write_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len); int (*ssl_dispatch_alert) (SSL *s); long (*ssl_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char) (const unsigned char *ptr); int (*put_cipher_by_char) (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned char *ptr); int (*ssl_pending) (const SSL *s); int (*num_ciphers) (void); const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher) (unsigned ncipher); const struct ssl_method_st *(*get_ssl_method) (int version); long (*get_timeout) (void); struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */ int (*ssl_version) (void); long (*ssl_callback_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); }; /*- * Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER, -- structure version number * SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number * Cipher OCTET STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID * Session_ID OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID * Master_key OCTET STRING, -- the master key * KRB5_principal OCTET STRING -- optional Kerberos principal * Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the optional Key argument * Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time * Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds * Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate * Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID context * Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- X509_V_... code for `Peer' * HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension * PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint * PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity * Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket * Ticket [10] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only) * Compression_meth [11] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method * SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username * } * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-). */ struct ssl_session_st { int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being * kept in here? */ /* only really used in SSLv2 */ unsigned int key_arg_length; unsigned char key_arg[SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH]; int master_key_length; unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; /* session_id - valid? */ unsigned int session_id_length; unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; /* * this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in the * appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, via * SSL_new */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len; unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH]; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK char *psk_identity_hint; char *psk_identity; # endif /* * Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed. Applications * can also set this bit for a new session via not_resumable_session_cb * to disable session caching and tickets. */ int not_resumable; /* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */ struct sess_cert_st /* SESS_CERT */ *sess_cert; /* * This is the cert for the other end. On clients, it will be the same as * sess_cert->peer_key->x509 (the latter is not enough as sess_cert is * not retained in the external representation of sessions, see * ssl_asn1.c). */ X509 *peer; /* * when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's * certificate is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse: */ long verify_result; /* only for servers */ int references; long timeout; long time; unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used * to load the 'cipher' structure */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */ /* * These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to * implement a maximum cache size. */ struct ssl_session_st *prev, *next; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT char *tlsext_hostname; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* peer's list */ size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* peer's list */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* RFC4507 info */ unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */ size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */ long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srp_username; # endif }; # endif # define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0x00000001L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0x00000002L /* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */ # define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L # define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING 0x00000010L # define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L # define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L # define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L # define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L # define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L /* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */ # define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0 /* Refers to ancient SSLREF and SSLv2, retained for compatibility */ # define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x0 /* * Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added in * OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol) the * workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include it in * SSL_OP_ALL. */ /* added in 0.9.6e */ # define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0x00000800L /* * SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless. This * used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7. */ # define SSL_OP_ALL 0x80000BFFL /* DTLS options */ # define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000L /* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */ # define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000L /* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */ # define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L /* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client) */ # define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT 0x00008000L /* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */ # define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L /* Don't use compression even if supported */ # define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0x00020000L /* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */ # define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L /* Does nothing: retained for compatibility */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L /* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */ # define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0 /* * Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's preferences */ # define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000L /* * If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number as * latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0 * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks. */ # define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0x00800000L # define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 0x01000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0x02000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 0x08000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 0x10000000L /* * These next two were never actually used for anything since SSLeay zap so * we have some more flags. */ /* * The next flag deliberately changes the ciphertest, this is a check for the * PKCS#1 attack */ # define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 0x0 # define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 0x0 # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG 0x20000000L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x40000000L /* * Make server add server-hello extension from early version of cryptopro * draft, when GOST ciphersuite is negotiated. Required for interoperability * with CryptoPro CSP 3.x */ # define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG 0x80000000L /* * Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success * when just a single record has been written): */ # define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE 0x00000001L /* * Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location (buffer * contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid the * misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like non-blocking * write(): */ # define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002L /* * Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking: */ # define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004L /* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */ # define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L /* * Save RAM by releasing read and write buffers when they're empty. (SSL3 and * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context or * just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */ # define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L /* * Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations * that require it. */ # define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L # define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L /* * Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. To be set only by applications * that reconnect with a downgraded protocol version; see * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your * application attempts a normal handshake. Only use this in explicit * fallback retries, following the guidance in * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00. */ # define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L /* * Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, they * cannot be used to clear bits. */ # define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_get_options(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL) # define DTLS_set_link_mtu(ssl, mtu) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU,(mtu),NULL) # define DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU,0,NULL) # define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS # define SSL_heartbeat(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT,0,NULL) # endif void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); # define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) # define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN typedef struct srp_ctx_st { /* param for all the callbacks */ void *SRP_cb_arg; /* set client Hello login callback */ int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *); /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */ int (*SRP_verify_param_callback) (SSL *, void *); /* set SRP client passwd callback */ char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback) (SSL *, void *); char *login; BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A; BIGNUM *a, *b, *v; char *info; int strength; unsigned long srp_Mask; } SRP_CTX; # endif /* see tls_srp.c */ int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s); int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx); int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad); int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key); int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s); int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key); # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*30 /* 30k max cert list :-) */ # else # define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 /* 100k max cert list :-) */ # endif # define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (1024*20) /* * This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that * set them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in * a server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed. * Also, callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique * otherwise the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do * this using the 'ssl' value they're passed by; * SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) The length value passed in * is set at the maximum size the session ID can be. In SSLv2 this is 16 * bytes, whereas SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32 bytes. The callback can alter this * length to be less if desired, but under SSLv2 session IDs are supposed to * be fixed at 16 bytes so the id will be padded after the callback returns * in this case. It is also an error for the callback to set the size to * zero. */ typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB) (const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); typedef struct ssl_comp_st SSL_COMP; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN struct ssl_comp_st { int id; const char *name; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_METHOD *method; # else char *method; # endif }; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) DECLARE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION); struct ssl_ctx_st { const SSL_METHOD *method; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; /* same as above but sorted for lookup */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store; LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions; /* * Most session-ids that will be cached, default is * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited. */ unsigned long session_cache_size; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail; /* * This can have one of 2 values, ored together, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT, * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which * means only SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS. */ int session_cache_mode; /* * If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when * SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make life easier to set * things up */ long session_timeout; /* * If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id * is added to the cache. If this function returns 1, it means that the * callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it. * Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If * remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is * removed from the cache. After the call, OpenSSL will * SSL_SESSION_free() it. */ int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); struct { int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */ int sess_connect_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */ int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */ int sess_accept_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */ int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */ int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */ int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */ int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */ int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not in the cache was * passed back via the callback. This * indicates that the application is * supplying session-id's from other * processes - spooky :-) */ } stats; int references; /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */ int (*app_verify_callback) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *); void *app_verify_arg; /* * before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument) */ /* Default password callback. */ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback; /* Default password callback user data. */ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata; /* get client cert callback */ int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); /* cookie generate callback */ int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len); /* verify cookie callback */ int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len); CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; const EVP_MD *rsa_md5; /* For SSLv2 - name is 'ssl2-md5' */ const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */ const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */ /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */ /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* what we put in client cert requests */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; /* * Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by * SSL_new) */ unsigned long options; unsigned long mode; long max_cert_list; struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; int read_ahead; /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int verify_mode; unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */ int (*default_verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; # if 0 int purpose; /* Purpose setting */ int trust; /* Trust setting */ # endif int quiet_shutdown; /* * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads. */ unsigned int max_send_fragment; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* * Engine to pass requests for client certs to */ ENGINE *client_cert_engine; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions servername callback */ int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *); void *tlsext_servername_arg; /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */ unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[16]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[16]; /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */ int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc); /* certificate status request info */ /* Callback for status request */ int (*tlsext_status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *tlsext_status_arg; /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */ int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback) (SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK char *psk_identity_hint; unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS # define SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT 32 unsigned int freelist_max_len; struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *wbuf_freelist; struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *rbuf_freelist; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* Next protocol negotiation information */ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */ /* * For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of * advertised protocols can be provided. */ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb) (SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, unsigned int *len, void *arg); void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; /* * For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the next * protocol from the list provided by the server. */ int (*next_proto_select_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg); void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; # endif /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles; # endif }; # endif # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT 0x0001 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER 0x0002 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR 0x0080 /* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */ # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP 0x0100 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0x0200 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \ (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx); # define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL) void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)); int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)); void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)); SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *Data, int len, int *copy); void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)); void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e); # endif void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg); int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len); # define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 # define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 # define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* * the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the * resulting identity/psk */ # define PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 128 # define PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN 256 void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint); int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint); const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s); # endif # define SSL_NOTHING 1 # define SSL_WRITING 2 # define SSL_READING 3 # define SSL_X509_LOOKUP 4 /* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */ # define SSL_want_nothing(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING) # define SSL_want_read(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING) # define SSL_want_write(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING) # define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP) # define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1 # define SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM 2 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN struct ssl_st { /* * protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION, * DTLS1_VERSION) */ int version; /* SSL_ST_CONNECT or SSL_ST_ACCEPT */ int type; /* SSLv3 */ const SSL_METHOD *method; /* * There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This * is so data can be read and written to different handlers */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO /* used by SSL_read */ BIO *rbio; /* used by SSL_write */ BIO *wbio; /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate messages */ BIO *bbio; # else /* used by SSL_read */ char *rbio; /* used by SSL_write */ char *wbio; char *bbio; # endif /* * This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1 * is returned. This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what * request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect */ int rwstate; /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */ int in_handshake; int (*handshake_func) (SSL *); /* * Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon * as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state is called for the first time, so * that "state" and "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this test instead of an * "init" member. */ /* are we the server side? - mostly used by SSL_clear */ int server; /* * Generate a new session or reuse an old one. * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously * cached session or even the previous session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ int new_session; /* don't send shutdown packets */ int quiet_shutdown; /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 for received */ int shutdown; /* where we are */ int state; /* where we are when reading */ int rstate; BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */ void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by * ssl3_get_message() */ int init_num; /* amount read/written */ int init_off; /* amount read/written */ /* used internally to point at a raw packet */ unsigned char *packet; unsigned int packet_length; struct ssl2_state_st *s2; /* SSLv2 variables */ struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */ struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */ int read_ahead; /* Read as many input bytes as possible (for * non-blocking reads) */ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int hit; /* reusing a previous session */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; # if 0 int purpose; /* Purpose setting */ int trust; /* Trust setting */ # endif /* crypto */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; /* * These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to * be 'copied' into these ones */ int mac_flags; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */ # else char *expand; # endif EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */ # else char *compress; # endif /* session info */ /* client cert? */ /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; /* * the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused in * the appropriate context */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */ SSL_SESSION *session; /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; /* Used in SSL2 and SSL3 */ /* * 0 don't care about verify failure. * 1 fail if verify fails */ int verify_mode; /* fail if callback returns 0 */ int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* optional informational callback */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* error bytes to be written */ int error; /* actual code */ int error_code; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 /* Kerberos 5 context */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); # endif SSL_CTX *ctx; /* * set this flag to 1 and a sleep(1) is put into all SSL_read() and * SSL_write() calls, good for nbio debuging :-) */ int debug; /* extra application data */ long verify_result; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; int references; /* protocol behaviour */ unsigned long options; /* API behaviour */ unsigned long mode; long max_cert_list; int first_packet; /* what was passed, used for SSLv3/TLS rollback check */ int client_version; unsigned int max_send_fragment; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extension debug callback */ void (*tlsext_debug_cb) (SSL *s, int client_server, int type, unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); void *tlsext_debug_arg; char *tlsext_hostname; /*- * no further mod of servername * 0 : call the servername extension callback. * 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback. * 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello */ int servername_done; /* certificate status request info */ /* Status type or -1 if no status type */ int tlsext_status_type; /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */ int tlsext_status_expected; /* OCSP status request only */ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids; X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts; /* OCSP response received or to be sent */ unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp; int tlsext_ocsp_resplen; /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */ int tlsext_ticket_expected; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; /* our list */ unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; /* our list */ unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* * draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information to be used for * handshakes */ void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input; size_t tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; /* TLS Session Ticket extension override */ TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *tlsext_session_ticket; /* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */ tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn tls_session_ticket_ext_cb; void *tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg; /* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */ tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb; void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; SSL_CTX *initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello * extensions. For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before * the Finished message. */ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; # endif # define session_ctx initial_ctx /* What we'll do */ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles; /* What's been chosen */ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile; /*- * Is use of the Heartbeat extension negotiated? * 0: disabled * 1: enabled * 2: enabled, but not allowed to send Requests */ unsigned int tlsext_heartbeat; /* Indicates if a HeartbeatRequest is in flight */ unsigned int tlsext_hb_pending; /* HeartbeatRequest sequence number */ unsigned int tlsext_hb_seq; # else # define session_ctx ctx # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ /*- * 1 if we are renegotiating. * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */ int renegotiate; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* ctx for SRP authentication */ SRP_CTX srp_ctx; # endif }; # endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif # include # include # include /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */ # include /* Datagram TLS */ # include # include /* Support for the use_srtp extension */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* compatibility */ # define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg) (SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg)) # define SSL_get_app_data(s) (SSL_get_ex_data(s,0)) # define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a) (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a)) # define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s) (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0)) # define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0)) # define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg) (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg)) /* * The following are the possible values for ssl->state are are used to * indicate where we are up to in the SSL connection establishment. The * macros that follow are about the only things you should need to use and * even then, only when using non-blocking IO. It can also be useful to work * out where you were when the connection failed */ # define SSL_ST_CONNECT 0x1000 # define SSL_ST_ACCEPT 0x2000 # define SSL_ST_MASK 0x0FFF # define SSL_ST_INIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL_ST_BEFORE 0x4000 # define SSL_ST_OK 0x03 # define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT) # define SSL_ST_ERR 0x05 # define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01 # define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02 # define SSL_CB_READ 0x04 # define SSL_CB_WRITE 0x08 # define SSL_CB_ALERT 0x4000/* used in callback */ # define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ) # define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE) # define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP) # define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT) # define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP) # define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT) # define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START 0x10 # define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20 /* Is the SSL_connection established? */ # define SSL_get_state(a) SSL_state(a) # define SSL_is_init_finished(a) (SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK) # define SSL_in_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) # define SSL_in_before(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE) # define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* * The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail, you should * not need these */ # define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER 0xF0 # define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1 # define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2 /*- * Obtain latest Finished message * -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished) * -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished). * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes. */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); /* * use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options are * 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired */ # define SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0x00 # define SSL_VERIFY_PEER 0x01 # define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02 # define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0x04 # define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() # define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() /* this is for backward compatibility */ # if 0 /* NEW_SSLEAY */ # define SSL_CTX_set_default_verify(a,b,c) SSL_CTX_set_verify(a,b,c) # define SSL_set_pref_cipher(c,n) SSL_set_cipher_list(c,n) # define SSL_add_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_add_session((a),(b)) # define SSL_remove_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_remove_session((a),(b)) # define SSL_flush_sessions(a,b) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions((a),(b)) # endif /* More backward compatibility */ # define SSL_get_cipher(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np) # define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_time(a) SSL_SESSION_get_time(a) # define SSL_set_time(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b)) # define SSL_get_timeout(a) SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a) # define SSL_set_timeout(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b)) # define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) # define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) # define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET 1000/* offset to get SSL_R_... value * from SSL_AD_... */ /* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */ # define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC # define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED # define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE /* Not for TLS */ # define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR # define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR # define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED # define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION # define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE # define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK # define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 # define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE 3 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP 4 # define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 5/* look at error stack/return * value/errno */ # define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN 6 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT 7 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8 # define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA 1 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA 2 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH 3 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH 4 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB 5 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB 6 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB 7 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED 8 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST 9 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 10 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 11 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS 12 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS 13 # define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT 14 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK 15 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG 16 /* only applies to datagram connections */ # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU 17 /* Stats */ # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER 20 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT 21 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD 22 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE 23 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT 24 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD 25 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE 26 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT 27 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT 28 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES 29 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS 30 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL 31 # define SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS 32 # define SSL_CTRL_MODE 33 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD 40 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD 41 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 42 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 43 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 44 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 45 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST 50 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST 51 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT 52 /* see tls1.h for macros based on these */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB 53 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG 54 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME 55 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB 56 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG 57 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 58 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 59 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT 60 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB 61 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG 62 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 63 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 64 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 65 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 66 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 67 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 68 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 69 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 70 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 71 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB 72 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB 75 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB 76 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB 77 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG 78 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME 79 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH 80 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD 81 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS # define SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT 85 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 86 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS 87 # endif # endif # define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT 73 # define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 74 # define DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN 75 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT 76 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS 77 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83 # define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119 # define DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU 120 # define DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU 121 # define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg) # define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL) # define DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN,0, (void *)peer) # define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL) # define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) # define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa) # define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) # define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) # define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509) # define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,NULL) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client); BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from); void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio); # endif int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *, const char *str); SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth); void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *); long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *, X509_STORE *); int SSL_want(const SSL *s); int SSL_clear(SSL *s); void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm); const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s); int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits); char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c); const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c); unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c); int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n); char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len); int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s); int SSL_pending(const SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd); int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd); int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s); BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s); # endif int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str); void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes); int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s); int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *); void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)); void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); # endif int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); /* PEM type */ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file); int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *file); # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! [was: #ifndef MAC_OS_pre_X] */ # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *dir); # endif # endif # endif void SSL_load_error_strings(void); const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s); long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to, const SSL *from); X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s); int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void); const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len); unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); # endif void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses); int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp); int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session); int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB); int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB); int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len); SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); # ifdef HEADER_X509_H X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s); # endif STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s); int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *); void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*callback) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)); void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); # endif int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u); int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx); int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose); int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose); int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust); int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust); int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb) (SSL *, void *)); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *, void *)); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *, int *, void *)); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info); int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp); BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s); BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s); char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s); char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s); # endif void SSL_free(SSL *ssl); int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl); int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl); int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void)); long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void)); int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int ret_code); const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s); /* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ # endif const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS * version */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available * SSL/TLS version */ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available * SSL/TLS version */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s); int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s); int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s); const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s); int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method); const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value); void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s); int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s); void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s); long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s); int SSL_library_init(void); char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *, char *buf, int size); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk); SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl); X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl); /* * EVP_PKEY */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *ssl); void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath); # define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session/* just peek at pointer */ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl); SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)); void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state); void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long v); long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx); int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx); int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx); int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void); # define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) # define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) # define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) # define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL) # define SSL_set_max_send_fragment(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL) /* NB: the keylength is only applicable when is_export is true */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s); const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s); const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp); STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm); # else const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s); const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s); const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp); void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm); # endif /* TLS extensions functions */ int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len); int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb, void *arg); /* Pre-shared secret session resumption functions */ int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb, void *arg); void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug); int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void); # endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); /* Error codes for the SSL functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 100 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED 167 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO 101 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 102 # define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION 103 # define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE 245 # define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE 104 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT 246 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 295 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD 247 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM 316 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO 248 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT 249 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC 250 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY 251 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE 252 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 297 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT 305 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS 424 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED 259 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 260 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 261 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 262 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 263 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 264 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 265 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 266 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 267 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES 268 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED 105 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 106 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 107 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED 108 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO 109 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY 110 # define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION 111 # define SSL_F_READ_N 112 # define SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 113 # define SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH 239 # define SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO 114 # define SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY 240 # define SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT 115 # define SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO 116 # define SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT 117 # define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 118 # define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO 119 # define SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK 237 # define SSL_F_SSL23_READ 120 # define SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE 121 # define SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT 122 # define SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT 123 # define SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT 124 # define SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL 241 # define SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK 234 # define SSL_F_SSL2_READ 125 # define SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL 236 # define SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE 126 # define SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE 127 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT 128 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 296 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 304 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED 339 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL 133 # define SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS 293 # define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET 388 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 289 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 137 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 138 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 139 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED 140 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 306 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO 146 # define SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC 285 # define SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 287 # define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 147 # define SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK 235 # define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES 148 # define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N 149 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 150 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 151 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 152 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 153 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 154 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 242 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 155 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER 156 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER 291 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 298 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 277 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 307 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 299 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 278 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 308 # define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160 # define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP 221 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST 222 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE 214 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW 162 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 163 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 280 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG 279 # define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR 230 # define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT 231 # define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR 164 # define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD 165 # define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST 166 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL 232 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 168 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES 309 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW 169 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST 269 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE 290 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE 226 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 219 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION 170 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST 229 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE 171 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 172 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE 220 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 173 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY 174 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 175 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 176 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 272 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 177 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 178 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 179 # define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE 180 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT 182 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY 317 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183 # define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184 # define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 # define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 300 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 302 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 310 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 301 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 303 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 311 # define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270 # define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 281 # define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 282 # define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223 # define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187 # define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW 225 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT 191 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST 271 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD 192 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY 193 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE 227 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD 194 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION 195 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 218 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT 294 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST 228 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD 196 # define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN 224 # define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT 313 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION 243 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION 197 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 203 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 273 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 204 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 205 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 206 # define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN 207 # define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE 208 # define SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC 286 # define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 209 # define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 274 # define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 210 # define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL 314 # define SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT 315 # define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275 # define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276 # define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF 284 # define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 211 # define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING 212 /* Reason codes. */ # define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100 # define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272 # define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD 101 # define SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE 102 # define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 103 # define SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM 104 # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106 # define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE 375 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE 393 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE 395 # define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111 # define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE 305 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT 306 # define SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH 332 # define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST 105 # define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH 271 # define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE 113 # define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH 333 # define SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE 114 # define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH 115 # define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER 116 # define SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH 316 # define SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT 117 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT 118 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT 119 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH 120 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH 121 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE 122 # define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 123 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH 347 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH 348 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH 349 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH 350 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS 371 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH 351 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 352 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 353 # define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 124 # define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 125 # define SSL_R_BAD_STATE 126 # define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY 127 # define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET 128 # define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG 129 # define SSL_R_BN_LIB 130 # define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH 131 # define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG 132 # define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY 133 # define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED 134 # define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 135 # define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT 136 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH 137 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 138 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR 139 # define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 226 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 140 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED 343 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE 141 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR 142 # define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 143 # define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 144 # define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH 308 # define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED 145 # define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281 # define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL 372 # define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148 # define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149 # define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334 # define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID 309 # define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT 317 # define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING 318 # define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE 322 # define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE 323 # define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER 310 # define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 354 # define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150 # define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY 282 # define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151 # define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 # define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 # define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 # define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 355 # define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 356 # define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 # define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 # define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 # define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373 # define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340 # define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158 # define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280 # define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 341 # define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278 # define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME 357 # define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 328 # define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 325 # define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279 # define SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG 284 # define SSL_R_KRB5 285 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC 286 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED 287 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT 288 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ 289 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET 290 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT 291 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ 292 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED 293 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 294 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 295 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161 # define SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG 296 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT 162 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY 163 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT 164 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT 165 # define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY 166 # define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY 167 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 168 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT 169 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT 170 # define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM 358 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 171 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 311 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173 # define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174 # define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS 346 # define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED 178 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET 179 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED 180 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE 181 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED 182 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED 183 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST 184 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH 185 # define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD 331 # define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED 186 # define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED 187 # define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER 330 # define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED 188 # define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY 189 # define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 190 # define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE 191 # define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY 192 # define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 339 # define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST 324 # define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193 # define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES 359 # define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK 194 # define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195 # define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196 # define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197 # define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344 # define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297 # define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG 327 # define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198 # define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 227 # define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 270 # define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 199 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR 200 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE 201 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE 202 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER 203 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 204 # define SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 205 # define SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS 206 # define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN 207 # define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 223 # define SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB 224 # define SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB 225 # define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR 208 # define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA 209 # define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 210 # define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET 211 # define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED 312 # define SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE 212 # define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 213 # define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE 214 # define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL 298 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG 335 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 336 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 337 # define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 215 # define SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING 342 # define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO 216 # define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO 217 # define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO 218 # define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 345 # define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275 # define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277 # define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219 # define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 360 # define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220 # define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 361 # define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES 362 # define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG 363 # define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE 364 # define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221 # define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG 299 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT 321 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 319 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE 320 # define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 300 # define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT 222 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043 # define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION 228 # define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 229 # define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 230 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED 301 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT 302 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG 273 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH 303 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 231 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110 # define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232 # define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT 365 # define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 366 # define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL 367 # define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 157 +# define SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS 409 # define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233 # define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234 # define SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 235 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS 236 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS 313 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY 237 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS 238 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS 314 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS 239 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD 240 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES 241 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES 242 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES 243 # define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 244 # define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD 245 # define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED 276 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE 246 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 247 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 248 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 249 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 368 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 250 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE 251 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 252 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE 253 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 254 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 255 # define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 338 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 256 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 257 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE 326 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329 # define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED 369 # define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260 # define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261 # define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262 # define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS 263 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 264 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE 265 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE 370 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 266 # define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267 # define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268 # define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 269 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h =================================================================== --- stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (revision 308199) +++ stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (revision 308200) @@ -1,732 +1,734 @@ /* ssl/ssl3.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL3_H # define HEADER_SSL3_H # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include # endif # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746 * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */ # define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF /* * Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */ # define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000004 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000005 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 0x03000006 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA 0x03000007 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000008 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000009 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000A # define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000B # define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000C # define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000D # define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000E # define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000F # define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000010 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000011 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000012 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000013 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000014 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000015 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000016 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000017 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000018 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000019 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001A # define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA 0x0300001B # if 0 # define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA 0x0300001C # define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA 0x0300001D # if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never * used any more, and is safe to remove * according to David Hopwood * of the * ietf-tls list */ # define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA 0x0300001E # endif # endif /* * VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries */ # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001E # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300001F # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000020 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000021 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 0x03000022 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 0x03000023 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000024 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 0x03000025 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000026 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000027 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA 0x03000028 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 0x03000029 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 0x0300002A # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 0x0300002B # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5 "NULL-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA "NULL-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 "RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA "RC4-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 "EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA "IDEA-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 "ADH-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA" # if 0 # define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA "FZA-NULL-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA "FZA-FZA-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA "FZA-RC4-SHA" # endif # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA "KRB5-RC4-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 "KRB5-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC4-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE 48 # define SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 32 # define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE 32 # define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 5 # define SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 4 # ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD /* * Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's not * actually true. Point is that malloc has to return at least 64-bit aligned * pointers, meaning that allocating 5 bytes wastes 3 bytes in either case. * Suggested pre-gaping simply moves these wasted bytes from the end of * allocated region to its front, but makes data payload aligned, which * improves performance:-) */ # define SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD 8 # else # if (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1))!=0 # error "insane SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD" # undef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD # endif # endif /* * This is the maximum MAC (digest) size used by the SSL library. Currently * maximum of 20 is used by SHA1, but we reserve for future extension for * 512-bit hashes. */ # define SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE 64 /* * Maximum block size used in all ciphersuites. Currently 16 for AES. */ # define SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16 # define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA (16384) /* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */ # define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH 16384 /* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */ # define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD 1024 /* * The standards give a maximum encryption overhead of 1024 bytes. In * practice the value is lower than this. The overhead is the maximum number * of padding bytes (256) plus the mac size. */ # define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD (256 + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE) /* * OpenSSL currently only uses a padding length of at most one block so the * send overhead is smaller. */ # define SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ (SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE) /* If compression isn't used don't include the compression overhead */ # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH # else # define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH \ (SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD) # endif # define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH \ (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) # define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \ (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) # define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST "\x43\x4C\x4E\x54" # define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST "\x53\x52\x56\x52" # define SSL3_VERSION 0x0300 # define SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 # define SSL3_VERSION_MINOR 0x00 # define SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20 # define SSL3_RT_ALERT 21 # define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 22 # define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 23 # define TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT 24 # define SSL3_AL_WARNING 1 # define SSL3_AL_FATAL 2 # define SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 # define SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE 41 # define SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE 42 # define SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 43 # define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 44 # define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 45 # define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 46 # define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47/* fatal */ # define TLS1_HB_REQUEST 1 # define TLS1_HB_RESPONSE 2 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN typedef struct ssl3_record_st { /* type of record */ /* * r */ int type; /* How many bytes available */ /* * rw */ unsigned int length; /* read/write offset into 'buf' */ /* * r */ unsigned int off; /* pointer to the record data */ /* * rw */ unsigned char *data; /* where the decode bytes are */ /* * rw */ unsigned char *input; /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */ /* * r */ unsigned char *comp; /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */ /* * r */ unsigned long epoch; /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */ /* * r */ unsigned char seq_num[8]; } SSL3_RECORD; typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st { /* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes, see ssl3_setup_buffers() */ unsigned char *buf; /* buffer size */ size_t len; /* where to 'copy from' */ int offset; /* how many bytes left */ int left; } SSL3_BUFFER; # endif # define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN 1 # define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN 2 # define SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3 # define SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4 # define SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH 5 # define SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH 6 # define SSL3_CT_FORTEZZA_DMS 20 /* * SSL3_CT_NUMBER is used to size arrays and it must be large enough to * contain all of the cert types defined either for SSLv3 and TLSv1. */ # define SSL3_CT_NUMBER 9 # define SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS 0x0001 # define SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x0002 # define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER 0x0004 # define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008 # define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010 # define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020 /* * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message. * Cleared after the message has been processed. */ # define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080 /* * SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we restart a handshake because of * MS SGC and so prevents us from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's * reset on a renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS attack where the * client handshakes in a loop using SGC to restart. Servers which permit * renegotiation can still be effected, but we can't prevent that. */ # define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN typedef struct ssl3_state_st { long flags; int delay_buf_pop_ret; unsigned char read_sequence[8]; int read_mac_secret_size; unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char write_sequence[8]; int write_mac_secret_size; unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */ int need_empty_fragments; int empty_fragment_done; /* The value of 'extra' when the buffers were initialized */ int init_extra; SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; /* read IO goes into here */ SSL3_BUFFER wbuf; /* write IO goes into here */ SSL3_RECORD rrec; /* each decoded record goes in here */ SSL3_RECORD wrec; /* goes out from here */ /* * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet * processed by ssl3_read_bytes: */ unsigned char alert_fragment[2]; unsigned int alert_fragment_len; unsigned char handshake_fragment[4]; unsigned int handshake_fragment_len; /* partial write - check the numbers match */ unsigned int wnum; /* number of bytes sent so far */ int wpend_tot; /* number bytes written */ int wpend_type; int wpend_ret; /* number of bytes submitted */ const unsigned char *wpend_buf; /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */ BIO *handshake_buffer; /* * When set of handshake digests is determined, buffer is hashed and * freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in this array */ EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst; /* * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed. * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received. * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert. */ int change_cipher_spec; int warn_alert; int fatal_alert; /* * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close * alert via the warning alert */ int alert_dispatch; unsigned char send_alert[2]; /* * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there * is no more data in the read or write buffers */ int renegotiate; int total_renegotiations; int num_renegotiations; int in_read_app_data; /* * Opaque PRF input as used for the current handshake. These fields are * used only if TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input is defined (otherwise, they * are merely present to improve binary compatibility) */ void *client_opaque_prf_input; size_t client_opaque_prf_input_len; void *server_opaque_prf_input; size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len; struct { /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */ unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */ unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; int finish_md_len; unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; int peer_finish_md_len; unsigned long message_size; int message_type; /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */ const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh; /* holds short lived ECDH key */ # endif /* used when SSL_ST_FLUSH_DATA is entered */ int next_state; int reuse_message; /* used for certificate requests */ int cert_req; int ctype_num; char ctype[SSL3_CT_NUMBER]; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names; int use_rsa_tmp; int key_block_length; unsigned char *key_block; const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc; const EVP_MD *new_hash; int new_mac_pkey_type; int new_mac_secret_size; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const SSL_COMP *new_compression; # else char *new_compression; # endif int cert_request; } tmp; /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */ unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char previous_client_finished_len; unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char previous_server_finished_len; int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */ int next_proto_neg_seen; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */ char is_probably_safari; # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ + /* Count of the number of consecutive warning alerts received */ + unsigned int alert_count; } SSL3_STATE; # endif /* SSLv3 */ /* * client */ /* extra state */ # define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP # define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK (0x310|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK (0x320|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # endif /* write to server */ # define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* read from server */ # define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x120|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x121|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x126|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x127|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A (0x130|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B (0x131|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x140|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x141|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A (0x150|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B (0x151|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A (0x160|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B (0x161|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* write to server */ # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A (0x170|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B (0x171|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C (0x172|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D (0x173|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x180|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x181|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A (0x190|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG # define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # endif # define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* read from server */ # define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* server */ /* extra state */ # define SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP # define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK (0x310|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK (0x320|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # endif /* read from client */ /* Do not change the number values, they do matter */ # define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C (0x112|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* write to client */ # define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x113|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x114|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A (0x120|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B (0x121|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C (0x122|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x130|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x131|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A (0x140|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B (0x141|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x150|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x151|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A (0x160|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B (0x161|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A (0x170|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B (0x171|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* read from client */ # define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A (0x180|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B (0x181|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x190|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x191|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG # define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # endif # define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* write to client */ # define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A (0x200|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B (0x201|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST 0 # define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO 2 # define SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET 4 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 11 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE 14 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 # define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 # define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG # define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67 # endif # define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 # define SSL3_MT_CCS 1 /* These are used when changing over to a new cipher */ # define SSL3_CC_READ 0x01 # define SSL3_CC_WRITE 0x02 # define SSL3_CC_CLIENT 0x10 # define SSL3_CC_SERVER 0x20 # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_WRITE) # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_READ) # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_READ) # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_WRITE) #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h =================================================================== --- stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 308199) +++ stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 308200) @@ -1,1247 +1,1249 @@ /* ssl/ssl_locl.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H # define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H # include # include # include # include # include "e_os.h" # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include # endif # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include # endif # include # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif # undef PKCS1_CHECK # define c2l(c,l) (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ # define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ } \ } # define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff)) # define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) # define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define n2l6(c,l) (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ # define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ } \ } # define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned int)(c[1])) )),c+=2) # define s2n(s,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),c+=2) # define n2l3(c,l) ((l =(((unsigned long)(c[0]))<<16)| \ (((unsigned long)(c[1]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned long)(c[2])) )),c+=3) # define l2n3(l,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),c+=3) /* LOCAL STUFF */ # define SSL_DECRYPT 0 # define SSL_ENCRYPT 1 # define TWO_BYTE_BIT 0x80 # define SEC_ESC_BIT 0x40 # define TWO_BYTE_MASK 0x7fff # define THREE_BYTE_MASK 0x3fff # define INC32(a) ((a)=((a)+1)&0xffffffffL) # define DEC32(a) ((a)=((a)-1)&0xffffffffL) # define MAX_MAC_SIZE 20 /* up from 16 for SSLv3 */ /* * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms. * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms * can be publicly accessed. * Use the according functions for cipher management instead. * * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive: * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME. */ /* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */ /* RSA key exchange */ # define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001L /* DH cert, RSA CA cert */ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */ # define SSL_kDHr 0x00000002L /* DH cert, DSA CA cert */ /* no such ciphersuite supported! */ # define SSL_kDHd 0x00000004L /* tmp DH key no DH cert */ # define SSL_kEDH 0x00000008L /* Kerberos5 key exchange */ # define SSL_kKRB5 0x00000010L /* ECDH cert, RSA CA cert */ # define SSL_kECDHr 0x00000020L /* ECDH cert, ECDSA CA cert */ # define SSL_kECDHe 0x00000040L /* ephemeral ECDH */ # define SSL_kEECDH 0x00000080L /* PSK */ # define SSL_kPSK 0x00000100L /* GOST key exchange */ # define SSL_kGOST 0x00000200L /* SRP */ # define SSL_kSRP 0x00000400L /* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */ /* RSA auth */ # define SSL_aRSA 0x00000001L /* DSS auth */ # define SSL_aDSS 0x00000002L /* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */ # define SSL_aNULL 0x00000004L /* Fixed DH auth (kDHd or kDHr) */ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */ # define SSL_aDH 0x00000008L /* Fixed ECDH auth (kECDHe or kECDHr) */ # define SSL_aECDH 0x00000010L /* KRB5 auth */ # define SSL_aKRB5 0x00000020L /* ECDSA auth*/ # define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000040L /* PSK auth */ # define SSL_aPSK 0x00000080L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */ # define SSL_aGOST94 0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */ # define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000200L /* SRP auth */ # define SSL_aSRP 0x00000400L /* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */ # define SSL_DES 0x00000001L # define SSL_3DES 0x00000002L # define SSL_RC4 0x00000004L # define SSL_RC2 0x00000008L # define SSL_IDEA 0x00000010L # define SSL_eNULL 0x00000020L # define SSL_AES128 0x00000040L # define SSL_AES256 0x00000080L # define SSL_CAMELLIA128 0x00000100L # define SSL_CAMELLIA256 0x00000200L # define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 0x00000400L # define SSL_SEED 0x00000800L # define SSL_AES128GCM 0x00001000L # define SSL_AES256GCM 0x00002000L # define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AES128GCM|SSL_AES256GCM) # define SSL_CAMELLIA (SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256) /* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */ # define SSL_MD5 0x00000001L # define SSL_SHA1 0x00000002L # define SSL_GOST94 0x00000004L # define SSL_GOST89MAC 0x00000008L # define SSL_SHA256 0x00000010L # define SSL_SHA384 0x00000020L /* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */ # define SSL_AEAD 0x00000040L /* Bits for algorithm_ssl (protocol version) */ # define SSL_SSLV2 0x00000001UL # define SSL_SSLV3 0x00000002UL # define SSL_TLSV1 SSL_SSLV3/* for now */ # define SSL_TLSV1_2 0x00000004UL /* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */ # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 0x10 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA 0x20 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 0x40 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 0x80 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 0x100 # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 | SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA) /* * When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSM_MD_NUM_IDX make * sure to update this constant too */ # define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 6 +# define MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT 5 + # define TLS1_PRF_DGST_MASK (0xff << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 10 # define TLS1_PRF_MD5 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA1 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF (TLS1_PRF_MD5 | TLS1_PRF_SHA1) /* * Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft (currently this also * goes into algorithm2) */ # define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x04 /* * Export and cipher strength information. For each cipher we have to decide * whether it is exportable or not. This information is likely to change * over time, since the export control rules are no static technical issue. * * Independent of the export flag the cipher strength is sorted into classes. * SSL_EXP40 was denoting the 40bit US export limit of past times, which now * is at 56bit (SSL_EXP56). If the exportable cipher class is going to change * again (eg. to 64bit) the use of "SSL_EXP*" becomes blurred even more, * since SSL_EXP64 could be similar to SSL_LOW. * For this reason SSL_MICRO and SSL_MINI macros are included to widen the * namespace of SSL_LOW-SSL_HIGH to lower values. As development of speed * and ciphers goes, another extension to SSL_SUPER and/or SSL_ULTRA would * be possible. */ # define SSL_EXP_MASK 0x00000003L # define SSL_STRONG_MASK 0x000001fcL # define SSL_NOT_EXP 0x00000001L # define SSL_EXPORT 0x00000002L # define SSL_STRONG_NONE 0x00000004L # define SSL_EXP40 0x00000008L # define SSL_MICRO (SSL_EXP40) # define SSL_EXP56 0x00000010L # define SSL_MINI (SSL_EXP56) # define SSL_LOW 0x00000020L # define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000040L # define SSL_HIGH 0x00000080L # define SSL_FIPS 0x00000100L # define SSL_NOT_DEFAULT 0x00000200L /* we have used 000003ff - 22 bits left to go */ /*- * Macros to check the export status and cipher strength for export ciphers. * Even though the macros for EXPORT and EXPORT40/56 have similar names, * their meaning is different: * *_EXPORT macros check the 'exportable' status. * *_EXPORT40/56 macros are used to check whether a certain cipher strength * is given. * Since the SSL_IS_EXPORT* and SSL_EXPORT* macros depend on the correct * algorithm structure element to be passed (algorithms, algo_strength) and no * typechecking can be done as they are all of type unsigned long, their * direct usage is discouraged. * Use the SSL_C_* macros instead. */ # define SSL_IS_EXPORT(a) ((a)&SSL_EXPORT) # define SSL_IS_EXPORT56(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP56) # define SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP40) # define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT56(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT56((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT40(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT40((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(a,s) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(s) ? 5 : \ (a) == SSL_DES ? 8 : 7) # define SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(a) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ? 512 : 1024) # define SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH((c)->algorithm_enc, \ (c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH((c)->algo_strength) /* Mostly for SSLv3 */ # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC 0 # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 1 # define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN 2 # define SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA 3 # define SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA 4 # define SSL_PKEY_ECC 5 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST94 6 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST01 7 # define SSL_PKEY_NUM 8 /*- * SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC | (RSA_TMP & RSA_SIGN) | * <- (EXPORT & (RSA_ENC | RSA_TMP) & RSA_SIGN) * SSL_kDH <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN) * SSL_kEDH <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN */ /*- #define CERT_INVALID 0 #define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters */ # define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE 1 # define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE 2 # define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ typedef struct cert_pkey_st { X509 *x509; EVP_PKEY *privatekey; /* Digest to use when signing */ const EVP_MD *digest; } CERT_PKEY; typedef struct cert_st { /* Current active set */ /* * ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array * Probably it would make more sense to store * an index, not a pointer. */ CERT_PKEY *key; /* * The following masks are for the key and auth algorithms that are * supported by the certs below */ int valid; unsigned long mask_k; unsigned long mask_a; unsigned long export_mask_k; unsigned long export_mask_a; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa_tmp; RSA *(*rsa_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh_tmp; DH *(*dh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh_tmp; /* Callback for generating ephemeral ECDH keys */ EC_KEY *(*ecdh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); # endif CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */ } CERT; typedef struct sess_cert_st { STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; /* as received from peer (not for SSL2) */ /* The 'peer_...' members are used only by clients. */ int peer_cert_type; CERT_PKEY *peer_key; /* points to an element of peer_pkeys (never * NULL!) */ CERT_PKEY peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* * Obviously we don't have the private keys of these, so maybe we * shouldn't even use the CERT_PKEY type here. */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *peer_rsa_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *peer_dh_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *peer_ecdh_tmp; # endif int references; /* actually always 1 at the moment */ } SESS_CERT; /* * #define MAC_DEBUG */ /* * #define ERR_DEBUG */ /* * #define ABORT_DEBUG */ /* * #define PKT_DEBUG 1 */ /* * #define DES_DEBUG */ /* * #define DES_OFB_DEBUG */ /* * #define SSL_DEBUG */ /* * #define RSA_DEBUG */ /* * #define IDEA_DEBUG */ # define FP_ICC (int (*)(const void *,const void *)) # define ssl_put_cipher_by_char(ssl,ciph,ptr) \ ((ssl)->method->put_cipher_by_char((ciph),(ptr))) # define ssl_get_cipher_by_char(ssl,ptr) \ ((ssl)->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr)) /* * This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit * of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-) */ typedef struct ssl3_enc_method { int (*enc) (SSL *, int); int (*mac) (SSL *, unsigned char *, int); int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *); int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int); int (*change_cipher_state) (SSL *, int); int (*final_finish_mac) (SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *); int finish_mac_length; int (*cert_verify_mac) (SSL *, int, unsigned char *); const char *client_finished_label; int client_finished_label_len; const char *server_finished_label; int server_finished_label_len; int (*alert_value) (int); int (*export_keying_material) (SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context); } SSL3_ENC_METHOD; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */ typedef struct ssl3_comp_st { int comp_id; /* The identifier byte for this compression * type */ char *name; /* Text name used for the compression type */ COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */ } SSL3_COMP; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st { size_t chunklen; unsigned int len; struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *head; } SSL3_BUF_FREELIST; typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st { struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *next; } SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY; # endif extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method; OPENSSL_EXTERN const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]; OPENSSL_EXTERN SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]; SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver); extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data; # define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->version == DTLS1_VERSION) # define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \ s_get_meth) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ version, \ tls1_new, \ tls1_clear, \ tls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_get_message, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ tls1_default_timeout, \ &TLSv1_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ SSL3_VERSION, \ ssl3_new, \ ssl3_clear, \ ssl3_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_get_message, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ ssl3_default_timeout, \ &SSLv3_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ TLS1_2_VERSION, \ tls1_new, \ tls1_clear, \ tls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl23_read, \ ssl23_peek, \ ssl23_write, \ ssl_undefined_function, \ ssl_undefined_function, \ ssl_ok, \ ssl3_get_message, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl23_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl23_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl_undefined_const_function, \ ssl23_num_ciphers, \ ssl23_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ ssl23_default_timeout, \ &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ SSL2_VERSION, \ ssl2_new, /* local */ \ ssl2_clear, /* local */ \ ssl2_free, /* local */ \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl2_read, \ ssl2_peek, \ ssl2_write, \ ssl2_shutdown, \ ssl_ok, /* NULL - renegotiate */ \ ssl_ok, /* NULL - check renegotiate */ \ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_message */ \ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_record */ \ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_write_bytes */ \ NULL, /* NULL - dispatch_alert */ \ ssl2_ctrl, /* local */ \ ssl2_ctx_ctrl, /* local */ \ ssl2_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl2_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl2_pending, \ ssl2_num_ciphers, \ ssl2_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ ssl2_default_timeout, \ &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl2_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \ ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ DTLS1_VERSION, \ dtls1_new, \ dtls1_clear, \ dtls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ dtls1_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ dtls1_get_message, \ dtls1_read_bytes, \ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \ dtls1_dispatch_alert, \ dtls1_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ dtls1_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ dtls1_default_timeout, \ &DTLSv1_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } struct openssl_ssl_test_functions { int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer) (SSL *s, int push); int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers) (SSL *s); int (*p_tls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s); int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s); }; # ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s); int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s); CERT *ssl_cert_new(void); CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert); int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o); void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c); SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void); void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc); int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type); int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session); int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session, int len, const unsigned char *limit); SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket); int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp); int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p, int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted, const char *rule_str); void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode); int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp); int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int i, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md); int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s); int ssl_undefined_void_function(void); int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s); CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s); X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *); EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd); int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s); int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type); void ssl_load_ciphers(void); int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len); int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client); int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s); int ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send_data); void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *mac, int send_data); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i); int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s); int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data); void ssl2_return_error(SSL *s, int reason); void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s); int ssl2_num_ciphers(void); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl2_new(SSL *s); void ssl2_free(SSL *s); int ssl2_accept(SSL *s); int ssl2_connect(SSL *s); int ssl2_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl2_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s); void ssl2_clear(SSL *s); long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl2_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); long ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); int ssl2_pending(const SSL *s); long ssl2_default_timeout(void); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b); int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b); int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s); int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type); int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc); int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len); int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen); int ssl3_num_ciphers(void); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen, unsigned char *p); int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p); void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len); int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send_data); int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send_data); void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s); unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x); SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr); int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s); int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s); int ssl3_new(SSL *s); void ssl3_free(SSL *s); int ssl3_accept(SSL *s); int ssl3_connect(SSL *s); int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s); void ssl3_clear(SSL *s); long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s); void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq); int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl); long ssl3_default_timeout(void); int ssl23_num_ciphers(void); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl23_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl23_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl23_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); long ssl23_default_timeout(void); long tls1_default_timeout(void); int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type); int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend); int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len); unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b); int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen); unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x); int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code); int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs); int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off, int *found); int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs); int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr); void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr); void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw); long dtls1_default_timeout(void); struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft); int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s); int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s); const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u); void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s); void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s); int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s); void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s); unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void); void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag); /* some client-only functions */ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s); # endif # endif int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s); /* some server-only functions */ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s); int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s); # endif int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s); int ssl23_accept(SSL *s); int ssl23_connect(SSL *s); int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n); int ssl23_write_bytes(SSL *s); int tls1_new(SSL *s); void tls1_free(SSL *s); void tls1_clear(SSL *s); long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); int dtls1_new(SSL *s); int dtls1_accept(SSL *s); int dtls1_connect(SSL *s); void dtls1_free(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear(SSL *s); long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s); long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s); int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement); int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd); int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push); void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s); int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s); int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd); int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p); int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p); int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd); int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len); int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context); int tls1_alert_code(int code); int ssl3_alert_code(int code); int ssl_ok(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s); # endif SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id); int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *limit, int *al); int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s); int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s); int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s); int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s); int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s); # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 # define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha1 # else # define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha256 # endif int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret); int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md); int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk); const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg); # endif EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md); void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash); int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s); int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize); int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); /* s3_cbc.c */ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size, unsigned orig_len); int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md_out, size_t *md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13], const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size, size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3); void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len); int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al); # else # define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer # define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers # define tls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_tls1_process_heartbeat # define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat # endif #endif Index: stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c =================================================================== --- stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c (revision 308199) +++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c (revision 308200) @@ -1,1864 +1,1879 @@ /* ssl/d1_pkt.c */ /* * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch); #if 0 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset); #endif static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, PQ_64BIT * priority); static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT * num); #endif /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); s->packet = rdata->packet; s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); return (1); } static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, PQ_64BIT * priority) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; pitem *item; /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) return 0; rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA)); item = pitem_new(*priority, rdata); if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata); if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (0); } rdata->packet = s->packet; rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length; memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); item->data = rdata; /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return (0); } s->packet = NULL; s->packet_length = 0; memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return (0); } return (1); } static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) { pitem *item; item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); if (item) { dtls1_copy_record(s, item); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); return (1); } return (0); } /* * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not * processed yet */ #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds)) /* * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, * processed */ #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &((s)->d1->processed_rcds)) static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) { pitem *item; SSL3_BUFFER *rb; SSL3_RECORD *rr; DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; unsigned int is_next_epoch; int replayok = 1; item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); if (item) { /* Check if epoch is current. */ if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) return 1; /* Nothing to do. */ rr = &s->s3->rrec; rb = &s->s3->rbuf; if (rb->left > 0) { /* * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've * finished reading the current packet). */ return 1; } /* Process all the records. */ while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) { dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { /* * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot * be the case because we already checked the epoch above */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } { /* * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this * check once already when we first received the record - but * we might have updated the window since then due to * records we subsequently processed. */ replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap); } if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { /* dump this record */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; continue; } if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), &s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0) return 0; } } /* * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been * processed */ s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch; s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1; return 1; } #if 0 static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) { pitem *item; PQ_64BIT priority = (((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) | ((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off); /* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */ if (!SSL_in_init(s)) return 0; item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records); if (item && item->priority == priority) { /* * Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be a * handshake record, since data records as passed up without * buffering */ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records); rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); s->packet = rdata->packet; s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */ return (1); } return 0; } #endif static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int i, al; int enc_err; SSL_SESSION *sess; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned int mac_size, orig_len; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; rr = &(s->s3->rrec); sess = s->session; /* * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data = rr->input; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (s->read_hash != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in * constant time from within the record, without leaking the * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto err; } /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr->off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->packet_length = 0; /* Mark receipt of record. */ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (0); } /*- * Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor; int i, n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned short version; DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; unsigned int is_next_epoch; rr = &(s->s3->rrec); again: /* * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. * This is a non-blocking operation. */ dtls1_process_buffered_records(s); /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) return 1; /* get something from the wire */ /* check if we have the header */ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; p = s->packet; /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ rr->type = *(p++); ssl_major = *(p++); ssl_minor = *(p++); version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ n2s(p, rr->epoch); memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6); p += 6; n2s(p, rr->length); /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet) { if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* unexpected version, silently discard */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } } if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) && (version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) { /* wrong version, silently discard record */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { /* record too long, silently discard it */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } s->client_version = version; /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ i = rr->length; n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (n != i) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } /* * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ } s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } /* * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if we're * listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look as if * they're replayed, since they arrive from different connections and * would be dropped unnecessarily. */ if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH && s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr->length == 0) goto again; /* * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while * listening. */ if (is_next_epoch) { if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) { if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), &rr->seq_num) < 0) return -1; } rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } return (1); } /*- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { int al, i, j, ret; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) return (-1); /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */ if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek))) return ret; /* * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } } start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /*- * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * s->s3->rrec.data, - data * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered * during the last handshake in advance, if any. */ if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) { pitem *item; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); if (item) { dtls1_copy_record(s, item); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } } /* Check for timeout */ if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) goto start; /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret = dtls1_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) { ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ if (ret <= 0) return (ret); else goto start; } } if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) + s->s3->alert_count = 0; + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { /* * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. */ dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), &rr->seq_num); rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in * 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { rr->length = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ /* * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are * doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (len <= 0) return (len); if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); if (!peek) { rr->length -= n; rr->off += n; if (rr->length == 0) { s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->off = 0; } } return (n); } /* * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ /* * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ { unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment; dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment); dest = s->d1->alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len; } /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again * reading. */ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { BIO *bio; s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } if (dest_maxlen > 0) { /* * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */ if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) { #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE /* * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this * non-existing alert... */ FIX ME #endif s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* now move 'n' bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) { dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++]; rr->length--; } *dest_len = dest_maxlen; } } /*- * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto err; } /* * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !s->s3->renegotiate) { s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } } } /* * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) { int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1]; s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */ s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; + + s->s3->alert_count++; + if (s->s3->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + goto f_err; + } + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } #if 0 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ /* now check if it's a missing record */ if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { unsigned short seq; unsigned int frag_off; unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]); n2s(p, seq); n2l3(p, frag_off); dtls1_retransmit_message(s, dtls1_get_queue_priority (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off, &found); if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */ /* * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert * ourselves */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); } } #endif } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */ char tmp[16]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); return (0); } else { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a * shutdown */ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; rr->length = 0; return (0); } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly * what the record payload has to look like */ /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ccs_hdr_len = 3; if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto err; } rr->length = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages * are still missing, so just drop it. */ if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) { goto start; } s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) goto err; /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; goto start; } /* * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && !s->in_handshake) { struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. */ if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) return -1; dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); rr->length = 0; goto start; } if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences * are not as expected (and because this is * not really needed for clients except for * detecting protocol violations): */ s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #else s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #endif s->new_session = 1; } i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, but we * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty * problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } goto start; } switch (rr->type) { default: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } #endif al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not * happen when type != rr->type */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet * started), we will indulge it. */ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) ) )) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; return (-1); } else { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { int i; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); return -1; } i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); return i; } /* * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake * is started. */ static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k, n; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; return n; } return 0; } /* * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) { int i; OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); return i; } int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *p, *pseq; int i, mac_size, clear = 0; int prefix_len = 0; SSL3_RECORD *wr; SSL3_BUFFER *wb; SSL_SESSION *sess; int bs; /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) { OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); } /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return (i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; wr = &(s->s3->wrec); wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (s->write_hash == NULL)) clear = 1; if (clear) mac_size = 0; else mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */ #if 0 /* * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual * payload) */ prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); if (prefix_len <= 0) goto err; if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; } #endif p = wb->buf + prefix_len; /* write the header */ *(p++) = type & 0xff; wr->type = type; if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER >> 8, *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff; else *(p++) = (s->version >> 8), *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ pseq = p; p += 10; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ /* * Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC. (this is a bit of a * boundary violation, but what the heck). */ if (s->enc_write_ctx && (EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)) bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher); else bs = 0; wr->data = p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ wr->length = (int)len; wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; /* * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); wr->input = wr->data; } /* * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the * wb->buf */ if (mac_size != 0) { s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + bs]), 1); wr->length += mac_size; } /* this is true regardless of mac size */ wr->input = p; wr->data = p; /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ if (bs) { /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, bs); /* * master IV and last CBC residue stand for the rest of randomness */ wr->length += bs; } s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1); /* record length after mac and block padding */ /* * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! * SSL_in_init(s))) */ /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq); /* XDTLS: ?? */ /* * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */ memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6); pseq += 6; s2n(wr->length, pseq); /* * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */ /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length, *((PQ_64BIT *) & (s->s3->write_sequence[0]))); #endif ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])); if (create_empty_fragment) { /* * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write * out anything here */ return wr->length; } /* now let's set up wb */ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; wb->offset = 0; /* * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write * retries later */ s->s3->wpend_tot = len; s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; s->s3->wpend_type = type; s->s3->wpend_ret = len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); err: return -1; } static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER PQ_64BIT mask = 0x0000000000000001L; #endif PQ_64BIT rcd_num, tmp; pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_init(&tmp); /* this is the sequence number for the record just read */ pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8); if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) || pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num))) { pq_64bit_assign(&s->s3->rrec.seq_num, &rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); return 1; /* this record is new */ } pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num); if (pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp) > bitmap->length) { pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ } #if PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM { int offset; pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num); pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1); offset = pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp); if (pq_64bit_is_bit_set(&(bitmap->map), offset)) { pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); return 0; } } #else mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1); if (bitmap->map & mask) return 0; /* record previously received */ #endif pq_64bit_assign(&s->s3->rrec.seq_num, &rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); return 1; } static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { unsigned int shift; PQ_64BIT rcd_num; PQ_64BIT tmp; PQ_64BIT_CTX *ctx; pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_init(&tmp); pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8); /* * unfortunate code complexity due to 64-bit manipulation support on * 32-bit machines */ if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) || pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num))) { pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)); pq_64bit_add_word(&tmp, 1); shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp); pq_64bit_lshift(&(tmp), &(bitmap->map), shift); pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->map), &tmp); pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), 0); pq_64bit_add_word(&rcd_num, 1); pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num); pq_64bit_assign_word(&tmp, 1); pq_64bit_lshift(&tmp, &tmp, bitmap->length); ctx = pq_64bit_ctx_new(&ctx); pq_64bit_mod(&(bitmap->map), &(bitmap->map), &tmp, ctx); pq_64bit_ctx_free(ctx); } else { pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num); pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1); shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp); pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), shift); } pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); } int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i, j; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0]; s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0]; *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1]; #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr); # if 0 if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* * waiting for a new msg */ else s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */ # endif # if 0 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n", s->d1->handshake_read_seq, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq); # endif l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr); } #endif i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */ } else { if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE #endif ) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); } } return (i); } static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch) { *is_next_epoch = 0; /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch) return &s->d1->bitmap; /* * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last * epoch */ else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) && s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch && (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { *is_next_epoch = 1; return &s->d1->next_bitmap; } return NULL; } #if 0 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset) { /* alerts are passed up immediately */ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) return 0; /* * Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. (this implies that * Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up immediately) */ if (SSL_in_init(s)) { unsigned char *data = rr->data; /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { unsigned short seq_num; struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr); seq_num = msg_hdr.seq; *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off; } else { dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr); seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq; *offset = 0; } /* * this is either a record we're waiting for, or a retransmit of * something we happened to previously receive (higher layers * will drop the repeat silently */ if (seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) return 0; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off) return 0; else if (seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)) return 0; else { *priority = seq_num; return 1; } } else /* unknown record type */ return 0; } return 0; } #endif void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) { unsigned char *seq; unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence); if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { seq = s->s3->read_sequence; s->d1->r_epoch++; pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.map), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.map)); s->d1->bitmap.length = s->d1->next_bitmap.length; pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num)); pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map)); pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num)); memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map)); pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num)); /* * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous * epoch */ dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); } else { seq = s->s3->write_sequence; memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); s->d1->w_epoch++; } memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes); } #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT * num) { PQ_64BIT _num; _num = (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[0]) << 56) | (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[1]) << 48) | (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[2]) << 40) | (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[3]) << 32) | (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[4]) << 24) | (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[5]) << 16) | (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[6]) << 8) | (((PQ_64BIT) bytes[7])); *num = _num; return _num; } #endif Index: stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c =================================================================== --- stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 308199) +++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 308200) @@ -1,1418 +1,1433 @@ /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) { /* * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) */ int i, off, newb; if (!extend) { /* start with empty packet ... */ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0; s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset; s->packet_length = 0; /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ } /* * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into * the buffer). */ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0 && extend) return 0; if (s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left) n = s->s3->rbuf.left; } /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n) { s->packet_length += n; s->s3->rbuf.left -= n; s->s3->rbuf.offset += n; return (n); } /* else we need to read more data */ if (!s->read_ahead) max = n; { /* avoid buffer overflow */ int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length; if (max > max_max) max = max_max; } if (n > max) { /* does not happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } off = s->packet_length; newb = s->s3->rbuf.left; /* * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'off' bytes already * pointed to by 'packet', 'newb' extra ones at the end */ if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf) { /* off > 0 */ memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off + newb); s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf; } while (newb < n) { /* * Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and * need to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if * possible) */ clear_sys_error(); if (s->rbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; i = BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off + newb]), max - newb); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i <= 0) { s->s3->rbuf.left = newb; return (i); } newb += i; /* * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to * byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { if (n > newb) n = newb; /* makes the while condition false */ } } /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n; s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n; s->packet_length += n; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (n); } /* * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */ #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 /*- * Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; short version; unsigned mac_size, orig_len; size_t extra; unsigned empty_record_count = 0; rr = &(s->s3->rrec); sess = s->session; if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; else extra = 0; if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { /* * actually likely an application error: * SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after ssl3_setup_buffers() * was done */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } again: /* check if we have the header */ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; p = s->packet; /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ rr->type = *(p++); ssl_major = *(p++); ssl_minor = *(p++); version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; n2s(p, rr->length); /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet) { if (version != s->version) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) /* * Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ s->version = (unsigned short)version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } } if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); goto err; } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ i = rr->length; n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ /* * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH * + rr->length */ } s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ /* * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data = rr->input; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (s->read_hash != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in * constant time from within the record, without leaking the * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto f_err; } /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr->off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->packet_length = 0; /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr->length == 0) { empty_record_count++; if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } goto again; } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (ret); } int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *rr; rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); if (i < 0) return (0); else rr->length = i; rr->data = rr->comp; #endif return (1); } int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *wr; wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, wr->input, (int)wr->length); if (i < 0) return (0); else wr->length = i; wr->input = wr->data; #endif return (1); } /* * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { const unsigned char *buf = buf_; unsigned int n, nw; int i, tot; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); tot = s->s3->wnum; s->s3->wnum = 0; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } /* * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and * report the error in a way the user will notice */ if (len < tot) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return (-1); } n = (len - tot); for (;;) { if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) nw = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; else nw = n; i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { /* * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; return tot + i; } n -= i; tot += i; } } static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *p, *plen; int i, mac_size, clear = 0; int prefix_len = 0; SSL3_RECORD *wr; SSL3_BUFFER *wb; SSL_SESSION *sess; /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return (i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; wr = &(s->s3->wrec); wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (s->write_hash == NULL)) clear = 1; if (clear) mac_size = 0; else mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); /* * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { /* * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual * payload) */ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); if (prefix_len <= 0) goto err; if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; } p = wb->buf + prefix_len; /* write the header */ *(p++) = type & 0xff; wr->type = type; *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet length */ plen = p; p += 2; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ wr->data = p; wr->length = (int)len; wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; /* * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); wr->input = wr->data; } /* * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the * wb->buf */ if (mac_size != 0) { s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length]), 1); wr->length += mac_size; wr->input = p; wr->data = p; } /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1); /* record length after mac and block padding */ s2n(wr->length, plen); /* * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; if (create_empty_fragment) { /* * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write * out anything here */ return wr->length; } /* now let's set up wb */ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; wb->offset = 0; /* * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write * retries later */ s->s3->wpend_tot = len; s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; s->s3->wpend_type = type; s->s3->wpend_ret = len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); err: return -1; } /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) { int i; /* XXXX */ if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); return (-1); } for (;;) { clear_sys_error(); if (s->wbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]), (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left) { s->s3->wbuf.left = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (s->s3->wpend_ret); } else if (i <= 0) { if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in * using a datagram service */ s->s3->wbuf.left = 0; } return (i); } s->s3->wbuf.offset += i; s->s3->wbuf.left -= i; } } /*- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { int al, i, j, ret; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) return (-1); if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; return n; } /* * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } } start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /*- * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * s->s3->rrec.data, - data * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret = ssl3_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); } + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) + s->s3->alert_count = 0; + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); goto f_err; } /* * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in * 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { rr->length = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ /* * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are * doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (len <= 0) return (len); if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); if (!peek) { rr->length -= n; rr->off += n; if (rr->length == 0) { s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->off = 0; } } return (n); } /* * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ /* * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ { unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; } if (dest_maxlen > 0) { n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ if (rr->length < n) n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ /* now move 'n' bytes: */ while (n-- > 0) { dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; rr->length--; } if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) goto start; /* fragment was too small */ } } /*- * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto f_err; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !s->s3->renegotiate) { ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } } } /* * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } /* * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) */ if (s->server && SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !s->s3->send_connection_binding && (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /* * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; */ rr->length = 0; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto start; } if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */ s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; + + s->s3->alert_count++; + if (s->s3->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + goto f_err; + } + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } /* * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if * the peer refused it where we carry on. */ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto f_err; } } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */ char tmp[16]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); return (0); } else { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a * shutdown */ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; rr->length = 0; return (0); } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly * what the record payload has to look like */ if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; rr->length = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) goto err; else goto start; } /* * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences * are not as expected (and because this is * not really needed for clients except for * detecting protocol violations): */ s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #else s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #endif s->new_session = 1; } i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, but we * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty * problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } goto start; } switch (rr->type) { default: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } #endif al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not * happen when type != rr->type */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet * started), we will indulge it. */ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) ) )) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; return (-1); } else { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { int i; const char *sender; int slen; if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; else i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return (0); } s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return (0); } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) return (0); /* * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it * before we read the finished message */ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, & (s->s3->finish_dgst1), & (s->s3->finish_dgst2), sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); return (1); } int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have * protocol_version alerts */ if (desc < 0) return -1; /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); /* * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in * the future */ return -1; } int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i, j; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; } else { /* * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not * worry too much. */ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); } } return (i); } Index: stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h =================================================================== --- stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (revision 308199) +++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (revision 308200) @@ -1,2245 +1,2246 @@ /* ssl/ssl.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_H # define HEADER_SSL_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509 # include # endif # include # include # include # endif # include # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */ /*- * Version 0 - initial version * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate */ # define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001 /* text strings for the ciphers */ # define SSL_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA # define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA /* * VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries */ # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA # define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 # define SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH 256 # define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH 32 # define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES (512/8) # define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH 8 # define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48 /* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */ # define SSL_TXT_LOW "LOW" # define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM "MEDIUM" # define SSL_TXT_HIGH "HIGH" # define SSL_TXT_FIPS "FIPS" # define SSL_TXT_kFZA "kFZA" # define SSL_TXT_aFZA "aFZA" # define SSL_TXT_eFZA "eFZA" # define SSL_TXT_FZA "FZA" # define SSL_TXT_aNULL "aNULL" # define SSL_TXT_eNULL "eNULL" # define SSL_TXT_NULL "NULL" # define SSL_TXT_kKRB5 "kKRB5" # define SSL_TXT_aKRB5 "aKRB5" # define SSL_TXT_KRB5 "KRB5" # define SSL_TXT_kRSA "kRSA" # define SSL_TXT_kDHr "kDHr" # define SSL_TXT_kDHd "kDHd" # define SSL_TXT_kEDH "kEDH" # define SSL_TXT_aRSA "aRSA" # define SSL_TXT_aDSS "aDSS" # define SSL_TXT_aDH "aDH" # define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS" # define SSL_TXT_DH "DH" # define SSL_TXT_EDH "EDH" # define SSL_TXT_ADH "ADH" # define SSL_TXT_RSA "RSA" # define SSL_TXT_DES "DES" # define SSL_TXT_3DES "3DES" # define SSL_TXT_RC4 "RC4" # define SSL_TXT_RC2 "RC2" # define SSL_TXT_IDEA "IDEA" # define SSL_TXT_SEED "SEED" # define SSL_TXT_AES "AES" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA "CAMELLIA" # define SSL_TXT_MD5 "MD5" # define SSL_TXT_SHA1 "SHA1" # define SSL_TXT_SHA "SHA" # define SSL_TXT_EXP "EXP" # define SSL_TXT_EXPORT "EXPORT" # define SSL_TXT_EXP40 "EXPORT40" # define SSL_TXT_EXP56 "EXPORT56" # define SSL_TXT_SSLV2 "SSLv2" # define SSL_TXT_SSLV3 "SSLv3" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1 "TLSv1" # define SSL_TXT_ALL "ALL" # define SSL_TXT_ECC "ECCdraft"/* ECC ciphersuites are not yet * official */ /*- * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select) * ciphers normally not being used. * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection. * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments * to the default cipher setup will also be included here. * * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed * for DEFAULT. */ # define SSL_TXT_CMPALL "COMPLEMENTOFALL" # define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" /* * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'. */ # define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2:@STRENGTH" /* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */ # define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN 1 # define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN 2 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # if (defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) # define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 # endif # define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 X509_FILETYPE_ASN1 # define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM X509_FILETYPE_PEM /* * This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the 'struct ssl_st *' * function parameters used to prototype callbacks in SSL_CTX. */ typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st; /* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */ typedef struct ssl_cipher_st { int valid; const char *name; /* text name */ unsigned long id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */ unsigned long algorithms; /* what ciphers are used */ unsigned long algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */ unsigned long algorithm2; /* Extra flags */ int strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */ int alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */ unsigned long mask; /* used for matching */ unsigned long mask_strength; /* also used for matching */ } SSL_CIPHER; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) /* Used to hold functions for SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1 functions */ typedef struct ssl_method_st { int version; int (*ssl_new) (SSL *s); void (*ssl_clear) (SSL *s); void (*ssl_free) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_accept) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_connect) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_read) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_peek) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_write) (SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_shutdown) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate_check) (SSL *s); long (*ssl_get_message) (SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int (*ssl_read_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int (*ssl_write_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len); int (*ssl_dispatch_alert) (SSL *s); long (*ssl_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char) (const unsigned char *ptr); int (*put_cipher_by_char) (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned char *ptr); int (*ssl_pending) (const SSL *s); int (*num_ciphers) (void); SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher) (unsigned ncipher); struct ssl_method_st *(*get_ssl_method) (int version); long (*get_timeout) (void); struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */ int (*ssl_version) (void); long (*ssl_callback_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); } SSL_METHOD; /*- * Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER, -- structure version number * SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number * Cipher OCTET_STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID * Session_ID OCTET_STRING, -- the Session ID * Master_key OCTET_STRING, -- the master key * KRB5_principal OCTET_STRING -- optional Kerberos principal * Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET_STRING, -- the optional Key argument * Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time * Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds * Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate * Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING, -- the Session ID context * Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER -- X509_V_... code for `Peer' * Compression [6] IMPLICIT ASN1_OBJECT -- compression OID XXXXX * } * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-). */ typedef struct ssl_session_st { int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being * kept in here? */ /* only really used in SSLv2 */ unsigned int key_arg_length; unsigned char key_arg[SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH]; int master_key_length; unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; /* session_id - valid? */ unsigned int session_id_length; unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; /* * this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in the * appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, via * SSL_new */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len; unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH]; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ int not_resumable; /* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */ struct sess_cert_st /* SESS_CERT */ *sess_cert; /* * This is the cert for the other end. On clients, it will be the same as * sess_cert->peer_key->x509 (the latter is not enough as sess_cert is * not retained in the external representation of sessions, see * ssl_asn1.c). */ X509 *peer; /* * when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's * certificate is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse: */ long verify_result; /* only for servers */ int references; long timeout; long time; int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */ SSL_CIPHER *cipher; unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used * to load the 'cipher' structure */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */ /* * These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to * implement a maximum cache size. */ struct ssl_session_st *prev, *next; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT char *tlsext_hostname; /* RFC4507 info */ unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */ size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */ long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */ # endif } SSL_SESSION; # define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0x00000001L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0x00000002L /* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */ # define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L # define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x00000010L # define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L # define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L # define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L # define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L # define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L /* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */ # define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0 /* * Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added in * OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol) the * workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include it in * SSL_OP_ALL. */ /* added in 0.9.6e */ # define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0x00000800L /* * SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless. This * used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7. */ # define SSL_OP_ALL 0x00000FFFL /* DTLS options */ # define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000L /* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */ # define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000L /* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */ # define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L /* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client) */ # define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT 0x00008000L /* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */ # define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L /* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */ # define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L /* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */ # define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0 /* * Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's preferences */ # define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000L /* * If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number as * latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0 * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks. */ # define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0x00800000L # define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 0x01000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0x02000000L # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000L /* * The next flag deliberately changes the ciphertest, this is a check for the * PKCS#1 attack */ # define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 0x08000000L # define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 0x10000000L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG 0x20000000L # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x40000000L /* * Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success * when just a single record has been written): */ # define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE 0x00000001L /* * Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location (buffer * contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid the * misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like non-blocking * write(): */ # define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002L /* * Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking: */ # define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004L /* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */ # define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L /* * Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. To be set only by applications * that reconnect with a downgraded protocol version; see * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your * application attempts a normal handshake. Only use this in explicit * fallback retries, following the guidance in * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00. */ # define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L /* * Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, they * cannot be used to clear bits. */ # define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_get_options(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL) # define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL) void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); # define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) # define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*30 /* 30k max cert list :-) */ # else # define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 /* 100k max cert list :-) */ # endif # define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (1024*20) /* * This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that * set them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in * a server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed. * Also, callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique * otherwise the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do * this using the 'ssl' value they're passed by; * SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) The length value passed in * is set at the maximum size the session ID can be. In SSLv2 this is 16 * bytes, whereas SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32 bytes. The callback can alter this * length to be less if desired, but under SSLv2 session IDs are supposed to * be fixed at 16 bytes so the id will be padded after the callback returns * in this case. It is also an error for the callback to set the size to * zero. */ typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB) (const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); typedef struct ssl_comp_st { int id; const char *name; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_METHOD *method; # else char *method; # endif } SSL_COMP; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) struct ssl_ctx_st { SSL_METHOD *method; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; /* same as above but sorted for lookup */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store; struct lhash_st /* LHASH */ *sessions; /* a set of SSL_SESSIONs */ /* * Most session-ids that will be cached, default is * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited. */ unsigned long session_cache_size; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail; /* * This can have one of 2 values, ored together, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT, * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which * means only SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS. */ int session_cache_mode; /* * If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when * SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make life easier to set * things up */ long session_timeout; /* * If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id * is added to the cache. If this function returns 1, it means that the * callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it. * Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If * remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is * removed from the cache. After the call, OpenSSL will * SSL_SESSION_free() it. */ int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); struct { int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */ int sess_connect_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */ int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */ int sess_accept_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */ int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */ int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */ int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */ int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */ int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not in the cache was * passed back via the callback. This * indicates that the application is * supplying session-id's from other * processes - spooky :-) */ } stats; int references; /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */ int (*app_verify_callback) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *); void *app_verify_arg; /* * before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument) */ /* Default password callback. */ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback; /* Default password callback user data. */ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata; /* get client cert callback */ int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); /* cookie generate callback */ int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len); /* verify cookie callback */ int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len); CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; const EVP_MD *rsa_md5; /* For SSLv2 - name is 'ssl2-md5' */ const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */ const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */ /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */ /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* what we put in client cert requests */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; /* * Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by * SSL_new) */ unsigned long options; unsigned long mode; long max_cert_list; struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; int read_ahead; /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int verify_mode; unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */ int (*default_verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; # if 0 int purpose; /* Purpose setting */ int trust; /* Trust setting */ # endif int quiet_shutdown; # ifndef OPENSSL_ENGINE /* * Engine to pass requests for client certs to */ ENGINE *client_cert_engine; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions servername callback */ int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *); void *tlsext_servername_arg; /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */ unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[16]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[16]; /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */ int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc); /* certificate status request info */ /* Callback for status request */ int (*tlsext_status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *tlsext_status_arg; # endif }; # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT 0x0001 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER 0x0002 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR 0x0080 /* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */ # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP 0x0100 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0x0200 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \ (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx); # define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL) void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)); int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)); void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)); SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *Data, int len, int *copy); void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)); void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e); # endif void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); # define SSL_NOTHING 1 # define SSL_WRITING 2 # define SSL_READING 3 # define SSL_X509_LOOKUP 4 /* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */ # define SSL_want_nothing(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING) # define SSL_want_read(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING) # define SSL_want_write(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING) # define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP) struct ssl_st { /* * protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION, * DTLS1_VERSION) */ int version; /* SSL_ST_CONNECT or SSL_ST_ACCEPT */ int type; /* SSLv3 */ SSL_METHOD *method; /* * There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This * is so data can be read and written to different handlers */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO /* used by SSL_read */ BIO *rbio; /* used by SSL_write */ BIO *wbio; /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate messages */ BIO *bbio; # else /* used by SSL_read */ char *rbio; /* used by SSL_write */ char *wbio; char *bbio; # endif /* * This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1 * is returned. This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what * request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect */ int rwstate; /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */ int in_handshake; int (*handshake_func) (SSL *); /* * Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon * as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state is called for the first time, so * that "state" and "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this test instead of an * "init" member. */ /* are we the server side? - mostly used by SSL_clear */ int server; /* * 1 if we are to use a new session. * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously * cached session or even the previous session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ int new_session; /* don't send shutdown packets */ int quiet_shutdown; /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 for received */ int shutdown; /* where we are */ int state; /* where we are when reading */ int rstate; BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */ void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by * ssl3_get_message() */ int init_num; /* amount read/written */ int init_off; /* amount read/written */ /* used internally to point at a raw packet */ unsigned char *packet; unsigned int packet_length; struct ssl2_state_st *s2; /* SSLv2 variables */ struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */ struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */ int read_ahead; /* Read as many input bytes as possible (for * non-blocking reads) */ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int hit; /* reusing a previous session */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; # if 0 int purpose; /* Purpose setting */ int trust; /* Trust setting */ # endif /* crypto */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; /* * These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to * be 'copied' into these ones */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ const EVP_MD *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */ # else char *expand; # endif EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ const EVP_MD *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */ # else char *compress; # endif /* session info */ /* client cert? */ /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; /* * the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused in * the appropriate context */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */ SSL_SESSION *session; /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; /* Used in SSL2 and SSL3 */ /* * 0 don't care about verify failure. * 1 fail if verify fails */ int verify_mode; /* fail if callback returns 0 */ int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* optional informational callback */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* error bytes to be written */ int error; /* actual code */ int error_code; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 /* Kerberos 5 context */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ SSL_CTX *ctx; /* * set this flag to 1 and a sleep(1) is put into all SSL_read() and * SSL_write() calls, good for nbio debuging :-) */ int debug; /* extra application data */ long verify_result; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; int references; /* protocol behaviour */ unsigned long options; /* API behaviour */ unsigned long mode; long max_cert_list; int first_packet; /* what was passed, used for SSLv3/TLS rollback check */ int client_version; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extension debug callback */ void (*tlsext_debug_cb) (SSL *s, int client_server, int type, unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); void *tlsext_debug_arg; char *tlsext_hostname; /*- * no further mod of servername * 0 : call the servername extension callback. * 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback. * 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello */ int servername_done; /* certificate status request info */ /* Status type or -1 if no status type */ int tlsext_status_type; /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */ int tlsext_status_expected; /* OCSP status request only */ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids; X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts; /* OCSP response received or to be sent */ unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp; int tlsext_ocsp_resplen; /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */ int tlsext_ticket_expected; SSL_CTX *initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ # define session_ctx initial_ctx # else # define session_ctx ctx # endif }; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif # include # include # include /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */ # include /* Datagram TLS */ # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* compatibility */ # define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg) (SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg)) # define SSL_get_app_data(s) (SSL_get_ex_data(s,0)) # define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a) (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a)) # define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s) (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0)) # define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0)) # define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg) (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg)) /* * The following are the possible values for ssl->state are are used to * indicate where we are up to in the SSL connection establishment. The * macros that follow are about the only things you should need to use and * even then, only when using non-blocking IO. It can also be useful to work * out where you were when the connection failed */ # define SSL_ST_CONNECT 0x1000 # define SSL_ST_ACCEPT 0x2000 # define SSL_ST_MASK 0x0FFF # define SSL_ST_INIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL_ST_BEFORE 0x4000 # define SSL_ST_OK 0x03 # define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT) # define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01 # define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02 # define SSL_CB_READ 0x04 # define SSL_CB_WRITE 0x08 # define SSL_CB_ALERT 0x4000/* used in callback */ # define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ) # define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE) # define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP) # define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT) # define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP) # define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT) # define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START 0x10 # define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20 /* Is the SSL_connection established? */ # define SSL_get_state(a) SSL_state(a) # define SSL_is_init_finished(a) (SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK) # define SSL_in_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) # define SSL_in_before(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE) # define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* * The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail, you should * not need these */ # define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER 0xF0 # define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1 # define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2 /*- * Obtain latest Finished message * -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished) * -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished). * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes. */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); /* * use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options are * 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired */ # define SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0x00 # define SSL_VERIFY_PEER 0x01 # define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02 # define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0x04 # define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() # define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() /* this is for backward compatibility */ # if 0 /* NEW_SSLEAY */ # define SSL_CTX_set_default_verify(a,b,c) SSL_CTX_set_verify(a,b,c) # define SSL_set_pref_cipher(c,n) SSL_set_cipher_list(c,n) # define SSL_add_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_add_session((a),(b)) # define SSL_remove_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_remove_session((a),(b)) # define SSL_flush_sessions(a,b) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions((a),(b)) # endif /* More backward compatibility */ # define SSL_get_cipher(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np) # define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_time(a) SSL_SESSION_get_time(a) # define SSL_set_time(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b)) # define SSL_get_timeout(a) SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a) # define SSL_set_timeout(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b)) # if 1 /* SSLEAY_MACROS */ # define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) # define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) # define PEM_read_SSL_SESSION(fp,x,cb,u) (SSL_SESSION *)PEM_ASN1_read( \ (char *(*)())d2i_SSL_SESSION,PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,fp,(char **)x,cb,u) # define PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(bp,x,cb,u) PEM_ASN1_read_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,d2i_SSL_SESSION,PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,bp,x,cb,u) # define PEM_write_SSL_SESSION(fp,x) \ PEM_ASN1_write((int (*)())i2d_SSL_SESSION, \ PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,fp, (char *)x, NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL) # define PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bp,x) \ PEM_ASN1_write_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,bp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL) # endif # define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET 1000 /* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */ # define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC # define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED # define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE /* Not for TLS */ # define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR # define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR # define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED # define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION # define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE # define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK # define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 # define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE 3 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP 4 # define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 5/* look at error stack/return * value/errno */ # define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN 6 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT 7 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8 # define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA 1 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA 2 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH 3 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH 4 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB 5 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB 6 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB 7 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED 8 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST 9 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 10 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 11 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS 12 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS 13 # define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT 14 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK 15 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG 16 /* only applies to datagram connections */ # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU 17 /* Stats */ # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER 20 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT 21 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD 22 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE 23 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT 24 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD 25 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE 26 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT 27 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT 28 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES 29 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS 30 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL 31 # define SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS 32 # define SSL_CTRL_MODE 33 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD 40 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD 41 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 42 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 43 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 44 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 45 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST 50 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST 51 /* see tls1.h for macros based on these */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB 53 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG 54 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME 55 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB 56 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG 57 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 58 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 59 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 63 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 64 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 65 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 66 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 67 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 68 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 69 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 70 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 71 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB 72 # endif # define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT 73 # define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 74 # define DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN 75 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT 76 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS 77 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78 # define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119 # define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg) # define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL) # define DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN,0, (void *)peer) # define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL) # define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) # define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa) # define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) # define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) # define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client); BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from); void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio); # endif int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *, const char *str); SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth); void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *); long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *, X509_STORE *); int SSL_want(const SSL *s); int SSL_clear(SSL *s); void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm); SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s); int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits); char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c); const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c); int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n); char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len); int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s); int SSL_pending(const SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd); int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd); int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s); BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s); # endif int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str); void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes); int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s); int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *); void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)); void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); # endif int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); /* PEM type */ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file); int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *file); # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! [was: #ifndef MAC_OS_pre_X] */ # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *dir); # endif # endif # endif void SSL_load_error_strings(void); const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s); long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to, const SSL *from); SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void); unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a); int SSL_SESSION_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b); const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); # endif void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses); int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp); int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session); int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB); int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB); int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len); SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); # ifdef HEADER_X509_H X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s); # endif STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s); int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *); void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*callback) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)); void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); # endif int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u); int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx); int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose); int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose); int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust); int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust); void SSL_free(SSL *ssl); int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl); int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl); int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void)); long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void)); int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int ret_code); const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s); /* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_METHOD *meth); SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */ SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s); int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s); int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s); SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s); int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, SSL_METHOD *method); const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value); void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s); int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s); void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s); long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s); int SSL_library_init(void); char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *, char *buf, int size); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk); SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl); X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl); /* * EVP_PKEY */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *ssl); void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath); # define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session/* just peek at pointer */ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl); SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)); void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long v); long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx); int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx); int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx); int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void); # define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) # define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) # define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) # define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) /* NB: the keylength is only applicable when is_export is true */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s); const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s); const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp); STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm); # else const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s); const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s); const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp); void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm); # endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); /* Error codes for the SSL functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 100 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED 167 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO 101 # define SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 102 # define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION 103 # define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE 245 # define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE 104 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT 246 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 280 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD 247 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM 293 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO 248 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT 249 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC 250 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY 251 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE 252 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 282 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 277 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS 424 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED 259 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 260 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 261 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 262 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 263 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 264 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 265 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 266 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 267 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES 268 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED 105 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 106 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 107 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED 108 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO 109 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY 110 # define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION 111 # define SSL_F_READ_N 112 # define SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 113 # define SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH 239 # define SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO 114 # define SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY 240 # define SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT 115 # define SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO 116 # define SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT 117 # define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 118 # define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO 119 # define SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK 237 # define SSL_F_SSL23_READ 120 # define SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE 121 # define SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT 122 # define SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT 123 # define SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT 124 # define SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL 241 # define SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK 234 # define SSL_F_SSL2_READ 125 # define SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL 236 # define SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE 126 # define SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE 127 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT 128 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 281 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 292 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL 133 # define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 279 # define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 288 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 137 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 138 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 139 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED 140 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO 146 # define SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 284 # define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 147 # define SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK 235 # define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES 148 # define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N 149 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 150 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 151 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 152 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 153 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 154 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 242 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 155 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_BUFFERS 156 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 285 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 272 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 286 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 273 # define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160 # define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP 221 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST 222 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE 214 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW 162 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 163 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 274 # define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR 230 # define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT 231 # define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR 164 # define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD 165 # define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST 166 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL 232 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 168 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW 169 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST 269 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE 278 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE 226 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 219 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION 170 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST 229 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE 171 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 172 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE 220 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 173 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY 174 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 175 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 176 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 177 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 178 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 179 # define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE 180 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT 182 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY 317 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183 # define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184 # define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 # define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 287 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 290 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 289 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 291 # define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270 # define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275 # define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276 # define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223 # define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187 # define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW 225 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT 191 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST 271 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD 192 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY 193 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE 227 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD 194 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION 195 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 218 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST 228 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD 196 # define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN 224 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION 243 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION 197 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 203 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 204 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 205 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 206 # define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN 207 # define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE 208 # define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 209 # define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 210 # define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 211 # define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING 212 /* Reason codes. */ # define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100 # define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272 # define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD 101 # define SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE 102 # define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 103 # define SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM 104 # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106 # define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110 # define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111 # define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE 305 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT 306 # define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST 105 # define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH 271 # define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE 113 # define SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE 114 # define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH 115 # define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER 116 # define SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT 117 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT 118 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT 119 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH 120 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH 121 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE 122 # define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 123 # define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 124 # define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 125 # define SSL_R_BAD_STATE 126 # define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY 127 # define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET 128 # define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG 129 # define SSL_R_BN_LIB 130 # define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH 131 # define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG 132 # define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY 133 # define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED 134 # define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 135 # define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT 136 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH 137 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 138 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR 139 # define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 157 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 140 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE 141 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR 142 # define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 143 # define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 144 # define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH 308 # define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED 145 # define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281 # define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148 # define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149 # define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 318 # define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID 309 # define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER 310 # define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150 # define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY 282 # define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151 # define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 # define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 # define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 # define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 # define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 # define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 # define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373 # define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158 # define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280 # define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278 # define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 316 # define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 275 # define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279 # define SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG 284 # define SSL_R_KRB5 285 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC 286 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED 287 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT 288 # define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ 289 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET 290 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT 291 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ 292 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED 293 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 294 # define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 295 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161 # define SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG 296 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT 162 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY 163 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT 164 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT 165 # define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY 166 # define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY 167 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 168 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT 169 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT 170 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 171 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 311 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173 # define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174 # define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS 325 # define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED 178 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET 179 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED 180 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE 181 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED 182 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED 183 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST 184 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH 185 # define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD 317 # define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED 186 # define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED 187 # define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED 188 # define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY 189 # define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 190 # define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE 191 # define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY 192 # define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 319 # define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193 # define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK 194 # define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195 # define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196 # define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197 # define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297 # define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198 # define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 223 # define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 270 # define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 199 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR 200 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE 201 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE 202 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER 203 # define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 204 # define SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 205 # define SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS 206 # define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN 207 # define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR 208 # define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA 209 # define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 210 # define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET 211 # define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED 312 # define SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE 212 # define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 213 # define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE 214 # define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL 298 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG 320 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 321 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 322 # define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 215 # define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO 216 # define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO 217 # define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO 218 # define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 324 # define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 224 # define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277 # define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219 # define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220 # define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221 # define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG 299 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 225 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE 226 # define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 300 # define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT 222 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043 # define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION 228 # define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 229 # define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 230 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED 301 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT 302 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG 273 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH 303 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 231 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110 # define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232 # define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 227 +# define SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS 409 # define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233 # define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234 # define SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 235 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS 236 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS 313 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY 237 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS 238 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS 314 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS 239 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD 240 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES 241 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES 242 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES 243 # define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 244 # define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD 245 # define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED 276 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE 246 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 247 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 248 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 249 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 250 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE 251 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 252 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE 253 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 254 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 255 # define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 323 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 256 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 257 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329 # define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260 # define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261 # define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262 # define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS 263 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 264 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE 265 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 266 # define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267 # define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268 # define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 269 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h =================================================================== --- stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (revision 308199) +++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (revision 308200) @@ -1,615 +1,617 @@ /* ssl/ssl3.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL3_H # define HEADER_SSL3_H # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include # endif # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746 * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */ # define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF /* * Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */ # define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000004 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000005 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 0x03000006 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA 0x03000007 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000008 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000009 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000A # define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000B # define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000C # define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000D # define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000E # define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000F # define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000010 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000011 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000012 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000013 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000014 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000015 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000016 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000017 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000018 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000019 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001A # define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA 0x0300001B # define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA 0x0300001C # define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA 0x0300001D # if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never * used any more, and is safe to remove * according to David Hopwood * of the * ietf-tls list */ # define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA 0x0300001E # endif /* * VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries */ # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001E # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300001F # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000020 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000021 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 0x03000022 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 0x03000023 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000024 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 0x03000025 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000026 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000027 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA 0x03000028 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 0x03000029 # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 0x0300002A # define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 0x0300002B # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5 "NULL-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA "NULL-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 "RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA "RC4-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 "EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA "IDEA-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 "ADH-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA "FZA-NULL-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA "FZA-FZA-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA "FZA-RC4-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA "KRB5-RC4-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 "KRB5-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC4-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE 48 # define SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 32 # define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE 32 # define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 5 /* Due to MS stuffing up, this can change.... */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) || \ (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)) # define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA (14000) # else # define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA (16384) # endif # define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH 16384 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH # else # define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH (1024+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) # endif # define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH (1024+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) # define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) # define SSL3_RT_MAX_DATA_SIZE (1024*1024) # define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST "\x43\x4C\x4E\x54" # define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST "\x53\x52\x56\x52" # define SSL3_VERSION 0x0300 # define SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 # define SSL3_VERSION_MINOR 0x00 # define SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20 # define SSL3_RT_ALERT 21 # define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 22 # define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 23 # define SSL3_AL_WARNING 1 # define SSL3_AL_FATAL 2 # define SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 # define SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE 41 # define SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE 42 # define SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 43 # define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 44 # define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 45 # define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 46 # define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47/* fatal */ typedef struct ssl3_record_st { /* type of record */ /* * r */ int type; /* How many bytes available */ /* * rw */ unsigned int length; /* read/write offset into 'buf' */ /* * r */ unsigned int off; /* pointer to the record data */ /* * rw */ unsigned char *data; /* where the decode bytes are */ /* * rw */ unsigned char *input; /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */ /* * r */ unsigned char *comp; /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */ /* * r */ unsigned long epoch; /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */ /* * r */ PQ_64BIT seq_num; } SSL3_RECORD; typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st { /* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes, see ssl3_setup_buffers() */ unsigned char *buf; /* buffer size */ size_t len; /* where to 'copy from' */ int offset; /* how many bytes left */ int left; } SSL3_BUFFER; # define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN 1 # define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN 2 # define SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3 # define SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4 # define SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH 5 # define SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH 6 # define SSL3_CT_FORTEZZA_DMS 20 /* * SSL3_CT_NUMBER is used to size arrays and it must be large enough to * contain all of the cert types defined either for SSLv3 and TLSv1. */ # define SSL3_CT_NUMBER 7 # define SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS 0x0001 # define SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x0002 # define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER 0x0004 # define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008 # define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080 /* * SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we restart a handshake because of * MS SGC and so prevents us from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's * reset on a renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS attack where the * client handshakes in a loop using SGC to restart. Servers which permit * renegotiation can still be effected, but we can't prevent that. */ # define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040 typedef struct ssl3_state_st { long flags; int delay_buf_pop_ret; unsigned char read_sequence[8]; unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char write_sequence[8]; unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */ int need_empty_fragments; int empty_fragment_done; SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; /* read IO goes into here */ SSL3_BUFFER wbuf; /* write IO goes into here */ SSL3_RECORD rrec; /* each decoded record goes in here */ SSL3_RECORD wrec; /* goes out from here */ /* * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet * processed by ssl3_read_bytes: */ unsigned char alert_fragment[2]; unsigned int alert_fragment_len; unsigned char handshake_fragment[4]; unsigned int handshake_fragment_len; /* partial write - check the numbers match */ unsigned int wnum; /* number of bytes sent so far */ int wpend_tot; /* number bytes written */ int wpend_type; int wpend_ret; /* number of bytes submitted */ const unsigned char *wpend_buf; /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */ EVP_MD_CTX finish_dgst1; EVP_MD_CTX finish_dgst2; /* * this is set whenerver we see a change_cipher_spec message come in when * we are not looking for one */ int change_cipher_spec; int warn_alert; int fatal_alert; /* * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close * alert via the warning alert */ int alert_dispatch; unsigned char send_alert[2]; /* * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there * is no more data in the read or write buffers */ int renegotiate; int total_renegotiations; int num_renegotiations; int in_read_app_data; struct { /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */ unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */ unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; int finish_md_len; unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; int peer_finish_md_len; unsigned long message_size; int message_type; /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */ SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh; /* holds short lived ECDH key */ # endif /* used when SSL_ST_FLUSH_DATA is entered */ int next_state; int reuse_message; /* used for certificate requests */ int cert_req; int ctype_num; char ctype[SSL3_CT_NUMBER]; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names; int use_rsa_tmp; int key_block_length; unsigned char *key_block; const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc; const EVP_MD *new_hash; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const SSL_COMP *new_compression; # else char *new_compression; # endif int cert_request; } tmp; /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */ unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char previous_client_finished_len; unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char previous_server_finished_len; int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */ char is_probably_safari; # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ + /* Count of the number of consecutive warning alerts received */ + unsigned int alert_count; } SSL3_STATE; /* SSLv3 */ /* * client */ /* extra state */ # define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* write to server */ # define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* read from server */ # define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x120|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x121|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x126|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x127|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A (0x130|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B (0x131|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x140|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x141|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A (0x150|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B (0x151|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A (0x160|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B (0x161|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* write to server */ # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A (0x170|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B (0x171|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C (0x172|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D (0x173|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x180|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x181|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A (0x190|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* read from server */ # define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) # define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) /* server */ /* extra state */ # define SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* read from client */ /* Do not change the number values, they do matter */ # define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C (0x112|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* write to client */ # define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x113|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x114|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A (0x120|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B (0x121|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C (0x122|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x130|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x131|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A (0x140|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B (0x141|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x150|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x151|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A (0x160|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B (0x161|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A (0x170|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B (0x171|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* read from client */ # define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A (0x180|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B (0x181|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x190|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x191|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* write to client */ # define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A (0x200|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B (0x201|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) # define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST 0 # define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO 2 # define SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET 4 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 11 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE 14 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 # define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 # define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 # define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 # define SSL3_MT_CCS 1 /* These are used when changing over to a new cipher */ # define SSL3_CC_READ 0x01 # define SSL3_CC_WRITE 0x02 # define SSL3_CC_CLIENT 0x10 # define SSL3_CC_SERVER 0x20 # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_WRITE) # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_READ) # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_READ) # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_WRITE) #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h =================================================================== --- stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 308199) +++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 308200) @@ -1,1080 +1,1082 @@ /* ssl/ssl_locl.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H # define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H # include # include # include # include # include "e_os.h" # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include # endif # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include # endif # include # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif # define PKCS1_CHECK # define c2l(c,l) (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ # define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ } \ } # define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff)) # define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) # define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define n2l6(c,l) (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ # define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ } \ } # define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned int)(c[1])) )),c+=2) # define s2n(s,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),c+=2) # define n2l3(c,l) ((l =(((unsigned long)(c[0]))<<16)| \ (((unsigned long)(c[1]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned long)(c[2])) )),c+=3) # define l2n3(l,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),c+=3) /* LOCAL STUFF */ # define SSL_DECRYPT 0 # define SSL_ENCRYPT 1 # define TWO_BYTE_BIT 0x80 # define SEC_ESC_BIT 0x40 # define TWO_BYTE_MASK 0x7fff # define THREE_BYTE_MASK 0x3fff # define INC32(a) ((a)=((a)+1)&0xffffffffL) # define DEC32(a) ((a)=((a)-1)&0xffffffffL) # define MAX_MAC_SIZE 20 /* up from 16 for SSLv3 */ +# define MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT 5 + /* * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms. * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms * can be publicly accessed. * Use the according functions for cipher management instead. * * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive: * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME. */ # define SSL_MKEY_MASK 0x000000FFL /* RSA key exchange */ # define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001L /* DH cert RSA CA cert */ # define SSL_kDHr 0x00000002L /* DH cert DSA CA cert */ # define SSL_kDHd 0x00000004L # define SSL_kFZA 0x00000008L /* tmp DH key no DH cert */ # define SSL_kEDH 0x00000010L /* Kerberos5 key exchange */ # define SSL_kKRB5 0x00000020L /* ECDH w/ long-term keys */ # define SSL_kECDH 0x00000040L /* ephemeral ECDH */ # define SSL_kECDHE 0x00000080L # define SSL_EDH (SSL_kEDH|(SSL_AUTH_MASK^SSL_aNULL)) # define SSL_AUTH_MASK 0x00007F00L /* Authenticate with RSA */ # define SSL_aRSA 0x00000100L /* Authenticate with DSS */ # define SSL_aDSS 0x00000200L # define SSL_DSS SSL_aDSS # define SSL_aFZA 0x00000400L /* no Authenticate, ADH */ # define SSL_aNULL 0x00000800L /* no Authenticate, ADH */ # define SSL_aDH 0x00001000L /* Authenticate with KRB5 */ # define SSL_aKRB5 0x00002000L /* Authenticate with ECDSA */ # define SSL_aECDSA 0x00004000L # define SSL_NULL (SSL_eNULL) # define SSL_ADH (SSL_kEDH|SSL_aNULL) # define SSL_RSA (SSL_kRSA|SSL_aRSA) # define SSL_DH (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH) # define SSL_ECDH (SSL_kECDH|SSL_kECDHE) # define SSL_FZA (SSL_aFZA|SSL_kFZA|SSL_eFZA) # define SSL_KRB5 (SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5) # define SSL_ENC_MASK 0x1C3F8000L # define SSL_DES 0x00008000L # define SSL_3DES 0x00010000L # define SSL_RC4 0x00020000L # define SSL_RC2 0x00040000L # define SSL_IDEA 0x00080000L # define SSL_eFZA 0x00100000L # define SSL_eNULL 0x00200000L # define SSL_AES 0x04000000L # define SSL_CAMELLIA 0x08000000L # define SSL_SEED 0x10000000L # define SSL_MAC_MASK 0x00c00000L # define SSL_MD5 0x00400000L # define SSL_SHA1 0x00800000L # define SSL_SHA (SSL_SHA1) # define SSL_SSL_MASK 0x03000000L # define SSL_SSLV2 0x01000000L # define SSL_SSLV3 0x02000000L # define SSL_TLSV1 SSL_SSLV3/* for now */ /* we have used 1fffffff - 3 bits left to go. */ /* * Export and cipher strength information. For each cipher we have to decide * whether it is exportable or not. This information is likely to change * over time, since the export control rules are no static technical issue. * * Independent of the export flag the cipher strength is sorted into classes. * SSL_EXP40 was denoting the 40bit US export limit of past times, which now * is at 56bit (SSL_EXP56). If the exportable cipher class is going to change * again (eg. to 64bit) the use of "SSL_EXP*" becomes blurred even more, * since SSL_EXP64 could be similar to SSL_LOW. * For this reason SSL_MICRO and SSL_MINI macros are included to widen the * namespace of SSL_LOW-SSL_HIGH to lower values. As development of speed * and ciphers goes, another extension to SSL_SUPER and/or SSL_ULTRA would * be possible. */ # define SSL_EXP_MASK 0x00000003L # define SSL_NOT_EXP 0x00000001L # define SSL_EXPORT 0x00000002L # define SSL_STRONG_MASK 0x000000fcL # define SSL_STRONG_NONE 0x00000004L # define SSL_EXP40 0x00000008L # define SSL_MICRO (SSL_EXP40) # define SSL_EXP56 0x00000010L # define SSL_MINI (SSL_EXP56) # define SSL_LOW 0x00000020L # define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000040L # define SSL_HIGH 0x00000080L # define SSL_FIPS 0x00000100L /* we have used 000001ff - 23 bits left to go */ /*- * Macros to check the export status and cipher strength for export ciphers. * Even though the macros for EXPORT and EXPORT40/56 have similar names, * their meaning is different: * *_EXPORT macros check the 'exportable' status. * *_EXPORT40/56 macros are used to check whether a certain cipher strength * is given. * Since the SSL_IS_EXPORT* and SSL_EXPORT* macros depend on the correct * algorithm structure element to be passed (algorithms, algo_strength) and no * typechecking can be done as they are all of type unsigned long, their * direct usage is discouraged. * Use the SSL_C_* macros instead. */ # define SSL_IS_EXPORT(a) ((a)&SSL_EXPORT) # define SSL_IS_EXPORT56(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP56) # define SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP40) # define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT56(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT56((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT40(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT40((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(a,s) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(s) ? 5 : \ ((a)&SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_DES ? 8 : 7) # define SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(a) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ? 512 : 1024) # define SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH((c)->algorithms, \ (c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH((c)->algo_strength) # define SSL_ALL 0xffffffffL # define SSL_ALL_CIPHERS (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK|SSL_ENC_MASK|\ SSL_MAC_MASK) # define SSL_ALL_STRENGTHS (SSL_EXP_MASK|SSL_STRONG_MASK) /* Mostly for SSLv3 */ # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC 0 # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 1 # define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN 2 # define SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA 3 # define SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA 4 # define SSL_PKEY_ECC 5 # define SSL_PKEY_NUM 6 /*- * SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC | (RSA_TMP & RSA_SIGN) | * <- (EXPORT & (RSA_ENC | RSA_TMP) & RSA_SIGN) * SSL_kDH <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN) * SSL_kEDH <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN */ /*- #define CERT_INVALID 0 #define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters */ # define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE 1 # define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE 2 # define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ typedef struct cert_pkey_st { X509 *x509; EVP_PKEY *privatekey; } CERT_PKEY; typedef struct cert_st { /* Current active set */ /* * ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array * Probably it would make more sense to store * an index, not a pointer. */ CERT_PKEY *key; /* * The following masks are for the key and auth algorithms that are * supported by the certs below */ int valid; unsigned long mask; unsigned long export_mask; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa_tmp; RSA *(*rsa_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh_tmp; DH *(*dh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh_tmp; /* Callback for generating ephemeral ECDH keys */ EC_KEY *(*ecdh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); # endif CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */ } CERT; typedef struct sess_cert_st { STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; /* as received from peer (not for SSL2) */ /* The 'peer_...' members are used only by clients. */ int peer_cert_type; CERT_PKEY *peer_key; /* points to an element of peer_pkeys (never * NULL!) */ CERT_PKEY peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* * Obviously we don't have the private keys of these, so maybe we * shouldn't even use the CERT_PKEY type here. */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *peer_rsa_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *peer_dh_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *peer_ecdh_tmp; # endif int references; /* actually always 1 at the moment */ } SESS_CERT; /* * #define MAC_DEBUG */ /* * #define ERR_DEBUG */ /* * #define ABORT_DEBUG */ /* * #define PKT_DEBUG 1 */ /* * #define DES_DEBUG */ /* * #define DES_OFB_DEBUG */ /* * #define SSL_DEBUG */ /* * #define RSA_DEBUG */ /* * #define IDEA_DEBUG */ # define FP_ICC (int (*)(const void *,const void *)) # define ssl_put_cipher_by_char(ssl,ciph,ptr) \ ((ssl)->method->put_cipher_by_char((ciph),(ptr))) # define ssl_get_cipher_by_char(ssl,ptr) \ ((ssl)->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr)) /* * This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit * of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-) */ typedef struct ssl3_enc_method { int (*enc) (SSL *, int); int (*mac) (SSL *, unsigned char *, int); int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *); int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int); int (*change_cipher_state) (SSL *, int); int (*final_finish_mac) (SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char *, int, unsigned char *); int finish_mac_length; int (*cert_verify_mac) (SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *); const char *client_finished_label; int client_finished_label_len; const char *server_finished_label; int server_finished_label_len; int (*alert_value) (int); } SSL3_ENC_METHOD; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */ typedef struct ssl3_comp_st { int comp_id; /* The identifier byte for this compression * type */ char *name; /* Text name used for the compression type */ COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */ } SSL3_COMP; # endif extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method; OPENSSL_EXTERN SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]; OPENSSL_EXTERN SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]; SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver); SSL_METHOD *sslv2_base_method(void); SSL_METHOD *sslv23_base_method(void); SSL_METHOD *sslv3_base_method(void); extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data; # define IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ TLS1_VERSION, \ tls1_new, \ tls1_clear, \ tls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_get_message, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ tls1_default_timeout, \ &TLSv1_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ SSL3_VERSION, \ ssl3_new, \ ssl3_clear, \ ssl3_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_get_message, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ ssl3_default_timeout, \ &SSLv3_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ TLS1_VERSION, \ tls1_new, \ tls1_clear, \ tls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl23_read, \ ssl23_peek, \ ssl23_write, \ ssl_undefined_function, \ ssl_undefined_function, \ ssl_ok, \ ssl3_get_message, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl23_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl23_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl_undefined_const_function, \ ssl23_num_ciphers, \ ssl23_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ ssl23_default_timeout, \ &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ SSL2_VERSION, \ ssl2_new, /* local */ \ ssl2_clear, /* local */ \ ssl2_free, /* local */ \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl2_read, \ ssl2_peek, \ ssl2_write, \ ssl2_shutdown, \ ssl_ok, /* NULL - renegotiate */ \ ssl_ok, /* NULL - check renegotiate */ \ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_message */ \ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_record */ \ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_write_bytes */ \ NULL, /* NULL - dispatch_alert */ \ ssl2_ctrl, /* local */ \ ssl2_ctx_ctrl, /* local */ \ ssl2_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl2_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl2_pending, \ ssl2_num_ciphers, \ ssl2_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ ssl2_default_timeout, \ &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl2_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \ ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \ SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ DTLS1_VERSION, \ dtls1_new, \ dtls1_clear, \ dtls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ dtls1_get_message, \ dtls1_read_bytes, \ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \ dtls1_dispatch_alert, \ dtls1_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ dtls1_get_cipher, \ s_get_meth, \ dtls1_default_timeout, \ &DTLSv1_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s); int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s); CERT *ssl_cert_new(void); CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert); int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o); void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c); SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void); void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc); int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type); int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session); int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session, int len, const unsigned char *limit); SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket); int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b); int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp); int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p, int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted, const char *rule_str); void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode); int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md, SSL_COMP **comp); int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s); int ssl_undefined_void_function(void); int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s); CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s); X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *); EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *, SSL_CIPHER *); int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s); int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type); void ssl_load_ciphers(void); int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client); int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s); void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send_data); void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *mac, int send_data); SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i); int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s); int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data); void ssl2_return_error(SSL *s, int reason); void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s); int ssl2_num_ciphers(void); SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl2_new(SSL *s); void ssl2_free(SSL *s); int ssl2_accept(SSL *s); int ssl2_connect(SSL *s); int ssl2_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl2_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s); void ssl2_clear(SSL *s); long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl2_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); long ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); int ssl2_pending(const SSL *s); long ssl2_default_timeout(void); SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b); int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b); int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s); int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type); int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc); int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len); int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen); int ssl3_num_ciphers(void); SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx1, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx2, const char *sender, int slen, unsigned char *p); int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in, unsigned char *p); void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len); int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send_data); int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send_data); unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x); SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr); int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s); int ssl3_new(SSL *s); void ssl3_free(SSL *s); int ssl3_accept(SSL *s); int ssl3_connect(SSL *s); int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s); void ssl3_clear(SSL *s); long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s); void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq); int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl); long ssl3_default_timeout(void); int ssl23_num_ciphers(void); SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl23_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl23_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int ssl23_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); long ssl23_default_timeout(void); long tls1_default_timeout(void); int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type); int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend); int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len); unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b); int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen); unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x); int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code); int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs); int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off, int *found); int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs); int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr); void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr); void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw); long dtls1_default_timeout(void); struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft); int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s); int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s); SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u); void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s); void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s); int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s); void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void); /* some client-only functions */ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s); int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); # endif int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s); /* some server-only functions */ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s); int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s); int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s); int ssl23_accept(SSL *s); int ssl23_connect(SSL *s); int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n); int ssl23_write_bytes(SSL *s); int tls1_new(SSL *s); void tls1_free(SSL *s); void tls1_clear(SSL *s); long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_base_method(void); int dtls1_new(SSL *s); int dtls1_accept(SSL *s); int dtls1_connect(SSL *s); void dtls1_free(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear(SSL *s); long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_base_method(void); long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s); int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement); int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd); int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push); void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s); int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s); int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd); int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in1_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *in2_ctx, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p); int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in, unsigned char *p); int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd); int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len); int tls1_alert_code(int code); int ssl3_alert_code(int code); int ssl_ok(SSL *s); int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs); SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit); unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit); int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *limit, int *al); int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al); int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s); int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 # define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha1 # else # define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha256 # endif int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret); EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md); void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash); int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, int *al); # endif /* s3_cbc.c */ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size, unsigned orig_len); int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *hash); void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *hash, unsigned char *md_out, size_t *md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13], const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size, size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3); void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, const EVP_MD *hash, HMAC_CTX *hctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len); #endif