Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c (nonexistent) @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: roaming_dummy.c,v 1.4 2015/01/19 19:52:16 markus Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR - * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN - * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF - * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -/* - * This file is included in the client programs which should not - * support roaming. - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#include -#include - -#include "roaming.h" - -int resume_in_progress = 0; - -u_int64_t -get_recv_bytes(void) -{ - return 0; -} - -u_int64_t -get_sent_bytes(void) -{ - return 0; -} - -void -roam_set_bytes(u_int64_t sent, u_int64_t recvd) -{ -} - -ssize_t -roaming_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, int *cont) -{ - return write(fd, buf, count); -} - -ssize_t -roaming_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, int *cont) -{ - if (cont) - *cont = 0; - return read(fd, buf, count); -} - -void -add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t num) -{ -} - -int -resume_kex(void) -{ - return 1; -} Property changes on: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_dummy.c ___________________________________________________________________ Deleted: svn:eol-style ## -1 +0,0 ## -native \ No newline at end of property Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_serv.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_serv.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_serv.c (nonexistent) @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: roaming_serv.c,v 1.1 2009/10/24 11:18:23 andreas Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR - * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN - * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF - * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#include - -#include "roaming.h" - -/* - * Wait for the roaming client to reconnect. Returns 0 if a connect ocurred. - */ -int -wait_for_roaming_reconnect(void) -{ - return 1; -} Property changes on: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_serv.c ___________________________________________________________________ Deleted: svn:eol-style ## -1 +0,0 ## -native \ No newline at end of property Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_client.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_client.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_client.c (nonexistent) @@ -1,271 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: roaming_client.c,v 1.9 2015/01/27 12:54:06 okan Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR - * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN - * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF - * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "channels.h" -#include "cipher.h" -#include "dispatch.h" -#include "clientloop.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "match.h" -#include "misc.h" -#include "packet.h" -#include "ssh.h" -#include "key.h" -#include "kex.h" -#include "readconf.h" -#include "roaming.h" -#include "ssh2.h" -#include "sshconnect.h" -#include "digest.h" - -/* import */ -extern Options options; -extern char *host; -extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; -extern int session_resumed; - -static u_int32_t roaming_id; -static u_int64_t cookie; -static u_int64_t lastseenchall; -static u_int64_t key1, key2, oldkey1, oldkey2; - -void -roaming_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) { - logit("Server denied roaming"); - return; - } - verbose("Roaming enabled"); - roaming_id = packet_get_int(); - cookie = packet_get_int64(); - key1 = oldkey1 = packet_get_int64(); - key2 = oldkey2 = packet_get_int64(); - set_out_buffer_size(packet_get_int() + get_snd_buf_size()); - roaming_enabled = 1; -} - -void -request_roaming(void) -{ - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring(ROAMING_REQUEST); - packet_put_char(1); - packet_put_int(get_recv_buf_size()); - packet_send(); - client_register_global_confirm(roaming_reply, NULL); -} - -static void -roaming_auth_required(void) -{ - u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; - Buffer b; - u_int64_t chall, oldchall; - - chall = packet_get_int64(); - oldchall = packet_get_int64(); - if (oldchall != lastseenchall) { - key1 = oldkey1; - key2 = oldkey2; - } - lastseenchall = chall; - - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_put_int64(&b, cookie); - buffer_put_int64(&b, chall); - if (ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) - fatal("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed", __func__); - buffer_free(&b); - - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH); - packet_put_int64(key1 ^ get_recv_bytes()); - packet_put_raw(digest, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); - packet_send(); - - oldkey1 = key1; - oldkey2 = key2; - calculate_new_key(&key1, cookie, chall); - calculate_new_key(&key2, cookie, chall); - - debug("Received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)get_recv_bytes()); - debug("Sent roaming_auth packet"); -} - -int -resume_kex(void) -{ - /* - * This should not happen - if the client sends the kex method - * resume@appgate.com then the kex is done in roaming_resume(). - */ - return 1; -} - -static int -roaming_resume(void) -{ - u_int64_t recv_bytes; - char *str = NULL, *kexlist = NULL, *c; - int i, type; - int timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; - u_int len; - u_int32_t rnd = 0; - - resume_in_progress = 1; - - /* Exchange banners */ - ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms); - packet_set_nonblocking(); - - /* Send a kexinit message with resume@appgate.com as only kex algo */ - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); - for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { - if (i % 4 == 0) - rnd = arc4random(); - packet_put_char(rnd & 0xff); - rnd >>= 8; - } - packet_put_cstring(KEX_RESUME); - for (i = 1; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { - /* kex algorithm added so start with i=1 and not 0 */ - packet_put_cstring(""); /* Not used when we resume */ - } - packet_put_char(1); /* first kex_packet follows */ - packet_put_int(0); /* reserved */ - packet_send(); - - /* Assume that resume@appgate.com will be accepted */ - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_RESUME); - packet_put_int(roaming_id); - packet_send(); - - /* Read the server's kexinit and check for resume@appgate.com */ - if ((type = packet_read()) != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) { - debug("expected kexinit on resume, got %d", type); - goto fail; - } - for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) - (void)packet_get_char(); - kexlist = packet_get_string(&len); - if (!kexlist - || (str = match_list(KEX_RESUME, kexlist, NULL)) == NULL) { - debug("server doesn't allow resume"); - goto fail; - } - free(str); - for (i = 1; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { - /* kex algorithm taken care of so start with i=1 and not 0 */ - free(packet_get_string(&len)); - } - i = packet_get_char(); /* first_kex_packet_follows */ - if (i && (c = strchr(kexlist, ','))) - *c = 0; - if (i && strcmp(kexlist, KEX_RESUME)) { - debug("server's kex guess (%s) was wrong, skipping", kexlist); - (void)packet_read(); /* Wrong guess - discard packet */ - } - - /* - * Read the ROAMING_AUTH_REQUIRED challenge from the server and - * send ROAMING_AUTH - */ - if ((type = packet_read()) != SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_REQUIRED) { - debug("expected roaming_auth_required, got %d", type); - goto fail; - } - roaming_auth_required(); - - /* Read ROAMING_AUTH_OK from the server */ - if ((type = packet_read()) != SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_OK) { - debug("expected roaming_auth_ok, got %d", type); - goto fail; - } - recv_bytes = packet_get_int64() ^ oldkey2; - debug("Peer received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)recv_bytes); - resend_bytes(packet_get_connection_out(), &recv_bytes); - - resume_in_progress = 0; - - session_resumed = 1; /* Tell clientloop */ - - return 0; - -fail: - free(kexlist); - if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out()) - close(packet_get_connection_in()); - else { - close(packet_get_connection_in()); - close(packet_get_connection_out()); - } - return 1; -} - -int -wait_for_roaming_reconnect(void) -{ - static int reenter_guard = 0; - int timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; - int c; - - if (reenter_guard != 0) - fatal("Server refused resume, roaming timeout may be exceeded"); - reenter_guard = 1; - - fprintf(stderr, "[connection suspended, press return to resume]"); - fflush(stderr); - packet_backup_state(); - /* TODO Perhaps we should read from tty here */ - while ((c = fgetc(stdin)) != EOF) { - if (c == 'Z' - 64) { - kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); - continue; - } - if (c != '\n' && c != '\r') - continue; - - if (ssh_connect(host, NULL, &hostaddr, options.port, - options.address_family, 1, &timeout_ms, - options.tcp_keep_alive, options.use_privileged_port) == 0 && - roaming_resume() == 0) { - packet_restore_state(); - reenter_guard = 0; - fprintf(stderr, "[connection resumed]\n"); - fflush(stderr); - return 0; - } - - fprintf(stderr, "[reconnect failed, press return to retry]"); - fflush(stderr); - } - fprintf(stderr, "[exiting]\n"); - fflush(stderr); - exit(0); -} Property changes on: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_client.c ___________________________________________________________________ Deleted: svn:eol-style ## -1 +0,0 ## -native \ No newline at end of property Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c (nonexistent) @@ -1,241 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: roaming_common.c,v 1.13 2015/01/27 12:54:06 okan Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR - * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN - * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF - * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#include -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "atomicio.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "packet.h" -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include "cipher.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "roaming.h" -#include "digest.h" - -static size_t out_buf_size = 0; -static char *out_buf = NULL; -static size_t out_start; -static size_t out_last; - -static u_int64_t write_bytes = 0; -static u_int64_t read_bytes = 0; - -int roaming_enabled = 0; -int resume_in_progress = 0; - -int -get_snd_buf_size(void) -{ - int fd = packet_get_connection_out(); - int optval; - socklen_t optvallen = sizeof(optval); - - if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, &optval, &optvallen) != 0) - optval = DEFAULT_ROAMBUF; - return optval; -} - -int -get_recv_buf_size(void) -{ - int fd = packet_get_connection_in(); - int optval; - socklen_t optvallen = sizeof(optval); - - if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &optval, &optvallen) != 0) - optval = DEFAULT_ROAMBUF; - return optval; -} - -void -set_out_buffer_size(size_t size) -{ - if (size == 0 || size > MAX_ROAMBUF) - fatal("%s: bad buffer size %lu", __func__, (u_long)size); - /* - * The buffer size can only be set once and the buffer will live - * as long as the session lives. - */ - if (out_buf == NULL) { - out_buf_size = size; - out_buf = xmalloc(size); - out_start = 0; - out_last = 0; - } -} - -u_int64_t -get_recv_bytes(void) -{ - return read_bytes; -} - -void -add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t num) -{ - read_bytes += num; -} - -u_int64_t -get_sent_bytes(void) -{ - return write_bytes; -} - -void -roam_set_bytes(u_int64_t sent, u_int64_t recvd) -{ - read_bytes = recvd; - write_bytes = sent; -} - -static void -buf_append(const char *buf, size_t count) -{ - if (count > out_buf_size) { - buf += count - out_buf_size; - count = out_buf_size; - } - if (count < out_buf_size - out_last) { - memcpy(out_buf + out_last, buf, count); - if (out_start > out_last) - out_start += count; - out_last += count; - } else { - /* data will wrap */ - size_t chunk = out_buf_size - out_last; - memcpy(out_buf + out_last, buf, chunk); - memcpy(out_buf, buf + chunk, count - chunk); - out_last = count - chunk; - out_start = out_last + 1; - } -} - -ssize_t -roaming_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, int *cont) -{ - ssize_t ret; - - ret = write(fd, buf, count); - if (ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) { - write_bytes += ret; - if (out_buf_size > 0) - buf_append(buf, ret); - } - if (out_buf_size > 0 && - (ret == 0 || (ret == -1 && errno == EPIPE))) { - if (wait_for_roaming_reconnect() != 0) { - ret = 0; - *cont = 1; - } else { - ret = -1; - errno = EAGAIN; - } - } - return ret; -} - -ssize_t -roaming_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, int *cont) -{ - ssize_t ret = read(fd, buf, count); - if (ret > 0) { - if (!resume_in_progress) { - read_bytes += ret; - } - } else if (out_buf_size > 0 && - (ret == 0 || (ret == -1 && (errno == ECONNRESET - || errno == ECONNABORTED || errno == ETIMEDOUT - || errno == EHOSTUNREACH)))) { - debug("roaming_read failed for %d ret=%ld errno=%d", - fd, (long)ret, errno); - ret = 0; - if (wait_for_roaming_reconnect() == 0) - *cont = 1; - } - return ret; -} - -size_t -roaming_atomicio(ssize_t(*f)(int, void*, size_t), int fd, void *buf, - size_t count) -{ - size_t ret = atomicio(f, fd, buf, count); - - if (f == vwrite && ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) { - write_bytes += ret; - } else if (f == read && ret > 0 && !resume_in_progress) { - read_bytes += ret; - } - return ret; -} - -void -resend_bytes(int fd, u_int64_t *offset) -{ - size_t available, needed; - - if (out_start < out_last) - available = out_last - out_start; - else - available = out_buf_size; - needed = write_bytes - *offset; - debug3("resend_bytes: resend %lu bytes from %llu", - (unsigned long)needed, (unsigned long long)*offset); - if (needed > available) - fatal("Needed to resend more data than in the cache"); - if (out_last < needed) { - int chunkend = needed - out_last; - atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf + out_buf_size - chunkend, - chunkend); - atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf, out_last); - } else { - atomicio(vwrite, fd, out_buf + (out_last - needed), needed); - } -} - -/* - * Caclulate a new key after a reconnect - */ -void -calculate_new_key(u_int64_t *key, u_int64_t cookie, u_int64_t challenge) -{ - u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; - Buffer b; - - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_put_int64(&b, *key); - buffer_put_int64(&b, cookie); - buffer_put_int64(&b, challenge); - - if (ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &b, hash, sizeof(hash)) != 0) - fatal("%s: digest_buffer failed", __func__); - - buffer_clear(&b); - buffer_append(&b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); - *key = buffer_get_int64(&b); - buffer_free(&b); -} Property changes on: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming_common.c ___________________________________________________________________ Deleted: svn:eol-style ## -1 +0,0 ## -native \ No newline at end of property Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog (revision 296853) @@ -1,7615 +1,8905 @@ -commit c88ac102f0eb89f2eaa314cb2e2e0ca3c890c443 +commit 5c35450a0c901d9375fb23343a8dc82397da5f75 Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Mar 10 05:04:48 2016 +1100 + + update versions for release + +commit 9d47b8d3f50c3a6282896df8274147e3b9a38c56 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Mar 10 05:03:39 2016 +1100 + + sanitise characters destined for xauth(1) + + reported by github.com/tintinweb + +commit 72b061d4ba0f909501c595d709ea76e06b01e5c9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 26 14:40:04 2016 +1100 + + Add a note about using xlc on AIX. + +commit fd4e4f2416baa2e6565ea49d52aade296bad3e28 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Feb 24 10:44:25 2016 +1100 + + Skip PrintLastLog in config dump mode. + + When DISABLE_LASTLOG is set, do not try to include PrintLastLog in the + config dump since it'll be reported as UNKNOWN. + +commit 99135c764fa250801da5ec3b8d06cbd0111caae8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Feb 23 20:17:23 2016 +1100 + + update spec/README versions ahead of release + +commit b86a334aaaa4d1e643eb1fd71f718573d6d948b5 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Feb 23 20:16:53 2016 +1100 + + put back portable patchlevel to p1 + +commit 555dd35ff176847e3c6bd068ba2e8db4022eb24f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 23 09:14:34 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + openssh-7.2 + + Upstream-ID: 9db776b26014147fc907ece8460ef2bcb0f11e78 + +commit 1acc058d0a7913838c830ed998a1a1fb5b7864bf +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Feb 23 16:12:13 2016 +1100 + + Disable tests where fs perms are incorrect + + Some tests have strict requirements on the filesystem permissions + for certain files and directories. This adds a regress/check-perm + tool that copies the relevant logic from sshd to exactly test + the paths in question. This lets us skip tests when the local + filesystem doesn't conform to our expectations rather than + continuing and failing the test run. + + ok dtucker@ + +commit 39f303b1f36d934d8410b05625f25c7bcb75db4d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Feb 23 12:56:59 2016 +1100 + + fix sandbox on OSX Lion + + sshd was failing with: + + ssh_sandbox_child: sandbox_init: dlopen(/usr/lib/libsandbox.1.dylib, 261):cw + image not found [preauth] + + caused by chroot before sandboxing. Avoid by explicitly linking libsandbox + to sshd. Spotted by Darren. + +commit 0d1451a32c7436e6d3d482351e776bc5e7824ce4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 23 01:34:14 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix spurious error message when incorrect passphrase + entered for keys; reported by espie@ ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 58b2e46e63ed6912ed1ee780bd3bd8560f9a5899 + +commit 09d87d79741beb85768b5e788d7dfdf4bc3543dc +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 20 23:06:23 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + set ssh(1) protocol version to 2 only. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: e168daf9d27d7e392e3c9923826bd8e87b2b3a10 + +commit 9262e07826ba5eebf8423f7ac9e47ec488c47869 +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 20 23:02:39 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add missing ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 to + IdentityFile. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 6ce99466312e4ae7708017c3665e3edb976f70cf + +commit c12f0fdce8f985fca8d71829fd64c5b89dc777f5 +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 20 23:01:46 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + AddressFamily defaults to any. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 0d94aa06a4b889bf57a7f631c45ba36d24c13e0c + +commit 907091acb188b1057d50c2158f74c3ecf1c2302b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 19 09:05:39 2016 +1100 + + Make Solaris privs code build on older systems. + + Not all systems with Solaris privs have priv_basicset so factor that + out and provide backward compatibility code. Similarly, not all have + PRIV_NET_ACCESS so wrap that in #ifdef. Based on code from + alex at cooperi.net and djm@ with help from carson at taltos.org and + wieland at purdue.edu. + +commit 292a8dee14e5e67dcd1b49ba5c7b9023e8420d59 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 17 22:20:14 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + rekey refactor broke SSH1; spotted by Tom G. Christensen + + Upstream-ID: 43f0d57928cc077c949af0bfa71ef574dcb58243 + +commit 3a13cb543df9919aec2fc6b75f3dd3802facaeca +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 17 08:57:34 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 cannot be selected explicitly + in *KeyTypes options yet. Remove them from the lists of algorithms for now. + committing on behalf of markus@ ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c6e8820eb8e610ac21551832c0c89684a9a51bb7 + +commit a685ae8d1c24fb7c712c55a4f3280ee76f5f1e4b +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 17 07:38:19 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + since these pages now clearly tell folks to avoid v1, + normalise the docs from a v2 perspective (i.e. stop pointing out which bits + are v2 only); + + ok/tweaks djm ok markus + + Upstream-ID: eb474f8c36fb6a532dc05c282f7965e38dcfa129 + +commit c5c3f3279a0e4044b8de71b70d3570d692d0f29d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 17 05:29:04 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make sandboxed privilege separation the default, not just + for new installs; "absolutely" deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 5221ef3b927d2df044e9aa3f5db74ae91743f69b + +commit eb3f7337a651aa01d5dec019025e6cdc124ed081 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 16 07:47:54 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + no need to state that protocol 2 is the default twice; + + Upstream-ID: b1e4c36b0c2e12e338e5b66e2978f2ac953b95eb + +commit e7901efa9b24e5b0c7e74f2c5520d47eead4d005 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 16 05:11:04 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Replace list of ciphers and MACs adjacent to -1/-2 flag + descriptions in ssh(1) with a strong recommendation not to use protocol 1. + Add a similar warning to the Protocol option descriptions in ssh_config(5) + and sshd_config(5); + + prompted by and ok mmcc@ + + Upstream-ID: 961f99e5437d50e636feca023978950a232ead5e + +commit 5a0fcb77287342e2fc2ba1cee79b6af108973dc2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 16 03:37:48 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add a "Close session" log entry (at loglevel=verbose) to + correspond to the existing "Starting session" one. Also include the session + id number to make multiplexed sessions more apparent. + + feedback and ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: e72d2ac080e02774376325136e532cb24c2e617c + +commit 624fd395b559820705171f460dd33d67743d13d6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 17 02:24:17 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + include bad $SSH_CONNECTION in failure output + + Upstream-Regress-ID: b22d72edfde78c403aaec2b9c9753ef633cc0529 + +commit 60d860e54b4f199e5e89963b1c086981309753cb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Feb 17 13:37:09 2016 +1100 + + Rollback addition of va_start. + + va_start was added in 0f754e29dd3760fc0b172c1220f18b753fb0957e, however + it has the wrong number of args and it's not usable in non-variadic + functions anyway so it breaks things (for example Solaris 2.6 as + reported by Tom G. Christensen).i ok djm@ + +commit 2fee909c3cee2472a98b26eb82696297b81e0d38 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Feb 17 09:48:15 2016 +1100 + + Look for gethostbyname in libresolv and libnsl. + + Should fix build problem on Solaris 2.6 reported by Tom G. Christensen. + +commit 5ac712d81a84396aab441a272ec429af5b738302 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Feb 16 10:45:02 2016 +1100 + + make existing ssh_malloc_init only for __OpenBSD__ + +commit 24c9bded569d9f2449ded73f92fb6d12db7a9eec +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 15 23:32:37 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + memleak of algorithm name in mm_answer_sign; reported by + Jakub Jelen + + Upstream-ID: ccd742cd25952240ebd23d7d4d6b605862584d08 + +commit ffb1e7e896139a42ceb78676f637658f44612411 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 15 09:47:49 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add a function to enable security-related malloc_options. + With and ok deraadt@, something similar has been in the snaps for a while. + + Upstream-ID: 43a95523b832b7f3b943d2908662191110c380ed + +commit ef39e8c0497ff0564990a4f9e8b7338b3ba3507c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Feb 16 10:34:39 2016 +1100 + + sync ssh-copy-id with upstream 783ef08b0a75 + +commit d2d772f55b19bb0e8d03c2fe1b9bb176d9779efd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 12 00:20:30 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + avoid fatal() for PKCS11 tokens that present empty key IDs + bz#1773, ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 044a764fee526f2c4a9d530bd10695422d01fc54 + +commit e4c918a6c721410792b287c9fd21356a1bed5805 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 11 02:56:32 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sync crypto algorithm lists in ssh_config(5) and + sshd_config(5) with current reality. bz#2527 + + Upstream-ID: d7fd1b6c1ed848d866236bcb1d7049d2bb9b2ff6 + +commit e30cabfa4ab456a30b3224f7f545f1bdfc4a2517 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 11 02:21:34 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix regression in openssh-6.8 sftp client: existing + destination directories would incorrectly terminate recursive uploads; + bz#2528 + + Upstream-ID: 3306be469f41f26758e3d447987ac6d662623e18 + +commit 714e367226ded4dc3897078be48b961637350b05 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 9 05:30:04 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + turn off more old crypto in the client: hmac-md5, ripemd, + truncated HMACs, RC4, blowfish. ok markus@ dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 96aa11c2c082be45267a690c12f1d2aae6acd46e + +commit 5a622844ff7f78dcb75e223399f9ef0977e8d0a3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 8 23:40:12 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't attempt to percent_expand() already-canonicalised + addresses, avoiding unnecessary failures when attempting to connect to scoped + IPv6 addresses (that naturally contain '%' characters) + + Upstream-ID: f24569cffa1a7cbde5f08dc739a72f4d78aa5c6a + +commit 19bcf2ea2d17413f2d9730dd2a19575ff86b9b6a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 8 10:57:07 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + refactor activation of rekeying + + This makes automatic rekeying internal to the packet code (previously + the server and client loops needed to assist). In doing to it makes + application of rekey limits more accurate by accounting for packets + about to be sent as well as packets queued during rekeying events + themselves. + + Based on a patch from dtucker@ which was in turn based on a patch + Aleksander Adamowski in bz#2521; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: a441227fd64f9739850ca97b4cf794202860fcd8 + +commit 603ba41179e4b53951c7b90ee95b6ef3faa3f15d +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 5 13:28:19 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Only check errno if read() has returned an error. EOF is + not an error. This fixes a problem where the mux master would sporadically + fail to notice that the client had exited. ok mikeb@ djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 3c2dadc21fac6ef64665688aac8a75fffd57ae53 + +commit 56d7dac790693ce420d225119283bc355cff9185 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 5 04:31:21 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + avoid an uninitialised value when NumberOfPasswordPrompts + is 0 ok markus@ djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 11b068d83c2865343aeb46acf1e9eec00f829b6b + +commit deae7d52d59c5019c528f977360d87fdda15d20b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 5 03:07:06 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention internal DH-GEX fallback groups; bz#2302 + + Upstream-ID: e7b395fcca3122cd825515f45a2e41c9a157e09e + +commit cac3b6665f884d46192c0dc98a64112e8b11a766 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 5 02:37:56 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + better description for MaxSessions; bz#2531 + + Upstream-ID: e2c0d74ee185cd1a3e9d4ca1f1b939b745b354da + +commit 5ef4b0fdcc7a239577a754829b50022b91ab4712 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jan 27 17:45:56 2016 +1100 + + avoid FreeBSD RCS Id in comment + + Change old $FreeBSD version string in comment so it doesn't + become an RCS ident downstream; requested by des AT des.no + +commit 696d12683c90d20a0a9c5f4275fc916b7011fb04 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 4 23:43:48 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + printf argument casts to avoid warnings on strict + compilers + + Upstream-ID: 7b9f6712cef01865ad29070262d366cf13587c9c + +commit 5658ef2501e785fbbdf5de2dc33b1ff7a4dca73a +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 1 21:18:17 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Avoid ugly "DISPLAY "(null)" invalid; disabling X11 + forwarding" message when DISPLAY is not set. This could also result in a + crash on systems with a printf that doesn't handle NULL. OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 20ee0cfbda678a247264c20ed75362042b90b412 + +commit 537f88ec7bcf40bd444ac5584c707c5588c55c43 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 05:18:15 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add regression test for RekeyLimit parsing of >32bit values + (4G and 8G). + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 548390350c62747b6234f522a99c319eee401328 + +commit 4c6cb8330460f94e6c7ae28a364236d4188156a3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 23:04:46 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove leftover roaming dead code. ok djm markus. + + Upstream-ID: 13d1f9c8b65a5109756bcfd3b74df949d53615be + +commit 28136471809806d6246ef41e4341467a39fe2f91 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 05:46:01 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + include packet type of non-data packets in debug3 output; + ok markus dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 034eaf639acc96459b9c5ce782db9fcd8bd02d41 + +commit 6fd6e28daccafaa35f02741036abe64534c361a1 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 03:31:03 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Revert "account for packets buffered but not yet + processed" change as it breaks for very small RekeyLimit values due to + continuous rekeying. ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 7e03f636cb45ab60db18850236ccf19079182a19 + +commit 921ff00b0ac429666fb361d2d6cb1c8fff0006cb +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 02:54:45 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Allow RekeyLimits in excess of 4G up to 2**63 bits + (limited by the return type of scan_scaled). Part of bz#2521, ok djm. + + Upstream-ID: 13bea82be566b9704821b1ea05bf7804335c7979 + +commit c0060a65296f01d4634f274eee184c0e93ba0f23 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 02:42:46 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Account for packets buffered but not yet processed when + computing whether or not it is time to perform rekeying. bz#2521, based + loosely on a patch from olo at fb.com, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 67e268b547f990ed220f3cb70a5624d9bda12b8c + +commit 44cf930e670488c85c9efeb373fa5f4b455692ac +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 27 06:44:58 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + change old $FreeBSD version string in comment so it doesn't + become an RCS ident downstream; requested by des AT des.no + + Upstream-ID: 8ca558c01f184e596b45e4fc8885534b2c864722 + +commit ebacd377769ac07d1bf3c75169644336056b7060 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 27 00:53:12 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make the debug messages a bit more useful here + + Upstream-ID: 478ccd4e897e0af8486b294aa63aa3f90ab78d64 + +commit 458abc2934e82034c5c281336d8dc0f910aecad3 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 23 05:31:35 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Zero a stack buffer with explicit_bzero() instead of + memset() when returning from client_loop() for consistency with + buffer_free()/sshbuf_free(). + + ok dtucker@ deraadt@ djm@ + + Upstream-ID: bc9975b2095339811c3b954694d7d15ea5c58f66 + +commit 65a3c0dacbc7dbb75ddb6a70ebe22d8de084d0b0 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 20 09:22:39 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Include sys/time.h for gettimeofday. From sortie at + maxsi.org. + + Upstream-ID: 6ed0c33b836d9de0a664cd091e86523ecaa2fb3b + +commit fc77ccdc2ce6d5d06628b8da5048a6a5f6ffca5a +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 14 22:56:56 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fd leaks; report Qualys Security Advisory team; ok + deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 4ec0f12b9d8fa202293c9effa115464185aa071d + +commit a306863831c57ec5fad918687cc5d289ee8e2635 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 14 16:17:39 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove roaming support; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 2cab8f4b197bc95776fb1c8dc2859dad0c64dc56 + +commit 6ef49e83e30688504552ac10875feabd5521565f +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 14 14:34:34 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Disable experimental client-side roaming support. Server + side was disabled/gutted for years already, but this aspect was surprisingly + forgotten. Thanks for report from Qualys + + Upstream-ID: 2328004b58f431a554d4c1bf67f5407eae3389df + +commit 8d7b523b96d3be180572d9d338cedaafc0570f60 +Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 14 11:08:19 2016 +1100 bump version numbers -commit 302bc21e6fadacb04b665868cd69b625ef69df90 +commit 8c3d512a1fac8b9c83b4d0c9c3f2376290bd84ca Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 14 11:04:04 2016 +1100 openssh-7.1p2 -commit 6b33763242c063e4e0593877e835eeb1fd1b60aa +commit e6c85f8889c5c9eb04796fdb76d2807636b9eef5 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 14 11:02:58 2016 +1100 +Date: Fri Jan 15 01:30:36 2016 +1100 forcibly disable roaming support in the client -commit 34d364f0d2e1e30a444009f0e04299bb7c94ba13 +commit ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 13 23:04:47 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted + forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by + Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938 + +commit 9a728cc918fad67c8a9a71201088b1e150340ba4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 12 23:42:54 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use explicit_bzero() more liberally in the buffer code; ok + deraadt + + Upstream-ID: 0ece37069fd66bc6e4f55eb1321f93df372b65bf + +commit 4626cbaf78767fc8e9c86dd04785386c59ae0839 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jan 8 14:24:56 2016 +1100 + + Support Illumos/Solaris fine-grained privileges + + Includes a pre-auth privsep sandbox and several pledge() + emulations. bz#2511, patch by Alex Wilson. + + ok dtucker@ + +commit 422d1b3ee977ff4c724b597fb2e437d38fc8de9d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 31 00:33:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix three bugs in KRL code related to (unused) signature + support: verification length was being incorrectly calculated, multiple + signatures were being incorrectly processed and a NULL dereference that + occurred when signatures were verified. Reported by Carl Jackson + + Upstream-ID: e705e97ad3ccce84291eaa651708dd1b9692576b + +commit 6074c84bf95d00f29cc7d5d3cd3798737851aa1a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Dec 30 23:46:14 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unused prototype + + Upstream-ID: f3eef4389d53ed6c0d5c77dcdcca3060c745da97 + +commit 6213f0e180e54122bb1ba928e11c784e2b4e5380 +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Dec 26 20:51:35 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use pread/pwrite instead separate lseek+read/write for + lastlog. Cast to off_t before multiplication to avoid truncation on ILP32 + + ok kettenis@ mmcc@ + + Upstream-ID: fc40092568cd195719ddf1a00aa0742340d616cf + +commit d7d2bc95045a43dd56ea696cc1d030ac9d77e81f +Author: semarie@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Dec 26 07:46:03 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + adjust pledge promises for ControlMaster: when using + "ask" or "autoask", the process will use ssh-askpass for asking confirmation. + + problem found by halex@ + + ok halex@ + + Upstream-ID: 38a58b30ae3eef85051c74d3c247216ec0735f80 + +commit 271df8185d9689b3fb0523f58514481b858f6843 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 13 22:42:23 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unbreak connections with peers that set + first_kex_follows; fix from Matt Johnston va bz#2515 + + Upstream-ID: decc88ec4fc7515594fdb42b04aa03189a44184b + +commit 43849a47c5f8687699eafbcb5604f6b9c395179f +Author: doug@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 17:41:37 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add "id" to ssh-agent pledge for subprocess support. + + Found the hard way by Jan Johansson when using ssh-agent with X. Also, + rearranged proc/exec and retval to match other pledge calls in the tree. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 914255f6850e5e7fa830a2de6c38605333b584db + +commit 52d7078421844b2f88329f5be3de370b0a938636 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 04:21:11 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove NULL-checks before sshbuf_free(). + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 5ebed00ed5f9f03b119a345085e8774565466917 + +commit a4b9e0f4e4a6980a0eb8072f76ea611cab5b77e7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 03:24:25 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + include remote port number in a few more messages; makes + tying log messages together into a session a bit easier; bz#2503 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 9300dc354015f7a7368d94a8ff4a4266a69d237e + +commit 6091c362e89079397e68744ae30df121b0a72c07 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 03:20:09 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't try to load SSHv1 private key when compiled without + SSHv1 support. From Iain Morgan bz#2505 + + Upstream-ID: 8b8e7b02a448cf5e5635979df2d83028f58868a7 + +commit cce6a36bb95e81fa8bfb46daf22eabcf13afc352 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 03:19:09 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES consistently as buffer size when + reading key files. Increase it to match the size of the buffers already being + used. + + Upstream-ID: 1b60586b484b55a947d99a0b32bd25e0ced56fae + +commit 89540b6de025b80404a0cb8418c06377f3f98848 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 02:31:47 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove NULL-checks before sshkey_free(). + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 3e35afe8a25e021216696b5d6cde7f5d2e5e3f52 + +commit 79394ed6d74572c2d2643d73937dad33727fc240 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 02:29:03 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fflush stdout so that output is seen even when running in + debug mode when output may otherwise not be flushed. Patch from dustin at + null-ptr.net. + + Upstream-ID: b0c6b4cd2cdb01d7e9eefbffdc522e35b5bc4acc + +commit ee607cccb6636eb543282ba90e0677b0604d8b7a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 15 15:23:49 2015 +1100 + + Increase robustness of redhat/openssh.spec + + - remove configure --with-rsh, because this option isn't supported anymore + - replace last occurrence of BuildPreReq by BuildRequires + - update grep statement to query the krb5 include directory + + Patch from CarstenGrohmann via github, ok djm. + +commit b5fa0cd73555b991a543145603658d7088ec6b60 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 15 15:10:32 2015 +1100 + + Allow --without-ssl-engine with --without-openssl + + Patch from Mike Frysinger via github. + +commit c1d7e546f6029024f3257cc25c92f2bddf163125 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 15 14:27:09 2015 +1100 + + Include openssl crypto.h for SSLeay. + + Patch from doughdemon via github. + +commit c6f5f01651526e88c00d988ce59d71f481ebac62 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 15 13:59:12 2015 +1100 + + Add sys/time.h for gettimeofday. + + Should allow it it compile with MUSL libc. Based on patch from + doughdemon via github. + +commit 39736be06c7498ef57d6970f2d85cf066ae57c82 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 02:20:28 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correct error messages; from Tomas Kuthan bz#2507 + + Upstream-ID: 7454a0affeab772398052954c79300aa82077093 + +commit 94141b7ade24afceeb6762a3f99e09e47a6c42b6 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 00:20:04 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Pass (char *)NULL rather than (char *)0 to execl and + execlp. + + ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 56c955106cbddba86c3dd9bbf786ac0d1b361492 + +commit d59ce08811bf94111c2f442184cf7d1257ffae24 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 10 17:08:40 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove NULL-checks before free(). + + ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: e3d3cb1ce900179906af36517b5eea0fb15e6ef8 + +commit 8e56dd46cb37879c73bce2d6032cf5e7f82d5a71 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 10 07:01:35 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix a couple "the the" typos. ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: ec364c5af32031f013001fd28d1bd3dfacfe9a72 + +commit 6262a0522ddc2c0f2e9358dcb68d59b46e9c533e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 7 20:04:09 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + stricter encoding type checks for ssh-rsa; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 8cca7c787599a5e8391e184d0b4f36fdc3665650 + +commit d86a3ba7af160c13496102aed861ae48a4297072 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Dec 9 09:18:45 2015 +1100 + + Don't set IPV6_V6ONLY on OpenBSD + + It isn't necessary and runs afoul of pledge(2) restrictions. + +commit da98c11d03d819a15429d8fff9688acd7505439f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 7 02:20:46 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + basic unit tests for rsa-sha2-* signature types + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 7dc4b9db809d578ff104d591b4d86560c3598d3c + +commit 3da893fdec9936dd2c23739cdb3c0c9d4c59fca0 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Dec 5 20:53:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + prefer rsa-sha2-512 over -256 for hostkeys, too; noticed + by naddy@ + + Upstream-ID: 685f55f7ec566a8caca587750672723a0faf3ffe + +commit 8b56e59714d87181505e4678f0d6d39955caf10e +Author: tobias@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 4 21:51:06 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Properly handle invalid %-format by calling fatal. + + ok deraadt, djm + + Upstream-ID: 5692bce7d9f6eaa9c488cb93d3b55e758bef1eac + +commit 76c9fbbe35aabc1db977fb78e827644345e9442e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 4 16:41:28 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures + (user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and + draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309 + +commit 6064a8b8295cb5a17b5ebcfade53053377714f40 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 4 00:24:55 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + clean up agent_fd handling; properly initialise it to -1 + and make tests consistent + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: ac9554323d5065745caf17b5e37cb0f0d4825707 + +commit b91926a97620f3e51761c271ba57aa5db790f48d +Author: semarie@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 3 17:00:18 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + pledges ssh client: - mux client: which is used when + ControlMaster is in use. will end with "stdio proc tty" (proc is to + permit sending SIGWINCH to mux master on window resize) + + - client loop: several levels of pledging depending of your used options + + ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 21676155a700e51f2ce911e33538e92a2cd1d94b + +commit bcce47466bbc974636f588b5e4a9a18ae386f64a +Author: doug@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Dec 2 08:30:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add "cpath" to the ssh-agent pledge so the cleanup + handler can unlink(). + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 9e632991d48241d56db645602d381253a3d8c29d + +commit a90d001543f46716b6590c6dcc681d5f5322f8cf +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Dec 2 08:00:58 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ssh-agent pledge needs proc for askpass; spotted by todd@ + + Upstream-ID: 349aa261b29cc0e7de47ef56167769c432630b2a + +commit d952162b3c158a8f23220587bb6c8fcda75da551 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 1 23:29:24 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + basic pledge() for ssh-agent, more refinement needed + + Upstream-ID: 5b5b03c88162fce549e45e1b6dd833f20bbb5e13 + +commit f0191d7c8e76e30551084b79341886d9bb38e453 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Nov 30 10:53:25 2015 +1100 + + Revert "stub for pledge(2) for systems that lack it" + + This reverts commit 14c887c8393adde2d9fd437d498be30f8c98535c. + + dtucker beat me to it :/ + +commit 6283cc72eb0e49a3470d30e07ca99a1ba9e89676 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Nov 30 10:37:03 2015 +1100 + + revert 7d4c7513: bring back S/Key prototypes + + (but leave RCSID changes) + +commit 14c887c8393adde2d9fd437d498be30f8c98535c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Nov 30 09:45:29 2015 +1100 + + stub for pledge(2) for systems that lack it + +commit 452c0b6af5d14c37553e30059bf74456012493f3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 29 22:18:37 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + pledge, better fatal() messages; feedback deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 3e00f6ccfe2b9a7a2d1dbba5409586180801488f + +commit 6da413c085dba37127687b2617a415602505729b +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 28 06:50:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + do not leak temp file if there is no known_hosts file + from craig leres, ok djm + + Upstream-ID: c820497fd5574844c782e79405c55860f170e426 + +commit 3ddd15e1b63a4d4f06c8ab16fbdd8a5a61764f16 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 30 07:23:53 2015 +1100 + + Add a null implementation of pledge. + + Fixes builds on almost everything. + +commit b1d6b3971ef256a08692efc409fc9ada719111cc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 28 06:41:03 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't include port number in tcpip-forward replies for + requests that don't allocate a port; bz#2509 diagnosed by Ron Frederick ok + markus + + Upstream-ID: 77efad818addb61ec638b5a2362f1554e21a970a + +commit 9080bd0b9cf10d0f13b1f642f20cb84285cb8d65 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 27 00:49:31 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + pledge "stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec" + except for the -p option (which sadly has insane semantics...) ok semarie + dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 8854bbd58279abe00f6c33f8094bdc02c8c65059 + +commit 4d90625b229cf6b3551d81550a9861897509a65f +Author: halex@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 20 23:04:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow comment change for all supported formats + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 5fc477cf2f119b2d44aa9c683af16cb00bb3744b + +commit 8ca915fc761519dd1f7766a550ec597a81db5646 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 20 01:45:29 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add cast to make -Werror clean + + Upstream-ID: 288db4f8f810bd475be01320c198250a04ff064d + +commit ac9473580dcd401f8281305af98635cdaae9bf96 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Nov 20 12:35:41 2015 +1100 + + fix multiple authentication using S/Key w/ privsep + + bz#2502, patch from Kevin Korb and feandil_ + +commit 88b6fcdeb87a2fb76767854d9eb15006662dca57 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 19 08:23:27 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ban ConnectionAttempts=0, it makes no sense and would cause + ssh_connect_direct() to print an uninitialised stack variable; bz#2500 + reported by dvw AT phas.ubc.ca + + Upstream-ID: 32b5134c608270583a90b93a07b3feb3cbd5f7d5 + +commit 964ab3ee7a8f96bdbc963d5b5a91933d6045ebe7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 19 01:12:32 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + trailing whitespace + + Upstream-ID: 31fe0ad7c4d08e87f1d69c79372f5e3c5cd79051 + +commit f96516d052dbe38561f6b92b0e4365d8e24bb686 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 19 01:09:38 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + print host certificate contents at debug level + + Upstream-ID: 39354cdd8a2b32b308fd03f98645f877f540f00d + +commit 499cf36fecd6040e30e2912dd25655bc574739a7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 19 01:08:55 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + move the certificate validity formatting code to + sshkey.[ch] + + Upstream-ID: f05f7c78fab20d02ff1d5ceeda533ef52e8fe523 + +commit bcb7bc77bbb1535d1008c7714085556f3065d99d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 18 08:37:28 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix "ssh-keygen -l" of private key, broken in support for + multiple plain keys on stdin + + Upstream-ID: 6b3132d2c62d03d0bad6f2bcd7e2d8b7dab5cd9d + +commit 259adb6179e23195c8f6913635ea71040d1ccd63 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 23:47:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Replace remaining calls to index(3) with strchr(3). OK + jca@ krw@ + + Upstream-ID: 33837d767a0cf1db1489b96055f9e330bc0bab6d + +commit c56a255162c2166884539c0a1f7511575325b477 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 22:53:07 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Allow fingerprinting from standard input "ssh-keygen -lf + -" + + Support fingerprinting multiple plain keys in a file and authorized_keys + files too (bz#1319) + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 903f8b4502929d6ccf53509e4e07eae084574b77 + +commit 5b4010d9b923cf1b46c9c7b1887c013c2967e204 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 22:51:05 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + always call privsep_preauth_child() regardless of whether + sshd was started by root; it does important priming before sandboxing and + failing to call it could result in sandbox violations later; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: c8a6d0d56c42f3faab38460dc917ca0d1705d383 + +commit 3a9f84b58b0534bbb485f1eeab75665e2d03371f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 22:50:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + improve sshkey_read() semantics; only update *cpp when a + key is successfully read; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: f371e78e8f4fab366cf69a42bdecedaed5d1b089 + +commit db6f8dc5dd5655b59368efd074994d4568bc3556 +Author: logan@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 06:13:04 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + 1) Use xcalloc() instead of xmalloc() to check for + potential overflow. (Feedback from both mmcc@ and djm@) 2) move set_size + just before the for loop. (suggested by djm@) + + OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 013534c308187284756c3141f11d2c0f33c47213 + +commit 383f10fb84a0fee3c01f9d97594f3e22aa3cd5e0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 00:30:02 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that + includes all current and future key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc). Also + add permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g. "no-pty" -> "pty". + This simplifies the task of setting up restricted keys and ensures they are + maximally-restricted, regardless of any permissions we might implement in the + future. + + Example: + + restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1... + + Idea from Jann Horn; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 04ceb9d448e46e67e13887a7ae5ea45b4f1719d0 + +commit e41a071f7bda6af1fb3f081bed0151235fa61f15 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 15 23:58:04 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correct section number for ssh-agent; + + Upstream-ID: 44be72fd8bcc167635c49b357b1beea8d5674bd6 + +commit 1a11670286acddcc19f5eff0966c380831fc4638 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 15 23:54:15 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + do not confuse mandoc by presenting "Dd"; + + Upstream-ID: 1470fce171c47b60bbc7ecd0fc717a442c2cfe65 + +commit f361df474c49a097bfcf16d1b7b5c36fcd844b4b +Author: jcs@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 15 22:26:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set to + 'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'. When enabled, a + private key that is used during authentication will be added to ssh-agent if + it is running (with confirmation enabled if set to 'confirm'). + + Initial version from Joachim Schipper many years ago. + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: a680db2248e8064ec55f8be72d539458c987d5f4 + +commit d87063d9baf5479b6e813d47dfb694a97df6f6f5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 13 04:39:35 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + send SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED replies to unexpected + messages during KEX; bz#2949, ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 2b3abdff344d53c8d505f45c83a7b12e84935786 + +commit 9fd04681a1e9b0af21e08ff82eb674cf0a499bfc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 13 04:38:06 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Support "none" as an argument for sshd_config + ForceCommand and ChrootDirectory. Useful inside Match blocks to override a + global default. bz#2486 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 7ef478d6592bc7db5c7376fc33b4443e63dccfa5 + +commit 94bc0b72c29e511cbbc5772190d43282e5acfdfe +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 13 04:34:15 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + support multiple certificates (one per line) and + reading from standard input (using "-f -") for "ssh-keygen -L"; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: ecbadeeef3926e5be6281689b7250a32a80e88db + +commit b6b9108f5b561c83612cb97ece4134eb59fde071 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 13 02:57:46 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + list a couple more options usable in Match blocks; + bz#2489 + + Upstream-ID: e4d03f39d254db4c0cc54101921bb89fbda19879 + +commit a7994b3f5a5a5a33b52b0a6065d08e888f0a99fb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 11 04:56:39 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + improve PEEK/POKE macros: better casts, don't multiply + evaluate arguments; ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 9a1889e19647615ededbbabab89064843ba92d3e + +commit 7d4c7513a7f209cb303a608ac6e46b3f1dfc11ec +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 11 01:48:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove prototypes for long-gone s/key support; ok + dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: db5bed3c57118af986490ab23d399df807359a79 + +commit 07889c75926c040b8e095949c724e66af26441cb +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Nov 14 18:44:49 2015 +1100 + + read back from libcrypto RAND when privdropping + + makes certain libcrypto implementations cache a /dev/urandom fd + in preparation of sandboxing. Based on patch by Greg Hartman. + +commit 1560596f44c01bb0cef977816410950ed17b8ecd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Nov 10 11:14:47 2015 +1100 + + Fix compiler warnings in the openssl header check. + + Noted by Austin English. + +commit e72a8575ffe1d8adff42c9abe9ca36938acc036b +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 8 23:24:03 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + -c before -H, in SYNOPSIS and usage(); + + Upstream-ID: 25e8c58a69e1f37fcd54ac2cd1699370acb5e404 + +commit 3a424cdd21db08c7b0ded902f97b8f02af5aa485 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 8 22:30:20 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add "ssh-keyscan -c ..." flag to allow fetching + certificates instead of plain keys; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 0947e2177dba92339eced9e49d3c5bf7dda69f82 + +commit 69fead5d7cdaa73bdece9fcba80f8e8e70b90346 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 8 22:08:38 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove slogin links; ok deraadt markus djm + + Upstream-ID: 39ba08548acde4c54f2d4520c202c2a863a3c730 + +commit 2fecfd486bdba9f51b3a789277bb0733ca36e1c0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 8 21:59:11 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix OOB read in packet code caused by missing return + statement found by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: a3e3a85434ebfa0690d4879091959591f30efc62 + +commit 5e288923a303ca672b686908320bc5368ebec6e6 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 6 00:31:41 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + 1. rlogin and rsh are long gone 2. protocol version isn't + of core relevance here, and v1 is going away + + ok markus@, deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 8b46bc94cf1ca7c8c1a75b1c958b2bb38d7579c8 + +commit 8b29008bbe97f33381d9b4b93fcfa304168d0286 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 5 09:48:05 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + "commandline" -> "command line", since there are so few + examples of the former in the pages, so many of the latter, and in some of + these pages we had multiple spellings; + + prompted by tj + + Upstream-ID: 78459d59bff74223f8139d9001ccd56fc4310659 + +commit 996b24cebf20077fbe5db07b3a2c20c2d9db736e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 29 20:57:34 2015 +1100 + + (re)wrap SYS_sendsyslog in ifdef. + + Replace ifdef that went missing in commit + c61b42f2678f21f05653ac2d3d241b48ab5d59ac. Fixes build on older + OpenBSDs. + +commit b67e2e76fcf1ae7c802eb27ca927e16c91a513ff +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 29 08:05:17 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + regress test for "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a + Match block + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 246c37ed64a2e5704d4c158ccdca1ff700e10647 + +commit abd9dbc3c0d8c8c7561347cfa22166156e78c077 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 26 02:50:58 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix typo certopt->certopts in shell variable. This would + cause the test to hang at a host key prompt if you have an A or CNAME for + "proxy" in your local domain. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 6ea03bcd39443a83c89e2c5606392ceb9585836a + +commit ed08510d38aef930a061ae30d10f2a9cf233bafa +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 29 08:05:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a Match block; + ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 853662c4036730b966aab77684390c47b9738c69 + +commit a4aef3ed29071719b2af82fdf1ac3c2514f82bc5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 27 08:54:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix execv arguments in a way less likely to cause grief + for -portable; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 5902bf0ea0371f39f1300698dc3b8e4105fc0fc5 + +commit 63d188175accea83305e89fafa011136ff3d96ad +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 27 01:44:45 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + log certificate serial in verbose() messages to match the + main auth success/fail message; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: dfc48b417c320b97c36ff351d303c142f2186288 + +commit 2aaba0cfd560ecfe92aa50c00750e6143842cf1f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 27 00:49:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + avoid de-const warning & shrink; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 69a85ef94832378952a22c172009cbf52aaa11db + +commit 03239c18312b9bab7d1c3b03062c61e8bbc1ca6e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Oct 25 23:42:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Expand tildes in filenames passed to -i before checking + whether or not the identity file exists. This means that if the shell + doesn't do the expansion (eg because the option and filename were given as a + single argument) then we'll still add the key. bz#2481, ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: db1757178a14ac519e9a3e1a2dbd21113cb3bfc6 + +commit 97e184e508dd33c37860c732c0eca3fc57698b40 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Oct 25 23:14:03 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Do not prepend "exec" to the shell command run by "Match + exec" in a config file. It's an unnecessary optimization from repurposed + ProxyCommand code and prevents some things working with some shells. + bz#2471, pointed out by res at qoxp.net. ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: a1ead25ae336bfa15fb58d8c6b5589f85b4c33a3 + +commit 8db134e7f457bcb069ec72bc4ee722e2af557c69 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 29 10:48:23 2015 +1100 + + Prevent name collisions with system glob (bz#2463) + + Move glob.h from includes.h to the only caller (sftp) and override the + names for the symbols. This prevents name collisions with the system glob + in the case where something other than ssh uses it (eg kerberos). With + jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@ + +commit 86c10dbbef6a5800d2431a66cf7f41a954bb62b5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 23 02:22:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Update expected group sizes to match recent code changes. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 0004f0ea93428969fe75bcfff0d521c553977794 + +commit 9ada37d36003a77902e90a3214981e417457cf13 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Oct 24 22:56:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix keyscan output for multiple hosts/addrs on one line + when host hashing or a non standard port is in use; bz#2479 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 5321dabfaeceba343da3c8a8b5754c6f4a0a307b + +commit 44fc7cd7dcef6c52c6b7e9ff830dfa32879bd319 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Oct 24 22:52:22 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + skip "Could not chdir to home directory" message when + chrooted + + patch from Christian Hesse in bz#2485 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 86783c1953da426dff5b03b03ce46e699d9e5431 + +commit a820a8618ec44735dabc688fab96fba38ad66bb2 +Author: sthen@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Oct 24 08:34:09 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Handle the split of tun(4) "link0" into tap(4) in ssh + tun-forwarding. Adapted from portable (using separate devices for this is the + normal case in most OS). ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 90facf4c59ce73d6741db1bc926e578ef465cd39 + +commit 66d2e229baa9fe57b868c373b05f7ff3bb20055b +Author: gsoares@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 21 11:33:03 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix memory leak in error path ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: dd2f402b0a0029b755df029fc7f0679e1365ce35 + +commit 7d6c0362039ceacdc1366b5df29ad5d2693c13e5 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 20 23:24:25 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Compare pointers to NULL rather than 0. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 21616cfea27eda65a06e772cc887530b9a1a27f8 + +commit f98a09cacff7baad8748c9aa217afd155a4d493f +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 20 03:36:35 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Replace a function-local allocation with stack memory. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c09fbbab637053a2ab9f33ca142b4e20a4c5a17e + +commit ac908c1eeacccfa85659594d92428659320fd57e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 22 09:35:24 2015 +1100 + + turn off PrintLastLog when --disable-lastlog + + bz#2278 from Brent Paulson + +commit b56deb847f4a0115a8bf488bf6ee8524658162fd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 16 22:32:22 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + increase the minimum modulus that we will send or accept in + diffie-hellman-group-exchange to 2048 bits; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 06dce7a24c17b999a0f5fadfe95de1ed6a1a9b6a + +commit 5ee0063f024bf5b3f3ffb275b8cd20055d62b4b9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 16 18:40:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + better handle anchored FQDNs (e.g. 'cvs.openbsd.org.') in + hostname canonicalisation - treat them as already canonical and remove the + trailing '.' before matching ssh_config; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: f7619652e074ac3febe8363f19622aa4853b679a + +commit e92c499a75477ecfe94dd7b4aed89f20b1fac5a7 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 16 17:07:24 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + 0 -> NULL when comparing with a char*. + + ok dtucker@, djm@. + + Upstream-ID: a928e9c21c0a9020727d99738ff64027c1272300 + +commit b1d38a3cc6fe349feb8d16a5f520ef12d1de7cb2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 15 23:51:40 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix some signed/unsigned integer type mismatches in + format strings; reported by Nicholas Lemonias + + Upstream-ID: 78cd55420a0eef68c4095bdfddd1af84afe5f95c + +commit 1a2663a15d356bb188196b6414b4c50dc12fd42b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 15 23:08:23 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + argument to sshkey_from_private() and sshkey_demote() + can't be NULL + + Upstream-ID: 0111245b1641d387977a9b38da15916820a5fd1f + +commit 0f754e29dd3760fc0b172c1220f18b753fb0957e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 16 10:53:14 2015 +1100 + + need va_copy before va_start + + reported by Nicholas Lemonias + +commit eb6c50d82aa1f0d3fc95f5630ea69761e918bfcd +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 15 15:48:28 2015 -0700 + + fix compilation on systems without SYMLOOP_MAX + +commit fafe1d84a210fb3dae7744f268059cc583db8c12 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 09:22:15 2015 -0700 + + s/SANDBOX_TAME/SANDBOX_PLEDGE/g + +commit 8f22911027ff6c17d7226d232ccd20727f389310 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:28:19 2015 +1100 + + upstream commit + + revision 1.20 + date: 2015/10/13 20:55:37; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; commitid: X39sl5ay1czgFIgp; + In rev 1.15 the sizeof argument was fixed in a strlcat() call but + the truncation check immediately following it was not updated to + match. Not an issue in practice since the buffers are the same + size. OK deraadt@ + +commit 23fa695bb735f54f04d46123662609edb6c76767 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:27:51 2015 +1100 + + upstream commit + + revision 1.19 + date: 2015/01/16 16:48:51; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: 0DYulI8hhujBHMcR; + Move to the universe. + review by millert, binary checking process with doug, concept with guenther + +commit c71be375a69af00c2d0a0c24d8752bec12d8fd1b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:27:08 2015 +1100 + + upstream commit + + revision 1.18 + date: 2014/10/19 03:56:28; author: doug; state: Exp; lines: +9 -9; commitid: U6QxmtbXrGoc02S5; + Revert last commit due to changed semantics found by make release. + +commit c39ad23b06e9aecc3ff788e92f787a08472905b1 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:26:24 2015 +1100 + + upstream commit + + revision 1.17 + date: 2014/10/18 20:43:52; author: doug; state: Exp; lines: +10 -10; commitid: I74hI1tVZtsspKEt; + Better POSIX compliance in realpath(3). + + millert@ made changes to realpath.c based on FreeBSD's version. I merged + Todd's changes into dl_realpath.c. + + ok millert@, guenther@ + +commit e929a43f957dbd1254aca2aaf85c8c00cbfc25f4 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:55 2015 +1100 + + upstream commit + + revision 1.16 + date: 2013/04/05 12:59:54; author: kurt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -1; + - Add comments regarding copies of these files also in libexec/ld.so + okay guenther@ + +commit 5225db68e58a1048cb17f0e36e0d33bc4a8fc410 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:32 2015 +1100 + + upstream commit + + revision 1.15 + date: 2012/09/13 15:39:05; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; + specify the bounds of the dst to strlcat (both values were static and + equal, but it is more correct) + from Michal Mazurek + +commit 7365fe5b4859de2305e40ea132da3823830fa710 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:09 2015 +1100 + + upstream commit + + revision 1.14 + date: 2011/07/24 21:03:00; author: miod; state: Exp; lines: +35 -13; + Recent Single Unix will malloc memory if the second argument of realpath() + is NULL, and third-party software is starting to rely upon this. + Adapted from FreeBSD via Jona Joachim (jaj ; hcl-club , .lu), with minor + tweaks from nicm@ and yours truly. + +commit e679c09cd1951f963793aa3d9748d1c3fdcf808f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 13 16:15:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + apply PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes filtering earlier, so all + skipped keys are noted before pubkey authentication starts. ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: ba4f52f54268a421a2a5f98bb375403f4cb044b8 + +commit 179c353f564ec7ada64b87730b25fb41107babd7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 13 00:21:27 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + free the correct IV length, don't assume it's always the + cipher blocksize; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: c260d9e5ec73628d9ff4b067fbb060eff5a7d298 + +commit 2539dce2a049a8f6bb0d44cac51f07ad48e691d3 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 9 01:37:08 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Change all tame callers to namechange to pledge(2). + + Upstream-ID: 17e654fc27ceaf523c60f4ffd9ec7ae4e7efc7f2 + +commit 9846a2f4067383bb76b4e31a9d2303e0a9c13a73 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 8 04:30:48 2015 +1100 + + hook tame(2) sandbox up to build + + OpenBSD only for now + +commit 0c46bbe68b70bdf0d6d20588e5847e71f3739fe6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 7 15:59:12 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + include PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes in ssh -G config dump + + Upstream-ID: 6c097ce6ffebf6fe393fb7988b5d152a5d6b36bb + +commit bdcb73fb7641b1cf73c0065d1a0dd57b1e8b778e +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 7 14:45:30 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + UsePrivilegeSeparation defaults to sandbox now. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: bff136c38bcae89df82e044d2f42de21e1ad914f + +commit 2905d6f99c837bb699b6ebc61711b19acd030709 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 7 00:54:06 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't try to change tun device flags if they are already + what we need; makes it possible to use tun/tap networking as non- root user + if device permissions and interface flags are pre-established; based on patch + by Ossi Herrala + + Upstream-ID: 89099ac4634cd477b066865acf54cb230780fd21 + +commit 0dc74512bdb105b048883f07de538b37e5e024d4 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Oct 5 18:33:05 2015 -0700 + + unbreak merge botch + +commit fdd020e86439afa7f537e2429d29d4b744c94331 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 6 01:20:59 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + adapt to recent sshkey_parse_private_fileblob() API + change + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 5c0d818da511e33e0abf6a92a31bd7163b7ad988 + +commit 21ae8ee3b630b0925f973db647a1b9aa5fcdd4c5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 24 07:15:39 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix command-line option to match what was actually + committed + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 3e8c24a2044e8afd37e7ce17b69002ca817ac699 + +commit e14ac43b75e68f1ffbd3e1a5e44143c8ae578dcd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 24 06:16:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + regress test for CertificateFile; patch from Meghana Bhat + via bz#2436 + + Upstream-Regress-ID: e7a6e980cbe0f8081ba2e83de40d06c17be8bd25 + +commit 905b054ed24e0d5b4ef226ebf2c8bfc02ae6d4ad +Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 5 17:11:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit some more bzero->explicit_bzero, from Michael McConville Upstream-ID: 17f19545685c33327db2efdc357c1c9225ff00d0 -commit 8f5b93026797b9f7fba90d0c717570421ccebbd3 +commit b007159a0acdbcf65814b3ee05dbe2cf4ea46011 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 2 15:52:55 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix email + + Upstream-ID: 72150f2d54b94de14ebef1ea054ef974281bf834 + +commit b19e1b4ab11884c4f62aee9f8ab53127a4732658 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 2 01:39:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + a sandbox using tame ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 4ca24e47895e72f5daaa02f3e3d3e5ca2d820fa3 + +commit c61b42f2678f21f05653ac2d3d241b48ab5d59ac +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 2 01:39:26 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + re-order system calls in order of risk, ok i'll be + honest, ordered this way they look like tame... ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 42a1e6d251fd8be13c8262bee026059ae6328813 + +commit c5f7c0843cb6e6074a93c8ac34e49ce33a6f5546 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 25 18:19:54 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + some certificatefile tweaks; ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 0e5a7852c28c05fc193419cc7e50e64c1c535af0 + +commit 4e44a79a07d4b88b6a4e5e8c1bed5f58c841b1b8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 24 06:15:11 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add ssh_config CertificateFile option to explicitly list + a certificate; patch from Meghana Bhat on bz#2436; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 58648ec53c510b41c1f46d8fe293aadc87229ab8 + +commit e3cbb06ade83c72b640a53728d362bbefa0008e2 +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 22 08:33:23 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix two typos. + + Upstream-ID: 424402c0d8863a11b51749bacd7f8d932083b709 + +commit 8408218c1ca88cb17d15278174a24a94a6f65fe1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 21 04:31:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix possible hang on closed output; bz#2469 reported by Tomas + Kuthan ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: f7afd41810f8540f524284f1be6b970859f94fe3 + +commit 0097248f90a00865082e8c146b905a6555cc146f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 11 04:55:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + skip if running as root; many systems (inc OpenBSD) allow + root to ptrace arbitrary processes + + Upstream-Regress-ID: be2b925df89360dff36f972951fa0fa793769038 + +commit 9c06c814aff925e11a5cc592c06929c258a014f6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 11 03:44:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + try all supported key types here; bz#2455 reported by + Jakub Jelen + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 188cb7d9031cdbac3a0fa58b428b8fa2b2482bba + +commit 3c019a936b43f3e2773f3edbde7c114d73caaa4c +Author: tim@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 13 14:39:16 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + - Fix error message: passphrase needs to be at least 5 + characters, not 4. - Remove unused function argument. - Remove two + unnecessary variables. + + OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 13010c05bfa8b523da1c0dc19e81dd180662bc30 + +commit 2681cdb6e0de7c1af549dac37a9531af202b4434 +Author: tim@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 13 13:48:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + When adding keys to the agent, don't ignore the comment + of keys for which the user is prompted for a passphrase. + + Tweak and OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: dc737c620a5a8d282cc4f66e3b9b624e9abefbec + +commit 14692f7b8251cdda847e648a82735eef8a4d2a33 Author: guenther@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 11 08:50:04 2015 +0000 upstream commit Use explicit_bzero() when zeroing before free() from Michael McConville (mmcconv1 (at) sccs.swarthmore.edu) ok millert@ djm@ Upstream-ID: 2e3337db046c3fe70c7369ee31515ac73ec00f50 -commit d77148e3a3ef6c29b26ec74331455394581aa257 +commit 846f6fa4cfa8483a9195971dbdd162220f199d85 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 11 06:55:46 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sync -Q in usage() to SYNOPSIS; since it's drastically + shorter, i've reformatted the block to sync with the man (80 cols) and saved + a line; + + Upstream-ID: 86e2c65c3989a0777a6258a77e589b9f6f354abd + +commit 95923e0520a8647417ee6dcdff44694703dfeef0 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 11 06:51:39 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + tweak previous; + + Upstream-ID: f29b3cfcfd9aa31fa140c393e7bd48c1c74139d6 + +commit 86ac462f833b05d8ed9de9c50ccb295d7faa79ff +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 11 05:27:02 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Update usage to match man page. + + Upstream-ID: 9e85aefaecfb6aaf34c7cfd0700cd21783a35675 + +commit 674b3b68c1d36b2562324927cd03857b565e05e8 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 8 21:59:11 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Sep 11 03:47:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit - fix OOB read in packet code caused by missing return - statement found by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ deraadt@ + expand %i in ControlPath to UID; bz#2449 - Upstream-ID: a3e3a85434ebfa0690d4879091959591f30efc62 + patch from Christian Hesse w/ feedback from dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 2ba8d303e555a84e2f2165ab4b324b41e80ab925 -commit 076d849e17ab12603627f87b301e2dca71bae518 +commit c0f55db7ee00c8202b05cb4b9ad4ce72cc45df41 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 11 03:42:32 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention -Q key-plain and -Q key-cert; bz#2455 pointed out + by Jakub Jelen + + Upstream-ID: c8f1f8169332e4fa73ac96b0043e3b84e01d4896 + +commit cfffbdb10fdf0f02d3f4232232eef7ec3876c383 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Sep 14 16:24:21 2015 +1000 + + Use ssh-keygen -A when generating host keys. + + Use ssh-keygen -A instead of per-keytype invocations when generating host + keys. Add tests when doing host-key-force since we can't use ssh-keygen -A + since it can't specify alternate locations. bz#2459, ok djm@ + +commit 366bada1e9e124654aac55b72b6ccf878755b0dc +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 11 13:29:22 2015 +1000 + + Correct default value for --with-ssh1. + + bz#2457, from konto-mindrot.org at walimnieto.com. + +commit 2bca8a43e7dd9b04d7070824ffebb823c72587b2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 11 03:13:36 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + more clarity on what AuthorizedKeysFile=none does; based + on diff by Thiebaud Weksteen + + Upstream-ID: 78ab87f069080f0cc3bc353bb04eddd9e8ad3704 + +commit 61942ea4a01e6db4fdf37ad61de81312ffe310e9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 9 00:52:44 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + openssh_RSA_verify return type is int, so don't make it + size_t within the function itself with only negative numbers or zero assigned + to it. bz#2460 + + Upstream-ID: b6e794b0c7fc4f9f329509263c8668d35f83ea55 + +commit 4f7cc2f8cc861a21e6dbd7f6c25652afb38b9b96 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 4 08:21:47 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Plug minor memory leaks when options are used more than + once. bz#2182, patch from Tiago Cunha, ok deraadt djm + + Upstream-ID: 5b84d0401e27fe1614c10997010cc55933adb48e + +commit 7ad8b287c8453a3e61dbc0d34d467632b8b06fc8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 11 13:11:02 2015 +1000 + + Force resolution of _res for correct detection. + + bz#2259, from sconeu at yahoo.com. + +commit 26ad18247213ff72b4438abe7fc660c958810fa2 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Nov 14 18:44:49 2015 +1100 +Date: Thu Sep 10 10:57:41 2015 +1000 - read back from libcrypto RAND when privdropping + allow getrandom syscall; from Felix von Leitner + +commit 5245bc1e6b129a10a928f73f11c3aa32656c44b4 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 4 06:40:45 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit - makes certain libcrypto implementations cache a /dev/urandom fd - in preparation of sandboxing. Based on patch by Greg Hartman. + full stop belongs outside the brackets, not inside; + + Upstream-ID: 99d098287767799ac33d2442a05b5053fa5a551a -commit f72adc0150011a28f177617a8456e1f83733099d +commit a85768a9321d74b41219eeb3c9be9f1702cbf6a5 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 13 22:42:23 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Sep 4 04:56:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit - unbreak connections with peers that set - first_kex_follows; fix from Matt Johnston va bz#2515 + add a debug2() right before DNS resolution; it's a place + where ssh could previously silently hang for a while. bz#2433 - Upstream-ID: decc88ec4fc7515594fdb42b04aa03189a44184b + Upstream-ID: 52a1a3e0748db66518e7598352c427145692a6a0 -commit 04bd8d019ccd906cac1a2b362517b8505f3759e6 +commit 46152af8d27aa34d5d26ed1c371dc8aa142d4730 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 12 23:42:54 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Sep 4 04:55:24 2015 +0000 upstream commit - use explicit_bzero() more liberally in the buffer code; ok - deraadt + correct function name in error messages - Upstream-ID: 0ece37069fd66bc6e4f55eb1321f93df372b65bf + Upstream-ID: 92fb2798617ad9561370897f4ab60adef2ff4c0e +commit a954cdb799a4d83c2d40fbf3e7b9f187fbfd72fc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 4 04:47:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + better document ExitOnForwardFailure; bz#2444, ok + dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: a126209b5a6d9cb3117ac7ab5bc63d284538bfc2 + +commit f54d8ac2474b6fc3afa081cf759b48a6c89d3319 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 4 04:44:08 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't record hostbased authentication hostkeys as user + keys in test for multiple authentication with the same key + + Upstream-ID: 26b368fa2cff481f47f37e01b8da1ae5b57b1adc + +commit ac3451dd65f27ecf85dc045c46d49e2bbcb8dddd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 4 03:57:38 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove extra newline in nethack-mode hostkey; from + Christian Hesse bz#2686 + + Upstream-ID: 4f56368b1cc47baeea0531912186f66007fd5b92 + +commit 9e3ed9ebb1a7e47c155c28399ddf09b306ea05df +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 4 04:23:10 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + trim junk from end of file; bz#2455 from Jakub Jelen + + Upstream-Regress-ID: a4e64e8931e40d23874b047074444eff919cdfe6 + +commit f3a3ea180afff080bab82087ee0b60db9fd84f6c +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 2 07:51:12 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix occurrences of "r = func() != 0" which result in the + wrong error codes being returned due to != having higher precedence than =. + + ok deraadt@ markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 5fc35c9fc0319cc6fca243632662d2f06b5fd840 + +commit f498a98cf83feeb7ea01c15cd1c98b3111361f3a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Sep 3 09:11:22 2015 +1000 + + don't check for yp_match; ok tim@ + +commit 9690b78b7848b0b376980a61d51b1613e187ddb5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 21 23:57:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Improve printing of KEX offers and decisions + + The debug output now labels the client and server offers and the + negotiated options. ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 8db921b3f92a4565271b1c1fbce6e7f508e1a2cb + +commit 60a92470e21340e1a3fc10f9c7140d8e1519dc55 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 21 23:53:08 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix printing (ssh -G ...) of HostKeyAlgorithms=+... + Reported by Bryan Drewery + + Upstream-ID: 19ad20c41bd5971e006289b6f9af829dd46c1293 + +commit 6310f60fffca2d1e464168e7d1f7e3b6b0268897 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 21 23:52:30 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix expansion of HostkeyAlgorithms=+... + + Reported by Bryan Drewery + + Upstream-ID: 70ca1deea39d758ba36d36428ae832e28566f78d + +commit e774e5ea56237fd626a8161f9005023dff3e76c9 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 21 23:29:31 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Improve size == 0, count == 0 checking in mm_zalloc, + which is "array" like. Discussed with tedu, millert, otto.... and ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 899b021be43b913fad3eca1aef44efe710c53e29 + +commit 189de02d9ad6f3645417c0ddf359b923aae5f926 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Aug 21 15:45:02 2015 +1000 + + expose POLLHUP and POLLNVAL for netcat.c + commit e91346dc2bbf460246df2ab591b7613908c1b0ad Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 21 14:49:03 2015 +1000 we don't use Github for issues/pull-requests commit a4f5b507c708cc3dc2c8dd2d02e4416d7514dc23 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 21 14:43:55 2015 +1000 fix URL for connect.c commit d026a8d3da0f8186598442997c7d0a28e7275414 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 21 13:47:10 2015 +1000 update version numbers for 7.1 commit 78f8f589f0ca1c9f41e5a9bae3cda5ce8a6b42ed Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 21 03:45:26 2015 +0000 upstream commit openssh-7.1 Upstream-ID: ff7b1ef4b06caddfb45e08ba998128c88be3d73f commit 32a181980c62fce94f7f9ffaf6a79d90f0c309cf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 21 03:42:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix inverted logic that broke PermitRootLogin; reported by Mantas Mikulenas; ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 260dd6a904c1bb7e43267e394b1c9cf70bdd5ea5 commit ce445b0ed927e45bd5bdce8f836eb353998dd65c Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 20 22:32:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit Do not cast result of malloc/calloc/realloc* if stdlib.h is in scope ok krw millert Upstream-ID: 5e50ded78cadf3841556649a16cc4b1cb6c58667 commit 05291e5288704d1a98bacda269eb5a0153599146 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 20 19:20:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit In the certificates section, be consistent about using "host_key" and "user_key" for the respective key types. ok sthen@ deraadt@ Upstream-ID: 9e037ea3b15577b238604c5533e082a3947f13cb commit 8543d4ef6f2e9f98c3e6b77c894ceec30c5e4ae4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 19 23:21:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit Better compat matching for WinSCP, add compat matching for FuTTY (fork of PuTTY); ok markus@ deraadt@ Upstream-ID: 24001d1ac115fa3260fbdc329a4b9aeb283c5389 commit ec6eda16ebab771aa3dfc90629b41953b999cb1e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 19 23:19:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix double-free() in error path of DSA key generation reported by Mateusz Kocielski; ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 4735d8f888b10599a935fa1b374787089116713c commit 45b0eb752c94954a6de046bfaaf129e518ad4b5b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 19 23:18:26 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix free() of uninitialised pointer reported by Mateusz Kocielski; ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 519552b050618501a06b7b023de5cb104e2c5663 commit c837643b93509a3ef538cb6624b678c5fe32ff79 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 19 23:17:51 2015 +0000 upstream commit fixed unlink([uninitialised memory]) reported by Mateusz Kocielski; ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 14a0c4e7d891f5a8dabc4b89d4f6b7c0d5a20109 commit 1f8d3d629cd553031021068eb9c646a5f1e50994 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 14 15:32:41 2015 +0000 upstream commit match myproposal.h order; from brian conway (i snuck in a tweak while here) ok dtucker Upstream-ID: 35174a19b5237ea36aa3798f042bf5933b772c67 commit 1dc8d93ce69d6565747eb44446ed117187621b26 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 6 14:53:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit add prohibit-password as a synonymn for without-password, since the without-password is causing too many questions. Harden it to ban all but pubkey, hostbased, and GSSAPI auth (when the latter is enabled) from djm, ok markus Upstream-ID: d53317d7b28942153e6236d3fd6e12ceb482db7a commit 90a95a4745a531b62b81ce3b025e892bdc434de5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 11 13:53:41 2015 +1000 update version in README commit 318c37743534b58124f1bab37a8a0087a3a9bd2f Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 11 13:53:09 2015 +1000 update versions in *.spec commit 5e75f5198769056089fb06c4d738ab0e5abc66f7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 11 13:34:12 2015 +1000 set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised. Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@ commit d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 11 13:33:24 2015 +1000 Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it. Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@ commit 88763a6c893bf3dfe951ba9271bf09715e8d91ca Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 27 12:14:25 2015 +1000 Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD. commit 55b263fb7cfeacb81aaf1c2036e0394c881637da Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Aug 10 11:13:44 2015 +1000 let principals-command.sh work for noexec /var/run commit 2651e34cd11b1aac3a0fe23b86d8c2ff35c07897 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 6 11:43:42 2015 +1000 work around echo -n / sed behaviour in tests commit d85dad81778c1aa8106acd46930b25fdf0d15b2a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 5 05:27:33 2015 +0000 upstream commit adjust for RSA minimum modulus switch; ok deraadt@ Upstream-Regress-ID: 5a72c83431b96224d583c573ca281cd3a3ebfdae commit 57e8e229bad5fe6056b5f1199665f5f7008192c6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 4 05:23:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit backout SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE increase for this release; problems spotted by sthen@ ok deraadt@ markus@ Upstream-ID: d0bd60dde9e8c3cd7030007680371894c1499822 commit f097d0ea1e0889ca0fa2e53a00214e43ab7fa22a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Aug 2 09:56:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit openssh 7.0; ok deraadt@ Upstream-ID: c63afdef537f57f28ae84145c5a8e29e9250221f commit 3d5728a0f6874ce4efb16913a12963595070f3a9 Author: chris@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 31 15:38:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit Allow PermitRootLogin to be overridden by config ok markus@ deeradt@ Upstream-ID: 5cf3e26ed702888de84e2dc9d0054ccf4d9125b4 commit 6f941396b6835ad18018845f515b0c4fe20be21a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 30 23:09:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix pty permissions; patch from Nikolay Edigaryev; ok deraadt Upstream-ID: 40ff076d2878b916fbfd8e4f45dbe5bec019e550 commit f4373ed1e8fbc7c8ce3fc4ea97d0ba2e0c1d7ef0 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 30 19:23:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit change default: PermitRootLogin without-password matching install script changes coming as well ok djm markus Upstream-ID: 0e2a6c4441daf5498b47a61767382bead5eb8ea6 commit 0c30ba91f87fcda7e975e6ff8a057f624e87ea1c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 30 12:31:39 2015 +1000 downgrade OOM adjustment logging: verbose -> debug commit f9eca249d4961f28ae4b09186d7dc91de74b5895 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 30 00:01:34 2015 +0000 upstream commit Allow ssh_config and sshd_config kex parameters options be prefixed by a '+' to indicate that the specified items be appended to the default rather than replacing it. approach suggested by dtucker@, feedback dlg@, ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 0f901137298fc17095d5756ff1561a7028e8882a commit 5cefe769105a2a2e3ca7479d28d9a325d5ef0163 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 29 08:34:54 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix bug in previous; was printing incorrect string for failed host key algorithms negotiation Upstream-ID: 22c0dc6bc61930513065d92e11f0753adc4c6e6e commit f319912b0d0e1675b8bb051ed8213792c788bcb2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 29 04:43:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit include the peer's offer when logging a failure to negotiate a mutual set of algorithms (kex, pubkey, ciphers, etc.) ok markus@ Upstream-ID: bbb8caabf5c01790bb845f5ce135565248d7c796 commit b6ea0e573042eb85d84defb19227c89eb74cf05a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 28 23:20:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit add Cisco to the list of clients that choke on the hostkeys update extension. Pointed out by Howard Kash Upstream-ID: c9eadde28ecec056c73d09ee10ba4570dfba7e84 commit 3f628c7b537291c1019ce86af90756fb4e66d0fd Author: guenther@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 27 16:29:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit Permit kbind(2) use in the sandbox now, to ease testing of ld.so work using it reminded by miod@, ok deraadt@ Upstream-ID: 523922e4d1ba7a091e3824e77a8a3c818ee97413 commit ebe27ebe520098bbc0fe58945a87ce8490121edb Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 20 18:44:12 2015 +0000 upstream commit Move .Pp before .Bl, not after to quiet mandoc -Tlint. Noticed by jmc@ Upstream-ID: 59fadbf8407cec4e6931e50c53cfa0214a848e23 commit d5d91d0da819611167782c66ab629159169d94d4 Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 20 18:42:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit Sync usage with SYNOPSIS Upstream-ID: 7a321a170181a54f6450deabaccb6ef60cf3f0b7 commit 79ec2142fbc68dd2ed9688608da355fc0b1ed743 Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 20 15:39:52 2015 +0000 upstream commit Better desciption of Unix domain socket forwarding. bz#2423; ok jmc@ Upstream-ID: 85e28874726897e3f26ae50dfa2e8d2de683805d commit d56fd1828074a4031b18b8faa0bf949669eb18a0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jul 20 11:19:51 2015 +1000 make realpath.c compile -Wsign-compare clean commit c63c9a691dca26bb7648827f5a13668832948929 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 20 00:30:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit mention that the default of UseDNS=no implies that hostnames cannot be used for host matching in sshd_config and authorized_keys; bz#2045, ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 0812705d5f2dfa59aab01f2764ee800b1741c4e1 commit 63ebcd0005e9894fcd6871b7b80aeea1fec0ff76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 18 08:02:17 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't ignore PKCS#11 hosted keys that return empty CKA_ID; patch by Jakub Jelen via bz#2429; ok markus Upstream-ID: 2f7c94744eb0342f8ee8bf97b2351d4e00116485 commit b15fd989c8c62074397160147a8d5bc34b3f3c63 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 18 08:00:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit skip uninitialised PKCS#11 slots; patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2427 ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 744c1e7796e237ad32992d0d02148e8a18f27d29 commit 5b64f85bb811246c59ebab70aed331f26ba37b18 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 18 07:57:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit only query each keyboard-interactive device once per authentication request regardless of how many times it is listed; ok markus@ Upstream-ID: d73fafba6e86030436ff673656ec1f33d9ffeda1 commit cd7324d0667794eb5c236d8a4e0f236251babc2d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 03:34:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove -u flag to diff (only used for error output) to make things easier for -portable Upstream-Regress-ID: a5d6777d2909540d87afec3039d9bb2414ade548 commit deb8d99ecba70b67f4af7880b11ca8768df9ec3a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 03:09:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit direct-streamlocal@openssh.com Unix domain foward messages do not contain a "reserved for future use" field and in fact, serverloop.c checks that there isn't one. Remove erroneous mention from PROTOCOL description. bz#2421 from Daniel Black Upstream-ID: 3d51a19e64f72f764682f1b08f35a8aa810a43ac commit 356b61f365405b5257f5b2ab446e5d7bd33a7b52 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 03:04:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit describe magic for setting up Unix domain socket fowards via the mux channel; bz#2422 patch from Daniel Black Upstream-ID: 943080fe3864715c423bdeb7c920bb30c4eee861 commit d3e2aee41487d55b8d7d40f538b84ff1db7989bc Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 17 12:52:34 2015 +1000 Check if realpath works on nonexistent files. On some platforms the native realpath doesn't work with non-existent files (this is actually specified in some versions of POSIX), however the sftp spec says its realpath with "canonicalize any given path name". On those platforms, use realpath from the compat library. In addition, when compiling with -DFORTIFY_SOURCE, glibc redefines the realpath symbol to the checked version, so redefine ours to something else so we pick up the compat version we want. bz#2428, ok djm@ commit 25b14610dab655646a109db5ef8cb4c4bf2a48a0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 02:47:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix incorrect test for SSH1 keys when compiled without SSH1 support Upstream-ID: 6004d720345b8e481c405e8ad05ce2271726e451 commit df56a8035d429b2184ee94aaa7e580c1ff67f73a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 15 08:00:11 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix NULL-deref when SSH1 reenabled Upstream-ID: f22fd805288c92b3e9646782d15b48894b2d5295 commit 41e38c4d49dd60908484e6703316651333f16b93 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 15 07:19:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit regen RSA1 test keys; the last batch was missing their private parts Upstream-Regress-ID: 7ccf437305dd63ff0b48dd50c5fd0f4d4230c10a commit 5bf0933184cb622ca3f96d224bf3299fd2285acc Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 10 06:23:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit Adapt tests, now that DSA if off by default; use PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to test DSA. Upstream-Regress-ID: 0ff2a3ff5ac1ce5f92321d27aa07b98656efcc5c commit 7a6e3fd7b41dbd3756b6bf9acd67954c0b1564cc Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 7 14:54:16 2015 +0000 upstream commit regen test data after mktestdata.sh changes Upstream-Regress-ID: 3495ecb082b9a7c048a2d7c5c845d3bf181d25a4 commit 7c8c174c69f681d4910fa41c37646763692b28e2 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 7 14:53:30 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt tests to new minimum RSA size and default FP format Upstream-Regress-ID: a4b30afd174ce82b96df14eb49fb0b81398ffd0e commit 6a977a4b68747ade189e43d302f33403fd4a47ac Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 04:39:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit legacy v00 certificates are gone; adapt and don't try to test them; "sure" markus@ dtucker@ Upstream-Regress-ID: c57321e69b3cd4a3b3396dfcc43f0803d047da12 commit 0c4123ad5e93fb90fee9c6635b13a6cdabaac385 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 1 23:11:18 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't expect SSH v.1 in unittests Upstream-Regress-ID: f8812b16668ba78e6a698646b2a652b90b653397 commit 3c099845798a817cdde513c39074ec2063781f18 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 15 06:38:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit turn SSH1 back on to match src/usr.bin/ssh being tested Upstream-Regress-ID: 6c4f763a2f0cc6893bf33983919e9030ae638333 commit b1dc2b33689668c75e95f873a42d5aea1f4af1db Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 13 04:57:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit Add "PuTTY_Local:" to the clients to which we do not offer DH-GEX. This was the string that was used for development versions prior to September 2014 and they don't do RFC4419 DH-GEX, but unfortunately there are some extant products based on those versions. bx2424 from Jay Rouman, ok markus@ djm@ Upstream-ID: be34d41e18b966832fe09ca243d275b81882e1d5 commit 3a1638dda19bbc73d0ae02b4c251ce08e564b4b9 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 10 06:21:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit Turn off DSA by default; add HostKeyAlgorithms to the server and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the client side, so it still can be tested or turned back on; feedback and ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 8450a9e6d83f80c9bfed864ff061dfc9323cec21 commit 16db0a7ee9a87945cc594d13863cfcb86038db59 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 9 09:49:46 2015 +0000 upstream commit re-enable ed25519-certs if compiled w/o openssl; ok djm Upstream-ID: e10c90808b001fd2c7a93778418e9b318f5c4c49 commit c355bf306ac33de6545ce9dac22b84a194601e2f Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 8 20:24:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit no need to include the old buffer/key API Upstream-ID: fb13c9f7c0bba2545f3eb0a0e69cb0030819f52b commit a3cc48cdf9853f1e832d78cb29bedfab7adce1ee Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 8 19:09:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit typedefs for Cipher&CipherContext are unused Upstream-ID: 50e6a18ee92221d23ad173a96d5b6c42207cf9a7 commit a635bd06b5c427a57c3ae760d3a2730bb2c863c0 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 8 19:04:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit xmalloc.h is unused Upstream-ID: afb532355b7fa7135a60d944ca1e644d1d63cb58 commit 2521cf0e36c7f3f6b19f206da0af134f535e4a31 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 8 19:01:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit compress.c is gone Upstream-ID: 174fa7faa9b9643cba06164b5e498591356fbced commit c65a7aa6c43aa7a308ee1ab8a96f216169ae9615 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 04:05:54 2015 +0000 upstream commit another SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE that needed cranking Upstream-ID: 9d8826cafe96aab4ae8e2f6fd22800874b7ffef1 commit b1f383da5cd3cb921fc7776f17a14f44b8a31757 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 03:56:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit add an XXX reminder for getting correct key paths from sshd_config Upstream-ID: feae52b209d7782ad742df04a4260e9fe41741db commit 933935ce8d093996c34d7efa4d59113163080680 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 03:49:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit refuse to generate or accept RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits; feedback and ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 7ea3d31271366ba264f06e34a3539bf1ac30f0ba commit bdfd29f60b74f3e678297269dc6247a5699583c1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 03:47:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit turn off 1024 bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange method (already off in server, this turns it off in the client by default too) ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: f59b88f449210ab7acf7d9d88f20f1daee97a4fa commit c28fc62d789d860c75e23a9fa9fb250eb2beca57 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 03:43:18 2015 +0000 upstream commit delete support for legacy v00 certificates; "sure" markus@ dtucker@ Upstream-ID: b5b9bb5f9202d09e88f912989d74928601b6636f commit 564d63e1b4a9637a209d42a9d49646781fc9caef Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 1 23:10:47 2015 +0000 upstream commit Compile-time disable SSH v.1 again Upstream-ID: 1d4b513a3a06232f02650b73bad25100d1b800af commit 868109b650504dd9bcccdb1f51d0906f967c20ff Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 1 02:39:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit twiddle PermitRootLogin back Upstream-ID: 2bd23976305d0512e9f84d054e1fc23cd70b89f2 commit 7de4b03a6e4071d454b72927ffaf52949fa34545 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 1 02:32:17 2015 +0000 upstream commit twiddle; (this commit marks the openssh-6.9 release) Upstream-ID: 78500582819f61dd8adee36ec5cc9b9ac9351234 commit 1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 1 02:26:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit better refuse ForwardX11Trusted=no connections attempted after ForwardX11Timeout expires; reported by Jann Horn Upstream-ID: bf0fddadc1b46a0334e26c080038313b4b6dea21 commit 47aa7a0f8551b471fcae0447c1d78464f6dba869 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 1 01:56:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit put back default PermitRootLogin=no Upstream-ID: 7bdedd5cead99c57ed5571f3b6b7840922d5f728 commit 984b064fe2a23733733262f88d2e1b2a1a501662 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit openssh-6.9 Upstream-ID: 6cfe8e1904812531080e6ab6e752d7001b5b2d45 commit d921082ed670f516652eeba50705e1e9f6325346 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit reset default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' (momentarily, for release) Upstream-ID: cad8513527066e65dd7a1c16363d6903e8cefa24 commit 66295e0e1ba860e527f191b6325d2d77dec4dbce Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 1 11:49:12 2015 +1000 crank version numbers for release commit 37035c07d4f26bb1fbe000d2acf78efdb008681d Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 1 10:49:37 2015 +1000 s/--with-ssh1/--without-ssh1/ commit 629df770dbadc2accfbe1c81b3f31f876d0acd84 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 30 05:25:07 2015 +0000 upstream commit fatal() when a remote window update causes the window value to overflow. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok markus@ Upstream-ID: ead397a9aceb3bf74ebfa5fcaf259d72e569f351 commit f715afebe735d61df3fd30ad72d9ac1c8bd3b5f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 30 05:23:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit Fix math error in remote window calculations that causes eventual stalls for datagram channels. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok markus@ Upstream-ID: be54059d11bf64e0d85061f7257f53067842e2ab commit 52fb6b9b034fcfd24bf88cc7be313e9c31de9889 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jun 30 16:05:40 2015 +1000 skip IPv6-related portions on hosts without IPv6 with Tim Rice commit 512caddf590857af6aa12218461b5c0441028cf5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 29 22:35:12 2015 +0000 upstream commit add getpid to sandbox, reachable by grace_alarm_handler reported by Jakub Jelen; bz#2419 Upstream-ID: d0da1117c16d4c223954995d35b0f47c8f684cd8 commit 78c2a4f883ea9aba866358e2acd9793a7f42ca93 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 26 05:13:20 2015 +0000 upstream commit Fix \-escaping bug that caused forward path parsing to skip two characters and skip past the end of the string. Based on patch by Salvador Fandino; ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 7b879dc446335677cbe4cb549495636a0535f3bd commit bc20205c91c9920361d12b15d253d4997dba494a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jun 25 09:51:39 2015 +1000 add missing pselect6 patch from Jakub Jelen commit 9d27fb73b4a4e5e99cb880af790d5b1ce44f720a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 24 23:47:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit correct test to sshkey_sign(); spotted by Albert S. Upstream-ID: 5f7347f40f0ca6abdaca2edb3bd62f4776518933 commit 7ed01a96a1911d8b4a9ef4f3d064e1923bfad7e3 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups in the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in this case. ok deraadt@ djm@ Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01 commit 882f8bf94f79528caa65b0ba71c185d705bb7195 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups in the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in this case. ok deraadt@ djm@ Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01 commit 9488538a726951e82b3a4374f3c558d72c80a89b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 23:42:16 2015 +0000 upstream commit Don't count successful partial authentication as failures in monitor; this may have caused the monitor to refuse multiple authentications that would otherwise have successfully completed; ok markus@ Upstream-ID: eb74b8e506714d0f649bd5c300f762a527af04a3 commit 63b78d003bd8ca111a736e6cea6333da50f5f09b Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 12:29:57 2015 +0000 upstream commit Don't call setgroups if we have zero groups; there's no guarantee that it won't try to deref the pointer. Based on a patch from mail at quitesimple.org, ok djm deraadt Upstream-ID: 2fff85e11d7a9a387ef7fddf41fbfaf566708ab1 commit 5c15e22c691c79a47747bcf5490126656f97cecd Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jun 18 15:07:56 2015 +1000 fix syntax error commit 596dbca82f3f567fb3d2d69af4b4e1d3ba1e6403 Author: jsing@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 15 18:44:22 2015 +0000 upstream commit If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified, however AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is not (or is set to "none"), authentication will potentially fail due to key_cert_check_authority() failing to locate a principal that matches the username, even though an authorized principal has already been matched in the output of the subprocess. Fix this by using the same logic to determine if pw->pw_name should be passed, as is used to determine if a authorized principal must be matched earlier on. ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 43b42302ec846b0ea68aceb40677245391b9409d commit aff3e94c0d75d0d0fa84ea392b50ab04f8c57905 Author: jsing@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 15 18:42:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit Make the arguments to match_principals_command() similar to match_principals_file(), by changing the last argument a struct sshkey_cert * and dereferencing key->cert in the caller. No functional change. ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 533f99b844b21b47342b32b62e198dfffcf8651c commit 97e2e1596c202a4693468378b16b2353fd2d6c5e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jun 17 14:36:54 2015 +1000 trivial optimisation for seccomp-bpf When doing arg inspection and the syscall doesn't match, skip past the instruction that reloads the syscall into the accumulator, since the accumulator hasn't been modified at this point. commit 99f33d7304893bd9fa04d227cb6e870171cded19 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jun 17 10:50:51 2015 +1000 aarch64 support for seccomp-bpf sandbox Also resort and tidy syscall list. Based on patches by Jakub Jelen bz#2361; ok dtucker@ commit 4ef702e1244633c1025ec7cfe044b9ab267097bf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 15 01:32:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit return failure on RSA signature error; reported by Albert S Upstream-ID: e61bb93dbe0349625807b0810bc213a6822121fa commit a170f22baf18af0b1acf2788b8b715605f41a1f9 Author: Tim Rice Date: Tue Jun 9 22:41:13 2015 -0700 Fix t12 rules for out of tree builds. commit ec04dc4a5515c913121bc04ed261857e68fa5c18 Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 5 15:13:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit For "ssh -L 12345:/tmp/sock" don't fail with "No forward host name." (we have a path, not a host name). Based on a diff from Jared Yanovich. OK djm@ Upstream-ID: 2846b0a8c7de037e33657f95afbd282837fc213f commit 732d61f417a6aea0aa5308b59cb0f563bcd6edd6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 5 03:44:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit typo: accidental repetition; bz#2386 Upstream-ID: 45e620d99f6bc301e5949d34a54027374991c88b commit adfb24c69d1b6f5e758db200866c711e25a2ba73 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 5 14:51:40 2015 +1000 Add Linux powerpc64le and powerpcle entries. Stopgap to resolve bz#2409 because we are so close to release and will update config.guess and friends shortly after the release. ok djm@ commit a1195a0fdc9eddddb04d3e9e44c4775431cb77da Merge: 6397eed d2480bc Author: Tim Rice Date: Wed Jun 3 21:43:13 2015 -0700 Merge branch 'master' of git.mindrot.org:/var/git/openssh commit 6397eedf953b2b973d2d7cbb504ab501a07f8ddc Author: Tim Rice Date: Wed Jun 3 21:41:11 2015 -0700 Remove unneeded backslashes. Patch from Ángel González commit d2480bcac1caf31b03068de877a47d6e1027bf6d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jun 4 14:10:55 2015 +1000 Remove redundant include of stdarg.h. bz#2410 commit 5e67859a623826ccdf2df284cbb37e2d8e2787eb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 2 09:10:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit mention CheckHostIP adding addresses to known_hosts; bz#1993; ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: fd44b68440fd0dc29abf9f2d3f703d74a2396cb7 commit d7a58bbac6583e33fd5eca8e2c2cc70c57617818 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jun 2 20:15:26 2015 +1000 Replace strcpy with strlcpy. ok djm, sanity check by Corinna Vinschen. commit 51a1c2115265c6e80ede8a5c9dccada9aeed7143 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri May 29 18:27:21 2015 +1000 skip, rather than fatal when run without SUDO set commit 599f01142a376645b15cbc9349d7e8975e1cf245 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri May 29 18:03:15 2015 +1000 fix merge botch that left ",," in KEX algs commit 0c2a81dfc21822f2423edd30751e5ec53467b347 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri May 29 17:08:28 2015 +1000 re-enable SSH protocol 1 at compile time commit db438f9285d64282d3ac9e8c0944f59f037c0151 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 03:05:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit make this work without SUDO set; ok dtucker@ Upstream-Regress-ID: bca88217b70bce2fe52b23b8e06bdeb82d98c715 commit 1d9a2e2849c9864fe75daabf433436341c968e14 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 28 07:37:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit wrap all moduli-related code in #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL. based on patch from Reuben Hawkins; bz#2388 feedback and ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: d80cfc8be3e6ec65b3fac9e87c4466533b31b7cf commit 496aeb25bc2d6c434171292e4714771b594bd00e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 28 05:41:29 2015 +0000 upstream commit Increase the allowed length of the known host file name in the log message to be consistent with other cases. Part of bz#1993, ok deraadt. Upstream-ID: a9e97567be49f25daf286721450968251ff78397 commit dd2cfeb586c646ff8d70eb93567b2e559ace5b14 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 28 05:09:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit Fix typo (keywork->keyword) Upstream-ID: 8aacd0f4089c0a244cf43417f4f9045dfaeab534 commit 9cc6842493fbf23025ccc1edab064869640d3bec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 28 04:50:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit add error message on ftruncate failure; bz#2176 Upstream-ID: cbcc606e0b748520c74a210d8f3cc9718d3148cf commit d1958793a0072c22be26d136dbda5ae263e717a0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 28 04:40:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit make ssh-keygen default to ed25519 keys when compiled without OpenSSL; bz#2388, ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 85a471fa6d3fa57a7b8e882d22cfbfc1d84cdc71 commit 3ecde664c9fc5fb3667aedf9e6671462600f6496 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 27 23:51:10 2015 +0000 upstream commit Reorder client proposal to prefer diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058 commit 40f64292b907afd0a674fdbf3e4c2356d17a7d68 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 27 23:39:18 2015 +0000 upstream commit Add a stronger (4k bit) fallback group that sshd can use when the moduli file is missing or broken, sourced from RFC3526. bz#2302, ok markus@ (earlier version), djm@ Upstream-ID: b635215746a25a829d117673d5e5a76d4baee7f4 commit 5ab7d5fa03ad55bc438fab45dfb3aeb30a3c237a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu May 28 10:03:40 2015 +1000 New moduli file from OpenBSD, removing 1k groups. Remove 1k bit groups. ok deraadt@, markus@ commit a71ba58adf34e599f30cdda6e9b93ae6e3937eea Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 27 05:15:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit support PKCS#11 devices with external PIN entry devices bz#2240, based on patch from Dirk-Willem van Gulik; feedback and ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 504568992b55a8fc984375242b1bd505ced61b0d commit b282fec1aa05246ed3482270eb70fc3ec5f39a00 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 26 23:23:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit Cap DH-GEX group size at 4kbits for Cisco implementations. Some of them will choke when asked for preferred sizes >4k instead of returning the 4k group that they do have. bz#2209, ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 54b863a19713446b7431f9d06ad0532b4fcfef8d commit 3e91b4e8b0dc2b4b7e7d42cf6e8994a32e4cb55e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun May 24 23:39:16 2015 +0000 upstream commit add missing 'c' option to getopt(), case statement was already there; from Felix Bolte Upstream-ID: 9b19b4e2e0b54d6fefa0dfac707c51cf4bae3081 commit 64a89ec07660abba4d0da7c0095b7371c98bab62 Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Sat May 23 14:28:37 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix a memory leak in an error path ok markus@ dtucker@ Upstream-ID: bc1da0f205494944918533d8780fde65dff6c598 commit f948737449257d2cb83ffcfe7275eb79b677fd4a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 22 05:28:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit mention ssh-keygen -E for comparing legacy MD5 fingerprints; bz#2332 Upstream-ID: 079a3669549041dbf10dbc072d9563f0dc3b2859 commit 0882332616e4f0272c31cc47bf2018f9cb258a4e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 22 04:45:52 2015 +0000 upstream commit Reorder EscapeChar option parsing to avoid a single-byte out- of-bounds read. bz#2396 from Jaak Ristioja; ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 1dc6b5b63d1c8d9a88619da0b27ade461d79b060 commit d7c31da4d42c115843edee2074d7d501f8804420 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 22 03:50:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit add knob to relax GSSAPI host credential check for multihomed hosts bz#928, patch by Simon Wilkinson; ok dtucker (kerberos/GSSAPI is not compiled by default on OpenBSD) Upstream-ID: 15ddf1c6f7fd9d98eea9962f480079ae3637285d commit aa72196a00be6e0b666215edcffbc10af234cb0e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 22 17:49:46 2015 +1000 Include signal.h for sig_atomic_t, used by kex.h. bz#2402, from tomas.kuthan at oracle com. commit 8b02481143d75e91c49d1bfae0876ac1fbf9511a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 22 12:47:24 2015 +1000 Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD. commit 4739e8d5e1c0be49624082bd9f6b077e9e758db9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 21 12:01:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit Support "ssh-keygen -lF hostname" to find search known_hosts and print key hashes. Already advertised by ssh-keygen(1), but not delivered by code; ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: 459e0e2bf39825e41b0811c336db2d56a1c23387 commit e97201feca10b5196da35819ae516d0b87cf3a50 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 21 17:55:15 2015 +1000 conditionalise util.h inclusion commit 13640798c7dd011ece0a7d02841fe48e94cfa0e0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 21 06:44:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit regress test for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand Upstream-Regress-ID: c658fbf1ab6b6011dc83b73402322e396f1e1219 commit 84452c5d03c21f9bfb28c234e0dc1dc67dd817b1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 21 06:40:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit regress test for AuthorizedKeysCommand arguments Upstream-Regress-ID: bbd65c13c6b3be9a442ec115800bff9625898f12 commit bcc50d816187fa9a03907ac1f3a52f04a52e10d1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 21 06:43:30 2015 +0000 upstream commit add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows getting authorized_principals from a subprocess rather than a file, which is quite useful in deployments with large userbases feedback and ok markus@ Upstream-ID: aa1bdac7b16fc6d2fa3524ef08f04c7258d247f6 commit 24232a3e5ab467678a86aa67968bbb915caffed4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 21 06:38:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit support arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand bz#2081 loosely based on patch by Sami Hartikainen feedback and ok markus@ Upstream-ID: b080387a14aa67dddd8ece67c00f268d626541f7 commit d80fbe41a57c72420c87a628444da16d09d66ca7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu May 21 04:55:51 2015 +0000 upstream commit refactor: split base64 encoding of pubkey into its own sshkey_to_base64() function and out of sshkey_write(); ok markus@ Upstream-ID: 54fc38f5832e9b91028900819bda46c3959a0c1a commit 7cc44ef74133a473734bbcbd3484f24d6a7328c5 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 18 15:06:05 2015 +0000 upstream commit getentropy() and sendsyslog() have been around long enough. openssh-portable may want the #ifdef's but not base. discussed with djm few weeks back Upstream-ID: 0506a4334de108e3fb6c66f8d6e0f9c112866926 commit 9173d0fbe44de7ebcad8a15618e13a8b8d78902e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 15 05:44:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit Use a salted hash of the lock passphrase instead of plain text and do constant-time comparisons of it. Should prevent leaking any information about it via timing, pointed out by Ryan Castellucci. Add a 0.1s incrementing delay for each failed unlock attempt up to 10s. ok markus@ (earlier version), djm@ Upstream-ID: c599fcc325aa1cc65496b25220b622d22208c85f commit d028d5d3a697c71b21e4066d8672cacab3caa0a8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 5 19:10:58 2015 +1000 upstream commit - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/12 03:20:04 [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] rename blocks to words. bcrypt "blocks" are unrelated to blowfish blocks, nor are they the same size. commit f6391d4e59b058984163ab28f4e317e7a72478f1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 5 19:10:23 2015 +1000 upstream commit - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/08 00:30:07 [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] declare a local version of MIN(), call it MINIMUM() commit 8ac6b13cc9113eb47cd9e86c97d7b26b4b71b77f Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 5 19:09:46 2015 +1000 upstream commit - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/12/30 01:41:43 [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] typo in comment: ouput => output commit 1f792489d5cf86a4f4e3003e6e9177654033f0f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we only ever use it for strlen(pattern). Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL and his own tools. ok markus@ commit 639d6bc57b1942393ed12fb48f00bc05d4e093e4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 07:10:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit refactor ssh_dispatch_run_fatal() to use sshpkt_fatal() to better report error conditions. Teach sshpkt_fatal() about ECONNRESET. Improves error messages on TCP connection resets. bz#2257 ok dtucker@ commit 9559d7de34c572d4d3fd990ca211f8ec99f62c4d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 07:08:08 2015 +0000 upstream commit a couple of parse targets were missing activep checks, causing them to be misapplied in match context; bz#2272 diagnosis and original patch from Sami Hartikainen ok dtucker@ commit 7e8528cad04b2775c3b7db08abf8fb42e47e6b2a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 04:17:51 2015 +0000 upstream commit make handling of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile=none more consistent with other =none options; bz#2288 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@ commit ca430d4d9cc0f62eca3b1fb1e2928395b7ce80f7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 04:03:20 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove failed remote forwards established by muliplexing from the list of active forwards; bz#2363, patch mostly by Yoann Ricordel; ok dtucker@ commit 8312cfb8ad88657517b3e23ac8c56c8e38eb9792 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 04:01:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit reduce stderr spam when using ssh -S /path/mux -O forward -R 0:... ok dtucker@ commit 179be0f5e62f1f492462571944e45a3da660d82b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 03:23:51 2015 +0000 upstream commit prevent authorized_keys options picked up on public key tests without a corresponding private key authentication being applied to other authentication methods. Reported by halex@, ok markus@ commit a42d67be65b719a430b7fcaba2a4e4118382723a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 03:20:54 2015 +0000 upstream commit Don't make parsing of authorized_keys' environment= option conditional on PermitUserEnv - always parse it, but only use the result if the option is enabled. This prevents the syntax of authorized_keys changing depending on which sshd_config options were enabled. bz#2329; based on patch from coladict AT gmail.com, ok dtucker@ commit e661a86353e11592c7ed6a847e19a83609f49e77 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we only ever use it for strlen(pattern). Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL and his own tools. ok markus@ commit 0ef1de742be2ee4b10381193fe90730925b7f027 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 23 05:01:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit Add a simple regression test for sshd's configuration parser. Right now, all it does is run the output of sshd -T back through itself and ensure the output is valid and invariant. commit 368f83c793275faa2c52f60eaa9bdac155c4254b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 22 01:38:36 2015 +0000 upstream commit use correct key for nested certificate test commit 8d4d1bfddbbd7d21f545dc6997081d1ea1fbc99a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 07:11:47 2015 +0000 upstream commit mention that the user's shell from /etc/passwd is used for commands too; bz#1459 ok dtucker@ commit 5ab283d0016bbc9d4d71e8e5284d011bc5a930cf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 8 07:29:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit whitespace Upstream-Regress-ID: 6b708a3e709d5b7fd37890f874bafdff1f597519 commit 8377d5008ad260048192e1e56ad7d15a56d103dd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 8 07:26:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit whitespace at EOL Upstream-Regress-ID: 9c48911643d5b05173b36a012041bed4080b8554 commit c28a3436fa8737709ea88e4437f8f23a6ab50359 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 8 06:45:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit moar whitespace at eol Upstream-ID: 64eaf872a3ba52ed41e494287e80d40aaba4b515 commit 2b64c490468fd4ca35ac8d5cc31c0520dc1508bb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 8 06:41:56 2015 +0000 upstream commit whitespace at EOL Upstream-ID: 57bcf67d666c6fc1ad798aee448fdc3f70f7ec2c commit 4e636cf201ce6e7e3b9088568218f9d4e2c51712 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 8 03:56:51 2015 +0000 upstream commit whitespace at EOL commit 38b8272f823dc1dd4e29dbcee83943ed48bb12fa Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 4 01:47:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit Use diff w/out -u for better portability commit 297060f42d5189a4065ea1b6f0afdf6371fb0507 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 8 03:25:07 2015 +0000 upstream commit Use xcalloc for permitted_adm_opens instead of xmalloc to ensure it's zeroed. Fixes post-auth crash with permitopen=none. bz#2355, ok djm@ commit 63ebf019be863b2d90492a85e248cf55a6e87403 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 8 03:17:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't choke on new-format private keys encrypted with an AEAD cipher; bz#2366, patch from Ron Frederick; ok markus@ commit f8484dac678ab3098ae522a5f03bb2530f822987 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 6 05:45:17 2015 +0000 upstream commit Clarify pseudo-terminal request behaviour and use "pseudo-terminal" consistently. bz#1716, ok jmc@ "I like it" deraadt@. commit ea139507bef8bad26e86ed99a42c7233ad115c38 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 6 04:07:18 2015 +0000 upstream commit Blacklist DH-GEX for specific PuTTY versions known to send non-RFC4419 DH-GEX messages rather than all versions of PuTTY. According to Simon Tatham, 0.65 and newer versions will send RFC4419 DH-GEX messages. ok djm@ commit b58234f00ee3872eb84f6e9e572a9a34e902e36e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 5 10:17:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit WinSCP doesn't implement RFC4419 DH-GEX so flag it so we don't offer that KEX method. ok markus@ commit d5b1507a207253b39e810e91e68f9598691b7a29 Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 5 02:48:17 2015 +0000 upstream commit use the sizeof the struct not the sizeof a pointer to the struct in ssh_digest_start() This file is only used if ssh is built with OPENSSL=no ok markus@ commit a647b9b8e616c231594b2710c925d31b1b8afea3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 8 11:07:27 2015 +1000 Put brackets around mblen() compat constant. This might help with the reported problem cross compiling for Android ("error: expected identifier or '(' before numeric constant") but shouldn't hurt in any case. commit d1680d36e17244d9af3843aeb5025cb8e40d6c07 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 30 09:18:11 2015 +1000 xrealloc -> xreallocarray in portable code too. commit 531a57a3893f9fcd4aaaba8c312b612bbbcc021e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 29 03:48:56 2015 +0000 upstream commit Allow ListenAddress, Port and AddressFamily in any order. bz#68, ok djm@, jmc@ (for the man page bit). commit c1d5bcf1aaf1209af02f79e48ba1cbc76a87b56f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 28 13:47:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit enviroment -> environment: apologies to darren for not spotting that first time round... commit 43beea053db191cac47c2cd8d3dc1930158aff1a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 28 10:25:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit Fix typo in previous commit 85b96ef41374f3ddc9139581f87da09b2cd9199e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 28 10:17:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit Document that the TERM environment variable is not subject to SendEnv and AcceptEnv. bz#2386, based loosely on a patch from jjelen at redhat, help and ok jmc@ commit 88a7c598a94ff53f76df228eeaae238d2d467565 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 27 21:42:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit Make sshd default to PermitRootLogin=no; ok deraadt@ rpe@ commit 734226b4480a6c736096c729fcf6f391400599c7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 27 01:52:30 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix compilation with OPENSSL=no; ok dtucker@ commit a4b9d2ce1eb7703eaf0809b0c8a82ded8aa4f1c6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 27 00:37:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit Include stdio.h for FILE (used in sshkey.h) so it compiles with OPENSSL=no. commit dbcc652f4ca11fe04e5930c7ef18a219318c6cda Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 27 00:21:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit allow "sshd -f none" to skip reading the config file, much like "ssh -F none" does. ok dtucker commit b7ca276fca316c952f0b90f5adb1448c8481eedc Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 24 06:26:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit combine -Dd onto one line and update usage(); commit 2ea974630d7017e4c7666d14d9dc939707613e96 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 24 05:26:44 2015 +0000 upstream commit add ssh-agent -D to leave ssh-agent in foreground without enabling debug mode; bz#2381 ok dtucker@ commit 8ac2ffd7aa06042f6b924c87139f2fea5c5682f7 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:24 2015 +0000 upstream commit 2*len -> use xreallocarray() ok djm commit 657a5fbc0d0aff309079ff8fb386f17e964963c2 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit rename xrealloc() to xreallocarray() since it follows that form. ok djm commit 1108ae242fdd2c304307b68ddf46aebe43ebffaa Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 23 04:59:10 2015 +0000 upstream commit Two small fixes for sshd -T: ListenAddress'es are added to a list head so reverse the order when printing them to ensure the behaviour remains the same, and print StreamLocalBindMask as octal with leading zero. ok deraadt@ commit bd902b8473e1168f19378d5d0ae68d0c203525df Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 23 04:53:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit Check for and reject missing arguments for VersionAddendum and ForceCommand. bz#2281, patch from plautrba at redhat com, ok djm@ commit ca42c1758575e592239de1d5755140e054b91a0d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 22 01:24:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit unknown certificate extensions are non-fatal, so don't fatal when they are encountered; bz#2387 reported by Bob Van Zant; ok dtucker@ commit 39bfbf7caad231cc4bda6909fb1af0705bca04d8 Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 21 07:01:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit Add back a backslash removed in rev 1.42 so KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT will include aes again. ok deraadt@ commit 6b0d576bb87eca3efd2b309fcfe4edfefc289f9c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 13:32:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit s/recommended/required/ that private keys be og-r this wording change was made a while ago but got accidentally reverted commit 44a8e7ce6f3ab4c2eb1ae49115c210b98e53c4df Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 13:25:52 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't try to cleanup NULL KEX proposals in kex_prop_free(); found by Jukka Taimisto and Markus Hietava commit 3038a191872d2882052306098c1810d14835e704 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 13:19:22 2015 +0000 upstream commit use error/logit/fatal instead of fprintf(stderr, ...) and exit(0), fix a few errors that were being printed to stdout instead of stderr and a few non-errors that were going to stderr instead of stdout bz#2325; ok dtucker commit a58be33cb6cd24441fa7e634db0e5babdd56f07f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 13:16:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit debug log missing DISPLAY environment when X11 forwarding requested; bz#1682 ok dtucker@ commit 17d4d9d9fbc8fb80e322f94d95eecc604588a474 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 04:32:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't call record_login() in monitor when UseLogin is enabled; bz#278 reported by drk AT sgi.com; ok dtucker commit 40132ff87b6cbc3dc05fb5df2e9d8e3afa06aafd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 04:12:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit Add some missing options to sshd -T and fix the output of VersionAddendum HostCertificate. bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat com, ok djm. commit 6cc7cfa936afde2d829e56ee6528c7ea47a42441 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 16 23:25:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit Document "none" for PidFile XAuthLocation TrustedUserCAKeys and RevokedKeys. bz#2382, feedback from jmc@, ok djm@ commit 15fdfc9b1c6808b26bc54d4d61a38b54541763ed Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 15 23:23:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit Plug leak of address passed to logging. bz#2373, patch from jjelen at redhat, ok markus@ commit bb2289e2a47d465eaaaeff3dee2a6b7777b4c291 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 14 04:17:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit Output remote username in debug output since with Host and Match it's not always obvious what it will be. bz#2368, ok djm@ commit 70860b6d07461906730632f9758ff1b7c98c695a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 17 10:56:13 2015 +1000 Format UsePAM setting when using sshd -T. Part of bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat com. commit ee15d9c9f0720f5a8b0b34e4b10ecf21f9824814 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 17 10:40:23 2015 +1000 Wrap endian.h include inside ifdef (bz#2370). commit 408f4c2ad4a4c41baa7b9b2b7423d875abbfa70b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 17 09:39:58 2015 +1000 Look for '${host}-ar' before 'ar'. This changes configure.ac to look for '${host}-ar' as set by AC_CANONICAL_HOST before looking for the unprefixed 'ar'. Useful when cross-compiling when all your binutils are prefixed. Patch from moben at exherbo org via astrand at lysator liu se and bz#2352. commit 673a1c16ad078d41558247ce739fe812c960acc8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Apr 16 11:40:20 2015 +1000 remove dependency on arpa/telnet.h commit 202d443eeda1829d336595a3cfc07827e49f45ed Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 15 15:59:49 2015 +1000 Remove duplicate include of pwd.h. bz#2337, patch from Mordy Ovits. commit 597986493412c499f2bc2209420cb195f97b3668 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Apr 9 10:14:48 2015 +1000 platform's with openpty don't need pty_release commit 318be28cda1fd9108f2e6f2f86b0b7589ba2aed0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 13 02:04:08 2015 +0000 upstream commit deprecate ancient, pre-RFC4419 and undocumented SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD message; ok markus@ deraadt@ "seems reasonable" dtucker@ commit d8f391caef62378463a0e6b36f940170dadfe605 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 10 05:16:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit Don't send hostkey advertisments (hostkeys-00@openssh.com) to current versions of Tera Term as they can't handle them. Newer versions should be OK. Patch from Bryan Drewery and IWAMOTO Kouichi, ok djm@ commit 2c2cfe1a1c97eb9a08cc9817fd0678209680c636 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 10 00:08:55 2015 +0000 upstream commit include port number if a non-default one has been specified; based on patch from Michael Handler commit 4492a4f222da4cf1e8eab12689196322e27b08c4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 7 23:00:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit treat Protocol=1,2|2,1 as Protocol=2 when compiled without SSH1 support; ok dtucker@ millert@ commit c265e2e6e932efc6d86f6cc885dea33637a67564 Author: miod@openbsd.org Date: Sun Apr 5 15:43:43 2015 +0000 upstream commit Do not use int for sig_atomic_t; spotted by christos@netbsd; ok markus@ commit e7bf3a5eda6a1b02bef6096fed78527ee11e54cc Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 7 10:48:04 2015 +1000 Use do{}while(0) for no-op functions. From FreeBSD. commit bb99844abae2b6447272f79e7fa84134802eb4df Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 7 10:47:15 2015 +1000 Wrap blf.h include in ifdef. From FreeBSD. commit d9b9b43656091cf0ad55c122f08fadb07dad0abd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 7 09:10:00 2015 +1000 Fix misspellings of regress CONFOPTS env variables. Patch from Bryan Drewery. commit 3f4ea3c9ab1d32d43c9222c4351f58ca11144156 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 22:17:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit correct return value in pubkey parsing, spotted by Ben Hawkes ok markus@ commit 7da2be0cb9601ed25460c83aa4d44052b967ba0f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 31 22:59:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt to recent hostfile.c change: when parsing known_hosts without fully parsing the keys therein, hostkeys_foreach() will now correctly identify KEY_RSA1 keys; ok markus@ miod@ commit 9e1777a0d1c706714b055811c12ab8cc21033e4a Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 24 20:19:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit use ${SSH} for -Q instead of installed ssh commit ce1b358ea414a2cc88e4430cd5a2ea7fecd9de57 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 16 22:46:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit make CLEANFILES clean up more of the tests' droppings commit 398f9ef192d820b67beba01ec234d66faca65775 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 31 22:57:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit downgrade error() for known_hosts parse errors to debug() to quiet warnings from ssh1 keys present when compiled !ssh1. also identify ssh1 keys when scanning, even when compiled !ssh1 ok markus@ miod@ commit 9a47ab80030a31f2d122b8fd95bd48c408b9fcd9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit fd leak for !ssh1 case; found by unittests; ok markus@ commit c9a0805a6280681901c270755a7cd630d7c5280e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:24 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't fatal when a !ssh1 sshd is reexeced from a w/ssh1 listener; reported by miod@; ok miod@ markus@ commit 704d8c88988cae38fb755a6243b119731d223222 Author: tobias@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 31 11:06:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys. If a user tried to add one and entered his passphrase, explicitly clear it before exit. This is done in all other error paths, too. ok djm commit 78de1673c05ea2c33e0d4a4b64ecb5186b6ea2e9 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 30 18:28:37 2015 +0000 upstream commit ssh-askpass(1) is the default, overridden by SSH_ASKPASS; diff originally from jiri b; commit 26e0bcf766fadb4a44fb6199386fb1dcab65ad00 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 30 00:00:29 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix uninitialised memory read when parsing a config file consisting of a single nul byte. Found by hanno AT hboeck.de using AFL; ok dtucker commit fecede00a76fbb33a349f5121c0b2f9fbc04a777 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Mar 26 19:32:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit sigp and lenp are not optional in ssh_agent_sign(); ok djm@ commit 1b0ef3813244c78669e6d4d54c624f600945327d Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Mar 26 12:32:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't try to load .ssh/identity by default if SSH1 is disabled; ok markus@ commit f9b78852379b74a2d14e6fc94fe52af30b7e9c31 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Mar 26 07:00:04 2015 +0000 upstream commit ban all-zero curve25519 keys as recommended by latest CFRG curves draft; ok markus commit b8afbe2c1aaf573565e4da775261dfafc8b1ba9c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Mar 26 06:59:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit relax bits needed check to allow diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange to complete for chacha20-poly1305 was selected as symmetric cipher; ok markus commit 47842f71e31da130555353c1d57a1e5a8937f1c0 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 25 19:29:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit ignore v1 errors on ssh-add -D; only try v2 keys on -l/-L (unless WITH_SSH1) ok djm@ commit 5f57e77f91bf2230c09eca96eb5ecec39e5f2da6 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 25 19:21:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit unbreak ssh_agent_sign (lenp vs *lenp) commit 4daeb67181054f2a377677fac919ee8f9ed3490e Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 24 20:10:08 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't leak 'setp' on error; noted by Nicholas Lemonias; ok djm@ commit 7d4f96f9de2a18af0d9fa75ea89a4990de0344f5 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 24 20:09:11 2015 +0000 upstream commit consistent check for NULL as noted by Nicholas Lemonias; ok djm@ commit df100be51354e447d9345cf1ec22e6013c0eed50 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 24 20:03:44 2015 +0000 upstream commit correct fmt-string for size_t as noted by Nicholas Lemonias; ok djm@ commit a22b9ef21285e81775732436f7c84a27bd3f71e0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 24 09:17:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default cipher; ok markus commit 2aa9da1a3b360cf7b13e96fe1521534b91501fb5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 24 01:29:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit Compile-time disable SSH protocol 1. You can turn it back on using the Makefile.inc knob if you need it to talk to ancient devices. commit 53097b2022154edf96b4e8526af5666f979503f7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 24 01:11:12 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix double-negative error message "ssh1 is not unsupported" commit 5c27e3b6ec2db711dfcd40e6359c0bcdd0b62ea9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 23 06:06:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit for ssh-keygen -A, don't try (and fail) to generate ssh v.1 keys when compiled without SSH1 support RSA/DSA/ECDSA keys when compiled without OpenSSL based on patch by Mike Frysinger; bz#2369 commit 725fd22a8c41db7de73a638539a5157b7e4424ae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 18 01:44:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit KRL support doesn't need OpenSSL anymore, remove #ifdefs from around call commit b07011c18e0b2e172c5fd09d21fb159a0bf5fcc7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 16 11:09:52 2015 +0000 upstream commit #if 0 some more arrays used only for decrypting (we don't use since we only need encrypt for AES-CTR) commit 1cb3016635898d287e9d58b50c430995652d5358 Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 11 00:48:39 2015 +0000 upstream commit add back the changes from rev 1.206, djm reverted this by mistake in rev 1.207 commit 4d24b3b6a4a6383e05e7da26d183b79fa8663697 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Mar 20 09:11:59 2015 +1100 remove error() accidentally inserted for debugging pointed out by Christian Hesse commit 9f82e5a9042f2d872e98f48a876fcab3e25dd9bb Author: Tim Rice Date: Mon Mar 16 22:49:20 2015 -0700 portability fix: Solaris systems may not have a grep that understands -q commit 8ef691f7d9ef500257a549d0906d78187490668f Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 11 10:35:26 2015 +1100 fix compile with clang commit 4df590cf8dc799e8986268d62019b487a8ed63ad Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 11 10:02:39 2015 +1100 make unit tests work for !OPENSSH_HAS_ECC commit 307bb40277ca2c32e97e61d70d1ed74b571fd6ba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 7 04:41:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit unbreak for w/SSH1 (default) case; ok markus@ deraadt@ commit b44ee0c998fb4c5f3c3281f2398af5ce42840b6f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Mar 5 18:39:20 2015 -0800 unbreak hostkeys test for w/ SSH1 case commit 55e5bdeb519cb60cc18b7ba0545be581fb8598b4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 01:40:56 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix sshkey_certify() return value for unsupported key types; ok markus@ deraadt@ commit be8f658e550a434eac04256bfbc4289457a24e99 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 15:38:03 2015 -0800 update version numbers to match version.h commit ac5e8acefa253eb5e5ba186e34236c0e8007afdc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 4 23:22:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit make these work with !SSH1; ok markus@ deraadt@ commit 2f04af92f036b0c87a23efb259c37da98cd81fe6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 4 21:12:59 2015 +0000 upstream commit make ssh-add -D work with !SSH1 agent commit a05adf95d2af6abb2b7826ddaa7a0ec0cdc1726b Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 00:55:48 2015 -0800 netcat needs poll.h portability goop commit dad2b1892b4c1b7e58df483a8c5b983c4454e099 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 22:35:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit make it possible to run tests w/o ssh1 support; ok djm@ commit d48a22601bdd3eec054794c535f4ae8d8ae4c6e2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 4 18:53:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit crank; ok markus, deraadt commit bbffb23daa0b002dd9f296e396a9ab8a5866b339 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Mar 3 13:50:27 2015 -0800 more --without-ssh1 fixes commit 6c2039286f503e2012a58a1d109e389016e7a99b Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Mar 3 13:48:48 2015 -0800 fix merge both that broke --without-ssh1 compile commit 111dfb225478a76f89ecbcd31e96eaf1311b59d3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 21:21:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit add SSH1 Makefile knob to make it easier to build without SSH1 support; ok markus@ commit 3f7f5e6c5d2aa3f6710289c1a30119e534e56c5c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 20:42:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit expand __unused to full __attribute__ for better portability commit 2fab9b0f8720baf990c931e3f68babb0bf9949c6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 07:41:27 2015 +1100 avoid warning commit d1bc844322461f882b4fd2277ba9a8d4966573d2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 06:31:45 2015 +1100 Revert "define __unused to nothing if not already defined" This reverts commit 1598419e38afbaa8aa5df8dd6b0af98301e2c908. Some system headers have objects named __unused commit 00797e86b2d98334d1bb808f65fa1fd47f328ff1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 05:02:45 2015 +1100 check for crypt and DES_crypt in openssl block fixes builds on systems that use DES_crypt; based on patch from Roumen Petrov commit 1598419e38afbaa8aa5df8dd6b0af98301e2c908 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 04:59:13 2015 +1100 define __unused to nothing if not already defined fixes builds on BSD/OS commit d608a51daad4f14ad6ab43d7cf74ef4801cc3fe9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 17:53:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit reorder logic for better portability; patch from Roumen Petrov commit 68d2dfc464fbcdf8d6387884260f9801f4352393 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 06:48:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit Allow "ssh -Q protocol-version" to list supported SSH protocol versions. Useful for detecting builds without SSH v.1 support; idea and ok markus@ commit 39e2f1229562e1195169905607bc12290d21f021 Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Sun Mar 1 15:44:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit Make sure we only call getnameinfo() for AF_INET or AF_INET6 sockets. getpeername() of a Unix domain socket may return without error on some systems without actually setting ss_family so getnameinfo() was getting called with ss_family set to AF_UNSPEC. OK djm@ commit e47536ba9692d271b8ad89078abdecf0a1c11707 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Feb 28 08:20:11 2015 -0800 portability fixes for regress/netcat.c Mostly avoiding "err(1, NULL)" commit 02973ad5f6f49d8420e50a392331432b0396c100 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Feb 28 08:05:27 2015 -0800 twiddle another test for portability from Tom G. Christensen commit f7f3116abf2a6e2f309ab096b08c58d19613e5d0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 27 15:52:49 2015 -0800 twiddle test for portability commit 1ad3a77cc9d5568f5437ff99d377aa7a41859b83 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 26 20:33:22 2015 -0800 make regress/netcat.c fd passing (more) portable commit 9e1cfca7e1fe9cf8edb634fc894e43993e4da1ea Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 26 20:32:58 2015 -0800 create OBJ/valgrind-out before running unittests commit bd58853102cee739f0e115e6d4b5334332ab1442 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Feb 25 16:58:22 2015 -0800 valgrind support commit f43d17269194761eded9e89f17456332f4c83824 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 26 20:45:47 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't printf NULL key comments; reported by Tom Christensen commit 6e6458b476ec854db33e3e68ebf4f489d0ab3df8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 25 23:05:47 2015 +0000 upstream commit zero cmsgbuf before use; we initialise the bits we use but valgrind still spams warning on it commit a63cfa26864b93ab6afefad0b630e5358ed8edfa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 25 19:54:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix small memory leak when UpdateHostkeys=no commit e6b950341dd75baa8526f1862bca39e52f5b879b Author: Tim Rice Date: Wed Feb 25 09:56:48 2015 -0800 Revert "Work around finicky USL linker so netcat will build." This reverts commit d1db656021d0cd8c001a6692f772f1de29b67c8b. No longer needed with commit 678e473e2af2e4802f24dd913985864d9ead7fb3 commit 6f621603f9cff2a5d6016a404c96cb2f8ac2dec0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 25 17:29:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't leak validity of user in "too many authentication failures" disconnect message; reported by Sebastian Reitenbach commit 6288e3a935494df12519164f52ca5c8c65fc3ca5 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 24 15:24:05 2015 +0000 upstream commit add -v (show ASCII art) to -l's synopsis; ok djm@ commit 678e473e2af2e4802f24dd913985864d9ead7fb3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 26 04:12:58 2015 +1100 Remove dependency on xmalloc. Remove ssh_get_progname's dependency on xmalloc, which should reduce link order problems. ok djm@ commit 5d5ec165c5b614b03678afdad881f10e25832e46 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 25 15:32:49 2015 +1100 Restrict ECDSA and ECDH tests. ifdef out some more ECDSA and ECDH tests when built against an OpenSSL that does not have eliptic curve functionality. commit 1734e276d99b17e92d4233fac7aef3a3180aaca7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 25 13:40:45 2015 +1100 Move definition of _NSIG. _NSIG is only unsed in one file, so move it there prevent redefinition warnings reported by Kevin Brott. commit a47ead7c95cfbeb72721066c4da2312e5b1b9f3d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 25 13:17:40 2015 +1100 Add includes.h for compatibility stuff. commit 38806bda6d2e48ad32812b461eebe17672ada771 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 16:50:06 2015 -0800 include netdb.h to look for MAXHOSTNAMELEN; ok tim commit d1db656021d0cd8c001a6692f772f1de29b67c8b Author: Tim Rice Date: Tue Feb 24 10:42:08 2015 -0800 Work around finicky USL linker so netcat will build. commit cb030ce25f555737e8ba97bdd7883ac43f3ff2a3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 09:23:04 2015 -0800 include includes.h to avoid build failure on AIX commit 13af342458f5064144abbb07e5ac9bbd4eb42567 Author: Tim Rice Date: Tue Feb 24 07:56:47 2015 -0800 Original portability patch from djm@ for platforms missing err.h. Fix name space clash on Solaris 10. Still more to do for Solaris 10 to deal with msghdr structure differences. ok djm@ commit 910209203d0cd60c5083901cbcc0b7b44d9f48d2 Author: Tim Rice Date: Mon Feb 23 22:06:56 2015 -0800 cleaner way fix dispatch.h portion of commit a88dd1da119052870bb2654c1a32c51971eade16 (some systems have sig_atomic_t in signal.h, some in sys/signal.h) Sounds good to me djm@ commit 676c38d7cbe65b76bbfff796861bb6615cc6a596 Author: Tim Rice Date: Mon Feb 23 21:51:33 2015 -0800 portability fix: if we can't dind a better define for HOST_NAME_MAX, use 255 commit 1221b22023dce38cbc90ba77eae4c5d78c77a5e6 Author: Tim Rice Date: Mon Feb 23 21:50:34 2015 -0800 portablity fix: s/__inline__/inline/ commit 4c356308a88d309c796325bb75dce90ca16591d5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 24 13:49:31 2015 +1100 Wrap stdint.h includes in HAVE_STDINT_H. commit c9c88355c6a27a908e7d1e5003a2b35ea99c1614 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 24 13:43:57 2015 +1100 Add AI_NUMERICSERV to fake-rfc2553. Our getaddrinfo implementation always returns numeric values already. commit ef342ab1ce6fb9a4b30186c89c309d0ae9d0eeb4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 24 13:39:57 2015 +1100 Include OpenSSL's objects.h before bn.h. Prevents compile errors on some platforms (at least old GCCs and AIX's XLC compilers). commit dcc8997d116f615195aa7c9ec019fb36c28c6228 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 24 12:30:59 2015 +1100 Convert two macros into functions. Convert packet_send_debug and packet_disconnect from macros to functions. Some older GCCs (2.7.x, 2.95.x) see to have problems with variadic macros with only one argument so we convert these two into functions. ok djm@ commit 2285c30d51b7e2052c6526445abe7e7cc7e170a1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 22:21:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit further silence spurious error message even when -v is specified (e.g. to get visual host keys); reported by naddy@ commit 9af21979c00652029e160295e988dea40758ece2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 09:04:32 2015 +1100 don't include stdint.h unless HAVE_STDINT_H set commit 62f678dd51660d6f8aee1da33d3222c5de10a89e Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 09:02:54 2015 +1100 nother sys/queue.h -> sys-queue.h fix spotted by Tom Christensen commit b3c19151cba2c0ed01b27f55de0d723ad07ca98f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 20:32:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix a race condition by using a mux socket rather than an ineffectual wait statement commit a88dd1da119052870bb2654c1a32c51971eade16 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 06:30:29 2015 +1100 various include fixes for portable commit 5248429b5ec524d0a65507cff0cdd6e0cb99effd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 16:55:51 2015 +0000 upstream commit add an XXX to remind me to improve sshkey_load_public commit e94e4b07ef2eaead38b085a60535df9981cdbcdb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 16:55:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit silence a spurious error message when listing fingerprints for known_hosts; bz#2342 commit f2293a65392b54ac721f66bc0b44462e8d1d81f8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 16:33:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix setting/clearing of TTY raw mode around UpdateHostKeys=ask confirmation question; reported by Herb Goldman commit f2004cd1adf34492eae0a44b1ef84e0e31b06088 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 23 05:04:21 2015 +1100 Repair for non-ECC OpenSSL. Ifdef out the ECC parts when building with an OpenSSL that doesn't have it. commit 37f9220db8d1a52c75894c3de1e5f2ae5bd71b6f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 23 03:07:24 2015 +1100 Wrap stdint.h includes in ifdefs. commit f81f1bbc5b892c8614ea740b1f92735652eb43f0 Author: Tim Rice Date: Sat Feb 21 18:12:10 2015 -0800 out of tree build fix commit 2e13a1e4d22f3b503c3bfc878562cc7386a1d1ae Author: Tim Rice Date: Sat Feb 21 18:08:51 2015 -0800 mkdir kex unit test directory so testing out of tree builds works commit 1797f49b1ba31e8700231cd6b1d512d80bb50d2c Author: halex@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 21 21:46:57 2015 +0000 upstream commit make "ssh-add -d" properly remove a corresponding certificate, and also not whine and fail if there is none ok djm@ commit 7faaa32da83a609059d95dbfcb0649fdb04caaf6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Feb 22 07:57:27 2015 +1100 mkdir hostkey and bitmap unit test directories commit bd49da2ef197efac5e38f5399263a8b47990c538 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 20 23:46:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit sort options useable under Match case-insensitively; prodded jmc@ commit 1a779a0dd6cd8b4a1a40ea33b5415ab8408128ac Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 21 20:51:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit correct paths to configuration files being written/updated; they live in $OBJ not cwd; some by Roumen Petrov commit 28ba006c1acddff992ae946d0bc0b500b531ba6b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 21 15:41:07 2015 +1100 More correct checking of HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV. commit e50e8c97a9cecae1f28febccaa6ca5ab3bc10f54 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 21 15:10:33 2015 +1100 Add null declaration of AI_NUMERICINFO. Some platforms (older FreeBSD and DragonFly versions) do have getaddrinfo() but do not have AI_NUMERICINFO. so define it to zero in those cases. commit 18a208d6a460d707a45916db63a571e805f5db46 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 20 22:40:32 2015 +0000 upstream commit more options that are available under Match; bz#2353 reported by calestyo AT scientia.net commit 44732de06884238049f285f1455b2181baa7dc82 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 20 22:17:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit UpdateHostKeys fixes: I accidentally changed the format of the hostkeys@openssh.com messages last week without changing the extension name, and this has been causing connection failures for people who are running -current. First reported by sthen@ s/hostkeys@openssh.com/hostkeys-00@openssh.com/ Change the name of the proof message too, and reorder it a little. Also, UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist (no TTY available to read the response) so disable UpdateHostKeys if it is in ask mode and ControlPersist is active (and document this) commit 13a39414d25646f93e6d355521d832a03aaaffe2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 17 00:14:05 2015 +0000 upstream commit Regression: I broke logging of public key fingerprints in 1.46. Pointed out by Pontus Lundkvist commit 773dda25e828c4c9a52f7bdce6e1e5924157beab Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 30 23:10:17 2015 +1100 repair --without-openssl; broken in refactor commit e89c780886b23600de1e1c8d74aabd1ff61f43f0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 17 10:04:55 2015 +1100 hook up hostkeys unittest to portable Makefiles commit 0abf41f99aa16ff09b263bead242d6cb2dbbcf99 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:21:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit enable hostkeys unit tests commit 68a5d647ccf0fb6782b2f749433a1eee5bc9044b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:20:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit check string/memory compare arguments aren't NULL commit ef575ef20d09f20722e26b45dab80b3620469687 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:18:34 2015 +0000 upstream commit unit tests for hostfile.c code, just hostkeys_foreach so far commit 8ea3365e6aa2759ccf5c76eaea62cbc8a280b0e7 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 14 12:43:16 2015 +0000 upstream commit test server rekey limit commit ce63c4b063c39b2b22d4ada449c9e3fbde788cb3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:30:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit partial backout of: revision 1.441 date: 2015/01/31 20:30:05; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +17 -10; commitid : x8klYPZMJSrVlt3O; Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are missing. Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation. Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@ hostkey updates now require access to the private key, so we can't load public keys only. The improved log messages (fingerprints of keys loaded) are kept. commit 523463a3a2a9bfc6cfc5afa01bae9147f76a37cc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:13:32 2015 +0000 upstream commit Revise hostkeys@openssh.com hostkey learning extension. The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client. Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the user manually review keys offered. ok markus@ commit 6c5c949782d86a6e7d58006599c7685bfcd01685 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:08:57 2015 +0000 upstream commit Refactor hostkeys_foreach() and dependent code Deal with IP addresses (i.e. CheckHostIP) Don't clobber known_hosts when nothing changed ok markus@ as part of larger commit commit 51b082ccbe633dc970df1d1f4c9c0497115fe721 Author: miod@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 18:26:26 2015 +0000 upstream commit Declare ge25519_base as extern, to prevent it from becoming a common. Gets us rid of ``lignment 4 of symbol `crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519_base' in mod_ge25519.o is smaller than 16 in mod_ed25519.o'' warnings at link time. commit 02db468bf7e3281a8e3c058ced571b38b6407c34 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 13 18:57:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit make rekey_limit for sshd w/privsep work; ok djm@ dtucker@ commit 8ec67d505bd23c8bf9e17b7a364b563a07a58ec8 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 12 20:34:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit Prevent sshd spamming syslog with "ssh_dispatch_run_fatal: disconnected". ok markus@ commit d4c0295d1afc342057ba358237acad6be8af480b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 11 01:20:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit Some packet error messages show the address of the peer, but might be generated after the socket to the peer has suffered a TCP reset. In these cases, getpeername() won't work so cache the address earlier. spotted in the wild via deraadt@ and tedu@ commit 4af1709cf774475ce5d1bc3ddcc165f6c222897d Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 9 23:22:37 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix some leaks in error paths ok markus@ commit fd36834871d06a03e1ff8d69e41992efa1bbf85f Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 6 23:21:59 2015 +0000 upstream commit SIZE_MAX is standard, we should be using it in preference to the obsolete SIZE_T_MAX. OK miod@ beck@ commit 1910a286d7771eab84c0b047f31c0a17505236fa Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 5 12:59:57 2015 +0000 upstream commit Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX. OK guenther@ commit ce4f59b2405845584f45e0b3214760eb0008c06c Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 3 08:07:20 2015 +0000 upstream commit missing ; djm and mlarkin really having great interactions recently commit 5d34aa94938abb12b877a25be51862757f25d54b Author: halex@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 3 00:34:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit slightly extend the passphrase prompt if running with -c in order to give the user a chance to notice if unintentionally running without it wording tweak and ok djm@ commit cb3bde373e80902c7d5d0db429f85068d19b2918 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 2 22:48:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit handle PKCS#11 C_Login returning CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN; based on patch from Yuri Samoilenko; ok markus@ commit 15ad750e5ec3cc69765b7eba1ce90060e7083399 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 2 07:41:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit turn UpdateHostkeys off by default until I figure out mlarkin@'s warning message; requested by deraadt@ commit 3cd5103c1e1aaa59bd66f7f52f6ebbcd5deb12f9 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 2 01:57:44 2015 +0000 upstream commit increasing encounters with difficult DNS setups in darknets has convinced me UseDNS off by default is better ok djm commit 6049a548a8a68ff0bbe581ab1748ea6a59ecdc38 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 31 20:30:05 2015 +0000 upstream commit Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are missing. Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation. Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@ commit 46347ed5968f582661e8a70a45f448e0179ca0ab Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 11:43:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit Add a ssh_config HostbasedKeyType option to control which host public key types are tried during hostbased authentication. This may be used to prevent too many keys being sent to the server, and blowing past its MaxAuthTries limit. bz#2211 based on patch by Iain Morgan; ok markus@ commit 802660cb70453fa4d230cb0233bc1bbdf8328de1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 10:44:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit set a timeout to prevent hangs when talking to busted servers; ok markus@ commit 86936ec245a15c7abe71a0722610998b0a28b194 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 01:11:39 2015 +0000 upstream commit regression test for 'wildcard CA' serial/key ID revocations commit 4509b5d4a4fa645a022635bfa7e86d09b285001f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 01:13:33 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid more fatal/exit in the packet.c paths that ssh-keyscan uses; feedback and "looks good" markus@ commit 669aee994348468af8b4b2ebd29b602cf2860b22 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 01:10:33 2015 +0000 upstream commit permit KRLs that revoke certificates by serial number or key ID without scoping to a particular CA; ok markus@ commit 7a2c368477e26575d0866247d3313da4256cb2b5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 00:59:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit missing parentheses after if in do_convert_from() broke private key conversion from other formats some time in 2010; bz#2345 reported by jjelen AT redhat.com commit 25f5f78d8bf5c22d9cea8b49de24ebeee648a355 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 00:22:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix ssh protocol 1, spotted by miod@ commit 9ce86c926dfa6e0635161b035e3944e611cbccf0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 28 22:36:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit update to new API (key_fingerprint => sshkey_fingerprint) check sshkey_fingerprint return values; ok markus commit 9125525c37bf73ad3ee4025520889d2ce9d10f29 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 28 22:05:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid fatal() calls in packet code makes ssh-keyscan more reliable against server failures ok dtucker@ markus@ commit fae7bbe544cba7a9e5e4ab47ff6faa3d978646eb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 28 21:15:47 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid fatal() calls in packet code makes ssh-keyscan more reliable against server failures ok dtucker@ markus@ commit 1a3d14f6b44a494037c7deab485abe6496bf2c60 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 28 11:07:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove obsolete comment commit 80c25b7bc0a71d75c43a4575d9a1336f589eb639 Author: okan@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 27 12:54:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit Since r1.2 removed the use of PRI* macros, inttypes.h is no longer required. ok djm@ commit 69ff64f69615c2a21c97cb5878a0996c21423257 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 27 23:07:43 2015 +1100 compile on systems without TCP_MD5SIG (e.g. OSX) commit 358964f3082fb90b2ae15bcab07b6105cfad5a43 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 27 23:07:25 2015 +1100 use ssh-keygen under test rather than system's commit a2c95c1bf33ea53038324d1fdd774bc953f98236 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 27 23:06:59 2015 +1100 OSX lacks HOST_NAME_MAX, has _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX commit ade31d7b6f608a19b85bee29a7a00b1e636a2919 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 27 23:06:23 2015 +1100 these need active_state defined to link on OSX temporary measure until active_state goes away entirely commit e56aa87502f22c5844918c10190e8b4f785f067b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 27 12:01:36 2015 +0000 upstream commit use printf instead of echo -n to reduce diff against -portable commit 9f7637f56eddfaf62ce3c0af89c25480f2cf1068 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 13:55:29 2015 +0000 upstream commit sort previous; commit 3076ee7d530d5b16842fac7a6229706c7e5acd26 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 13:36:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit properly restore umask commit d411d395556b73ba1b9e451516a0bd6697c4b03d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 06:12:18 2015 +0000 upstream commit regression test for host key rotation commit fe8a3a51699afbc6407a8fae59b73349d01e49f8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 06:11:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt to sshkey API tweaks commit 7dd355fb1f0038a3d5cdca57ebab4356c7a5b434 Author: miod@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 24 10:39:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit Move -lz late in the linker commandline for things to build on static arches. commit 0dad3b806fddb93c475b30853b9be1a25d673a33 Author: miod@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 23 21:21:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit -Wpointer-sign is supported by gcc 4 only. commit 2b3b1c1e4bd9577b6e780c255c278542ea66c098 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 22:58:57 2015 +0000 upstream commit use SUBDIR to recuse into unit tests; makes "make obj" actually work commit 1d1092bff8db27080155541212b420703f8b9c92 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 12:16:36 2015 +0000 upstream commit correct description of UpdateHostKeys in ssh_config.5 and add it to -o lists for ssh, scp and sftp; pointed out by jmc@ commit 5104db7cbd6cdd9c5971f4358e74414862fc1022 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 06:10:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit correctly match ECDSA subtype (== curve) for offered/recevied host keys. Fixes connection-killing host key mismatches when a server offers multiple ECDSA keys with different curve type (an extremely unlikely configuration). ok markus, "looks mechanical" deraadt@ commit 8d4f87258f31cb6def9b3b55b6a7321d84728ff2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 03:04:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit Host key rotation support. Add a hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension (global request) for a server to inform a client of all its available host key after authentication has completed. The client may record the keys in known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better host key algorithms and a server to gracefully rotate its keys. The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config option (default on). ok markus@ commit 60b1825262b1f1e24fc72050b907189c92daf18e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 02:59:11 2015 +0000 upstream commit small refactor and add some convenience functions; ok markus commit a5a3e3328ddce91e76f71ff479022d53e35c60c9 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 22 21:00:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit heirarchy -> hierarchy; commit dcff5810a11195c57e1b3343c0d6b6f2b9974c11 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 22 20:24:41 2015 +0000 upstream commit Provide a warning about chroot misuses (which sadly, seem to have become quite popular because shiny). sshd cannot detect/manage/do anything about these cases, best we can do is warn in the right spot in the man page. ok markus commit 087266ec33c76fc8d54ac5a19efacf2f4a4ca076 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 23:14:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit Reduce use of and transition to throughout. ok djm markus commit 57e783c8ba2c0797f93977e83b2a8644a03065d8 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 20:16:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit kex_setup errors are fatal() commit 1d6424a6ff94633c221297ae8f42d54e12a20912 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 08:02:33 2015 +0000 upstream commit this test would accidentally delete agent.sh if run without obj/ commit 12b5f50777203e12575f1b08568281e447249ed3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 07:56:44 2015 +0000 upstream commit make this compile with KERBEROS5 enabled commit e2cc6bef08941256817d44d146115b3478586ad4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 07:55:33 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix hostkeys in agent; ok markus@ commit 1ca3e2155aa5d3801a7ae050f85c71f41fcb95b1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 20 10:11:31 2015 +1100 fix kex test commit c78a578107c7e6dcf5d30a2f34cb6581bef14029 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:45:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit finally enable the KEX tests I wrote some years ago... commit 31821d7217e686667d04935aeec99e1fc4a46e7e Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:42:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt to new error message (SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) commit d3716ca19e510e95d956ae14d5b367e364bff7f1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 17:31:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit this test was broken in at least two ways, such that it wasn't checking that a KRL was not excluding valid keys commit 3f797653748e7c2b037dacb57574c01d9ef3b4d3 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:32:39 2015 +0000 upstream commit switch ssh-keyscan from setjmp to multiple ssh transport layer instances ok djm@ commit f582f0e917bb0017b00944783cd5f408bf4b0b5e Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:30:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit add experimental api for packet layer; ok djm@ commit 48b3b2ba75181f11fca7f327058a591f4426cade Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:20:20 2015 +0000 upstream commit store compat flags in struct ssh; ok djm@ commit 57d10cbe861a235dd269c74fb2fe248469ecee9d Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:16:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt kex to sshbuf and struct ssh; ok djm@ commit 3fdc88a0def4f86aa88a5846ac079dc964c0546a Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:07:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit move dispatch to struct ssh; ok djm@ commit 091c302829210c41e7f57c3f094c7b9c054306f0 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 19:52:16 2015 +0000 upstream commit update packet.c & isolate, introduce struct ssh a) switch packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh b) (de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c c) the old packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch] d) compress.c/h is removed and integrated into packet.c with and ok djm@ commit 4e62cc68ce4ba20245d208b252e74e91d3785b74 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 17:35:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix format strings in (disabled) debugging commit d85e06245907d49a2cd0cfa0abf59150ad616f42 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 06:01:32 2015 +0000 upstream commit be a bit more careful in these tests to ensure that known_hosts is clean commit 7947810eab5fe0ad311f32a48f4d4eb1f71be6cf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 22:00:18 2015 +0000 upstream commit regression test for known_host file editing using ssh-keygen (-H / -R / -F) after hostkeys_foreach() change; feedback and ok markus@ commit 3a2b09d147a565d8a47edf37491e149a02c0d3a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:54:46 2015 +0000 upstream commit more and better key tests test signatures and verification test certificate generation flesh out nested cert test removes most of the XXX todo markers commit 589e69fd82724cfc9738f128e4771da2e6405d0d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:53:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit make the signature fuzzing test much more rigorous: ensure that the fuzzed input cases do not match the original (using new fuzz_matches_original() function) and check that the verification fails in each case commit 80603c0daa2538c349c1c152405580b164d5475f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:52:44 2015 +0000 upstream commit add a fuzz_matches_original() function to the fuzzer to detect fuzz cases that are identical to the original data. Hacky implementation, but very useful when you need the fuzz to be different, e.g. when verifying signature commit 87d5495bd337e358ad69c524fcb9495208c0750b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:50:55 2015 +0000 upstream commit better dumps from the fuzzer (shown on errors) - include the original data as well as the fuzzed copy. commit d59ec478c453a3fff05badbbfd96aa856364f2c2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:47:55 2015 +0000 upstream commit enable hostkey-agent.sh test commit 26b3425170bf840e4b095e1c10bf25a0a3e3a105 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 17 18:54:30 2015 +0000 upstream commit unit test for hostkeys in ssh-agent commit 9e06a0fb23ec55d9223b26a45bb63c7649e2f2f2 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 23:41:29 2015 +0000 upstream commit add kex unit tests commit d2099dec6da21ae627f6289aedae6bc1d41a22ce Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 00:32:54 2015 +0000 upstream commit djm, your /usr/include tree is old commit 2b3c3c76c30dc5076fe09d590f5b26880f148a54 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 21:51:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit some feedback from markus@: comment hostkeys_foreach() context and avoid a member in it. commit cecb30bc2ba6d594366e657d664d5c494b6c8a7f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 21:49:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit make ssh-keygen use hostkeys_foreach(). Removes some horrendous code; ok markus@ commit ec3d065df3a9557ea96b02d061fd821a18c1a0b9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 21:48:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit convert load_hostkeys() (hostkey ordering and known_host matching) to use the new hostkey_foreach() iterator; ok markus commit c29811cc480a260e42fd88849fc86a80c1e91038 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 21:40:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit introduce hostkeys_foreach() to allow iteration over a known_hosts file or controlled subset thereof. This will allow us to pull out some ugly and duplicated code, and will be used to implement hostkey rotation later. feedback and ok markus commit f101d8291da01bbbfd6fb8c569cfd0cc61c0d346 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 14:01:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit string truncation due to sizeof(size) ok djm markus commit 35d6022b55b7969fc10c261cb6aa78cc4a5fcc41 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 13:33:34 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid trailing ',' in host key algorithms commit 7efb455789a0cb76bdcdee91c6060a3dc8f5c007 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 13:22:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit infer key length correctly when user specified a fully- qualified key name instead of using the -b bits option; ok markus@ commit 83f8ffa6a55ccd0ce9d8a205e3e7439ec18fedf5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 17 18:53:34 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix hostkeys on ssh agent; found by unit test I'm about to commit commit 369d61f17657b814124268f99c033e4dc6e436c1 Author: schwarze@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 16 16:20:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit garbage collect empty .No macros mandoc warns about commit bb8b442d32dbdb8521d610e10d8b248d938bd747 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 16 15:55:07 2015 +0000 upstream commit regression: incorrect error message on otherwise-successful ssh-keygen -A. Reported by Dmitry Orlov, via deraadt@ commit 9010902954a40b59d0bf3df3ccbc3140a653e2bc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 16 07:19:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit when hostname canonicalisation is enabled, try to parse hostnames as addresses before looking them up for canonicalisation. fixes bz#2074 and avoids needless DNS lookups in some cases; ok markus commit 2ae4f337b2a5fb2841b6b0053b49496fef844d1c Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 16 06:40:12 2015 +0000 upstream commit Replace with and other less dirty headers where possible. Annotate lines with their current reasons. Switch to PATH_MAX, NGROUPS_MAX, HOST_NAME_MAX+1, LOGIN_NAME_MAX, etc. Change MIN() and MAX() to local definitions of MINIMUM() and MAXIMUM() where sensible to avoid pulling in the pollution. These are the files confirmed through binary verification. ok guenther, millert, doug (helped with the verification protocol) commit 3c4726f4c24118e8f1bb80bf75f1456c76df072c Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 21:38:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove xmalloc, switch to sshbuf commit e17ac01f8b763e4b83976b9e521e90a280acc097 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 21:37:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit switch to sshbuf commit ddef9995a1fa6c7a8ff3b38bfe6cf724bebf13d0 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 18:32:54 2015 +0000 upstream commit handle UMAC128 initialization like UMAC; ok djm@ markus@ commit f14564c1f7792446bca143580aef0e7ac25dcdae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 11:04:36 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix regression reported by brad@ for passworded keys without agent present commit 45c0fd70bb2a88061319dfff20cb12ef7b1bc47e Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 22:08:23 2015 +1100 make bitmap test compile commit d333f89abf7179021e5c3f28673f469abe032062 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 07:36:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit unit tests for KRL bitmap commit 7613f828f49c55ff356007ae9645038ab6682556 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 09:58:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit re-add comment about full path commit 6c43b48b307c41cd656b415621a644074579a578 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 09:54:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't reset to the installed sshd; connect before reconfigure, too commit 771bb47a1df8b69061f09462e78aa0b66cd594bf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 14:51:51 2015 +0000 upstream commit implement a SIGINFO handler so we can discern a stuck fuzz test from a merely glacial one; prompted by and ok markus commit cfaa57962f8536f3cf0fd7daf4d6a55d6f6de45f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 08:23:26 2015 +0000 upstream commit use $SSH instead of installed ssh to allow override; spotted by markus@ commit 0920553d0aee117a596b03ed5b49b280d34a32c5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 07:49:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit regress test for PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes; ok markus@ commit 27ca1a5c0095eda151934bca39a77e391f875d17 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 20:13:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit unbreak parsing of pubkey comments; with gerhard; ok djm/deraadt commit 55358f0b4e0b83bc0df81c5f854c91b11e0bb4dc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 11:46:32 2015 +0000 upstream commit fatal if soft-PKCS11 library is missing rather (rather than continue and fail with a more cryptic error) commit c3554cdd2a1a62434b8161017aa76fa09718a003 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 11:12:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit let this test all supporte key types; pointed out/ok markus@ commit 1129dcfc5a3e508635004bcc05a3574cb7687167 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 09:40:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit sync ssh-keysign, ssh-keygen and some dependencies to the new buffer/key API; mostly mechanical, ok markus@ commit e4ebf5586452bf512da662ac277aaf6ecf0efe7c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 07:57:08 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove commented-out test code now that it has moved to a proper unit test commit e81cba066c1e9eb70aba0f6e7c0ff220611b370f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 20:54:29 2015 +0000 upstream commit whitespace commit 141efe49542f7156cdbc2e4cd0a041d8b1aab622 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 20:05:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit move authfd.c and its tentacles to the new buffer/key API; ok markus@ commit 0088c57af302cda278bd26d8c3ae81d5b6f7c289 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 19:33:41 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix small regression: ssh-agent would return a success message but an empty signature if asked to sign using an unknown key; ok markus@ commit b03ebe2c22b8166e4f64c37737f4278676e3488d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 03:08:58 2015 +1100 more --without-openssl fix some regressions caused by upstream merges enable KRLs now that they no longer require BIGNUMs commit bc42cc6fe784f36df225c44c93b74830027cb5a2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 03:08:29 2015 +1100 kludge around tun API mismatch betterer commit c332110291089b624fa0951fbf2d1ee6de525b9f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:59:51 2015 +1100 some systems lack SO_REUSEPORT commit 83b9678a62cbdc74eb2031cf1e1e4ffd58e233ae Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:35:50 2015 +1100 fix merge botch commit 0cdc5a3eb6fb383569a4da2a30705d9b90428d6b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:35:33 2015 +1100 unbreak across API change commit 6e2549ac2b5e7f96cbc2d83a6e0784b120444b47 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:30:18 2015 +1100 need includes.h for portable OpenSSH commit 72ef7c148c42db7d5632a29f137f8b87b579f2d9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:21:31 2015 +1100 support --without-openssl at configure time Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom. Considered highly experimental for now. commit 4f38c61c68ae7e3f9ee4b3c38bc86cd39f65ece9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:28:00 2015 +1100 add files missed in last commit commit a165bab605f7be55940bb8fae977398e8c96a46d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 15:02:39 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid BIGNUM in KRL code by using a simple bitmap; feedback and ok markus commit 7d845f4a0b7ec97887be204c3760e44de8bf1f32 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 13:54:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit update sftp client and server to new buffer API. pretty much just mechanical changes; with & ok markus commit 139ca81866ec1b219c717d17061e5e7ad1059e2a Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 13:09:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit switch to sshbuf/sshkey; with & ok djm@ commit 81bfbd0bd35683de5d7f2238b985e5f8150a9180 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 14 21:48:18 2015 +1100 support --without-openssl at configure time Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom. Considered highly experimental for now. commit 54924b53af15ccdcbb9f89984512b5efef641a31 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 10:46:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid an warning for the !OPENSSL case commit ae8b463217f7c9b66655bfc3945c050ffdaeb861 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 10:30:34 2015 +0000 upstream commit swith auth-options to new sshbuf/sshkey; ok djm@ commit 540e891191b98b89ee90aacf5b14a4a68635e763 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 10:29:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit make non-OpenSSL aes-ctr work on sshd w/ privsep; ok markus@ commit 60c2c4ea5e1ad0ddfe8b2877b78ed5143be79c53 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 10:24:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove unneeded includes, sync my copyright across files & whitespace; ok djm@ commit 128343bcdb0b60fc826f2733df8cf979ec1627b4 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 19:31:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt mac.c to ssherr.h return codes (de-fatal) and simplify dependencies ok djm@ commit e7fd952f4ea01f09ceb068721a5431ac2fd416ed Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 19:04:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit sync changes from libopenssh; prepared by markus@ mostly debug output tweaks, a couple of error return value changes and some other minor stuff commit 76c0480a85675f03a1376167cb686abed01a3583 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 13 19:38:18 2015 +1100 add --without-ssh1 option to configure Allows disabling support for SSH protocol 1. commit 1f729f0614d1376c3332fa1edb6a5e5cec7e9e03 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 07:39:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to allow sshd to control what public key types will be accepted. Currently defaults to all. Feedback & ok markus@ commit 816d1538c24209a93ba0560b27c4fda57c3fff65 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 20:13:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit unbreak parsing of pubkey comments; with gerhard; ok djm/deraadt commit 0097565f849851812df610b7b6b3c4bd414f6c62 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 19:22:46 2015 +0000 upstream commit missing error assigment on sshbuf_put_string() commit a7f49dcb527dd17877fcb8d5c3a9a6f550e0bba5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 15:18:07 2015 +0000 upstream commit apparently memcpy(x, NULL, 0) is undefined behaviour according to C99 (cf. sections 7.21.1 and 7.1.4), so check skip memcpy calls when length==0; ok markus@ commit 905fe30fca82f38213763616d0d26eb6790bde33 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 14:05:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit free->sshkey_free; ok djm@ commit f067cca2bc20c86b110174c3fef04086a7f57b13 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 13:29:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit allow WITH_OPENSSL w/o WITH_SSH1; ok djm@ commit c4bfafcc2a9300d9cfb3c15e75572d3a7d74670d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 8 13:10:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit adjust for sshkey_load_file() API change commit e752c6d547036c602b89e9e704851463bd160e32 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 8 13:44:36 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix ssh_config FingerprintHash evaluation order; from Petr Lautrbach commit ab24ab847b0fc94c8d5e419feecff0bcb6d6d1bf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 8 10:15:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit reorder hostbased key attempts to better match the default hostkey algorithms order in myproposal.h; ok markus@ commit 1195f4cb07ef4b0405c839293c38600b3e9bdb46 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 8 10:14:08 2015 +0000 upstream commit deprecate key_load_private_pem() and sshkey_load_private_pem() interfaces. Refactor the generic key loading API to not require pathnames to be specified (they weren't really used). Fixes a few other things en passant: Makes ed25519 keys work for hostbased authentication (ssh-keysign previously used the PEM-only routines). Fixes key comment regression bz#2306: key pathnames were being lost as comment fields. ok markus@ commit febbe09e4e9aff579b0c5cc1623f756862e4757d Author: tedu@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 7 18:15:07 2015 +0000 upstream commit workaround for the Meyer, et al, Bleichenbacher Side Channel Attack. fake up a bignum key before RSA decryption. discussed/ok djm markus commit 5191df927db282d3123ca2f34a04d8d96153911a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 23 22:42:48 2014 +0000 upstream commit KNF and add a little more debug() commit 8abd80315d3419b20e6938f74d37e2e2b547f0b7 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 09:26:31 2014 +0000 upstream commit add fingerprinthash to the options list; commit 296ef0560f60980da01d83b9f0e1a5257826536f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 09:24:59 2014 +0000 upstream commit tweak previous; commit 462082eacbd37778a173afb6b84c6f4d898a18b5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Dec 30 08:16:11 2014 +1100 avoid uninitialised free of ldns_res If an invalid rdclass was passed to getrrsetbyname() then this would execute a free on an uninitialised pointer. OpenSSH only ever calls this with a fixed and valid rdclass. Reported by Joshua Rogers commit 01b63498801053f131a0740eb9d13faf35d636c8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 29 18:10:18 2014 +1100 pull updated OpenBSD BCrypt PBKDF implementation Includes fix for 1 byte output overflow for large key length requests (not reachable in OpenSSH). Pointed out by Joshua Rogers commit c528c1b4af2f06712177b3de9b30705752f7cbcb Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Dec 23 15:26:13 2014 +1100 fix variable name for IPv6 case in construct_utmpx patch from writeonce AT midipix.org via bz#2296 commit 293cac52dcda123244b2e594d15592e5e481c55e Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 22 16:30:42 2014 +1100 include and use OpenBSD netcat in regress/ commit 8f6784f0cb56dc4fd00af3e81a10050a5785228d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 09:05:17 2014 +0000 upstream commit mention ssh -Q feature to list supported { MAC, cipher, KEX, key } algorithms in more places and include the query string used to list the relevant information; bz#2288 commit 449e11b4d7847079bd0a2daa6e3e7ea03d8ef700 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 08:24:17 2014 +0000 upstream commit tweak previous; commit 4bea0ab3290c0b9dd2aa199e932de8e7e18062d6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 08:06:03 2014 +0000 upstream commit regression test for multiple required pubkey authentication; ok markus@ commit f1c4d8ec52158b6f57834b8cd839605b0a33e7f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 08:04:23 2014 +0000 upstream commit correct description of what will happen when a AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not (sshd will refuse to start) commit 161cf419f412446635013ac49e8c660cadc36080 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 07:55:51 2014 +0000 upstream commit make internal handling of filename arguments of "none" more consistent with ssh. "none" arguments are now replaced with NULL when the configuration is finalised. Simplifies checking later on (just need to test not-NULL rather than that + strcmp) and cleans up some inconsistencies. ok markus@ commit f69b69b8625be447b8826b21d87713874dac25a6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 07:51:30 2014 +0000 upstream commit remember which public keys have been used for authentication and refuse to accept previously-used keys. This allows AuthenticationMethods=publickey,publickey to require that users authenticate using two _different_ pubkeys. ok markus@ commit 46ac2ed4677968224c4ca825bc98fc68dae183f0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 07:24:11 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix passing of wildcard forward bind addresses when connection multiplexing is in use; patch from Sami Hartikainen via bz#2324; ok dtucker@ commit 0d1b241a262e4d0a6bbfdd595489ab1b853c43a1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 06:14:29 2014 +0000 upstream commit make this slightly easier to diff against portable commit 0715bcdddbf68953964058f17255bf54734b8737 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 22 13:47:07 2014 +1100 add missing regress output file commit 1e30483c8ad2c2f39445d4a4b6ab20c241e40593 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 02:15:52 2014 +0000 upstream commit adjust for new SHA256 key fingerprints and slightly-different MD5 hex fingerprint format commit 6b40567ed722df98593ad8e6a2d2448fc2b4b151 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 01:14:49 2014 +0000 upstream commit poll changes to netcat (usr.bin/netcat.c r1.125) broke this test; fix it by ensuring more stdio fds are sent to devnull commit a5375ccb970f49dddf7d0ef63c9b713ede9e7260 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 21 23:35:14 2014 +0000 upstream commit tweak previous; commit b79efde5c3badf5ce4312fe608d8307eade533c5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 21 23:12:42 2014 +0000 upstream commit document FingerprintHash here too commit d16bdd8027dd116afa01324bb071a4016cdc1a75 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 22 10:18:09 2014 +1100 missing include for base64 encoding commit 56d1c83cdd1ac76f1c6bd41e01e80dad834f3994 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 21 22:27:55 2014 +0000 upstream commit Add FingerprintHash option to control algorithm used for key fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to base64. Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@ commit 058f839fe15c51be8b3a844a76ab9a8db550be4f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 18 23:58:04 2014 +0000 upstream commit don't count partial authentication success as a failure against MaxAuthTries; ok deraadt@ commit c7219f4f54d64d6dde66dbcf7a2699daa782d2a1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 12 00:02:17 2014 +0000 upstream commit revert chunk I didn't mean to commit yet; via jmc@ commit 7de5991aa3997e2981440f39c1ea01273a0a2c7b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 18 11:44:06 2014 +1100 upstream libc change revision 1.2 date: 2014/12/08 03:45:00; author: bcook; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; commitid: 7zWEBgJJOCZ2hvTV; avoid left shift overflow in reallocarray. Some 64-bit platforms (e.g. Windows 64) have a 32-bit long. So, shifting 1UL 32-bits to the left causes an overflow. This replaces the constant 1UL with (size_t)1 so that we get the correct constant size for the platform. discussed with tedu@ & deraadt@ commit 2048f85a5e6da8bc6e0532efe02ecfd4e63c978c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 18 10:15:49 2014 +1100 include CFLAGS in gnome askpass targets from Fedora commit 48b68ce19ca42fa488960028048dec023f7899bb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 11 08:20:09 2014 +0000 upstream commit explicitly include sys/param.h in files that use the howmany() macro; from portable commit d663bea30a294d440fef4398e5cd816317bd4518 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 11 05:25:06 2014 +0000 upstream commit mention AuthorizedKeysCommandUser must be set for AuthorizedKeysCommand to be run; bz#2287 commit 17bf3d81e00f2abb414a4fd271118cf4913f049f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 11 05:13:28 2014 +0000 upstream commit show in debug output which hostkeys are being tried when attempting hostbased auth; patch from Iain Morgan commit da0277e3717eadf5b15e03379fc29db133487e94 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 11 04:16:14 2014 +0000 upstream commit Make manual reflect reality: sftp-server's -d option accepts a "%d" option, not a "%h" one. bz#2316; reported by Kirk Wolf commit 4cf87f4b81fa9380bce5fcff7b0f8382ae3ad996 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Dec 10 01:24:09 2014 +0000 upstream commit better error value for invalid signature length commit 4bfad14ca56f8ae04f418997816b4ba84e2cfc3c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 10 02:12:51 2014 +1100 Resync more with OpenBSD's rijndael.c, in particular "#if 0"-ing out some unused code. Should fix compile error reported by plautrba at redhat. commit 642652d280499691c8212ec6b79724b50008ce09 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 10 01:32:23 2014 +1100 Add reallocarray to compat library commit 3dfd8d93dfcc69261f5af99df56f3ff598581979 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 4 22:31:50 2014 +0000 upstream commit add tests for new client RevokedHostKeys option; refactor to make it a bit more readable commit a31046cad1aed16a0b55171192faa6d02665ccec Author: krw@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 19 13:35:37 2014 +0000 upstream commit Nuke yet more obvious #include duplications. ok deraadt@ commit a7c762e5b2c1093542c0bc1df25ccec0b4cf479f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 4 20:47:36 2014 +0000 upstream commit key_in_file() wrapper is no longer used commit 5e39a49930d885aac9c76af3129332b6e772cd75 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 4 02:24:32 2014 +0000 upstream commit add RevokedHostKeys option for the client Allow textfile or KRL-based revocation of hostkeys. commit 74de254bb92c684cf53461da97f52d5ba34ded80 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 4 01:49:59 2014 +0000 upstream commit convert KRL code to new buffer API ok markus@ commit db995f2eed5fc432598626fa3e30654503bf7151 Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 26 18:34:51 2014 +0000 upstream commit Prefer setvbuf() to setlinebuf() for portability; ok deraadt@ commit 72bba3d179ced8b425272efe6956a309202a91f3 Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 24 03:39:22 2014 +0000 upstream commit Fix crashes in the handling of the sshd config file found with the afl fuzzer. ok deraadt@ djm@ commit 867f49c666adcfe92bf539d9c37c1accdea08bf6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 26 13:22:41 2014 +1100 Avoid Cygwin ssh-host-config reading /etc/group Patch from Corinna Vinschen commit 8b66f36291a721b1ba7c44f24a07fdf39235593e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 26 13:20:35 2014 +1100 allow custom service name for sshd on Cygwin Permits the use of multiple sshd running with different service names. Patch by Florian Friesdorf via Corinna Vinschen commit 08c0eebf55d70a9ae1964399e609288ae3186a0c Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 22 19:21:03 2014 +0000 upstream commit restore word zapped in previous, and remove some useless "No" macros; commit a1418a0033fba43f061513e992e1cbcc3343e563 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 22 18:15:41 2014 +0000 upstream commit /dev/random has created the same effect as /dev/arandom (and /dev/urandom) for quite some time. Mop up the last few, by using /dev/random where we actually want it, or not even mentioning arandom where it is irrelevant. commit b6de5ac9ed421362f479d1ad4fa433d2e25dad5b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 21 01:00:38 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix NULL pointer dereference crash on invalid timestamp found using Michal Zalewski's afl fuzzer commit a1f8110cd5ed818d59b3a2964fab7de76e92c18e Author: mikeb@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 18 22:38:48 2014 +0000 upstream commit Sync AES code to the one shipped in OpenSSL/LibreSSL. This includes a commit made by Andy Polyakov to the OpenSSL source tree on Wed, 28 Jun 2006 with the following message: "Mitigate cache-collision timing attack on last round." OK naddy, miod, djm commit 335c83d5f35d8620e16b8aa26592d4f836e09ad2 Author: krw@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 18 20:54:28 2014 +0000 upstream commit Nuke more obvious #include duplications. ok deraadt@ millert@ tedu@ commit 51b64e44121194ae4bf153dee391228dada2abcb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 17 00:21:40 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix KRL generation when multiple CAs are in use We would generate an invalid KRL when revoking certs by serial number for multiple CA keys due to a section being written out twice. Also extend the regress test to catch this case by having it produce a multi-CA KRL. Reported by peter AT pean.org commit d2d51003a623e21fb2b25567c4878d915e90aa2a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 18 01:02:25 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix NULL pointer dereference crash in key loading found by Michal Zalewski's AFL fuzzer commit 9f9fad0191028edc43d100d0ded39419b6895fdf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 17 00:21:40 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix KRL generation when multiple CAs are in use We would generate an invalid KRL when revoking certs by serial number for multiple CA keys due to a section being written out twice. Also extend the regress test to catch this case by having it produce a multi-CA KRL. Reported by peter AT pean.org commit da8af83d3f7ec00099963e455010e0ed1d7d0140 Author: bentley@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 15 14:41:03 2014 +0000 upstream commit Reduce instances of `` '' in manuals. troff displays these as typographic quotes, but nroff implementations almost always print them literally, which rarely has the intended effect with modern fonts, even in stock xterm. These uses of `` '' can be replaced either with more semantic alternatives or with Dq, which prints typographic quotes in a UTF-8 locale (but will automatically fall back to `` '' in an ASCII locale). improvements and ok schwarze@ commit fc302561369483bb755b17f671f70fb894aec01d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 10 22:25:49 2014 +0000 upstream commit mux-related manual tweaks mention ControlPersist=0 is the same as ControlPersist=yes recommend that ControlPath sockets be placed in a og-w directory commit 0e4cff5f35ed11102fe3783779960ef07e0cd381 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 5 11:01:31 2014 +1100 Prepare scripts for next Cygwin release Makes the Cygwin-specific ssh-user-config script independent of the existence of /etc/passwd. The next Cygwin release will allow to generate passwd and group entries from the Windows account DBs, so the scripts have to adapt. from Corinna Vinschen commit 7d0ba5336651731949762eb8877ce9e3b52df436 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 30 10:45:41 2014 +1100 include version number in OpenSSL-too-old error commit 3bcb92e04d9207e9f78d82f7918c6d3422054ce9 Author: lteo@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 24 02:01:20 2014 +0000 upstream commit Remove unnecessary include: netinet/in_systm.h is not needed by these programs. NB. skipped for portable ok deraadt@ millert@ commit 6fdcaeb99532e28a69f1a1599fbd540bb15b70a0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 20 03:43:01 2014 +0000 upstream commit whitespace commit 165bc8786299e261706ed60342985f9de93a7461 Author: daniel@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 14 03:09:59 2014 +0000 upstream commit plug a memory leak; from Maxime Villard. ok djm@ commit b1ba15f3885947c245c2dbfaad0a04ba050abea0 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 9 06:21:31 2014 +0000 upstream commit tweak previous; commit 259a02ebdf74ad90b41d116ecf70aa823fa4c6e7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 13 00:38:35 2014 +0000 upstream commit whitespace commit 957fbceb0f3166e41b76fdb54075ab3b9cc84cba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 8 22:20:25 2014 +0000 upstream commit Tweak config reparsing with host canonicalisation Make the second pass through the config files always run when hostname canonicalisation is enabled. Add a "Match canonical" criteria that allows ssh_config Match blocks to trigger only in the second config pass. Add a -G option to ssh that causes it to parse its configuration and dump the result to stdout, similar to "sshd -T" Allow ssh_config Port options set in the second config parse phase to be applied (they were being ignored). bz#2267 bz#2286; ok markus commit 5c0dafd38bf66feeeb45fa0741a5baf5ad8039ba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 8 22:15:27 2014 +0000 upstream commit another -Wpointer-sign from clang commit bb005dc815ebda9af3ae4b39ca101c4da918f835 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 8 22:15:06 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix a few -Wpointer-sign warnings from clang commit 3cc1fbb4fb0e804bfb873fd363cea91b27fc8188 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 8 21:45:48 2014 +0000 upstream commit parse cert sections using nested buffers to reduce copies; ok markus commit 4a45922aebf99164e2fc83d34fe55b11ae1866ef Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 6 00:47:15 2014 +0000 upstream commit correct options in usage(); from mancha1 AT zoho.com commit 48dffd5bebae6fed0556dc5c36cece0370690618 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 9 09:45:36 2014 +0000 upstream commit mention permissions on tun(4) devices in PermitTunnel documentation; bz#2273 commit a5883d4eccb94b16c355987f58f86a7dee17a0c2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 3 18:55:07 2014 +0000 upstream commit tighten permissions on pty when the "tty" group does not exist; pointed out by Corinna Vinschen; ok markus commit 180bcb406b58bf30723c01a6b010e48ee626dda8 Author: sobrado@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 30 16:32:25 2014 +0000 upstream commit typo. commit f70b22bcdd52f6bf127047b3584371e6e5d45627 Author: sobrado@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 30 15:33:50 2014 +0000 upstream commit improve capitalization for the Ed25519 public-key signature system. ok djm@ commit 7df8818409c752cf3f0c3f8044fe9aebed8647bd Author: doug@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 21 01:08:52 2014 +0000 upstream commit Free resources on error in mkstemp and fdopen ok djm@ commit 40ba4c9733aaed08304714faeb61529f18da144b Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 20 01:28:55 2014 +0000 upstream commit djm how did you make a typo like that... commit 57d378ec9278ba417a726f615daad67d157de666 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 19 23:58:28 2014 +0000 upstream commit When dumping the server configuration (sshd -T), print correct KEX, MAC and cipher defaults. Spotted by Iain Morgan commit 7ff880ede5195d0b17e7f1e3b6cfbc4cb6f85240 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 19 23:57:18 2014 +0000 upstream commit ~-expand lcd paths commit 4460a7ad0c78d4cd67c467f6e9f4254d0404ed59 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Oct 12 12:35:48 2014 +1100 remove duplicated KEX_DH1 entry commit c9b8426a616138d0d762176c94f51aff3faad5ff Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 9 10:34:06 2014 +1100 remove ChangeLog file Commit logs will be generated from git at release time. commit 81d18ff7c93a04affbf3903e0963859763219aed Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 7 21:24:25 2014 +1100 delete contrib/caldera directory commit 0ec9e87d3638206456968202f05bb5123670607a Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 7 19:57:27 2014 +1100 test commit commit 8fb65a44568701b779f3d77326bceae63412d28d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 7 09:21:49 2014 +1100 - (djm) Release OpenSSH-6.7 commit e8c9f2602c46f6781df5e52e6cd8413dab4602a3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Oct 3 09:24:56 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshd_config.5] typo; from Iain Morgan commit 703b98a26706f5083801d11059486d77491342ae Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 1 09:43:07 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c] [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Kludge around bad glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE check that doesn't grok heap-allocated fd_sets; ok dtucker@ commit 0fa0ed061bbfedb0daa705e220748154a84c3413 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Sep 10 08:15:34 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow mremap and exit for DietLibc; patch from Felix von Leitner; ok dtucker commit ad7d23d461c3b7e1dcb15db13aee5f4b94dc1a95 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Sep 9 12:23:10 2014 +1000 20140908 - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Update info about egd. ok djm@ commit 2a8699f37cc2515e3bc60e0c677ba060f4d48191 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 4 03:46:05 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Zero seed after keying PRNG commit 44988defb1f5e3afe576d86000365e1f07a1b494 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Sep 3 05:35:32 2014 +1000 - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Fix old code leading to permissions/ACLs; from Corinna Vinschen commit 23f269562b7537b2f6f5014e50a25e5dcc55a837 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Sep 3 05:33:25 2014 +1000 - (djm) [defines.h sshbuf.c] Move __predict_true|false to defines.h and conditionalise to avoid duplicate definition. commit 41c8de2c0031cf59e7cf0c06b5bcfbf4852c1fda Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 30 16:23:06 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in] Make TEST_SHELL a variable; "good idea" tim@ commit d7c81e216a7bd9eed6e239c970d9261bb1651947 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 30 04:18:28 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add include guard commit 4687802dda57365b984b897fc3c8e2867ea09b22 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 30 03:29:19 2014 +1000 - (djm) [misc.c] Missing newline between functions commit 51c77e29220dee87c53be2dc47092934acab26fe Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 30 02:30:30 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add OPENSSL_[RD]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS defines for OpenSSL that lacks them commit 3d673d103bad35afaec6e7ef73e5277216ce33a3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 27 06:32:01 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c] implement explicit_bzero() using memset_s() where possible; improve fallback to indirect bzero via a volatile pointer to give it more of a chance to avoid being optimised away. commit 146218ac11a1eb0dcade6f793d7acdef163b5ddc Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 27 04:11:55 2014 +1000 - (djm) [monitor.c sshd.c] SIGXFSZ needs to be ignored in postauth monitor, not preauth; bz#2263 commit 1b215c098b3b37e38aa4e4c91bb908eee41183b1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 27 04:04:40 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c] Don't include openssl/ec.h on !ECC OpenSSL systems commit ad013944af0a19e3f612089d0099bb397cf6502d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 26 09:27:28 2014 +1000 - (djm) [INSTALL] Recommend libcrypto be built -fPIC, mention LibreSSL, update OpenSSL version requirement. commit ed126de8ee04c66640a0ea2697c4aaf36801f100 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 26 08:37:47 2014 +1000 - (djm) [bufec.c] Skip this file on !ECC OpenSSL commit 9c1dede005746864a4fdb36a7cdf6c51296ca909 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Aug 24 03:01:06 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sftp-server.c] Some systems (e.g. Irix) have prctl() but not PR_SET_DUMPABLE, so adjust ifdef; reported by Tom Christensen commit d244a5816fd1312a33404b436e4dd83594f1119e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 23 17:06:49 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] We now require a working vsnprintf everywhere (not just for systems that lack asprintf); check for it always and extend test to catch more brokenness. Fixes builds on Solaris <= 9 commit 4cec036362a358e398e6a2e6d19d8e5780558634 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 23 03:11:09 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshd.c] Ignore SIGXFSZ in preauth monitor child; can explode on lastlog writing on platforms with high UIDs; bz#2263 commit 394a60f2598d28b670d934b93942a3370b779b39 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 22 18:06:20 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] double braces to appease autoconf commit 4d69aeabd6e60afcdc7cca177ca751708ab79a9d Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 22 17:48:27 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] Fix compilation failure (prototype/ definition mismatch) and warning for broken/missing snprintf case. commit 0c11f1ac369d2c0aeb0ab0458a7cd04c72fe5e9e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 22 17:36:56 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC commit 6d62784b8973340b251fea6b04890f471adf28db Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 22 17:36:19 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] include leading zero characters in OpenSSL version number; fixes test for unsupported versions commit 4f1ff1ed782117f5d5204d4e91156ed5da07cbb7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 21 15:54:50 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] Fix for systems that don't set __progname. Diagnosed by Tom Christensen. commit 005a64da0f457410045ef0bfa93c863c2450447d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 21 10:48:41 2014 +1000 - (djm) [key.h] Fix ifdefs for no-ECC OpenSSL commit aa6598ebb3343c7380e918388e10e8ca5852b613 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 21 10:47:54 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in] fix reference to libtest_helper.a in sshkey test too. commit 54703e3cf63f0c80d4157e5ad7dbc2b363ee2c56 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 20 11:10:51 2014 +1000 - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/README] Correct build instructions; from Corinna commit f0935698f0461f24d8d1f1107b476ee5fd4db1cb Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 20 11:06:50 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshkey.h] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC commit c5089ecaec3b2c02f014f4e67518390702a4ba14 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 20 11:06:20 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in] refer to libtest_helper.a by explicit path rather than -L/-l; fixes linking problems on some platforms commit 2195847e503a382f83ee969b0a8bd3dfe0e55c18 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 20 11:05:03 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] Check OpenSSL version is supported at configure time; suggested by Kevin Brott commit a75aca1bbc989aa9f8b1b08489d37855f3d24d1a Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:36:07 2014 +1000 - (djm) [INSTALL contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/cygwin/README] [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Remove mentions of TCP wrappers. commit 3f022b5a9477abceeb1bbeab04b055f3cc7ca8f6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:32:34 2014 +1000 - (djm) [ssh-dss.c] Include openssl/dsa.h for DSA_SIG commit 88137902632aceb923990e98cf5dc923bb3ef2f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:28:11 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshbuf.h] Fix compilation on systems without OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit 2f3d1e7fb2eabd3cfbfd8d0f7bdd2f9a1888690b Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:14:36 2014 +1000 - (djm) [myproposal.h] Make curve25519 KEX dependent on HAVE_EVP_SHA256 instead of OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit d4e7d59d01a6c7f59e8c1f94a83c086e9a33d8aa Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:14:17 2014 +1000 - (djm) [serverloop.c] Fix syntax error on Cygwin; from Corinna Vinschen commit 9eaeea2cf2b6af5f166cfa9ad3c7a90711a147a9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Aug 10 11:35:05 2014 +1000 - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update versions commit f8988fbef0c9801d19fa2f8f4f041690412bec37 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 1 13:31:52 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Use -d (detach stdin) flag to disassociate nc from stdin, it's more portable commit 5b3879fd4b7a4e3d43bab8f40addda39bc1169d0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 1 12:28:31 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Instruct nc not to quit as soon as stdin is closed; avoid regress failures when stdin is /dev/null commit a9c46746d266f8a1b092a72b2150682d1af8ebfc Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 1 12:26:49 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Skip test for non-OpenBSD netcat. We need a better solution, but this will have to do for now. commit 426117b2e965e43f47015942b5be8dd88fe74b88 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 30 12:33:20 2014 +1000 - schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/28 15:40:08 [sftp-server.8 sshd_config.5] some systems no longer need /dev/log; issue noticed by jirib; ok deraadt commit f497794b6962eaf802ab4ac2a7b22ae591cca1d5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 30 12:32:46 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/25 21:22:03 [ssh-agent.c] Clear buffer used for handling messages. This prevents keys being left in memory after they have been expired or deleted in some cases (but note that ssh-agent is setgid so you would still need root to access them). Pointed out by Kevin Burns, ok deraadt commit a8a0f65c57c8ecba94d65948e9090da54014dfef Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 30 12:32:28 2014 +1000 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/24 22:57:10 [ssh.1] Mention UNIX-domain socket forwarding too. OK jmc@ deraadt@ commit 56b840f2b81e14a2f95c203403633a72566736f8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 25 08:11:30 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] restore incorrectly deleted line; pointed out by Christian Hesse commit dd417b60d5ca220565d1014e92b7f8f43dc081eb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 10:41:21 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:35:38 [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/*] Regenerate test keys with certs signed with ed25519 instead of ecdsa. These can be used in -portable on platforms that don't support ECDSA. commit 40e50211896369dba8f64f3b5e5fd58b76f5ac3f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 10:35:45 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:57:40 [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh] Add $OpenBSD tag to make syncs easier commit 07e644251e809b1d4c062cf85bd1146a7e3f5a8a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 10:34:26 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:23:22 [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh] Sign test certs with ed25519 instead of ecdsa so that they'll work in -portable on platforms that don't have ECDSA in their OpenSSL. ok djm commit cea099a7c4eaecb01b001e5453bb4e5c25006c22 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 10:04:02 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:32:12 [regress/multiplex.sh] change the test for still-open Unix domain sockets to be robust against nc implementations that produce error messages. from -portable (Id sync only) commit 31eb78078d349b32ea41952ecc944b3ad6cb0d45 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 09:43:42 2014 +1000 - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 07:13:42 [umac.c] Convert from to the shiney new ok dtucker@, who also confirmed that -portable handles this already (ID sync only, includes.h pulls in endian.h if available.) commit 820763efef2d19d965602533036c2b4badc9d465 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 09:40:46 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:18:50 [key.c] Prevent spam from key_load_private_pem during hostbased auth. ok djm@ commit c4ee219a66f3190fa96cbd45b4d11015685c6306 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 04:27:50 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_{file,fuzz,sshkey}.c] Wrap ecdsa- specific tests inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit 04f4824940ea3edd60835416ececbae16438968a Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jul 22 11:31:47 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] change the test for still-open Unix domain sockets to be robust against nc implementations that produce error messages. commit 5ea4fe00d55453aaa44007330bb4c3181bd9b796 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jul 22 09:39:19 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] ssh mux master lost -N somehow; put it back commit 948a1774a79a85f9deba6d74db95f402dee32c69 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 22 01:07:11 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [sshkey.c] ifdef out unused variable when compiling without OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit c8f610f6cc57ae129758052439d9baf13699097b Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jul 21 10:23:27 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Not all netcat accept the -N option. commit 0e4e95566cd95c887f69272499b8f3880b3ec0f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jul 21 09:52:54 2014 +1000 - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:15 [forwarding.sh multiplex.sh] Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from: http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html OK djm@ markus@ commit 93a87ab27ecdc709169fb24411133998f81e2761 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 21 06:30:25 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/ {common,test_file,test_fuzz,test_sshkey}.c] Wrap stdint.h includes in ifdefs. commit 5573171352ea23df2dc6d2fe0324d023b7ba697c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 21 02:24:59 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [cipher.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Restore the bits needed to build AES CTR mode against OpenSSL 0.9.8f and above. ok djm commit 74e28682711d005026c7c8f15f96aea9d3c8b5a3 Author: Tim Rice Date: Fri Jul 18 20:00:11 2014 -0700 - (tim) [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used in servconf.h. commit d1a0421f8e5e933fee6fb58ee6b9a22c63c8a613 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 19 07:23:55 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [key.c sshkey.c] Put new ecdsa bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit f0fe9ea1be62227c130b317769de3d1e736b6dc1 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 19 06:33:12 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add a t-exec target to run just the executable tests. commit 450bc1180d4b061434a4b733c5c8814fa30b022b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 19 06:23:18 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [auth2-gss.c gss-serv-krb5.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used in servconf.h. commit ab2ec586baad122ed169285c31927ccf58bc7b28 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:04:47 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/18 02:46:01 [ssh-agent.c] restore umask around listener socket creation (dropped in streamlocal patch merge) commit 357610d15946381ae90c271837dcdd0cdce7145f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:04:10 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 07:22:19 [mux.c ssh.c] reflect stdio-forward ("ssh -W host:port ...") failures in exit status. previously we were always returning 0. bz#2255 reported by Brendan Germain; ok dtucker commit dad9a4a0b7c2b5d78605f8df28718f116524134e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:03:49 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:12:03 [key.c] silence "incorrect passphrase" error spam; reported and ok dtucker@ commit f42f7684ecbeec6ce50e0310f80b3d6da2aaf533 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:03:27 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:18 [mux.c] preserve errno across syscall commit 1b83320628cb0733e3688b85bfe4d388a7c51909 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:03:02 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:56 [sandbox-systrace.c] ifdef SYS_sendsyslog so this will compile without patching on -stable commit 6d57656331bcd754d912950e4a18ad259d596e61 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:02:06 2014 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/16 14:48:57 [ssh.1] add the streamlocal* options to ssh's -o list; millert says they're irrelevant for scp/sftp; ok markus millert commit 7acefbbcbeab725420ea07397ae35992f505f702 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 14:11:24 2014 +1000 - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:14 [PROTOCOL auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c] [auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c canohost.c channels.c channels.h] [clientloop.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c mux.c packet.c readconf.c] [readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] [sshd_config.5 sshlogin.c] Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from: http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html OK djm@ markus@ commit 6262d760e00714523633bd989d62e273a3dca99a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 17 09:52:07 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt commit 9d69d937b46ecba17f16d923e538ceda7b705c7a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 17 09:49:37 2014 +1000 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 08:09:54 [sandbox-systrace.c] Permit use of SYS_sendsyslog from inside the sandbox. Clock is ticking, update your kernels and sshd soon.. libc will start using sendsyslog() in about 4 days. commit f6293a0b4129826fc2e37e4062f96825df43c326 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 17 09:01:25 2014 +1000 - (djm) [digest-openssl.c] Preserve array order when disabling digests. Reported by Petr Lautrbach. commit 00f9cd230709c04399ef5ff80492d70a55230694 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jul 15 10:41:38 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] Delay checks for arc4random* until after libcrypto has been located; fixes builds agains libressl-portable commit 1d0df3249c87019556b83306c28d4769375c2edc Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 11 09:19:04 2014 +1000 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - benno@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 14:15:56 [ssh-add.c] fix ssh-add crash while loading more than one key ok markus@ commit 7a57eb3d105aa4ced15fb47001092c58811e6d9d Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:22:31 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:15:26 [multiplex.sh] remove forced-fatal that I stuck in there to test the new cleanup logic and forgot to remove... commit 612f965239a30fe536b11ece1834d9f470aeb029 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:22:03 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/06 07:42:03 [multiplex.sh test-exec.sh] add a hook to the cleanup() function to kill $SSH_PID if it is set use it to kill the mux master started in multiplex.sh (it was being left around on fatal failures) commit d0bb950485ba121e43a77caf434115ed6417b46f Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:07:28 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 03:02:15 [key.c] downgrade more error() to debug() to better match what old authfile.c did; suppresses spurious errors with hostbased authentication enabled commit 0070776a038655c57f57e70cd05e4c38a5de9d84 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:07:06 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 01:45:10 [sftp.c] more useful error message when GLOB_NOSPACE occurs; bz#2254, patch from Orion Poplawski commit 079bac2a43c74ef7cf56850afbab3b1932534c50 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:06:25 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:19:12 [ssh_config.5] mention that ProxyCommand is executed using shell "exec" to avoid a lingering process; bz#1977 commit 3a48cc090096cf99b9de592deb5f90e444edebfb Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jul 6 09:32:49 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/05 23:11:48 [channels.c] fix remote-forward cancel regression; ok markus@ commit 48bae3a38cb578713e676708164f6e7151cc64fa Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jul 6 09:27:06 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 23:18:35 [authfile.h] remove leakmalloc droppings commit 72e6b5c9ed5e72ca3a6ccc3177941b7c487a0826 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 4 09:00:04 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:40:43 [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config.5] Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option; bz#2160; ok markus@ commit 602943d1179a08dfa70af94f62296ea5e3d6ebb8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 4 08:59:41 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:33:41 [channels.c] allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family; bz#2222 ok markus@ commit 6b37fbb7921d156b31e2c8f39d9e1b6746c34983 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 4 08:59:24 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:23:46 [sshconnect.c] when rekeying, skip file/DNS lookup if it is the same as the key sent during initial key exchange. bz#2154 patch from Iain Morgan; ok markus@ commit d2c3cd5f2e47ee24cf7093ce8e948c2e79dfc3fd Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 4 08:59:01 2014 +1000 - jsing@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 12:42:16 [cipher-chachapoly.c] Call chacha_ivsetup() immediately before chacha_encrypt_bytes() - this makes it easier to verify that chacha_encrypt_bytes() is only called once per chacha_ivsetup() call. ok djm@ commit 686feb560ec43a06ba04da82b50f3c183c947309 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:29:38 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 11:16:55 [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c] make the "Too many authentication failures" message include the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the authentication success / failure messages; bz#2199, ok dtucker commit 0f12341402e18fd9996ec23189b9418d2722453f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:28:09 2014 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 07:45:27 [ssh_config.5] escape %C since groff thinks it part of an Rs/Re block; commit 9c38643c5cd47a19db2cc28279dcc28abadc22b3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:27:46 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 06:39:19 [ssh.c ssh_config.5] Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that expands to a unique identifer based on a has of the tuple of (local host, remote user, hostname, port). Helps avoid exceeding sockaddr_un's miserly pathname limits for mux control paths. bz#2220, based on patch from mancha1 AT zoho.com; ok markus@ commit 49d9bfe2b2f3e90cc158a215dffa7675e57e7830 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:26:42 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:38:17 [ssh.1] document that -g will only work in the multiplexed case if applied to the mux master commit ef9f13ba4c58057b2166d1f2e790535da402fbe5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:26:21 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:32:36 [ssh_config.5] mention '%%' escape sequence in HostName directives and how it may be used to specify IPv6 link-local addresses commit e6a407789e5432dd2e53336fb73476cc69048c54 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:25:03 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 04:36:45 [digest.h] forward-declare struct sshbuf so consumers don't need to include sshbuf.h commit 4a1d3d50f02d0a8a4ef95ea4749293cbfb89f919 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:24:40 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:47:27 [ssh-keygen.c] When hashing or removing hosts using ssh-keygen, don't choke on @revoked markers and don't remove @cert-authority markers; bz#2241, reported by mlindgren AT runelind.net commit e5c0d52ceb575c3db8c313e0b1aa3845943d7ba8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:24:19 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09 [gss-serv.c session.c ssh-keygen.c] standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths; about 1/2 the cases were using it already. Fixes bz#2239 en passant commit c174a3b7c14e0d178c61219de2aa1110e209950c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:23:24 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:26:43 [digest-openssl.c] use EVP_Digest() for one-shot hash instead of creating, updating, finalising and destroying a context. bz#2231, based on patch from Timo Teras commit d7ca2cd31ecc4d63a055e2dcc4bf35c13f2db4c5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:23:01 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:15:01 [ssh-add.c] make stdout line-buffered; saves partial output getting lost when ssh-add fatal()s part-way through (e.g. when listing keys from an agent that supports key types that ssh-add doesn't); bz#2234, reported by Phil Pennock commit b1e967c8d7c7578dd0c172d85b3046cf54ea42ba Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:22:40 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:11:03 [ssh-agent.c] Only cleanup agent socket in the main agent process and not in any subprocesses it may have started (e.g. forked askpass). Fixes agent sockets being zapped when askpass processes fatal(); bz#2236 patch from Dmitry V. Levin commit 61e28e55c3438d796b02ef878bcd28620d452670 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:22:22 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 01:45:38 [sshkey.c] make Ed25519 keys' title fit properly in the randomart border; bz#2247 based on patch from Christian Hesse commit 9eb4cd9a32c32d40d36450b68ed93badc6a94c68 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 13:29:50 2014 +1000 - (djm) [monitor_fdpass.c] Use sys/poll.h if poll.h doesn't exist; bz#2237 commit 8da0fa24934501909408327298097b1629b89eaa Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 11:54:19 2014 +1000 - (djm) [digest-openssl.c configure.ac] Disable RIPEMD160 if libcrypto doesn't support it. commit 81309c857dd0dbc0a1245a16d621c490ad48cfbb Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:45:55 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/Makefile] fix execution of sshkey unit/fuzz test commit 82b2482ce68654815ee049b9bf021bb362a35ff2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:43:41 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshkey.c] Conditionalise inclusion of util.h commit dd8b1dd7933eb6f5652641b0cdced34a387f2e80 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:38:31 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:14:17 [Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/unittests/Makefile] [regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile] [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h] [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw] unit and fuzz tests for new key API commit c1dc24b71f087f385b92652b9673f52af64e0428 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:02:03 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:04:43 [regress/krl.sh] regress test for broken consecutive revoked serial number ranges commit 43d3ed2dd3feca6d0326c7dc82588d2faa115e92 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:01:08 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/21 07:04:21 [regress/integrity.sh] when failing because of unexpected output, show the offending output commit 5a96707ffc8d227c2e7d94fa6b0317f8a152cf4e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:38:05 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:32:00 [regress/Makefile] unit tests for new buffer API; including basic fuzz testing NB. Id sync only. commit 3ff92ba756aee48e4ae3e0aeff7293517b3dd185 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:33:09 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/30 12:54:39 [key.c] suppress spurious error message when loading key with a passphrase; reported by kettenis@ ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/02 04:59:06 [cipher-3des1.c] fix ssh protocol 1 on the server that regressed with the sshkey change (sometimes fatal() after auth completed), make file return useful status codes. NB. Id sync only for these two. They were bundled into the sshkey merge above, since it was easier to sync the entire file and then apply portable-specific changed atop it. commit ec3d0e24a1e46873d80507f5cd8ee6d0d03ac5dc Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:30:00 2014 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 18:50:39 [ssh-add.c] fix loading of private keys commit 4b3ed647d5b328cf68e6a8ffbee490d8e0683e82 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:29:40 2014 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 16:41:56 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c] fix remote fwding with same listen port but different listen address with gerhard@, ok djm@ commit 9e01ff28664921ce9b6500681333e42fb133b4d0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:29:21 2014 +1000 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/25 14:16:09 [sshbuf.c] unblock SIGSEGV before raising it ok djm commit 1845fe6bda0729e52f4c645137f4fc3070b5438a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:29:01 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:21:01 [scp.c] when copying local->remote fails during read, don't send uninitialised heap to the remote end. Reported by Jann Horn commit 19439e9a2a0ac0b4b3b1210e89695418beb1c883 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:28:40 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:19:48 [ssh.c] don't fatal() when hostname canonicalisation fails with a ProxyCommand in use; continue and allow the ProxyCommand to connect anyway (e.g. to a host with a name outside the DNS behind a bastion) commit 8668706d0f52654fe64c0ca41a96113aeab8d2b8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:28:02 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:13:21 [Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c [auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c [cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h [hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c [ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c [ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like, existing API is offered as a set of wrappers. with and ok markus@ Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago. NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL <0.9.8e. commit 2cd7929250cf9e9f658d70dcd452f529ba08c942 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 12:48:30 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 00:52:02 [krl.c] fix bug in KRL generation: multiple consecutive revoked certificate serial number ranges could be serialised to an invalid format. Readers of a broken KRL caused by this bug will fail closed, so no should-have-been-revoked key will be accepted. commit 99db840ee8dbbd2b3fbc6c45d0ee2f6a65e96898 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 12:48:04 2014 +1000 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 15:42:09 [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c] The ssh_get_bignum functions must accept the same range of bignums the corresponding ssh_put_bignum functions create. This fixes the use of 16384-bit RSA keys (bug reported by Eivind Evensen). ok djm@ commit 84a89161a9629239b64171ef3e22ef6a3e462d51 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 12:47:48 2014 +1000 - matthew@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 02:59:13 [sandbox-systrace.c] Now that we have a dedicated getentropy(2) system call for arc4random(3), we can disallow __sysctl(2) in OpenSSH's systrace sandbox. ok djm commit 51504ceec627c0ad57b9f75585c7b3d277f326be Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 12:47:25 2014 +1000 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/13 08:26:29 [sandbox-systrace.c] permit SYS_getentropy from matthew commit a261b8df59117f7dc52abb3a34b35a40c2c9fa88 Author: Tim Rice Date: Wed Jun 18 16:17:28 2014 -0700 - (tim) [openssh/session.c] Work around to get chroot sftp working on UnixWare commit 316fac6f18f87262a315c79bcf68b9f92c9337e4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jun 17 23:06:07 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [entropy.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h} openbsd-compat/regress/{.cvsignore,Makefile.in,opensslvertest.c}] Move the OpenSSL header/library version test into its own function and add tests for it. Fix it to allow fix version upgrades (but not downgrades). Prompted by chl@ via OpenSMTPD (issue #462) and Debian (bug #748150). ok djm@ chl@ commit af665bb7b092a59104db1e65577851cf35b86e32 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jun 16 22:50:55 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [defines.h] Fix undef of _PATH_MAILDIR. From rak at debian via OpenSMTPD and chl@ commit f9696566fb41320820f3b257ab564fa321bb3751 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 13 11:06:04 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Remove tcpwrappers support, support has already been removed from sshd.c. commit 5e2b8894b0b24af4ad0a2f7aa33ebf255df7a8bc Author: Tim Rice Date: Wed Jun 11 18:31:10 2014 -0700 - (tim) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h] Add includes.h for u_intXX_t types. commit 985ee2cbc3e43bc65827c3c0d4df3faa99160c37 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jun 12 05:32:29 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.c regress/unittests/test_helper/*] Wrap stdlib.h include an ifdef for platforms that don't have it. commit cf5392c2db2bb1dbef9818511d34056404436109 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jun 12 05:22:49 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [defines.h] Add va_copy if we don't already have it, taken from openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c. commit 58538d795e0b662f2f4e5a7193f1204bbe992ddd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 13:39:24 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c] Pull in includes.h for compat stuff, specifically whether or not OpenSSL has ECC. commit eb012ac581fd0abc16ee86ee3a68cf07c8ce4d08 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 13:10:00 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Use explicit_bzero instead of an assigment that might get optimized out. ok djm@ commit b9609fd86c623d6d440e630f5f9a63295f7aea20 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 08:04:02 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [sshbuf.h] Only declare ECC functions if building without OpenSSL or if OpenSSL has ECC. commit a54a040f66944c6e8913df8635a01a2327219be9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 07:58:35 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/10 21:46:11 [sshbuf.h] Group ECC functions together to make things a little easier in -portable. "doesn't bother me" deraadt@ commit 9f92c53bad04a89067756be8198d4ec2d8a08875 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 07:57:58 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/05 22:17:50 [sshconnect2.c] fix inverted test that caused PKCS#11 keys that were explicitly listed not to be preferred. Reported by Dirk-Willem van Gulik commit 15c254a25394f96643da2ad0f674acdc51e89856 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 07:38:49 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] ifdef ECC variable too. commit d7af0cc5bf273eeed0897a99420bc26841d07d8f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 07:37:25 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org in the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC. commit 67508ac2563c33d582be181a3e777c65f549d22f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 06:27:16 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] Only do NISTP256 curve tests if OpenSSL has them. commit 6482d90a65459a88c18c925368525855832272b3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 27 14:34:42 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] On Cygwin, determine privilege separation user at runtime, since it may need to be a domain account. Patch from Corinna Vinschen. commit f9eb5e0734f7a7f6e975809eb54684d2a06a7ffc Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 27 14:31:58 2014 +1000 - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Updated Cygwin ssh-host-config from Corinna Vinschen, fixing a number of bugs and preparing for Cygwin 1.7.30. commit eae88744662e6b149f43ef071657727f1a157d95 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 27 14:27:02 2014 +1000 - (djm) [cipher.c] Fix merge botch. commit 564b5e253c1d95c26a00e8288f0089a2571661c3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 22 08:23:59 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in] typo in path commit e84d10302aeaf7a1acb05c451f8718143656856a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed May 21 17:13:36 2014 +1000 revert a diff I didn't mean to commit commit 795b86313f1f1aab9691666c4f2d5dae6e4acd50 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed May 21 17:12:53 2014 +1000 - (djm) [misc.c] Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is available. It takes into account time spent suspended, thereby ensuring timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly. bz#2228 reported by John Haxby commit 18912775cb97c0b1e75e838d3c7d4b56648137b5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed May 21 17:06:46 2014 +1000 - (djm) [commit configure.ac defines.h sshpty.c] don't attempt to use vhangup on Linux. It doens't work for non-root users, and for them it just messes up the tty settings. commit 7f1c264d3049cd95234e91970ccb5406e1d15b27 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 18:01:52 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshbuf.c] need __predict_false commit e7429f2be8643e1100380a8a7389d85cc286c8fe Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 18:01:01 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/Makefile Makefile.in] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] Hook new unit tests into the build and "make tests" commit def1de086707b0e6b046fe7e115c60aca0227a99 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:17:15 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/unittests/Makefile] [regress/unittests/Makefile.inc] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile] [regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h] Import new unit tests from OpenBSD; not yet hooked up to build. commit 167685756fde8bc213a8df2c8e1848e312db0f46 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:08:40 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/04 10:40:59 [connect-privsep.sh] Remove the Z flag from the list of malloc options as it was removed from malloc.c 10 days ago. OK from miod@ commit d0b69fe90466920d69c96069312e24b581771bd7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:08:19 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 18:46:14 [proxy-connect.sh] Add tests for with and without compression, with and without privsep. commit edb1af50441d19fb2dd9ccb4d75bf14473fca584 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:07:53 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 22:15:37 [dhgex.sh integrity.sh kextype.sh rekey.sh try-ciphers.sh] repair regress tests broken by server-side default cipher/kex/mac changes by ensuring that the option under test is included in the server's algorithm list commit 54343e95c70994695f8842fb22836321350198d3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:07:33 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/13 20:44:49 [login-timeout.sh] this test is a sorry mess of race conditions; add another sleep to avoid a failure on slow machines (at least until I find a better way) commit e5b9f0f2ee6e133894307e44e862b66426990733 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:58:07 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sshbuf-getput-basic.c] [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf.c] compilation and portability fixes commit b9c566788a9ebd6a9d466f47a532124f111f0542 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:43:37 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] Unconditionally define WITH_OPENSSL until we write portability glue to support building without libcrypto commit 3dc27178b42234b653a32f7a87292d7994045ee3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:37:59 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/05 07:02:30 [sftp.c] Zap extra whitespace. OK from djm@ and dtucker@ commit c31a0cd5b31961f01c5b731f62a6cb9d4f767472 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:37:39 2014 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 17:20:34 [monitor.c packet.c packet.h] unbreak compression, by re-init-ing the compression code in the post-auth child. the new buffer code is more strict, and requires buffer_init() while the old code was happy after a bzero(); originally from djm@ commit 686c7d9ee6f44b2be4128d7860b6b37adaeba733 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:37:03 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/02 03:27:54 [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c] [misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c defines.h] revert __bounded change; it causes way more problems for portable than it solves; pointed out by dtucker@ commit 294c58a007cfb2f3bddc4fc3217e255857ffb9bf Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:35:03 2014 +1000 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48 [mac.c myproposal.h umac.c] UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't available. Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c. ok markus@ commit 05e82c3b963c33048128baf72a6f6b3a1c10b4c1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:33:43 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:29:56 [bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c buffer.h sshbuf-getput-basic.c] [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c sshbuf.h ssherr.c] [ssherr.h] New buffer API; the first installment of the conversion/replacement of OpenSSH's internals to make them usable as a standalone library. This includes a set of wrappers to make it compatible with the existing buffer API so replacement can occur incrementally. With and ok markus@ Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review. commit 380948180f847a26f2d0c85b4dad3dca2ed2fd8b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:25:18 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 20:36:51 [sftp.c] Don't attempt to append a nul quote char to the filename. Should prevent fatal'ing with "el_insertstr failed" when there's a single quote char somewhere in the string. bz#2238, ok markus@ commit d7fd8bedd4619a2ec7fd02aae4c4e1db4431ad9f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:24:59 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 19:58:50 [sftp.c] Move nulling of variable next to where it's freed. ok markus@ commit 1f0311c7c7d10c94ff7f823de9c5b2ed79368b14 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:24:09 2014 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm commit c5893785564498cea73cb60d2cf199490483e080 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:48:49 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 13:10:30 [clientloop.c serverloop.c] bz#1818 - don't send channel success/failre replies on channels that have sent a close already; analysis and patch from Simon Tatham; ok markus@ commit 633de33b192d808d87537834c316dc8b75fe1880 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:48:26 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/28 03:09:18 [authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c krl.c mux.c packet.c packet.h] [ssh-keygen.c] buffer_get_string_ptr's return should be const to remind callers that futzing with it will futz with the actual buffer contents commit 15271907843e4ae50dcfc83b3594014cf5e9607b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:47:56 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/23 12:42:34 [readconf.c] don't record duplicate IdentityFiles commit 798a02568b13a2e46efebd81f08c8f4bb33a6dc7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:47:37 2014 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 14:16:30 [sftp.1] zap eol whitespace; commit d875ff78d2b8436807381051de112f0ebf9b9ae1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:47:15 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 12:42:04 [sftp.1] Document sftp upload resume. OK from djm@, with feedback from okan@. commit b15cd7bb097fd80dc99520f45290ef775da1ef19 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:46:52 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 10:07:12 [sftp.c] Sort the sftp command list. OK from djm@ commit d8accc0aa72656ba63d50937165c5ae49db1dcd6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:46:25 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 14:36:16 [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.c] Implement sftp upload resume support. OK from djm@, with input from guenther@, mlarkin@ and okan@ commit 16cd3928a87d20c77b13592a74b60b08621d3ce6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:45:58 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 09:24:26 [dns.c dns.h ssh-keygen.c] Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519 key types. OK from djm@ commit ec0b67eb3b4e12f296ced1fafa01860c374f7eea Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:45:26 2014 +1000 - (djm) [rijndael.c rijndael.h] Sync with newly-ressurected versions ine OpenBSD commit f028460d0b2e5a584355321015cde69bf6fd933e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu May 1 02:24:35 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [defines.h] Define __GNUC_PREREQ__ macro if we don't already have it. Only attempt to use __attribute__(__bounded__) for gcc. commit b628cc4c3e4a842bab5e4584d18c2bc5fa4d0edf Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:33:58 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:49:32 [compat.c] add a canonical 6.6 + curve25519 bignum fix fake version that I can recommend people use ahead of the openssh-6.7 release commit 888566913933a802f3a329ace123ebcb7154cf78 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:33:19 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:30:25 [misc.c misc.h umac.c] use get/put_u32 to load values rather than *((UINT32 *)p) that breaks on strict-alignment architectures; reported by and ok stsp@ commit 16f85cbc7e5139950e6a38317e7c8b368beafa5d Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:29:28 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:42:19 [ssh.1] delete .xr to hosts.equiv. there's still an unfortunate amount of documentation referring to rhosts equivalency in here. commit 69cb24b7356ec3f0fc5ff04a68f98f2c55c766f4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:29:06 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:15:16 [sshd.8] remove some really old rsh references commit 84c1e7bca8c4ceaccf4d5557e39a833585a3c77e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:27:53 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 14:53:48 [ssh-keysign.c sshd.c] Delete futile calls to RAND_seed. ok djm NB. Id sync only. This only applies to OpenBSD's libcrypto slashathon commit 0e6b67423b8662f9ca4c92750309e144fd637ef1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:27:01 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 05:54:59 [compat.c] missing wildcard; pointed out by naddy@ commit 9395b28223334826837c15e8c1bb4dfb3b0d2ca5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:25:30 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/18 23:52:25 [compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h] OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of connections using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX exchange method to fail when connecting with something that implements the spec properly. Disable this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected versions. reported by Aris Adamantiadis; ok markus@ commit 8c492da58f8ceb85cf5f7066f23e26fb813a963d Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:25:09 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:28:12 [ssh-agent.1] remove the identity files from this manpage - ssh-agent doesn't deal with them at all and the same information is duplicated in ssh-add.1 (which does deal with them); prodded by deraadt@ commit adbfdbbdccc70c9bd70d81ae096db115445c6e26 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:24:49 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:22:45 [bufaux.c] skip leading zero bytes in buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(); reported by jan AT mojzis.com; ok markus@ commit 75c62728dc87af6805696eeb520b9748faa136c8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:24:31 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/12 04:55:53 [sshd.c] avoid crash at exit: check that pmonitor!=NULL before dereferencing; bz#2225, patch from kavi AT juniper.net commit 2a328437fb1b0976f2f4522d8645803d5a5d0967 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:24:01 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 05:32:57 [packet.c] demote a debug3 to PACKET_DEBUG; ok markus@ commit 7d6a9fb660c808882d064e152d6070ffc3844c3f Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:23:43 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10 [sshconnect.c] When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution. Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey dialog by offering only certificate keys. Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk commit fcd62c0b66b8415405ed0af29c236329eb88cc0f Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:23:21 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 02:05:27 [ssh-keysign.c] include fingerprint of key not found use arc4random_buf() instead of loop+arc4random() commit 43b156cf72f900f88065b0a1c1ebd09ab733ca46 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:23:03 2014 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/31 13:39:34 [ssh-keygen.1] the text for the -K option was inserted in the wrong place in -r1.108; fix From: Matthew Clarke commit c1621c84f2dc1279065ab9fde2aa9327af418900 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:22:46 2014 +1000 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/28 05:17:11 [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] sync available and default algorithms, improve algorithm list formatting help from jmc@ and schwarze@, ok deraadt@ commit f2719b7c2b8a3b14d778d8a6d8dc729b5174b054 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:22:18 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 19:58:37 [sshd.8 sshd.c] remove libwrap support. ok deraadt djm mfriedl commit 4f40209aa4060b9c066a2f0d9332ace7b8dfb391 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:21:22 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 04:55:35 [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c [misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c] use __bounded(...) attribute recently added to sys/cdefs.h instead of longform __attribute__(__bounded(...)); for brevity and a warning free compilation with llvm/clang commit 9235a030ad1b16903fb495d81544e0f7c7449523 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:17:20 2014 +1000 Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@ commit 6e1777f592f15f4559728c78204617537b1ac076 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:02:58 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/19 14:42:44 [scp.1] there is no need for rcp anymore ok deraadt millert commit eb1b7c514d2a7b1802ccee8cd50e565a4d419887 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:02:26 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/17 19:44:10 [ssh.1] old descriptions of des and blowfish are old. maybe ok deraadt commit f0858de6e1324ec730752387074b111b8551081e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:01:30 2014 +1000 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/15 17:28:26 [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] Improve usage() and documentation towards the standard form. In particular, this line saves a lot of man page reading time. usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1] [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] ok schwarze jmc commit 94bfe0fbd6e91a56b5b0ab94ac955d2a67d101aa Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:00:51 2014 +1000 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 13:06:59 [ssh-keyscan.1] scan for Ed25519 keys by default too commit 3819519288b2b3928c6882f5883b0f55148f4fc0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:00:28 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:51:12 [authfile.c] correct test that kdf name is not "none" or "bcrypt" commit 8f9cd709c7cf0655d414306a0ed28306b33802be Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:00:11 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:50:32 [auth-bsdauth.c ssh-keygen.c] don't count on things that accept arguments by reference to clear things for us on error; most things do, but it's unsafe form. commit 1c7ef4be83f6dec84509a312518b9df00ab491d9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 12:59:46 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:44:58 [ssh-keyscan.c] scan for Ed25519 keys by default too commit c10bf4d051c97939b30a1616c0499310057d07da Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 12:58:04 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30 [session.c] ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters; spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@ Id sync only - portable already has this. commit c2e49062faccbcd7135c40d1c78c5c329c58fc2e Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Apr 1 14:42:46 2014 +1100 - (djm) Use full release (e.g. 6.5p1) in debug output rather than just version. From des@des.no commit 14928b7492abec82afa4c2b778fc03f78cd419b6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Apr 1 14:38:07 2014 +1100 - (djm) On platforms that support it, use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing /proc/self/{mem,maps}; patch from jann AT thejh.net commit 48abc47e60048461fe9117e108a7e99ea1ac2bb8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Mar 17 14:45:56 2014 +1100 - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Soft-fail stat() syscalls. Add XXX to remind myself to add sandbox violation logging via the log socket. commit 9c36698ca2f554ec221dc7ef29c7a89e97c88705 Author: Tim Rice Date: Fri Mar 14 12:45:01 2014 -0700 20140314 - (tim) [opensshd.init.in] Add support for ed25519 commit 19158b2447e35838d69b2b735fb640d1e86061ea Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Mar 13 13:14:21 2014 +1100 - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6 - -commit 8569eba5d7f7348ce3955eeeb399f66f25c52ece -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 4 09:35:17 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30 - [session.c] - ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters; - spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@ - -commit 2476c31b96e89aec7d4e73cb6fbfb9a4290de3a7 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Mar 2 04:01:00 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Disable dhgex regress test; it breaks when - no moduli file exists at the expected location. - -commit c83fdf30e9db865575b2521b1fe46315cf4c70ae -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:34:03 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [regress/host-expand.sh] Add RCS Id - -commit 834aeac3555e53f7d29a6fcf3db010dfb99681c7 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:25:16 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 21:21:25 - [agent-ptrace.sh agent.sh] - keep return values that are printed in error messages; - from portable - (Id sync only) - -commit 4f7f1a9a0de24410c30952c7e16d433240422182 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:24:11 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 20:04:16 - [login-timeout.sh] - remove any existing LoginGraceTime from sshd_config before adding - a specific one for the test back in - -commit d705d987c27f68080c8798eeb5262adbdd6b4ffd -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:23:26 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:49:17 - [scp-ssh-wrapper.sh scp.sh] - make sure $SCP is tested on the remote end rather than whichever one - happens to be in $PATH; from portable - (Id sync only) - -commit 624a3ca376e3955a4b9d936c9e899e241b65d357 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:22:37 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:22:10 - [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] - automatically generate revoked keys from listed keys rather than - manually specifying each type; from portable - (Id sync only) - -commit b84392328425e4b9a71f8bde5fe6a4a4c48d3ec4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:21:26 2014 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 04:35:32 - [regress/Makefile regress/dhgex.sh] - Add a test for DH GEX sizes - -commit 1e2aa3d90472293ea19008f02336d6d68aa05793 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:19:51 2014 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:00:30 - [sftp-chroot.sh] - append to rather than truncating the log file - -commit f483cc16fe7314e24a37aa3a4422b03c013c3213 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:19:11 2014 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 23:43:02 - [regress/sftp-chroot.sh] - Don't use -q on sftp as it suppresses logging, instead redirect the - output to the regress logfile. - -commit 6486f16f1c0ebd6f39286f6ab5e08286d90a994a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:03:52 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] - [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers - -commit 92cf5adea194140380e6af6ec32751f9ad540794 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:01:53 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:57:40 - [version.h] - openssh-6.6 - -commit fc5d6759aba71eb205b296b5f148010ffc828583 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:01:28 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:47:07 - [sshd_config.5] - bz#2184 clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple - matching Match blocks; ok dtucker@ - -commit 172ec7e0af1a5f1d682f6a2dca335c6c186153d5 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:00:57 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 08:25:09 - [bufbn.c] - off by one in range check - -commit f9a9aaba437c2787e40cf7cc928281950e161678 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 28 10:00:27 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 00:41:49 - [bufbn.c] - fix unsigned overflow that could lead to reading a short ssh protocol - 1 bignum value; found by Ben Hawkes; ok deraadt@ - -commit fb3423b612713d9cde67c8a75f6f51188d6a3de3 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 27 10:20:07 2014 +1100 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 21:53:37 - [sshd.c] - ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids needs GSSAPI - -commit 1348129a34f0f7728c34d86c100a32dcc8d1f922 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 27 10:18:32 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:29:29 - [channels.c] - don't assume that the socks4 username is \0 terminated; - spotted by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ - -commit e6a74aeeacd01d885262ff8e50eb28faee8c8039 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 27 10:17:49 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:28:44 - [auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c ssh-gss.h sshd.c] - bz#2107 - cache OIDs of supported GSSAPI mechanisms before privsep - sandboxing, as running this code in the sandbox can cause violations; - ok markus@ - -commit 08b57c67f3609340ff703fe2782d7058acf2529e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 27 10:17:13 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:18:37 - [ssh.c] - bz#2205: avoid early hostname lookups unless canonicalisation is enabled; - ok dtucker@ markus@ - -commit 13f97b2286142fd0b8eab94e4ce84fe124eeb752 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Feb 24 15:57:55 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:11:36 - [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh_config.5] - reparse ssh_config and ~/.ssh/config if hostname canonicalisation changes - the hostname. This allows users to write configurations that always - refer to canonical hostnames, e.g. - - CanonicalizeHostname yes - CanonicalDomains int.example.org example.org - CanonicalizeFallbackLocal no - - Host *.int.example.org - Compression off - Host *.example.org - User djm - - ok markus@ - -commit bee3a234f3d1ad4244952bcff1b4b7c525330dc2 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Feb 24 15:57:22 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:03:42 - [ssh-ed25519.c] - check for unsigned overflow; not reachable in OpenSSH but others might - copy our code... - -commit 0628780abe61e7e50cba48cdafb1837f49ff23b2 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Feb 24 15:56:45 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/22 01:32:19 - [readconf.c] - when processing Match blocks, skip 'exec' clauses if previous predicates - failed to match; ok markus@ - -commit 0890dc8191bb201eb01c3429feec0300a9d3a930 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Feb 24 15:56:07 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/15 23:05:36 - [channels.c] - avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" errors in ssh -W; - bz#2200, debian#738692 via Colin Watson; ok dtucker@ - -commit d3cf67e1117c25d151d0f86396e77ee3a827045a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Feb 24 15:55:36 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/07 06:55:54 - [cipher.c mac.c] - remove some logging that makes ssh debugging output very verbose; - ok markus - -commit 03ae081aeaa118361c81ece76eb7cc1aaa2b40c5 -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Fri Feb 21 09:09:34 2014 -0800 - - 20140221 - - (tim) [configure.ac] Fix cut-and-paste error. Patch from Bryan Drewery. - -commit 4a20959d2e3c90e9d66897c0b4032c785672d815 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 13 16:38:32 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}] Add compat - code for older OpenSSL versions that don't have EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex. - -commit d1a7a9c0fd1ac2e3314cceb2891959fd2cd9eabb -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 7 09:24:33 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/06 22:21:01 - [sshconnect.c] - in ssh_create_socket(), only do the getaddrinfo for BindAddress when - BindAddress is actually specified. Fixes regression in 6.5 for - UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from Corinna Vinschen - -commit 6ce35b6cc4ead1bf98abec34cb2e2d6ca0abb15e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 7 09:24:14 2014 +1100 - - - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/05 20:13:25 - [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] - tweak synopsis: calling ssh-keygen without any arguments is fine; ok jmc@ - while here, fix ordering in usage(); requested by jmc@ - -commit 6434cb2cfbbf0a46375d2d22f2ff9927feb5e478 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Feb 6 11:17:50 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Not all Linux architectures define - __NR_shutdown; some go via the socketcall(2) multiplexer. - -commit 8d36f9ac71eff2e9f5770c0518b73d875f270647 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Feb 6 10:44:13 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Don't bother checking for non-NULL - before freeing since free(NULL) is a no-op. ok djm. - -commit a0959da3680b4ce8cf911caf3293a6d90f88eeb7 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Feb 5 10:33:45 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Don't fatal if Capsicum is offered by - headers/libc but not supported by the kernel. Patch from Loganaden - Velvindron @ AfriNIC - -commit 9c449bc183b256c84d8f740727b0bc54d247b15e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:38:28 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Missing string.h for strerror() - -commit bf7e0f03be661b6f5b3bfe325135ce19391f9c4d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:37:50 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] Add missing explicit_bzero.o - -commit eb6d870a0ea8661299bb2ea8f013d3ace04e2024 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:26:34 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/04 00:24:29 - [ssh.c] - delay lowercasing of hostname until right before hostname - canonicalisation to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config; - reported by Ike Devolder; ok markus@ - -commit d56b44d2dfa093883a5c4e91be3f72d99946b170 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:26:04 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/04 00:24:29 - [ssh.c] - delay lowercasing of hostname until right before hostname - canonicalisation to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config; - reported by Ike Devolder; ok markus@ - -commit db3c595ea74ea9ccd5aa644d7e1f8dc675710731 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:25:45 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:31 - [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c] - convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero() - -commit aae07e2e2000dd318418fd7fd4597760904cae32 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:20:40 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/03 23:28:00 - [ssh-ecdsa.c] - fix memory leak; ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates 'r' and 's' for us, unlike - DSA_SIG_new. Reported by Batz Spear; ok markus@ - -commit a5103f413bde6f31bff85d6e1fd29799c647d765 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:20:14 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:32 - [auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] - [buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c] - [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c] - [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c] - [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c] - [ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] - [sshd.c] - convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero() - -commit 1d2c4564265ee827147af246a16f3777741411ed -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:18:20 2014 +1100 - - - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/31 16:39:19 - [auth2-chall.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufec.c canohost.c] - [channels.c cipher-chachapoly.c clientloop.c configure.ac hostfile.c] - [kexc25519.c krl.c monitor.c sandbox-systrace.c session.c] - [sftp-client.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c] - [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] - replace most bzero with explicit_bzero, except a few that cna be memset - ok djm dtucker - -commit 3928de067c286683a95fbdbdb5fdb3c78a0e5efd -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:13:54 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/30 22:26:14 - [sandbox-systrace.c] - allow shutdown(2) syscall in sandbox - it may be called by packet_close() - from portable - (Id sync only; change is already in portable) - -commit e1e480aee8a9af6cfbe7188667b7b940d6b57f9f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:13:17 2014 +1100 - - - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 14:04:51 - [sshd_config.5] - document kbdinteractiveauthentication; - requested From: Ross L Richardson - - dtucker/markus helped explain its workings; - -commit 7cc194f70d4a5ec9a82d19422eaf18db4a6624c6 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:12:56 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 06:18:35 - [Makefile.in auth.h auth2-jpake.c auth2.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor.c] - [monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h] - [schnorr.c schnorr.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c] - remove experimental, never-enabled JPAKE code; ok markus@ - -commit b0f26544cf6f4feeb1a4f6db09fca834f5c9867d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:10:01 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 00:19:26 - [sshd.c] - use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); on most operating systems - they are equivalent, but SUSv2 describes the latter as having undefined - behaviour; from portable; ok dtucker - (Id sync only; change is already in portable) - -commit f8f35bc471500348bb262039fb1fc43175d251b0 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:09:12 2014 +1100 - - - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/28 14:13:39 - [ssh-keyscan.1] - kill some bad Pa; - From: Jan Stary - -commit 0ba85d696ae9daf66002c2e4ab0d6bb111e1a787 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:08:38 2014 +1100 - - ignore a few more regress droppings - -commit ec93d15170b7a6ddf63fd654bd0f6a752acc19dd -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:07:13 2014 +1100 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 20:13:46 - [digest.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c Makefile.in] - rename digest.c to digest-openssl.c and add libc variant; ok djm@ - -commit 4a1c7aa640fb97d3472d51b215b6a0ec0fd025c7 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:03:36 2014 +1100 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 19:18:54 - [auth-rsa.c cipher.c ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] - replace openssl MD5 with our ssh_digest_*; ok djm@ - -commit 4e8d937af79ce4e253f77ec93489d098b25becc3 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 4 11:02:42 2014 +1100 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 18:58:14 - [Makefile.in digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.h mac.c hmac.c hmac.h] - replace openssl HMAC with an implementation based on our ssh_digest_* - ok and feedback djm@ - -commit 69d0d09f76bab5aec86fbf78489169f63bd16475 -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Fri Jan 31 14:25:18 2014 -0800 - - - (tim) [Makefile.in] build regress/setuid-allow. - -commit 0eeafcd76b972a3d159f3118227c149a4d7817fe -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 31 14:18:51 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Include for the hton macros. Fixes - build with HP-UX's compiler. Patch from Kevin Brott. - -commit 7e5cec6070673e9f9785ffc749837ada22fbe99f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jan 31 09:25:34 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-systrace.c] Allow shutdown(2) - syscall from sandboxes; it may be called by packet_close. - -commit cdb6c90811caa5df2df856be9b0b16db020fe31d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 30 12:50:17 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) Release openssh-6.5p1 - -commit 996ea80b1884b676a901439f1f2681eb6ff68501 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 30 12:49:55 2014 +1100 - - trim entries prior to openssh-6.0p1 - -commit f5bbd3b657b6340551c8a95f74a70857ff8fac79 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 30 11:26:46 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac atomicio.c] Kludge around NetBSD offering - different symbols for 'read' when various compiler flags are - in use, causing atomicio.c comparisons against it to break and - read/write operations to hang; ok dtucker - -commit c2868192ddc4e1420a50389e18c05db20b0b1f32 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 30 10:21:19 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac] Only check for width-specified integer types - in headers that actually exist. patch from Tom G. Christensen; - ok dtucker@ - -commit c161fc90fc86e2035710570238a9e1ca7a68d2a5 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jan 29 21:01:33 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix broken shell test '==' vs '='; patch from - Tom G. Christensen - -commit 6f917ad376481995ab7d29fb53b08ec8d507eb9e -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Tue Jan 28 10:26:25 2014 -0800 - - - (tim) [regress/agent.sh regress/agent-ptrace.sh] Assign $? to a variable - when used as an error message inside an if statement so we display the - correct into. agent.sh patch from Petr Lautrbach. - -commit ab16ef4152914d44ce6f76e48167d26d22f66a06 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Jan 28 15:08:12 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [sshd.c] Use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); the - latter being specified to have undefined behaviour in SUSv3; - ok dtucker - -commit ab0394905884dc6e58c3721211c6b38fb8fc2ca8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Jan 28 15:07:10 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac] Search for inet_ntop in libnsl and libresovl; - ok dtucker - -commit 4ab20a82d4d4168d62318923f62382f6ef242fcd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jan 27 17:35:04 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing backslash which some make - implementations (eg older Solaris) do not cope with. - -commit e7e8b3cfe9f8665faaf0e68b33df5bbb431bd129 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jan 27 17:32:50 2014 +1100 - - Welcome to 2014 - -commit 5b447c0aac0dd444251e276f6bb3bbbe1c05331c -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Jan 26 09:46:53 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac] correct AC_DEFINE for previous. - -commit 2035b2236d3b1f76c749c642a43e03c85eae76e6 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Jan 26 09:39:53 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-rlimit.c] Disable - RLIMIT_NOFILE pseudo-sandbox on FreeBSD. In some configurations, - libc will attempt to open additional file descriptors for crypto - offload and crash if they cannot be opened. - -commit a92ac7410475fbb00383c7402aa954dc0a75ae19 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Jan 26 09:38:03 2014 +1100 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 20:35:37 - [kex.c] - dh_need needs to be set to max(seclen, blocksize, ivlen, mac_len) - ok dtucker@, noted by mancha - -commit 76eea4ab4e658670ca6e76dd1e6d17f262208b57 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Jan 26 09:37:25 2014 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 10:12:50 - [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexgexc.c] - Add a special case for the DH group size for 3des-cbc, which has an - effective strength much lower than the key size. This causes problems - with some cryptlib implementations, which don't support group sizes larger - than 4k but also don't use the largest group size it does support as - specified in the RFC. Based on a patch from Petr Lautrbach at Redhat, - reduced by me with input from Markus. ok djm@ markus@ - -commit 603b8f47f1cd9ed95a2017447db8e60ca6704594 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Jan 25 13:16:59 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac] autoconf sets finds to 'yes' not '1', so test - against the correct thing. - -commit c96d85376d779b6ac61525b5440010d344d2f23f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Jan 25 13:12:28 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac] Do not attempt to use capsicum sandbox unless - sys/capability.h exists and cap_rights_limit is in libc. Fixes - build on FreeBSD9x which provides the header but not the libc - support. - -commit f62ecef9939cb3dbeb10602fd705d4db3976d822 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Jan 25 12:34:38 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix detection of capsicum sandbox on FreeBSD - -commit b0e0f760b861676a3fe5c40133b270713d5321a9 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jan 24 14:27:04 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [Makefile.in regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh regress/scp.sh] Make - the scp regress test actually test the built scp rather than the one - in $PATH. ok dtucker@ - -commit 42a092530159637da9cb7f9e1b5f4679e34a85e6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jan 23 23:14:39 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] NetBSD's (and FreeBSD's) strnvis is gratuitously - incompatible with OpenBSD's despite post-dating it by more than a decade. - Declare it as broken, and document FreeBSD's as the same. ok djm@ - -commit 617da33c20cb59f9ea6c99c881d92493371ef7b8 -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Wed Jan 22 19:16:10 2014 -0800 - - - (tim) [session.c] Improve error reporting on set_id(). - -commit 5c2ff5e31f57d303ebb414d84a934c02728fa568 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jan 22 21:30:12 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac aclocal.m4] More tests to detect fallout from - platform hardening options: include some long long int arithmatic - to detect missing support functions for -ftrapv in libgcc and - equivalents, actually test linking when -ftrapv is supplied and - set either both -pie/-fPIE or neither. feedback and ok dtucker@ - -commit 852472a54b8a0dc3e53786b313baaa86850a4273 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jan 22 16:31:18 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac] Unless specifically requested, only attempt - to build Position Independent Executables on gcc >= 4.x; ok dtucker - -commit ee87838786cef0194db36ae0675b3e7c4e8ec661 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jan 22 16:30:15 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Don't fail to compile if a - platform that is expected to use the reuse-argv style setproctitle - hack surprises us by providing a setproctitle in libc; ok dtucker - -commit 5c96a154c7940fa67b1f11c421e390dbbc159f27 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Jan 21 13:10:26 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [aclocal.m4] Flesh out the code run in the OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE - and OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK tests to give them a better chance of - detecting toolchain-related problems; ok dtucker - -commit 9464ba6fb34bb42eb3501ec3c5143662e75674bf -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Mon Jan 20 17:59:28 2014 -0800 - - - (tim) [platform.c session.c] Fix bug affecting SVR5 platforms introduced - with sftp chroot support. Move set_id call after chroot. - -commit a6d573caa14d490e6c42fb991bcb5c6860ec704b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jan 21 12:50:46 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4] Differentiate between compile-time and link-time - tests in the configure output. ok djm. - -commit 096118dc73ab14810b3c12785c0b5acb01ad6123 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jan 21 12:48:51 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Make PIE a configure-time option which defaults - to on platforms where it's known to be reliably detected and off elsewhere. - Works around platforms such as FreeBSD 9.1 where it does not interop with - -ftrapv (it seems to work but fails when trying to link ssh). ok djm@ - -commit f9df7f6f477792254eab33cdef71a6d66488cb88 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Jan 20 20:07:15 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] Fix regress failure on platforms that - skip one or more key types (e.g. RHEL/CentOS 6.5); ok dtucker@ - -commit c74e70eb52ccc0082bd5a70b5798bb01c114d138 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jan 20 13:18:09 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [gss-serv-krb5.c] Fall back to krb5_cc_gen_new if the Kerberos - implementation does not have krb5_cc_new_unique, similar to what we do - in auth-krb5.c. - -commit 3510979e83b6a18ec8773c64c3fa04aa08b2e783 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Jan 20 12:41:53 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:08:48 - [digest.c] - memleak; found by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok markus@ - -commit 7eee358d7a6580479bee5cd7e52810ebfd03e5b2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jan 19 22:37:02 2014 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 11:21:51 - [addrmatch.c] - Cast the sizeof to socklen_t so it'll work even if the supplied len is - negative. Suggested by and ok djm, ok deraadt. - -commit b7e01c09b56ab26e8fac56bbce0fd25e36d12bb0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jan 19 22:36:13 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:48:08 - [ssh_config.5] - fix inverted meaning of 'no' and 'yes' for CanonicalizeFallbackLocal - -commit 7b1ded04adce42efa25ada7c3a39818d3109b724 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jan 19 15:30:02 2014 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:17:29 - [canohost.c addrmatch.c] - Cast socklen_t when comparing to size_t and use socklen_t to iterate over - the ip options, both to prevent signed/unsigned comparison warnings. - Patch from vinschen at redhat via portable openssh, begrudging ok deraadt. - -commit 293ee3c9f0796d99ebb033735f0e315f2e0180bf -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jan 19 15:28:01 2014 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/18 09:36:26 - [session.c] - explicitly define USE_PIPES to 1 to prevent redefinition warnings in - portable on platforms that use pipes for everything. From redhat @ - redhat. - -commit 2aca159d05f9e7880d1d8f1ce49a218840057f53 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jan 19 15:25:34 2014 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 06:23:24 - [sftp-server.c] - fix log message statvfs. ok djm - -commit 841f7da89ae8b367bb502d61c5c41916c6e7ae4c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 18 22:12:15 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Correct some error messages and make the - return value check for cap_enter() consistent with the other uses in - FreeBSD. From by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC via bz#2140. - -commit fdce3731660699b2429e93e822f2ccbaccd163ae -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 18 21:12:42 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] On Cygwin the getopt variables (like optargs, - optind) are defined in getopt.h already. Unfortunately they are defined as - "declspec(dllimport)" for historical reasons, because the GNU linker didn't - allow auto-import on PE/COFF targets way back when. The problem is the - dllexport attributes collide with the definitions in the various source - files in OpenSSH, which obviousy define the variables without - declspec(dllimport). The least intrusive way to get rid of these warnings - is to disable warnings for GCC compiler attributes when building on Cygwin. - Patch from vinschen at redhat.com. - -commit 1411c9263f46e1ee49d0d302bf7258ebe69ce827 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 18 21:03:59 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] Add missing function - declarations that stopped being included when we stopped including - from openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h. Patch from vinschen at - redhat.com. - -commit 89c532d843c95a085777c66365067d64d1937eb9 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 18 20:43:49 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [uidswap.c] Prevent unused variable warnings on Cygwin. Patch - from vinschen at redhat.com - -commit 355f861022be7b23d3009fae8f3c9f6f7fc685f7 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 18 00:12:38 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [defines.h] Move our definitions of uintXX_t types down to after - they're defined if we have to define them ourselves. Fixes builds on old - AIX. - -commit a3357661ee1d5d553294f36e4940e8285c7f1332 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jan 18 00:03:57 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Wrap paths.h inside an ifdef. Allows building on - Solaris. - -commit 9edcbff46ff01c8d5dee9c1aa843f09e9ad8a80e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 21:54:32 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Have --without-toolchain-hardening not turn off - stack-protector since that has a separate flag that's been around a while. - -commit 6d725687c490d4ba957a1bbc0ba0a2956c09fa69 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 19:17:34 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Also look in inttypes.h for uintXX_t types. - -commit 5055699c7f7c7ef21703a443ec73117da392f6ae -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 18:48:22 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Only start including headers if we - need them to cut down on the name collisions. - -commit a5cf1e220def07290260e4125e74f41ac75cf88d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 18:10:58 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c - openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Implement enough of statvfs on top of statfs - to be useful (and for the regression tests to pass) on platforms that - have statfs and fstatfs. ok djm@ - -commit 1357d71d7b6d269969520aaa3e84d312ec971d5b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 18:00:40 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) Fix typo in #ifndef. - -commit d23a91ffb289d3553a58b7a60cec39fba9f0f506 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 17:32:30 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac digest.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c - openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Add compatibility layer for older - openssl versions. ok djm@ - -commit 868ea1ea1c1bfdbee5dbad78f81999c5983ecf31 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jan 17 16:47:04 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-darwin.c] - [sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] - [sandbox-systrace.c ssh-sandbox.h sshd.c] Support preauth sandboxing - using the Capsicum API introduced in FreeBSD 10. Patch by Dag-Erling - Smorgrav, updated by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok dtucker@ - -commit a9d186a8b50d18869a10e9203abf71c83ddb1f79 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 16:30:49 2014 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 05:26:41 - [digest.c] - remove unused includes. ok djm@ - -commit 5f1c57a7a7eb39c0e4fee3367712337dbcaef024 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 16:29:45 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 00:21:06 - [sftp-client.c] - signed/unsigned comparison warning fix; from portable (Id sync only) - -commit c548722361d89fb12c108528f96b306a26477b18 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 15:12:16 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Split AC_CHECK_FUNCS for OpenSSL functions into - separate lines and alphabetize for easier diffing of changes. - -commit acad351a5b1c37de9130c9c1710445cc45a7f6b9 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 14:20:05 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [defines.h] Add typedefs for uintXX_t types for platforms that - don't have them. - -commit c3ed065ce8417aaa46490836648c173a5010f226 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 14:18:45 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside - #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. - -commit f45f78ae437062c7d9506c5f475b7215f486be44 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 12:43:43 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [blocks.c fe25519.c ge25519.c hash.c sc25519.c verify.c] Include - includes.h to pull in all of the compatibility stuff. - -commit 99df369d0340caac145d57f700d830147ff18b87 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 12:42:17 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [poly1305.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. - -commit ac413b62ea1957e80c711acbe0c11b908273fc01 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 12:31:33 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [crypto_api.h] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. - -commit 1c4a011e9c939e74815346a560843e1862c300b8 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 12:23:23 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [loginrec.c] Cast to the types specfied in the format - specification to prevent warnings. - -commit c3d483f9a8275be1113535a1e0d0e384f605f3c4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jan 17 11:20:26 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [sftp-client.c] signed/unsigned comparison fix - -commit fd994379dd972417d0491767f7cd9b5bf23f4975 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jan 17 09:53:24 2014 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4 configure.ac] Add some additional compiler/toolchain - hardening flags including -fstack-protector-strong. These default to on - if the toolchain supports them, but there is a configure-time knob - (--without-hardening) to disable them if necessary. ok djm@ - -commit 366224d21768ee8ec28cfbcc5fbade1b32582d58 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 16 18:51:44 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [README] update release notes URL. - -commit 2ae77e64f8fa82cbf25c9755e8e847709b978b40 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 16 18:51:07 2014 +1100 - - - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] - [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank RPM spec version numbers. - -commit 0fa29e6d777c73a1b4ddd3b996b06ee20022ae8a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 16 18:42:31 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:32:00 - [version.h] - openssh-6.5 - -commit 52c371cd6d2598cc73d4e633811b3012119c47e2 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 16 18:42:10 2014 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:31:09 - [sftp-client.c] - needless and incorrect cast to size_t can break resumption of - large download; patch from tobias@ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-upgrade =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-upgrade (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/FREEBSD-upgrade (revision 296853) @@ -1,177 +1,183 @@ - FreeBSD maintainer's guide to OpenSSH-portable ============================================== 00) Make sure your mail spool has plenty of free space. It'll fill up pretty fast once you're done with this checklist. 01) Download the latest OpenSSH-portable tarball and signature from OpenBSD (ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/). 02) Verify the signature: $ gpg --verify openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz.asc 03) Unpack the tarball in a suitable directory: $ tar xf openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz 04) Copy to the vendor directory: $ svn co svn+ssh://svn.freebsd.org/base/vendor-crypto/openssh/dist $ rsync --archive --delete openssh-X.YpZ/ dist/ 05) Take care of added / deleted files: $ svn rm $(svn stat dist | awk '$1 == "!" { print $2 }') $ svn add --no-auto-props $(svn stat dist | awk '$1 == "?" { print $2 }') 06) Commit: $ svn commit -m "Vendor import of OpenSSH X.YpZ." dist 07) Tag: $ svn copy -m "Tag OpenSSH X.YpZ." \ svn+ssh://svn.freebsd.org/base/vendor-crypto/openssh/dist \ svn+ssh://svn.freebsd.org/base/vendor-crypto/openssh/X.YpZ 08) Check out head and run the pre-merge script, which strips our RCS tags from files that have them: $ svn co svn+ssh://svn.freebsd.org/base/head $ cd head/crypto/openssh $ sh freebsd-pre-merge.sh 09) Merge from the vendor branch: $ svn merge -cNNNNNN \^/vendor-crypto/openssh/dist . 0A) Resolve conflicts. Remember to bump the version addendum in version.h, and update the default value in ssh{,d}_config and ssh{,d}_config.5. 0B) Diff against the vendor branch: $ svn diff --no-diff-deleted --no-diff-added \ --ignore-properties \^/vendor-crypto/openssh/X.YpZ . Files that have modifications relative to the vendor code, and only those files, must have the svn:keywords property set to FreeBSD=%H and be listed in the 'keywords' file created by the pre-merge script. 0C) Run the post-merge script, which re-adds RCS tags to files that need them: $ sh freebsd-post-merge.sh 0D) Run the configure script: $ sh freebsd-configure.sh 0E) Review changes to config.h very carefully. 0F) If source files have been added or removed, update the appropriate makefiles to reflect changes in the vendor's Makefile.in. 10) Build libssh: $ cd ../../secure/lib/libssh && make obj && make depend && make 11) Follow the instructions in ssh_namespace.h to get a list of new symbols, and them to ssh_namespace.h. Keep it sorted! 12) Build and install world, reboot, test. Pay particular attention to pam_ssh(8), which gropes inside libssh and will break if something significant changes or if ssh_namespace.h is out of whack. 13) Commit, and hunker down for the inevitable storm of complaints. An overview of FreeBSD changes to OpenSSH-portable ================================================== 0) VersionAddendum The SSH protocol allows for a human-readable version string of up to 40 characters to be appended to the protocol version string. FreeBSD takes advantage of this to include a date indicating the "patch level", so people can easily determine whether their system is vulnerable when an OpenSSH advisory goes out. Some people, however, dislike advertising their patch level in the protocol handshake, so we've added a VersionAddendum configuration variable to allow them to change or disable it. Upstream added support for VersionAddendum on the server side, but we also support it on the client side. 1) Modified server-side defaults We've modified some configuration defaults in sshd: - UsePAM defaults to "yes". - PermitRootLogin defaults to "no". - X11Forwarding defaults to "yes". - PasswordAuthentication defaults to "no". - VersionAddendum defaults to "FreeBSD-YYYYMMDD". - PrivilegeSeparation defaults to "sandbox". - UseDNS defaults to "yes". 2) Modified client-side defaults We've modified some configuration defaults in ssh: - CheckHostIP defaults to "no". - VerifyHostKeyDNS defaults to "yes" if built with LDNS. - VersionAddendum defaults to "FreeBSD-YYYYMMDD". 3) Canonic host names We've added code to ssh.c to canonicize the target host name after reading options but before trying to connect. This eliminates the usual problem with duplicate known_hosts entries. 4) setusercontext() environment Our setusercontext(3) can set environment variables, which we must take care to transfer to the child's environment. 5) TCP wrappers Support for TCP wrappers was removed in upstream 6.7p1. We've added it back by porting the 6.6p1 code forward. 6) DSA keys DSA keys were disabled by default in upstream 6.9p1. We've added them back. 7) Agent client reference counting We've added code to ssh-agent.c to implement client reference counting; the agent will automatically exit when the last client disconnects. 8) Class-based login restrictions We've added code to auth2.c to enforce the host.allow, host.deny, times.allow and times.deny login class capabilities. 9) HPN We no longer have the HPN patches (adaptive buffer size for increased throughput on high-BxD links), but we recognize and ignore HPN-related configuration options to avoid breaking existing configurations. + +A) AES-CBC + + The AES-CBC ciphers were removed from the server-side proposal list + in 6.7p1 due to theoretical weaknesses and the availability of + superior ciphers (including AES-CTR and AES-GCM). We have re-added + them for compatibility with third-party clients. This port was brought to you by (in no particular order) DARPA, NAI Labs, ThinkSec, Nescafé, the Aberlour Glenlivet Distillery Co., Suzanne Vega, and a Sanford's #69 Deluxe Marker. -- des@FreeBSD.org $FreeBSD$ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in (revision 296853) @@ -1,607 +1,583 @@ # $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.365 2014/08/30 06:23:07 djm Exp $ # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh #SHELL = @SH@ AUTORECONF=autoreconf prefix=@prefix@ exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@ bindir=@bindir@ sbindir=@sbindir@ libexecdir=@libexecdir@ datadir=@datadir@ datarootdir=@datarootdir@ mandir=@mandir@ mansubdir=@mansubdir@ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ srcdir=@srcdir@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ DESTDIR= VPATH=@srcdir@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \ -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\" CC=@CC@ LD=@LD@ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ LIBS=@LIBS@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@ SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@ AR=@AR@ AWK=@AWK@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@ PERL=@PERL@ SED=@SED@ ENT=@ENT@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ MANFMT=@MANFMT@ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\ ssh_api.o \ ssherr.o \ sshbuf.o \ sshkey.o \ sshbuf-getput-basic.o \ sshbuf-misc.o \ sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \ krl.o \ bitmap.o LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o bufec.o buffer.o \ canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \ cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \ compat.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \ readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \ - kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o + kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \ + platform-pledge.o SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ - sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ - roaming_common.o roaming_client.o + sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \ audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \ auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \ auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ - roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ - sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o + sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \ + sandbox-solaris.o MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli PATHSUBS = \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \ -e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \ -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \ -e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \ -e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \ -e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \ -e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \ -e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g' FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS) FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \ @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@ all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) $(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h $(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h $(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h .c.o: $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a $(LIBCOMPAT): always (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE)) always: libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS) $(RANLIB) $@ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) +ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) +ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT) # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \ else \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \ fi; \ if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \ $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \ else \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \ fi $(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN) conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@ # fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o" moduli: echo # special case target for umac128 umac128.o: umac.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o umac128.o -c $(srcdir)/umac.c \ -DUMAC_OUTPUT_LEN=16 -Dumac_new=umac128_new \ -Dumac_update=umac128_update -Dumac_final=umac128_final \ -Dumac_delete=umac128_delete clean: regressclean rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log rm -f *.out core survey rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean) distclean: regressclean rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~ rm -rf autom4te.cache rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean) if test -d pkg ; then \ rm -fr pkg ; \ fi veryclean: distclean rm -f configure config.h.in *.0 cleandir: veryclean mrproper: veryclean realclean: veryclean catman-do: @for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \ base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \ echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \ $(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \ >$$base.0 ; \ done distprep: catman-do $(AUTORECONF) -rm -rf autom4te.cache install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files check-config: -$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config install-files: $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir) $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5 $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) (umask 022 ; $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin - ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 - ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 install-sysconf: if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \ if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \ echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ else \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \ fi ; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ - if [ -f "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key" ] ; then \ - echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key already exists, skipping." ; \ - else \ - ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N "" ; \ - fi ; \ - if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key ] ; then \ - echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \ - else \ - ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" ; \ - fi ; \ - if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key ] ; then \ - echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \ - else \ - ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ; \ - fi ; \ - if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key ] ; then \ - echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key already exists, skipping." ; \ - else \ - ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" ; \ - fi ; \ - if [ -z "@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@" ] ; then \ - if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ] ; then \ - echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \ - else \ - ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N "" ; \ - fi ; \ - fi ; \ - fi ; + ./ssh-keygen -A; \ + fi -host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) - ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N "" +host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT) + if ./ssh -Q protocol-version | grep '^1$$' >/dev/null; then \ + ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N ""; \ + fi ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" - test -z "@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@" && ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N "" + if ./ssh -Q key | grep ecdsa >/dev/null ; then \ + ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""; \ + fi uninstallall: uninstall -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) uninstall: - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 regress-prep: [ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey ] || \ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap ] || \ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys ] || \ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex ] || \ mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \ ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) +regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \ + $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \ regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS} $(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS) $(RANLIB) $@ UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \ - regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o \ - roaming_dummy.o + regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\ regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) REGRESS_BINARIES=\ regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \ regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \ regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) tests interop-tests t-exec: regress-prep $(TARGETS) $(REGRESS_BINARIES) BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \ TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \ TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \ TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink"; \ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen"; \ TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch"; \ TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" ; \ TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" ; \ cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \ $(MAKE) \ .OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \ .CURDIR="`pwd`" \ BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \ OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \ PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \ TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \ TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \ TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \ TEST_SSH_PLINK="$${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" \ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" \ TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \ TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \ TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \ TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \ EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \ $@ && echo all tests passed compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT) (cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE)) regressclean: if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \ (cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \ fi survey: survey.sh ssh @$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey @echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the' @echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with' @echo '"make send-survey".' send-survey: survey mail portable-survey@mindrot.org This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other Unices. OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/ This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris, Unicos, and UnixWare. This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository. The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for all logins, not just when using password authentication. OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5]. There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join. Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by unsubscribed users.Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD style guidelines[6]. Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7] for details and general tips. Damien Miller Miscellania - This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation released by Tatu Ylonen. References - [0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html [1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ [2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html [3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ [4] http://www.openssl.org/ [5] http://www.openpam.org http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11) [6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9 [7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html $Id: README,v 1.87 2014/08/10 01:35:06 djm Exp $ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/README.platform =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/README.platform (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/README.platform (revision 296853) @@ -1,96 +1,99 @@ This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms. AIX --- As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry settings, where previously it did not. Because of this, it's possible for sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired chuser attribute). Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the administrator. As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8. As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it if found. This will enable IPv6 support. If for some reason configure gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour. IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5 IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4 If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \ --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the "rlogin" attribute set. This check is not done for the root account, instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used. +If you are using the IBM compiler you probably want to use CC=xlc rather +than the default of cc. + Cygwin ------ To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages: gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl, openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel. Darwin and MacOS X ------------------ Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X. Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode using a third party driver. More information is available at: http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/ Linux ----- Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent development packages. On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel, zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev. Solaris ------- If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4) for praudit(1m) to give sensible output. The following line needs to be added to /etc/security/audit_event: 32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is 32768 - 65535. Event number 32800 has been choosen for AUE_openssh. There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding. Platforms using PAM ------------------- As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when PAM is enabled. To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell sessions. Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still return the output from pam_nologin to the client. $Id: README.platform,v 1.10 2009/08/28 23:14:48 dtucker Exp $ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,145 +1,145 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.13 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.14 2015/10/20 23:24:25 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef BSD_AUTH #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" static void * bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { return authctxt; } int bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; char *challenge = NULL; *infotxt = NULL; *numprompts = 0; *prompts = NULL; *echo_on = NULL; if (authctxt->as != NULL) { debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session"); challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE); if (challenge == NULL) { auth_close(authctxt->as); authctxt->as = NULL; } } if (challenge == NULL) { debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session"); debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge); if (authctxt->as == NULL) challenge = NULL; debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty"); } if (challenge == NULL) return -1; *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge); return 0; } int bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; int authok; if (!authctxt->valid) return -1; - if (authctxt->as == 0) + if (authctxt->as == NULL) error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session"); if (numresponses != 1) return -1; authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0); authctxt->as = NULL; debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok); return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0; } static void bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; if (authctxt && authctxt->as) { auth_close(authctxt->as); authctxt->as = NULL; } } KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = { "bsdauth", bsdauth_init_ctx, bsdauth_query, bsdauth_respond, bsdauth_free_ctx }; KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = { "bsdauth", bsdauth_init_ctx, mm_bsdauth_query, mm_bsdauth_respond, bsdauth_free_ctx }; #endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,273 +1,273 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.20 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.21 2016/01/27 06:44:58 djm Exp $ */ /* * Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines. * - * $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar Exp $ + * From: FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #ifdef KRB5 #include #include #include #include extern ServerOptions options; static int krb5_init(void *context) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context; krb5_error_code problem; if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) { problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx); if (problem) return (problem); } return (0); } int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { #ifndef HEIMDAL krb5_creds creds; krb5_principal server; #endif krb5_error_code problem; krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; int len; char *client, *platform_client; const char *errmsg; /* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */ platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name); client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name; temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); problem = krb5_init(authctxt); if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client, &authctxt->krb5_user); if (problem) goto out; #ifdef HEIMDAL # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache); # else problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); # endif if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, authctxt->krb5_user); if (problem) goto out; restore_uid(); problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, ccache, password, 1, NULL); temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); if (problem) goto out; # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); # else problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); # endif if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache); ccache = NULL; if (problem) goto out; #else problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL, KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); if (problem) goto out; restore_uid(); problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server, NULL, NULL, NULL); krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server); temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); if (problem) goto out; if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name)) { problem = -1; goto out; } problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, authctxt->krb5_user); if (problem) goto out; problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &creds); if (problem) goto out; #endif authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif out: restore_uid(); free(platform_client); if (problem) { if (ccache) krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache); if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem); debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg); } else debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d", problem); krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) return (-1); else return (0); } return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0); } void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) { debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called"); if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) { krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL; } if (authctxt->krb5_user) { krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user); authctxt->krb5_user = NULL; } if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) { krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx); authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL; } } #ifndef HEIMDAL krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { int tmpfd, ret, oerrno; char ccname[40]; mode_t old_umask; ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) return ENOMEM; old_umask = umask(0177); tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); oerrno = errno; umask(old_umask); if (tmpfd == -1) { logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); return oerrno; } if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { oerrno = errno; logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); close(tmpfd); return oerrno; } close(tmpfd); return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); } #endif /* !HEIMDAL */ #endif /* KRB5 */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,620 +1,639 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.68 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.70 2015/12/10 17:08:40 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" /* Flags set authorized_keys flags */ int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_pty_flag = 0; int no_user_rc = 0; int key_is_cert_authority = 0; /* "command=" option. */ char *forced_command = NULL; /* "environment=" options. */ struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL; /* "tunnel=" option. */ int forced_tun_device = -1; /* "principals=" option. */ char *authorized_principals = NULL; extern ServerOptions options; void auth_clear_options(void) { no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; no_pty_flag = 0; no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; no_user_rc = 0; key_is_cert_authority = 0; while (custom_environment) { struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; custom_environment = ce->next; free(ce->s); free(ce); } - if (forced_command) { - free(forced_command); - forced_command = NULL; - } - if (authorized_principals) { - free(authorized_principals); - authorized_principals = NULL; - } + free(forced_command); + forced_command = NULL; + free(authorized_principals); + authorized_principals = NULL; forced_tun_device = -1; channel_clear_permitted_opens(); } /* + * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match + * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0 + * if negated option matches. + * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to + * point to the first character after the option and, if 'msg' is not NULL + * then a message based on it added via auth_debug_add(). + */ +static int +match_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, char **optsp, const char *msg) +{ + size_t opt_len = strlen(opt); + char *opts = *optsp; + int negate = 0; + + if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) { + opts += 3; + negate = 1; + } + if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) { + *optsp = opts + opt_len; + if (msg != NULL) { + auth_debug_add("%s %s.", msg, + negate ? "disabled" : "enabled"); + } + return negate ? 0 : 1; + } + return -1; +} + +/* * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not. * side effect: sets key option flags */ int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) { const char *cp; - int i; + int i, r; /* reset options */ auth_clear_options(); if (!opts) return 1; while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') { - cp = "cert-authority"; - if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { - key_is_cert_authority = 1; - opts += strlen(cp); + if ((r = match_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts, NULL)) != -1) { + key_is_cert_authority = r; goto next_option; } - cp = "no-port-forwarding"; - if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { - auth_debug_add("Port forwarding disabled."); + if ((r = match_flag("restrict", 0, &opts, NULL)) != -1) { + auth_debug_add("Key is restricted."); no_port_forwarding_flag = 1; - opts += strlen(cp); + no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; + no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; + no_pty_flag = 1; + no_user_rc = 1; goto next_option; } - cp = "no-agent-forwarding"; - if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { - auth_debug_add("Agent forwarding disabled."); - no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; - opts += strlen(cp); + if ((r = match_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts, + "Port forwarding")) != -1) { + no_port_forwarding_flag = r != 1; goto next_option; } - cp = "no-X11-forwarding"; - if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { - auth_debug_add("X11 forwarding disabled."); - no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; - opts += strlen(cp); + if ((r = match_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts, + "Agent forwarding")) != -1) { + no_agent_forwarding_flag = r != 1; goto next_option; } - cp = "no-pty"; - if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { - auth_debug_add("Pty allocation disabled."); - no_pty_flag = 1; - opts += strlen(cp); + if ((r = match_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts, + "X11 forwarding")) != -1) { + no_x11_forwarding_flag = r != 1; goto next_option; } - cp = "no-user-rc"; - if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { - auth_debug_add("User rc file execution disabled."); - no_user_rc = 1; - opts += strlen(cp); + if ((r = match_flag("pty", 1, &opts, + "PTY allocation")) != -1) { + no_pty_flag = r != 1; goto next_option; } + if ((r = match_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts, + "User rc execution")) != -1) { + no_user_rc = r != 1; + goto next_option; + } cp = "command=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { opts += strlen(cp); - if (forced_command != NULL) - free(forced_command); + free(forced_command); forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; forced_command[i++] = '"'; continue; } forced_command[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(forced_command); forced_command = NULL; goto bad_option; } forced_command[i] = '\0'; auth_debug_add("Forced command."); opts++; goto next_option; } cp = "principals=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { opts += strlen(cp); - if (authorized_principals != NULL) - free(authorized_principals); + free(authorized_principals); authorized_principals = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; authorized_principals[i++] = '"'; continue; } authorized_principals[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(authorized_principals); authorized_principals = NULL; goto bad_option; } authorized_principals[i] = '\0'; auth_debug_add("principals: %.900s", authorized_principals); opts++; goto next_option; } cp = "environment=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *s; struct envstring *new_envstring; opts += strlen(cp); s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; s[i++] = '"'; continue; } s[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(s); goto bad_option; } s[i] = '\0'; opts++; if (options.permit_user_env) { auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: " "%.900s", s); debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); new_envstring = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*new_envstring)); new_envstring->s = s; new_envstring->next = custom_environment; custom_environment = new_envstring; s = NULL; } free(s); goto next_option; } cp = "from=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); const char *remote_host = get_canonical_hostname( options.use_dns); char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); opts += strlen(cp); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; patterns[i++] = '"'; continue; } patterns[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } patterns[i] = '\0'; opts++; switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip, patterns)) { case 1: free(patterns); /* Host name matches. */ goto next_option; case -1: debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid criteria", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: " "invalid criteria", file, linenum); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 0: free(patterns); logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with " "correct key but not from a permitted " "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip); auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not " "permitted to use this key for login.", remote_host); break; } /* deny access */ return 0; } cp = "permitopen=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *host, *p; int port; char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); opts += strlen(cp); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; patterns[i++] = '"'; continue; } patterns[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing " "end quote", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } patterns[i] = '\0'; opts++; p = patterns; /* XXX - add streamlocal support */ host = hpdelim(&p); if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen " "specification <%.100s>", file, linenum, patterns); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: " "Bad permitopen specification", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } host = cleanhostname(host); if (p == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(p)) < 0) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port " "<%.100s>", file, linenum, p ? p : ""); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: " "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port); free(patterns); goto next_option; } cp = "tunnel=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *tun = NULL; opts += strlen(cp); tun = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; tun[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(tun); forced_tun_device = -1; goto bad_option; } tun[i] = '\0'; forced_tun_device = a2tun(tun, NULL); free(tun); if (forced_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device", file, linenum); forced_tun_device = -1; goto bad_option; } auth_debug_add("Forced tun device: %d", forced_tun_device); opts++; goto next_option; } next_option: /* * Skip the comma, and move to the next option * (or break out if there are no more). */ if (!*opts) fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing."); if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t') break; /* End of options. */ if (*opts != ',') goto bad_option; opts++; /* Process the next option. */ } /* grant access */ return 1; bad_option: logit("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s", file, linenum, opts); auth_debug_add("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s", file, linenum, opts); /* deny access */ return 0; } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static int parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw, u_int which, int crit, int *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag, int *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag, int *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag, int *cert_no_pty_flag, int *cert_no_user_rc, char **cert_forced_command, int *cert_source_address_done) { char *command, *allowed; const char *remote_ip; char *name = NULL; struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL; int r, ret = -1, result, found; if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__); goto out; } while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) { sshbuf_free(data); data = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto out; } debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu", name, sshbuf_len(data)); found = 0; if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) { if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) { *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) { *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) { *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) { *cert_no_pty_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) { *cert_no_user_rc = 0; found = 1; } } if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) { if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command, NULL)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse \"%s\" " "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (*cert_forced_command != NULL) { error("Certificate has multiple " "force-command options"); free(command); goto out; } *cert_forced_command = command; found = 1; } if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed, NULL)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse \"%s\" " "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((*cert_source_address_done)++) { error("Certificate has multiple " "source-address options"); free(allowed); goto out; } remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); result = addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip, allowed); free(allowed); switch (result) { case 1: /* accepted */ break; case 0: /* no match */ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s " "with valid certificate but not " "from a permitted host " "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name, remote_ip); auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' " "is not permitted to use this " "certificate for login.", remote_ip); goto out; case -1: default: error("Certificate source-address " "contents invalid"); goto out; } found = 1; } } if (!found) { if (crit) { error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" " "is not supported", name); goto out; } else { logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" " "is not supported", name); } } else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) { error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt " "(extra data)", name); goto out; } free(name); name = NULL; } /* successfully parsed all options */ ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0 && cert_forced_command != NULL && *cert_forced_command != NULL) { free(*cert_forced_command); *cert_forced_command = NULL; } - if (name != NULL) - free(name); + free(name); sshbuf_free(data); sshbuf_free(c); return ret; } /* * Set options from critical certificate options. These supersede user key * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options(). */ int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw) { int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1; int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; int cert_no_pty_flag = 1; int cert_no_user_rc = 1; char *cert_forced_command = NULL; int cert_source_address_done = 0; /* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */ if (parse_option_list(k->cert->critical, pw, OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cert_forced_command, &cert_source_address_done) == -1) return -1; if (parse_option_list(k->cert->extensions, pw, OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0, &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_pty_flag, &cert_no_user_rc, NULL, NULL) == -1) return -1; no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag; no_agent_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag; no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag; no_pty_flag |= cert_no_pty_flag; no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc; /* CA-specified forced command supersedes key option */ if (cert_forced_command != NULL) { - if (forced_command != NULL) - free(forced_command); + free(forced_command); forced_command = cert_forced_command; } return 0; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1219 +1,1220 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the * DARPA CHATS research program. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -/* Based on $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des Exp $ */ +/* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */ + #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef USE_PAM #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif /* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, AIX */ #else # define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM */ #endif /* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member) #else # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member) #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "auth-options.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" extern ServerOptions options; extern Buffer loginmsg; extern int compat20; extern u_int utmp_len; /* so we don't silently change behaviour */ #ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS # error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK" #endif /* * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported * and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if * this breaks. */ #ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK #include /* * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with* * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h * (e.g. Linux) */ typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t; #else typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t; #endif struct pam_ctxt { sp_pthread_t pam_thread; int pam_psock; int pam_csock; int pam_done; }; static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *); static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt; #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* * Simulate threads with processes. */ static int sshpam_thread_status = -1; static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig; static void sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig) { signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL) return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */ if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG) <= 0) { /* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */ kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM); if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, 0) <= 0) return; /* could not wait */ } if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) && WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM) return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */ if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status)) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly"); if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly"); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void pthread_exit(void *value) { _exit(0); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr, void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg) { pid_t pid; struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg; sshpam_thread_status = -1; switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno)); return (-1); case 0: close(ctx->pam_psock); ctx->pam_psock = -1; thread_start(arg); _exit(1); default: *thread = pid; close(ctx->pam_csock); ctx->pam_csock = -1; sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler); return (0); } } static int pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread) { signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); return (kill(thread, SIGTERM)); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value) { int status; if (sshpam_thread_status != -1) return (sshpam_thread_status); signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); waitpid(thread, &status, 0); return (status); } #endif static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL; static int sshpam_err = 0; static int sshpam_authenticated = 0; static int sshpam_session_open = 0; static int sshpam_cred_established = 0; static int sshpam_account_status = -1; static char **sshpam_env = NULL; static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL; static const char *sshpam_password = NULL; static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT"; /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */ #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST static char ** pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh) { /* * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment. */ return NULL; } #endif /* * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root. * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do * the right thing. */ #ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID static int sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) { int result; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized"); if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags); if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return result; } # define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b))) #endif void sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd) { debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd); if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd; if (reqd) { no_port_forwarding_flag |= 2; no_agent_forwarding_flag |= 2; no_x11_forwarding_flag |= 2; } else { no_port_forwarding_flag &= ~2; no_agent_forwarding_flag &= ~2; no_x11_forwarding_flag &= ~2; } } /* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */ static void import_environments(Buffer *b) { char *env; u_int i, num_env; int err; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Import variables set by do_pam_account */ sshpam_account_status = buffer_get_int(b); sshpam_password_change_required(buffer_get_int(b)); /* Import environment from subprocess */ num_env = buffer_get_int(b); if (num_env > 1024) fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024", __func__, num_env); sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env)); debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env); for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) sshpam_env[i] = buffer_get_string(b, NULL); sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL; /* Import PAM environment from subprocess */ num_env = buffer_get_int(b); debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env); for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { env = buffer_get_string(b, NULL); #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV /* Errors are not fatal here */ if ((err = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) { error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } #endif } #endif } /* * Conversation function for authentication thread. */ static int sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { Buffer buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; struct pam_response *reply; int i; debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (data == NULL) { error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context"); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } ctxt = data; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); buffer_init(&buffer); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK) goto fail; reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL); break; case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK) goto fail; reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL); break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1) goto fail; break; case PAM_TEXT_INFO: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1) goto fail; break; default: goto fail; } buffer_clear(&buffer); } buffer_free(&buffer); *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); buffer_free(&buffer); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } /* * Authentication thread. */ static void * sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; Buffer buffer; struct pam_conv sshpam_conv; int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK extern char **environ; char **env_from_pam; u_int i; const char *pam_user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; char *tz = getenv("TZ"); sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; environ[0] = NULL; if (tz != NULL) if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1) error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s", strerror(errno)); if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) { setproctitle("%s [pam]", sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown"); } #endif sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv; sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); buffer_init(&buffer); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&sshpam_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; if (compat20) { if (!do_pam_account()) { sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; goto auth_fail; } if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_password_change_required(0); } } buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, "OK"); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Export variables set by do_pam_account */ buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_account_status); buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange); /* Export any environment strings set in child */ for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) ; /* Count */ buffer_put_int(&buffer, i); for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, environ[i]); /* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */ env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle); for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) ; /* Count */ buffer_put_int(&buffer, i); for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, env_from_pam[i]); #endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */ /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, &buffer); buffer_free(&buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); auth_fail: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, &buffer); else ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer); buffer_free(&buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */ } void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) { pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread); pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL); close(ctxt->pam_psock); close(ctxt->pam_csock); memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt)); cleanup_ctxt = NULL; } } static int sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL }; static int sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int i; size_t len; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); buffer_append(&loginmsg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len); buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1 ); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL }; void sshpam_cleanup(void) { if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor())) return; debug("PAM: cleanup"); pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv); if (sshpam_session_open) { debug("PAM: closing session"); pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT); sshpam_session_open = 0; } if (sshpam_cred_established) { debug("PAM: deleting credentials"); pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED); sshpam_cred_established = 0; } sshpam_authenticated = 0; pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } static int sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt) { extern char *__progname; const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; if (sshpam_handle != NULL) { /* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */ sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0) return (0); pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user); sshpam_err = pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle); sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } pam_rhost = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns); debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } #ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE /* * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate. * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and * may not even set one (for tty-less connections) */ debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\""); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh"); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } #endif return (0); } static void * sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; int socks[2]; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); /* * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account * has previously failed. */ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0) return NULL; /* Initialize PAM */ if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) { error("PAM: initialization failed"); return (NULL); } ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt); /* Start the authentication thread */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) { error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno)); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0]; ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1]; if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) { error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s", strerror(errno)); close(socks[0]); close(socks[1]); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } cleanup_ctxt = ctxt; return (ctxt); } static int sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; size_t plen; u_char type; char *msg; size_t len, mlen; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&buffer); *name = xstrdup(""); *info = xstrdup(""); *prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); **prompts = NULL; plen = 0; *echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int)); while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, &buffer) == 0) { type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); msg = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL); mlen = strlen(msg); switch (type) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: *num = 1; len = plen + mlen + 1; **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON); free(msg); return (0); case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: /* accumulate messages */ len = plen + mlen + 2; **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen); plen++; free(msg); break; case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED: sshpam_account_status = 0; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_AUTH_ERR: debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type)); if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) { *info = **prompts; **prompts = NULL; *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = -1; free(msg); return 0; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_SUCCESS: if (**prompts != NULL) { /* drain any accumulated messages */ debug("PAM: %s", **prompts); buffer_append(&loginmsg, **prompts, strlen(**prompts)); free(**prompts); **prompts = NULL; } if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) { if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid || (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) fatal("Internal error: PAM auth " "succeeded when it should have " "failed"); import_environments(&buffer); *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = 1; free(msg); return (0); } error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg, sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", sshpam_authctxt->user, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns)); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; free(msg); ctxt->pam_done = -1; return (-1); } } return (-1); } /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */ static int sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) { Buffer buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num); switch (ctxt->pam_done) { case 1: sshpam_authenticated = 1; return (0); case 0: break; default: return (-1); } if (num != 1) { error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num); return (-1); } buffer_init(&buffer); if (sshpam_authctxt->valid && (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 || options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp); else buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) { buffer_free(&buffer); return (-1); } buffer_free(&buffer); return (1); } static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); free(ctxt); /* * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before * the server process terminates. */ } KbdintDevice sshpam_device = { "pam", sshpam_init_ctx, sshpam_query, sshpam_respond, sshpam_free_ctx }; KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = { "pam", mm_sshpam_init_ctx, mm_sshpam_query, mm_sshpam_respond, mm_sshpam_free_ctx }; /* * This replaces auth-pam.c */ void start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt) { if (!options.use_pam) fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no"); if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) fatal("PAM: initialisation failed"); } void finish_pam(void) { sshpam_cleanup(); } u_int do_pam_account(void) { debug("%s: called", __func__); if (sshpam_account_status != -1) return (sshpam_account_status); sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0); debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { sshpam_account_status = 0; return (sshpam_account_status); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) sshpam_password_change_required(1); sshpam_account_status = 1; return (sshpam_account_status); } void do_pam_set_tty(const char *tty) { if (tty != NULL) { debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"%s\"", tty); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, tty); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_TTY: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } } void do_pam_setcred(int init) { sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (init) { debug("PAM: establishing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); } else { debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) { sshpam_cred_established = 1; return; } if (sshpam_authenticated) fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); else debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } static int sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; struct pam_response *reply; int i; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: reply[i].resp = read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), RP_ALLOW_STDIN); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL) input[0] = '\0'; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL }; /* * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't * support that */ void do_pam_chauthtok(void) { if (use_privsep) fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)"); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&tty_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); debug("PAM: changing password"); sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } void do_pam_session(void) { debug3("PAM: opening session"); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) sshpam_session_open = 1; else { sshpam_session_open = 0; disable_forwarding(); error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } } int is_pam_session_open(void) { return sshpam_session_open; } /* * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear * during the ssh authentication process. */ int do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) { int ret = 1; #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV char *compound; size_t len; len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2; compound = xmalloc(len); snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value); ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound); free(compound); #endif return (ret); } char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void) { return sshpam_env; } char ** fetch_pam_environment(void) { return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle)); } void free_pam_environment(char **env) { char **envp; if (env == NULL) return; for (envp = env; *envp; envp++) free(*envp); free(env); } /* * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later * display. */ static int sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int i; size_t len; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: if (sshpam_password == NULL) goto fail; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (len > 0) { buffer_append(&loginmsg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len); buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1); } if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL }; /* * Attempt password authentication via PAM */ int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL) fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to " "initialise.", __func__); sshpam_password = password; sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; /* * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail). */ if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) sshpam_password = badpw; sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&passwd_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); sshpam_password = NULL; if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) { debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s", authctxt->user); return 1; } else { debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s", authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); return 0; } } #endif /* USE_PAM */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,229 +1,229 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.84 2015/05/08 06:41:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.86 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #ifndef AUTH_H #define AUTH_H #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP #include #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH #include #endif #ifdef KRB5 #include #endif struct ssh; struct sshkey; typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod; typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice; struct Authctxt { sig_atomic_t success; int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */ int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */ int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */ int attempt; int failures; int server_caused_failure; int force_pwchange; char *user; /* username sent by the client */ char *service; struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ char *style; void *kbdintctxt; char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */ #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ u_int num_auth_methods; #ifdef KRB5 krb5_context krb5_ctx; krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache; krb5_principal krb5_user; char *krb5_ticket_file; char *krb5_ccname; #endif Buffer *loginmsg; void *methoddata; struct sshkey **prev_userkeys; u_int nprev_userkeys; }; /* * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by * the client. */ struct Authmethod { char *name; int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); int *enabled; }; /* * Keyboard interactive device: * init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success * query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure * respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction, * otherwise - failure */ struct KbdintDevice { const char *name; void* (*init_ctx)(Authctxt*); int (*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on); int (*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses); void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx); }; int auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *); int auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *); int auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, Key *); int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *); int auth_rsa(Authctxt *, BIGNUM *); int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *); BIGNUM *auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); int auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]); int auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *); int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int); void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))); void auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *); int auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *); struct stat; int auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, char *, size_t); #ifdef KRB5 int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *); int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt); int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password); void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt); #endif /* KRB5 */ #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) #include int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *); int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *); #endif #include "auth-pam.h" #include "audit.h" void remove_kbdint_device(const char *); void disable_forwarding(void); void do_authentication(Authctxt *); void do_authentication2(Authctxt *); void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *); void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn)); void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *); int auth_root_allowed(const char *); void userauth_send_banner(const char *); char *auth2_read_banner(void); int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int); int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *); int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); void privsep_challenge_enable(void); int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *); void auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *); int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); int skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **); int allowed_user(struct passwd *); struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user); char *get_challenge(Authctxt *); int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *); void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *); char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *); HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *); /* hostkey handling */ Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *); int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *, - const u_char *, size_t, u_int); + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); /* debug messages during authentication */ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void auth_debug_send(void); void auth_debug_reset(void); struct passwd *fakepw(void); int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *); #define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: " #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) #include krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *); #endif #endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1102 +1,1110 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 18:44:22 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.55 2016/01/27 00:53:12 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */ #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */ /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; static int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer b; Key *key = NULL; - char *pkalg, *userstyle; + char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL; u_char *pkblob, *sig; u_int alen, blen, slen; int have_sig, pktype; int authenticated = 0; if (!authctxt->valid) { - debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user"); + debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); return 0; } have_sig = packet_get_char(); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { - debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH"); + debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__); /* no explicit pkalg given */ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */ pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); buffer_free(&b); } else { pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); } pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ - logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", - pkalg); + logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", + __func__, pkalg); goto done; } key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); if (key == NULL) { - error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); + error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { - error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key " - "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); + error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key " + "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype); goto done; } if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe " "signature scheme"); goto done; } + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) { logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key)); goto done; } if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto done; } if (have_sig) { + debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s", + __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); sig = packet_get_string(&slen); packet_check_eom(); buffer_init(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); } else { buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); } /* reconstruct packet */ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle); free(userstyle); buffer_put_cstring(&b, datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey"); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); } buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) && PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) { authenticated = 1; /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */ auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key); key = NULL; /* Don't free below */ } buffer_free(&b); free(sig); } else { - debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable"); + debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s", + __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); packet_check_eom(); /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ /* * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an * issue? -markus */ if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK); packet_put_string(pkalg, alen); packet_put_string(pkblob, blen); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); authctxt->postponed = 1; } } if (authenticated != 1) auth_clear_options(); done: - debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg); + debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg); if (key != NULL) key_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); + free(fp); return authenticated; } void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...) { char *fp, *extra; va_list ap; int i; extra = NULL; if (fmt != NULL) { va_start(ap, fmt); i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (i < 0 || extra == NULL) fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__); } if (key_is_cert(key)) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", key_type(key), key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); free(fp); } else { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); free(fp); } free(extra); } /* * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector * and its members. */ static int split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; int argc = 0, quote, i, j; char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv)); *argvp = NULL; *argcp = 0; for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { /* Skip leading whitespace */ if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') continue; /* Start of a token */ quote = 0; if (s[i] == '\\' && (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\')) i++; else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"') quote = s[i++]; argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv)); arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1); argv[argc] = NULL; /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */ for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (s[i] == '\\') { if (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\') { i++; /* Skip '\' */ arg[j++] = s[i]; } else { /* Unrecognised escape */ arg[j++] = s[i]; } } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')) break; /* done */ else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote) break; /* done */ else arg[j++] = s[i]; } if (s[i] == '\0') { if (quote != 0) { /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } break; } } /* Success */ *argcp = argc; *argvp = argv; argc = 0; argv = NULL; r = 0; out: if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) free(argv[i]); free(argv); } return r; } /* * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as * necessary. Caller must free returned string. */ static char * assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv) { int i, j, ws, r; char c, *ret; struct sshbuf *buf, *arg; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { ws = 0; sshbuf_reset(arg); for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) { r = 0; c = argv[i][j]; switch (c) { case ' ': case '\t': ws = 1; r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); break; case '\\': case '\'': case '"': if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0) break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); break; } if (r != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) || (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 || (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0)) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL) fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__); memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0'; sshbuf_free(buf); sshbuf_free(arg); return ret; } /* * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure. * NB. "command" is only used for logging. */ static pid_t subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command, int ac, char **av, FILE **child) { FILE *f; struct stat st; int devnull, p[2], i; pid_t pid; char *cp, errmsg[512]; u_int envsize; char **child_env; *child = NULL; debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__, tag, command, pw->pw_name); /* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */ if (*av[0] != '/') { error("%s path is not absolute", tag); return 0; } temporarily_use_uid(pw); if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) { error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); return 0; } if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg); restore_uid(); return 0; } /* * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the * authorized_keys output. */ if (pipe(p) != 0) { error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); return 0; } /* * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and * run cleanup_exit() code. */ restore_uid(); switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: /* error */ error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); close(p[1]); return 0; case 0: /* child */ /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */ envsize = 5; child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize); child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL) child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp); for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) signal(i, SIG_DFL); if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } execve(av[0], av, child_env); error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno)); _exit(127); default: /* parent */ break; } close(p[1]); if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); /* Don't leave zombie child */ kill(pid, SIGTERM); while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; return 0; } /* Success */ debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid); *child = f; return pid; } /* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */ static int exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd) { int status; while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) { error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); return -1; } } if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status)); return -1; } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status)); return -1; } return 0; } static int match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { char *result; u_int i; /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i], principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) { debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"", result); free(result); return 1; } } return 0; } static int process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts; u_long linenum = 0; u_int i; while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* Skip blank and comment lines. */ if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL) *ep = '\0'; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n') continue; /* Trim trailing whitespace. */ ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1; while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t')) *ep-- = '\0'; /* * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has * key options. */ line_opts = NULL; if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL || (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) { for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++) ; line_opts = cp; cp = ep; } for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) { debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"", file == NULL ? "(command)" : file, linenum, cert->principals[i]); if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts, file, linenum) != 1) continue; return 1; } } } return 0; } static int match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { FILE *f; int success; temporarily_use_uid(pw); debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { restore_uid(); return 0; } success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert); fclose(f); restore_uid(); return success; } /* * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command. * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { FILE *f = NULL; int ok, found_principal = 0; struct passwd *pw; int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0; pid_t pid; char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; void (*osigchld)(int); if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL) return 0; if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) { error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, " "skipping"); return 0; } /* * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. */ osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); pw = getpwnam(username); if (pw == NULL) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", username, strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains " "invalid quotes", command); goto out; } if (ac == 0) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", command); goto out; } for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { tmp = percent_expand(av[i], "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir, (char *)NULL); if (tmp == NULL) fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); free(av[i]); av[i] = tmp; } /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ command = assemble_argv(ac, av); if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command, ac, av, &f)) == 0) goto out; uid_swapped = 1; temporarily_use_uid(pw); ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert); if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0) goto out; /* Read completed successfully */ found_principal = ok; out: if (f != NULL) fclose(f); signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) free(av[i]); free(av); if (uid_swapped) restore_uid(); free(command); free(username); return found_principal; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) { char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; const char *reason; int found_key = 0; u_long linenum = 0; Key *found; char *fp; found_key = 0; found = NULL; while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { char *cp, *key_options = NULL; if (found != NULL) key_free(found); found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); auth_clear_options(); /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { /* no key? check if there are options for this key */ int quoted = 0; debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); key_options = cp; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } /* Skip remaining whitespace. */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); /* still no key? advance to next line*/ continue; } } if (key_is_cert(key)) { if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key)) continue; if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1) continue; if (!key_is_cert_authority) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) continue; debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s", file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); /* * If the user has specified a list of principals as * a key option, then prefer that list to matching * their username in the certificate principals list. */ if (authorized_principals != NULL && !match_principals_option(authorized_principals, key->cert)) { reason = "Certificate does not contain an " "authorized principal"; fail_reason: free(fp); error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); continue; } if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) { free(fp); continue; } - verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" " + verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) " "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, key_type(found), fp, file); free(fp); found_key = 1; break; } else if (key_equal(found, key)) { if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1) continue; if (key_is_cert_authority) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) continue; debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); free(fp); found_key = 1; break; } } if (found != NULL) key_free(found); if (!found_key) debug2("key not found"); return found_key; } /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ static int user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) { char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; const char *reason; int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) return 0; if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) { debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); goto out; } /* * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate * principals against the names in that file rather than matching * against the username. */ if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) { if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) found_principal = 1; } /* Try querying command if specified */ if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key->cert)) found_principal = 1; /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */ use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL || options.authorized_principals_command != NULL; if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) { reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; fail_reason: error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); goto out; } if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) goto out; - verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s", - key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, + verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by " + "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, + key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); ret = 1; out: free(principals_file); free(ca_fp); return ret; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in file. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) { FILE *f; int found_key = 0; /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); debug("trying public key file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) { found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw); fclose(f); } restore_uid(); return found_key; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) { FILE *f = NULL; int r, ok, found_key = 0; struct passwd *pw; int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0; pid_t pid; char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL; char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; void (*osigchld)(int); if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL) return 0; if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) { error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping"); return 0; } /* * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. */ osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); pw = getpwnam(username); if (pw == NULL) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", username, strerror(errno)); goto out; } /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */ if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", command); goto out; } if (ac == 0) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", command); goto out; } for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { tmp = percent_expand(av[i], "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir, "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), "f", key_fp, "k", keytext, (char *)NULL); if (tmp == NULL) fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); free(av[i]); av[i] = tmp; } /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ command = assemble_argv(ac, av); /* * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the * target username as a single argument. */ if (ac == 1) { av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av)); av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name); av[2] = NULL; /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */ free(command); xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]); } if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command, ac, av, &f)) == 0) goto out; uid_swapped = 1; temporarily_use_uid(pw); ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw); if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0) goto out; /* Read completed successfully */ found_key = ok; out: if (f != NULL) fclose(f); signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) free(av[i]); free(av); if (uid_swapped) restore_uid(); free(command); free(username); free(key_fp); free(keytext); return found_key; } /* * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. */ int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt) { u_int success, i; char *file; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) return 0; success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key); if (success) return success; success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key); if (success > 0) return success; for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) continue; file = expand_authorized_keys( options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); free(file); } return success; } /* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */ void auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key) { struct sshkey **tmp; if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX || (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys, authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__); authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp; authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key; authctxt->nprev_userkeys++; } /* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */ int auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) { return 1; } } return 0; } Authmethod method_pubkey = { "publickey", userauth_pubkey, &options.pubkey_authentication }; Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/authfd.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/authfd.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/authfd.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,707 +1,721 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.98 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.100 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */ #define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */ /* macro to check for "agent failure" message */ #define agent_failed(x) \ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) /* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */ static int decode_reply(u_char type) { if (agent_failed(type)) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) return 0; else return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */ int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp) { const char *authsocket; int sock, oerrno; struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; if (fdp != NULL) *fdp = -1; authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); if (!authsocket) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT; memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; /* close on exec */ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 || connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { oerrno = errno; close(sock); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (fdp != NULL) *fdp = sock; else close(sock); return 0; } /* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */ static int ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply) { int r; size_t l, len; char buf[1024]; /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */ len = sshbuf_len(request); put_u32(buf, len); /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 || atomicio(vwrite, sock, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(request), sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request)) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; /* * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the * response packet. */ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */ len = get_u32(buf); if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */ sshbuf_reset(reply); while (len > 0) { l = len; if (l > sizeof(buf)) l = sizeof(buf); if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0) return r; len -= l; } return 0; } /* * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was * obtained). The argument must have been returned by * ssh_get_authentication_socket(). */ void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock) { if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) close(sock); } /* Lock/unlock agent */ int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password) { int r; u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK; struct sshbuf *msg; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static int deserialise_identity1(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshkey *key; int r, keybits; u_int32_t bits; char *comment = NULL; if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n); /* XXX previously we just warned here. I think we should be strict */ if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = key; key = NULL; } if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } r = 0; out: sshkey_free(key); free(comment); return r; } #endif static int deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; char *comment = NULL; const u_char *blob; size_t blen; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0) goto out; if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } r = 0; out: free(comment); return r; } /* * Fetch list of identities held by the agent. */ int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp) { u_char type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0; u_int32_t num, i; struct sshbuf *msg; struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL; int r; /* Determine request and expected response types */ switch (version) { case 1: code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES; code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; break; case 2: code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES; code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } /* * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the * identities it can represent. */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code1)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != code2) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0) goto out; if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (num == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES; goto out; } /* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */ if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL || (idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL || (idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < num;) { switch (version) { case 1: #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if ((r = deserialise_identity1(msg, &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) goto out; #endif break; case 2: if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) { /* Gracefully skip unknown key types */ num--; continue; } else goto out; } break; } i++; } idl->nkeys = num; *idlp = idl; idl = NULL; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); if (idl != NULL) ssh_free_identitylist(idl); return r; } void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl) { size_t i; if (idl == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) { if (idl->keys != NULL) sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]); if (idl->comments != NULL) free(idl->comments[i]); } free(idl); } /* * Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent, * and waits for a response from the agent. * Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero * otherwise. */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16]) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_char type; if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, challenge)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(msg, session_id, 16)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 1)) != 0) /* Response type for proto 1.1 */ goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get(msg, response, 16)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } #endif +/* encode signature algoritm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */ +static u_int +agent_encode_alg(struct sshkey *key, const char *alg) +{ + if (alg != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA) { + if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0) + return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256; + else if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0) + return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512; + } + return 0; +} + /* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */ int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *blob = NULL, type; size_t blen = 0, len = 0; u_int flags = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) flags |= SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; + flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0) goto out; - if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg) != 0)) + if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, sigp, &len)) != 0) goto out; *lenp = len; r = 0; out: if (blob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(blob, blen); free(blob); } sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static int ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(struct sshbuf *b, RSA *key, const char *comment) { int r; /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(key->n))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0) return r; return 0; } #endif static int ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, b)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm) { int r; if (life != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0) goto out; } if (confirm != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: return r; } /* * Adds an identity to the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r, constrained = (life || confirm); u_char type; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case KEY_RSA1: type = constrained ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED : SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(msg, key->rsa, comment)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: #endif case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: type = constrained ? SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED : SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(msg, key, comment)) != 0) goto out; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (constrained && (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Removes an identity from the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_char type, *blob = NULL; size_t blen; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0) goto out; } else #endif if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) { if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0) goto out; } else { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: if (blob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(blob, blen); free(blob); } sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r, constrained = (life || confirm); u_char type; if (add) { type = constrained ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED : SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY; } else type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0) goto out; if (constrained && (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Removes all identities from the agent. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type = (version == 1) ? SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/authfd.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/authfd.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/authfd.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,90 +1,92 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.38 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.39 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef AUTHFD_H #define AUTHFD_H /* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */ struct ssh_identitylist { size_t nkeys; struct sshkey **keys; char **comments; }; int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp); void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock); int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password); int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp); void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl); int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm); int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key); int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm); int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version); int ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16]); int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat); /* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */ #define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1 #define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2 #define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3 #define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4 #define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5 #define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6 #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7 #define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8 #define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9 /* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */ #define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11 #define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 #define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13 #define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 /* smartcard */ #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20 #define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21 /* lock/unlock the agent */ #define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22 #define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23 /* add key with constraints */ #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24 #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26 #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 /* extended failure messages */ #define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30 /* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */ #define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102 #define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01 +#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 0x02 +#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 0x04 #endif /* AUTHFD_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/authfile.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/authfile.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/authfile.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,580 +1,573 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.116 2015/07/09 09:49:46 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.120 2015/12/11 04:21:11 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cipher.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "misc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "krl.h" #define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024) /* Save a key blob to a file */ static int sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename) { int fd, oerrno; if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(keybuf), sshbuf_len(keybuf)) != sshbuf_len(keybuf)) { oerrno = errno; close(fd); unlink(filename); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } close(fd); return 0; } int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) { struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL; int r; if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment, force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(keyblob); return r; } /* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */ int sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob) { u_char buf[1024]; size_t len; struct stat st; int r; if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; for (;;) { if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) { if (errno == EPIPE) break; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0) goto out; if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) { r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED; goto out; } r = 0; out: explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); if (r != 0) sshbuf_reset(blob); return r; } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file. Returns NULL if an error was * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key * otherwise. */ static int sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r; *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, b)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(b, keyp, commentp)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ /* XXX remove error() calls from here? */ int sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) { struct stat st; if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; /* * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user, * then we don't care. */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(filename)) #endif if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.", (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename); error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); error("This private key will be ignored."); return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; } return 0; } /* XXX kill perm_ok now that we have SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS? */ int sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp, int *perm_ok) { int fd, r; *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { if (perm_ok != NULL) *perm_ok = 0; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { if (perm_ok != NULL) *perm_ok = 0; r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; goto out; } if (perm_ok != NULL) *perm_ok = 1; r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp); out: close(fd); return r; } int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; int r; if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: - if (buffer != NULL) - sshbuf_free(buffer); + sshbuf_free(buffer); return r; } /* XXX this is almost identical to sshkey_load_private_type() */ int sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; int r, fd; *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; goto out; } if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 || - (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, filename, - keyp, commentp)) != 0) + (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, keyp, + commentp)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: close(fd); - if (buffer != NULL) - sshbuf_free(buffer); + sshbuf_free(buffer); return r; } static int sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp) { FILE *f; char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; char *cp; u_long linenum = 0; int r; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { cp = line; switch (*cp) { case '#': case '\n': case '\0': continue; } /* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */ if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 || strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0) break; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) ; if (*cp) { if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) { cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0'; if (commentp) { *commentp = strdup(*cp ? cp : filename); if (*commentp == NULL) r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } fclose(f); return r; } } } fclose(f); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */ int sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshkey *pub = NULL; char file[PATH_MAX]; int r, fd; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; /* XXX should load file once and attempt to parse each format */ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) goto skip; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* try rsa1 private key */ r = sshkey_load_public_rsa1(fd, keyp, commentp); close(fd); switch (r) { case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: case 0: return r; } #else /* WITH_SSH1 */ close(fd); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ /* try ssh2 public key */ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = pub; return 0; } sshkey_free(pub); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* try rsa1 public key */ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = pub; return 0; } sshkey_free(pub); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ skip: /* try .pub suffix */ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* in case strlcpy or strlcat fail */ if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && (r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) { if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = pub; return 0; } sshkey_free(pub); return r; } /* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */ int sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *pub = NULL; char *file = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *keyp = NULL; if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0) goto out; *keyp = pub; pub = NULL; r = 0; out: - if (file != NULL) - free(file); - if (pub != NULL) - sshkey_free(pub); + free(file); + sshkey_free(pub); return r; } /* Load private key and certificate */ int sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, int *perm_ok) { struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL; int r; *keyp = NULL; switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename, passphrase, &key, NULL, perm_ok)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0) goto out; /* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */ if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; *keyp = key; key = NULL; out: - if (key != NULL) - sshkey_free(key); - if (cert != NULL) - sshkey_free(cert); + sshkey_free(key); + sshkey_free(cert); return r; } /* * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename", * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error. * If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly, * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed. * If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is * also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found. */ int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type, int check_ca) { FILE *f; char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; char *cp; u_long linenum = 0; int r = 0; struct sshkey *pub = NULL; int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) = strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { cp = line; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) ; /* Skip comments and empty lines */ switch (*cp) { case '#': case '\n': case '\0': continue; } if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) || (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) && sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) { r = 0; goto out; } sshkey_free(pub); pub = NULL; } r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; out: - if (pub != NULL) - sshkey_free(pub); + sshkey_free(pub); fclose(f); return r; } /* * Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not, * SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something * unexpected happened. * This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too. * "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. */ int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file) { int r; r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key); /* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */ if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC) return r; /* * If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to * parse the file as a flat list of keys. */ switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) { case 0: /* Key found => revoked */ return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: /* Key not found => not revoked */ return 0; default: /* Some other error occurred */ return r; } } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/channels.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/channels.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/channels.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,4285 +1,4285 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.347 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.349 2016/02/05 13:28:19 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding. * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections, * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" /* -- channel core */ /* * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array is * dynamically extended as needed. */ static Channel **channels = NULL; /* * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL */ static u_int channels_alloc = 0; /* * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is * updated in channel_new. */ static int channel_max_fd = 0; /* -- tcp forwarding */ /* * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests. * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local * network (which might be behind a firewall). */ /* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */ /* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */ /* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */ typedef struct { char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */ int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */ char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */ char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */ int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */ } ForwardPermission; /* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */ static ForwardPermission *permitted_opens = NULL; /* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */ static ForwardPermission *permitted_adm_opens = NULL; /* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */ static int num_permitted_opens = 0; /* Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by the admin. */ static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0; /* special-case port number meaning allow any port */ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0 /* * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do * anything after logging in anyway. */ static int all_opens_permitted = 0; /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ #define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */ static char *x11_saved_display = NULL; /* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL; /* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ static char *x11_saved_data = NULL; static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0; /* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */ static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us; * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data. */ static u_char *x11_fake_data = NULL; static u_int x11_fake_data_len; /* -- agent forwarding */ #define NUM_SOCKS 10 /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ static int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; /* helper */ static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype); /* non-blocking connect helpers */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *); static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *); /* -- channel core */ Channel * channel_by_id(int id) { Channel *c; if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= channels_alloc) { logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id", id); return NULL; } c = channels[id]; if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id: channel free", id); return NULL; } return c; } /* * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages. * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages. */ Channel * channel_lookup(int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) return (NULL); switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: return (c); } logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type); return (NULL); } /* * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd */ static void channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty) { /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */ channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, rfd); channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd); channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd); if (rfd != -1) fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); c->rfd = rfd; c->wfd = wfd; c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1; c->efd = efd; c->extended_usage = extusage; if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0) debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd); #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd); #endif /* enable nonblocking mode */ if (nonblock) { if (rfd != -1) set_nonblock(rfd); if (wfd != -1) set_nonblock(wfd); if (efd != -1) set_nonblock(efd); } } /* * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause * remote_name to be freed. */ Channel * channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock) { int found; u_int i; Channel *c; /* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */ if (channels_alloc == 0) { channels_alloc = 10; channels = xcalloc(channels_alloc, sizeof(Channel *)); for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) channels[i] = NULL; } /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */ for (found = -1, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i] == NULL) { /* Found a free slot. */ found = (int)i; break; } if (found < 0) { /* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand the array. */ found = channels_alloc; if (channels_alloc > 10000) fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d " "too big.", channels_alloc); channels = xreallocarray(channels, channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(Channel *)); channels_alloc += 10; debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc); for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++) channels[i] = NULL; } /* Initialize and return new channel. */ c = channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel)); buffer_init(&c->input); buffer_init(&c->output); buffer_init(&c->extended); c->path = NULL; c->listening_addr = NULL; c->listening_port = 0; c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN; c->flags = 0; channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0); c->notbefore = 0; c->self = found; c->type = type; c->ctype = ctype; c->local_window = window; c->local_window_max = window; c->local_consumed = 0; c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; c->remote_id = -1; c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); c->remote_window = 0; c->remote_maxpacket = 0; c->force_drain = 0; c->single_connection = 0; c->detach_user = NULL; c->detach_close = 0; c->open_confirm = NULL; c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; c->input_filter = NULL; c->output_filter = NULL; c->filter_ctx = NULL; c->filter_cleanup = NULL; c->ctl_chan = -1; c->mux_rcb = NULL; c->mux_ctx = NULL; c->mux_pause = 0; c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms); debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); return c; } static int channel_find_maxfd(void) { u_int i; int max = 0; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { max = MAX(max, c->rfd); max = MAX(max, c->wfd); max = MAX(max, c->efd); } } return max; } int channel_close_fd(int *fdp) { int ret = 0, fd = *fdp; if (fd != -1) { ret = close(fd); *fdp = -1; if (fd == channel_max_fd) channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd(); } return ret; } /* Close all channel fd/socket. */ static void channel_close_fds(Channel *c) { channel_close_fd(&c->sock); channel_close_fd(&c->rfd); channel_close_fd(&c->wfd); channel_close_fd(&c->efd); } /* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */ void channel_free(Channel *c) { char *s; u_int i, n; struct channel_confirm *cc; for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i]) n++; debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self, c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n); s = channel_open_message(); debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s); free(s); if (c->sock != -1) shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR); channel_close_fds(c); buffer_free(&c->input); buffer_free(&c->output); buffer_free(&c->extended); free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = NULL; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; free(c->listening_addr); c->listening_addr = NULL; while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) { if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL) cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); } if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL) c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx); channels[c->self] = NULL; free(c); } void channel_free_all(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i] != NULL) channel_free(channels[i]); } /* * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file * descriptors after a fork. */ void channel_close_all(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i] != NULL) channel_close_fds(channels[i]); } /* * Stop listening to channels. */ void channel_stop_listening(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: channel_close_fd(&c->sock); channel_free(c); break; } } } } /* * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or * more channel is overfull. */ int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { #if 0 if (!compat20 && buffer_len(&c->input) > packet_get_maxsize()) { debug2("channel %d: big input buffer %d", c->self, buffer_len(&c->input)); return 0; } #endif if (buffer_len(&c->output) > packet_get_maxsize()) { debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %u > %u", c->self, buffer_len(&c->output), packet_get_maxsize()); return 0; } } } return 1; } /* Returns true if any channel is still open. */ int channel_still_open(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: if (!compat20) fatal("cannot happen: SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL"); continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: return 1; case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: if (!compat13) fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); return 1; default: fatal("channel_still_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return 0; } /* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */ int channel_find_open(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->remote_id < 0) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: return i; case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: if (!compat13) fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); return i; default: fatal("channel_find_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return -1; } /* * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections, * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for * newlines. */ char * channel_open_message(void) { Buffer buffer; Channel *c; char buf[1024], *cp; u_int i; buffer_init(&buffer); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n"); buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, - " #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%d/%d o%d/%d fd %d/%d cc %d)\r\n", + " #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%u/%d o%u/%d fd %d/%d cc %d)\r\n", c->self, c->remote_name, c->type, c->remote_id, c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input), c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output), c->rfd, c->wfd, c->ctl_chan); buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); continue; default: fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1); cp = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&buffer)); buffer_free(&buffer); return cp; } void channel_send_open(int id) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: send open", id); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring(c->ctype); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_send(); } void channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_request_start: %d: unknown channel id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_cstring(service); packet_put_char(wantconfirm); } void channel_register_status_confirm(int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx) { struct channel_confirm *cc; Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) fatal("channel_register_expect: %d: bad id", id); cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc)); cc->cb = cb; cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb; cc->ctx = ctx; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); } void channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_register_open_confirm: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->open_confirm = fn; c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx; } void channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = fn; c->detach_close = do_close; } void channel_cancel_cleanup(int id) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = NULL; c->detach_close = 0; } void channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->input_filter = ifn; c->output_filter = ofn; c->filter_ctx = ctx; c->filter_cleanup = cfn; } void channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_send(); } /* * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits relevant to * channels in the select bitmasks. */ /* * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which * have events pending. */ typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset); chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { FD_SET(c->sock, readset); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self); FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } static void channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize()) FD_SET(c->sock, readset); if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } static void channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize(); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && limit > 0 && buffer_len(&c->input) < limit && buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF)) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)", c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended)); else chan_obuf_empty(c); } } /** XXX check close conditions, too */ if (compat20 && c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) FD_SET(c->efd, writeset); else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window) FD_SET(c->efd, readset); } /* XXX: What about efd? races? */ } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; debug2("channel %d: closing after input drain.", c->self); } } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0) chan_mark_dead(c); else FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } /* * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11 * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode. * XXX All this happens at the client side. * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok */ static int x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) { u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */ if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return -1; } /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(b) < 12) return 0; /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */ ucp = buffer_ptr(b); if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */ proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7]; data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9]; } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */ proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7]; data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9]; } else { debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x", ucp[0]); return -1; } /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(b) < 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3)) return 0; /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */ if (proto_len != strlen(x11_saved_proto) || memcmp(ucp + 12, x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol."); return -1; } /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len || timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); return -1; } /* Check fake data length */ if (x11_fake_data_len != x11_saved_data_len) { error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d", x11_fake_data_len, x11_saved_data_len); return -1; } /* * Received authentication protocol and data match * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real * data. */ memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), x11_saved_data, x11_saved_data_len); return 1; } static void channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); if (ret == 1) { /* Start normal processing for the channel. */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; channel_pre_open_13(c, readset, writeset); } else if (ret == -1) { /* * We have received an X11 connection that has bad * authentication information. */ logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); buffer_clear(&c->input); buffer_clear(&c->output); channel_close_fd(&c->sock); c->sock = -1; c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); } } static void channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); /* c->force_drain = 1; */ if (ret == 1) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; channel_pre_open(c, readset, writeset); } else if (ret == -1) { logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); chan_read_failed(c); buffer_clear(&c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(c); buffer_clear(&c->output); /* for proto v1, the peer will send an IEOF */ if (compat20) chan_write_failed(c); else c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); } } static void channel_pre_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause && buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF)) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */ buffer_clear(&c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(c); /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */ chan_rcvd_oclose(c); } if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) chan_obuf_empty(c); } } /* try to decode a socks4 header */ /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char *p, *host; u_int len, have, i, found, need; char username[256]; struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int16_t dest_port; struct in_addr dest_addr; } s4_req, s4_rsp; debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self); have = buffer_len(&c->input); len = sizeof(s4_req); if (have < len) return 0; p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input); need = 1; /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */ if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) { debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self); /* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */ need = 2; } /* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */ for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) { if (p[i] == '\0') { found++; if (found == need) break; } if (i > 1024) { /* the peer is probably sending garbage */ debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long", c->self); return -1; } } if (found < need) return 0; buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4); have = buffer_len(&c->input); p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input); if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated", c->self); len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ if (len > have) fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d", c->self, len, have); strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username)); buffer_consume(&c->input, len); free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */ host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr); c->path = xstrdup(host); } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */ have = buffer_len(&c->input); p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input); len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ if (len > have) fatal("channel %d: decode socks4a: len %d > have %d", c->self, len, have); if (len > NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long", c->self, p); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(p); buffer_consume(&c->input, len); } c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command); if (s4_req.command != 1) { debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d", c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command); return -1; } s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */ s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */ s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */ buffer_append(&c->output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp)); return 1; } /* try to decode a socks5 header */ #define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000 #define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04 #define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00 /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int8_t reserved; u_int8_t atyp; } s5_req, s5_rsp; u_int16_t dest_port; char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; u_char *p; u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af; debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self); p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); if (p[0] != 0x05) return -1; have = buffer_len(&c->input); if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) { /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */ if (have < 2) return 0; nmethods = p[1]; if (have < nmethods + 2) return 0; /* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */ for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) { if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found", c->self); return -1; } buffer_consume(&c->input, nmethods + 2); buffer_put_char(&c->output, 0x05); /* version */ buffer_put_char(&c->output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH); /* method */ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE; debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self); return 0; /* need more */ } debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self); if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1) return 0; /* need more */ memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req)); if (s5_req.version != 0x05 || s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT || s5_req.reserved != 0x00) { debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self); return -1; } switch (s5_req.atyp){ case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4: addrlen = 4; af = AF_INET; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN: addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)]; af = -1; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6: addrlen = 16; af = AF_INET6; break; default: debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp); return -1; } need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) need++; if (have < need) return 0; buffer_consume(&c->input, sizeof(s5_req)); if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) buffer_consume(&c->input, 1); /* host string length */ buffer_get(&c->input, &dest_addr, addrlen); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_port, 2); dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0'; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname " "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr); } else { if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL) return -1; c->path = xstrdup(ntop); } c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command); s5_rsp.version = 0x05; s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS; s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */ s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4; dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ buffer_append(&c->output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp)); buffer_put_int(&c->output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY)); /* bind address */ buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port)); return 1; } Channel * channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out) { Channel *c; debug("channel_connect_stdio_fwd %s:%d", host_to_connect, port_to_connect); c = channel_new("stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0); c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect); c->host_port = port_to_connect; c->listening_port = 0; c->force_drain = 1; channel_register_fds(c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0); port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip"); return c; } /* dynamic port forwarding */ static void channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_char *p; u_int have; int ret; have = buffer_len(&c->input); debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have); /* buffer_dump(&c->input); */ /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) { /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); return; } /* try to guess the protocol */ p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, readset, writeset); break; case 0x05: ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, readset, writeset); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { chan_mark_dead(c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self); /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); } else { /* switch to the next state */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip"); } } /* This is our fake X11 server socket. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int newsock, oerrno; socklen_t addrlen; char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr; int remote_port; if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { debug("X11 connection requested."); addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (c->single_connection) { oerrno = errno; debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); channel_close_fd(&c->sock); chan_mark_dead(c); errno = oerrno; } if (newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } set_nodelay(newsock); remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", remote_ipaddr, remote_port); nc = channel_new("accepted x11 socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring("x11"); packet_put_int(nc->self); packet_put_int(nc->local_window_max); packet_put_int(nc->local_maxpacket); /* originator ipaddr and port */ packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) { debug2("ssh2 x11 bug compat mode"); } else { packet_put_int(remote_port); } packet_send(); } else { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN); packet_put_int(nc->self); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) packet_put_cstring(buf); packet_send(); } free(remote_ipaddr); } } static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype) { char buf[1024]; char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock); int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_sock_port(c->sock, 1); char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock); int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock); if (remote_port == -1) { /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */ free(remote_ipaddr); remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1"); remote_port = 65535; } snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, " "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d", rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port, remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port); free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = xstrdup(buf); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring(rtype); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { /* target host, port */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); packet_put_int(c->host_port); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* target path */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* listen path */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); } else { /* listen address, port */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); packet_put_int(local_port); } if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* reserved for future owner/mode info */ packet_put_cstring(""); } else { /* originator host and port */ packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); packet_put_int((u_int)remote_port); } packet_send(); } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_cstring(c->path); packet_put_int(c->host_port); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) packet_put_cstring(c->remote_name); packet_send(); } free(remote_ipaddr); free(local_ipaddr); } static void channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd) { int on = 1; /* * Set socket options. * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. */ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); } void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int refuse_time) { x11_refuse_time = refuse_time; } /* * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int newsock, nextstate; socklen_t addrlen; char *rtype; if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { debug("Connection to port %d forwarding " "to %.100s port %d requested.", c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == 0) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; } else { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-tcpip"; } addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) set_nodelay(newsock); nc = channel_new(rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1); nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; nc->host_port = c->host_port; if (c->path != NULL) nc->path = xstrdup(c->path); if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) port_open_helper(nc, rtype); } } /* * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from * clients. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; int newsock; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock < 0) { error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } nc = channel_new("accepted auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "accepted auth socket", 1); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring("auth-agent@openssh.com"); packet_put_int(nc->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); } else { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN); packet_put_int(nc->self); } packet_send(); } } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int err = 0, sock; socklen_t sz = sizeof(err); if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) { if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) { err = errno; error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); } if (err == 0) { debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d", c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); } } else { debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", c->self, strerror(err)); /* Try next address, if any */ if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { close(c->sock); c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd(); return; } /* Exhausted all addresses */ error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { packet_put_cstring(strerror(err)); packet_put_cstring(""); } } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); } chan_mark_dead(c); } packet_send(); } } /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; int len, force; force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; if (c->rfd != -1 && (force || FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) { errno = 0; len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) return 1; #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD if (len <= 0) { #else if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) || (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d", c->self, c->rfd, len); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(c); return -1; } else if (compat13) { buffer_clear(&c->output); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); } else { chan_read_failed(c); } return -1; } if (c->input_filter != NULL) { if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); chan_read_failed(c); } } else if (c->datagram) { buffer_put_string(&c->input, buf, len); } else { buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); } } return 1; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct termios tio; u_char *data = NULL, *buf; u_int dlen, olen = 0; int len; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ if (c->wfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { olen = buffer_len(&c->output); if (c->output_filter != NULL) { if ((buf = c->output_filter(c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) chan_mark_dead(c); else chan_write_failed(c); return -1; } } else if (c->datagram) { buf = data = buffer_get_string(&c->output, &dlen); } else { buf = data = buffer_ptr(&c->output); dlen = buffer_len(&c->output); } if (c->datagram) { /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */ len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); free(data); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) chan_mark_dead(c); else chan_write_failed(c); return -1; } goto out; } #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ if (compat20 && c->wfd_isatty) dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024); #endif len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(c); return -1; } else if (compat13) { buffer_clear(&c->output); debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; } else { chan_write_failed(c); } return -1; } #ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') { if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { /* * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of * traffic analysis. We need to match the * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message * (4 byte channel id + buf) */ packet_send_ignore(4 + len); packet_send(); } } #endif buffer_consume(&c->output, len); } out: if (compat20 && olen > 0) c->local_consumed += olen - buffer_len(&c->output); return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; int len; /** XXX handle drain efd, too */ if (c->efd != -1) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) { len = write(c->efd, buffer_ptr(&c->extended), buffer_len(&c->extended)); debug2("channel %d: written %d to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(&c->efd); } else { buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); c->local_consumed += len; } } else if (c->efd != -1 && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && (c->detach_close || FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) { len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close))) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(&c->efd); } else { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) { debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self); } else buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len); } } } return 1; } static int channel_check_window(Channel *c) { if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) && ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) || c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && c->local_consumed > 0) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->local_consumed); packet_send(); debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self, c->local_window, c->local_consumed); c->local_window += c->local_consumed; c->local_consumed = 0; } return 1; } static void channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset); channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset); if (!compat20) return; channel_handle_efd(c, readset, writeset); channel_check_window(c); } static u_int read_mux(Channel *c, u_int need) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; int len; u_int rlen; if (buffer_len(&c->input) < need) { rlen = need - buffer_len(&c->input); len = read(c->rfd, buf, MIN(rlen, CHAN_RBUF)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) + return buffer_len(&c->input); if (len <= 0) { - if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) { - debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %d", - c->self, c->rfd, len); - chan_read_failed(c); - return 0; - } + debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %d", + c->self, c->rfd, len); + chan_read_failed(c); + return 0; } else buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); } return buffer_len(&c->input); } static void channel_post_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_int need; ssize_t len; if (!compat20) fatal("%s: entered with !compat20", __func__); if (c->rfd != -1 && !c->mux_pause && FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset) && (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)) { /* * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to * avoid disrupting fd passing. */ if (read_mux(c, 4) < 4) /* read header */ return; need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&c->input)); #define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024) if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) { debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u", c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need); chan_rcvd_oclose(c); return; } if (read_mux(c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */ return; if (c->mux_rcb(c) != 0) { debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self); chan_mark_dead(c); return; } } if (c->wfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { len = write(c->wfd, buffer_ptr(&c->output), buffer_len(&c->output)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return; if (len <= 0) { chan_mark_dead(c); return; } buffer_consume(&c->output, len); } } static void channel_post_mux_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; int newsock; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; debug("multiplexing control connection"); /* * Accept connection on control socket */ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addrlen = sizeof(addr); if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addrlen)) == -1) { error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) < 0) { error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(newsock); return; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid()); close(newsock); return; } nc = channel_new("multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1); nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb; debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->sock); /* establish state */ nc->mux_rcb(nc); /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */ nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL; } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int len; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output), buffer_len(&c->output)); if (len <= 0) buffer_clear(&c->output); else buffer_consume(&c->output, len); } } static void channel_handler_init_20(void) { channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client; } static void channel_handler_init_13(void) { channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_13; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open_13; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_input_draining; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_output_draining; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_post_output_drain_13; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; } static void channel_handler_init_15(void) { channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; } static void channel_handler_init(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) { channel_pre[i] = NULL; channel_post[i] = NULL; } if (compat20) channel_handler_init_20(); else if (compat13) channel_handler_init_13(); else channel_handler_init_15(); } /* gc dead channels */ static void channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c) { if (c == NULL) return; if (c->detach_user != NULL) { if (!chan_is_dead(c, c->detach_close)) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self); c->detach_user(c->self, NULL); /* if we still have a callback */ if (c->detach_user != NULL) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self); } if (!chan_is_dead(c, 1)) return; debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self); channel_free(c); } static void channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs) { static int did_init = 0; u_int i, oalloc; Channel *c; time_t now; if (!did_init) { channel_handler_init(); did_init = 1; } now = monotime(); if (unpause_secs != NULL) *unpause_secs = 0; for (i = 0, oalloc = channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; if (c->delayed) { if (ftab == channel_pre) c->delayed = 0; else continue; } if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) { /* * Run handlers that are not paused. */ if (c->notbefore <= now) (*ftab[c->type])(c, readset, writeset); else if (unpause_secs != NULL) { /* * Collect the time that the earliest * channel comes off pause. */ debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds", __func__, c->self, (int)(c->notbefore - now)); if (*unpause_secs == 0 || (c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs) *unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now; } } channel_garbage_collect(c); } if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0) debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds", __func__, (int)*unpause_secs); } /* * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in * select bitmasks. */ void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs, int rekeying) { u_int n, sz, nfdset; n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd); nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS); /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */ if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask)) fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n); sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask); /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */ if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { *readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *nallocp = sz; } *maxfdp = n; memset(*readsetp, 0, sz); memset(*writesetp, 0, sz); if (!rekeying) channel_handler(channel_pre, *readsetp, *writesetp, minwait_secs); } /* * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have * events pending. */ void channel_after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset, NULL); } /* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */ void channel_output_poll(void) { Channel *c; u_int i, len; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; /* * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered * incoming data. */ if (compat13) { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING) continue; } else { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; } if (compat20 && (c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { /* XXX is this true? */ debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self); continue; } /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */ if ((c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) && (len = buffer_len(&c->input)) > 0) { if (c->datagram) { if (len > 0) { u_char *data; u_int dlen; data = buffer_get_string(&c->input, &dlen); if (dlen > c->remote_window || dlen > c->remote_maxpacket) { debug("channel %d: datagram " "too big for channel", c->self); free(data); continue; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_string(data, dlen); packet_send(); c->remote_window -= dlen; free(data); } continue; } /* * Send some data for the other side over the secure * connection. */ if (compat20) { if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; } else { if (packet_is_interactive()) { if (len > 1024) len = 512; } else { /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()/2) len = packet_get_maxsize()/2; } } if (len > 0) { packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA : SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->input), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&c->input, len); c->remote_window -= len; } } else if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (compat13) fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3"); /* * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF. * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still in use. */ if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)", c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended)); else chan_ibuf_empty(c); } /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */ if (compat20 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && c->remote_window > 0 && (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) { debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %u euse %d", c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended), c->extended_usage); if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->extended), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); c->remote_window -= len; debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %d", c->self, len); } } } /* -- protocol input */ /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; const u_char *data; u_int data_len, win_len; Channel *c; /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received data for nonexistent channel %d.", id); /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN) return 0; /* Get the data. */ data = packet_get_string_ptr(&data_len); win_len = data_len; if (c->datagram) win_len += 4; /* string length header */ /* * Ignore data for protocol > 1.3 if output end is no longer open. * For protocol 2 the sending side is reducing its window as it sends * data, so we must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure * that window updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might * deadlock. */ if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { if (compat20) { c->local_window -= win_len; c->local_consumed += win_len; } return 0; } if (compat20) { if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) { logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d", c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket); } if (win_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d", c->self, win_len, c->local_window); return 0; } c->local_window -= win_len; } if (c->datagram) buffer_put_string(&c->output, data, data_len); else buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len); packet_check_eom(); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; char *data; u_int data_len, tcode; Channel *c; /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", id); return 0; } if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", id); else packet_disconnect("Received extended_data after EOF " "on channel %d.", id); } tcode = packet_get_int(); if (c->efd == -1 || c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE || tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) { logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self); return 0; } data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); if (data_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d", c->self, data_len, c->local_window); free(data); return 0; } debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len); c->local_window -= data_len; buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len); free(data); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received ieof for nonexistent channel %d.", id); chan_rcvd_ieof(c); /* XXX force input close */ if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) { debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self); c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) chan_ibuf_empty(c); } return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received close for nonexistent channel %d.", id); /* * Send a confirmation that we have closed the channel and no more * data is coming for it. */ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); /* * If the channel is in closed state, we have sent a close request, * and the other side will eventually respond with a confirmation. * Thus, we cannot free the channel here, because then there would be * no-one to receive the confirmation. The channel gets freed when * the confirmation arrives. */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) { /* * Not a closed channel - mark it as draining, which will * cause it to be freed later. */ buffer_clear(&c->input); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING; } return 0; } /* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */ /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id = packet_get_int(); Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); packet_check_eom(); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id); chan_rcvd_oclose(c); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id = packet_get_int(); Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); packet_check_eom(); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " "out-of-range channel %d.", id); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED) packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type); channel_free(c); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id, remote_id; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for " "non-opening channel %d.", id); remote_id = packet_get_int(); /* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel is now open. */ c->remote_id = remote_id; c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (compat20) { c->remote_window = packet_get_int(); c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int(); if (c->open_confirm) { debug2("callback start"); c->open_confirm(c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2("callback done"); } debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self, c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); } packet_check_eom(); return 0; } static char * reason2txt(int reason) { switch (reason) { case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED: return "administratively prohibited"; case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED: return "connect failed"; case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE: return "unknown channel type"; case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: return "resource shortage"; } return "unknown reason"; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id, reason; char *msg = NULL, *lang = NULL; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) packet_disconnect("Received open failure for " "non-opening channel %d.", id); if (compat20) { reason = packet_get_int(); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { msg = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); } logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", id, reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); free(msg); free(lang); if (c->open_confirm) { debug2("callback start"); c->open_confirm(c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2("callback done"); } } packet_check_eom(); /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */ chan_mark_dead(c); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c; int id; u_int adjust, tmp; if (!compat20) return 0; /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id); return 0; } adjust = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust); if ((tmp = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u", id, adjust, c->remote_window); c->remote_window = tmp; return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; u_short host_port; char *host, *originator_string; int remote_id; remote_id = packet_get_int(); host = packet_get_string(NULL); host_port = packet_get_int(); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { originator_string = packet_get_string(NULL); } else { originator_string = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); } packet_check_eom(); c = channel_connect_to_port(host, host_port, "connected socket", originator_string); free(originator_string); free(host); if (c == NULL) { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(remote_id); packet_send(); } else c->remote_id = remote_id; return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c; struct channel_confirm *cc; int id; /* Reset keepalive timeout */ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug2("channel_input_status_confirm: type %d id %d", type, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) { logit("channel_input_status_confirm: %d: unknown", id); return 0; } if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; cc->cb(type, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); return 0; } /* -- tcp forwarding */ void channel_set_af(int af) { IPv4or6 = af; } /* * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'') * will bind to whatever address the client asked for. * * Special-case listen_addrs are: * * "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR * "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6 * "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6 * "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set */ static const char * channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp, int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { const char *addr = NULL; int wildcard = 0; if (listen_addr == NULL) { /* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */ if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports) wildcard = 1; } else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) { if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) || *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 || (!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) { wildcard = 1; /* * Notify client if they requested a specific listen * address and it was overridden. */ if (*listen_addr != '\0' && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 && strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) { packet_send_debug("Forwarding listen address " "\"%s\" overridden by server " "GatewayPorts", listen_addr); } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* Accept localhost address when GatewayPorts=yes */ addr = listen_addr; } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* * If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been * requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in * effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6. */ addr = listen_addr; } if (wildcardp != NULL) *wildcardp = wildcard; return addr; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { Channel *c; int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; const char *host, *addr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; in_port_t *lport_p; is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER); if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) { host = fwd->connect_path; } else { host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; if (host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } } /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */ addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(fwd->listen_host, &wildcard, is_client, fwd_opts); debug3("%s: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", __func__, type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr); /* * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port); if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { if (addr == NULL) { /* This really shouldn't happen */ packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } else { error("%s: getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", __func__, addr, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } return 0; } if (allocated_listen_port != NULL) *allocated_listen_port = 0; for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { switch (ai->ai_family) { case AF_INET: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin_port; break; case AF_INET6: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin6_port; break; default: continue; } /* * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the * same port for all address families. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0) *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port); if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); continue; } /* Create a port to listen for the host. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } channel_set_reuseaddr(sock); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); /* Bind the socket to the address. */ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { /* address can be in use ipv6 address is already bound */ if (!ai->ai_next) error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else verbose("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port - * record what we got. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port == 0) { *allocated_listen_port = get_sock_port(sock, 1); debug("Allocated listen port %d", *allocated_listen_port); } /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "port listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(host); c->host_port = fwd->connect_port; c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr); if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT)) c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port; else c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port; success = 1; } if (success == 0) error("%s: cannot listen to port: %d", __func__, fwd->listen_port); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return success; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(int type, struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; const char *path; Channel *c; int port, sock; mode_t omask; switch (type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local connecting path too long: %s", fwd->connect_path); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_host; port = fwd->connect_port; } break; case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: path = fwd->listen_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; break; default: error("%s: unexpected channel type %d", __func__, type); return 0; } if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { error("No forward path name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path); return 0; } debug3("%s: type %d path %s", __func__, type, fwd->listen_path); /* Start a Unix domain listener. */ omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask); sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink); umask(omask); if (sock < 0) return 0; debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path); /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new("unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "unix listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(path); c->host_port = port; c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); return 1; } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->path == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path); else return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { u_int i; int found = 0; const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts); for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_port != lport) continue; if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) { /* skip dynamic forwardings */ if (c->host_port == 0) continue; } else { if (c->host_port != cport) continue; } if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) || (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL)) continue; if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; if (path == NULL) { error("%s: no path specified.", __func__); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_addr == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path); else return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts); } /* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh (and sshd in v1) */ int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal( SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts); } } /* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */ int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal( SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip( SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port, fwd_opts); } } /* * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for * this server. */ static const char * channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host) { if (listen_host == NULL) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR) return "127.0.0.1"; else return "localhost"; } else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR) return "0.0.0.0"; else return ""; } else return listen_host; } /* * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through * the secure channel to host:port from local side. * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with * channel_update_permitted_opens(). */ int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *fwd) { int type, success = 0, idx = -1; /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { packet_put_cstring("streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ packet_put_cstring(fwd->listen_path); } else { packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host)); packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port); } packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Assume that server accepts the request */ success = 1; } else if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST); packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port); packet_put_cstring(fwd->connect_host); packet_put_int(fwd->connect_port); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for response from the remote side. */ type = packet_read(); switch (type) { case SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS: success = 1; break; case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: break; default: /* Unknown packet */ packet_disconnect("Protocol error for port forward request:" "received packet type %d.", type); } } else { logit("Warning: Server does not support remote stream local forwarding."); } if (success) { /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); idx = num_permitted_opens++; if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path); permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_host); permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port; } if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL; permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = fwd->listen_host ? xstrdup(fwd->listen_host) : NULL; permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL; permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = fwd->listen_port; } } return (idx); } static int open_match(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, int requestedport) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport) return 0; if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Note that in the listen host/port case * we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and * need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host) * and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host) */ static int open_listen_match_tcpip(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate) { const char *allowed_host; if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport) return 0; if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL && requestedhost == NULL) return 1; allowed_host = translate ? channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) : allowed_open->listen_host; if (allowed_host == NULL || strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } static int open_listen_match_streamlocal(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, const char *requestedpath) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL || strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from * local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port) { int i; if (!compat20) return -1; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], host, port, 0)) break; } if (i >= num_permitted_opens) { debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); return -1; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("cancel-tcpip-forward"); packet_put_char(0); packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(host)); packet_put_int(port); packet_send(); permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0; permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0; free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL; free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host); permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL; permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL; return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket * path from local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(const char *path) { int i; if (!compat20) return -1; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path)) break; } if (i >= num_permitted_opens) { debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); return -1; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(0); packet_put_cstring(path); packet_send(); permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0; permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0; free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL; permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL; free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path); permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL; return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side. */ int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal( fwd->listen_path)); } else { return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port)); } } /* * This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST. This initates * listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect * message if there was an error). */ int channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { int success = 0; struct Forward fwd; /* Get arguments from the packet. */ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = packet_get_int(); fwd.connect_host = packet_get_string(NULL); fwd.connect_port = packet_get_int(); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * Check that an unprivileged user is not trying to forward a * privileged port. */ if (fwd.listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && !is_root) packet_disconnect( "Requested forwarding of port %d but user is not root.", fwd.listen_port); if (fwd.connect_port == 0) packet_disconnect("Dynamic forwarding denied."); #endif /* Initiate forwarding */ success = channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, fwd_opts); /* Free the argument string. */ free(fwd.connect_host); return (success ? 0 : -1); } /* * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_opens[] is empty. This is * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway. */ void channel_permit_all_opens(void) { if (num_permitted_opens == 0) all_opens_permitted = 1; } void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) { debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL; permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL; permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0; num_permitted_opens++; all_opens_permitted = 0; } /* * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is * passed then they entry will be invalidated. */ void channel_update_permitted_opens(int idx, int newport) { if (idx < 0 || idx >= num_permitted_opens) { debug("channel_update_permitted_opens: index out of range:" " %d num_permitted_opens %d", idx, num_permitted_opens); return; } debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d", newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing", newport, permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect, permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect); if (newport >= 0) { permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport; } else { permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = 0; permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = 0; free(permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect); permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = NULL; free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_host); permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL; free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_path); permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL; } } int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) { debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); permitted_adm_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_adm_opens, num_adm_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens)); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL; permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL; permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0; return ++num_adm_permitted_opens; } void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void) { channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); permitted_adm_opens = xcalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens), 1); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = NULL; num_adm_permitted_opens = 1; } void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host); free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path); } free(permitted_opens); permitted_opens = NULL; num_permitted_opens = 0; } void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) { free(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect); free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_host); free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_path); } free(permitted_adm_opens); permitted_adm_opens = NULL; num_adm_permitted_opens = 0; } void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void) { int i; printf("permitopen"); if (num_adm_permitted_opens == 0) { printf(" any\n"); return; } for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect == NULL) printf(" none"); else printf(" %s:%d", permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect); printf("\n"); } /* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */ int permitopen_port(const char *p) { int port; if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0) return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT; if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0) return port; return -1; } /* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx) { int sock, saved_errno; struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[MAX(NI_MAXSERV,sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))]; for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) { switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) { case AF_UNIX: /* unix:pathname instead of host:port */ sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr; strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop)); strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport)); break; case AF_INET: case AF_INET6: if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed"); continue; } break; default: continue; } if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype, cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) { if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1) fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock); if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) { debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): " "%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); saved_errno = errno; close(sock); errno = saved_errno; continue; /* fail -- try next */ } if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX) set_nodelay(sock); debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) " "in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock); cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next; return sock; } return -1; } static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx) { free(cctx->host); if (cctx->aitop) { if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX) free(cctx->aitop); else freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop); } memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx)); } /* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ static Channel * connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct addrinfo hints; int gaierr; int sock = -1; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct channel_connect cctx; Channel *c; memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; struct addrinfo *ai; if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) { error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG)); return (NULL); } /* * Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections. * channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family * and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX. */ ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr); ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX; ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC; sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr; sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)); cctx.aitop = ai; } else { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) { error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } } cctx.host = xstrdup(name); cctx.port = port; cctx.ai = cctx.aitop; if ((sock = connect_next(&cctx)) == -1) { error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s", name, port, strerror(errno)); channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->connect_ctx = cctx; return c; } Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], listen_host, listen_port, 1)) { return connect_to( permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d", listen_port); return NULL; } Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path)) { return connect_to( permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s", path); return NULL; } /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; permit = all_opens_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], host, port)) { permit = 1; break; } } if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], host, port)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, " "but the request was denied.", host, port); return NULL; } return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname); } /* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; permit = all_opens_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit = 1; break; } } if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, " "but the request was denied.", path); return NULL; } return connect_to(path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname); } void channel_send_window_changes(void) { u_int i; struct winsize ws; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { if (channels[i] == NULL || !channels[i]->client_tty || channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) continue; channel_request_start(i, "window-change", 0); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); packet_send(); } } /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections. * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs. */ int x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) { Channel *nc = NULL; int display_number, sock; u_short port; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS]; if (chanids == NULL) return -1; for (display_number = x11_display_offset; display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; display_number++) { port = 6000 + display_number; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) #ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT) #endif ) { error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return -1; } else { debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported", ai->ai_family); continue; } } if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); if (x11_use_localhost) channel_set_reuseaddr(sock); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno)); close(sock); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { close(socks[n]); } num_socks = 0; break; } socks[num_socks++] = sock; if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (num_socks > 0) break; } if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); return -1; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); return -1; } } /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids)); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; nc = channel_new("x11 listener", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "X11 inet listener", 1); nc->single_connection = single_connection; (*chanids)[n] = nc->self; } (*chanids)[n] = -1; /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */ *display_numberp = display_number; return (0); } static int connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) { int sock; struct sockaddr_un addr; sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock < 0) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) return sock; close(sock); error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); return -1; } static int connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) { char buf[1024]; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); } int x11_connect_display(void) { u_int display_number; const char *display; char buf[1024], *cp; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, sock = 0; /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (!display) { error("DISPLAY not set."); return -1; } /* * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a * connection to the real X server. */ /* Check if the display is from launchd. */ #ifdef __APPLE__ if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) { sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } #endif /* * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s] */ if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 || display[0] == ':') { /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */ if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } /* Create a socket. */ sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } /* * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address. */ strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf)); cp = strchr(buf, ':'); if (!cp) { error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } *cp = 0; /* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } /* Look up the host address */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { /* Create a socket. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } /* Connect it to the display. */ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Success */ break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (!ai) { error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); return -1; } set_nodelay(sock); return sock; } /* * This is called when SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN is received. The packet contains * the remote channel number. We should do whatever we want, and respond * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE. */ /* ARGSUSED */ int x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; int remote_id, sock = 0; char *remote_host; debug("Received X11 open request."); remote_id = packet_get_int(); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { remote_host = packet_get_string(NULL); } else { remote_host = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); } packet_check_eom(); /* Obtain a connection to the real X display. */ sock = x11_connect_display(); if (sock != -1) { /* Allocate a channel for this connection. */ c = channel_new("connected x11 socket", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0, remote_host, 1); c->remote_id = remote_id; c->force_drain = 1; } free(remote_host); if (c == NULL) { /* Send refusal to the remote host. */ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(remote_id); } else { /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); } packet_send(); return 0; } /* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */ /* ARGSUSED */ int deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int rchan = packet_get_int(); switch (type) { case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN: error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); break; case SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN: error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); break; default: error("deny_input_open: type %d", type); break; } error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a malicious server."); packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(rchan); packet_send(); return 0; } /* * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication * data, and enables authentication spoofing. * This should be called in the client only. */ void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply) { u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2; u_int i, value; char *new_data; int screen_number; const char *cp; u_int32_t rnd = 0; if (x11_saved_display == NULL) x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp); else if (strcmp(disp, x11_saved_display) != 0) { error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different " "$DISPLAY already forwarded"); return; } cp = strchr(disp, ':'); if (cp) cp = strchr(cp, '.'); if (cp) screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL); else screen_number = 0; if (x11_saved_proto == NULL) { /* Save protocol name. */ x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); /* * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data * of the same length. */ x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad " "authentication data: %.100s", data); if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); x11_saved_data[i] = value; x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; } x11_saved_data_len = data_len; x11_fake_data_len = data_len; } /* Convert the fake data into hex. */ new_data = tohex(x11_fake_data, data_len); /* Send the request packet. */ if (compat20) { channel_request_start(client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply); packet_put_char(0); /* XXX bool single connection */ } else { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING); } packet_put_cstring(proto); packet_put_cstring(new_data); packet_put_int(screen_number); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); free(new_data); } /* -- agent forwarding */ /* Sends a message to the server to request authentication fd forwarding. */ void auth_request_forwarding(void) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/cipher.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/cipher.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/cipher.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,657 +1,656 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.100 2015/01/14 10:29:45 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.101 2015/12/10 17:08:40 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "cipher.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #ifdef WITH_SSH1 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void); extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void); extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); #endif struct sshcipher { char *name; int number; /* for ssh1 only */ u_int block_size; u_int key_len; u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ u_int auth_len; u_int discard_len; u_int flags; #define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) #define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) #define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) #define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); #else void *ignored; #endif }; static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, { "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf }, #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, { "blowfish-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc }, { "cast128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_cast5_cbc }, { "arcfour", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_rc4 }, { "arcfour128", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 }, { "arcfour256", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 }, { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 64, 0, 16, 0, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL }, { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } }; /*--*/ /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */ char * cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only) { char *tmp, *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct sshcipher *c; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) continue; if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0) continue; if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(c->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->block_size); } u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->key_len); } u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c) { if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0) return 14; return cipher_keylen(c); } u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->auth_len); } u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c) { /* * Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that * needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default? */ return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ? c->iv_len : c->block_size; } u_int cipher_get_number(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->number); } u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0; } u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int client) { u_int mask = 0; mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES; /* Mandatory */ mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH; if (client) { mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_DES; } return mask; } const struct sshcipher * cipher_by_name(const char *name) { const struct sshcipher *c; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) return c; return NULL; } const struct sshcipher * cipher_by_number(int id) { const struct sshcipher *c; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) if (c->number == id) return c; return NULL; } #define CIPHER_SEP "," int ciphers_valid(const char *names) { const struct sshcipher *c; char *cipher_list, *cp; char *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) { c = cipher_by_name(p); if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) { free(cipher_list); return 0; } } free(cipher_list); return 1; } /* * Parses the name of the cipher. Returns the number of the corresponding * cipher, or -1 on error. */ int cipher_number(const char *name) { const struct sshcipher *c; if (name == NULL) return -1; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) return c->number; return -1; } char * cipher_name(int id) { const struct sshcipher *c = cipher_by_number(id); return (c==NULL) ? "" : c->name; } const char * cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) return NULL; if (cc->cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) return "use of DES is strongly discouraged due to " "cryptographic weaknesses"; return NULL; } int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const struct sshcipher *cipher, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen, int do_encrypt) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; const EVP_CIPHER *type; int klen; u_char *junk, *discard; if (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) { if (keylen > 8) keylen = 8; } #endif cc->plaintext = (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_NONE); cc->encrypt = do_encrypt; if (keylen < cipher->key_len || (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; cc->cipher = cipher; if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { return chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen); } #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen); aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv); return 0; } if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) return 0; return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #else type = (*cipher->evptype)(); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cc->evp); if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv, (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto bad; } if (cipher_authlen(cipher) && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (u_char *)iv)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto bad; } klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp); if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto bad; } } if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto bad; } if (cipher->discard_len > 0) { if ((junk = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL || (discard = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL) { - if (junk != NULL) - free(junk); + free(junk); ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto bad; } ret = EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk, cipher->discard_len); explicit_bzero(discard, cipher->discard_len); free(junk); free(discard); if (ret != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; bad: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp); return ret; } } #endif return 0; } /* * cipher_crypt() operates as following: * Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'. * Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for * authenticated encryption modes. * En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. * Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag. * This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption. * Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0. */ int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen) { if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src, len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt); } #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { if (aadlen) memcpy(dest, src, aadlen); aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen, dest + aadlen, len); return 0; } if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len); return 0; } return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #else if (authlen) { u_char lastiv[1]; if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* increment IV */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 1, lastiv)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; /* set tag on decyption */ if (!cc->encrypt && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } if (aadlen) { if (authlen && EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; memcpy(dest, src, aadlen); } if (len % cc->cipher->block_size) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen, len) < 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if (authlen) { /* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */ if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0) return cc->encrypt ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; if (cc->encrypt && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, authlen, dest + aadlen + len)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } return 0; #endif } /* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */ int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) { if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) return chachapoly_get_length(&cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr, cp, len); if (len < 4) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; *plenp = get_u32(cp); return 0; } int cipher_cleanup(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) return 0; if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx)); else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp) == 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; #endif return 0; } /* * Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key. */ int cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const struct sshcipher *cipher, const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt) { u_char digest[16]; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; r = cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt); out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); return r; } /* * Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent * process. */ int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; int ivlen = 0; if (c->number == SSH_CIPHER_3DES) ivlen = 24; else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ivlen = 0; else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) ivlen = sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL else ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ return (ivlen); } int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len) { const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int evplen; #endif if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { if (len != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; return 0; } if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len); return 0; } if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) return 0; switch (c->number) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2: case SSH_CIPHER_DES: case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH: evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp); if (evplen == 0) return 0; else if (evplen < 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if ((u_int)evplen != len) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len); else #endif if (cipher_authlen(c)) { if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, len, iv)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } else memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len); break; #endif #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: return ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24); #endif default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } return 0; } int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv) { const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int evplen = 0; #endif if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) return 0; if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) return 0; switch (c->number) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2: case SSH_CIPHER_DES: case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH: evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp); if (evplen <= 0) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if (cipher_authlen(c)) { /* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv)) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } else memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen); break; #endif #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: return ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, 24); #endif default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } return 0; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #define EVP_X_STATE(evp) (evp).cipher_data #define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) (evp).cipher->ctx_size #endif int cipher_get_keycontext(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *dat) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; int plen = 0; if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) { plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp); if (dat == NULL) return (plen); memcpy(dat, EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), plen); } return (plen); #else return 0; #endif } void cipher_set_keycontext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *dat) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; int plen; if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) { plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp); memcpy(EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), dat, plen); } #endif } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2690 +1,2727 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.275 2015/07/10 06:21:53 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.284 2016/02/08 10:57:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The main loop for the interactive session (client side). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" -#include "roaming.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" /* import options */ extern Options options; /* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */ extern int stdin_null_flag; /* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */ extern int no_shell_flag; /* Control socket */ extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */ /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ extern char *host; /* * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile * because this is updated in a signal handler. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0; /* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */ static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0; /* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */ static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0; /* Common data for the client loop code. */ volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */ static int escape_char1; /* Escape character. (proto1 only) */ static int escape_pending1; /* Last character was an escape (proto1 only) */ static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */ static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on stderr. */ static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */ static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */ static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */ static u_int buffer_high; /* Soft max buffer size. */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */ static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ static void client_init_dispatch(void); int session_ident = -1; -int session_resumed = 0; - /* Track escape per proto2 channel */ struct escape_filter_ctx { int escape_pending; int escape_char; }; /* Context for channel confirmation replies */ struct channel_reply_ctx { const char *request_type; int id; enum confirm_action action; }; /* Global request success/failure callbacks */ struct global_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry; global_confirm_cb *cb; void *ctx; int ref_count; }; TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm); static struct global_confirms global_confirms = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms); void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, Buffer *); /* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */ static void leave_non_blocking(void) { if (in_non_blocking_mode) { unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); in_non_blocking_mode = 0; } } /* Puts stdin terminal in non-blocking mode. */ static void enter_non_blocking(void) { in_non_blocking_mode = 1; set_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); } /* * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a * flag indicating that the window has changed. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void window_change_handler(int sig) { received_window_change_signal = 1; signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); } /* * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void signal_handler(int sig) { received_signal = sig; quit_pending = 1; } /* * Returns current time in seconds from Jan 1, 1970 with the maximum * available resolution. */ static double get_current_time(void) { struct timeval tv; gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0; } /* * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the * ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout. */ static void set_control_persist_exit_time(void) { if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) { /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */ control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (channel_still_open()) { /* some client connections are still open */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__); control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) { /* a client connection has recently closed */ control_persist_exit_time = monotime() + (time_t)options.control_persist_timeout; debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__, options.control_persist_timeout); } /* else we are already counting down to the timeout */ } #define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_" static int client_x11_display_valid(const char *display) { size_t i, dlen; + if (display == NULL) + return 0; + dlen = strlen(display); for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) && strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) { debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]); return 0; } } return 1; } #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 -void +int client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) { - char cmd[1024]; - char line[512]; - char xdisplay[512]; + char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512]; + char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX]; static char proto[512], data[512]; FILE *f; - int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i; - char *xauthdir, *xauthfile; + int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i, r; struct stat st; u_int now, x11_timeout_real; - xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL; *_proto = proto; *_data = data; - proto[0] = data[0] = '\0'; + proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0'; - if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) { + if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { + if (display != NULL) + logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding", + display); + return -1; + } + if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) { debug("No xauth program."); - } else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { - logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data", - display); - } else { - if (display == NULL) { - debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set"); - return; - } + xauth_path = NULL; + } + + if (xauth_path != NULL) { /* * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does * not match an authorization entry. For this we * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum". * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal * is not perfect. */ if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) { - snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", - display + 10); + if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", + display + 10)) < 0 || + (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) { + error("%s: display name too long", __func__); + return -1; + } display = xdisplay; } if (trusted == 0) { - xauthdir = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); - xauthfile = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); - mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX); /* + * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie. + * * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server. */ + mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir)); + if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) { + error("%s: mkdtemp: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + do_unlink = 1; + if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile), + "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 || + (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) { + error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__); + unlink(xauthfile); + rmdir(xauthdir); + return -1; + } + if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK) x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX; else x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK; - if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) { - do_unlink = 1; - snprintf(xauthfile, PATH_MAX, "%s/xauthfile", - xauthdir); - snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), - "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO - " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, - xauth_path, xauthfile, display, - x11_timeout_real); - debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); - if (x11_refuse_time == 0) { - now = monotime() + 1; - if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) - x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; - else - x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; - channel_set_x11_refuse_time( - x11_refuse_time); - } - if (system(cmd) == 0) - generated = 1; + if ((r = snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), + "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO + " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, + xauth_path, xauthfile, display, + x11_timeout_real)) < 0 || + (size_t)r >= sizeof(cmd)) + fatal("%s: cmd too long", __func__); + debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd); + if (x11_refuse_time == 0) { + now = monotime() + 1; + if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) + x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; + else + x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; + channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time); } + if (system(cmd) == 0) + generated = 1; } /* * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step * above. */ if (trusted || generated) { snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, xauth_path, generated ? "-f " : "" , generated ? xauthfile : "", display); debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "r"); if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) && sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2) got_data = 1; if (f) pclose(f); - } else - error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " - "xauth key data not generated"); + } } if (do_unlink) { unlink(xauthfile); rmdir(xauthdir); } - free(xauthdir); - free(xauthfile); + /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */ + if (!trusted && !got_data) { + error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " + "xauth key data not generated"); + return -1; + } + /* * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise * for the local connection. */ if (!got_data) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; logit("Warning: No xauth data; " "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding."); strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", rnd & 0xff); rnd >>= 8; } } + + return 0; } /* * This is called when the interactive is entered. This checks if there is * an EOF coming on stdin. We must check this explicitly, as select() does * not appear to wake up when redirecting from /dev/null. */ static void client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(void) { int len; char buf[1]; /* * If standard input is to be "redirected from /dev/null", we simply * mark that we have seen an EOF and send an EOF message to the * server. Otherwise, we try to read a single character; it appears * that for some files, such /dev/null, select() never wakes up for * read for this descriptor, which means that we never get EOF. This * way we will get the EOF if stdin comes from /dev/null or similar. */ if (stdin_null_flag) { /* Fake EOF on stdin. */ debug("Sending eof."); stdin_eof = 1; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } else { enter_non_blocking(); /* Check for immediate EOF on stdin. */ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, 1); if (len == 0) { /* * EOF. Record that we have seen it and send * EOF to server. */ debug("Sending eof."); stdin_eof = 1; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } else if (len > 0) { /* * Got data. We must store the data in the buffer, * and also process it as an escape character if * appropriate. */ if ((u_char) buf[0] == escape_char1) escape_pending1 = 1; else buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1); } leave_non_blocking(); } } /* * Make packets from buffered stdin data, and buffer them for sending to the * connection. */ static void client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void) { u_int len; /* Send buffered stdin data to the server. */ while (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0 && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { len = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) len = packet_get_maxsize(); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len); /* If we have a pending EOF, send it now. */ if (stdin_eof && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } } } /* * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if * appropriate. */ static void client_check_window_change(void) { struct winsize ws; if (! received_window_change_signal) return; /** XXX race */ received_window_change_signal = 0; debug2("client_check_window_change: changed"); if (compat20) { channel_send_window_changes(); } else { if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) return; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); packet_send(); } } static int client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct global_confirm *gc; if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; if (gc->cb != NULL) gc->cb(type, seq, gc->ctx); if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry); explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc)); free(gc); } packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); return 0; } static void server_alive_check(void) { if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) { logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host); cleanup_exit(255); } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ packet_send(); /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */ client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL); } /* * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on * one of the file descriptors). */ static void client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying) { struct timeval tv, *tvp; int timeout_secs; time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime(); int ret; /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */ channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, &minwait_secs, rekeying); if (!compat20) { /* Read from the connection, unless our buffers are full. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) < buffer_high && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) < buffer_high && channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); /* * Read from stdin, unless we have seen EOF or have very much * buffered data to send to the server. */ if (!stdin_eof && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) FD_SET(fileno(stdin), *readsetp); /* Select stdout/stderr if have data in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) FD_SET(fileno(stdout), *writesetp); if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) FD_SET(fileno(stderr), *writesetp); } else { /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */ if (session_closed && !channel_still_open() && !packet_have_data_to_write()) { /* clear mask since we did not call select() */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); return; } else { FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); } } /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */ if (packet_have_data_to_write()) FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); /* * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other * event pending, or a timeout expires. */ timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && compat20) { timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval; server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval; } if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && !rekeying) timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, packet_get_rekey_timeout()); set_control_persist_exit_time(); if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, control_persist_exit_time - now); if (timeout_secs < 0) timeout_secs = 0; } if (minwait_secs != 0) timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs); if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX) tvp = NULL; else { tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs; tv.tv_usec = 0; tvp = &tv; } ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); if (ret < 0) { char buf[100]; /* * We have to clear the select masks, because we return. * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags * set by the signal handlers. */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); if (errno == EINTR) return; /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; } else if (ret == 0) { /* * Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying. * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop. */ if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime()) server_alive_check(); } } static void client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr) { /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */ if (buffer_len(bout) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(bout), buffer_len(bout)); if (buffer_len(berr) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(berr), buffer_len(berr)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets * written to swap. */ buffer_free(bin); buffer_free(bout); buffer_free(berr); /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */ kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */ received_window_change_signal = 1; /* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */ buffer_init(bin); buffer_init(bout); buffer_init(berr); enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } static void client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset) { - int len, cont = 0; + int len; char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; /* * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of * the packet subsystem. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { /* Read as much as possible. */ - len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont); - if (len == 0 && cont == 0) { + len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == 0) { /* * Received EOF. The remote host has closed the * connection. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n", host); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; return; } /* * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available. */ if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) len = 0; if (len < 0) { /* * An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a * network problem. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n", host, strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; return; } packet_process_incoming(buf, len); } } static void client_status_confirm(int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx; char errmsg[256]; int tochan; /* * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate * one is fatal. */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY && (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)) cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE; /* XXX supress on mux _client_ quietmode */ tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR && c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE; if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) { debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) { if (tochan) { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type); } else { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } /* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident) fatal("%s", errmsg); /* * If error occurred on mux client, append to * their stderr. */ if (tochan) { buffer_append(&c->extended, errmsg, strlen(errmsg)); } else error("%s", errmsg); if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) { /* * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode. */ if (c->self == session_ident) leave_raw_mode(0); else mux_tty_alloc_failed(c); } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) { chan_read_failed(c); chan_write_failed(c); } } free(cr); } static void client_abandon_status_confirm(Channel *c, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } void client_expect_confirm(int id, const char *request, enum confirm_action action) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr)); cr->request_type = request; cr->action = action; channel_register_status_confirm(id, client_status_confirm, client_abandon_status_confirm, cr); } void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx) { struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc; /* Coalesce identical callbacks */ last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms); if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) { if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d", __func__, last_gc->ref_count); return; } gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc)); gc->cb = cb; gc->ctx = ctx; gc->ref_count = 1; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry); } static void process_cmdline(void) { void (*handler)(int); char *s, *cmd; int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0; struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO); if (s == NULL) goto out; while (isspace((u_char)*s)) s++; if (*s == '-') s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */ if (*s == '\0') goto out; if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') { logit("Commands:"); logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request local forward"); logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request remote forward"); logit(" -D[bind_address:]port " "Request dynamic forward"); logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port " "Cancel local forward"); logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port " "Cancel remote forward"); logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port " "Cancel dynamic forward"); if (!options.permit_local_command) goto out; logit(" !args " "Execute local command"); goto out; } if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) { s++; ssh_local_cmd(s); goto out; } if (*s == 'K') { delete = 1; s++; } if (*s == 'L') local = 1; else if (*s == 'R') remote = 1; else if (*s == 'D') dynamic = 1; else { logit("Invalid command."); goto out; } if (delete && !compat20) { logit("Not supported for SSH protocol version 1."); goto out; } while (isspace((u_char)*++s)) ; /* XXX update list of forwards in options */ if (delete) { /* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */ if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) { logit("Bad forwarding close specification."); goto out; } if (remote) ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(&fwd) == 0; else if (dynamic) ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, 0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; else ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; if (!ok) { logit("Unkown port forwarding."); goto out; } logit("Canceled forwarding."); } else { if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) { logit("Bad forwarding specification."); goto out; } if (local || dynamic) { if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } else { if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd) < 0) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } logit("Forwarding port."); } out: signal(SIGINT, handler); enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); free(cmd); free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); free(fwd.connect_path); } /* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */ #define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */ #define SUPPRESS_PROTO1 1 /* don't show in protocol 1 sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 2 /* don't show in mux client sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 4 /* don't show in mux master sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 8 /* don't show when logging to syslog */ struct escape_help_text { const char *cmd; const char *text; unsigned int flags; }; static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = { {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER}, {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_PROTO1}, {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_PROTO1}, {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, }; static void print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client, int using_stderr) { unsigned int i, suppress_flags; char string[1024]; snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c?\r\n" "Supported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); suppress_flags = (protocol2 ? 0 : SUPPRESS_PROTO1) | (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) | (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) | (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) { if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags) continue; snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n", escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); } snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n" "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after " "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); } /* * Process the characters one by one, call with c==NULL for proto1 case. */ static int process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, char *buf, int len) { char string[1024]; pid_t pid; int bytes = 0; u_int i; u_char ch; char *s; int *escape_pendingp, escape_char; struct escape_filter_ctx *efc; if (c == NULL) { escape_pendingp = &escape_pending1; escape_char = escape_char1; } else { if (c->filter_ctx == NULL) return 0; efc = (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx; escape_pendingp = &efc->escape_pending; escape_char = efc->escape_char; } if (len <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) { /* Get one character at a time. */ ch = buf[i]; if (*escape_pendingp) { /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ /* Clear the flag now. */ *escape_pendingp = 0; /* Process the escaped character. */ switch (ch) { case '.': /* Terminate the connection. */ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { chan_read_failed(c); chan_write_failed(c); if (c->detach_user) c->detach_user(c->self, NULL); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED; buffer_clear(&c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(c); return 0; } else quit_pending = 1; return -1; case 'Z' - 64: /* XXX support this for mux clients */ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { char b[16]; noescape: if (ch == 'Z' - 64) snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z"); else snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch); snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%s escape not available to " "multiplexed sessions\r\n", escape_char, b); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; } /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr); /* We have been continued. */ continue; case 'B': if (compat20) { snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%cB\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); channel_request_start(c->self, "break", 0); packet_put_int(1000); packet_send(); } continue; case 'R': if (compat20) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) logit("Server does not " "support re-keying"); else need_rekeying = 1; } continue; case 'V': /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'v': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; if (!log_is_on_stderr()) { snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n", escape_char, ch); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; } if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) log_change_level(--options.log_level); if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_change_level(++options.log_level); snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", escape_char, ch, log_level_name(options.log_level)); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; case '&': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; /* * Detach the program (continue to serve * connections, but put in background and no * more new connections). */ /* Restore tty modes. */ leave_raw_mode( options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* Stop listening for new connections. */ channel_stop_listening(); snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); /* Fork into background. */ pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ /* The parent just exits. */ exit(0); } /* The child continues serving connections. */ if (compat20) { buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1); /* fake EOF on stdin */ return -1; } else if (!stdin_eof) { /* * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not * always appear to be enough. So we * try to send an EOF character first. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); packet_put_string("\004", 1); packet_send(); /* Close stdin. */ stdin_eof = 1; if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } } continue; case '?': print_escape_help(berr, escape_char, compat20, (c && c->ctl_chan != -1), log_is_on_stderr()); continue; case '#': snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); s = channel_open_message(); buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s)); free(s); continue; case 'C': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; process_cmdline(); continue; default: if (ch != escape_char) { buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char); bytes++; } /* Escaped characters fall through here */ break; } } else { /* * The previous character was not an escape char. * Check if this is an escape. */ if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) { /* * It is. Set the flag and continue to * next character. */ *escape_pendingp = 1; continue; } } /* * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, * and append it to the buffer. */ last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); buffer_put_char(bin, ch); bytes++; } return bytes; } static void client_process_input(fd_set *readset) { int len; char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; /* Read input from stdin. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) { /* Read as much as possible. */ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return; /* we'll try again later */ if (len <= 0) { /* * Received EOF or error. They are treated * similarly, except that an error message is printed * if it was an error condition. */ if (len < 0) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "read: %.100s\r\n", strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); } /* Mark that we have seen EOF. */ stdin_eof = 1; /* * Send an EOF message to the server unless there is * data in the buffer. If there is data in the * buffer, no message will be sent now. Code * elsewhere will send the EOF when the buffer * becomes empty if stdin_eof is set. */ if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } } else if (escape_char1 == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { /* * Normal successful read, and no escape character. * Just append the data to buffer. */ buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, len); } else { /* * Normal, successful read. But we have an escape * character and have to process the characters one * by one. */ if (process_escapes(NULL, &stdin_buffer, &stdout_buffer, &stderr_buffer, buf, len) == -1) return; } } } static void client_process_output(fd_set *writeset) { int len; char buf[100]; /* Write buffered output to stdout. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), writeset)) { /* Write as much data as possible. */ len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); if (len <= 0) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) len = 0; else { /* * An error or EOF was encountered. Put an * error message to stderr buffer. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "write stdout: %.50s\r\n", strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; return; } } /* Consume printed data from the buffer. */ buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); } /* Write buffered output to stderr. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stderr), writeset)) { /* Write as much data as possible. */ len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); if (len <= 0) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) len = 0; else { /* * EOF or error, but can't even print * error message. */ quit_pending = 1; return; } } /* Consume printed characters from the buffer. */ buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); } } /* * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as * there are packets available. * * Any unknown packets received during the actual * session cause the session to terminate. This is * intended to make debugging easier since no * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol * extensions must be negotiated during the * preparatory phase. */ static void client_process_buffered_input_packets(void) { dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending, active_state); } /* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ /* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */ void * client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char) { struct escape_filter_ctx *ret; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->escape_pending = 0; ret->escape_char = escape_char; return (void *)ret; } /* Free the escape filter context on channel free */ void client_filter_cleanup(int cid, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } int client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len) { if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return 0; return process_escapes(c, &c->input, &c->output, &c->extended, buf, len); } static void client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg) { channel_cancel_cleanup(id); session_closed = 1; leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } /* * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session. */ int client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; double start_time, total_time; - int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len, rekeying = 0; + int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; u_int nalloc = 0; char buf[100]; debug("Entering interactive session."); + if (options.control_master && + ! option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) { + debug("pledge: id"); + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec id tty", + NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + } else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) { + debug("pledge: exec"); + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty", + NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + } else if (options.update_hostkeys) { + debug("pledge: filesystem full"); + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty", + NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + } else if (! option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command)) { + debug("pledge: proc"); + if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + } else { + debug("pledge: network"); + if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns tty", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + start_time = get_current_time(); /* Initialize variables. */ escape_pending1 = 0; last_was_cr = 1; exit_status = -1; stdin_eof = 0; buffer_high = 64 * 1024; connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); if (!compat20) { /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) set_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) set_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) set_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdin)); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdout)); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stderr)); } quit_pending = 0; escape_char1 = escape_char_arg; /* Initialize buffers. */ buffer_init(&stdin_buffer); buffer_init(&stdout_buffer); buffer_init(&stderr_buffer); client_init_dispatch(); /* * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode) * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1) */ if (signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler); if (signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGINT, signal_handler); if (signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler); if (signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler); signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); if (have_pty) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (compat20) { session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; if (session_ident != -1) { if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { channel_register_filter(session_ident, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx( escape_char_arg)); } channel_register_cleanup(session_ident, client_channel_closed, 0); } } else { /* Check if we should immediately send eof on stdin. */ client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(); } /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ while (!quit_pending) { /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ client_process_buffered_input_packets(); if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open()) break; - rekeying = (active_state->kex != NULL && !active_state->kex->done); - - if (rekeying) { + if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) { debug("rekeying in progress"); + } else if (need_rekeying) { + /* manual rekey request */ + debug("need rekeying"); + if ((r = kex_start_rekex(active_state)) != 0) + fatal("%s: kex_start_rekex: %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + need_rekeying = 0; } else { /* * Make packets of buffered stdin data, and buffer * them for sending to the server. */ if (!compat20) client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(); /* * Make packets from buffered channel data, and * enqueue them for sending to the server. */ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) channel_output_poll(); /* * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a * message about it to the server if so. */ client_check_window_change(); if (quit_pending) break; } /* * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes * available on one of the descriptors). */ max_fd2 = max_fd; client_wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, - &max_fd2, &nalloc, rekeying); + &max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)); if (quit_pending) break; /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ - if (!rekeying) { + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) channel_after_select(readset, writeset); - if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { - debug("need rekeying"); - active_state->kex->done = 0; - if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(active_state)) != 0) - fatal("%s: kex_send_kexinit: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - need_rekeying = 0; - } - } /* Buffer input from the connection. */ client_process_net_input(readset); if (quit_pending) break; if (!compat20) { /* Buffer data from stdin */ client_process_input(readset); /* * Process output to stdout and stderr. Output to * the connection is processed elsewhere (above). */ client_process_output(writeset); } - if (session_resumed) { - connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); - connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); - max_fd = MAX(max_fd, connection_out); - max_fd = MAX(max_fd, connection_in); - session_resumed = 0; - } - /* * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the * sender. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) packet_write_poll(); /* * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the * timeout has expired without any active client * connections, then quit. */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) { debug("ControlPersist timeout expired"); break; } } } free(readset); free(writeset); /* Terminate the session. */ /* Stop watching for window change. */ signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT); packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION); packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user"); packet_put_cstring(""); /* language tag */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } channel_free_all(); if (have_pty) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* restore blocking io */ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); /* * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the * connection was deliberately terminated at this end. */ if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) { received_signal = 0; exit_status = 0; } if (received_signal) fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal); /* * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating * that the connection has been closed. */ if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); } /* Output any buffered data for stdout. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)) error("Write failed flushing stdout buffer."); else buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); } /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)) error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer."); else buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); } /* Clear and free any buffers. */ - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); buffer_free(&stdin_buffer); buffer_free(&stdout_buffer); buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */ total_time = get_current_time() - start_time; packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time); if (total_time > 0) verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f", obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time); /* Return the exit status of the program. */ debug("Exit status %d", exit_status); return exit_status; } /*********/ static int client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { u_int data_len; char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len); explicit_bzero(data, data_len); free(data); return 0; } static int client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { u_int data_len; char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len); explicit_bzero(data, data_len); free(data); return 0; } static int client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { exit_status = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); /* Acknowledge the exit. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION); packet_send(); /* * Must wait for packet to be sent since we are * exiting the loop. */ packet_write_wait(); /* Flag that we want to exit. */ quit_pending = 1; return 0; } static int client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; int r, remote_id, sock; /* Read the remote channel number from the message. */ remote_id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); /* * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again * get forwarded). */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to * the server. This should never happen unless the agent dies, * because authentication forwarding is only enabled if we have an * agent. */ if (sock >= 0) { c = channel_new("", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); c->remote_id = remote_id; c->force_drain = 1; } if (c == NULL) { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(remote_id); } else { /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ debug("Forwarding authentication connection."); packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); } packet_send(); return 0; } static Channel * client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_address, *originator_address; u_short listen_port, originator_port; /* Get rest of the packet */ listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL); listen_port = packet_get_int(); originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL); originator_port = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__, listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port); c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address); free(originator_address); free(listen_address); return c; } static Channel * client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_path; /* Get the remote path. */ listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); /* XXX: Skip reserved field for now. */ if (packet_get_string_ptr(NULL) == NULL) fatal("%s: packet_get_string_ptr failed", __func__); packet_check_eom(); debug("%s: %s", __func__, listen_path); c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(listen_path, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal"); free(listen_path); return c; } static Channel * client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *originator; u_short originator_port; int sock; if (!options.forward_x11) { error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return NULL; } originator = packet_get_string(NULL); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) { debug2("buggy server: x11 request w/o originator_port"); originator_port = 0; } else { originator_port = packet_get_int(); } packet_check_eom(); /* XXX check permission */ debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator, originator_port); free(originator); sock = x11_connect_display(); if (sock < 0) return NULL; c = channel_new("x11", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } static Channel * client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; int r, sock; if (!options.forward_agent) { error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } c = channel_new("authentication agent connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } int client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun) { Channel *c; int fd; if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO) return 0; if (!compat20) { error("Tunnel forwarding is not supported for protocol 1"); return -1; } debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode); /* Open local tunnel device */ if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode)) == -1) { error("Tunnel device open failed."); return -1; } c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring("tun@openssh.com"); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_put_int(tun_mode); packet_put_int(remote_tun); packet_send(); return 0; } /* XXXX move to generic input handler */ static int client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype; int rchan; u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len; ctype = packet_get_string(&len); rchan = packet_get_int(); rwindow = packet_get_int(); rmaxpack = packet_get_int(); debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) { c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_agent(ctype, rchan); } /* XXX duplicate : */ if (c != NULL) { debug("confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_send(); } } else { debug("failure %s", ctype); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(rchan); packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { packet_put_cstring("open failed"); packet_put_cstring(""); } packet_send(); } free(ctype); return 0; } static int client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; int exitval, id, reply, success = 0; char *rtype; id = packet_get_int(); rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); reply = packet_get_char(); debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d", id, rtype, reply); if (id == -1) { error("client_input_channel_req: request for channel -1"); } else if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) { error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: " "unknown channel", id); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) { packet_check_eom(); chan_rcvd_eow(c); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) { exitval = packet_get_int(); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { mux_exit_message(c, exitval); success = 1; } else if (id == session_ident) { /* Record exit value of local session */ success = 1; exit_status = exitval; } else { /* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */ debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d", __func__, id); } packet_check_eom(); } if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); } free(rtype); return 0; } struct hostkeys_update_ctx { /* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */ char *host_str, *ip_str; /* * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating * whether they already exist in known_hosts. * keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(). */ struct sshkey **keys; int *keys_seen; size_t nkeys; size_t nnew; /* * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted). * Filled in by hostkeys_find(). */ struct sshkey **old_keys; size_t nold; }; static void hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { size_t i; if (ctx == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]); free(ctx->keys); free(ctx->keys_seen); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]); free(ctx->old_keys); free(ctx->host_str); free(ctx->ip_str); free(ctx); } static int hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i; struct sshkey **tmp; if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL || l->key->type == KEY_RSA1) return 0; /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) { debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum); ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1; return 0; } } /* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */ debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold + 1, sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL) fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nold = %zu", __func__, ctx->nold); ctx->old_keys = tmp; ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key; l->key = NULL; return 0; } static void update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { int r, was_raw = 0; int loglevel = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; char *fp, *response; size_t i; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp); free(fp); } for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp); free(fp); } if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) { leave_raw_mode(1); was_raw = 1; } response = NULL; for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) { free(response); response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? " "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO); if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0) break; else if (quit_pending || response == NULL || strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) { options.update_hostkeys = 0; break; } else { do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter " "\"yes\" or \"no\""); } } if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL) options.update_hostkeys = 0; free(response); if (was_raw) enter_raw_mode(1); } /* * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't * cancel the operation). */ if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 && (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, options.hash_known_hosts, 0, options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static void client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i, ndone; struct sshbuf *signdata; int r; const u_char *sig; size_t siglen; if (ctx->nnew == 0) fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */ if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { error("Server failed to confirm ownership of " "private host keys"); hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); return; } if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */ if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0) fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__); /* * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0. */ for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) continue; /* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */ sshbuf_reset(signdata); if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0) fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Extract and verify signature */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata), 0)) != 0) { error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu", __func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i); goto out; } /* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */ ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2; ndone++; } if (ndone != ctx->nnew) fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__, ndone, ctx->nnew); /* Shouldn't happen */ ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); /* Make the edits to known_hosts */ update_known_hosts(ctx); out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); } /* * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted. */ static int client_input_hostkeys(void) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ const u_char *blob = NULL; size_t i, len = 0; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp; int r; char *fp; static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */ extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL; if (hostkeys_seen) fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__); if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK && options.batch_mode) return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */ if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0) return 1; ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx)); while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); free(fp); /* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */ if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.hostkeyalgorithms ? options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, 0) != 1) { debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Skip certs */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Ensure keys are unique */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) { error("%s: received duplicated %s host key", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto out; } } /* Key is good, record it */ if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL) fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nkeys = %zu", __func__, ctx->nkeys); ctx->keys = tmp; ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key; key = NULL; } if (ctx->nkeys == 0) { debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__); goto out; } if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys, sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL) fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__); get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL, options.port, &ctx->host_str, options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL); /* Find which keys we already know about. */ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[0], hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) { error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */ ctx->nnew = 0; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (!ctx->keys_seen[i]) ctx->nnew++; } debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove", __func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold); if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) { /* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */ update_known_hosts(ctx); } else if (ctx->nnew != 0) { /* * We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server. * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves. */ debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys", __func__, ctx->nnew); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */ fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) continue; sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); client_register_global_confirm( client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx); ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */ } /* Success */ out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(buf); /* * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know * what the client does with its hosts file. */ return 1; } static int client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *rtype; int want_reply; int success = 0; rtype = packet_get_cstring(NULL); want_reply = packet_get_char(); debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0) success = client_input_hostkeys(); if (want_reply) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } free(rtype); return 0; } void client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, Buffer *cmd, char **env) { int len; Channel *c = NULL; debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) fatal("client_session2_setup: channel %d: unknown channel", id); packet_set_interactive(want_tty, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (want_tty) { struct winsize ws; /* Store window size in the packet. */ if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY); packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : ""); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); if (tiop == NULL) tiop = get_saved_tio(); tty_make_modes(-1, tiop); packet_send(); /* XXX wait for reply */ c->client_tty = 1; } /* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */ if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) { int i, j, matched; char *name, *val; debug("Sending environment."); for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Split */ name = xstrdup(env[i]); if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); continue; } *val++ = '\0'; matched = 0; for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) { matched = 1; break; } } if (!matched) { debug3("Ignored env %s", name); free(name); continue; } debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val); channel_request_start(id, "env", 0); packet_put_cstring(name); packet_put_cstring(val); packet_send(); free(name); } } len = buffer_len(cmd); if (len > 0) { if (len > 900) len = 900; if (want_subsystem) { debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "subsystem", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } else { debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(id, "exec", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(cmd), buffer_len(cmd)); packet_send(); } else { channel_request_start(id, "shell", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE); packet_send(); } } static void client_init_dispatch_20(void) { dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request); /* rekeying */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); /* global request reply messages */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply); } static void client_init_dispatch_13(void) { dispatch_init(NULL); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS, &client_input_exit_status); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA, &client_input_stderr_data); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA, &client_input_stdout_data); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN, options.forward_agent ? &client_input_agent_open : &deny_input_open); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN, options.forward_x11 ? &x11_input_open : &deny_input_open); } static void client_init_dispatch_15(void) { client_init_dispatch_13(); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, & channel_input_oclose); } static void client_init_dispatch(void) { if (compat20) client_init_dispatch_20(); else if (compat13) client_init_dispatch_13(); else client_init_dispatch_15(); } void client_stop_mux(void) { if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we * should close when all active channels are closed. */ if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) { session_closed = 1; setproctitle("[stopped mux]"); } } /* client specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); leave_non_blocking(); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); ssh_kill_proxy_command(); _exit(i); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,79 +1,79 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.31 2013/06/02 23:36:29 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.32 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */ int client_loop(int, int, int); -void client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int, +int client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int, char **, char **); void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *); void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *, int, Buffer *, char **); int client_request_tun_fwd(int, int, int); void client_stop_mux(void); /* Escape filter for protocol 2 sessions */ void *client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int); void client_filter_cleanup(int, void *); int client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *, char *, int); /* Global request confirmation callbacks */ typedef void global_confirm_cb(int, u_int32_t seq, void *); void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *); /* Channel request confirmation callbacks */ enum confirm_action { CONFIRM_WARN = 0, CONFIRM_CLOSE, CONFIRM_TTY }; void client_expect_confirm(int, const char *, enum confirm_action); /* Multiplexing protocol version */ #define SSHMUX_VER 4 /* Multiplexing control protocol flags */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN 1 /* Open new connection */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK 2 /* Check master is alive */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE 3 /* Ask master to exit */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD 4 /* Open stdio fwd (ssh -W) */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD 5 /* Forward only, no command */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP 6 /* Disable mux but not conn */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD 7 /* Cancel forwarding(s) */ void muxserver_listen(void); void muxclient(const char *); void mux_exit_message(Channel *, int); void mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *); Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/config.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/config.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/config.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,1730 +1,1751 @@ /* config.h. Generated from config.h.in by configure. */ /* config.h.in. Generated from configure.ac by autoheader. */ /* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */ /* #undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD */ /* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address */ /* #undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */ /* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */ /* #undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG */ /* System only supports IPv4 audit records */ /* #undef AU_IPv4 */ /* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */ /* #undef BIND_8_COMPAT */ /* The system has incomplete BSM API */ /* #undef BROKEN_BSM_API */ /* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */ /* #undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE */ /* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */ /* #undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO */ /* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */ /* #undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS */ /* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */ #define BROKEN_GLOB 1 /* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */ /* #undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA */ /* ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet */ /* #undef BROKEN_LIBIAF */ /* Ultrix mmap can't map files */ /* #undef BROKEN_MMAP */ /* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name */ /* #undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME */ /* Can't do comparisons on readv */ /* #undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON */ /* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it */ /* #undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON */ /* realpath does not work with nonexistent files */ #define BROKEN_REALPATH 1 /* Needed for NeXT */ /* #undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS */ /* Define if your setregid() is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETREGID */ /* Define if your setresgid() is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETRESGID */ /* Define if your setresuid() is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETRESUID */ /* Define if your setreuid() is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETREUID */ /* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETVBUF */ /* QNX shadow support is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ /* Define if your snprintf is busted */ /* #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF */ /* FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD */ #define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1 /* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */ /* #undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */ /* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */ /* #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX */ /* Define if you have BSD auth support */ /* #undef BSD_AUTH */ /* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */ /* #undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE */ /* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */ /* #undef CONF_UTMP_FILE */ /* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */ /* #undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE */ /* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */ /* #undef CONF_WTMP_FILE */ /* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */ /* #undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING */ /* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */ #define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1 /* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */ /* #undef DISABLE_LOGIN */ /* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */ /* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE */ /* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */ /* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE */ /* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */ /* #undef DISABLE_SHADOW */ /* Define if you don't want to use utmp */ #define DISABLE_UTMP 1 /* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */ /* #undef DISABLE_UTMPX */ /* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */ #define DISABLE_WTMP 1 /* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */ #define DISABLE_WTMPX 1 /* Enable for PKCS#11 support */ #define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/ /* File names may not contain backslash characters */ /* #undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH */ /* fsid_t has member val */ /* #undef FSID_HAS_VAL */ /* fsid_t has member __val */ /* #undef FSID_HAS___VAL */ /* Define to 1 if the `getpgrp' function requires zero arguments. */ #define GETPGRP_VOID 1 /* Conflicting defs for getspnam */ /* #undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS */ /* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */ #define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1 /* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */ #define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1 /* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */ /* #undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV */ /* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */ /* #undef GSSAPI */ /* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */ /* #undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ /* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */ /* #undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR */ /* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX */ /* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */ #define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */ #define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */ #define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */ #define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */ #define HAVE_ASPRINTF 1 /* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */ /* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ */ /* Have attribute nonnull */ #define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1 /* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */ /* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_B64_NTOP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_B64_PTON */ /* Define if you have the basename function. */ #define HAVE_BASENAME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */ #define HAVE_BCOPY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */ #define HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLF_ENC */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLF_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_BSTRING_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */ #define HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */ #define HAVE_CLOCK 1 /* Have clock_gettime */ #define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1 /* define if you have clock_t data type */ #define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */ #define HAVE_CLOSEFROM 1 /* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */ #define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1 /* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */ #define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */ #define HAVE_CRYPT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_CRYPT_H */ /* Define if you are on Cygwin */ /* #undef HAVE_CYGWIN */ /* Define if your libraries define daemon() */ #define HAVE_DAEMON 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG 0 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT 0 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */ #define HAVE_DES_CRYPT 1 /* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */ /* #undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX */ /* Define if you have /dev/ptc */ /* #undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_DIRENT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */ #define HAVE_DIRFD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */ #define HAVE_DIRNAME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_ELF_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */ #define HAVE_ENDGRENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_ENDUTENT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */ #define HAVE_ENDUTXENT 1 /* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */ /* #undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ /* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl */ #define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_ripemd160' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_SHA256 1 /* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */ #define HAVE_FCHMOD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */ #define HAVE_FCHOWN 1 /* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */ /* #undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_FCNTL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */ #define HAVE_FD_MASK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_FEATURES_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */ #define HAVE_FREEADDRINFO 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */ #define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */ #define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */ #define HAVE_FSTATFS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */ #define HAVE_FSTATVFS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */ #define HAVE_FUTIMES 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */ #define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */ #define HAVE_GETADDRINFO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */ #define HAVE_GETCWD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */ #define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETGRSET */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETLUID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */ #define HAVE_GETNAMEINFO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */ #define HAVE_GETOPT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_GETOPT_H 1 /* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */ #define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1 /* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */ #define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */ #define HAVE_GETPEEREID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */ #define HAVE_GETPGID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */ #define HAVE_GETPGRP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETPWANAM */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */ #define HAVE_GETRLIMIT 1 /* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */ /* #undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getrusage' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETRUSAGE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */ #define HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */ #define HAVE_GETTTYENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETUTENT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETUTID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETUTLINE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */ #define HAVE_GETUTXENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */ #define HAVE_GETUTXID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */ #define HAVE_GETUTXLINE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */ #define HAVE_GETUTXUSER 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */ #define HAVE_GLOB 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_GLOB_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */ #define HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */ /* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */ #define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */ #define HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT 1 /* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */ #define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_IAF_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_IA_H */ /* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */ #define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */ #define HAVE_INET_ATON 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */ #define HAVE_INET_NTOA 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */ #define HAVE_INET_NTOP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */ #define HAVE_INNETGR 1 /* define if you have int64_t data type */ #define HAVE_INT64_T 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */ #define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_INTTYPES_H 1 /* define if you have intxx_t data type */ #define HAVE_INTXX_T 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */ #define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */ #define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1 /* Define if you have isblank(3C). */ #define HAVE_ISBLANK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H */ /* Define if you want ldns support */ /* #undef HAVE_LDNS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBBSM */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBDL */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1 /* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBIAF */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK */ -/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsl' library (-lnsl). */ -/* #undef HAVE_LIBNSL */ - /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */ #define HAVE_LIBPAM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LIBUTIL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBXNET */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */ #define HAVE_LIBZ 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LIMITS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LOCALE_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_LOGIN */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */ #define HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LOGIN_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_LOGOUT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_LOGWTMP */ /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */ #define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */ #define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */ #define HAVE_MBLEN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT */ /* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */ /* #undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */ #define HAVE_MEMMOVE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_MEMORY_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_MEMSET_S */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */ #define HAVE_MKDTEMP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `mmap' function. */ #define HAVE_MMAP 1 /* define if you have mode_t data type */ #define HAVE_MODE_T 1 /* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */ #define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_NDIR_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_NETDB_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H 1 /* Define if you are on NeXT */ /* #undef HAVE_NEXT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_NSLEEP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO */ /* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to pam_strerror */ /* #undef HAVE_OLD_PAM */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */ #define HAVE_OPENPTY 1 /* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include */ #define HAVE_OPENSSL 1 /* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */ /* #undef HAVE_OSF_SIA */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */ #define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */ #define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_PATHS_H 1 /* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP */ /* define if you have pid_t data type */ #define HAVE_PID_T 1 +/* Define to 1 if you have the `pledge' function. */ +/* #undef HAVE_PLEDGE */ + /* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */ #define HAVE_POLL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_POLL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_PRCTL */ +/* Define to 1 if you have the `priv_basicset' function. */ +/* #undef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET */ + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +/* #undef HAVE_PRIV_H */ + /* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */ /* #undef HAVE_PROC_PID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_PSTAT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_PTY_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */ #define HAVE_PUTUTXLINE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */ #define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */ #define HAVE_REALPATH 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */ #define HAVE_RECVMSG 1 /* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */ #define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /**/ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */ #define HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT */ /* define if you have sa_family_t data type */ #define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED */ /* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */ /* #undef HAVE_SECUREWARE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */ #define HAVE_SENDMSG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETEGID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */ #define HAVE_SETENV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETEUID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */ #define HAVE_SETGROUPENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */ #define HAVE_SETGROUPS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */ #define HAVE_SETLINEBUF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */ #define HAVE_SETLOGIN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETLUID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */ #define HAVE_SETPASSENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETPCRED */ +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setppriv' function. */ +/* #undef HAVE_SETPPRIV */ + /* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */ #define HAVE_SETPROCTITLE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETREGID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETRESGID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETRESUID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETREUID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */ #define HAVE_SETRLIMIT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETSID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETUTENT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */ #define HAVE_SETUTXDB 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */ #define HAVE_SETUTXENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */ #define HAVE_SETVBUF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SET_ID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256_Update' function. */ #define HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SHA2_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SHADOW_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */ #define HAVE_SIGACTION 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */ #define HAVE_SIGVEC 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */ #define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1 /* define if you have size_t data type */ #define HAVE_SIZE_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */ #define HAVE_SNPRINTF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */ #define HAVE_SOCKETPAIR 1 /* Have PEERCRED socket option */ /* #undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED */ /* define if you have ssize_t data type */ #define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1 /* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ #define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */ #define HAVE_STATFS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */ #define HAVE_STATVFS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STDDEF_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STDINT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */ #define HAVE_STRDUP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */ #define HAVE_STRERROR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */ #define HAVE_STRFTIME 1 /* Silly mkstemp() */ /* #undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STRINGS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STRING_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */ #define HAVE_STRLCAT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */ #define HAVE_STRLCPY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */ #define HAVE_STRMODE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */ #define HAVE_STRNLEN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */ #define HAVE_STRNVIS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */ #define HAVE_STRPTIME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */ #define HAVE_STRSEP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */ #define HAVE_STRTOLL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */ #define HAVE_STRTONUM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */ #define HAVE_STRTOUL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */ #define HAVE_STRTOULL 1 /* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1 /* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1 /* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1 /* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1 /* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1 /* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1 /* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1 /* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1 /* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1 /* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1 /* define if you have struct timeval */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SWAP32 */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */ #define HAVE_SYSCONF 1 /* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */ /* #undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_DIR_H 1 /* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */ #define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H */ /* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */ #define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_POLL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_STAT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H */ /* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_TIME_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */ #define HAVE_TCGETPGRP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */ #define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */ #define HAVE_TIME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_TIME_H 1 /* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */ /* #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */ #define HAVE_TRUNCATE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_TTYENT_H 1 /* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */ #define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1 /* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */ #define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_UCRED_H */ /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */ #define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1 /* define if you have uintxx_t data type */ #define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_UNISTD_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */ #define HAVE_UNSETENV 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */ #define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_UPDWTMP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_USERSEC_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */ #define HAVE_USER_FROM_UID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */ #define HAVE_USLEEP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_UTIL_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */ #define HAVE_UTIMES 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_UTIME_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_UTMPNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_UTMPX_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_UTMP_H */ /* define if you have u_char data type */ #define HAVE_U_CHAR 1 /* define if you have u_int data type */ #define HAVE_U_INT 1 /* define if you have u_int64_t data type */ #define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1 /* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */ #define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */ #define HAVE_VASPRINTF 1 /* Define if va_copy exists */ #define HAVE_VA_COPY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_VIS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */ #define HAVE_VSNPRINTF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */ #define HAVE_WAITPID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */ #define HAVE__GETLONG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */ /* #undef HAVE__GETPTY */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */ #define HAVE__GETSHORT 1 /* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */ #define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */ #define HAVE___B64_NTOP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */ #define HAVE___B64_PTON 1 /* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */ #define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1 /* Define if libc defines __progname */ #define HAVE___PROGNAME 1 /* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ /* #undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS */ /* Define if __va_copy exists */ #define HAVE___VA_COPY 1 /* Define if compiler implements __func__ */ #define HAVE___func__ 1 /* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */ /* #undef HEIMDAL */ /* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */ /* #undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY */ /* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */ /* #undef IPV4_IN_IPV6 */ /* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */ /* #undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */ /* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */ /* #undef KRB5 */ /* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */ /* #undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */ /* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */ #define LIBWRAP 1 /* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP. */ /* #undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO */ /* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */ /* #undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */ /* max value of long long calculated by configure */ /* #undef LLONG_MAX */ /* min value of long long calculated by configure */ /* #undef LLONG_MIN */ /* Account locked with pw(1) */ #define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX "*LOCKED*" /* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ /* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING */ /* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ /* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR */ /* Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline */ /* #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */ /* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */ /* #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX */ /* Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--") */ /* #undef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT */ /* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) from environment and PATH */ #define LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK "/usr/bin/login" /* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */ /* #undef MAIL_DIRECTORY */ /* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */ /* #undef NEED_SETPGRP */ /* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */ /* #undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE */ /* Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known */ /* #undef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT */ /* Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c */ /* #undef NO_SSH_LASTLOG */ +/* Define to disable UID restoration test */ +/* #undef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST */ + /* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */ /* #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS */ /* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */ /* #undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID */ /* OpenSSL has ECC */ #define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1 /* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */ #define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1 /* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */ #define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1 /* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */ #define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1 /* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */ #define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1 /* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */ #define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1 /* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */ /* #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES */ /* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */ #define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1 /* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */ #define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org" /* Define to the full name of this package. */ #define PACKAGE_NAME "OpenSSH" /* Define to the full name and version of this package. */ #define PACKAGE_STRING "OpenSSH Portable" /* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */ #define PACKAGE_TARNAME "openssh" /* Define to the home page for this package. */ #define PACKAGE_URL "" /* Define to the version of this package. */ #define PACKAGE_VERSION "Portable" /* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */ /* #undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE */ /* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */ /* #undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE */ /* must supply username to passwd */ /* #undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME */ /* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */ /* #undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID */ /* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ /* #undef PRNGD_PORT */ /* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ /* #undef PRNGD_SOCKET */ /* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */ /* #undef PTY_ZEROREAD */ /* Sandbox using capsicum */ #define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1 /* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */ /* #undef SANDBOX_DARWIN */ /* no privsep sandboxing */ /* #undef SANDBOX_NULL */ +/* Sandbox using pledge(2) */ +/* #undef SANDBOX_PLEDGE */ + /* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */ /* #undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT */ /* Sandbox using seccomp filter */ /* #undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ /* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */ /* #undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE */ /* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */ #define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1 +/* Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges */ +/* #undef SANDBOX_SOLARIS */ + /* Sandbox using systrace(4) */ /* #undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */ /* Specify the system call convention in use */ /* #undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH */ /* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */ /* #undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID */ /* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_INT 4 /* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_LONG_INT 8 /* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT 8 /* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT 2 /* Define if you want S/Key support */ /* #undef SKEY */ /* Define if your skeychallenge() function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD) */ /* #undef SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG */ /* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */ #define SNPRINTF_CONST const /* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c */ /* #undef SPT_TYPE */ /* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */ /* #undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY */ /* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */ /* #undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID */ /* Use audit debugging module */ /* #undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ /* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */ /* #undef SSH_IOBUFSZ */ /* non-privileged user for privilege separation */ #define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd" /* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF */ /* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */ #define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1 /* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_LINUX */ /* No layer 2 tunnel support */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2 */ /* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD */ /* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF */ /* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */ #define STDC_HEADERS 1 /* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */ /* #undef SUPERUSER_PATH */ /* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */ /* #undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND */ /* Support passwords > 8 chars */ /* #undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */ /* Specify default $PATH */ /* #undef USER_PATH */ /* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */ /* #undef USE_AFS */ /* Use BSM audit module */ /* #undef USE_BSM_AUDIT */ /* Use btmp to log bad logins */ /* #undef USE_BTMP */ /* Use libedit for sftp */ #define USE_LIBEDIT 1 /* Use Linux audit module */ /* #undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ /* Enable OpenSSL engine support */ #define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1 /* Define if you want to enable PAM support */ #define USE_PAM 1 /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */ /* #undef USE_PIPES */ + +/* Define if you have Solaris privileges */ +/* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS */ /* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */ /* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS */ /* Define if you have Solaris projects */ /* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */ /* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */ /* #undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY */ /* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */ /* #undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ /* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C arrays) */ /* #undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */ /* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */ /* #undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */ /* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */ /* #undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS */ /* Define if you want IRIX project management */ /* #undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ /* use libcrypto for cryptography */ #define WITH_OPENSSL 1 /* Define if you want SELinux support. */ /* #undef WITH_SELINUX */ /* include SSH protocol version 1 support */ #define WITH_SSH1 1 /* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */ #if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD # if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__ # define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1 # endif #else # ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN /* # undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ # endif #endif /* Define if xauth is found in your path */ /* #undef XAUTH_PATH */ /* Enable large inode numbers on Mac OS X 10.5. */ #ifndef _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE # define _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE 1 #endif /* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */ /* #undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS */ /* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */ /* #undef _LARGE_FILES */ /* log for bad login attempts */ /* #undef _PATH_BTMP */ /* Full path of your "passwd" program */ #define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd" /* Specify location of ssh.pid */ #define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run" /* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */ /* #undef __res_state */ /* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */ #ifndef __cplusplus /* #undef inline */ #endif /* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */ /* #undef socklen_t */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/configure.ac =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/configure.ac (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/configure.ac (revision 296853) @@ -1,5049 +1,5100 @@ # $Id: configure.ac,v 1.583 2014/08/26 20:32:01 djm Exp $ # $FreeBSD$ # # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES # WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR # ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES # WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN # ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org]) AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) AC_LANG([C]) AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h]) AC_PROG_CC AC_CANONICAL_HOST AC_C_BIGENDIAN # Checks for programs. AC_PROG_AWK AC_PROG_CPP AC_PROG_RANLIB AC_PROG_INSTALL AC_PROG_EGREP AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar]) AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat]) AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill]) AC_PATH_PROGS([PERL], [perl5 perl]) AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed]) AC_SUBST([PERL]) AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent]) AC_SUBST([ENT]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff]) AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff]) AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh]) dnl select manpage formatter if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$MANDOC" elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" else AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatted found]) MANFMT="false" fi AC_SUBST([MANFMT]) dnl for buildpkg.sh AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no]) if test -x /sbin/sh; then AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh]) else AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh]) fi # System features AC_SYS_LARGEFILE if test -z "$AR" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***]) fi # Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM"], [If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) from environment and PATH]) else # Search for login AC_PATH_PROG([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], [login]) if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK"]) fi fi AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd]) if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"], [Full path of your "passwd" program]) fi if test -z "$LD" ; then LD=$CC fi AC_SUBST([LD]) AC_C_INLINE AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [ #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [ #include #include ]) openssl=yes ssh1=yes AC_ARG_WITH([openssl], [ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl=no ssh1=no fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography]) if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_ARG_WITH([ssh1], - [ --without-ssh1 Enable support for SSH protocol 1], + [ --with-ssh1 Enable support for SSH protocol 1], [ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled]) fi ssh1=yes elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then ssh1=no else AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown --with-ssh1 argument]) fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether SSH protocol 1 support is enabled]) if test "x$ssh1" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_SSH1], [1], [include SSH protocol version 1 support]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi use_stack_protector=1 use_toolchain_hardening=1 AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect], [ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_stack_protector=0 fi ]) AC_ARG_WITH([hardening], [ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_toolchain_hardening=0 fi ]) # We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is # on by default" for things like -fPIE. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) WERROR="-Werror"], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) WERROR="" ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2]) if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack]) # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number # of integer operations that should exercise this. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version]) GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'` case $GCC_VER in 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.8* | 2.9*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; *) ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] ) # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror. if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \ -fstack-protector; do AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror" AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) break ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test]) break ] ) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" done fi if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99" AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"], [#include ] ) fi fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include __attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1, [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ] ) if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull]) fi AC_ARG_WITH([rpath], [ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then need_dash_r="" fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then need_dash_r=1 fi ] ) # Allow user to specify flags AC_ARG_WITH([cflags], [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags], [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] , [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags], [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([libs], [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LIBS="$LIBS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([Werror], [ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then werror_flags="-Werror" if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then werror_flags="$withval" fi fi ] ) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ blf.h \ bstring.h \ crypt.h \ crypto/sha2.h \ dirent.h \ endian.h \ elf.h \ features.h \ fcntl.h \ floatingpoint.h \ getopt.h \ glob.h \ ia.h \ iaf.h \ inttypes.h \ limits.h \ locale.h \ login.h \ maillock.h \ ndir.h \ net/if_tun.h \ netdb.h \ netgroup.h \ pam/pam_appl.h \ paths.h \ poll.h \ pty.h \ readpassphrase.h \ rpc/types.h \ security/pam_appl.h \ sha2.h \ shadow.h \ stddef.h \ stdint.h \ string.h \ strings.h \ sys/audit.h \ sys/bitypes.h \ sys/bsdtty.h \ sys/cdefs.h \ sys/dir.h \ sys/mman.h \ sys/ndir.h \ sys/poll.h \ sys/prctl.h \ sys/pstat.h \ sys/select.h \ sys/stat.h \ sys/stream.h \ sys/stropts.h \ sys/strtio.h \ sys/statvfs.h \ sys/sysmacros.h \ sys/time.h \ sys/timers.h \ time.h \ tmpdir.h \ ttyent.h \ ucred.h \ unistd.h \ usersec.h \ util.h \ utime.h \ utmp.h \ utmpx.h \ vis.h \ ]) # sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif ]) # lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif ]) # sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H # include #endif ]) # login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [ #include #include ]) # Messages for features tested for in target-specific section SIA_MSG="no" SPC_MSG="no" SP_MSG="no" +SPP_MSG="no" +# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both +# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris). +SOLARIS_PRIVS="no" + # Check for some target-specific stuff case "$host" in *-*-aix*) # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc. # It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are # not fatal. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #define testmacro foo #define testmacro bar]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" LD="`echo $LD | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)]) if (test -z "$blibpath"); then blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib" fi saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:" else flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath," fi for tryflags in $flags ;do if (test -z "$blibflags"); then LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])], [blibflags=$tryflags], []) fi done if (test -z "$blibflags"); then AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags]) fi LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1], [Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate], [ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE]) LIBS="$LIBS -ls" ]) ]) dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers. AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess, passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include ]) dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed], [AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1], [Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])], [], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb]) AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM], AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]), [], [ #include #include ] ) check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1 AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1], [Define if you have a broken realpath.]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1], [Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken]) dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1], [Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this]) AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) ;; *-*-android*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) ;; *-*-cygwin*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()]) + AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1], + [Define to disable UID restoration test]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1], [Define if you want to disable shadow passwords]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1], [Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system]) AC_DEFINE([NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT], [1], [Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size]) AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters]) # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes]) ;; *-*-dgux*) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1], [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-*-darwin*) use_pie=auto AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) exit(0); else exit(1); } ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([working])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1], [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1], [Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) [#include ] AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too]) ) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h]) + AC_CHECK_LIB([sandbox], [sandbox_apply], [ + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox" + ]) ;; *-*-dragonfly*) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt" TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-haiku*) LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd " AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) MANTYPE=man ;; *-*-hpux*) # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1], [Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) maildir="/var/mail" LIBS="$LIBS -lsec" AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])]) # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" fi ;; *-*-hpux11*) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1], [Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1 check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1 ;; esac # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10.26) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1], [Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database]) disable_ptmx_check=yes LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw" ;; esac ;; *-*-irix5*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1], [Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue)]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1], [Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-irix6*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1], [Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C arrays)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX project management]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX audit trails]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1], [Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) ;; *-*-linux*) no_dev_ptmx=1 use_pie=auto check_for_libcrypt_later=1 check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1], [Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM], [Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP]) AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer]) inet6_default_4in6=yes case `uname -r` in 1.*|2.0.*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1], [Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly]) ;; esac # tun(4) forwarding compat code AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h]) if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1], [Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) fi AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [], [], [#include ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([prctl]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture]) seccomp_audit_arch= case "$host" in x86_64-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 ;; i*86-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 ;; arm*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM ;; aarch64*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 ;; esac if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch], [Specify the system call convention in use]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported]) fi ;; mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty]) SONY=1 ;; *-*-netbsd*) check_for_libcrypt_before=1 if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then need_dash_r=1 fi AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [NetBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1], [NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it]) ;; *-*-freebsd*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload # and will crash if they cannot be opened. AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1], [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things]) ;; *-*-bsdi*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-next-*) conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog" conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp maildir=/usr/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT]) ;; *-*-openbsd*) use_pie=auto AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1], [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-solaris*) if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then need_dash_r=1 fi AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM], [1], [Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty. AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1], [Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid()]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd in case the name is longer than 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions) conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x]) sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'` if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setppriv]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([priv_basicset]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([priv.h]) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts], [ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris process contracts]) - SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcontract" + LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract" SPC_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects], [ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris projects]) - SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lproject" + LIBS="$LIBS -lproject" SP_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) + AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-privs], + [ --with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)], + [ + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Solaris/Illumos privilege support]) + if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \ + "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then + SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes + AC_MSG_RESULT([found]) + AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1], + [Define to disable UID restoration test]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS], [1], + [Define if you have Solaris privileges]) + SPP_MSG="yes" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs]) + fi + ], + ) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; *-*-sunos4*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) ;; *-ncr-sysv*) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-sni-sysv*) # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,) # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ]) IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc, # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog ;; # UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel. *-*-sysv4.2*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8 *-*-sysv5*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf" AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell case "$host" in *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x maildir=/var/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_LIBIAF], [1], [ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) ], , ) ;; *) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 ;; esac ;; *-*-sysv*) ;; # SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX *-*-sco3.2v4*) AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.") ;; # SCO OpenServer 5.x *-*-sco3.2v5*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" fi LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm" no_dev_ptmx=1 AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid]) MANTYPE=man TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes ;; *-*-unicosmk*) AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm" MANTYPE=cat ;; *-*-unicosmp*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lacid -ldb" MANTYPE=cat ;; *-*-unicos*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG]) LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm" MANTYPE=cat ;; *-dec-osf*) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA]) no_osfsia="" AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia], [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled]) no_osfsia=1 fi ], ) if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1], [Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1], [Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud" SIA_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) fi fi AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv]) ;; *-*-nto-qnx*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken]) enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login case "$host" in *-*-nto-qnx6*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) ;; esac ;; *-*-ultrix*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_MMAP], [1], [Ultrix mmap can't map files]) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix]) ;; *-*-lynxos) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1], [LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation]) ;; esac AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ] ) dnl Checks for header files. # Checks for libraries. -AC_CHECK_FUNC([yp_match], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([nsl], [yp_match])]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])]) dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname], ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [ save_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *s, buf[32]; strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32); s = dirname(buf); if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) { exit(1); } else { exit(0); } } ]])], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], ) LIBS="$save_LIBS" ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h]) fi ]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1], [Define if you have the basename function.])]) dnl zlib is required AC_ARG_WITH([zlib], [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib is required ***]) elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], , [ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" save_LIBS="$LIBS" dnl Check default zlib install dir if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" fi CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" LIBS="$LIBS -lz" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***]) ] ) ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check], [ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then zlib_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v; n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d); if (n != 3 && n != 4) exit(1); v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d; fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v); /* 1.1.4 is OK */ if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4) exit(0); /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */ if (v >= 1020300) exit(0); exit(2); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]), [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log *** Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-zlib-version-check". If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater. See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.]) else AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ] ) dnl UnixWare 2.x AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES]) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ] ) dnl Checks for libutil functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp]) -# On some platforms, inet_ntop may be found in libresolv or libnsl. +# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv +# or libnsl. AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl]) AC_FUNC_STRFTIME # Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support]) AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT], [ #include #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC FOUNDIT #endif ], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) # Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ #ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT #error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension" #endif glob_t g; g.gl_statv = NULL; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct dirent d; exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char)); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1], [Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory]) if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi # Check whether user wants S/Key support SKEY_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([skey], [ --with-skey[[=PATH]] Enable S/Key support (optionally in PATH)], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" fi AC_DEFINE([SKEY], [1], [Define if you want S/Key support]) LIBS="-lskey $LIBS" SKEY_MSG="yes" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for s/key support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ char *ff = skey_keyinfo(""); ff=""; exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries.]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if skeychallenge takes 4 arguments]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ (void)skeychallenge(NULL,"name","",0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG], [1], [Define if your skeychallenge() function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD)])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi ] ) # Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support TCPW_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers], [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then saved_LIBS="$LIBS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" if test -n "${withval}" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "${withval}/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0; ]], [[ hosts_access(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1], [Define if you want TCP Wrappers support]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap" TCPW_MSG="yes" ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing]) ]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi ] ) # Check whether user wants to use ldns LDNS_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(ldns, [ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" fi AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support]) LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" LDNS_MSG="yes" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #include #include int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); } ]]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.]) ]) fi ] ) # Check whether user wants libedit support LIBEDIT_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([libedit], [ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit]) if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit` CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`" else LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses" fi OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'` AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp]) LIBEDIT_MSG="yes" AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ], [ $OTHERLIBS ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int i = H_SETSIZE; el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL); exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ] ) fi ] ) AUDIT_MODULE=none AC_ARG_WITH([audit], [ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)], [ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module]) case "$withval" in bsm) AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm]) AUDIT_MODULE=bsm dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])], [ #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H # include #endif ] ) AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])]) # These are optional AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module]) if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1], [The system has incomplete BSM API]) fi ;; linux) AC_MSG_RESULT([linux]) AUDIT_MODULE=linux dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module]) ;; debug) AUDIT_MODULE=debug AC_MSG_RESULT([debug]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module]) ;; no) AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval]) ;; esac ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([pie], [ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then use_pie=yes fi ] ) if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4 #error gcc is too old #endif ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) use_pie=no ] ) fi if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie]) # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither. AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported]) if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS" fi fi dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ Blowfish_initstate \ Blowfish_expandstate \ Blowfish_expand0state \ Blowfish_stream2word \ asprintf \ b64_ntop \ __b64_ntop \ b64_pton \ __b64_pton \ bcopy \ bcrypt_pbkdf \ bindresvport_sa \ blf_enc \ cap_rights_limit \ clock \ closefrom \ dirfd \ endgrent \ explicit_bzero \ fchmod \ fchown \ freeaddrinfo \ fstatfs \ fstatvfs \ futimes \ getaddrinfo \ getcwd \ getgrouplist \ getnameinfo \ getopt \ getpeereid \ getpeerucred \ getpgid \ getpgrp \ _getpty \ getrlimit \ getttyent \ glob \ group_from_gid \ inet_aton \ inet_ntoa \ inet_ntop \ innetgr \ login_getcapbool \ mblen \ md5_crypt \ memmove \ memset_s \ mkdtemp \ mmap \ ngetaddrinfo \ nsleep \ ogetaddrinfo \ openlog_r \ + pledge \ poll \ prctl \ pstat \ readpassphrase \ reallocarray \ recvmsg \ rresvport_af \ sendmsg \ setdtablesize \ setegid \ setenv \ seteuid \ setgroupent \ setgroups \ setlinebuf \ setlogin \ setpassent\ setpcred \ setproctitle \ setregid \ setreuid \ setrlimit \ setsid \ setvbuf \ sigaction \ sigvec \ snprintf \ socketpair \ statfs \ statvfs \ strdup \ strerror \ strlcat \ strlcpy \ strmode \ strnlen \ strnvis \ strptime \ strtonum \ strtoll \ strtoul \ strtoull \ swap32 \ sysconf \ tcgetpgrp \ timingsafe_bcmp \ truncate \ unsetenv \ updwtmpx \ user_from_uid \ usleep \ vasprintf \ vsnprintf \ waitpid \ ]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include ]], [[ return (isblank('a')); ]])], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).]) ]) # PKCS11 depends on OpenSSL. if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl], [AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support])] ) fi # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include const char *gai_strerror(int); ]], [[ char *str; str = gai_strerror(0); ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1], [Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1], [Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])]) dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them. AC_CHECK_DECL([getrusage], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getrusage])]) AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H # include #endif ]) dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD], , , [ #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([writev], , , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [ #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [ #include ]) # extra bits for select(2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresuid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1], [Define if your setresuid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresgid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1], [Define if your setresgid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([realpath], [ dnl the sftp v3 spec says SSH_FXP_REALPATH will "canonicalize any given dnl path name", however some implementations of realpath (and some dnl versions of the POSIX spec) do not work on non-existent files, dnl so we use the OpenBSD implementation on those platforms. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if realpath works with non-existent files]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ char buf[PATH_MAX]; if (realpath("/opensshnonexistentfilename1234", buf) == NULL) if (errno == ENOENT) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1], [realpath does not work with nonexistent files]) AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working])] ) ]) dnl Checks for time functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time]) dnl Checks for utmp functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname]) dnl Checks for utmpx functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname]) dnl Checks for lastlog functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon], [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])] ) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1], [Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize], [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])] ) # Check for broken snprintf if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char b[5]; snprintf(b,5,"123456789"); exit(b[4]!='\0'); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ] ) fi # We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the # number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3) if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...) { size_t ret; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } ]], [[ char x[1]; if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) return 1; if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) return 1; return 0; ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ] ) fi # On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio, # check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *. # This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; } ]], [[ snprintf(0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const], [Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])]) # Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support NO_PEERCHECK="" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) NO_PEERCHECK=1 ]) fi dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test"; if (mkstemp(template) == -1) exit(1); unlink(template); exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP]) ] ) fi dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include ]], [[ pid_t pid; int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { /* failed */ exit(1); } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */ waitpid(pid, &status, 0); if (WIFEXITED(status)) exit(WEXITSTATUS(status)); else exit(2); } else { /* child */ close(0); close(1); close(2); setsid(); openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */ else exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */ } ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (err != 0) { if (err == EAI_SYSTEM) perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM"); else fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n", gai_strerror(err)); exit(2); } sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) perror("socket"); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { if (errno == EBADF) exit(3); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) { perror("getnameinfo"); exit(2); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1], [Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , , [#include #include #include ]) fi if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1], [Conflicting defs for getspnam]) ] ) fi AC_FUNC_GETPGRP # Search for OpenSSL saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir], [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ], [ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled]) fi if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then case "$withval" in # Relative paths ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval" esac if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check], [ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) openssl_engine=no AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine], [ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ], [ - if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled]) - fi if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled]) + fi openssl_engine=yes fi ] ) if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL], [1], [Define if your ssl headers are included with #include ])], [ dnl Check default openssl install dir if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" fi CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL])], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***]) ] ) ] ) # Determine OpenSSL header version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.sslincver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); - if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0) + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08lx (%s)\n", + (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver` AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) # Determine OpenSSL library version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.ssllibver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver` # Check version is supported. case "$ssl_library_ver" in 0090[[0-7]]*|009080[[0-5]]*) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) ;; *) ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) # Sanity check OpenSSL headers AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include + #include ]], [[ exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check". Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches. ]) else AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -ldl" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ] ) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ BN_is_prime_ex \ DSA_generate_parameters_ex \ EVP_DigestInit_ex \ EVP_DigestFinal_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_init \ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \ HMAC_CTX_init \ RSA_generate_key_ex \ RSA_get_default_method \ ]) if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1], [Enable OpenSSL engine support]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found]) ]) fi # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1], [libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL || EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES CTR]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES GCM]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com" ] ) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl], [crypto], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL], [1], [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl])]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1], [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void]) ] ) # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, # because the system crypt() is more featureful. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt]) fi # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the # version in OpenSSL. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt]) # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SHA256_Update EVP_sha256], , [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 \ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \ hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" ] ) # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_ripemd160], , [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ hmac-ripemd160 hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com" ] ) # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp256=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp384=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]],[[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ] )], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ) COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" TEST_SSH_ECC=no if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC]) fi if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1], [libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC]) AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC]) else AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt]) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ arc4random \ arc4random_buf \ arc4random_stir \ arc4random_uniform \ ]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [ LIBS="$LIBS -liaf" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1], [Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id]) ]) ]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ### Configure cryptographic random number support # Check wheter OpenSSL seeds itself if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly. OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes ] ) fi # PRNGD TCP socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port], [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT], [ case "$withval" in no) withval="" ;; [[0-9]]*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then PRNGD_PORT="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT], [Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ] ) # PRNGD Unix domain socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket], [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)], [ case "$withval" in yes) withval="/var/run/egd-pool" ;; no) withval="" ;; /*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket]) fi if test ! -r "$withval" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable]) fi PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"], [Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ], [ # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket]) # Insert other locations here for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"]) break; fi done if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) fi fi ] ) # Which randomness source do we use? if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT" elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET" elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1], [Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only]) RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY" elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible]) else AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options]) fi # Check for PAM libs PAM_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([pam], [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found]) fi saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , ) AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" PAM_MSG="yes" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1], [Define if you want to enable PAM support]) if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then case "$LIBS" in *-ldl*) # libdl already in LIBS ;; *) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" ;; esac fi fi ] ) # Check for older PAM if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif ]], [[ (void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1], [Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to pam_strerror]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) PAM_MSG="yes (old library)" ]) fi case "$host" in *-*-cygwin*) SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER ;; *) SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd ;; esac AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user], [ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval fi ] ) if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation]) else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"], [non-privileged user for privilege separation]) fi AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER]) if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [ #include #include ]) fi if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch; errno = 0; prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0); exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) # Disable seccomp filter as a target have_seccomp_filter=0 ] ) fi # Decide which sandbox style to use sandbox_arg="" AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox], - [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace, seccomp_filter, capsicum)], + [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)], [ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then sandbox_arg="" else sandbox_arg="$withval" fi ] ) # Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type # function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor # when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int fd, r; fd_set fds; struct timeval tv; fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY); FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(fd, &fds); rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero); setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) select_works_with_rlimit=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) select_works_with_rlimit=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int fd, r; fd_set fds; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1, [setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) -if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \ +if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then + test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support]) + SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_PLEDGE], [1], [Sandbox using pledge(2)]) +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support]) SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \ "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host]) test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS]) test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers]) test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header]) test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function]) test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit]) SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)]) +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then + SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SOLARIS], [1], [Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges]) elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \ test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then SANDBOX_STYLE="none" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing]) else AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox]) fi # Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right. if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -liberty"; fi # Check for long long datatypes AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double]) # Check datatype sizes AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int], [2]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int], [4]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int], [4]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int], [8]) # Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX) if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0 fi # compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them. if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include /* Why is this so damn hard? */ #ifdef __GNUC__ # undef __GNUC__ #endif #define __USE_ISOC99 #include #define DATA "conftest.llminmax" #define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a)) /* * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so * we do this the hard way. */ static int fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n) { unsigned int i; int l[sizeof(long long) * 8]; if (n < 0) if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) { l[i] = my_abs(n % 10); n /= 10; } do { if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0) return -1; } while (i != 0); if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0) return -1; return 0; } ]], [[ FILE *f; long long i, llmin, llmax = 0; if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL) exit(1); #if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX) fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); llmin = LLONG_MIN; llmax = LLONG_MAX; #else fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++) llmax = i; llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */ #endif /* Sanity check */ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0 || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) { fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n"); exit(2); } if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0) exit(3); if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0) exit(4); if (fclose(f) < 0) exit(5); exit(0); ]])], [ llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax` llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax` AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL], [max value of long long calculated by configure]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long]) AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL], [min value of long long calculated by configure]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) fi # More checks for data types AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type]) have_u_int=1 fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type]) have_intxx_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H # include #endif ]], [[ int64_t a; a = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type]) have_u_intxx_t=1 fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type]) have_u_int64_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1], [define if you have uintxx_t data type]) fi fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g; a = b = c = e = f = g = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type]) fi AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [ #include #include ]) TYPE_SOCKLEN_T AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ] ) ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1], [define if you have sa_family_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1], [define if you have struct in6_addr data type]) dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , , [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #include ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1], [define if you have struct addrinfo data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval]) have_struct_timeval=1 fi AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct timespec]) # We need int64_t or else certian parts of the compile will fail. if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install" echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." echo "" exit 1; else dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF main() { char buf[50]; char expected_out[50]; int mazsize = 50 ; #if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; #else long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; #endif strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) exit(1); exit(0); } #else main() { exit(0); } #endif ]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ], AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ) fi dnl Checks for structure members OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class, struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire], [], [], [[ #include #include ]]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state], [Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])], [[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_accrights #error "msg_accrights is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_accrights = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_control #error "msg_control is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_control = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support], ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1], [Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr]) fi # Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1], [Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])], [ # Needed by our getrrsetbyname() AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]), [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [LIBS="$saved_LIBS" AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1], [Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], , [#include ]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include extern struct __res_state _res; - ]], [[ ]])], + ]], [[ +struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */ +return 0; + ]],)], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1], [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check whether user wants SELinux support SELINUX_MSG="no" LIBSELINUX="" AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], [ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then save_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1], [Define if you want SELinux support.]) SELINUX_MSG="yes" AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], , AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header])) AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon], [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux" ], AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library])) SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level]) LIBS="$save_LIBS" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS]) AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS]) # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support KRB5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], [ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then KRB5ROOT="/usr/local" else KRB5ROOT=${withval} fi AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support]) KRB5_MSG="yes" AC_PATH_PROG([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH]) if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`" K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support]) if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1], [Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol]) GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`" GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1], [Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib" AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5" K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1" AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"]) AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err" ]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgss" ], AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail])) ]) ]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], , [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], , AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail]) ) ] ) oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], , [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ]) fi if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1], [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H) # include #endif ]]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) # Looking for programs, paths and files PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path], [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval fi ] ) AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH]) AC_ARG_WITH([xauth], [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then xauth_path=$withval fi ], [ TestPath="$PATH" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin" AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath]) if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" fi ] ) STRIP_OPT=-s AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip], [ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then STRIP_OPT= fi ] ) AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT]) if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then XAUTH_PATH="undefined" AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"], [Define if xauth is found in your path]) XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) fi dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority. dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that. dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers. dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail. # Check for mail directory AC_ARG_WITH([maildir], [ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory], [ if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \ test "x${withval}" != xyes; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"], [Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR]) fi ],[ if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) else AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H #include #endif #define DATA "conftest.maildir" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); #if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (_PATH_MAIL) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0) exit(1); #else exit (2); #endif exit(0); ]])], [ maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir` maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \ | sed 's|/$||'` AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what]) if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) fi ], [ if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then # our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail]) ] ) fi ] ) # maildir if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test]) disable_ptmx_check=yes fi if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptmx]) have_dev_ptmx=1 ] ) fi fi if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptc]) have_dev_ptc=1 ] ) else AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test]) fi # Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above AC_ARG_WITH([mantype], [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type], [ case "$withval" in man|cat|doc) MANTYPE=$withval ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval]) ;; esac ] ) if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb" AC_PATH_PROGS([NROFF], [nroff awf], [/bin/false], [$TestPath]) if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=doc elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=man else MANTYPE=cat fi fi AC_SUBST([MANTYPE]) if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then mansubdir=man; else mansubdir=$MANTYPE; fi AC_SUBST([mansubdir]) # Check whether to enable MD5 passwords MD5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords], [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1], [Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords]) MD5_MSG="yes" fi ] ) # Whether to disable shadow password support AC_ARG_WITH([shadow], [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) disable_shadow=yes fi ] ) if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include struct spwd sp; ]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])], [ sp_expire_available=yes ], [ ]) if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [Define if you want to use shadow password expire field]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi # Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1], [Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY]) else DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display], [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY]) DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" fi ] ) fi # check for /etc/default/login and use it if present. AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login], [ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ], [ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ] ) if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"], [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ]) if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1], [Define if your system has /etc/default/login]) fi fi dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \ test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then external_path_file=/etc/login.conf fi # Whether to mess with the default path SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" AC_ARG_WITH([default-path], [ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system. Edit /etc/login.conf instead.]) elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in $external_path_file .]) fi user_path="$withval" SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval" fi ], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf]) else if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included, otherwise scp will not work.]) fi AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ /* find out what STDPATH is */ #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifndef _PATH_STDPATH # ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */ # define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH # else # define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" # endif #endif #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.stdpath" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ] ) # make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work t_bindir="${bindir}" while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}` case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;; esac case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac done echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work]) fi fi fi ] ) if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH]) AC_SUBST([user_path]) fi # Set superuser path separately to user path AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path], [ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"], [Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser]) superuser_path=$withval fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(4in6, [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1], [Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi ], [ if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)]) fi ] ) # Whether to enable BSD auth support BSD_AUTH_MSG=no AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth], [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1], [Define if you have BSD auth support]) BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes fi ] ) # Where to place sshd.pid piddir=/var/run # make sure the directory exists if test ! -d $piddir ; then piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` case $piddir in NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac fi AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir], [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of ssh.pid file], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then piddir=$withval if test ! -d $piddir ; then AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **]) fi fi ] ) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"], [Specify location of ssh.pid]) AC_SUBST([piddir]) dnl allow user to disable some login recording features AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog], [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp], [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx], [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp], [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx], [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil], [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline], [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline], [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog], [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then conf_lastlog_location=$withval fi ] ) dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the dnl need for command-line parameters dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails dnl lastlog detection dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_lastlog_path=no ]) ]) if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then conf_lastlog_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **]) dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file]) fi dnl utmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_utmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_utmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file]) fi dnl wtmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_wtmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file]) fi dnl wtmpx detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmpx_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX]) fi else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file]) fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath" AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile]) fi AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [ if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running. dnl Add now. CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then TEST_SSH_IPV6=no else TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes fi AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6]) AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS]) AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms]) AC_EXEEXT AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \ survey.sh]) AC_OUTPUT # Print summary of options # Someone please show me a better way :) A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}` B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}` C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}` D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}` E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}` F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}` G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}` H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}` I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}` J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}` echo "" echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:" echo " User binaries: $B" echo " System binaries: $C" echo " Configuration files: $D" echo " Askpass program: $E" echo " Manual pages: $F" echo " PID file: $G" echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H" if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file" echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work" else echo " sshd default user PATH: $I" if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If" echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)" fi fi if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J" fi echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG" echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG" echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG" echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG" echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" +echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" echo "" echo " Host: ${host}" echo " Compiler: ${CC}" echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" fi if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}" fi echo "" if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\"" echo "" fi if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file " echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. " echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ " echo "subdirectory" echo "" fi if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not" echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the" echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to" echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to" echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious" echo "user can connect to your agent." echo "" fi if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL." echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details." fi Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec (revision 296853) @@ -1,811 +1,810 @@ -%define ver 7.1p2 +%define ver 7.2p2 %define rel 1 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID %define sshd_uid 74 %define sshd_gid 74 # Version of ssh-askpass %define aversion 1.2.4.1 # Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %define no_x11_askpass 0 # Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %define no_gnome_askpass 0 # Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) %define static_libcrypto 0 # Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no) %define scard 0 # Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass %define gtk2 1 # Is this build for RHL 6.x? %define build6x 0 # Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no) %define kerberos5 1 # Reserve options to override askpass settings with: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1} %{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1} # Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+. # RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples. # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1' %{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0} # Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier? %{?build_6x:%define build6x 1} # If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc. %if %{build6x} %define _sysconfdir /etc %endif # Options for static OpenSSL link: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" %{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1} # Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine) # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1" %{?smartcard:%define scard 1} # Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no) %define rescue 0 %{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1} # Turn off some stuff for resuce builds %if %{rescue} %define kerberos5 0 %endif Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2. Name: openssh Version: %{ver} %if %{rescue} Release: %{rel}rescue %else Release: %{rel} %endif URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz %endif License: BSD Group: Applications/Internet BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot Obsoletes: ssh %if %{build6x} PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00 %else Requires: initscripts >= 5.20 %endif BuildRequires: perl, openssl-devel BuildRequires: /bin/login %if ! %{build6x} -BuildPreReq: glibc-devel, pam +BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam %else BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} BuildRequires: pkgconfig %endif %if %{kerberos5} BuildRequires: krb5-devel BuildRequires: krb5-libs %endif %package clients Summary: OpenSSH clients. Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Group: Applications/Internet Obsoletes: ssh-clients %package server Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon. Group: System Environment/Daemons Obsoletes: ssh-server Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9 %if ! %{build6x} Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth %endif %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %package askpass-gnome Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %description SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries. This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. To make this package useful, you should also install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. %description clients OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients. %description server OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh package installed. %description askpass OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %description askpass-gnome OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop environment. %prep %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build %if %{rescue} CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS %endif %if %{kerberos5} -K5DIR=`rpm -ql krb5-devel | grep include/krb5.h | sed 's,\/include\/krb5.h,,'` +K5DIR=`rpm -ql krb5-devel | grep 'include/krb5\.h' | sed 's,\/include\/krb5.h,,'` echo K5DIR=$K5DIR %endif %configure \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ - --with-rsh=%{_bindir}/rsh \ --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \ --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ --with-md5-passwords \ %if %{scard} --with-smartcard \ %endif %if %{rescue} --without-pam \ %else --with-pam \ %endif %if %{kerberos5} --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \ %endif %if %{static_libcrypto} perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile %endif make %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion} %configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh xmkmf -a make popd %endif # Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary # because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements. %if %{gtk2} gtk2=yes %else gtk2=no %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} pushd contrib if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then make gnome-ssh-askpass2 mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass else make gnome-ssh-askpass1 mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass fi popd %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh %if %{build6x} install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %else install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %endif install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} install -s x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{scard} rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ %endif perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %triggerun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then touch /var/run/sshd.restart fi %triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1 # Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have. gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1} /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1} END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config # And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default # behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't # specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying # one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both. if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config fi %triggerpostun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart /sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || : fi fi %pre server %{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || : %{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \ -g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || : %post server /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd %postun server /sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || : %preun server if [ "$1" = 0 ] then /sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || : /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd fi %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %if ! %{rescue} %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %endif %if %{scard} %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %files clients %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin %attr(-,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1* %if ! %{rescue} %attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %endif %if ! %{rescue} %files server %defattr(-,root,root) %dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} %files askpass-gnome %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %changelog * Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice - test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass * Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller - Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config file using new AddressFamily directive * Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller - Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass (patch from bet@rahul.net) * Wed Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller - Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks * Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller - Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs * Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta) - Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages - Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client * Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little - Add Privsep user, group and directory * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2 - bump and grind (through the build system) * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-1 - require sharutils for building (mindrot #137) - require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck - require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again - add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're building for 6.x * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-0 - update to 3.1p1 * Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020305 - update to SNAP-20020305 - drop debug patch, fixed upstream * Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020220 - update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind) * Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-3 - add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key exchange, authentication, and named key support * Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-2 - remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole by gnome-libs-devel * Sun Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix from Hugo van der Kooij) * Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-1 - update to 3.0.2p1 * Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.1p1-1 - update to 3.0.1p1 * Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to current CVS (not for use in distribution) * Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0p1-1 - merge some of Damien Miller changes from the upstream 3.0p1 spec file and init script * Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 3.0p1 - update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1 - change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package - replace primes with moduli * Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-9 - incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs * Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer 2.9p2-8 - Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd * Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-7 - fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc. (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827) - configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247) - pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298) - mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337) - refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug - change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751) - pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611) - clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221) * Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-6 - add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke) * Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2 * Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions - pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263) * Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci) * Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151) * Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2 * Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - disable the gssapi patch * Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9p2 - refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch * Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD - add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem so that we can verify it - drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch) - don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate - clear supplemental groups list at startup * Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config - add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not dealing with comments right * Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house, to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure from the upstream version * Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - finish marking strings in the init script for translation - modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by Pekka Savola) - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed * Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9 - drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS * Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer) * Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown - remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue - make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid races in condrestart * Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378) - bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly, because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like open connections) - require the version of openssl we had when we were built * Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and when to reinitialize them - add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata * Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p2 - call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually be group memberships * Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation) - don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to three password attempts as it is) - remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely * Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise * Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Revert the patch to move pam_open_session. - Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750) - Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540) * Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Chuck the closing patch. - Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we specify any other HostKey values, which we do. * Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user. - Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf. * Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.1p1. - Add init script mods from Pekka Savola. - Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely. - Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try adding id_rsa. * Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.0p1. - Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0. - Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init script now. * Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690). - Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which host the user is attempting a login from. - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS. - Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS). - Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS). * Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd - i18n-tweak to initscript. * Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - More gettextizing. - Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing). - Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client). - Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness. * Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Finish with the gettextizing. * Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877) - Gettextize the init script. * Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case. * Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs. * Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none" authentication. (#21268) * Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301) - Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290) * Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when doing keyboard-interactive authentication. * Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM. - Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client will try it when the server disallows password authentication. - Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway. * Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall. - Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch. * Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884). - Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984). - Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself. * Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata. - Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh. * Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1. - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0. - Enable keyboard-interactive authentication. * Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3. - Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966). * Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files it generates. * Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always build PAM authentication in. - Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed. - Clean out no-longer-used patches. - Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only when neither exists. * Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835) - Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will always find them in the right place. (#17909) - Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909) - Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865) * Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835) - Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023) * Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 20000823 snapshot. - Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release} - Back out the pipe patch. * Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems. - Move the init script back. - Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness. * Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok(). * Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Move condrestart to server postun. - Move key generation to init script. - Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script. - Clean up the init script a bit. * Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard. * Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p2. - Use of strtok() considered harmful. * Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Get the build root out of the man pages. * Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add and use condrestart support in the init script. - Add newer initscripts as a prereq. * Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Build in new environment (release 2) - Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group * Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.1p1 * Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref. - Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks. - Fix for possibly-compressed man pages. * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller - Added Jim Knoble's askpass * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id (revision 296853) @@ -1,300 +1,317 @@ #!/bin/sh # Copyright (c) 1999-2013 Philip Hands # 2013 Martin Kletzander # 2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= # 2010 Eric Moret # 2009 Xr # 2007 Justin Pryzby # 2004 Reini Urban # 2003 Colin Watson # All rights reserved. # # Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without # modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions # are met: # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the # documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR # IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES # OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. # IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, # INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT # NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, # DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY # THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT # (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF # THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine # See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details # check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0" then SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh} if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH" then printf "'%s' seems viable.\n" "$SANE_SH" exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@" else cat <<-EOF oh dear. If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc. please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work. EOF printf "%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n" "$0" exit 1 fi fi -DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE=$(ls -t ${HOME}/.ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1) +DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE="$HOME/$(cd "$HOME" ; ls -t .ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)" usage () { - printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o ] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2 + printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o ] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2 + printf '\t-f: force mode -- copy keys without trying to check if they are already installed\n' >&2 + printf '\t-n: dry run -- no keys are actually copied\n' >&2 + printf '\t-h|-?: print this help\n' >&2 exit 1 } # escape any single quotes in an argument quote() { printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g" } use_id_file() { local L_ID_FILE="$1" if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE" else PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub" fi - PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub) + [ "$FORCED" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub) # check that the files are readable - for f in $PUB_ID_FILE $PRIV_ID_FILE ; do - ErrMSG=$( { : < $f ; } 2>&1 ) || { - printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n" "$ErrMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')" + for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do + ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || { + local L_PRIVMSG="" + [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG=" (to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)" + printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n%s\n" "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')" exit 1 } done + printf '%s: INFO: Source of key(s) to be installed: "%s"\n' "$0" "$PUB_ID_FILE" >&2 GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\"" } if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then GET_ID="ssh-add -L" fi while test "$#" -gt 0 do [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && { printf "\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n" "$0" usage } OPT= OPTARG= # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain case "$1" in -i?*|-o?*|-p?*) OPT="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c1-2)" OPTARG="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c3-)" shift ;; -o|-p) OPT="$1" OPTARG="$2" shift 2 ;; -i) OPT="$1" test "$#" -le 2 || expr "$2" : "[-]" >/dev/null || { OPTARG="$2" shift } shift ;; - -n|-h|-\?) + -f|-n|-h|-\?) OPT="$1" OPTARG= shift ;; --) shift while test "$#" -gt 0 do SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'" shift done break ;; -*) printf "\n%s: ERROR: invalid option (%s)\n\n" "$0" "$1" usage ;; *) SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'" shift continue ;; esac case "$OPT" in -i) SEEN_OPT_I="yes" use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ;; -o|-p) SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }$OPT '$(quote "$OPTARG")'" ;; + -f) + FORCED=1 + ;; -n) DRY_RUN=1 ;; -h|-\?) usage ;; esac done eval set -- "$SAVEARGS" if [ $# = 0 ] ; then usage fi if [ $# != 1 ] ; then printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments. Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2 usage fi # drop trailing colon USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//') # tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'" # and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options) eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS" if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE" fi if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2 exit 1 fi # populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...) # and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS populate_new_ids() { local L_SUCCESS="$1" + if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then + NEW_IDS=$(eval $GET_ID) + return + fi + # repopulate "$@" inside this function eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS" umask 0177 local L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX) if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then - echo "mktemp failed" 1>&2 + printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2 exit 1 fi - trap "rm -f $L_TMP_ID_FILE ${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.pub" EXIT TERM INT QUIT + local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\"" + trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2 NEW_IDS=$( eval $GET_ID | { - while read ID ; do - printf '%s\n' "$ID" > $L_TMP_ID_FILE + while read ID || [ "$ID" ] ; do + printf '%s\n' "$ID" > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE" # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options. # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \ + -o ControlPath=none \ + -o LogLevel=INFO \ -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \ -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr $L_TMP_ID_FILE else grep 'Permission denied' $L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr >/dev/null || { sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr >$L_TMP_ID_FILE cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end } fi cat $L_TMP_ID_FILE done } ) - rm -f $L_TMP_ID_FILE* && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT + eval "$L_CLEANUP" && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2 exit 1 fi if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then - printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n\n' "$0" >&2 + printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2 + printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2 exit 0 fi printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2 } -REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 | +REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' -o ControlPath=none "$@" 2>&1 | sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p') case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in NetScreen*) populate_new_ids 1 for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do KEY_NO=$(($KEY_NO + 1)) printf "%s\n" "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || { printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2 continue } [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | ssh -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? = 255 ] ; then printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2 else ADDED=$(($ADDED + 1)) fi done if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then exit 1 fi ;; *) # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect populate_new_ids 0 - [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | ssh "$@" " - umask 077 ; - mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; - if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi" \ + # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX; 'cd' to be at $HOME; and all on one line, because tcsh. + [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \ + ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \ || exit 1 ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l) ;; esac if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then cat <<-EOF =-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Would have added the following key(s): $NEW_IDS =-=-=-=-=-=-=-= EOF else cat <<-EOF Number of key(s) added: $ADDED Now try logging into the machine, with: "ssh $SSH_OPTS" and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added. EOF fi # =-=-=-= Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 (revision 296853) @@ -1,186 +1,191 @@ .ig \" -*- nroff -*- Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .. .Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $ .Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-copy-id .Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm +.Op Fl f .Op Fl n .Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option .Op Ar user Ns @ Ns .Ar hostname .Nm .Fl h | Fl ? .br .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a script that uses .Xr ssh 1 to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password, so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some clever use of multiple identities). It assembles a list of one or more fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using .Xr ssh-agent 1 this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases). It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh, enables logins with those keys on the remote server. By default it adds the keys by appending them to the remote user's .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (creating the file, and directory, if necessary). It is also capable of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its .Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ... command instead. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl i Ar identity_file Use only the key(s) contained in .Ar identity_file (rather than looking for identities via .Xr ssh-add 1 or in the .Ic default_ID_file ) . If the filename does not end in .Pa .pub this is added. If the filename is omitted, the .Ic default_ID_file is used. .Pp Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted. +.It Fl f +Forced mode: doesn't check if the keys are present on the remote server. +This means that it does not need the private key. Of course, this can result +in more than one copy of the key being installed on the remote system. .It Fl n do a dry-run. Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply prints the key(s) that would have been installed. .It Fl h , Fl ? Print Usage summary .It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their argument, to allow one to set the port or other .Xr ssh 1 options, respectively. .Pp Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in .Xr ssh 1 Ns 's configuration file: .Xr ssh_config 5 . .El .Pp Default behaviour without .Fl i , is to check if .Ql ssh-add -L provides any output, and if so those keys are used. Note that this results in the comment on the key being the filename that was given to .Xr ssh-add 1 when the key was loaded into your .Xr ssh-agent 1 rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame. Otherwise, if .Xr ssh-add 1 provides no keys contents of the .Ic default_ID_file will be used. .Pp The .Ic default_ID_file is the most recent file that matches: .Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub , (excluding those that match .Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub ) so if you create a key that is not the one you want .Nm to use, just use .Xr touch 1 on your preferred key's .Pa .pub file to reinstate it as the most recent. .Pp .Sh EXAMPLES If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say, it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've installed the new key. One way of dealing with this is to load both the new key and old key(s) into your .Xr ssh-agent 1 . Load the new key first, without the .Fl c option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the .Fl A option to allow agent forwarding: .Pp .D1 user@newclient$ ssh-add .D1 user@newclient$ ssh -A old.client .D1 user@oldl$ ssh-add -c .D1 No ... prompt for pass-phrase ... .D1 user@old$ logoff .D1 user@newclient$ ssh someserver .Pp now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run .Pp .D1 user@newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver .Pp The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the .Pa .pub file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into you agent. It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than all the keys that you have in your .Xr ssh-agent 1 . Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the .Xr ssh-agent 1 as you prefer. .Pp Having mentioned .Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's .Fl c option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use .Xr ssh 1 Ns 's .Ar ProxyCommand and .Fl W option, to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your .Xr ssh-agent 1 . A web search for .Ql ssh proxycommand nc should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the .Fl W option, rather than .Xr nc 1 ) . .Sh "SEE ALSO" .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr sshd 8 Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec (revision 296853) @@ -1,243 +1,243 @@ # Default values for additional components %define build_x11_askpass 1 # Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation %define sshd_gid 65 %define sshd_uid 71 # The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use %define xversion 1.2.4.1 # Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1 %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0} Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation Name: openssh -Version: 7.1p2 +Version: 7.2p2 URL: http://www.openssh.com/ Release: 1 Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz License: BSD Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot PreReq: openssl Obsoletes: ssh Provides: ssh # # (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.) # building prerequisites -- stuff for # OpenSSL (openssl-devel), # and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd) # BuildPrereq: openssl BuildPrereq: zlib-devel #BuildPrereq: glibdev #BuildPrereq: gtkdev #BuildPrereq: gnlibsd %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System. Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Requires: openssh = %{version} Obsoletes: ssh-extras Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %if %{build_x11_askpass} BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel %endif %description Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL). This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. %description askpass Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL). This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %changelog * Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan - Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check * Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan - Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH * Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller - Glob manpages to catch compressed files * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia - Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass * Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia - Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into his released tarfile - Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600 even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs - Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing message if an SSH host key is already in place - Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation) * Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia - Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support - Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer) * Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia - Made this package correct for SuSE. - Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default. * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. %prep %if %{build_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ %configure --prefix=/usr \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \ --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \ --with-pam \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh make %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} %configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh xmkmf -a make cd .. %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \ $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin %endif %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %pre /usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || : /usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : %post /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A %{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd} %run_permissions %verifyscript %verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh %preun %stop_on_removal sshd %postun %restart_on_update sshd %{insserv_cleanup} %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* %doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %attr(-,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh %if %{build_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass %endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/defines.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/defines.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/defines.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,853 +1,860 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _DEFINES_H #define _DEFINES_H /* $Id: defines.h,v 1.183 2014/09/02 19:33:26 djm Exp $ */ /* Constants */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0 enum { SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */ SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */ SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */ }; # define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD # define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR # define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR #endif /* * Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos) */ #include #include #ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY # define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10 # define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08 # define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04 # define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02 # define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST #endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */ /* * Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474 */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 0x28 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 0x30 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 0x38 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 0x48 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 0x50 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 0x58 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 0x68 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 0x70 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 0x78 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 0x88 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 0x90 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 0x98 # define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 0x00 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 0x20 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 0x40 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 0x60 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 0x80 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 0xa0 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 0xc0 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 0xe0 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF # define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */ #ifndef PATH_MAX # ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX # define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX # endif #endif #ifndef MAXPATHLEN # ifdef PATH_MAX # define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX # else /* PATH_MAX */ # define MAXPATHLEN 64 /* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */ # ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH # define BROKEN_REALPATH 1 # endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */ # endif /* PATH_MAX */ #endif /* MAXPATHLEN */ #ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX # include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */ # if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX) # define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX # elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN) # define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN # else # define HOST_NAME_MAX 255 # endif #endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0 # define MAXSYMLINKS 5 #endif #ifndef STDIN_FILENO # define STDIN_FILENO 0 #endif #ifndef STDOUT_FILENO # define STDOUT_FILENO 1 #endif #ifndef STDERR_FILENO # define STDERR_FILENO 2 #endif #ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */ #ifdef NGROUPS #define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS #else #define NGROUPS_MAX 0 #endif #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0 # define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */ #endif #ifndef S_IFSOCK # define S_IFSOCK 0 #endif /* S_IFSOCK */ #ifndef S_ISDIR # define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR)) #endif /* S_ISDIR */ #ifndef S_ISREG # define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG)) #endif /* S_ISREG */ #ifndef S_ISLNK # define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) #endif /* S_ISLNK */ #ifndef S_IXUSR # define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */ # define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */ # define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */ # define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */ # define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */ # define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */ # define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */ # define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */ # define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */ # define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */ # define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */ # define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */ # define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */ #endif /* S_IXUSR */ #if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS) #define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS #endif #ifndef MAP_FAILED # define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1) #endif /* SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6 */ #ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK #define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001) #endif /* Types */ /* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ /* (or die trying) */ #ifndef HAVE_U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T typedef signed char int8_t; # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) typedef short int int16_t; # else # ifdef _UNICOS # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4) typedef short int16_t; # else typedef long int16_t; # endif # else # error "16 bit int type not found." # endif /* _UNICOS */ # endif # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) typedef int int32_t; # else # ifdef _UNICOS typedef long int32_t; # else # error "32 bit int type not found." # endif /* _UNICOS */ # endif #endif /* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ #ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T # ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T typedef uint8_t u_int8_t; typedef uint16_t u_int16_t; typedef uint32_t u_int32_t; # define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1 # else typedef unsigned char u_int8_t; # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t; # else # ifdef _UNICOS # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4) typedef unsigned short u_int16_t; # else typedef unsigned long u_int16_t; # endif # else # error "16 bit int type not found." # endif # endif # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) typedef unsigned int u_int32_t; # else # ifdef _UNICOS typedef unsigned long u_int32_t; # else # error "32 bit int type not found." # endif # endif # endif #define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__ #endif /* 64-bit types */ #ifndef HAVE_INT64_T # if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) typedef long int int64_t; # else # if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) typedef long long int int64_t; # endif # endif #endif #ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T # if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t; # else # if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t; # endif # endif #endif #ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T typedef u_int8_t uint8_t; typedef u_int16_t uint16_t; typedef u_int32_t uint32_t; typedef u_int64_t uint64_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T typedef long long intmax_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR typedef unsigned char u_char; # define HAVE_U_CHAR #endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */ #ifndef ULLONG_MAX # define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1) #endif #ifndef SIZE_T_MAX #define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX #endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */ #ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T typedef unsigned int size_t; # define HAVE_SIZE_T # define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX #endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */ #ifndef SIZE_MAX #define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX #endif #ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T typedef int ssize_t; # define HAVE_SSIZE_T #endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */ #ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T typedef long clock_t; # define HAVE_CLOCK_T #endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */ #ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T typedef int sa_family_t; # define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T #endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */ #ifndef HAVE_PID_T typedef int pid_t; # define HAVE_PID_T #endif /* HAVE_PID_T */ #ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T typedef int sig_atomic_t; # define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T #endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */ #ifndef HAVE_MODE_T typedef int mode_t; # define HAVE_MODE_T #endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */ #if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) # define ss_family __ss_family #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */ #ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H struct sockaddr_un { short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */ char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */ }; #endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ #ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T typedef u_int16_t in_port_t; #endif #if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE) #define _STRUCT_WINSIZE struct winsize { unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */ unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */ unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */ unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */ }; #endif /* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */ #ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK typedef unsigned long int fd_mask; #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0 # define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long)) #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0 # define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y)) #endif /* Paths */ #ifndef _PATH_BSHELL # define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" #endif #ifdef USER_PATH # ifdef _PATH_STDPATH # undef _PATH_STDPATH # endif # define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH #endif #ifndef _PATH_STDPATH # define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" #endif #ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH # define SUPERUSER_PATH _PATH_STDPATH #endif #ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL # define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" #endif /* user may have set a different path */ #if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) # undef _PATH_MAILDIR #endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */ #ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY # define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY #endif #ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN # define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" #endif /* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */ #ifdef XAUTH_PATH #define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH #endif /* XAUTH_PATH */ /* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */ #ifndef X_UNIX_PATH # ifdef __hpux # define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u" # else # define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u" # endif #endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */ #define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH #ifndef _PATH_TTY # define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty" #endif /* Macros */ #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H) # define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP #endif #ifndef MAX # define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) # define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) #endif #ifndef roundup # define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) #endif #ifndef timersub #define timersub(a, b, result) \ do { \ (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \ (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \ if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \ --(result)->tv_sec; \ (result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \ } \ } while (0) #endif #ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC #define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \ (ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \ (ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \ } #endif #ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL #define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \ (tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \ (tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \ } #endif #ifndef __P # define __P(x) x #endif #if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) # define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \ ((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \ (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff))) #endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */ #if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) # define __attribute__(x) #endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */ #if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__) # define __sentinel__ #endif #if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__) # define __bounded__(x, y, z) #endif #if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__) # define __nonnull__(x) #endif #ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES #define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1) #endif #ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN #define __CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) #endif /* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */ #ifndef CMSG_LEN #define CMSG_LEN(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len)) #endif /* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */ #ifndef CMSG_SPACE #define CMSG_SPACE(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len)) #endif /* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */ #ifndef CMSG_DATA #define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr))) #endif /* CMSG_DATA */ /* * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns * an empty list for some reasons. */ #ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR #define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \ ((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \ (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \ (struct cmsghdr *)NULL) #endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0 # define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member) #endif /* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */ /* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */ #ifndef BYTE_ORDER # ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN # define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234 # endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */ # ifndef BIG_ENDIAN # define BIG_ENDIAN 4321 # endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */ # ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN # define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN # else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ # define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN # endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ #endif /* BYTE_ORDER */ /* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */ #if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO)) # define HAVE_GETADDRINFO #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET # undef getopt # undef opterr # undef optind # undef optopt # undef optreset # undef optarg # define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o) # define opterr BSDopterr # define optind BSDoptind # define optopt BSDoptopt # define optreset BSDoptreset # define optarg BSDoptarg #endif #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) # undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO #endif #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO) # undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO #endif #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) # undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR #endif #if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) # if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0 # define AI_NUMERICSERV 0 # endif #endif #if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX) # undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX #endif #if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) # undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE #endif #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \ defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND) # define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND #endif #if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) # define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n)) #endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */ #ifndef GETPGRP_VOID # include # define getpgrp() getpgrp(0) #endif #ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT # define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS # define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #endif #ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT # define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS # define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #endif #if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__) # define __func__ __FUNCTION__ #elif !defined(HAVE___func__) # define __func__ "" #endif #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) # define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code) #endif #if defined(SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG) # define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) #else # define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c) #endif /* Maximum number of file descriptors available */ #ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF # define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) #else # define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000 #endif #ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL /* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value */ #define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \ ((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \ ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL)) #elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL) #define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \ ((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \ ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL)) #else # define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f)) #endif #if defined(__Lynx__) /* * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions. */ # define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1) # define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES) /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */ int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...); int mkstemp (char *); char *crypt (const char *, const char *); int seteuid (uid_t); int setegid (gid_t); char *mkdtemp (char *); int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t); int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); #endif /* * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the * client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems. * * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems * but you may need to set it yourself */ /* #define USE_PIPES 1 */ /** ** login recorder definitions **/ /* FIXME: put default paths back in */ #ifndef UTMP_FILE # ifdef _PATH_UTMP # define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP # else # ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE # define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE # endif # endif #endif #ifndef WTMP_FILE # ifdef _PATH_WTMP # define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP # else # ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE # define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE # endif # endif #endif /* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */ #ifndef LASTLOG_FILE # ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG # define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG # else # ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE # define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE # endif # endif #endif #if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) # define USE_SHADOW #endif /* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */ #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN) # define USE_LOGIN #else /* Simply select your favourite login types. */ /* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... */ # if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX) # define USE_UTMPX # endif # if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP) # define USE_UTMP # endif # if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX) # define USE_WTMPX # endif # if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP) # define USE_WTMP # endif #endif #ifndef UT_LINESIZE # define UT_LINESIZE 8 #endif /* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */ #if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG) # define USE_LASTLOG #endif #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA # ifdef USE_SHADOW # undef USE_SHADOW # endif # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 #endif #if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 #endif #if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF) # define USE_LIBIAF #endif /* HP-UX 11.11 */ #ifdef BTMP_FILE # define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE #endif #if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP) # define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN #endif /** end of login recorder definitions */ #ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS # define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b))) #endif #if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP) # undef HAVE_MMAP #endif #ifndef IOV_MAX # if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX) # define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX # elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX) # define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX # else # define IOV_MAX 16 # endif #endif #ifndef EWOULDBLOCK # define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN #endif #ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */ #define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46 #endif #ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ # define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192 #endif /* * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir() * shouldn't need the latter. */ #if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \ !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR) # define arc4random_stir() #endif #ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY # ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY # define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src) # else # define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src) # endif #endif #ifndef __predict_true # if defined(__GNUC__) && \ ((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96))) # define __predict_true(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1) # define __predict_false(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0) # else # define __predict_true(exp) ((exp) != 0) # define __predict_false(exp) ((exp) != 0) # endif /* gcc version */ #endif /* __predict_true */ +#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \ + defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \ + defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \ + !defined(BROKEN_GLOB) +# define USE_SYSTEM_GLOB +#endif + #endif /* _DEFINES_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/dh.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/dh.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/dh.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,75 +1,78 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.13 2015/05/27 23:39:18 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.14 2015/10/16 22:32:22 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef DH_H #define DH_H struct dhgroup { int size; BIGNUM *g; BIGNUM *p; }; DH *choose_dh(int, int, int); DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *); DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *); DH *dh_new_group1(void); DH *dh_new_group14(void); DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int); int dh_gen_key(DH *, int); int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *); u_int dh_estimate(int); -/* Min and max values from RFC4419. */ -#define DH_GRP_MIN 1024 +/* + * Max value from RFC4419. + * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks. + */ +#define DH_GRP_MIN 2048 #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 /* * Values for "type" field of moduli(5) * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus. */ #define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0) #define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED (1) #define MODULI_TYPE_SAFE (2) #define MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR (3) #define MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN (4) #define MODULI_TYPE_STRONG (5) /* * Values for "tests" field of moduli(5) * Specifies the methods used in checking for primality. * Usually, more than one test is used. */ #define MODULI_TESTS_UNTESTED (0x00) #define MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE (0x01) #define MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE (0x02) #define MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN (0x04) #define MODULI_TESTS_JACOBI (0x08) #define MODULI_TESTS_ELLIPTIC (0x10) #endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/includes.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/includes.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/includes.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,182 +1,176 @@ /* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.54 2006/07/22 20:48:23 stevesk Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file includes most of the needed system headers. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef INCLUDES_H #define INCLUDES_H #include "config.h" #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE /* activate extra prototypes for glibc */ #endif #include #include #include /* For CMSG_* */ #ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H # include /* For PATH_MAX, _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H # include #endif -#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \ - defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \ - defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \ - !defined(BROKEN_GLOB) -# include -#endif #ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_TTYENT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H # include /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_NEXT # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif /* *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively */ #ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H # include /* For u_intXX_t */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H # include /* For __P() */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include /* For S_* constants and macros */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H # include /* For MIN, MAX, etc */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H #include /* for MAP_ANONYMOUS */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H #include /* for TIOCCBRK on HP-UX */ #endif #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H) && defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) # if defined(HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H) # include /* reqd for queue_t on Solaris 2.5.1 */ # endif #include /* for grantpt() and friends */ #endif #include #include /* For typedefs */ #ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H # include /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */ #endif #ifdef USE_PAM #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) # include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) # include #endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_IA_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_IAF_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H # include #endif #if defined(HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H) # include #elif defined(HAVE_LIBUTIL_H) # include #endif #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) # include # include #endif #if defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H) # include #endif #include /* * On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations * of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here. */ #ifdef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS # ifdef _INCLUDE__STDC__ # undef _INCLUDE__STDC__ # endif #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ #endif #include "defines.h" #include "platform.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" #include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h" #include "entropy.h" #endif /* INCLUDES_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kex.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kex.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kex.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,915 +1,1015 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.109 2015/07/30 00:01:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.117 2016/02/08 10:57:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MAX roundup */ #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "misc.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "monitor.h" -#include "roaming.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 # else extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void); # endif #endif /* prototype */ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { + "KEX algorithms", + "host key algorithms", + "ciphers ctos", + "ciphers stoc", + "MACs ctos", + "MACs stoc", + "compression ctos", + "compression stoc", + "languages ctos", + "languages stoc", +}; + struct kexalg { char *name; u_int type; int ec_nid; int hash_alg; }; static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, }; char * kex_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(k->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } static const struct kexalg * kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) { const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) return k; } return NULL; } /* Validate KEX method name list */ int kex_names_valid(const char *names) { char *s, *cp, *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); free(s); return 0; } } debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names); free(s); return 1; } /* * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process. * Caller must free returned string. */ char * kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p; size_t len; if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') return NULL; if (b == NULL || *b == '\0') return strdup(a); if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024) return NULL; len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2; if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { free(tmp); return NULL; } strlcpy(ret, a, len); for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { if (match_list(ret, p, NULL) != NULL) continue; /* Algorithm already present */ if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len || strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) { free(tmp); free(ret); return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */ } } free(tmp); return ret; } /* * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to * indicate that it should be appended to the default. */ int kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list) { char *ret; if (list == NULL || *list == NULL || **list == '\0') { *list = strdup(def); return 0; } if (**list != '+') { return 0; } if ((ret = kex_names_cat(def, *list + 1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; free(*list); *list = ret; return 0; } /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { u_int i; int r; sshbuf_reset(b); /* * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0) return r; } for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */ return r; return 0; } /* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */ int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char v; u_int i; char **proposal = NULL; int r; *propp = NULL; if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) /* skip cookie */ goto out; /* extract kex init proposal strings */ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) goto out; - debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: %s", proposal[i]); + debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]); } /* first kex follows / reserved */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) /* reserved */ goto out; if (first_kex_follows != NULL) *first_kex_follows = v; debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v); debug2("reserved %u ", i); r = 0; *propp = proposal; out: if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL) kex_prop_free(proposal); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } void kex_prop_free(char **proposal) { u_int i; if (proposal == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) free(proposal[i]); free(proposal); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { - error("Hm, kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + int r; + + error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + return r; return 0; } static void kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); } +static int +kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent"); debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys); + if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c) + if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0) + return r; return 0; } +int +kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + u_int32_t i, ninfo; + char *name, *val, *found; + int r; + + debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0) + return r; + for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) { + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0) { + free(name); + return r; + } + debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val); + if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) { + found = match_list("rsa-sha2-256", val, NULL); + if (found) { + kex->rsa_sha2 = 256; + free(found); + } + found = match_list("rsa-sha2-512", val, NULL); + if (found) { + kex->rsa_sha2 = 512; + free(found); + } + } + free(name); + free(val); + } + return sshpkt_get_end(ssh); +} + static int kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) return r; kex->done = 1; sshbuf_reset(kex->peer); /* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */ kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT; free(kex->name); kex->name = NULL; return 0; } int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh) { u_char *cookie; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; if (kex == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) return 0; kex->done = 0; /* generate a random cookie */ if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent"); kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT; return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; const u_char *ptr; u_int i; size_t dlen; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received"); if (kex == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) return r; /* discard packet */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) return r; for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) return r; /* * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a * packet later. * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) return r; if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } int kex_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **kexp) { struct kex *kex; int r; *kexp = NULL; if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, proposal)) != 0) goto out; kex->done = 0; kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); r = 0; *kexp = kex; out: if (r != 0) kex_free(kex); return r; } void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys) { if (newkeys == NULL) return; if (newkeys->enc.key) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len); free(newkeys->enc.key); newkeys->enc.key = NULL; } if (newkeys->enc.iv) { - explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.block_size); + explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len); free(newkeys->enc.iv); newkeys->enc.iv = NULL; } free(newkeys->enc.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc)); free(newkeys->comp.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); if (newkeys->mac.key) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len); free(newkeys->mac.key); newkeys->mac.key = NULL; } free(newkeys->mac.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac)); explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys)); free(newkeys); } void kex_free(struct kex *kex) { u_int mode; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (kex->dh) DH_free(kex->dh); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC if (kex->ec_client_key) EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]); kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } sshbuf_free(kex->peer); sshbuf_free(kex->my); free(kex->session_id); free(kex->client_version_string); free(kex->server_version_string); free(kex->failed_choice); + free(kex->hostkey_alg); + free(kex->name); free(kex); } int kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { int r; if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0) return r; if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */ kex_free(ssh->kex); ssh->kex = NULL; return r; } return 0; } +/* + * Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error + * code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress. + */ +int +kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (ssh->kex == NULL) { + error("%s: no kex", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if (ssh->kex->done == 0) { + error("%s: requested twice", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ssh->kex->done = 0; + return kex_send_kexinit(ssh); +} + static int choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; enc->name = name; enc->enabled = 0; enc->iv = NULL; enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher); enc->key = NULL; enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher); enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher); return 0; } static int choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* truncate the key */ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC) mac->key_len = 16; mac->name = name; mac->key = NULL; mac->enabled = 0; return 0; } static int choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_ZLIB; } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_NONE; } else { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } comp->name = name; return 0; } static int choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) { const struct kexalg *kexalg; k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)"); if (k->name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH; if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; k->kex_type = kexalg->type; k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg; k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid; return 0; } static int choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) { - char *hostkeyalg = match_list(client, server, NULL); + k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (hostkeyalg == NULL) + debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s", + k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)"); + if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH; - k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(hostkeyalg); + k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg); if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(hostkeyalg); - free(hostkeyalg); + k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg); return 0; } static int proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { static int check[] = { PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1 }; int *idx; char *p; for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) { if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) { debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s", my[*idx], peer[*idx]); return (0); } } debug2("proposals match"); return (1); } static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct newkeys *newkeys; char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL; char **cprop, **sprop; int nenc, nmac, ncomp; u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen; int r, first_kex_follows; - if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0 || - (r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0) + debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client"); + if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0) goto out; + debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server"); + if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0) + goto out; if (kex->server) { cprop=peer; sprop=my; } else { cprop=my; sprop=peer; } - /* Check whether server offers roaming */ - if (!kex->server) { - char *roaming = match_list(KEX_RESUME, - peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); + /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */ + if (kex->server) { + char *ext; - if (roaming) { - kex->roaming = 1; - free(roaming); + ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); + if (ext) { + kex->ext_info_c = 1; + free(ext); } } /* Algorithm Negotiation */ + if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], + sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], + sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; + peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL; + goto out; + } for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys; ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc]; peer[nenc] = NULL; goto out; } authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher); /* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */ if (authlen == 0 && (r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac]; peer[nmac] = NULL; goto out; } if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp])) != 0) { kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp]; peer[ncomp] = NULL; goto out; } - debug("kex: %s %s %s %s", + debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s", ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client", newkeys->enc.name, authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", newkeys->comp.name); } - if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], - sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) { - kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; - peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL; - goto out; - } - if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], - sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) { - kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; - peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL; - goto out; - } need = dh_need = 0; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len); need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.block_size); need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); need = MAX(need, newkeys->mac.key_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher)); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); } /* XXX need runden? */ kex->we_need = need; kex->dh_need = dh_need; /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) && !(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1; r = 0; out: kex_prop_free(my); kex_prop_free(peer); return r; } static int derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL; char c = id; u_int have; size_t mdsz; u_char *digest; int r; if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((digest = calloc(1, roundup(need, mdsz))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */ if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } ssh_digest_free(hashctx); hashctx = NULL; /* * expand key: * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1) * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn */ for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) { if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } ssh_digest_free(hashctx); hashctx = NULL; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEX fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c); dump_digest("key", digest, need); #endif *keyp = digest; digest = NULL; r = 0; out: - if (digest) - free(digest); + free(digest); ssh_digest_free(hashctx); return r; } #define NKEYS 6 int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const struct sshbuf *shared_secret) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; u_char *keys[NKEYS]; u_int i, j, mode, ctos; int r; for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) { if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen, shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) { for (j = 0; j < i; j++) free(keys[j]); return r; } } for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1]; kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3]; kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5]; } return 0; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const BIGNUM *secret) { struct sshbuf *shared_secret; int r; if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(shared_secret, secret)) == 0) r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); sshbuf_free(shared_secret); return r; } #endif #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus, u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16]) { u_int8_t hbuf[2048], sbuf[2048], obuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL; size_t hlen, slen; int r; hlen = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus); slen = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus); if (hlen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)hlen > sizeof(hbuf) || slen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)slen > sizeof(sbuf)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; if (BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, hbuf) <= 0 || BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, sbuf) <= 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hbuf, hlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, sbuf, slen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, cookie, 8) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, obuf, sizeof(obuf)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)); r = 0; out: ssh_digest_free(hashctx); explicit_bzero(hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)); explicit_bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)); explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf)); return r; } #endif #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len) { fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr); } #endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kex.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kex.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kex.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,230 +1,233 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.73 2015/07/30 00:01:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.76 2016/02/08 10:57:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef KEX_H #define KEX_H #include "mac.h" #include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #ifdef WITH_LEAKMALLOC #include "leakmalloc.h" #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16 #define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" #define KEX_DH14 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" #define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" #define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" -#define KEX_RESUME "resume@appgate.com" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256 "ecdh-sha2-nistp256" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384 "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521 "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" #define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256 "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" #define COMP_NONE 0 #define COMP_ZLIB 1 #define COMP_DELAYED 2 #define CURVE25519_SIZE 32 enum kex_init_proposals { PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS, PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC, PROPOSAL_MAX }; enum kex_modes { MODE_IN, MODE_OUT, MODE_MAX }; enum kex_exchange { KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, KEX_C25519_SHA256, KEX_MAX }; #define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001 struct sshenc { char *name; const struct sshcipher *cipher; int enabled; u_int key_len; u_int iv_len; u_int block_size; u_char *key; u_char *iv; }; struct sshcomp { u_int type; int enabled; char *name; }; struct newkeys { struct sshenc enc; struct sshmac mac; struct sshcomp comp; }; struct ssh; struct kex { u_char *session_id; size_t session_id_len; struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; u_int we_need; u_int dh_need; int server; char *name; + char *hostkey_alg; int hostkey_type; int hostkey_nid; u_int kex_type; - int roaming; + int rsa_sha2; + int ext_info_c; struct sshbuf *my; struct sshbuf *peer; sig_atomic_t done; u_int flags; int hash_alg; int ec_nid; char *client_version_string; char *server_version_string; char *failed_choice; int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *(*load_host_private_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); int (*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); - int (*sign)(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, - u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, u_int); + int (*sign)(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); int (*kex[KEX_MAX])(struct ssh *); /* kex specific state */ DH *dh; /* DH */ u_int min, max, nbits; /* GEX */ EC_KEY *ec_client_key; /* ECDH */ const EC_GROUP *ec_group; /* ECDH */ u_char c25519_client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */ u_char c25519_client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */ }; int kex_names_valid(const char *); char *kex_alg_list(char); char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); int kex_assemble_names(const char *, char **); int kex_new(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **); int kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *); void kex_free(struct kex *); int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *, int *, char ***); int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]); void kex_prop_free(char **); int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *); int kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, void *); +int kex_input_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *); int kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const BIGNUM *); int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *); +int kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *); int kexdh_client(struct ssh *); int kexdh_server(struct ssh *); int kexgex_client(struct ssh *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *); int kexecdh_client(struct ssh *); int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *); int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *); int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *); int kex_dh_hash(const char *, const char *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *); int kexgex_hash(int, const char *, const char *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, int, int, int, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *); int kex_ecdh_hash(int, const EC_GROUP *, const char *, const char *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *); int kex_c25519_hash(int, const char *, const char *, const char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, const u_char *, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t *); void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); int kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); int derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]); #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int); #endif #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) || !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #endif #endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,159 +1,159 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.9 2015/04/27 00:37:53 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.10 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved. * * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" static int input_kex_c25519_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *ssh) { debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_c25519_init); return 0; } static int input_kex_c25519_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public; struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; u_char *client_pubkey = NULL; u_char server_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen; int r; /* generate private key */ kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pubkey); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("server private key:", server_key, sizeof(server_key)); #endif if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); if (server_host_public == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &client_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("client public key:", client_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(server_key, client_pubkey, shared_secret)) < 0) goto out; /* calc H */ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen)) != 0) goto out; hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kex_c25519_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, client_pubkey, server_pubkey, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen)) < 0) goto out; /* save session id := H */ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { kex->session_id_len = hashlen; kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); if (kex->session_id == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); } /* sign H */ - if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, - &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0) + if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, + &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0) goto out; /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_pubkey, sizeof(server_pubkey))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key)); free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); free(client_pubkey); sshbuf_free(shared_secret); return r; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,216 +1,216 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.22 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.23 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" static int input_kex_dh_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; /* generate server DH public key */ switch (kex->kex_type) { case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: kex->dh = dh_new_group1(); break; case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: kex->dh = dh_new_group14(); break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (kex->dh == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) goto out; debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, &input_kex_dh_init); r = 0; out: return r; } int input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private; u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t sbloblen, slen; size_t klen = 0, hashlen; int kout, r; if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); if (server_host_public == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; goto out; } /* key, cert */ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub)); #endif #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); #endif if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) { sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value"); r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; goto out; } klen = DH_size(kex->dh); if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); #endif if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen)) != 0) goto out; /* calc H */ hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, dh_client_pub, kex->dh->pub_key, shared_secret, hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; /* save session id := H */ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { kex->session_id_len = hashlen; kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); if (kex->session_id == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); } /* sign H */ - if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, - &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0) + if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, + &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0) goto out; /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */ /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); DH_free(kex->dh); kex->dh = NULL; if (dh_client_pub) BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); if (kbuf) { explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); free(kbuf); } if (shared_secret) BN_clear_free(shared_secret); free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,208 +1,208 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.14 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.15 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" static int input_kex_ecdh_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *ssh) { debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_ecdh_init); return 0; } static int input_kex_ecdh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; EC_POINT *client_public; EC_KEY *server_key = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; const EC_POINT *public_key; BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public; u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; u_char *kbuf = NULL; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t slen, sbloblen; size_t klen = 0, hashlen; int r; if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH fputs("server private key:\n", stderr); sshkey_dump_ec_key(server_key); #endif if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); if (server_host_public == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; goto out; } if ((client_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, client_public, group)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH fputs("client public key:\n", stderr); sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, client_public); #endif if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, client_public) != 0) { sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid client public key"); r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; goto out; } /* Calculate shared_secret */ klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, client_public, server_key, NULL) != (int)klen || BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen); #endif /* calc H */ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen)) != 0) goto out; hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash( kex->hash_alg, group, kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, client_public, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key), shared_secret, hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; /* save session id := H */ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { kex->session_id_len = hashlen; kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); if (kex->session_id == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); } /* sign H */ - if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, - &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0) + if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, + &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0) goto out; /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */ public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key); /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, public_key, group)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); if (kex->ec_client_key) { EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); kex->ec_client_key = NULL; } if (server_key) EC_KEY_free(server_key); if (kbuf) { explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); free(kbuf); } if (shared_secret) BN_clear_free(shared_secret); free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); return r; } #endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,254 +1,254 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.25 2015/04/13 02:04:08 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.26 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "compat.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, void *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, &input_kex_dh_gex_request); debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST"); return 0; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; kex->nbits = nbits; kex->min = min; kex->max = max; min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || kex->max < kex->nbits) { r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; goto out; } /* Contact privileged parent */ kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); if (kex->dh == NULL) { sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent"); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->p)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->g)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) goto out; debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init); r = 0; out: return r; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private; u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t sbloblen, slen; size_t klen = 0, hashlen; int kout, r; if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); if (server_host_public == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; goto out; } /* key, cert */ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub)); #endif #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); #endif if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) { sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value"); r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; goto out; } klen = DH_size(kex->dh); if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); #endif if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen)) != 0) goto out; /* calc H */ hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kexgex_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g, dh_client_pub, kex->dh->pub_key, shared_secret, hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; /* save session id := H */ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { kex->session_id_len = hashlen; kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); if (kex->session_id == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); } /* sign H */ - if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, - &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0) + if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, + &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0) goto out; /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */ /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: DH_free(kex->dh); kex->dh = NULL; if (dh_client_pub) BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); if (kbuf) { explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); free(kbuf); } if (shared_secret) BN_clear_free(shared_secret); free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/key.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/key.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/key.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,426 +1,426 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.128 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.129 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #define SSH_KEY_NO_DEFINE #include "key.h" #include "compat.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" void key_add_private(Key *k) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } Key * key_new_private(int type) { Key *ret = NULL; if ((ret = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) fatal("%s: failed", __func__); return ret; } int key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp) { return sshkey_read(ret, cpp) == 0 ? 1 : -1; } int key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f) { return sshkey_write(key, f) == 0 ? 1 : 0; } Key * key_generate(int type, u_int bits) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return ret; } void key_cert_copy(const Key *from_key, Key *to_key) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(from_key, to_key)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } Key * key_from_private(const Key *k) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &ret)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return ret; } static void fatal_on_fatal_errors(int r, const char *func, int extra_fatal) { if (r == SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR || r == SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL || (extra_fatal != 0 && r == extra_fatal)) fatal("%s: %s", func, ssh_err(r)); } Key * key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ret)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } return ret; } int key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) { u_char *blob; size_t blen; int r; if (blobp != NULL) *blobp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } if (blen > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: giant len %zu", __func__, blen); if (blobp != NULL) *blobp = blob; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = blen; return blen; } int key_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) + const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *alg) { int r; u_char *sig; size_t siglen; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &siglen, - data, datalen, datafellows)) != 0) { + data, datalen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } if (siglen > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: giant len %zu", __func__, siglen); if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = sig; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = siglen; return 0; } int key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen, datafellows)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return r == SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID ? 0 : -1; } return 1; } Key * key_demote(const Key *k) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_demote(k, &ret)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return ret; } int key_to_certified(Key *k) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(k)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } return 0; } int key_drop_cert(Key *k) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(k)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } return 0; } int key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_certify(k, ca)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } return 0; } int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal, const char *name, const char **reason) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(k, want_host, require_principal, name, reason)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } return 0; } #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, public)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } return 0; } int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(key)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } return 0; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ void key_private_serialize(const Key *key, struct sshbuf *b) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, b)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } Key * key_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *blob) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(blob, &ret)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } return ret; } /* authfile.c */ int key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_save_private(key, filename, passphrase, comment, force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } return 1; } int key_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *blob) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, blob)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } return 1; } Key * key_load_cert(const char *filename) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &ret)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); else error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } return ret; } Key * key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &ret, commentp)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); else error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } return ret; } Key * key_load_private(const char *path, const char *passphrase, char **commentp) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, passphrase, &ret, commentp)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); else error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } return ret; } Key * key_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, int *perm_ok) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_load_private_cert(type, filename, passphrase, &ret, perm_ok)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); else error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } return ret; } Key * key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, char **commentp, int *perm_ok) { int r; Key *ret = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename, passphrase, &ret, commentp, perm_ok)) != 0) { fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); else error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } return ret; } int key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) { return sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) == 0 ? 1 : 0; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/key.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/key.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/key.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,104 +1,105 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.48 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.49 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef KEY_H #define KEY_H #include "sshkey.h" typedef struct sshkey Key; #define types sshkey_types #define fp_type sshkey_fp_type #define fp_rep sshkey_fp_rep #ifndef SSH_KEY_NO_DEFINE #define key_new sshkey_new #define key_free sshkey_free #define key_equal_public sshkey_equal_public #define key_equal sshkey_equal #define key_type sshkey_type #define key_cert_type sshkey_cert_type #define key_ssh_name sshkey_ssh_name #define key_ssh_name_plain sshkey_ssh_name_plain #define key_type_from_name sshkey_type_from_name #define key_ecdsa_nid_from_name sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name #define key_type_is_cert sshkey_type_is_cert #define key_size sshkey_size #define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid #define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid #define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert #define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain #define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid #define key_curve_nid_to_bits sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits #define key_curve_nid_to_name sshkey_curve_nid_to_name #define key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg #define key_dump_ec_point sshkey_dump_ec_point #define key_dump_ec_key sshkey_dump_ec_key #endif void key_add_private(Key *); Key *key_new_private(int); void key_free(Key *); Key *key_demote(const Key *); int key_write(const Key *, FILE *); int key_read(Key *, char **); Key *key_generate(int, u_int); Key *key_from_private(const Key *); int key_to_certified(Key *); int key_drop_cert(Key *); int key_certify(Key *, Key *); void key_cert_copy(const Key *, Key *); int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *, const char **); char *key_alg_list(int, int); #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *); #endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */ Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int); int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *); -int key_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int); +int key_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, + const char *); int key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); void key_private_serialize(const Key *, struct sshbuf *); Key *key_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *); /* authfile.c */ int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int); int key_load_file(int, const char *, struct sshbuf *); Key *key_load_cert(const char *); Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **); Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **); Key *key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *); Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *); int key_perm_ok(int, const char *); #endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/krl.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/krl.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/krl.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1303 +1,1298 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.33 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.37 2015/12/31 00:33:52 djm Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "digest.h" #include "bitmap.h" #include "krl.h" /* #define DEBUG_KRL */ #ifdef DEBUG_KRL # define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x #else # define KRL_DBG(x) #endif /* * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order. */ /* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */ struct revoked_serial { u_int64_t lo, hi; RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry; }; static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp); /* Tree of key IDs */ struct revoked_key_id { char *key_id; RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry; }; static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp); /* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */ struct revoked_blob { u_char *blob; size_t len; RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry; }; static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp); /* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */ struct revoked_certs { struct sshkey *ca_key; struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials; struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids; TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry; }; TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs); struct ssh_krl { u_int64_t krl_version; u_int64_t generated_date; u_int64_t flags; char *comment; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s; struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs; }; /* Return equal if a and b overlap */ static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b) { if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi) return 0; return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1; } static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b) { return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id); } static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b) { int r; if (a->len != b->len) { if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MIN(a->len, b->len))) != 0) return r; return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1; } else return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len); } struct ssh_krl * ssh_krl_init(void) { struct ssh_krl *krl; if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL) return NULL; RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys); RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s); TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs); return krl; } static void revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc) { struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs; struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki; RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); free(rs); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } sshkey_free(rc->ca_key); } void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb; struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc; if (krl == NULL) return; free(krl->comment); RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); revoked_certs_free(rc); } } void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version) { krl->krl_version = version; } int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment) { free(krl->comment); if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } /* * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already. */ static int revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create) { struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; *rcp = NULL; TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) || sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) { *rcp = rc; return 0; } } if (!allow_create) return 0; /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */ if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (ca_key == NULL) rc->ca_key = NULL; else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) { free(rc); return r; } RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials); RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__, ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key))); *rcp = rc; return 0; } static int insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs; KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi)); memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = lo; rs.hi = hi; ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs); if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) { /* No entry matches. Just insert */ if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs)); ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__)); /* Shouldn't happen */ free(irs); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ers = irs; } else { KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); /* * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the * existing entry. */ if (ers->lo > lo) ers->lo = lo; if (ers->hi < hi) ers->hi = hi; } /* * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones; * coalesce as necessary. */ /* Check predecessors */ while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->lo < ers->lo) { ers->lo = crs->lo; KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } /* Check successors */ while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->hi > ers->hi) { ers->hi = crs->hi; KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; if (lo > hi || lo == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) return r; return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id) { struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki; struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) return r; KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id)); if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL || (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) { free(rki); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); if (erki != NULL) { free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } return 0; } /* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */ static int plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen) { struct sshkey *kcopy; int r; if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0) return r; if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) { if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) { sshkey_free(kcopy); return r; } } r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen); sshkey_free(kcopy); return r; } /* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */ static int revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb; if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; rb->blob = blob; rb->len = len; erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb); if (erb != NULL) { free(rb->blob); free(rb); } return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { u_char *blob; size_t len; int r; debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0) return r; return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { u_char *blob; size_t len; int r; debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &len)) != 0) return r; return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_sha1s, blob, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) return ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key); if (key->cert->serial == 0) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->key_id); } else { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->serial); } } /* * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial. * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL. */ static int choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final, u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section) { int new_state; u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart; /* * Avoid unsigned overflows. * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations. */ contig = MIN(contig, 1ULL<<31); last_gap = MIN(last_gap, 1ULL<<31); next_gap = MIN(next_gap, 1ULL<<31); /* * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates. * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their * switching cost is independent of the current_state. */ cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0; cost_range = 8; switch (current_state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: cost_list = 8; cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: case 0: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; cost_list = 8; } /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */ cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64)); cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64)); /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */ cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8; cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8; /* Now pick the best choice */ *force_new_section = 0; new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; cost = cost_bitmap; if (cost_range < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE; cost = cost_range; } if (cost_list < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST; cost = cost_list; } if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; *force_new_section = 1; cost = cost_bitmap_restart; } KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:" "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, " "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig, (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final, (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state, *force_new_section ? " restart" : "")); return new_state; } static int put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap) { size_t len; u_char *blob; int r; len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap); if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) { free(blob); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len); free(blob); return r; } /* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */ static int revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf) { int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0; struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs; struct revoked_key_id *rki; int next_state, state = 0; struct sshbuf *sect; struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */ if (rc->ca_key == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; } else { if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Store the revoked serials. */ for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials); rs != NULL; rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) { KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__, (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi, state)); /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */ nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); final = nrs == NULL; gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi; contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo); /* Choose next state based on these */ next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final, state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect); /* * If the current section is a range section or has a different * type to the next section, then finish it off now. */ if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state || state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) { KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state)); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) goto out; bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(sect); } /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */ if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) { KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, next_state)); state = next_state; sshbuf_reset(sect); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } bitmap_start = rs->lo; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, bitmap_start)) != 0) goto out; break; } } /* Perform section-specific processing */ switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0) goto out; } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap, rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } } break; } last = rs->hi; } /* Flush the remaining section, if any */ if (state != 0) { KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x", __func__, state)); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) goto out; bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__)); /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */ sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: bitmap_free(bitmap); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct revoked_certs *rc; struct revoked_blob *rb; struct sshbuf *sect; u_char *sblob = NULL; size_t slen, i; if (krl->generated_date == 0) krl->generated_date = time(NULL); if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Store the header */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0) goto out; /* Store sections for revoked certificates */ TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { sshbuf_reset(sect); if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */ sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) { KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i]))); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, - sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), 0)) != 0) + sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: free(sblob); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } static void format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts) { time_t t; struct tm *tm; t = timestamp; tm = localtime(&t); if (tm == NULL) strlcpy(ts, "", nts); else { *ts = '\0'; strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm); } } static int parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_char type; const u_char *blob; size_t blen, nbits; struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL; u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi; struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; char *key_id = NULL; struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL; if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Header: key, reserved */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) goto out; if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0) goto out; while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { - if (subsect != NULL) { - sshbuf_free(subsect); - subsect = NULL; - } + sshbuf_free(subsect); + subsect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type)); /* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */ switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial)) != 0) goto out; } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap); for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) { if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) { error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial)) continue; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0) goto out; } bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID: while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect, &key_id, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca_key, key_id)) != 0) goto out; free(key_id); key_id = NULL; } break; default: error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } r = 0; out: if (bitmap != NULL) bitmap_free(bitmap); free(key_id); sshkey_free(ca_key); sshbuf_free(subsect); return r; } /* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */ int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys) { struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL; struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; char timestamp[64]; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used; u_char type, *rdata = NULL; const u_char *blob; size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, rlen, blen, nca_used; u_int format_version; nca_used = 0; *krlp = NULL; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 || memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__); return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC; } /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0) goto out; if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp, *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment); /* * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified. */ sig_seen = 0; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) { if (sig_seen) { error("KRL contains non-signature section " "after signature"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Not interested for now. */ continue; } sig_seen = 1; /* First string component is the signing key */ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); /* Second string component is the signature itself */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen, - sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf) - sig_off, 0)) != 0) + sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */ for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) { error("KRL signed more than once with " "the same key"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ tmp_ca_used = reallocarray(ca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used)); if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } ca_used = tmp_ca_used; ca_used[nca_used++] = key; key = NULL; - break; } if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point * where the section start. */ sshbuf_free(copy); if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0) goto out; while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { - if (sect != NULL) { - sshbuf_free(sect); - sect = NULL; - } + sshbuf_free(sect); + sect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, §)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES: if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY: case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1: while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0) goto out; if (type == KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 && rlen != 20) { error("%s: bad SHA1 length", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = revoke_blob( type == KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY ? &krl->revoked_keys : &krl->revoked_sha1s, rdata, rlen)) != 0) goto out; rdata = NULL; /* revoke_blob frees rdata */ } break; case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE: /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */ sshbuf_reset(sect); sect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0) goto out; break; default: error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } - if (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { + if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { error("KRL section contains unparsed data"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */ sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0) sig_seen = 1; else { sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); ca_used[i] = NULL; } } if (nca_used && !sig_seen) { error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked"); r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; goto out; } /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */ if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) { sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) { for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) { if (ca_used[j] == NULL) continue; if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) { sig_seen = 1; break; } } } if (!sig_seen) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; error("KRL not signed with any trusted key"); goto out; } } *krlp = krl; r = 0; out: if (r != 0) ssh_krl_free(krl); for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); free(ca_used); free(rdata); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(copy); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } /* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */ static int is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc) { struct revoked_serial rs, *ers; struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki; /* Check revocation by cert key ID */ memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki)); rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id; erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki); if (erki != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } /* * Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the * CA doesn't specify one). */ if (key->cert->serial == 0) return 0; memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial; ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__, key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } return 0; } /* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */ static int is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { struct revoked_blob rb, *erb; struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } /* Next, explicit keys */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) return 0; /* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key, &rc, 0)) != 0) return r; if (rc != NULL) { if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) return r; } /* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0) return r; if (rc != NULL) { if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) return r; } KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { int r; KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__)); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0) return r; if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0) return r; } KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key) { struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL; struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; int oerrno = 0, r, fd; if (path == NULL) return 0; if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; oerrno = errno; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) { oerrno = errno; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key); out: close(fd); sshbuf_free(krlbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); if (r != 0) errno = oerrno; return r; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/krl.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/krl.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/krl.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,65 +1,64 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.4 2015/01/13 19:06:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.5 2015/12/30 23:46:14 djm Exp $ */ #ifndef _KRL_H #define _KRL_H /* Functions to manage key revocation lists */ #define KRL_MAGIC "SSHKRL\n\0" #define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1 /* KRL section types */ #define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1 #define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2 #define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3 #define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4 /* KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES subsection types */ #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22 #define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23 struct sshkey; struct sshbuf; struct ssh_krl; struct ssh_krl *ssh_krl_init(void); void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl); void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version); -void ssh_krl_set_sign_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *sign_key); int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment); int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial); int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi); int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id); int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys); int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys); int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key); #endif /* _KRL_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1726 +1,1729 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under * the the following license: * * Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, * advertising materials, and other materials related to such * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived * from this software without specific prior written permission. * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. */ /** ** loginrec.c: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval **/ /* * The new login code explained * ============================ * * This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording * (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval. * * Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a * union of all the useful fields in the various different types of * system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants. * * We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be * used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures * on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code * gets compiled here. * * The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular * recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so * many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in * the old code. * * For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as * these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems * this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably * in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back * to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method * requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing * information. These files and their access methods are very system * specific indeed. * * For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are * setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have * these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such * a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp * code should suffice. * * Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even * more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a * simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a * relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in * a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the * information separately at all. For systems in the latter category, * we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry * for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could * incur a significant performance penalty. * * Calling the new code * -------------------- * * In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in * login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c * program there are more examples. * * Internal handler calling method * ------------------------------- * * When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both * routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in, * or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which * calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf * selects for the local system. * * The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both * struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see * construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems * that introduce new features to either structure. * * While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar * code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to * write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining * support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is * a difficult and time-consuming task. * * Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog() * (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call * getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last * login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can, * otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0, * meaning "tilt". * * Maintenance * ----------- * * In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct * methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection * code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_ or CONF__FILE * symbols for the platform. * * Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying * configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself * with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.) * * Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful! */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "loginrec.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "packet.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "auth.h" #include "buffer.h" #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif /** ** prototypes for helper functions in this file **/ #if HAVE_UTMP_H void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut); void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut); #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut); void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut); #endif int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li); int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); extern Buffer loginmsg; /* pick the shortest string */ #define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2)) /** ** platform-independent login functions **/ /* * login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login * * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry() * * Returns: * >0 if successful * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) */ int login_login(struct logininfo *li) { li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN; return (login_write(li)); } /* * login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout * * Call as with login_login() * * Returns: * >0 if successful * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) */ int login_logout(struct logininfo *li) { li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT; return (login_write(li)); } /* * login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time * * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary * * Returns: * 0 on failure, or if user has never logged in * Time in seconds from the epoch if successful * * Useful preprocessor symbols: * DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog * info * USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog * facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set, * try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx. */ unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid) { struct logininfo li; if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid)) return (li.tv_sec); else return (0); } /* * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int) - Retrieve a lastlog entry * * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no * system lastlog information exists. * * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo. * * Returns: * >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) */ struct logininfo * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid) { struct passwd *pw; memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li)); li->uid = uid; /* * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see * wtmp_get_entry().) */ pw = getpwuid(uid); if (pw == NULL) fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %ld", __func__, (long)uid); if (strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)) >= sizeof(li->username)) { error("%s: username too long (%lu > max %lu)", __func__, (unsigned long)strlen(pw->pw_name), (unsigned long)sizeof(li->username) - 1); return NULL; } if (getlast_entry(li)) return (li); else return (NULL); } /* * login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*) - Allocate and initialise * a logininfo structure * * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info. * * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory * allocation fails, the program halts. */ struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username, const char *hostname, const char *line) { struct logininfo *newli; newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli)); login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line); return (newli); } /* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *) - free struct memory */ void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li) { free(li); } /* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*) * - initialise a struct logininfo * * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry * the information required to portably record login info. * * Returns: 1 */ int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username, const char *hostname, const char *line) { struct passwd *pw; memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li)); li->pid = pid; /* set the line information */ if (line) line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line)); if (username) { strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username)); pw = getpwnam(li->username); if (pw == NULL) { fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__, li->username); } li->uid = pw->pw_uid; } if (hostname) strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname)); return (1); } /* * login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *) - set the current time * * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for * time handling. */ void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li) { struct timeval tv; gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec; li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec; } /* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */ void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa, const unsigned int sa_size) { unsigned int bufsize = sa_size; /* make sure we don't overrun our union */ if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size) bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr); memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize); } /** ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf ** results **/ int login_write(struct logininfo *li) { #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (geteuid() != 0) { logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)"); return (1); } #endif /* set the timestamp */ login_set_current_time(li); #ifdef USE_LOGIN syslogin_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_LASTLOG if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN) lastlog_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_UTMP utmp_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_WTMP wtmp_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_UTMPX utmpx_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef USE_WTMPX wtmpx_write_entry(li); #endif #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN && !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line, &loginmsg)) logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN) audit_session_open(li); else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) audit_session_close(li); #endif return (0); } #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li) { li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN; login_set_current_time(li); # ifdef USE_UTMP utmp_write_entry(li); # endif # ifdef USE_WTMP wtmp_write_entry(li); # endif # ifdef USE_UTMPX utmpx_write_entry(li); # endif # ifdef USE_WTMPX wtmpx_write_entry(li); # endif return (0); } #endif /** ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login ** time. **/ /* take the uid in li and return the last login time */ int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li) { #ifdef USE_LASTLOG return(lastlog_get_entry(li)); #else /* !USE_LASTLOG */ #if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \ defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER) return (utmpx_get_entry(li)); #endif #if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG) /* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login * time, e.g. AIX */ return (0); # elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \ (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)) /* retrieve last login time from utmp */ return (wtmp_get_entry(li)); # elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \ (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)) /* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */ return (wtmpx_get_entry(li)); # else /* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */ return (0); # endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */ #endif /* USE_LASTLOG */ } /* * 'line' string utility functions * * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms: * * 1. The full filename (including '/dev') * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev') * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00 * /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 ) * * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok. */ /* * line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh) */ char * line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize) { memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5))) strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize); else { strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize); strlcat(dst, src, dstsize); } return (dst); } /* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */ char * line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize) { memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize); else strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize); return (dst); } /* * line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character) * form of the line (Just use the last characters of the * full name.) * * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero * termination */ char * line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize) { size_t len; memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); /* Always skip prefix if present */ if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) src += 5; #ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0) src += 3; #endif len = strlen(src); if (len > 0) { if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0) src += ((int)len - dstsize); /* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */ strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize); } return (dst); } /** ** utmp utility functions ** ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences ** into account. **/ #if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN) /* build the utmp structure */ void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { # if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP) ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec; ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec; # elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec; # endif } void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; # endif memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut)); /* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */ # ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id)); # endif # ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP /* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */ switch (li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; #ifdef _UNICOS cray_set_tmpdir(ut); #endif break; case LTYPE_LOGOUT: ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; #ifdef _UNICOS cray_retain_utmp(ut, li->pid); #endif break; } # endif set_utmp_time(li, ut); line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)); # ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP ut->ut_pid = li->pid; # endif /* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) return; /* * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank * for logouts. */ /* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */ strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username, MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username)); # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname)); # endif # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr; # endif # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa); memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16); if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) { ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3]; ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0; ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0; ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0; } } # endif } #endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */ /** ** utmpx utility functions ** ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system ** variations. **/ #if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX) /* build the utmpx structure */ void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { # if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX) utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec; utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec; # elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec; # endif } void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; # endif memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx)); # ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id)); # endif /* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */ switch (li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; break; case LTYPE_LOGOUT: utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; break; } line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line)); set_utmpx_time(li, utx); utx->ut_pid = li->pid; /* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */ strncpy(utx->ut_user, li->username, MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_user, li->username)); if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) return; /* * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank * for logouts. */ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname)); # endif # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr; # endif # ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa); memcpy(utx->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16); if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) { utx->ut_addr_v6[0] = utx->ut_addr_v6[3]; utx->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0; utx->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0; utx->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0; } } # endif # ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX /* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */ utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host)); # endif } #endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */ /** ** Low-level utmp functions **/ /* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */ #ifdef USE_UTMP /* if we can, use pututline() etc. */ # if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \ defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE) # define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY # endif /* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */ # ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY static int utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { setutent(); pututline(ut); # ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT endutent(); # endif return (1); } # else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */ /* * Write a utmp entry direct to the file * This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c */ static int utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { struct utmp old_ut; register int fd; int tty; /* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */ #if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT) struct ttyent *ty; tty=0; setttyent(); while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) { tty++; if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line))) break; } endttyent(); if (NULL == ty) { logit("%s: tty not found", __func__); return (0); } #else /* FIXME */ tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */ #endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */ if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) { off_t pos, ret; pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp); if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) { logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } if (ret != pos) { logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s", __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE); close(fd); return (0); } /* * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host. * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line. */ if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) && (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') && (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) && (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0)) memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host)); if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) { logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } if (ret != pos) { logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s", __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE); close(fd); return (0); } if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) { logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__, UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } close(fd); return (1); } else { return (0); } } # endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */ static int utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp ut; construct_utmp(li, &ut); # ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__); return (0); } # else if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__); return (0); } # endif return (1); } static int utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp ut; construct_utmp(li, &ut); # ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__); return (0); } # else if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__); return (0); } # endif return (1); } int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (utmp_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (utmp_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } #endif /* USE_UTMP */ /** ** Low-level utmpx functions **/ /* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */ #ifdef USE_UTMPX /* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */ # if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \ defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE) # define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY # endif /* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */ # ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY static int utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { setutxent(); pututxline(utx); # ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT endutxent(); # endif return (1); } # else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */ /* write a utmp entry direct to the file */ static int utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__); return (0); } # endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */ static int utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx utx; construct_utmpx(li, &utx); # ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__); return (0); } # else if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) { logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__); return (0); } # endif return (1); } static int utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx utx; construct_utmpx(li, &utx); # ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id)); # endif # ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; # endif # ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY utmpx_write_library(li, &utx); # else utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx); # endif return (1); } int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (utmpx_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (utmpx_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } #endif /* USE_UTMPX */ /** ** Low-level wtmp functions **/ #ifdef USE_WTMP /* * Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c */ static int wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { struct stat buf; int fd, ret = 1; if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) { logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0) if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) { ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size); logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); ret = 0; } close(fd); return (ret); } static int wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp ut; construct_utmp(li, &ut); return (wtmp_write(li, &ut)); } static int wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp ut; construct_utmp(li, &ut); return (wtmp_write(li, &ut)); } int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (wtmp_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (wtmp_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } /* * Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx * * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank * username on a given tty line. However, some systems (HP-UX is one) * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS. * * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.) * * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also, * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in * place and not have ut_type. */ /* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */ static int wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) { if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name, MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) { # ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS) return (1); # else return (1); # endif } return (0); } int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct stat st; struct utmp ut; int fd, found = 0; /* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */ li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0; if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) { /* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */ close(fd); return (0); } while (!found) { if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) { logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__, WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); close (fd); return (0); } if (wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) { found = 1; /* * We've already checked for a time in struct * utmp, in login_getlast() */ # ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time; # else # if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec; # endif # endif line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line, MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line)); # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host)); # endif continue; } /* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) { /* We've found the start of the file, so quit */ close(fd); return (0); } } /* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */ close(fd); return (1); } # endif /* USE_WTMP */ /** ** Low-level wtmpx functions **/ #ifdef USE_WTMPX /* * Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c */ static int wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { #ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX struct stat buf; int fd, ret = 1; if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) { logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0) if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) { ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size); logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); ret = 0; } close(fd); return (ret); #else updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx); return (1); #endif } static int wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx utx; construct_utmpx(li, &utx); return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx)); } static int wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx utx; construct_utmpx(li, &utx); return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx)); } int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (wtmpx_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } /* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the next two functions */ /* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */ static int wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) { if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_user, MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_user)) == 0 ) { # ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS) return (1); # else return (1); # endif } return (0); } int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct stat st; struct utmpx utx; int fd, found=0; /* Clear the time entries */ li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0; if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return (0); } /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) { /* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */ close(fd); return (0); } while (!found) { if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) { logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__, WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); close (fd); return (0); } /* * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular * line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx */ if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) { found = 1; # if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX) li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec; # elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time; # endif line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line)); # if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX) strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host)); # endif continue; } if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) { close(fd); return (0); } } close(fd); return (1); } #endif /* USE_WTMPX */ /** ** Low-level libutil login() functions **/ #ifdef USE_LOGIN static int syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmp *ut; ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut)); construct_utmp(li, ut); login(ut); free(ut); return (1); } static int syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) { # ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT char line[UT_LINESIZE]; (void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line)); if (!logout(line)) logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__); # ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP else logwtmp(line, "", ""); # endif /* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have * login, but no logout? what if logout but no logwtmp? All * routines are in libutil so they should all be there, * but... */ # endif return (1); } int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch (li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return (syslogin_perform_login(li)); case LTYPE_LOGOUT: return (syslogin_perform_logout(li)); default: logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } #endif /* USE_LOGIN */ /* end of file log-syslogin.c */ /** ** Low-level lastlog functions **/ #ifdef USE_LASTLOG #if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME) /* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */ static int lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode) { off_t offset; char lastlog_file[1024]; struct stat st; if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) { logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s", LASTLOG_FILE, li->username); } else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file)); } else { logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE); return (0); } *fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600); if (*fd < 0) { debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__, lastlog_file, strerror(errno)); return (0); } if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { /* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */ offset = (off_t) ((u_long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog)); if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) { logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__, lastlog_file, strerror(errno)); close(*fd); return (0); } } return (1); } #endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ #ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */ default: logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field"); return 0; } } #else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */ int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct lastlog last; int fd; switch(li->type) { case LTYPE_LOGIN: /* create our struct lastlog */ memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last)); line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line)); strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname)); last.ll_time = li->tv_sec; if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT)) return (0); /* write the entry */ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) { close(fd); logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); } close(fd); return (1); default: logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__); return (0); } } #endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */ #ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct lastlogx l, *ll; if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) { memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l)); ll = &l; } line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line)); strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host)); li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec; li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec; return (1); } #else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct lastlog last; int fd, ret; if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY)) return (0); ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last)); close(fd); switch (ret) { case 0: memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last)); /* FALLTHRU */ case sizeof(last): line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line)); strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host)); li->tv_sec = last.ll_time; return (1); case -1: error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); return (0); default: error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d", __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret); return (0); } /* NOTREACHED */ return (0); } #endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ #endif /* USE_LASTLOG */ #if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \ defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER) int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) { struct utmpx *utx; if (setutxdb(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN, NULL) != 0) return (0); utx = getutxuser(li->username); if (utx == NULL) { endutxent(); return (0); } line_fullname(li->line, utx->ut_line, MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, utx->ut_line)); strlcpy(li->hostname, utx->ut_host, MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx->ut_host)); li->tv_sec = utx->ut_tv.tv_sec; li->tv_usec = utx->ut_tv.tv_usec; endutxent(); return (1); } #endif /* USE_UTMPX && HAVE_SETUTXDB && UTXDB_LASTLOGIN && HAVE_GETUTXUSER */ #ifdef USE_BTMP /* * Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists. * The most common login failure is to give password instead of username. * So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that * only root can read it. */ void record_failed_login(const char *username, const char *hostname, const char *ttyn) { int fd; struct utmp ut; struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from); struct sockaddr_in *a4; struct sockaddr_in6 *a6; time_t t; struct stat fst; if (geteuid() != 0) return; if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) { debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP, strerror(errno)); return; } if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) { logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if((fst.st_mode & (S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){ logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s", _PATH_BTMP); goto out; } memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut)); /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user)); strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line)); time(&t); ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */ ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; ut.ut_pid = getpid(); /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host)); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket() && getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) { ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) { a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from; memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr), MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr)); } #ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) { a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from; memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr), MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr)); } #endif } if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP, strerror(errno)); out: close(fd); } #endif /* USE_BTMP */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/misc.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/misc.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/misc.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1117 +1,1121 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.97 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.101 2016/01/20 09:22:39 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #include #endif #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" /* remove newline at end of string */ char * chop(char *s) { char *t = s; while (*t) { if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') { *t = '\0'; return s; } t++; } return s; } /* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */ int set_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); if (val < 0) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (val & O_NONBLOCK) { debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd); val |= O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } int unset_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); if (val < 0) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd); val &= ~O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } const char * ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr) { if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0) return strerror(errno); return gai_strerror(gaierr); } /* disable nagle on socket */ void set_nodelay(int fd) { int opt; socklen_t optlen; optlen = sizeof opt; if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return; } if (opt == 1) { debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd); return; } opt = 1; debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd); if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1) error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } /* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" #define QUOTE "\"" /* return next token in configuration line */ char * strdelim(char **s) { char *old; int wspace = 0; if (*s == NULL) return NULL; old = *s; *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE QUOTE "="); if (*s == NULL) return (old); if (*s[0] == '\"') { memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */ /* Find matching quote */ if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) { return (NULL); /* no matching quote */ } else { *s[0] = '\0'; *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } } /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */ if (*s[0] == '=') wspace = 1; *s[0] = '\0'; /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace) *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } struct passwd * pwcopy(struct passwd *pw) { struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy)); copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos); #endif copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); #endif copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); return copy; } /* * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number. * Port must be >=0 and <=65535. * Return -1 if invalid. */ int a2port(const char *s) { long long port; const char *errstr; port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return -1; return (int)port; } int a2tun(const char *s, int *remote) { const char *errstr = NULL; char *sp, *ep; int tun; if (remote != NULL) { *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; sp = xstrdup(s); if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) { free(sp); return (a2tun(s, NULL)); } ep[0] = '\0'; ep++; *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL); tun = a2tun(sp, NULL); free(sp); return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun); } if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0) return (SSH_TUNID_ANY); tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return (SSH_TUNID_ERR); return (tun); } #define SECONDS 1 #define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60) #define HOURS (MINUTES * 60) #define DAYS (HOURS * 24) #define WEEKS (DAYS * 7) /* * Convert a time string into seconds; format is * a sequence of: * time[qualifier] * * Valid time qualifiers are: * seconds * s|S seconds * m|M minutes * h|H hours * d|D days * w|W weeks * * Examples: * 90m 90 minutes * 1h30m 90 minutes * 2d 2 days * 1w 1 week * * Return -1 if time string is invalid. */ long convtime(const char *s) { long total, secs; const char *p; char *endp; errno = 0; total = 0; p = s; if (p == NULL || *p == '\0') return -1; while (*p) { secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10); if (p == endp || (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) || secs < 0) return -1; switch (*endp++) { case '\0': endp--; break; case 's': case 'S': break; case 'm': case 'M': secs *= MINUTES; break; case 'h': case 'H': secs *= HOURS; break; case 'd': case 'D': secs *= DAYS; break; case 'w': case 'W': secs *= WEEKS; break; default: return -1; } total += secs; if (total < 0) return -1; p = endp; } return total; } /* * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string. * Caller must free returned string. */ char * put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port) { char *hoststr; if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) return(xstrdup(host)); if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0) fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno)); debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr); return hoststr; } /* * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports. * Argument may be modified (for termination). * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds. * *cp is set to the start of the next delimiter, if one was found. * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL. */ char * hpdelim(char **cp) { char *s, *old; if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL) return NULL; old = s = *cp; if (*s == '[') { if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL) return NULL; else s++; } else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL) s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */ switch (*s) { case '\0': *cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/ break; case ':': case '/': *s = '\0'; /* terminate */ *cp = s + 1; break; default: return NULL; } return old; } char * cleanhostname(char *host) { if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') { host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0'; return (host + 1); } else return host; } char * colon(char *cp) { int flag = 0; if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ return NULL; if (*cp == '[') flag = 1; for (; *cp; ++cp) { if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[') flag = 1; if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag) return (cp+1); if (*cp == ':' && !flag) return (cp); if (*cp == '/') return NULL; } return NULL; } /* function to assist building execv() arguments */ void addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; u_int nalloc; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal("addargs: argument too long"); nalloc = args->nalloc; if (args->list == NULL) { nalloc = 32; args->num = 0; } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc) nalloc *= 2; args->list = xreallocarray(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); args->nalloc = nalloc; args->list[args->num++] = cp; args->list[args->num] = NULL; } void replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal("replacearg: argument too long"); if (which >= args->num) fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d", which, args->num); free(args->list[which]); args->list[which] = cp; } void freeargs(arglist *args) { u_int i; if (args->list != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++) free(args->list[i]); free(args->list); args->nalloc = args->num = 0; args->list = NULL; } } /* * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc. * Warning: this calls getpw*. */ char * tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid) { const char *path, *sep; char user[128], *ret; struct passwd *pw; u_int len, slash; if (*filename != '~') return (xstrdup(filename)); filename++; path = strchr(filename, '/'); if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */ slash = path - filename; if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long"); memcpy(user, filename, slash); user[slash] = '\0'; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user); } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid); /* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */ len = strlen(pw->pw_dir); if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/') sep = "/"; else sep = ""; /* Skip leading '/' from specified path */ if (path != NULL) filename = path + 1; if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long"); return (ret); } /* * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory * allocated by xmalloc. */ char * percent_expand(const char *string, ...) { #define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16 u_int num_keys, i, j; struct { const char *key; const char *repl; } keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS]; char buf[4096]; va_list ap; /* Gather keys */ va_start(ap, string); for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) { keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL) break; keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL) fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__); } if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL) fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__); va_end(ap); /* Expand string */ *buf = '\0'; for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) { if (*string != '%') { append: buf[i++] = *string; if (i >= sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: string too long", __func__); buf[i] = '\0'; continue; } string++; /* %% case */ if (*string == '%') goto append; + if (*string == '\0') + fatal("%s: invalid format", __func__); for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) { if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) { i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf)); if (i >= sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: string too long", __func__); break; } } if (j >= num_keys) fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string); } return (xstrdup(buf)); #undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS } /* * Read an entire line from a public key file into a static buffer, discarding * lines that exceed the buffer size. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz, u_long *lineno) { while (fgets(buf, bufsz, f) != NULL) { if (buf[0] == '\0') continue; (*lineno)++; if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n' || feof(f)) { return 0; } else { debug("%s: %s line %lu exceeds size limit", __func__, filename, *lineno); /* discard remainder of line */ while (fgetc(f) != '\n' && !feof(f)) ; /* nothing */ } } return -1; } int tun_open(int tun, int mode) { #if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN) return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode)); #elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD) struct ifreq ifr; char name[100]; int fd = -1, sock; + const char *tunbase = "tun"; + if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) + tunbase = "tap"; + /* Open the tunnel device */ if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) { - snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun); + snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun); fd = open(name, O_RDWR); } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) { for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) { - snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun); + snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", + tunbase, tun); if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0) break; } } else { debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun); - return (-1); + return -1; } if (fd < 0) { - debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno)); - return (-1); + debug("%s: %s open: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno)); + return -1; } debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd); - /* Set the tunnel device operation mode */ - snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "tun%d", tun); + /* Bring interface up if it is not already */ + snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) goto failed; - if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) + if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) { + debug("%s: get interface %s flags: %s", __func__, + ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno)); goto failed; + } - /* Set interface mode */ - ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_UP; - if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) - ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_LINK0; - else - ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_LINK0; - if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) - goto failed; + if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) { + ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP; + if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) { + debug("%s: activate interface %s: %s", __func__, + ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno)); + goto failed; + } + } - /* Bring interface up */ - ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP; - if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) - goto failed; - close(sock); - return (fd); + return fd; failed: if (fd >= 0) close(fd); if (sock >= 0) close(sock); - debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name, - mode, strerror(errno)); - return (-1); + return -1; #else error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform"); return (-1); #endif } void sanitise_stdfd(void) { int nullfd, dupfd; if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } while (++dupfd <= 2) { /* Only clobber closed fds */ if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL, 0) >= 0) continue; if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } } if (nullfd > 2) close(nullfd); } char * tohex(const void *vp, size_t l) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; char b[3], *r; size_t i, hl; if (l > 65536) return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536"); hl = l * 2 + 1; r = xcalloc(1, hl); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]); strlcat(r, b, hl); } return (r); } u_int64_t get_u64(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int64_t v; v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56; v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48; v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40; v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32; v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24; v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16; v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8; v |= (u_int64_t)p[7]; return (v); } u_int32_t get_u32(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int32_t v; v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24; v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16; v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8; v |= (u_int32_t)p[3]; return (v); } u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int32_t v; v = (u_int32_t)p[0]; v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8; v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16; v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24; return (v); } u_int16_t get_u16(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int16_t v; v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8; v |= (u_int16_t)p[1]; return (v); } void put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff; p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; } void put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms) { struct timeval diff, finish; gettimeofday(&finish, NULL); timersub(&finish, start, &diff); *ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000); } void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms) { if (ms < 0) ms = 0; tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000; tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000; } time_t monotime(void) { #if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && \ (defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)) struct timespec ts; static int gettime_failed = 0; if (!gettime_failed) { #if defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) == 0) return (ts.tv_sec); #endif #if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0) return (ts.tv_sec); #endif debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno)); gettime_failed = 1; } #endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (CLOCK_MONOTONIC || CLOCK_BOOTTIME */ return time(NULL); } void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen) { bw->buflen = buflen; bw->rate = kbps; bw->thresh = bw->rate; bw->lamt = 0; timerclear(&bw->bwstart); timerclear(&bw->bwend); } /* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */ void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len) { u_int64_t waitlen; struct timespec ts, rm; if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) { gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL); return; } bw->lamt += read_len; if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh) return; gettimeofday(&bw->bwend, NULL); timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend); if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend)) return; bw->lamt *= 8; waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate; bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L; bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L; if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) { timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend); /* Adjust the wait time */ if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) { bw->thresh /= 2; if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4) bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4; } else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) { bw->thresh *= 2; if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8) bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8; } TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts); while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) break; ts = rm; } } bw->lamt = 0; gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL); } /* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */ void mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len) { const char *tmpdir; int r; if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) { r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len) return; } r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX"); if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len) fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__); } static const struct { const char *name; int value; } ipqos[] = { { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 }, { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 }, { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 }, { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 }, { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 }, { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 }, { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 }, { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 }, { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 }, { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 }, { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 }, { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 }, { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 }, { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 }, { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 }, { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 }, { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 }, { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF }, { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY }, { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT }, { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY }, { NULL, -1 } }; int parse_ipqos(const char *cp) { u_int i; char *ep; long val; if (cp == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0) return ipqos[i].value; } /* Try parsing as an integer */ val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255) return -1; return val; } const char * iptos2str(int iptos) { int i; static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"]; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (ipqos[i].value == iptos) return ipqos[i].name; } snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos); return iptos_str; } void lowercase(char *s) { for (; *s; s++) *s = tolower((u_char)*s); } int unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; int saved_errno, sock; memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("%s: \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", __func__, path); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return -1; } sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (unlink_first == 1) { if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT) error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno)); } if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); error("%s: cannot bind to path: %s", __func__, path); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (listen(sock, backlog) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); unlink(path); error("%s: cannot listen on path: %s", __func__, path); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } return sock; } void sock_set_v6only(int s) { -#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY +#if defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) int on = 1; debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s); if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno)); #endif } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/monitor.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/monitor.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/monitor.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2061 +1,2058 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.150 2015/06/22 23:42:16 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.157 2016/02/15 23:32:37 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef SKEY #include #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "key.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "dh.h" #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */ #undef TARGET_OS_MAC #include "zlib.h" #define TARGET_OS_MAC 1 #else #include "zlib.h" #endif #include "packet.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "monitor_mm.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" -#include "roaming.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef GSSAPI static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; #endif /* Imports */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_int utmp_len; extern u_char session_id[]; extern Buffer auth_debug; extern int auth_debug_init; extern Buffer loginmsg; /* State exported from the child */ static struct sshbuf *child_state; /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */ int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *); #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); #endif static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); static Authctxt *authctxt; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */ #endif /* local state for key verify */ static u_char *key_blob = NULL; static u_int key_bloblen = 0; static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; static char *hostbased_chost = NULL; static char *auth_method = "unknown"; static char *auth_submethod = NULL; static u_int session_id2_len = 0; static u_char *session_id2 = NULL; static pid_t monitor_child_pid; struct mon_table { enum monitor_reqtype type; int flags; int (*f)(int, Buffer *); }; #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */ #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */ #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */ #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */ #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE) #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, #ifdef USE_PAM {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, #endif #ifdef SKEY {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify}, #ifdef GSSAPI {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey}, {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response}, #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, #endif #ifdef SKEY {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond}, #endif #ifdef USE_PAM {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table *mon_dispatch; /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */ static void monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit) { while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; return; } ent++; } } static void monitor_permit_authentications(int permit) { struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch; while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; } ent++; } } void monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct mon_table *ent; int authenticated = 0, partial = 0; debug3("preauth child monitor started"); close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; authctxt = _authctxt; memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg; if (compat20) { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); } else { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1); } /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ while (!authenticated) { partial = 0; auth_method = "unknown"; auth_submethod = NULL; authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1); /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if (!compat20) fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported" "with SSH protocol 1"); if (authenticated && !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, auth_method, auth_submethod)) { debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__, auth_method); authenticated = 0; partial = 1; } } if (authenticated) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE)) fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d", __func__, ent->type); if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(auth_method)) authenticated = 0; #ifdef USE_PAM /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */ if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif } if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) { auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, auth_method, auth_submethod); if (!partial && !authenticated) authctxt->failures++; } } if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__); if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0) fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__); debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process", __func__, authctxt->user); mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ; close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; } static void monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid) { monitor_child_pid = pid; } static void monitor_child_handler(int sig) { kill(monitor_child_pid, sig); } void monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor) { close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid); signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler); #ifdef SIGXFSZ signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN); #endif if (compat20) { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); } else { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); } if (!no_pty_flag) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1); } for (;;) monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL); } void monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor) { if (options.compression) { /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */ mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback); } } /* Allocation functions for zlib */ static void * mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size) { - size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount; - void *address; - - if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size) + if (size == 0 || ncount == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size) fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size); - address = mm_malloc(mm, len); - - return (address); + return mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount); } static void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address) { mm_free(mm, address); } static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor) { Buffer logmsg; u_int len, level; char *msg; buffer_init(&logmsg); /* Read length */ buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) { if (errno == EPIPE) { buffer_free(&logmsg); debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; return -1; } fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg); if (len <= 4 || len > 8192) fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len); /* Read severity, message */ buffer_clear(&logmsg); buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Log it */ level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg); msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL); if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", __func__, level); do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg); buffer_free(&logmsg); free(msg); return 0; } int monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, struct mon_table **pent) { Buffer m; int ret; u_char type; struct pollfd pfd[2]; for (;;) { memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd)); pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd; pfd[0].events = POLLIN; pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd; pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN; if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) continue; fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if (pfd[1].revents) { /* * Drain all log messages before processing next * monitor request. */ monitor_read_log(pmonitor); continue; } if (pfd[0].revents) break; /* Continues below */ } buffer_init(&m); mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); type = buffer_get_char(&m); debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type); while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) break; ent++; } if (ent->f != NULL) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT)) fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__, type); ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); buffer_free(&m); /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) { debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__, type); ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; } if (pent != NULL) *pent = ent; return ret; } fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type); /* NOTREACHED */ return (-1); } /* allowed key state */ static int monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen) { /* make sure key is allowed */ if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen || timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen)) return (0); return (1); } static void monitor_reset_key_state(void) { /* reset state */ free(key_blob); free(hostbased_cuser); free(hostbased_chost); key_blob = NULL; key_bloblen = 0; key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; hostbased_cuser = NULL; hostbased_chost = NULL; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m) { DH *dh; int min, want, max; min = buffer_get_int(m); want = buffer_get_int(m); max = buffer_get_int(m); debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d", __func__, min, want, max); /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */ if (max < min || want < min || max < want) fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d", __func__, min, want, max); buffer_clear(m); dh = choose_dh(min, want, max); if (dh == NULL) { buffer_put_char(m, 0); return (0); } else { /* Send first bignum */ buffer_put_char(m, 1); buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p); buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g); DH_free(dh); } mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m); return (0); } #endif int mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */ struct sshkey *key; - struct sshbuf *sigbuf; - u_char *p; - u_char *signature; - size_t datlen, siglen; + struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; + u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL; + char *alg = NULL; + size_t datlen, siglen, alglen; int r, keyid, is_proof = 0; const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"; debug3("%s", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0) + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes), * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes). * * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey * proof. * * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too? * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather * than the full kex structure... */ if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) { /* * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what * the client sent us. */ if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */ fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen); if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid); if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2, - session_id2_len) != 0) || + session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0) fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key " "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) || memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0) fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu", __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf)); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); is_proof = 1; } /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */ if (session_id2_len == 0) { session_id2_len = datlen; session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len); } if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) { - if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, + if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL && auth_sock > 0) { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen, - p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) { + p, datlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) { fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } else fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid); debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__, is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(alg); free(p); free(signature); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m); /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); return (0); } /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *username; struct passwd *pwent; int allowed = 0; u_int i; debug3("%s", __func__); if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0) fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__); username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); pwent = getpwnamallow(username); authctxt->user = xstrdup(username); setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown"); free(username); buffer_clear(m); if (pwent == NULL) { buffer_put_char(m, 0); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); goto out; } allowed = 1; authctxt->pw = pwent; authctxt->valid = 1; buffer_put_char(m, 1); buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd)); buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name); buffer_put_cstring(m, "*"); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos); #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class); #endif buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir); buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell); out: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options)); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ if (options.x != NULL) \ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT /* Create valid auth method lists */ if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) { /* * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any * authentication to succeed. */ debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__); } debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */ if (!compat20) monitor_permit_authentications(1); else { /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1); #endif return (0); } int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *banner; buffer_clear(m); banner = auth2_read_banner(); buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : ""); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); free(banner); return (0); } int mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m) { monitor_permit_authentications(1); authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s", __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style); if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) { free(authctxt->style); authctxt->style = NULL; } return (0); } int mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m) { static int call_count; char *passwd; int authenticated; u_int plen; passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen); /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */ authenticated = options.password_authentication && auth_password(authctxt, passwd); explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); free(passwd); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); call_count++; if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1) auth_method = "none"; else auth_method = "password"; /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *name, *infotxt; u_int numprompts; u_int *echo_on; char **prompts; u_int success; success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1; buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, success); if (success) buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]); debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); if (success) { free(name); free(infotxt); free(prompts); free(echo_on); } return (0); } int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *response; int authok; - if (authctxt->as == 0) + if (authctxt->as == NULL) fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__); response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authok = options.challenge_response_authentication && auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0); authctxt->as = NULL; debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok); free(response); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authok); debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); if (compat20) { auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "bsdauth"; } else auth_method = "bsdauth"; return (authok != 0); } #endif #ifdef SKEY int mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m) { struct skey skey; char challenge[1024]; u_int success; success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge, sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1; buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, success); if (success) buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge); debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *response; int authok; response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication && authctxt->valid && skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 && skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1); free(response); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authok); debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m); - auth_method = "skey"; + auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; + auth_submethod = "skey"; return (authok != 0); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m) { if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); start_pam(authctxt); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m) { u_int ret; if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); ret = do_pam_account(); buffer_put_int(m, ret); buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); return (ret); } static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok; extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device; int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt); sshpam_authok = NULL; buffer_clear(m); if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1); buffer_put_int(m, 1); } else { buffer_put_int(m, 0); } mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL; u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on); if (ret == 0 && num == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL) ret = -1; buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, ret); buffer_put_cstring(m, name); free(name); buffer_put_cstring(m, info); free(info); buffer_put_int(m, num); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]); free(prompts[i]); buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]); } free(prompts); free(echo_on); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m) { char **resp; u_int i, num; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; num = buffer_get_int(m); if (num > 0) { resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) free(resp[i]); free(resp); } else { ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL); } buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, ret); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; if (ret == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt; debug3("%s", __func__); (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt); sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL; buffer_clear(m); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; return r; } #endif int mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key; char *cuser, *chost; u_char *blob; u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt; enum mm_keytype type = 0; int allowed = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); type = buffer_get_int(m); cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) || (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)) fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__); debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key); if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) { /* These should not make it past the privsep child */ if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__); switch (type) { case MM_USERKEY: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication && !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 && user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, pubkey_auth_attempt); pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); auth_method = "publickey"; if (options.pubkey_authentication && (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1)) auth_clear_options(); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 && hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); auth_method = "hostbased"; break; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case MM_RSAHOSTKEY: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */ allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1) auth_clear_options(); auth_method = "rsa"; break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type); break; } } if (key != NULL) key_free(key); /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */ monitor_reset_key_state(); if (allowed) { /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ key_blob = blob; key_bloblen = bloblen; key_blobtype = type; hostbased_cuser = cuser; hostbased_chost = chost; } else { /* Log failed attempt */ auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL); free(blob); free(cuser); free(chost); } debug3("%s: key %p is %s", __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, allowed); buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m); if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed); return (0); } static int monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer b; char *p, *userstyle; u_int len; int fail = 0; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, data, datalen); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { p = buffer_ptr(&b); len = buffer_len(&b); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len < session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len); } else { p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; free(p); } if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, p); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(p); buffer_skip_string(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { if (!buffer_get_char(&b)) fail++; } else { p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); if (!buffer_get_char(&b)) fail++; buffer_skip_string(&b); } buffer_skip_string(&b); if (buffer_len(&b) != 0) fail++; buffer_free(&b); return (fail == 0); } static int monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser, char *chost) { Buffer b; char *p, *userstyle; u_int len; int fail = 0; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, data, datalen); p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; free(p); if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, p); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(p); buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0) fail++; free(p); buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */ /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.') p[len - 1] = '\0'; if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* verify client user */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0) fail++; free(p); if (buffer_len(&b) != 0) fail++; buffer_free(&b); return (fail == 0); } int mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key; u_char *signature, *data, *blob; u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; int verified = 0; int valid_data = 0; blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if (key == NULL) fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__); switch (key_blobtype) { case MM_USERKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); break; default: valid_data = 0; break; } if (!valid_data) fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */ - if (verified == 1) + if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY) auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key); else key_free(key); free(blob); free(signature); free(data); auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased"; monitor_reset_key_state(); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, verified); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); return (verified == 1); } static void mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; if (options.use_login) return; /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } static void mm_session_close(Session *s) { debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } session_unused(s->self); } int mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; Session *s; int res, fd0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_clear(m); s = session_new(); if (s == NULL) goto error; s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid; res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)); if (res == 0) goto error; pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty); buffer_put_int(m, 1); buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty); /* We need to trick ttyslot */ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2", __func__); mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw); /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */ close(0); /* send messages generated by record_login */ buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg)); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 || mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0) fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (fd0 != 0) error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0); /* slave is not needed */ close(s->ttyfd); s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd; /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd); return (0); error: if (s != NULL) mm_session_close(s); buffer_put_int(m, 0); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m) { Session *s; char *tty; debug3("%s entering", __func__); tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) mm_session_close(s); buffer_clear(m); free(tty); return (0); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m) { BIGNUM *p; int rsafail; /* Turn off permissions */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(m, p); rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, rsafail); buffer_put_bignum2(m, p); BN_clear_free(p); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m); /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m) { int i; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (buffer_len(m) != 16) fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m); /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) { BIGNUM *client_n; Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob = NULL; u_int blen = 0; int allowed = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); auth_method = "rsa"; if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) { if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n); allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key); BN_clear_free(client_n); } buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, allowed); buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL); /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */ monitor_reset_key_state(); if (allowed && key != NULL) { key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen); /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ key_blob = blob; key_bloblen = blen; key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY; } if (key != NULL) key_free(key); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0); return (0); } int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob; u_int blen; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen); if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY) fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__); if (key->type != KEY_RSA) fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type); key->type = KEY_RSA1; if (ssh1_challenge) BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge); ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge); debug3("%s sending reply", __func__); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1); free(blob); key_free(key); return (0); } int mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob, *response; u_int blen, len; int success; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__); if (ssh1_challenge == NULL) fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen); if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY) fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__); response = buffer_get_string(m, &len); if (len != 16) fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__); success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response); free(blob); key_free(key); free(response); auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa"; /* reset state */ BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge); ssh1_challenge = NULL; monitor_reset_key_state(); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m); return (success); } #endif int mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; int res, status; debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__); /* The child is terminating */ session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) sshpam_cleanup(); #endif while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) exit(1); res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1; /* Terminate process */ exit(res); } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* Report that an audit event occurred */ int mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m) { ssh_audit_event_t event; debug3("%s entering", __func__); event = buffer_get_int(m); switch(event) { case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: case SSH_INVALID_USER: audit_event(event); break; default: fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event); } return (0); } int mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m) { u_int len; char *cmd; debug3("%s entering", __func__); cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); /* sanity check command, if so how? */ audit_run_command(cmd); free(cmd); return (0); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct kex *kex; int r; debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__); if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(child_state); child_state = NULL; - if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) { + if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) { /* XXX set callbacks */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; } /* Update with new address */ if (options.compression) { ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib, (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc, (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree); } } /* This function requries careful sanity checking */ void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, child_state); debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__); } /* XXX */ #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \ } while (0) static void monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds) { int pair[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_sendfd = pair[1]; if (do_logfds) { if (pipe(pair) == -1) fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1]; } else mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1; } #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536 struct monitor * monitor_init(void) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct monitor *mon; mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon)); monitor_openfds(mon, 1); /* Used to share zlib space across processes */ if (options.compression) { mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE); mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE); /* Compression needs to share state across borders */ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib, (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc, (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree); } return mon; } void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) { monitor_openfds(mon, 0); } #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_OID_desc goid; OM_uint32 major; u_int len; goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); goid.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid); free(goid.elements); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, major); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m); /* Now we have a context, enable the step */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_buffer_desc in; gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ u_int len; in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); in.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); free(in.value); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, major); buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length); buffer_put_int(m, flags); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out); if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); } return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic; OM_uint32 ret; u_int len; gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); gssbuf.length = len; mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); mic.length = len; ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic); free(gssbuf.value); free(mic.value); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, ret); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m); if (!GSS_ERROR(ret)) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m) { int authenticated; authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1089 +1,1089 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.85 2015/05/01 03:23:51 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.87 2016/01/14 16:17:40 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include "dh.h" #endif #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "packet.h" #include "mac.h" #include "log.h" #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */ #undef TARGET_OS_MAC #include "zlib.h" #define TARGET_OS_MAC 1 #else #include "zlib.h" #endif #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "misc.h" #include "uuencode.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "servconf.h" -#include "roaming.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* Imports */ extern int compat20; extern z_stream incoming_stream; extern z_stream outgoing_stream; extern struct monitor *pmonitor; extern Buffer loginmsg; extern ServerOptions options; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx) { Buffer log_msg; struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx; if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1) fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__); buffer_init(&log_msg); /* * Placeholder for packet length. Will be filled in with the actual * packet length once the packet has been constucted. This saves * fragile math. */ buffer_put_int(&log_msg, 0); buffer_put_int(&log_msg, level); buffer_put_cstring(&log_msg, msg); put_u32(buffer_ptr(&log_msg), buffer_len(&log_msg) - 4); if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd, buffer_ptr(&log_msg), buffer_len(&log_msg)) != buffer_len(&log_msg)) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&log_msg); } int mm_is_monitor(void) { /* * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and * points to the unprivileged child. */ return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0); } void mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m) { u_int mlen = buffer_len(m); u_char buf[5]; debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); put_u32(buf, mlen + 1); buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } void mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m) { u_char buf[4]; u_int msg_len; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { if (errno == EPIPE) cleanup_exit(255); fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } msg_len = get_u32(buf); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len); buffer_clear(m); buffer_append_space(m, msg_len); if (atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } void mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m) { u_char rtype; debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); mm_request_receive(sock, m); rtype = buffer_get_char(m); if (rtype != type) fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__, rtype, type); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL DH * mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) { BIGNUM *p, *g; int success = 0; Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, min); buffer_put_int(&m, nbits); buffer_put_int(&m, max); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, &m); success = buffer_get_char(&m); if (success == 0) fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g); debug3("%s: remaining %d", __func__, buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); return (dh_new_group(g, p)); } #endif int mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) + const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *hostkey_alg) { struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex; Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key, 0, active_state)); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, hostkey_alg); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, &m); *sigp = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp); buffer_free(&m); return (0); } struct passwd * mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username) { Buffer m; struct passwd *pw; u_int len, i; ServerOptions *newopts; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, username); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, &m); if (buffer_get_char(&m) == 0) { pw = NULL; goto out; } pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); if (len != sizeof(struct passwd)) fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__); pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); #endif pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); out: /* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */ newopts = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); if (len != sizeof(*newopts)) fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ if (newopts->x != NULL) \ newopts->x = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) \ newopts->x[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1); free(newopts); buffer_free(&m); return (pw); } char * mm_auth2_read_banner(void) { Buffer m; char *banner; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m); buffer_clear(&m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m); banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); /* treat empty banner as missing banner */ if (strlen(banner) == 0) { free(banner); banner = NULL; } return (banner); } /* Inform the privileged process about service and style */ void mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, service); buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : ""); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m); buffer_free(&m); } /* Do the password authentication */ int mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) { Buffer m; int authenticated = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, password); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, &m); authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated", __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt) { return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key, pubkey_auth_attempt)); } int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host, Key *key) { return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0)); } int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host, Key *key) { int ret; key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */ ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0); key->type = KEY_RSA1; return (ret); } int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int len; int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len)) return (0); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, type); buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : ""); buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : ""); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); buffer_put_int(&m, pubkey_auth_attempt); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m); allowed = buffer_get_int(&m); /* fake forced command */ auth_clear_options(); have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m); forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL; buffer_free(&m); return (allowed); } /* * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed * for authentication. */ int mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int len; int verified = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len)) return (0); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m); verified = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (verified); } void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct sshbuf *m; int r; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: get_state failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m); debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__); sshbuf_free(m); } int mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) { Buffer m; char *p, *msg; int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1; /* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */ if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__); if (tmp1 > 0) close(tmp1); if (tmp2 > 0) close(tmp2); return 0; } close(tmp1); close(tmp2); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (0); } p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */ free(p); buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg)); free(msg); if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || (*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__); /* Success */ return (1); } void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) { Buffer m; if (s->ttyfd == -1) return; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, &m); buffer_free(&m); /* closed dup'ed master */ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0) error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); /* unlink pty from session */ s->ttyfd = -1; } #ifdef USE_PAM void mm_start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, &m); buffer_free(&m); } u_int mm_do_pam_account(void) { Buffer m; u_int ret; char *msg; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); ret = buffer_get_int(&m); msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg)); free(msg); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret); return (ret); } void * mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer m; int success; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (NULL); } buffer_free(&m); return (authctxt); } int mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer m; u_int i; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, &m); ret = buffer_get_int(&m); debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret); *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); *info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); *num = buffer_get_int(&m); if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u", __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG); *prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int)); for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) { (*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); (*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m); } buffer_free(&m); return (ret); } int mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) { Buffer m; u_int i; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, num); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) buffer_put_cstring(&m, resp[i]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, &m); ret = buffer_get_int(&m); debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret); buffer_free(&m); return (ret); } void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) { Buffer m; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ /* Request process termination */ void mm_terminate(void) { Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num) { int rsafail; Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m); rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num); buffer_free(&m); return (rsafail); } #endif static void mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); (*echo_on)[0] = 0; } int mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer m; u_int success; char *challenge; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (-1); } /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); (*prompts)[0] = challenge; debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); return (0); } int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { Buffer m; int authok; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if (numresponses != 1) return (-1); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m); authok = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0); } #ifdef SKEY int mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer m; u_int success; char *challenge; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (-1); } /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT); free(challenge); return (0); } int mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { Buffer m; int authok; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if (numresponses != 1) return (-1); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, &m); authok = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0); } #endif /* SKEY */ void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16]) { Buffer m; int i; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey) { Buffer m; Key *key; u_char *blob; u_int blen; int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m); allowed = buffer_get_int(&m); /* fake forced command */ auth_clear_options(); have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m); forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL; if (allowed && rkey != NULL) { blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__); *rkey = key; free(blob); } buffer_free(&m); return (allowed); } BIGNUM * mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key) { Buffer m; BIGNUM *challenge; u_char *blob; u_int blen; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA1; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge); buffer_free(&m); return (challenge); } int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16]) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int blen; int success = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA1; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen); buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (success); } #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, event); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m); buffer_free(&m); } void mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid) { Buffer m; OM_uint32 major; /* Client doesn't get to see the context */ *ctx = NULL; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, goid->elements, goid->length); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (major); } OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in, gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flags) { Buffer m; OM_uint32 major; u_int len; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, in->value, in->length); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); out->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); out->length = len; if (flags) *flags = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (major); } OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) { Buffer m; OM_uint32 major; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length); buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return(major); } int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) { Buffer m; int authenticated = 0; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, &m); authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,108 +1,108 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.27 2015/05/01 03:23:51 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.29 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_ #define _MM_WRAP_H_ extern int use_privsep; #define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x) enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY}; struct monitor; struct mm_master; struct Authctxt; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *); int mm_is_monitor(void); DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); -int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int); +int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *); void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *, int); int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int); int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); #endif #ifdef USE_PAM void mm_start_pam(struct Authctxt *); u_int mm_do_pam_account(void); void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *); int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **); void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #include "audit.h" void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); #endif struct Session; void mm_terminate(void); int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t); void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *); /* SSHv1 interfaces */ void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char *); int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); /* Key export functions */ struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int); int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *); void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *); void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *); void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*); /* bsdauth */ int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); /* skey */ int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **); /* zlib allocation hooks */ void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *); #endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/mux.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/mux.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/mux.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2205 +1,2215 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.54 2015/08/19 23:18:26 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.58 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* ssh session multiplexing support */ /* * TODO: * - Better signalling from master to slave, especially passing of * error messages * - Better fall-back from mux slave error to new connection. * - ExitOnForwardingFailure * - Maybe extension mechanisms for multi-X11/multi-agent forwarding * - Support ~^Z in mux slaves. * - Inspect or control sessions in master. * - If we ever support the "signal" channel request, send signals on * sessions in master. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "key.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" /* from ssh.c */ extern int tty_flag; extern Options options; extern int stdin_null_flag; extern char *host; extern int subsystem_flag; extern Buffer command; extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; extern char *stdio_forward_host; extern int stdio_forward_port; /* Context for session open confirmation callback */ struct mux_session_confirm_ctx { u_int want_tty; u_int want_subsys; u_int want_x_fwd; u_int want_agent_fwd; Buffer cmd; char *term; struct termios tio; char **env; u_int rid; }; /* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */ struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx { u_int rid; }; /* Context for global channel callback */ struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx { u_int cid; /* channel id */ u_int rid; /* request id */ int fid; /* forward id */ }; /* fd to control socket */ int muxserver_sock = -1; /* client request id */ u_int muxclient_request_id = 0; /* Multiplexing control command */ u_int muxclient_command = 0; /* Set when signalled. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0; /* PID of multiplex server */ static u_int muxserver_pid = 0; static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL; struct mux_master_state { int hello_rcvd; }; /* mux protocol messages */ #define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001 #define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002 #define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004 #define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005 #define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006 #define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007 #define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008 #define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009 #define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001 #define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002 #define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003 #define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004 #define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005 #define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006 #define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007 #define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008 /* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */ #define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1 #define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2 #define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3 static void mux_session_confirm(int, int, void *); static void mux_stdio_confirm(int, int, void *); static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_new_session(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_alive_check(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_terminate(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_open_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_close_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_stop_listening(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static const struct { u_int type; int (*handler)(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); } mux_master_handlers[] = { { MUX_MSG_HELLO, process_mux_master_hello }, { MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, process_mux_new_session }, { MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, process_mux_alive_check }, { MUX_C_TERMINATE, process_mux_terminate }, { MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, process_mux_open_fwd }, { MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, process_mux_close_fwd }, { MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, process_mux_stdio_fwd }, { MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, process_mux_stop_listening }, { 0, NULL } }; /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused) { Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); c->ctl_chan = -1; cc->remote_id = -1; chan_rcvd_oclose(cc); } channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self); } /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused) { Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); if (c->remote_id != -1) { if ((sc = channel_by_id(c->remote_id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->remote_id); c->remote_id = -1; sc->ctl_chan = -1; if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) { debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self); chan_mark_dead(sc); } else { if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) chan_read_failed(sc); if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) chan_write_failed(sc); } } channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self); } /* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */ static int env_permitted(char *env) { int i, ret; char name[1024], *cp; if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env) return 0; ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env); if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) { error("env_permitted: name '%.100s...' too long", env); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++) if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i])) return 1; return 0; } /* Mux master protocol message handlers */ static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { u_int ver; struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; if (state == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self); if (state->hello_rcvd) { error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__); return -1; } if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ver, m) != 0) { malf: error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); return -1; } debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (buffer_len(m) > 0) { char *name = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL); char *value = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL); if (name == NULL || value == NULL) { free(name); free(value); goto malf; } debug2("Unrecognised slave extension \"%s\"", name); free(name); free(value); } state->hello_rcvd = 1; return 0; } static int process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { Channel *nc; struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx; char *reserved, *cmd, *cp; u_int i, j, len, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax; int new_fd[3]; /* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */ cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->term = NULL; cctx->rid = rid; cmd = reserved = NULL; cctx->env = NULL; env_len = 0; if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_tty, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_x_fwd, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_agent_fwd, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_subsys, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&escape_char, m) != 0 || (cctx->term = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL || (cmd = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL) { malf: free(cmd); free(reserved); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); free(cctx); error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } free(reserved); reserved = NULL; while (buffer_len(m) > 0) { #define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096 if ((cp = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL) goto malf; if (!env_permitted(cp)) { free(cp); continue; } cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2, sizeof(*cctx->env)); cctx->env[env_len++] = cp; cctx->env[env_len] = NULL; if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) { error(">%d environment variables received, ignoring " "additional", MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS); break; } } debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, " "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len); buffer_init(&cctx->cmd); buffer_append(&cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd)); free(cmd); cmd = NULL; /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", __func__, i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); buffer_free(&cctx->cmd); free(cctx); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->remote_id != -1) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); close(new_fd[2]); free(cctx->term); if (env_len != 0) { for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } buffer_free(&cctx->cmd); free(cctx); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } /* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */ if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1) error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); if (!isatty(new_fd[2])) set_nonblock(new_fd[2]); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (cctx->want_tty) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } nc = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) { channel_register_filter(nc->self, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char)); } debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_send_open(nc->self); channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } static int process_mux_alive_check(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_ALIVE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_int(r, (u_int)getpid()); return 0; } static int process_mux_terminate(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } quit_pending = 1; buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); /* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */ return 0; } static char * format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { char *ret; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *", (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype); } return ret; } static int compare_host(const char *a, const char *b) { if (a == NULL && b == NULL) return 1; if (a == NULL || b == NULL) return 0; return strcmp(a, b) == 0; } static int compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b) { if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host)) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path)) return 0; if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host)) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path)) return 0; if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port) return 0; return 1; } static void mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt; char *failmsg = NULL; struct Forward *rfwd; Channel *c; Buffer out; if ((c = channel_by_id(fctx->cid)) == NULL) { /* no channel for reply */ error("%s: unknown channel", __func__); return; } buffer_init(&out); if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards || (options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL && options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) { xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid); goto fail; } rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid]; debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__, type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) { rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int(); debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward" " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); buffer_put_int(&out, rfwd->allocated_port); channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); } goto out; } else { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1); if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, " "connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); free(rfwd->listen_host); free(rfwd->listen_path); free(rfwd->connect_host); free(rfwd->connect_path); memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd)); } fail: error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); buffer_put_cstring(&out, failmsg); free(failmsg); out: buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); buffer_free(&out); if (c->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause); c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ } static int process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { struct Forward fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; char *listen_addr, *connect_addr; u_int ftype; u_int lport, cport; int i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); /* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */ if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 || (listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 || (connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 || (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error("%s: malformed message", __func__); ret = -1; goto out; } if (*listen_addr == '\0') { free(listen_addr); listen_addr = NULL; } if (*connect_addr == '\0') { free(connect_addr); connect_addr = NULL; } memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = lport; if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; else fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; fwd.connect_port = cport; if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; else fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype); invalid: free(listen_addr); free(connect_addr); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Invalid forwarding request"); return 0; } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) { logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards " "are mutually exclusive", __func__); goto invalid; } if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) { logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__, fwd.listen_port); goto invalid; } if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536) || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) { logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__, fwd.connect_port); goto invalid; } if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) { logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__); goto invalid; } /* Skip forwards that have already been requested */ switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { exists: debug2("%s: found existing forwarding", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); goto out; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) { if (fwd.listen_port != 0) goto exists; debug2("%s: found allocated port", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_int(r, options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port); goto out; } } break; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) { debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); goto out; } } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { fail: logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Port forwarding failed"); goto out; } add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); freefwd = 0; } else { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx; fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd); if (fwd.handle < 0) goto fail; add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx)); fctx->cid = c->self; fctx->rid = rid; fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1; client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward, fctx); freefwd = 0; c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */ /* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */ goto out; } buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); out: free(fwd_desc); if (freefwd) { free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); free(fwd.connect_path); } return ret; } static int process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; const char *error_reason = NULL; char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL; u_int ftype; int i, ret = 0; u_int lport, cport; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 || (listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 || (connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 || (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error("%s: malformed message", __func__); ret = -1; goto out; } if (*listen_addr == '\0') { free(listen_addr); listen_addr = NULL; } if (*connect_addr == '\0') { free(connect_addr); connect_addr = NULL; } memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = lport; if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; else fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; fwd.connect_port = cport; if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; else fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); /* make sure this has been requested */ found_fwd = NULL; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i; break; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i; break; } } break; } if (found_fwd == NULL) error_reason = "port not forwarded"; else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) { /* * This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port * between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens. * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need * to use the actual listen port. */ if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(found_fwd) == -1) error_reason = "port not in permitted opens"; } else { /* local and dynamic forwards */ /* Ditto */ if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, fwd.connect_port, &options.fwd_opts) == -1) error_reason = "port not found"; } if (error_reason == NULL) { buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); free(found_fwd->listen_host); free(found_fwd->listen_path); free(found_fwd->connect_host); free(found_fwd->connect_path); found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL; found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL; found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0; } else { buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, error_reason); } out: free(fwd_desc); free(listen_addr); free(connect_addr); return ret; } static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { Channel *nc; char *reserved, *chost; u_int cport, i, j; int new_fd[2]; struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx; chost = reserved = NULL; if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || (chost = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0) { free(reserved); free(chost); error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } free(reserved); debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u", __func__, c->self, chost, cport); /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", __func__, i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); free(chost); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->remote_id != -1) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); free(chost); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ", chost, cport)) { debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->rid = rid; channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */ static void mux_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; Channel *c, *cc; Buffer reply; if (cctx == NULL) fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, id, c->ctl_chan); if (!success) { debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer"); goto done; } debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self); done: /* Send reply */ buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); buffer_free(&reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; free(cctx); } static int process_mux_stop_listening(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared " "connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) { channel_free(mux_listener_channel); client_stop_mux(); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; mux_listener_channel = NULL; muxserver_sock = -1; } /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); return 0; } /* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */ static int mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) { struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; Buffer in, out; const u_char *ptr; u_int type, rid, have, i; int ret = -1; /* Setup ctx and */ if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) { state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state)); c->mux_ctx = state; channel_register_cleanup(c->self, mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0); /* Send hello */ buffer_init(&out); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_MSG_HELLO); buffer_put_int(&out, SSHMUX_VER); /* no extensions */ buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); buffer_free(&out); debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self); return 0; } buffer_init(&in); buffer_init(&out); /* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */ if ((ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&c->input, &have)) == NULL) { malf: error("%s: malformed message", __func__); goto out; } buffer_append(&in, ptr, have); if (buffer_get_int_ret(&type, &in) != 0) goto malf; debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %u", __func__, c->self, type, buffer_len(&in)); if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO) rid = 0; else { if (!state->hello_rcvd) { error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), " "received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); goto out; } if (buffer_get_int_ret(&rid, &in) != 0) goto malf; } for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) { ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(rid, c, &in, &out); break; } } if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&out, rid); buffer_put_cstring(&out, "unsupported request"); ret = 0; } /* Enqueue reply packet */ if (buffer_len(&out) != 0) { buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); } out: buffer_free(&in); buffer_free(&out); return ret; } void mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval) { Buffer m; Channel *mux_chan; debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self, exitval); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE); buffer_put_int(&m, c->self); buffer_put_int(&m, exitval); buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); } void mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *c) { Buffer m; Channel *mux_chan; debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL); buffer_put_int(&m, c->self); buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); } /* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */ void muxserver_listen(void) { mode_t old_umask; char *orig_control_path = options.control_path; char rbuf[16+1]; u_int i, r; int oerrno; if (options.control_path == NULL || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) return; debug("setting up multiplex master socket"); /* * Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically * establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid * other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting * an unready socket. */ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) { r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10); rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r : (r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 : '0' + r - 26 - 26; } rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0'; options.control_path = NULL; xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf); debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path); old_umask = umask(0177); muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0); oerrno = errno; umask(old_umask); if (muxserver_sock < 0) { if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) { error("ControlSocket %s already exists, " "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path); disable_mux_master: if (muxserver_sock != -1) { close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; } free(orig_control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; return; } else { /* unix_listener() logs the error */ cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */ if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) { if (errno != EEXIST) { fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__, options.control_path, orig_control_path, strerror(errno)); } error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing", orig_control_path); unlink(options.control_path); goto disable_mux_master; } unlink(options.control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = orig_control_path; set_nonblock(muxserver_sock); mux_listener_channel = channel_new("mux listener", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, options.control_path, 1); mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb; debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__, mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock); } /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */ static void mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; const char *display; Channel *c, *cc; int i; Buffer reply; if (cctx == NULL) fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, id, c->ctl_chan); if (!success) { debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer"); goto done; } display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ - client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, + if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, - &proto, &data); - /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ - debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " - "spoofing."); - x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, - data, 1); - client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); - /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ + &proto, &data) == 0) { + /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ + debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " + "spoofing."); + x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, + data, 1); + /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ + client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", + CONFIRM_WARN); + } } if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); packet_send(); } client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env); debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self); done: /* Send reply */ buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); buffer_free(&reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; buffer_free(&cctx->cmd); free(cctx->term); if (cctx->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } free(cctx); } /* ** Multiplexing client support */ /* Exit signal handler */ static void control_client_sighandler(int signo) { muxclient_terminate = signo; } /* * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to * mux master. */ static void control_client_sigrelay(int signo) { int save_errno = errno; if (muxserver_pid > 1) kill(muxserver_pid, signo); errno = save_errno; } static int mux_client_read(int fd, Buffer *b, u_int need) { u_int have; ssize_t len; u_char *p; struct pollfd pfd; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLIN; p = buffer_append_space(b, need); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = read(fd, p + have, need - have); if (len < 0) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: return -1; } } if (len == 0) { errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (u_int)len; } return 0; } static int mux_client_write_packet(int fd, Buffer *m) { Buffer queue; u_int have, need; int oerrno, len; u_char *ptr; struct pollfd pfd; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLOUT; buffer_init(&queue); buffer_put_string(&queue, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m)); need = buffer_len(&queue); ptr = buffer_ptr(&queue); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { buffer_free(&queue); errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have); if (len < 0) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: oerrno = errno; buffer_free(&queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } } if (len == 0) { buffer_free(&queue); errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (u_int)len; } buffer_free(&queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_read_packet(int fd, Buffer *m) { Buffer queue; u_int need, have; const u_char *ptr; int oerrno; buffer_init(&queue); if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, 4) != 0) { if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE) debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&queue)); if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, need) != 0) { oerrno = errno; debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr(&queue, &have); buffer_append(m, ptr, have); buffer_free(&queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd) { Buffer m; u_int type, ver; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_MSG_HELLO); buffer_put_int(&m, SSHMUX_VER); /* no extensions */ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their HELLO */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) fatal("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); ver = buffer_get_int(&m); if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) fatal("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (buffer_len(&m) > 0) { char *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); char *value = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name); free(name); free(value); } buffer_free(&m); return 0; } static u_int mux_client_request_alive(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int pid, type, rid; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { buffer_free(&m); return 0; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) { e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); } if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); pid = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid); muxclient_request_id++; return pid; } static void mux_client_request_terminate(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int type, rid; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_TERMINATE); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { /* Remote end exited already */ if (errno == EPIPE) { buffer_free(&m); return; } fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e); default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } buffer_free(&m); muxclient_request_id++; } static int mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { Buffer m; char *e, *fwd_desc; u_int type, rid; fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd); debug("Requesting %s %s", cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc); free(fwd_desc); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); buffer_put_int(&m, ftype); if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->listen_path); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->listen_host == NULL ? "" : (*fwd->listen_host == '\0' ? "*" : fwd->listen_host)); } buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->listen_port); if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->connect_path); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->connect_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->connect_host); } buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->connect_port); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT: if (cancel_flag) fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__); fwd->allocated_port = buffer_get_int(&m); verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", fwd->allocated_port, fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "", fwd->connect_port); if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD) - fprintf(stdout, "%u\n", fwd->allocated_port); + fprintf(stdout, "%i\n", fwd->allocated_port); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e); return -1; default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } buffer_free(&m); muxclient_request_id++; return 0; } static int mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag) { int i, ret = 0; debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__, cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request", options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards); /* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ? MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL, options.local_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, options.remote_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } return ret; } static int mux_client_request_session(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e, *term; u_int i, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen; extern char **environ; int devnull, rawmode; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); return -1; } signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (stdin_null_flag) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } term = getenv("TERM"); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */ buffer_put_int(&m, tty_flag); buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_x11); buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_agent); buffer_put_int(&m, subsystem_flag); buffer_put_int(&m, options.escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE ? 0xffffffff : (u_int)options.escape_char); buffer_put_cstring(&m, term == NULL ? "" : term); buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command)); if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) { /* Pass environment */ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { if (env_permitted(environ[i])) { buffer_put_cstring(&m, environ[i]); } } } if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__); /* Read their reply */ buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { error("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: sid = buffer_get_int(&m); debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("Master refused session request: %s", e); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e); return -1; default: buffer_free(&m); error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; + if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + platform_pledge_mux(); + signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); rawmode = tty_flag; if (tty_flag) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. * Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message. * This process must read the value and wait for the closure of * the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will * terminate early too (possibly losing data). */ for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) { buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) break; type = buffer_get_int(&m); switch (type) { case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL: if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid) fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", __func__, sid, esid); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); rawmode = 0; continue; case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE: if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid) fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", __func__, sid, esid); if (exitval_seen) fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__); exitval = buffer_get_int(&m); exitval_seen = 1; continue; default: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); } } close(fd); if (rawmode) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (muxclient_terminate) { debug2("Exiting on signal %ld", (long)muxclient_terminate); exitval = 255; } else if (!exitval_seen) { debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly"); exitval = 255; } else debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval); if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host); exit(exitval); } static int mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int type, rid, sid; int devnull; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); return -1; } signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (stdin_null_flag) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */ buffer_put_cstring(&m, stdio_forward_host); buffer_put_int(&m, stdio_forward_port); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); + if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + platform_pledge_mux(); + debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__); /* Read their reply */ buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { error("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: sid = buffer_get_int(&m); debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e); default: buffer_free(&m); error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. */ buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { if (errno == EPIPE || (errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0)) return 0; fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type); } static void mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int type, rid; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e); default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } buffer_free(&m); muxclient_request_id++; } /* Multiplex client main loop. */ void muxclient(const char *path) { struct sockaddr_un addr; socklen_t sun_len; int sock; u_int pid; if (muxclient_command == 0) { if (stdio_forward_host != NULL) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD; else muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN; } switch (options.control_master) { case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO: case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK: debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master"); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO: break; default: return; } memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path) + 1; if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) fatal("ControlPath too long"); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) { switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: break; default: fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } if (errno == ECONNREFUSED && options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) { debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path); unlink(path); } else if (errno == ENOENT) { debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path); } else { error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } close(sock); return; } set_nonblock(sock); if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) { error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__); close(sock); return; } switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK: if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0) fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__); - fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%d)\r\n", pid); + fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%u)\r\n", pid); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE: mux_client_request_terminate(sock); fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) { error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); return; } mux_client_request_session(sock); return; case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP: mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock); fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0) error("%s: master cancel forward request failed", __func__); exit(0); default: fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command); } } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,198 +1,190 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.47 2015/07/10 06:21:53 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.50 2016/02/09 05:30:04 djm Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include /* conditional algorithm support */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 # define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," #else # define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," #endif #else # define KEX_ECDH_METHODS # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \ ",aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com" #else # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES #endif #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 # define KEX_SHA256_METHODS \ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," #define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \ "hmac-sha2-256," \ "hmac-sha2-512," #else # define KEX_SHA256_METHODS # define SHA2_HMAC_MODES #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 # define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," # else # define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "" # endif #define KEX_COMMON_KEX \ KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ KEX_SHA256_METHODS #define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \ #define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ssh-ed25519," \ + "rsa-sha2-512," \ + "rsa-sha2-256," \ "ssh-rsa," \ "ssh-dss" /* the actual algorithms */ #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \ - AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES + AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \ + ",aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc" #define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \ - "arcfour256,arcfour128," \ - "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \ - "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" + "3des-cbc" #define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-64@openssh.com," \ "umac-128@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256," \ "hmac-sha2-512," \ "hmac-sha1" -#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC "," \ - "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com," \ - "hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com," \ - "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com," \ - "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com," \ - "hmac-md5," \ - "hmac-ripemd160," \ - "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \ - "hmac-sha1-96," \ - "hmac-md5-96" +#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC -#else +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-ed25519" #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" #define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-64@openssh.com," \ "umac-128@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256," \ "hmac-sha2-512," \ "hmac-sha1" #define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX #define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib" #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" #define KEX_CLIENT \ KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG #define KEX_SERVER \ KEX_SERVER_KEX, \ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/opacket.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/opacket.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/opacket.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,349 +1,337 @@ /* Written by Markus Friedl. Placed in the public domain. */ #include "includes.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" struct ssh *active_state, *backup_state; /* Map old to new API */ void ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } void ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *ssh, int value) { u_char ch = value; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, ch)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } void ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *ssh, u_int value) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, value)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } void ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t value) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_put_u64(ssh, value)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } void ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } void ssh_packet_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const char *str) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, str)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } void ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_put(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 void ssh_packet_put_bignum(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_put_bignum1(ssh, value)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL void ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, value)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC void ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_GROUP *curve, const EC_POINT *point) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, point, curve)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ void ssh_packet_send(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } u_int ssh_packet_get_char(struct ssh *ssh) { u_char ch; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &ch)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return ch; } u_int ssh_packet_get_int(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int val; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &val)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return val; } u_int64_t ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int64_t val; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u64(ssh, &val)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return val; } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 void ssh_packet_get_bignum(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum1(ssh, value)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL void ssh_packet_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, value)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC void ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_GROUP *curve, EC_POINT *point) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, point, curve)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ void * ssh_packet_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr) { int r; size_t len; u_char *val; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (length_ptr != NULL) *length_ptr = (u_int)len; return val; } const void * ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr) { int r; size_t len; const u_char *val; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (length_ptr != NULL) *length_ptr = (u_int)len; return val; } char * ssh_packet_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr) { int r; size_t len; char *val; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (length_ptr != NULL) *length_ptr = (u_int)len; return val; } /* Old API, that had to be reimplemented */ void packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out) { active_state = ssh_packet_set_connection(active_state, fd_in, fd_out); if (active_state == NULL) fatal("%s: ssh_packet_set_connection failed", __func__); } -void -packet_backup_state(void) -{ - ssh_packet_backup_state(active_state, backup_state); -} - -void -packet_restore_state(void) -{ - ssh_packet_restore_state(active_state, backup_state); -} - u_int packet_get_char(void) { return (ssh_packet_get_char(active_state)); } u_int packet_get_int(void) { return (ssh_packet_get_int(active_state)); } int packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr) { u_char type; int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(active_state, &type, seqnr)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); return type; } int packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr) { u_char type; int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(active_state, &type, seqnr))) sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); return type; } void packet_close(void) { ssh_packet_close(active_state); active_state = NULL; } void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len) { int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(active_state, buf, len)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); } void packet_write_wait(void) { int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(active_state)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); } void packet_write_poll(void) { int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(active_state)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); } void packet_read_expect(int expected_type) { int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(active_state, expected_type)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); } void packet_disconnect(const char *fmt, ...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); ssh_packet_disconnect(active_state, "%s", buf); } void packet_send_debug(const char *fmt, ...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); ssh_packet_send_debug(active_state, "%s", buf); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/opacket.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/opacket.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/opacket.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,168 +1,164 @@ #ifndef _OPACKET_H /* Written by Markus Friedl. Placed in the public domain. */ /* Map old to new API */ void ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *, u_char); void ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *, int ch); void ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *, u_int value); void ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *, u_int64_t value); void ssh_packet_put_bignum(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); void ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); void ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); void ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len); void ssh_packet_put_cstring(struct ssh *, const char *str); void ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len); void ssh_packet_send(struct ssh *); u_int ssh_packet_get_char(struct ssh *); u_int ssh_packet_get_int(struct ssh *); u_int64_t ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_get_bignum(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); void ssh_packet_get_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); void ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); void *ssh_packet_get_string(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr); char *ssh_packet_get_cstring(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr); /* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */ #define ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh) \ do { \ int _len = ssh_packet_remaining(ssh); \ if (_len > 0) { \ logit("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \ _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, \ "Packet integrity error."); \ } \ } while (0) /* old API */ void packet_close(void); u_int packet_get_char(void); u_int packet_get_int(void); -void packet_backup_state(void); -void packet_restore_state(void); void packet_set_connection(int, int); int packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *); int packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *); void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len); void packet_write_wait(void); void packet_write_poll(void); void packet_read_expect(int expected_type); #define packet_set_timeout(timeout, count) \ ssh_packet_set_timeout(active_state, (timeout), (count)) #define packet_connection_is_on_socket() \ ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(active_state) #define packet_set_nonblocking() \ ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(active_state) #define packet_get_connection_in() \ ssh_packet_get_connection_in(active_state) #define packet_get_connection_out() \ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(active_state) #define packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags) \ ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(active_state, (protocol_flags)) #define packet_get_protocol_flags() \ ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(active_state) #define packet_start_compression(level) \ ssh_packet_start_compression(active_state, (level)) #define packet_set_encryption_key(key, keylen, number) \ ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(active_state, (key), (keylen), (number)) #define packet_start(type) \ ssh_packet_start(active_state, (type)) #define packet_put_char(value) \ ssh_packet_put_char(active_state, (value)) #define packet_put_int(value) \ ssh_packet_put_int(active_state, (value)) #define packet_put_int64(value) \ ssh_packet_put_int64(active_state, (value)) #define packet_put_string( buf, len) \ ssh_packet_put_string(active_state, (buf), (len)) #define packet_put_cstring(str) \ ssh_packet_put_cstring(active_state, (str)) #define packet_put_raw(buf, len) \ ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, (buf), (len)) #define packet_put_bignum(value) \ ssh_packet_put_bignum(active_state, (value)) #define packet_put_bignum2(value) \ ssh_packet_put_bignum2(active_state, (value)) #define packet_send() \ ssh_packet_send(active_state) #define packet_read() \ ssh_packet_read(active_state) #define packet_get_int64() \ ssh_packet_get_int64(active_state) #define packet_get_bignum(value) \ ssh_packet_get_bignum(active_state, (value)) #define packet_get_bignum2(value) \ ssh_packet_get_bignum2(active_state, (value)) #define packet_remaining() \ ssh_packet_remaining(active_state) #define packet_get_string(length_ptr) \ ssh_packet_get_string(active_state, (length_ptr)) #define packet_get_string_ptr(length_ptr) \ ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(active_state, (length_ptr)) #define packet_get_cstring(length_ptr) \ ssh_packet_get_cstring(active_state, (length_ptr)) void packet_send_debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void packet_disconnect(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))) __attribute__((noreturn)); #define packet_have_data_to_write() \ ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(active_state) #define packet_not_very_much_data_to_write() \ ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(active_state) #define packet_set_interactive(interactive, qos_interactive, qos_bulk) \ ssh_packet_set_interactive(active_state, (interactive), (qos_interactive), (qos_bulk)) #define packet_is_interactive() \ ssh_packet_is_interactive(active_state) #define packet_set_maxsize(s) \ ssh_packet_set_maxsize(active_state, (s)) #define packet_inc_alive_timeouts() \ ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(active_state) #define packet_set_alive_timeouts(ka) \ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(active_state, (ka)) #define packet_get_maxsize() \ ssh_packet_get_maxsize(active_state) #define packet_add_padding(pad) \ sshpkt_add_padding(active_state, (pad)) #define packet_send_ignore(nbytes) \ ssh_packet_send_ignore(active_state, (nbytes)) -#define packet_need_rekeying() \ - ssh_packet_need_rekeying(active_state) #define packet_set_server() \ ssh_packet_set_server(active_state) #define packet_set_authenticated() \ ssh_packet_set_authenticated(active_state) #define packet_get_input() \ ssh_packet_get_input(active_state) #define packet_get_output() \ ssh_packet_get_output(active_state) #define packet_set_compress_hooks(ctx, allocfunc, freefunc) \ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(active_state, ctx, \ allocfunc, freefunc); #define packet_check_eom() \ ssh_packet_check_eom(active_state) #define set_newkeys(mode) \ ssh_set_newkeys(active_state, (mode)) #define packet_get_state(m) \ ssh_packet_get_state(active_state, m) #define packet_set_state(m) \ ssh_packet_set_state(active_state, m) #if 0 #define get_remote_ipaddr() \ ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state) #endif #define packet_get_raw(lenp) \ sshpkt_ptr(active_state, lenp) #define packet_get_ecpoint(c,p) \ ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(active_state, c, p) #define packet_put_ecpoint(c,p) \ ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(active_state, c, p) #define packet_get_rekey_timeout() \ ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(active_state) #define packet_set_rekey_limits(x,y) \ ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(active_state, x, y) #define packet_get_bytes(x,y) \ ssh_packet_get_bytes(active_state, x, y) #endif /* _OPACKET_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,278 +1,286 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME char *__progname; #endif /* * NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0] * Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle() */ char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0) { char *p, *q; #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME extern char *__progname; p = __progname; #else if (argv0 == NULL) return ("unknown"); /* XXX */ p = strrchr(argv0, '/'); if (p == NULL) p = argv0; else p++; #endif if ((q = strdup(p)) == NULL) { perror("strdup"); exit(1); } return q; } #ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN int setlogin(const char *name) { return (0); } #endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */ #ifndef HAVE_INNETGR int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host, const char *user, const char *domain) { return (0); } #endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) int seteuid(uid_t euid) { return (setreuid(-1, euid)); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) int setegid(uid_t egid) { return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1)); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR) const char *strerror(int e) { extern int sys_nerr; extern char *sys_errlist[]; if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr)) return (sys_errlist[e]); return ("unlisted error"); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_UTIMES int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp) { struct utimbuf ub; ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec; ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec; return (utime(filename, &ub)); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE int truncate(const char *path, off_t length) { int fd, ret, saverrno; fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) return (-1); ret = ftruncate(fd, length); saverrno = errno; close(fd); if (ret == -1) errno = saverrno; return(ret); } #endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */ #if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP) int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem) { int rc, saverrno; extern int errno; struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait; TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req) (void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL); rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait); if (rc == -1) { saverrno = errno; (void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL); errno = saverrno; tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec - (tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec); tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec - (tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec); tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L; tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L; } else { tremain.tv_sec = 0; tremain.tv_usec = 0; } if (rem != NULL) TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem) return(rc); } #endif #if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP) int usleep(unsigned int useconds) { struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000; ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000; return nanosleep(&ts, NULL); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP pid_t tcgetpgrp(int fd) { int ctty_pgrp; if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1) return(-1); else return(ctty_pgrp); } #endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */ #ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK int tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration) { # if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK) struct timeval sleepytime; sleepytime.tv_sec = 0; sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000; if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1) return (-1); (void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime); if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1) return (-1); return (0); # else return -1; # endif } #endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */ mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act) { #ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION struct sigaction sa, osa; if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1) return (mysig_t) -1; if (osa.sa_handler != act) { memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); sa.sa_flags = 0; #ifdef SA_INTERRUPT if (sig == SIGALRM) sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT; #endif sa.sa_handler = act; if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1) return (mysig_t) -1; } return (osa.sa_handler); #else #undef signal return (signal(sig, act)); #endif } #ifndef HAVE_STRDUP char * strdup(const char *str) { size_t len; char *cp; len = strlen(str) + 1; cp = malloc(len); if (cp != NULL) return(memcpy(cp, str, len)); return NULL; } #endif #ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK int isblank(int c) { return (c == ' ' || c == '\t'); } #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETPGID pid_t getpgid(pid_t pid) { #if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID) return getpgrp(pid); #elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) if (pid == 0) return getpgrp(); #endif errno = ESRCH; return -1; } #endif + +#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE +int +pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,125 +1,129 @@ /* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.25 2013/08/04 11:48:41 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _BSD_MISC_H #define _BSD_MISC_H #include "includes.h" char *ssh_get_progname(char *); #ifndef HAVE_SETSID #define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid()) #endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */ #ifndef HAVE_SETENV int setenv(const char *, const char *, int); #endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */ #ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN int setlogin(const char *); #endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */ #ifndef HAVE_INNETGR int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); #endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) int seteuid(uid_t); #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) int setegid(uid_t); #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR) const char *strerror(int); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF) #define setlinebuf(a) (setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0)) #endif #ifndef HAVE_UTIMES #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL struct timeval { long tv_sec; long tv_usec; } #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */ int utimes(char *, struct timeval *); #endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */ #ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE int truncate (const char *, off_t); #endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */ #if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP) #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC struct timespec { time_t tv_sec; long tv_nsec; }; #endif int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_USLEEP int usleep(unsigned int useconds); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP pid_t tcgetpgrp(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK int tcsendbreak(int, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV int unsetenv(const char *); #endif /* wrapper for signal interface */ typedef void (*mysig_t)(int); mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act); #define signal(a,b) mysignal(a,b) #ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK int isblank(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETPGID pid_t getpgid(pid_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT # define endgrent() do { } while(0) #endif #ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE # define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text #endif #ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE # define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) do { } while(0) #endif +#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE +int pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]); +#endif + #endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,61 +1,61 @@ /* $OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */ #if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && !defined(HAVE_POLL_H) #ifndef _COMPAT_POLL_H_ #define _COMPAT_POLL_H_ typedef struct pollfd { int fd; short events; short revents; } pollfd_t; typedef unsigned int nfds_t; #define POLLIN 0x0001 #define POLLOUT 0x0004 #define POLLERR 0x0008 +#define POLLHUP 0x0010 +#define POLLNVAL 0x0020 #if 0 /* the following are currently not implemented */ #define POLLPRI 0x0002 -#define POLLHUP 0x0010 -#define POLLNVAL 0x0020 #define POLLRDNORM 0x0040 #define POLLNORM POLLRDNORM #define POLLWRNORM POLLOUT #define POLLRDBAND 0x0080 #define POLLWRBAND 0x0100 #endif #define INFTIM (-1) /* not standard */ int poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int); #endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */ #endif /* !HAVE_POLL_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1065 +1,1066 @@ /* $OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.38 2011/09/22 06:27:29 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by * Guido van Rossum. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */ /* * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2. * * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh). * * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX: * * GLOB_QUOTE: * Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following * character might have (except \ at end of string is retained). * GLOB_MAGCHAR: * Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character. * GLOB_NOMAGIC: * Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did * not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing] * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC: * Use alternately specified directory access functions. * GLOB_TILDE: * expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo * GLOB_BRACE: * expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b * gl_matchc: * Number of matches in the current invocation of glob. */ #include "includes.h" +#include "glob.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \ !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \ defined(BROKEN_GLOB) #include "charclass.h" #define DOLLAR '$' #define DOT '.' #define EOS '\0' #define LBRACKET '[' #define NOT '!' #define QUESTION '?' #define QUOTE '\\' #define RANGE '-' #define RBRACKET ']' #define SEP '/' #define STAR '*' #define TILDE '~' #define UNDERSCORE '_' #define LBRACE '{' #define RBRACE '}' #define SLASH '/' #define COMMA ',' #ifndef DEBUG #define M_QUOTE 0x8000 #define M_PROTECT 0x4000 #define M_MASK 0xffff #define M_ASCII 0x00ff typedef u_short Char; #else #define M_QUOTE 0x80 #define M_PROTECT 0x40 #define M_MASK 0xff #define M_ASCII 0x7f typedef char Char; #endif #define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII)) #define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE)) #define M_ALL META('*') #define M_END META(']') #define M_NOT META('!') #define M_ONE META('?') #define M_RNG META('-') #define M_SET META('[') #define M_CLASS META(':') #define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0) #define GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC 65536 #define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 128 #define GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR 16384 /* Limit of recursion during matching attempts. */ #define GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR 64 struct glob_lim { size_t glim_malloc; size_t glim_stat; size_t glim_readdir; }; struct glob_path_stat { char *gps_path; struct stat *gps_stat; }; static int compare(const void *, const void *); static int compare_gps(const void *, const void *); static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, u_int); static int g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); static DIR *g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *); static Char *g_strchr(const Char *, int); static int g_strncmp(const Char *, const char *, size_t); static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *, struct stat *); static const Char * globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *); static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *, int); #ifdef DEBUG static void qprintf(const char *, Char *); #endif int glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob) { const u_char *patnext; int c; Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; struct glob_lim limit = { 0, 0, 0 }; if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX) return(GLOB_NOMATCH); patnext = (u_char *) pattern; if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) { pglob->gl_pathc = 0; pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; pglob->gl_statv = NULL; if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS)) pglob->gl_offs = 0; } pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR; pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc; pglob->gl_matchc = 0; if (pglob->gl_offs < 0 || pglob->gl_pathc < 0 || pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1) return GLOB_NOSPACE; bufnext = patbuf; bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1; if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE) while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS) *bufnext++ = c; else { /* Protect the quoted characters. */ while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS) if (c == QUOTE) { if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) { c = QUOTE; --patnext; } *bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT; } else *bufnext++ = c; } *bufnext = EOS; if (flags & GLOB_BRACE) return globexp1(patbuf, pglob, &limit); else return glob0(patbuf, pglob, &limit); } /* * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic * characters */ static int globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { const Char* ptr = pattern; /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS) return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp); if ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL) return globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, limitp); return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp); } /* * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace. * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern. * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns. */ static int globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { int i, rv; Char *lm, *ls; const Char *pe, *pm, *pl; Char patbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; /* copy part up to the brace */ for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++) ; *lm = EOS; ls = lm; /* Find the balanced brace */ for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++) if (*pe == LBRACKET) { /* Ignore everything between [] */ for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++) ; if (*pe == EOS) { /* * We could not find a matching RBRACKET. * Ignore and just look for RBRACE */ pe = pm; } } else if (*pe == LBRACE) i++; else if (*pe == RBRACE) { if (i == 0) break; i--; } /* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */ if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS) return glob0(patbuf, pglob, limitp); for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) { switch (*pm) { case LBRACKET: /* Ignore everything between [] */ for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++) ; if (*pm == EOS) { /* * We could not find a matching RBRACKET. * Ignore and just look for RBRACE */ pm = pl; } break; case LBRACE: i++; break; case RBRACE: if (i) { i--; break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case COMMA: if (i && *pm == COMMA) break; else { /* Append the current string */ for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++) ; /* * Append the rest of the pattern after the * closing brace */ for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; ) ; /* Expand the current pattern */ #ifdef DEBUG qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf); #endif rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob, limitp); if (rv && rv != GLOB_NOMATCH) return rv; /* move after the comma, to the next string */ pl = pm + 1; } break; default: break; } } return 0; } /* * expand tilde from the passwd file. */ static const Char * globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob) { struct passwd *pwd; char *h; const Char *p; Char *b, *eb; if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE)) return pattern; /* Copy up to the end of the string or / */ eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1]; for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf; h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++) ; *h = EOS; #if 0 if (h == (char *)eb) return what; #endif if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) { /* * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME * first and then trying the password file */ #if 0 if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { #endif if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) return pattern; else h = pwd->pw_dir; } } else { /* * Expand a ~user */ if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL) return pattern; else h = pwd->pw_dir; } /* Copy the home directory */ for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++) ; /* Append the rest of the pattern */ while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS) ; *b = EOS; return patbuf; } static int g_strncmp(const Char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n) { int rv = 0; while (n--) { rv = *(Char *)s1 - *(const unsigned char *)s2++; if (rv) break; if (*s1++ == '\0') break; } return rv; } static int g_charclass(const Char **patternp, Char **bufnextp) { const Char *pattern = *patternp + 1; Char *bufnext = *bufnextp; const Char *colon; struct cclass *cc; size_t len; if ((colon = g_strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']') return 1; /* not a character class */ len = (size_t)(colon - pattern); for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) { if (!g_strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0') break; } if (cc->name == NULL) return -1; /* invalid character class */ *bufnext++ = M_CLASS; *bufnext++ = (Char)(cc - &cclasses[0]); *bufnextp = bufnext; *patternp += len + 3; return 0; } /* * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0 * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error * to find no matches. */ static int glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { const Char *qpatnext; int c, err, oldpathc; Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob); oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc; bufnext = patbuf; /* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */ while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) { switch (c) { case LBRACKET: c = *qpatnext; if (c == NOT) ++qpatnext; if (*qpatnext == EOS || g_strchr(qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) { *bufnext++ = LBRACKET; if (c == NOT) --qpatnext; break; } *bufnext++ = M_SET; if (c == NOT) *bufnext++ = M_NOT; c = *qpatnext++; do { if (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':') { do { err = g_charclass(&qpatnext, &bufnext); if (err) break; c = *qpatnext++; } while (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':'); if (err == -1 && !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK)) return GLOB_NOMATCH; if (c == RBRACKET) break; } *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); if (*qpatnext == RANGE && (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) { *bufnext++ = M_RNG; *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); qpatnext += 2; } } while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET); pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; *bufnext++ = M_END; break; case QUESTION: pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; *bufnext++ = M_ONE; break; case STAR: pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; /* collapse adjacent stars to one, * to avoid exponential behavior */ if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL) *bufnext++ = M_ALL; break; default: *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); break; } } *bufnext = EOS; #ifdef DEBUG qprintf("glob0:", patbuf); #endif if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0) return(err); /* * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh. */ if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) { if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) || ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) && !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR))) return(globextend(pattern, pglob, limitp, NULL)); else return(GLOB_NOMATCH); } if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) { if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT)) { /* Keep the paths and stat info synced during sort */ struct glob_path_stat *path_stat; int i; int n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc; int o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc; if ((path_stat = calloc(n, sizeof(*path_stat))) == NULL) return GLOB_NOSPACE; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { path_stat[i].gps_path = pglob->gl_pathv[o + i]; path_stat[i].gps_stat = pglob->gl_statv[o + i]; } qsort(path_stat, n, sizeof(*path_stat), compare_gps); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { pglob->gl_pathv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_path; pglob->gl_statv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_stat; } free(path_stat); } else { qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc, pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *), compare); } } return(0); } static int compare(const void *p, const void *q) { return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q)); } static int compare_gps(const void *_p, const void *_q) { const struct glob_path_stat *p = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_p; const struct glob_path_stat *q = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_q; return(strcmp(p->gps_path, q->gps_path)); } static int glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; /* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */ if (*pattern == EOS) return(0); return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp)); } /* * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more * meta characters. */ static int glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last, Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { struct stat sb; Char *p, *q; int anymeta; /* * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until * segment with meta character found. */ for (anymeta = 0;;) { if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */ *pathend = EOS; if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob)) return(0); if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && limitp->glim_stat++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) { errno = 0; *pathend++ = SEP; *pathend = EOS; return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) && pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) || (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) && (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) { if (pathend+1 > pathend_last) return (1); *pathend++ = SEP; *pathend = EOS; } ++pglob->gl_matchc; return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp, &sb)); } /* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */ q = pathend; p = pattern; while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) { if (ismeta(*p)) anymeta = 1; if (q+1 > pathend_last) return (1); *q++ = *p++; } if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */ pathend = q; pattern = p; while (*pattern == SEP) { if (pathend+1 > pathend_last) return (1); *pathend++ = *pattern++; } } else /* Need expansion, recurse. */ return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend, pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last, pglob, limitp)); } /* NOTREACHED */ } static int glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last, Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) { struct dirent *dp; DIR *dirp; int err; char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; /* * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque * structures. */ struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *); if (pathend > pathend_last) return (1); *pathend = EOS; errno = 0; if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) { /* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */ if (pglob->gl_errfunc) { if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf))) return(GLOB_ABORTED); if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) || pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR) return(GLOB_ABORTED); } return(0); } err = 0; /* Search directory for matching names. */ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir; else readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir; while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) { u_char *sc; Char *dc; if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && limitp->glim_readdir++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) { errno = 0; *pathend++ = SEP; *pathend = EOS; err = GLOB_NOSPACE; break; } /* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */ if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT) continue; dc = pathend; sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name; while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS) ; if (dc >= pathend_last) { *dc = EOS; err = 1; break; } if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern, GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR)) { *pathend = EOS; continue; } err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last, restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp); if (err) break; } if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) (*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp); else closedir(dirp); return(err); } /* * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item, * add the new item, and update gl_pathc. * * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic * behavior. * * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated. * * Invariant of the glob_t structure: * Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items. */ static int globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp, struct stat *sb) { char **pathv; ssize_t i; size_t newn, len; char *copy = NULL; const Char *p; struct stat **statv; newn = 2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs; if (pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX || newn >= INT_MAX || SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*pathv) <= newn || SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*statv) <= newn) { nospace: for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < (ssize_t)(newn - 2); i++) { if (pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i]) free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]); if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0 && pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i]) free(pglob->gl_statv[i]); } if (pglob->gl_pathv) { free(pglob->gl_pathv); pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; } if (pglob->gl_statv) { free(pglob->gl_statv); pglob->gl_statv = NULL; } return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } pathv = realloc(pglob->gl_pathv, newn * sizeof(*pathv)); if (pathv == NULL) goto nospace; if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) { /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */ pathv += pglob->gl_offs; for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; ) *--pathv = NULL; } pglob->gl_pathv = pathv; if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0) { statv = realloc(pglob->gl_statv, newn * sizeof(*statv)); if (statv == NULL) goto nospace; if (pglob->gl_statv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) { /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */ statv += pglob->gl_offs; for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; ) *--statv = NULL; } pglob->gl_statv = statv; if (sb == NULL) statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL; else { limitp->glim_malloc += sizeof(**statv); if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && limitp->glim_malloc >= GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) { errno = 0; return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } if ((statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = malloc(sizeof(**statv))) == NULL) goto copy_error; memcpy(statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc], sb, sizeof(*sb)); } statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc + 1] = NULL; } for (p = path; *p++;) ; len = (size_t)(p - path); limitp->glim_malloc += len; if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) { if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) { free(copy); return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy; } pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL; if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && (newn * sizeof(*pathv)) + limitp->glim_malloc > GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) { errno = 0; return(GLOB_NOSPACE); } copy_error: return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0); } /* * pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the * * pattern causes a recursion level. */ static int match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend, int recur) { int ok, negate_range; Char c, k; if (recur-- == 0) return(GLOB_NOSPACE); while (pat < patend) { c = *pat++; switch (c & M_MASK) { case M_ALL: while (pat < patend && (*pat & M_MASK) == M_ALL) pat++; /* eat consecutive '*' */ if (pat == patend) return(1); do { if (match(name, pat, patend, recur)) return(1); } while (*name++ != EOS); return(0); case M_ONE: if (*name++ == EOS) return(0); break; case M_SET: ok = 0; if ((k = *name++) == EOS) return(0); if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS) ++pat; while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) { if ((c & M_MASK) == M_CLASS) { Char idx = *pat & M_MASK; if (idx < NCCLASSES && cclasses[idx].isctype(k)) ok = 1; ++pat; } if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) { if (c <= k && k <= pat[1]) ok = 1; pat += 2; } else if (c == k) ok = 1; } if (ok == negate_range) return(0); break; default: if (*name++ != c) return(0); break; } } return(*name == EOS); } /* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */ void globfree(glob_t *pglob) { int i; char **pp; if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) { pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs; for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp) if (*pp) free(*pp); free(pglob->gl_pathv); pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; } if (pglob->gl_statv != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < pglob->gl_pathc; i++) { if (pglob->gl_statv[i] != NULL) free(pglob->gl_statv[i]); } free(pglob->gl_statv); pglob->gl_statv = NULL; } } static DIR * g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob) { char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; if (!*str) strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf); else { if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf))) return(NULL); } if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf)); return(opendir(buf)); } static int g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) { char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf))) return(-1); if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb)); return(lstat(buf, sb)); } static int g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) { char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf))) return(-1); if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb)); return(stat(buf, sb)); } static Char * g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch) { do { if (*str == ch) return ((Char *)str); } while (*str++); return (NULL); } static int g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, u_int len) { while (len--) { if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS) return (0); } return (1); } #ifdef DEBUG static void qprintf(const char *str, Char *s) { Char *p; (void)printf("%s:\n", str); for (p = s; *p; p++) (void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p)); (void)printf("\n"); for (p = s; *p; p++) (void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' '); (void)printf("\n"); for (p = s; *p; p++) (void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' '); (void)printf("\n"); } #endif #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,103 +1,107 @@ /* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.11 2010/09/24 13:32:55 djm Exp $ */ /* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by * Guido van Rossum. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */ #if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \ !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \ defined(BROKEN_GLOB) -#ifndef _GLOB_H_ -#define _GLOB_H_ +#ifndef _COMPAT_GLOB_H_ +#define _COMPAT_GLOB_H_ #include + +# define glob_t _ssh_compat_glob_t +# define glob(a, b, c, d) _ssh__compat_glob(a, b, c, d) +# define globfree(a) _ssh__compat_globfree(a) struct stat; typedef struct { int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */ int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */ int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */ int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */ char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */ struct stat **gl_statv; /* Stat entries corresponding to gl_pathv */ /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */ int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int); /* * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2) * and lstat(2). */ void (*gl_closedir)(void *); struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *); void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *); int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *); int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *); } glob_t; #define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */ #define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */ #define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */ #define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */ #define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */ #define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */ #define GLOB_NOESCAPE 0x1000 /* Disable backslash escaping. */ #define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */ #define GLOB_ABORTED (-2) /* Unignored error. */ #define GLOB_NOMATCH (-3) /* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */ #define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */ #define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */ #define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */ #define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */ #define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */ #define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */ #define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */ #define GLOB_LIMIT 0x2000 /* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */ #define GLOB_KEEPSTAT 0x4000 /* Retain stat data for paths in gl_statv. */ #define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED /* backward compatibility */ int glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); void globfree(glob_t *); #endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */ #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOH_HAS_GL_STATV) */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,302 +1,301 @@ /* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.62 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #include "includes.h" #include #include #include /* OpenBSD function replacements */ #include "base64.h" #include "sigact.h" -#include "glob.h" #include "readpassphrase.h" #include "vis.h" #include "getrrsetbyname.h" #include "sha1.h" #include "sha2.h" #include "rmd160.h" #include "md5.h" #include "blf.h" #ifndef HAVE_BASENAME char *basename(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa); #endif #ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM void closefrom(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETCWD char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size); #endif #ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) /* * glibc's FORTIFY_SOURCE can redefine this and prevent us picking up the * compat version. */ # ifdef BROKEN_REALPATH # define realpath(x, y) _ssh_compat_realpath(x, y) # endif char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved); #endif #ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY /* #include XXX Still needed? */ size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT /* #include XXX Still needed? */ size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETENV int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRMODE void strmode(int mode, char *p); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME #include char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) int mkstemps(char *path, int slen); int mkstemp(char *path); char *mkdtemp(char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_DAEMON int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); #endif #ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME char *dirname(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED #define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7 int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED int scan_scaled(char *, long long *); #endif #if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRSEP char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...); void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST /* #include XXXX Still needed ? */ int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts); #include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h" #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0 # include # include int writev(int, struct iovec *, int); #endif /* Home grown routines */ #include "bsd-misc.h" #include "bsd-setres_id.h" #include "bsd-statvfs.h" #include "bsd-waitpid.h" #include "bsd-poll.h" #ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *); #endif #ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM # ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR # define arc4random_stir() # endif #else unsigned int arc4random(void); void arc4random_stir(void); #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY # include /* for struct winsize */ int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *); #endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */ /* #include XXX needed? For size_t */ #ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **); #endif /* multibyte character support */ #ifndef HAVE_MBLEN # define mblen(x, y) (1) #endif #if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) # include #endif #ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t, u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n); #endif void *xmmap(size_t size); char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt); char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw); /* rfc2553 socket API replacements */ #include "fake-rfc2553.h" /* Routines for a single OS platform */ #include "bsd-cray.h" #include "bsd-cygwin_util.h" #include "port-aix.h" #include "port-irix.h" #include "port-linux.h" #include "port-solaris.h" #include "port-tun.h" #include "port-uw.h" /* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */ #if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) # include # if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) # if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) # include /* Ensure include guard is defined */ # undef FD_SET # undef FD_ISSET # define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set) # define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set) void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *); int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *); # endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */ # endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */ #endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */ #endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,229 +1,365 @@ /* $Id: port-solaris.c,v 1.4 2010/11/05 01:03:05 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "config.h" #include "includes.h" #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #define CT_TEMPLATE CTFS_ROOT "/process/template" #define CT_LATEST CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest" static int tmpl_fd = -1; /* Lookup the latest process contract */ static ctid_t get_active_process_contract_id(void) { int stat_fd; ctid_t ctid = -1; ct_stathdl_t stathdl; if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process " "contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) { error("%s: Error reading process contract " "status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) { error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } ct_status_free(stathdl); out: close(stat_fd); return ctid; } void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void) { if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno)); return; } debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d", __func__, tmpl_fd); /* First we set the template parameters and event sets. */ if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY) != 0) { error("%s: Error setting process contract parameter set " "(pgrponly): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) { error("%s: Error setting process contract template " "fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, 0) != 0) { error("%s: Error setting process contract template " "critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (ct_tmpl_set_informative(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) { error("%s: Error setting process contract template " "informative events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } /* Now make this the active template for this process. */ if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) { error("%s: Error activating process contract " "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } return; fail: if (tmpl_fd != -1) { close(tmpl_fd); tmpl_fd = -1; } } void solaris_contract_post_fork_child() { debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d", __func__, tmpl_fd); /* Clear the active template. */ if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0) error("%s: Error clearing active process contract " "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(tmpl_fd); tmpl_fd = -1; } void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid) { ctid_t ctid; char ctl_path[256]; int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1; debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd); if (tmpl_fd == -1) return; /* First clear the active template. */ if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0) error("%s: Error clearing active process contract " "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(tmpl_fd); tmpl_fd = -1; /* * If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing * th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing * more do. */ if (r != 0 || pid <= 0) return; /* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */ ctid = get_active_process_contract_id(); debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid); snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path), CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid); if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) { error("%s: Error opening process contract " "ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) { error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } close(ctl_fd); return; fail: if (tmpl_fd != -1) { close(tmpl_fd); tmpl_fd = -1; } if (stat_fd != -1) close(stat_fd); if (ctl_fd != -1) close(ctl_fd); } #endif #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS #include #include /* * Get/set solaris default project. * If we fail, just run along gracefully. */ void solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *pw) { struct project *defaultproject; struct project tempproject; char buf[1024]; /* get default project, if we fail just return gracefully */ if ((defaultproject = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &tempproject, &buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) { /* set default project */ if (setproject(defaultproject->pj_name, pw->pw_name, TASK_NORMAL) != 0) debug("setproject(%s): %s", defaultproject->pj_name, strerror(errno)); } else { /* debug on getdefaultproj() error */ debug("getdefaultproj(%s): %s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); } } #endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */ + +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS +# ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H +# include +# endif + +priv_set_t * +solaris_basic_privset(void) +{ + priv_set_t *pset; + +#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET + if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) { + error("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + priv_basicset(pset); +#else + if ((pset = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL)) == NULL) { + error("priv_str_to_set: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } +#endif + return pset; +} + +void +solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void) +{ + priv_set_t *pset = NULL, *npset = NULL; + + /* + * Note: this variant avoids dropping DAC filesystem rights, in case + * the process calling it is running as root and should have the + * ability to read/write/chown any file on the system. + * + * We start with the basic set, then *add* the DAC rights to it while + * taking away other parts of BASIC we don't need. Then we intersect + * this with our existing PERMITTED set. In this way we keep any + * DAC rights we had before, while otherwise reducing ourselves to + * the minimum set of privileges we need to proceed. + * + * This also means we drop any other parts of "root" that we don't + * need (e.g. the ability to kill any process, create new device nodes + * etc etc). + */ + + if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) + fatal("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno)); + if ((npset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL) + fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_CHOWN) != 0 || + priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_READ) != 0 || + priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_SEARCH) != 0 || + priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_WRITE) != 0 || + priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_OWNER) != 0) + fatal("priv_addset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (priv_delset(npset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || +#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 || + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) + fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (getppriv(PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0) + fatal("getppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); + + priv_intersect(pset, npset); + + if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, npset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, npset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, npset) != 0) + fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); + + priv_freeset(pset); + priv_freeset(npset); +} + +void +solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void) +{ + priv_set_t *pset = NULL; + + /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */ + if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL) + fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || +#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) + fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0) + fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); + + priv_freeset(pset); +} + +void +solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void) +{ + priv_set_t *pset = NULL; + + + /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */ + if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL) + fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || +#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) + fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0) + fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); + + priv_freeset(pset); +} + +#endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,30 +1,36 @@ /* $Id: port-solaris.h,v 1.2 2010/11/05 01:03:05 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _PORT_SOLARIS_H #include #include void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void); void solaris_contract_post_fork_child(void); void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid); void solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *); +# ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS +priv_set_t *solaris_basic_privset(void); +void solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void); +void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void); +void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void); +# endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS */ #endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,200 +1,229 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.20 2015/10/13 20:55:37 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote * products derived from this software without specific prior written * permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/realpath.c */ #include "includes.h" #if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include +#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX +# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32 +#endif + +/* A slightly modified copy of this file exists in libexec/ld.so */ + /* * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]); * * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure, * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved). */ char * -realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]) +realpath(const char *path, char *resolved) { struct stat sb; char *p, *q, *s; size_t left_len, resolved_len; unsigned symlinks; - int serrno, slen; + int serrno, slen, mem_allocated; char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX]; + if (path[0] == '\0') { + errno = ENOENT; + return (NULL); + } + serrno = errno; + + if (resolved == NULL) { + resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX); + if (resolved == NULL) + return (NULL); + mem_allocated = 1; + } else + mem_allocated = 0; + symlinks = 0; if (path[0] == '/') { resolved[0] = '/'; resolved[1] = '\0'; if (path[1] == '\0') return (resolved); resolved_len = 1; left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left)); } else { if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) { - strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX); + if (mem_allocated) + free(resolved); + else + strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX); return (NULL); } resolved_len = strlen(resolved); left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left)); } if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return (NULL); + goto err; } /* * Iterate over path components in `left'. */ while (left_len != 0) { /* * Extract the next path component and adjust `left' * and its length. */ p = strchr(left, '/'); s = p ? p : left + left_len; if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return (NULL); + goto err; } memcpy(next_token, left, s - left); next_token[s - left] = '\0'; left_len -= s - left; if (p != NULL) memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1); if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') { if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return (NULL); + goto err; } resolved[resolved_len++] = '/'; resolved[resolved_len] = '\0'; } if (next_token[0] == '\0') continue; else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0) continue; else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) { /* * Strip the last path component except when we have * single "/" */ if (resolved_len > 1) { resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1; *q = '\0'; resolved_len = q - resolved; } continue; } /* * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if * there are no more path components left. */ resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX); if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return (NULL); + goto err; } if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) { if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) { errno = serrno; return (resolved); } - return (NULL); + goto err; } if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) { - if (symlinks++ > MAXSYMLINKS) { + if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) { errno = ELOOP; - return (NULL); + goto err; } slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1); if (slen < 0) - return (NULL); + goto err; symlink[slen] = '\0'; if (symlink[0] == '/') { resolved[1] = 0; resolved_len = 1; } else if (resolved_len > 1) { /* Strip the last path component. */ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1; *q = '\0'; resolved_len = q - resolved; } /* * If there are any path components left, then * append them to symlink. The result is placed * in `left'. */ if (p != NULL) { if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') { if (slen + 1 >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return (NULL); + goto err; } symlink[slen] = '/'; symlink[slen + 1] = 0; } - left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(left)); - if (left_len >= sizeof(left)) { + left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink)); + if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return (NULL); + goto err; } } left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left)); } } /* * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname * is a single "/". */ if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/') resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; return (resolved); + +err: + if (mem_allocated) + free(resolved); + return (NULL); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/packet.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/packet.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/packet.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2929 +1,2975 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.214 2015/08/20 22:32:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.229 2016/02/17 22:20:14 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include /* MIN roundup */ #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "buffer.h" /* typedefs XXX */ #include "key.h" /* typedefs XXX */ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "crc32.h" #include "deattack.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "digest.h" #include "mac.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "packet.h" -#include "roaming.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG #define DBG(x) x #else #define DBG(x) #endif #define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024) struct packet_state { u_int32_t seqnr; u_int32_t packets; u_int64_t blocks; u_int64_t bytes; }; struct packet { TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next; u_char type; struct sshbuf *payload; }; struct session_state { /* * This variable contains the file descriptors used for * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket. */ int connection_in; int connection_out; /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */ u_int remote_protocol_flags; /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */ struct sshcipher_ctx receive_context; /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */ struct sshcipher_ctx send_context; /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */ struct sshbuf *input; /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */ struct sshbuf *output; /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */ struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet; /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */ struct sshbuf *incoming_packet; /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */ struct sshbuf *compression_buffer; /* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */ z_stream compression_in_stream; z_stream compression_out_stream; int compression_in_started; int compression_out_started; int compression_in_failures; int compression_out_failures; /* * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is * enabled. */ int packet_compression; /* default maximum packet size */ u_int max_packet_size; /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */ int initialized; /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */ int interactive_mode; /* Set to true if we are the server side. */ int server_side; /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */ int after_authentication; int keep_alive_timeouts; /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */ int packet_timeout_ms; /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */ struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; struct packet_state p_read, p_send; /* Volume-based rekeying */ - u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out; - u_int32_t rekey_limit; + u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit; /* Time-based rekeying */ u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */ time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */ /* Session key for protocol v1 */ u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_int ssh1_keylen; /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */ u_char extra_pad; /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */ u_int packet_discard; struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac; /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */ u_int packlen; /* Used in packet_send2 */ int rekeying; /* Used in packet_set_interactive */ int set_interactive_called; /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */ int set_maxsize_called; /* One-off warning about weak ciphers */ int cipher_warning_done; /* SSH1 CRC compensation attack detector */ struct deattack_ctx deattack; TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; }; struct ssh * ssh_alloc_session_state(void) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; struct session_state *state = NULL; if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL || (state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL || (state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) goto fail; TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing); TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys); TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys); state->connection_in = -1; state->connection_out = -1; state->max_packet_size = 32768; state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0; state->initialized = 1; /* * ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until * we've done the initial key exchange. */ state->rekeying = 1; ssh->state = state; return ssh; fail: if (state) { sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); free(state); } free(ssh); return NULL; } +/* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */ +int +ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return compat20 && + (ssh->state->rekeying || (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0)); +} + /* * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until * packet_set_encryption_key is called. */ struct ssh * ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) { struct session_state *state; const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); int r; if (none == NULL) { error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__); return NULL; } if (ssh == NULL) ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state(); if (ssh == NULL) { error("%s: cound not allocate state", __func__); return NULL; } state = ssh->state; state->connection_in = fd_in; state->connection_out = fd_out; if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) { error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(ssh); return NULL; } state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; deattack_init(&state->deattack); /* * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed. */ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); return ssh; } void ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) { state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; return; } if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout) state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX; else state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000; } int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (state->packet_discard_mac) { char buf[1024]; memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf)); while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < PACKET_MAX_SIZE) if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) return r; (void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), PACKET_MAX_SIZE, NULL, 0); } - logit("Finished discarding for %.200s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; } static int ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, struct sshmac *mac, u_int packet_length, u_int discard) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; } if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled) state->packet_discard_mac = mac; if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard && (r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0) return r; state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input); return 0; } /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */ int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sockaddr_storage from, to; socklen_t fromlen, tolen; /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) return 1; fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) return 0; tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0) return 0; if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0) return 0; if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) return 0; return 1; } void ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes) { if (ibytes) *ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes; if (obytes) *obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes; } int ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sockaddr_storage to; socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0) return 0; #ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6 if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr)) return AF_INET; #endif return to.ss_family; } /* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */ void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh) { /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */ set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in); if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in) set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out); } /* Returns the socket used for reading. */ int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->connection_in; } /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */ int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->connection_out; } /* * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. */ const char * ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh) { + const int sock = ssh->state->connection_in; + /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */ - if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) - ssh->remote_ipaddr = ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) ? - get_peer_ipaddr(ssh->state->connection_in) : - strdup("UNKNOWN"); - if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) - return "UNKNOWN"; + if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) { + if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { + ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock); + ssh->remote_port = get_sock_port(sock, 0); + } else { + ssh->remote_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN"); + ssh->remote_port = 0; + } + } return ssh->remote_ipaddr; } +/* Returns the port number of the remote host. */ + +int +ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ + return ssh->remote_port; +} + /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; u_int mode; if (!state->initialized) return; state->initialized = 0; if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); close(state->connection_out); } else { close(state->connection_in); close(state->connection_out); } sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); if (state->compression_buffer) { sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer); if (state->compression_out_started) { z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream; debug("compress outgoing: " "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 : (double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in); if (state->compression_out_failures == 0) deflateEnd(stream); } if (state->compression_in_started) { z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream; debug("compress incoming: " "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 : (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out); if (state->compression_in_failures == 0) inflateEnd(stream); } } if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0) error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0) error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if (ssh->remote_ipaddr) { - free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); - ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; - } + free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); + ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; free(ssh->state); ssh->state = NULL; } /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags) { ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags; } /* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */ u_int ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags; } /* * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions. * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip. */ static int ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh) { if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer && ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } static int start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level) { if (level < 1 || level > 9) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level); if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1) deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream); switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) { case Z_OK: ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1; break; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; default: return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } static int start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1) inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream); switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) { case Z_OK: ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1; break; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; default: return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } int ssh_packet_start_compression(struct ssh *ssh, int level) { int r; if (ssh->state->packet_compression && !compat20) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->packet_compression = 1; if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0 || (r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0 || (r = start_compression_out(ssh, level)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */ static int compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { u_char buf[4096]; int r, status; if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* This case is not handled below. */ if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0) return 0; /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */ if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */ do { /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */ status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); switch (status) { case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; case Z_OK: /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0) return r; break; case Z_STREAM_ERROR: default: ssh->state->compression_out_failures++; return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } } while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0); return 0; } static int uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { u_char buf[4096]; int r, status; if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); for (;;) { /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); switch (status) { case Z_OK: if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0) return r; break; case Z_BUF_ERROR: /* * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to * be the error that we get. */ return 0; case Z_DATA_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; case Z_STREAM_ERROR: default: ssh->state->compression_in_failures++; return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } } /* NOTREACHED */ } /* Serialise compression state into a blob for privsep */ static int ssh_packet_get_compress_state(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshbuf *b; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (state->compression_in_started) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_in_stream, sizeof(state->compression_in_stream))) != 0) goto out; } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; if (state->compression_out_started) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_out_stream, sizeof(state->compression_out_stream))) != 0) goto out; } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b); out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* Deserialise compression state from a blob for privsep */ static int ssh_packet_set_compress_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r; const u_char *inblob, *outblob; size_t inl, outl; if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &inblob, &inl)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &outblob, &outl)) != 0) goto out; if (inl == 0) state->compression_in_started = 0; else if (inl != sizeof(state->compression_in_stream)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } else { state->compression_in_started = 1; memcpy(&state->compression_in_stream, inblob, inl); } if (outl == 0) state->compression_out_started = 0; else if (outl != sizeof(state->compression_out_stream)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } else { state->compression_out_started = 1; memcpy(&state->compression_out_stream, outblob, outl); } r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } void ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(struct ssh *ssh, void *ctx, void *(*allocfunc)(void *, u_int, u_int), void (*freefunc)(void *, void *)) { ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.opaque = ctx; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.opaque = ctx; } /* * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are * encrypted independently of each other. */ void ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number) { #ifndef WITH_SSH1 fatal("no SSH protocol 1 support"); #else /* WITH_SSH1 */ struct session_state *state = ssh->state; const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number); int r; const char *wmsg; if (cipher == NULL) fatal("%s: unknown cipher number %d", __func__, number); if (keylen < 20) fatal("%s: keylen too small: %d", __func__, keylen); if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) fatal("%s: keylen too big: %d", __func__, keylen); memcpy(state->ssh1_key, key, keylen); state->ssh1_keylen = keylen; if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT) != 0)) fatal("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (!state->cipher_warning_done && ((wmsg = cipher_warning_message(&state->send_context)) != NULL || (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(&state->send_context)) != NULL)) { error("Warning: %s", wmsg); state->cipher_warning_done = 1; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ } /* * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set, * encrypts the packet before sending. */ int ssh_packet_send1(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char buf[8], *cp; int r, padding, len; u_int checksum; /* * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing * packet. */ if (state->packet_compression) { sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); /* Skip padding. */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8)) != 0) goto out; /* padding */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->compression_buffer, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; } /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8; /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */ padding = 8 - len % 8; if (!state->send_context.plaintext) { cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); if (cp == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } arc4random_buf(cp + 8 - padding, padding); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding)) != 0) goto out; /* Add check bytes. */ checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)); POKE_U32(buf, checksum); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: "); sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr); #endif /* Append to output. */ POKE_U32(buf, len); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, buf, 4)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->send_context, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); #endif state->p_send.packets++; state->p_send.bytes += len + sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); /* * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be * actually sent until ssh_packet_write_wait or ssh_packet_write_poll * is called. */ r = 0; out: return r; } int ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshcipher_ctx *cc; u_int64_t *max_blocks; const char *wmsg; int r, crypt_type; debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode); if (mode == MODE_OUT) { cc = &state->send_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT; state->p_send.packets = state->p_send.blocks = 0; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out; } else { cc = &state->receive_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT; state->p_read.packets = state->p_read.blocks = 0; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in; } if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { - debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); + debug("set_newkeys: rekeying, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, " + "output %llu bytes %llu blocks", + (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes, + (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks, + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); if ((r = cipher_cleanup(cc)) != 0) return r; enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; mac_clear(mac); explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len); explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); free(enc->name); free(enc->iv); free(enc->key); free(mac->name); free(mac->key); free(comp->name); free(state->newkeys[mode]); } /* move newkeys from kex to state */ if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0) return r; } mac->enabled = 1; DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode)); if ((r = cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len, enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0) return r; if (!state->cipher_warning_done && (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(cc)) != NULL) { error("Warning: %s", wmsg); state->cipher_warning_done = 1; } /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */ /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size); explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */ if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB || (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) { if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0) return r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) { if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) return r; } comp->enabled = 1; } /* * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, * blowfish, etc, so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. */ if (enc->block_size >= 16) *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2); else *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size; if (state->rekey_limit) *max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks, state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size); + debug("rekey after %llu blocks", (unsigned long long)*max_blocks); return 0; } +#define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) +static int +ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + u_int32_t out_blocks; + + /* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */ + if (!state->after_authentication) + return 0; + + /* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */ + if (ssh->kex == NULL || ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + return 0; + + /* Peer can't rekey */ + if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) + return 0; + + /* + * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to + * make progress when rekey limits are very small. + */ + if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0) + return 0; + + /* Time-based rekeying */ + if (state->rekey_interval != 0 && + state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) + return 1; + + /* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */ + if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS || + state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) + return 1; + + /* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maxiumum blocks */ + out_blocks = roundup(outbound_packet_len, + state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size); + return (state->max_blocks_out && + (state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) || + (state->max_blocks_in && + (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in)); +} + /* * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication: * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent, * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received. */ static int ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r, mode; /* * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately. */ state->after_authentication = 1; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */ if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) continue; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) { if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) { if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) return r; } comp->enabled = 1; } } return 0; } +/* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */ +static int +ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type) +{ + switch (type) { + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: + return 0; + default: + return 1; + } +} + /* * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue) */ int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; u_char padlen, pad = 0; u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0; u_int len; struct sshenc *enc = NULL; struct sshmac *mac = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r, block_size; if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) { enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5]; - + if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) + debug3("send packet: type %u", type); #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "plain: "); sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr); #endif if (comp && comp->enabled) { len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); /* skip header, compress only payload */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet))); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); /* * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data, * minimum padding is 4 bytes */ len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */ padlen = block_size - (len % block_size); if (padlen < 4) padlen += block_size; if (state->extra_pad) { /* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */ state->extra_pad = roundup(state->extra_pad, block_size); pad = state->extra_pad - ((len + padlen) % state->extra_pad); DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)", __func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad)); padlen += pad; state->extra_pad = 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if (enc && !state->send_context.plaintext) { /* random padding */ arc4random_buf(cp, padlen); } else { /* clear padding */ explicit_bzero(cp, padlen); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); if (cp == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */ POKE_U32(cp, len - 4); cp[4] = padlen; DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)", len, padlen, aadlen)); /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */ if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) { if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr)); } /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* append unencrypted MAC */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { if (mac->etm) { /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */ if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr)); } if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); #endif /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); if (++state->p_send.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size; state->p_send.bytes += len; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side) r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); else r = 0; out: return r; } +/* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */ +static int +ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type) +{ + return + type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN && + type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX && + type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST && + type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT && + type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO; +} + int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct packet *p; u_char type; - int r; + int r, need_rekey; + if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5]; + need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) && + ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)); - /* during rekeying we can only send key exchange messages */ - if (state->rekeying) { - if ((type < SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN) || - (type > SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX) || - (type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST) || - (type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) { - debug("enqueue packet: %u", type); - p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); - if (p == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - p->type = type; - p->payload = state->outgoing_packet; - TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next); - state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new(); - if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - return 0; + /* + * During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages. + * Queue everything else. + */ + if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) { + if (need_rekey) + debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__); + debug("enqueue packet: %u", type); + p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + if (p == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + p->type = type; + p->payload = state->outgoing_packet; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next); + state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new(); + if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (need_rekey) { + /* + * This packet triggered a rekey, so send the + * KEXINIT now. + * NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex(). + */ + return kex_start_rekex(ssh); } + return 0; } /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) state->rekeying = 1; if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) return r; /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) { state->rekeying = 0; state->rekey_time = monotime(); while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) { type = p->type; + /* + * If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the + * remaining packets in the queue for now. + * NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex. + */ + if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, + sshbuf_len(p->payload))) { + debug3("%s: queued packet triggered rekex", + __func__); + return kex_start_rekex(ssh); + } debug("dequeue packet: %u", type); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); state->outgoing_packet = p->payload; TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next); + memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); free(p); if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) return r; } } return 0; } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not * be used during the interactive session. */ int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; - int len, r, ms_remain, cont; + int len, r, ms_remain; fd_set *setp; char buf[8192]; struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL; DBG(debug("packet_read()")); setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); if (setp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* * Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have * been sent. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ for (;;) { /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) break; if (!compat20 && ( *typep == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS || *typep == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EOF || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION)) if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) break; /* If we got a packet, return it. */ if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) break; /* * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the * buffer, and try again. */ memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp); if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; timeoutp = &timeout; } /* Wait for some data to arrive. */ for (;;) { if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); gettimeofday(&start, NULL); } if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp, NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) break; if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { r = 0; break; } } if (r == 0) return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; /* Read data from the socket. */ - do { - cont = 0; - len = roaming_read(state->connection_in, buf, - sizeof(buf), &cont); - } while (len == 0 && cont); + len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; goto out; } if (len < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } /* Append it to the buffer. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) goto out; } out: free(setp); return r; } int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh) { u_char type; int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return type; } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch. */ int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type) { int r; u_char type; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) return r; if (type != expected_type) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d", expected_type, type)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } return 0; } /* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection. * * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also, * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned * to higher levels. */ int ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int len, padded_len; const char *emsg; const u_char *cp; u_char *p; u_int checksum, stored_checksum; int r; *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 8) return 0; /* Get length of incoming packet. */ len = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->input)); if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Bad packet length %u", len)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7; /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + padded_len) return 0; /* The entire packet is in buffer. */ /* Consume packet length. */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, 4)) != 0) goto out; /* * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com) */ if (!state->receive_context.plaintext) { emsg = NULL; switch (detect_attack(&state->deattack, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len)) { case DEATTACK_OK: break; case DEATTACK_DETECTED: emsg = "crc32 compensation attack detected"; break; case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED: emsg = "deattack denial of service detected"; break; default: emsg = "deattack error"; break; } if (emsg != NULL) { error("%s", emsg); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", emsg)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } } /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */ sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, padded_len, &p)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, 0, p, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len, 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, padded_len)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: "); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif /* Compute packet checksum. */ checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) - 4); /* Skip padding. */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8)) != 0) goto out; /* Test check bytes. */ if (len != sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)) { error("%s: len %d != sshbuf_len %zd", __func__, len, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet length")) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet) + len - 4; stored_checksum = PEEK_U32(cp); if (checksum != stored_checksum) { error("Corrupted check bytes on input"); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "connection corrupted")) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, 4)) < 0) goto out; if (state->packet_compression) { sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; } state->p_read.packets++; state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) goto out; if (*typep < SSH_MSG_MIN || *typep > SSH_MSG_MAX) { error("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", *typep); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet type")) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } r = 0; out: return r; } int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int padlen, need; u_char *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size; struct sshenc *enc = NULL; struct sshmac *mac = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r; *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; if (state->packet_discard) return 0; if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) { enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0; block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) { if (cipher_get_length(&state->receive_context, &state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0) return 0; if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); } else if (state->packlen == 0) { /* * check if input size is less than the cipher block size, * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size) return 0; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), block_size, 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)); if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "input: \n"); sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n"); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0) goto out; } DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4)); if (aadlen) { /* only the payload is encrypted */ need = state->packlen; } else { /* * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we * have a partial packet of block_size bytes */ need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size; } DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d," " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen)); if (need % block_size != 0) { logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d", need, block_size, need % block_size); return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size); } /* * check if the entire packet has been received and * decrypt into incoming_packet: * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated. * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code. */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen) return 0; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: "); sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); #endif /* EtM: compute mac over encrypted input */ if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) { if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* * compute MAC over seqnr and packet, * increment sequence number for incoming packet */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { if (!mac->etm) if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet), macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; if (timingsafe_bcmp(macbuf, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), mac->mac_len) != 0) { logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need); } DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr)); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } if (seqnr_p != NULL) *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr; if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) logit("incoming seqnr wraps around"); if (++state->p_read.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size; state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4; /* get padlen */ padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4]; DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen)); if (padlen < 4) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 || ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0)) goto out; DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd", sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); if (comp && comp->enabled) { sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd", sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); } /* * get packet type, implies consume. * return length of payload (without type field) */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) goto out; + if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep)) + debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep); if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN); else if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side) r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); else r = 0; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif /* reset for next packet */ state->packlen = 0; + + /* do we need to rekey? */ + if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) { + debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__); + if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + } out: return r; } int ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int reason, seqnr; int r; u_char *msg; for (;;) { msg = NULL; if (compat20) { r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) return r; if (*typep) { state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); } switch (*typep) { case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); break; case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - if (msg) - free(msg); + free(msg); return r; } debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); break; case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) return r; /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, - "Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), reason, msg); + "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" + "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); free(msg); return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) return r; debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u", seqnr); break; default: return 0; } } else { r = ssh_packet_read_poll1(ssh, typep); switch (*typep) { case SSH_MSG_NONE: return SSH_MSG_NONE; case SSH_MSG_IGNORE: break; case SSH_MSG_DEBUG: if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) return r; debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); break; case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT: if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) return r; - logit("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), msg); + logit("Received disconnect from %s port %d: " + "%.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), msg); free(msg); return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; default: DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); return 0; } } } } /* * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used * together with packet_read_poll. */ int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (state->packet_discard) { state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */ if (len >= state->packet_discard) { if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0) return r; } state->packet_discard -= len; return 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0) return r; return 0; } int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh) { return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); } /* * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait. */ void ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; if (compat20 && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG)) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); if (compat20) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit. */ void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r) { switch (r) { case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: - logit("Connection closed by %.200s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + logit("Connection closed by %.200s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); cleanup_exit(255); case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: - logit("Connection to %.200s timed out", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + logit("Connection %s %.200s port %d timed out", + ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); cleanup_exit(255); case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: - logit("Disconnected from %.200s", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + logit("Disconnected from %.200s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); cleanup_exit(255); case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: if (errno == ECONNRESET) { - logit("Connection reset by %.200s", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + logit("Connection reset by %.200s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); cleanup_exit(255); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) { - fatal("Unable to negotiate with %.200s: %s. " + fatal("Unable to negotiate with %.200s port %d: %s. " "Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - ssh_err(r), ssh->kex->failed_choice); + ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r), + ssh->kex->failed_choice); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: - fatal("%s%sConnection to %.200s: %s", + fatal("%s%sConnection %s %.200s port %d: %s", tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_err(r)); + ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r)); } } /* * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must * not exceed 1024 bytes. */ void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; static int disconnecting = 0; int r; if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */ fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively."); disconnecting = 1; /* * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the * message is of limited size. */ va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); /* Display the error locally */ logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf); /* * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait * for it to get sent. */ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); /* Close the connection. */ ssh_packet_close(ssh); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of * the output. */ int ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int len = sshbuf_len(state->output); - int cont, r; + int r; if (len > 0) { - cont = 0; - len = roaming_write(state->connection_out, - sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len, &cont); + len = write(state->connection_out, + sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len); if (len == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) return 0; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } - if (len == 0 && !cont) + if (len == 0) return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been * written. */ int ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh) { fd_set *setp; int ret, r, ms_remain = 0; struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL; struct session_state *state = ssh->state; setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); if (setp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh); + if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { + free(setp); + return r; + } while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) { memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp); if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; timeoutp = &timeout; } for (;;) { if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); gettimeofday(&start, NULL); } if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1, NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) break; if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } } if (ret == 0) { free(setp); return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; } if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { free(setp); return r; } } free(setp); return 0; } /* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */ int ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) { return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0; } /* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */ int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state->interactive_mode) return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384; else return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024; } void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos) { #ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) return; switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) { # ifdef IP_TOS case AF_INET: debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0) error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:", tos, strerror(errno)); break; # endif /* IP_TOS */ # ifdef IPV6_TCLASS case AF_INET6: debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0) error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:", tos, strerror(errno)); break; # endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */ } #endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */ } /* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */ void ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (state->set_interactive_called) return; state->set_interactive_called = 1; /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */ state->interactive_mode = interactive; /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */ if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) return; set_nodelay(state->connection_in); ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive : qos_bulk); } /* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */ int ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->interactive_mode; } int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (state->set_maxsize_called) { logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d", state->max_packet_size, s); return -1; } if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) { logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s); return -1; } state->set_maxsize_called = 1; debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s); state->max_packet_size = s; return s; } int ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh) { return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts; } void ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka) { ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka; } u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->max_packet_size; } /* * 9.2. Ignored Data Message * * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE * string data * * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques. */ void ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; int r, i; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); rnd >>= 8; } } -#define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) -int -ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh) -{ - struct session_state *state = ssh->state; - - if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) - return 0; - return - (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) || - (state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) || - (state->max_blocks_out && - (state->p_send.blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) || - (state->max_blocks_in && - (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in)) || - (state->rekey_interval != 0 && state->rekey_time + - state->rekey_interval <= monotime()); -} - void -ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t bytes, time_t seconds) +ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, time_t seconds) { - debug3("rekey after %lld bytes, %d seconds", (long long)bytes, + debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %d seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes, (int)seconds); ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes; ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds; } time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh) { time_t seconds; seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval - monotime(); return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds); } void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->server_side = 1; } void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; } void * ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh) { return (void *)ssh->state->input; } void * ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) { return (void *)ssh->state->output; } -/* XXX TODO update roaming to new API (does not work anyway) */ -/* - * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when - * resuming a suspended connection. - */ -void -ssh_packet_backup_state(struct ssh *ssh, - struct ssh *backup_state) -{ - struct ssh *tmp; - - close(ssh->state->connection_in); - ssh->state->connection_in = -1; - close(ssh->state->connection_out); - ssh->state->connection_out = -1; - if (backup_state) - tmp = backup_state; - else - tmp = ssh_alloc_session_state(); - backup_state = ssh; - ssh = tmp; -} - -/* XXX FIXME FIXME FIXME */ -/* - * Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion. - */ -void -ssh_packet_restore_state(struct ssh *ssh, - struct ssh *backup_state) -{ - struct ssh *tmp; - u_int len; - int r; - - tmp = backup_state; - backup_state = ssh; - ssh = tmp; - ssh->state->connection_in = backup_state->state->connection_in; - backup_state->state->connection_in = -1; - ssh->state->connection_out = backup_state->state->connection_out; - backup_state->state->connection_out = -1; - len = sshbuf_len(backup_state->state->input); - if (len > 0) { - if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->input, - backup_state->state->input)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - sshbuf_reset(backup_state->state->input); - add_recv_bytes(len); - } -} - /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ static int ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshcomp *comp; int r, mode; debug("%s: called", __func__); /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */ ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; ssh->state->rekeying = 0; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { if (ssh->state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) continue; comp = &ssh->state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (comp && comp->enabled && (r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */ /* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */ static int kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */ static int newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshcipher_ctx *cc; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct newkeys *newkey; int r; if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? &ssh->state->send_context : &ssh->state->receive_context; if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) return r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) goto out; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0) goto out; r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b); out: - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); + sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* serialize packet state into a blob */ int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char *p; size_t slen, rlen; int r, ssh1cipher; if (!compat20) { ssh1cipher = cipher_get_number(state->receive_context.cipher); slen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->send_context); rlen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->receive_context); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ssh1cipher)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, state->ssh1_key, state->ssh1_keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0 || (r = cipher_get_keyiv(&state->send_context, p, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0 || (r = cipher_get_keyiv(&state->receive_context, p, rlen)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) return r; } slen = cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, NULL); rlen = cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, NULL); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0) return r; if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, p) != (int)slen) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0) return r; if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, p) != (int)rlen) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = ssh_packet_get_compress_state(m, ssh)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0) return r; - if (compat20) { - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, get_sent_bytes())) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, get_recv_bytes())) != 0) - return r; - } return 0; } /* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */ static int newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct newkeys *newkey = NULL; size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen; int r; if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0) goto out; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0) goto out; if (maclen > mac->key_len) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } mac->key_len = maclen; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&comp->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } enc->key_len = keylen; enc->iv_len = ivlen; ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey; newkey = NULL; r = 0; out: - if (newkey != NULL) - free(newkey); - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); + free(newkey); + sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */ static int kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp) { struct kex *kex; int r; if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(struct kex))) == NULL || (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->client_version_string, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->server_version_string, NULL)) != 0) goto out; kex->server = 1; kex->done = 1; r = 0; out: if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) { if (kex != NULL) { - if (kex->my != NULL) - sshbuf_free(kex->my); - if (kex->peer != NULL) - sshbuf_free(kex->peer); + sshbuf_free(kex->my); + sshbuf_free(kex->peer); free(kex); } if (kexp != NULL) *kexp = NULL; } else { *kexp = kex; } return r; } /* * Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization). * Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors. */ int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; const u_char *ssh1key, *ivin, *ivout, *keyin, *keyout, *input, *output; size_t ssh1keylen, rlen, slen, ilen, olen; int r; u_int ssh1cipher = 0; - u_int64_t sent_bytes = 0, recv_bytes = 0; if (!compat20) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ssh1cipher)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ssh1key, &ssh1keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivout, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivin, &rlen)) != 0) return r; if (ssh1cipher > INT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(ssh, ssh1key, ssh1keylen, (int)ssh1cipher); if (cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->send_context) != (int)slen || cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->receive_context) != (int)rlen) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(&state->send_context, ivout)) != 0 || (r = cipher_set_keyiv(&state->receive_context, ivin)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) return r; /* * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we * count from the completion of the authentication. */ state->rekey_time = monotime(); /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */ if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyout, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyin, &rlen)) != 0) return r; if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, NULL) != (int)slen || cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, NULL) != (int)rlen) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; cipher_set_keycontext(&state->send_context, keyout); cipher_set_keycontext(&state->receive_context, keyin); if ((r = ssh_packet_set_compress_state(ssh, m)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0) return r; sshbuf_reset(state->input); sshbuf_reset(state->output); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0) return r; - if (compat20) { - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &sent_bytes)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &recv_bytes)) != 0) - return r; - roam_set_bytes(sent_bytes, recv_bytes); - } if (sshbuf_len(m)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; debug3("%s: done", __func__); return 0; } /* NEW API */ /* put data to the outgoing packet */ int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); } int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b) { return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b); } int sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val) { return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val) { return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val) { return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); } int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v) { return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v) { return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_put_bignum1(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* fetch data from the incoming packet */ int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len) { return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len); } int sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_get_bignum1(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh) { if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0) return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; return 0; } const u_char * sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp) { if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet); } /* start a new packet */ int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type) { u_char buf[9]; int len; DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type)); len = compat20 ? 6 : 9; memset(buf, 0, len - 1); buf[len - 1] = type; sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet); return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, len); } /* send it */ int sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh) { if (compat20) return ssh_packet_send2(ssh); else return ssh_packet_send1(ssh); } int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); if (compat20) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* roundup current message to pad bytes */ int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad) { ssh->state->extra_pad = pad; return 0; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/packet.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/packet.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/packet.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,206 +1,203 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.66 2015/01/30 01:13:33 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.70 2016/02/08 10:57:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Interface for the packet protocol functions. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef PACKET_H #define PACKET_H #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ # define BIGNUM void # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" struct kex; struct sshkey; struct sshbuf; struct session_state; /* private session data */ #include "dispatch.h" /* typedef, DISPATCH_MAX */ struct key_entry { TAILQ_ENTRY(key_entry) next; struct sshkey *key; }; struct ssh { /* Session state */ struct session_state *state; /* Key exchange */ struct kex *kex; /* cached remote ip address and port*/ char *remote_ipaddr; int remote_port; /* Dispatcher table */ dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX]; /* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */ int dispatch_skip_packets; /* datafellows */ int compat; /* Lists for private and public keys */ TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) private_keys; TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) public_keys; /* APP data */ void *app_data; }; struct ssh *ssh_alloc_session_state(void); struct ssh *ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *, int, int); void ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *, int, int); int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *, const u_char *, u_int, int); +int ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *, u_int); u_int ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_start_compression(struct ssh *, int); void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *, int); void ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *, int, int, int); int ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_send1(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type); int ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *, u_char *); int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len); int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); int ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); const void *ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr); void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((noreturn)); void ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *, int mode); void ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *, u_int64_t *, u_int64_t *); typedef void *(ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func)(void *, u_int, u_int); typedef void (ssh_packet_comp_free_func)(void *, void *); void ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(struct ssh *, void *, ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *, ssh_packet_comp_free_func *); int ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *, int); void tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *); void tty_parse_modes(int, int *); void ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *, int); int ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int); u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); const char *ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *); +int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *); -int ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *); -void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int32_t, time_t); +void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, time_t); time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *); - -/* XXX FIXME */ -void ssh_packet_backup_state(struct ssh *, struct ssh *); -void ssh_packet_restore_state(struct ssh *, struct ssh *); void *ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *); void *ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *); /* new API */ int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type); int sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh); int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *, u_char); void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r); int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len); int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b); int sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val); int sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val); int sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val); int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len); int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v); int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v); int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); int sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v); int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v); int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len); int sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp); int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp); int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp); int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); int sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v); int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v); int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh); const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp); /* OLD API */ extern struct ssh *active_state; #include "opacket.h" #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) # undef BIGNUM # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #endif #endif /* PACKET_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/platform-pledge.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/platform-pledge.c (nonexistent) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/platform-pledge.c (revision 296853) @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc + * Author: Alex Wilson + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "platform.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" + +/* + * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup + * operation of ssh-agent + * + * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", ...) + */ +void +platform_pledge_agent(void) +{ +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS + /* + * Note: Solaris priv dropping is closer to tame() than pledge(), but + * we will use what we have. + */ + solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(); +#endif +} + +/* + * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup + * operation of sftp-server + */ +void +platform_pledge_sftp_server(void) +{ +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS + solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(); +#endif +} + +/* + * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for the post-startup + * operation of the SSH client mux + * + * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio proc tty", ...) + */ +void +platform_pledge_mux(void) +{ +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS + solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(); +#endif +} Property changes on: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/platform-pledge.c ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/platform.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/platform.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/platform.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,33 +1,38 @@ /* $Id: platform.h,v 1.9 2013/09/22 09:02:40 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include void platform_pre_listen(void); void platform_pre_fork(void); void platform_pre_restart(void); void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid); void platform_post_fork_child(void); int platform_privileged_uidswap(void); void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *); void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *); char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *); char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *); int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t); + +/* in platform-pledge.c */ +void platform_pledge_agent(void); +void platform_pledge_sftp_server(void); +void platform_pledge_mux(void); Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/readconf.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/readconf.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/readconf.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2439 +1,2493 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.239 2015/07/30 00:01:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.250 2016/02/08 23:40:12 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "version.h" /* Format of the configuration file: # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order # that they are given in. Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi User foo Host fake.com HostName another.host.name.real.org User blaah Port 34289 ForwardX11 no ForwardAgent no Host books.com RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999 Cipher 3des Host fascist.blob.com Port 23123 User tylonen PasswordAuthentication no Host puukko.hut.fi User t35124p ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p Host *.fr PublicKeyAuthentication no Host *.su Cipher none PasswordAuthentication no Host vpn.fake.com Tunnel yes TunnelDevice 3 # Defaults for various options Host * ForwardAgent no ForwardX11 no PasswordAuthentication yes RSAAuthentication yes RhostsRSAAuthentication yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes TcpKeepAlive no IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity Port 22 EscapeChar ~ */ /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { oBadOption, oVersionAddendum, oHost, oMatch, oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout, oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure, oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication, oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation, oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, + oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oUser, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand, oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression, oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs, oPubkeyAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider, oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, - oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, + oVisualHostKey, oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes, oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported } OpCodes; /* Textual representations of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; OpCodes opcode; } keywords[] = { { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted }, { "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout }, { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure }, { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation }, { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts }, { "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort }, { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices }, { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication }, { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication }, { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, { "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, #endif { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, { "usersh", oDeprecated }, { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */ { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly }, + { "certificatefile", oCertificateFile }, + { "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent }, { "hostname", oHostName }, { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, { "port", oPort }, { "cipher", oCipher }, { "ciphers", oCiphers }, { "macs", oMacs }, { "protocol", oProtocol }, { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward }, { "localforward", oLocalForward }, { "user", oUser }, { "host", oHost }, { "match", oMatch }, { "escapechar", oEscapeChar }, { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile }, { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts }, { "batchmode", oBatchMode }, { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP }, { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking }, { "compression", oCompression }, { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel }, { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, { "loglevel", oLogLevel }, { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward }, { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, #else { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, #endif { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost }, { "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit }, { "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout }, { "addressfamily", oAddressFamily }, { "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval }, { "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax }, { "sendenv", oSendEnv }, { "controlpath", oControlPath }, { "controlmaster", oControlMaster }, { "controlpersist", oControlPersist }, { "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts }, { "tunnel", oTunnel }, { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice }, { "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, - { "useroaming", oUseRoaming }, + { "useroaming", oDeprecated }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass }, { "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains }, { "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal }, { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname }, { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots }, { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs }, { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink }, { "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys }, { "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash }, { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys }, { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes }, { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, { "hpndisabled", oDeprecated }, { "hpnbuffersize", oDeprecated }, { "tcprcvbufpoll", oDeprecated }, { "tcprcvbuf", oDeprecated }, { "noneenabled", oUnsupported }, { "noneswitch", oUnsupported }, { "versionaddendum", oVersionAddendum }, { NULL, oBadOption } }; /* * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an * error. */ void add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT extern uid_t original_real_uid; int ipport_reserved; #ifdef __FreeBSD__ size_t len_ipport_reserved = sizeof(ipport_reserved); if (sysctlbyname("net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh", &ipport_reserved, &len_ipport_reserved, NULL, 0) != 0) ipport_reserved = IPPORT_RESERVED; else ipport_reserved++; #else ipport_reserved = IPPORT_RESERVED; #endif if (newfwd->listen_port < ipport_reserved && original_real_uid != 0) if (newfwd->listen_port < ipport_reserved && original_real_uid != 0 && newfwd->listen_path == NULL) fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root."); #endif options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards, options->num_local_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->local_forwards)); fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; } /* * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is * an error. */ void add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards, options->num_remote_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->remote_forwards)); fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; fwd->handle = newfwd->handle; fwd->allocated_port = 0; } static void clear_forwardings(Options *options) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) { free(options->local_forwards); options->local_forwards = NULL; } options->num_local_forwards = 0; for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) { free(options->remote_forwards); options->remote_forwards = NULL; } options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; } void +add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided) +{ + int i; + + if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) + fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)", + SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); + + /* Avoid registering duplicates */ + for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) { + if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && + strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) { + debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path); + return; + } + } + + options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] = + userprovided; + options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] = + xstrdup(path); +} + +void add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename, int userprovided) { char *path; int i; if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)", SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */ path = xstrdup(filename); else (void)xasprintf(&path, "%.100s%.100s", dir, filename); /* Avoid registering duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) { if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) { debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path); free(path); return; } } options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] = userprovided; options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path; } int default_ssh_port(void) { static int port; struct servent *sp; if (port == 0) { sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; } return port; } /* * Execute a command in a shell. * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit. */ static int execute_in_shell(const char *cmd) { - char *shell, *command_string; + char *shell; pid_t pid; int devnull, status; extern uid_t original_real_uid; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; - /* - * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms - * (e.g. Solaris) - */ - xasprintf(&command_string, "exec %s", cmd); - /* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd); /* Fork and execute the command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[4]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid); /* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; - argv[2] = command_string; + argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd); argv[3] = NULL; execv(argv[0], argv); error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno)); /* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); kill(getpid(), SIGTERM); _exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(devnull); - free(command_string); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd); return -1; } debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); return WEXITSTATUS(status); } /* * Parse and execute a Match directive. */ static int match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int post_canon, const char *filename, int linenum) { char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria; const char *ruser; int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; /* * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we * must be prepared to use default values. */ port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port; ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user; - if (options->hostname != NULL) { + if (post_canon) { + host = xstrdup(options->hostname); + } else if (options->hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */ host = percent_expand(options->hostname, "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL); - } else + } else { host = xstrdup(host_arg); + } debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s", cp, host, original_host); while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { criteria = NULL; this_result = 1; if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!')) attrib++; /* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined " "with other Match attributes", filename, linenum, oattrib); result = -1; goto out; } if (result) result = negate ? 0 : 1; goto out; } attributes++; if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0) { r = !!post_canon; /* force bitmask member to boolean */ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'", filename, linenum, this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib); continue; } /* All other criteria require an argument */ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(host); r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(original_host); r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(ruser); r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) { if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port); cmd = percent_expand(arg, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", original_host, "p", portstr, "r", ruser, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); if (result != 1) { /* skip execution if prior predicate failed */ debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec " "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd); free(cmd); continue; } r = execute_in_shell(cmd); if (r == -1) { fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec " "'%.100s' error", filename, linenum, cmd); } criteria = xstrdup(cmd); free(cmd); /* Force exit status to boolean */ r = r == 0; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ", filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ", oattrib, criteria); free(criteria); } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); result = -1; goto out; } out: if (result != -1) debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; free(host); return result; } /* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */ static void valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum) { size_t i, l = strlen(name); u_char c, last = '\0'; if (l == 0) fatal("%s line %d: empty hostname suffix", filename, linenum); if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" " "starts with invalid character", filename, linenum, name); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { c = tolower((u_char)name[i]); name[i] = (char)c; if (last == '.' && c == '.') fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains " "consecutive separators", filename, linenum, name); if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) && c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains " "invalid characters", filename, linenum, name); last = c; } if (name[l - 1] == '.') name[l - 1] = '\0'; } /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. */ static OpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, const char *ignored_unknown) { int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) return keywords[i].opcode; if (ignored_unknown != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1) return oIgnoredUnknownOption; error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return oBadOption; } /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { "ask", 2 }, { NULL, -1 } }; +static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = { + { "true", 1 }, + { "false", 0 }, + { "yes", 1 }, + { "no", 0 }, + { "ask", 2 }, + { "confirm", 3 }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = { { "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO }, { "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK }, { "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = { { "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET }, { "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT }, { "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = { { "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE }, { "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = { { "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS }, { NULL, -1 } }; /* * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This * only sets those values that have not already been set. */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" int process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags) { char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2; char **cpptr, fwdarg[256]; u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0; int negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; long long val64; size_t len; struct Forward fwd; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; struct allowed_cname *cname; if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } /* Strip trailing whitespace */ if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) return 0; for (len--; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } s = line; /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ if (*keyword == '\0') keyword = strdelim(&s); if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') return 0; /* Match lowercase keyword */ lowercase(keyword); opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, options->ignored_unknown); switch (opcode) { case oBadOption: /* don't panic, but count bad options */ return -1; /* NOTREACHED */ case oIgnoredUnknownOption: debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; case oConnectTimeout: intptr = &options->connection_timeout; parse_time: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = -1; else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardAgent: intptr = &options->forward_agent; parse_flag: multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; parse_multistate: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardX11: intptr = &options->forward_x11; goto parse_flag; case oForwardX11Trusted: intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted; goto parse_flag; case oForwardX11Timeout: intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout; goto parse_time; case oGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; goto parse_flag; case oExitOnForwardFailure: intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure; goto parse_flag; case oUsePrivilegedPort: intptr = &options->use_privileged_port; goto parse_flag; case oPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveDevices: charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices; goto parse_string; case oPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oRhostsRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oChallengeResponseAuthentication: intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssDelegateCreds: intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; goto parse_flag; case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; case oCheckHostIP: intptr = &options->check_host_ip; goto parse_flag; case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oStrictHostKeyChecking: intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oCompression: intptr = &options->compression; goto parse_flag; case oTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost: intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost; goto parse_flag; case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts: intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts; goto parse_int; case oCompressionLevel: intptr = &options->compression_level; goto parse_int; case oRekeyLimit: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); - /* check for too-large or too-small limits */ - if (val64 > UINT_MAX) - fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large", - filename, linenum); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) - options->rekey_limit = (u_int32_t)val64; + options->rekey_limit = val64; if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) { (void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case oIdentityFile: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { intptr = &options->num_identity_files; if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); add_identity_file(options, NULL, arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); } break; + case oCertificateFile: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep) { + intptr = &options->num_certificate_files; + if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) { + fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate " + "files specified (max %d).", + filename, linenum, + SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); + } + add_certificate_file(options, arg, + flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); + } + break; + case oXAuthLocation: charptr=&options->xauth_location; goto parse_string; case oUser: charptr = &options->user; parse_string: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oGlobalKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; parse_char_array: if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authorized keys files.", filename, linenum); cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg); } } return 0; case oUserKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; goto parse_char_array; case oHostName: charptr = &options->hostname; goto parse_string; case oHostKeyAlias: charptr = &options->host_key_alias; goto parse_string; case oPreferredAuthentications: charptr = &options->preferred_authentications; goto parse_string; case oBindAddress: charptr = &options->bind_address; goto parse_string; case oPKCS11Provider: charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider; goto parse_string; case oProxyCommand: charptr = &options->proxy_command; parse_command: if (s == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "="); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(s + len); return 0; case oPort: intptr = &options->port; parse_int: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9') fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0); if (arg == endofnumber) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oConnectionAttempts: intptr = &options->connection_attempts; goto parse_int; case oCipher: intptr = &options->cipher; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = cipher_number(arg); if (value == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oCiphers: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case oMacs: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case oKexAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case oHostKeyAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; parse_keytypes: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oProtocol: intptr = &options->protocol; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = proto_spec(arg); if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) *intptr = value; break; case oLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = strdelim(&s); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case oLocalForward: case oRemoteForward: case oDynamicForward: arg = strdelim(&s); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.", filename, linenum); if (opcode == oLocalForward || opcode == oRemoteForward) { arg2 = strdelim(&s); if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.", filename, linenum); /* construct a string for parse_forward */ snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2); } else if (opcode == oDynamicForward) { strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg)); } if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, opcode == oDynamicForward ? 1 : 0, opcode == oRemoteForward ? 1 : 0) == 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { if (opcode == oLocalForward || opcode == oDynamicForward) add_local_forward(options, &fwd); else if (opcode == oRemoteForward) add_remote_forward(options, &fwd); } break; case oClearAllForwardings: intptr = &options->clear_forwardings; goto parse_flag; case oHost: if (cmdline) fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); *activep = 0; arg2 = NULL; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { negated = *arg == '!'; if (negated) arg++; if (match_pattern(host, arg)) { if (negated) { debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host " "block because of negated match " "for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg); *activep = 0; break; } if (!*activep) arg2 = arg; /* logged below */ *activep = 1; } } if (*activep) debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg2); /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */ return 0; case oMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host, original_host, flags & SSHCONF_POSTCANON, filename, linenum); if (value < 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = value; break; case oEscapeChar: intptr = &options->escape_char; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else if (arg[1] == '\0') value = (u_char) arg[0]; else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128) value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31; else { fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.", filename, linenum); /* NOTREACHED */ value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */ } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; goto parse_multistate; case oEnableSSHKeysign: intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign; goto parse_flag; case oIdentitiesOnly: intptr = &options->identities_only; goto parse_flag; case oServerAliveInterval: intptr = &options->server_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case oServerAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case oSendEnv: while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; if (options->num_send_env >= MAX_SEND_ENV) fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.", filename, linenum); options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oControlPath: charptr = &options->control_path; goto parse_string; case oControlMaster: intptr = &options->control_master; multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster; goto parse_multistate; case oControlPersist: /* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */ intptr = &options->control_persist; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist" " argument.", filename, linenum); value = 0; value2 = 0; /* timeout */ if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0) value = 0; else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0) value = 1; else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0) value = 1; else fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { *intptr = value; options->control_persist_timeout = value2; } break; case oHashKnownHosts: intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case oTunnel: intptr = &options->tun_open; multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel; goto parse_multistate; case oTunnelDevice: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = a2tun(arg, &value2); if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { options->tun_local = value; options->tun_remote = value2; } break; case oLocalCommand: charptr = &options->local_command; goto parse_command; case oPermitLocalCommand: intptr = &options->permit_local_command; goto parse_flag; case oVisualHostKey: intptr = &options->visual_host_key; goto parse_flag; case oIPQoS: arg = strdelim(&s); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); arg = strdelim(&s); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; - case oUseRoaming: - intptr = &options->use_roaming; - goto parse_flag; - case oRequestTTY: intptr = &options->request_tty; multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty; goto parse_multistate; case oVersionAddendum: if (s == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { if (strcasecmp(s + len, "none") == 0) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); else if (strchr(s + len, '\r') != NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument", filename, linenum); else options->version_addendum = xstrdup(s + len); } return 0; case oIgnoreUnknown: charptr = &options->ignored_unknown; goto parse_string; case oProxyUseFdpass: intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass; goto parse_flag; case oCanonicalDomains: value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { valid_domain(arg, filename, linenum); if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.", filename, linenum); options->canonical_domains[ options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs: value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { /* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */ if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0) arg2 = arg; else { lowercase(arg); if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL || arg2[1] == '\0') { fatal("%s line %d: " "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"", filename, linenum, arg); } *arg2 = '\0'; arg2++; } if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.", filename, linenum); cname = options->permitted_cnames + options->num_permitted_cnames++; cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg); cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2); } break; case oCanonicalizeHostname: intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname; multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname; goto parse_multistate; case oCanonicalizeMaxDots: intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots; goto parse_int; case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal: intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local; goto parse_flag; case oStreamLocalBindMask: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", filename, linenum); /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8); if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case oStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case oRevokedHostKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys; goto parse_string; case oFingerprintHash: intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oUpdateHostkeys: intptr = &options->update_hostkeys; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oHostbasedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types; goto parse_keytypes; case oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types; goto parse_keytypes; + case oAddKeysToAgent: + intptr = &options->add_keys_to_agent; + multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoaskconfirm; + goto parse_multistate; + case oDeprecated: debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; case oUnsupported: error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; default: fatal("%s: Unimplemented opcode %d", __func__, opcode); } /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", filename, linenum, arg); } return 0; } /* * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. */ int read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags) { FILE *f; char line[1024]; int active, linenum; int bad_options = 0; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return 0; if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) { struct stat sb; if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); } debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); /* * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned * on/off by Host specifications. */ active = 1; linenum = 0; while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { /* Update line number counter. */ linenum++; if (process_config_line(options, pw, host, original_host, line, filename, linenum, &active, flags) != 0) bad_options++; } fclose(f); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); return 1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } /* * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. */ void initialize_options(Options * options) { memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options)); options->version_addendum = NULL; options->forward_agent = -1; options->forward_x11 = -1; options->forward_x11_trusted = -1; options->forward_x11_timeout = -1; options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->use_privileged_port = -1; options->rsa_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->batch_mode = -1; options->check_host_ip = -1; options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; options->compression = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->compression_level = -1; options->port = -1; options->address_family = -1; options->connection_attempts = -1; options->connection_timeout = -1; options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; options->cipher = -1; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; options->num_identity_files = 0; + options->num_certificate_files = 0; options->hostname = NULL; options->host_key_alias = NULL; options->proxy_command = NULL; options->user = NULL; options->escape_char = -1; options->num_system_hostfiles = 0; options->num_user_hostfiles = 0; options->local_forwards = NULL; options->num_local_forwards = 0; options->remote_forwards = NULL; options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->clear_forwardings = -1; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->preferred_authentications = NULL; options->bind_address = NULL; options->pkcs11_provider = NULL; options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; options->identities_only = - 1; options->rekey_limit = - 1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->verify_host_key_dns = -1; options->server_alive_interval = -1; options->server_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_send_env = 0; options->control_path = NULL; options->control_master = -1; options->control_persist = -1; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; options->hash_known_hosts = -1; options->tun_open = -1; options->tun_local = -1; options->tun_remote = -1; options->local_command = NULL; options->permit_local_command = -1; - options->use_roaming = 0; + options->add_keys_to_agent = -1; options->visual_host_key = -1; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->request_tty = -1; options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1; options->ignored_unknown = NULL; options->num_canonical_domains = 0; options->num_permitted_cnames = 0; options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1; options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1; options->canonicalize_hostname = -1; options->revoked_host_keys = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; options->update_hostkeys = -1; options->hostbased_key_types = NULL; options->pubkey_key_types = NULL; } /* * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed. */ void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options) { if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; } /* * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. */ void fill_default_options(Options * options) { if (options->forward_agent == -1) options->forward_agent = 0; if (options->forward_x11 == -1) options->forward_x11 = 0; if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1) options->forward_x11_trusted = 0; if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1) options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200; if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1) options->exit_on_forward_failure = 0; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH; if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->use_privileged_port == -1) options->use_privileged_port = 0; if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) options->rsa_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->batch_mode == -1) options->batch_mode = 0; if (options->check_host_ip == -1) options->check_host_ip = 0; if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1) options->strict_host_key_checking = 2; /* 2 is default */ if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = 0; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->compression_level == -1) options->compression_level = 6; if (options->port == -1) options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */ if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->connection_attempts == -1) options->connection_attempts = 1; if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; /* Selected in ssh_login(). */ if (options->cipher == -1) options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET; /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; + if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) + options->add_keys_to_agent = 0; if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, 0); } if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0); #endif add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0); } } if (options->escape_char == -1) options->escape_char = '~'; if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) { options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE); options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) { options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->clear_forwardings == 1) clear_forwardings(options); if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1) options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; if (options->identities_only == -1) options->identities_only = 0; if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1) options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0; if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; #if HAVE_LDNS if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) /* automatically trust a verified SSHFP record */ options->verify_host_key_dns = 1; #else if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) options->verify_host_key_dns = 0; #endif if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) options->server_alive_interval = 0; if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) options->server_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->control_master == -1) options->control_master = 0; if (options->control_persist == -1) { options->control_persist = 0; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; } if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1) options->hash_known_hosts = 0; if (options->tun_open == -1) options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->tun_local == -1) options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->tun_remote == -1) options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->permit_local_command == -1) options->permit_local_command = 0; - options->use_roaming = 0; if (options->visual_host_key == -1) options->visual_host_key = 0; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; if (options->request_tty == -1) options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO; if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1) options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0; if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; if (options->update_hostkeys == -1) options->update_hostkeys = 0; if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, &options->macs) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, &options->kex_algorithms) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &options->hostbased_key_types) != 0 || kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &options->pubkey_key_types) != 0) fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__); #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys); /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */ /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */ if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD); } struct fwdarg { char *arg; int ispath; }; /* * parse_fwd_field * parses the next field in a port forwarding specification. * sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon * or sets it to NULL at end of string. * returns 0 on success, else non-zero. */ static int parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd) { char *ep, *cp = *p; int ispath = 0; if (*cp == '\0') { *p = NULL; return -1; /* end of string */ } /* * A field escaped with square brackets is used literally. * XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash? */ if (*cp == '[') { /* find matching ']' */ for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) { if (*ep == '/') ispath = 1; } /* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */ if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0')) return -1; /* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */ *ep++ = '\0'; if (*ep != '\0') *ep++ = '\0'; fwd->arg = cp + 1; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = ep; return 0; } for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { switch (*cp) { case '\\': memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1); if (*cp == '\0') return -1; break; case '/': ispath = 1; break; case ':': *cp++ = '\0'; goto done; } } done: fwd->arg = *p; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = cp; return 0; } /* * parse_forward * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form: * dynamicfwd == 0 * [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath * listenpath:connectpath * dynamicfwd == 1 * [listenhost:]listenport * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error */ int parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd) { struct fwdarg fwdargs[4]; char *p, *cp; int i; memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd)); memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs)); cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec); /* skip leading spaces */ while (isspace((u_char)*cp)) cp++; for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0) break; } /* Check for trailing garbage */ if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { i = 0; /* failure */ } switch (i) { case 1: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); } fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); break; case 2: if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); } break; case 3: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } break; case 4: fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg); break; default: i = 0; /* failure */ } free(p); if (dynamicfwd) { if (!(i == 1 || i == 2)) goto fail_free; } else { if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) { if (fwd->connect_path == NULL && fwd->listen_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) || (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0)) goto fail_free; if (fwd->connect_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; /* XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not match this host */ if (fwd->connect_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; return (i); fail_free: free(fwd->connect_host); fwd->connect_host = NULL; free(fwd->connect_path); fwd->connect_path = NULL; free(fwd->listen_host); fwd->listen_host = NULL; free(fwd->listen_path); fwd->listen_path = NULL; return (0); } /* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */ static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case oAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: case oStrictHostKeyChecking: case oUpdateHostkeys: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask); case oControlMaster: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster); case oTunnel: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel); case oRequestTTY: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty); case oCanonicalizeHostname: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname); case oFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); case oProtocol: switch (val) { case SSH_PROTO_1: return "1"; case SSH_PROTO_2: return "2"; case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2): return "2,1"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static const char * lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } static void dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) { if (val == NULL) return; printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); printf("\n"); } static void dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds) { const struct Forward *fwd; u_int i; /* oDynamicForward */ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { fwd = &fwds[i]; if (code == oDynamicForward && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0) continue; if (code == oLocalForward && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0) continue; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path); else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } if (code != oDynamicForward) { if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path); else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); } } printf("\n"); } } void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) { int i; char vbuf[5]; + /* This is normally prepared in ssh_kex2 */ + if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &o->hostkeyalgorithms) != 0) + fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__); + /* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */ dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user); dump_cfg_string(oHostName, host); dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port); /* Flag options */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family); dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname); dump_cfg_fmtint(oChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master); dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign); dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure); dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds); #endif /* GSSAPI */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command); dump_cfg_fmtint(oProtocol, o->protocol); dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open); dump_cfg_fmtint(oUsePrivilegedPort, o->use_privileged_port); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key); dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys); /* Integer options */ dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots); dump_cfg_int(oCompressionLevel, o->compression_level); dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts); dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout); dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval); /* String options */ dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address); dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT); dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path); - dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms ? o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); + dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms); dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias); dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types); dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices); dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_CLIENT_KEX); dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command); dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC); dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider); dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications); dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command); + dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types); dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys); dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); /* Forwards */ dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards); /* String array options */ dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env); /* Special cases */ /* oConnectTimeout */ if (o->connection_timeout == -1) printf("connecttimeout none\n"); else dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout); /* oTunnelDevice */ printf("tunneldevice"); if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(" any"); else printf(" %d", o->tun_local); if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(":any"); else printf(":%d", o->tun_remote); printf("\n"); /* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */ if ( o->num_permitted_cnames > 0) { printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames"); for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) { printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list, o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list); } printf("\n"); } /* oCipher */ if (o->cipher != SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) printf("Cipher %s\n", cipher_name(o->cipher)); /* oControlPersist */ if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0) dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist); else dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout); /* oEscapeChar */ if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) printf("escapechar none\n"); else { vis(vbuf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0); printf("escapechar %s\n", vbuf); } /* oIPQoS */ printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); /* oRekeyLimit */ - printf("rekeylimit %lld %d\n", - (long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); + printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", + (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); /* oStreamLocalBindMask */ printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n", o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/readconf.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/readconf.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/readconf.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,201 +1,207 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.110 2015/07/10 06:21:53 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.113 2016/01/14 16:17:40 markus Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration file. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef READCONF_H #define READCONF_H /* Data structure for representing option data. */ #define MAX_SEND_ENV 256 #define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32 #define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32 #define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path) struct allowed_cname { char *source_list; char *target_list; }; typedef struct { int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */ int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */ int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */ int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */ int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */ char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ int use_privileged_port; /* Don't use privileged port if false. */ int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* Try rhosts with RSA * authentication. */ int rsa_authentication; /* Try RSA authentication. */ int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ int challenge_response_authentication; /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ int password_authentication; /* Try password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */ int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */ int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */ int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */ int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */ int compression_level; /* Compression level 1 (fast) to 9 * (best). */ int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */ int port; /* Port to connect. */ int address_family; int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before * giving up */ int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before * aborting connection attempt */ int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password * prompts. */ int cipher; /* Cipher to use. */ char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */ char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ int protocol; /* Protocol in order of preference. */ char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ char *user; /* User to log in as. */ int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */ u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */ char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */ char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; char *preferred_authentications; char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */ char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */ int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */ int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */ char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + int num_certificate_files; /* Number of extra certificates for ssh. */ + char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + + int add_keys_to_agent; + /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */ int num_local_forwards; struct Forward *local_forwards; /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */ int num_remote_forwards; struct Forward *remote_forwards; int clear_forwardings; int enable_ssh_keysign; int64_t rekey_limit; int rekey_interval; int no_host_authentication_for_localhost; int identities_only; int server_alive_interval; int server_alive_count_max; int num_send_env; char *send_env[MAX_SEND_ENV]; char *control_path; int control_master; int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */ int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */ int hash_known_hosts; int tun_open; /* tun(4) */ int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */ int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */ char *local_command; int permit_local_command; int visual_host_key; - int use_roaming; - int request_tty; int proxy_use_fdpass; int num_canonical_domains; char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; int canonicalize_hostname; int canonicalize_max_dots; int canonicalize_fallback_local; int num_permitted_cnames; struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; char *revoked_host_keys; int fingerprint_hash; int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */ char *hostbased_key_types; char *pubkey_key_types; char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */ char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */ } Options; #define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0 #define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1 #define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4 #define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0 #define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1 #define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2 #define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3 #define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */ #define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */ #define SSHCONF_POSTCANON 4 /* After hostname canonicalisation */ #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0 #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1 #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2 void initialize_options(Options *); void fill_default_options(Options *); void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *); int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int); int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, Options *, int); int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int); int default_ssh_port(void); int option_clear_or_none(const char *); void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host); void add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); void add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int); +void add_certificate_file(Options *, const char *, int); #endif /* READCONF_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/readpass.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/readpass.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/readpass.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,193 +1,193 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.50 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.51 2015/12/11 00:20:04 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "misc.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "uidswap.h" static char * ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg) { pid_t pid, ret; size_t len; char *pass; int p[2], status; char buf[1024]; void (*osigchld)(int); if (fflush(stdout) != 0) error("ssh_askpass: fflush: %s", strerror(errno)); if (askpass == NULL) fatal("internal error: askpass undefined"); if (pipe(p) < 0) { error("ssh_askpass: pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); return NULL; } osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { error("ssh_askpass: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); return NULL; } if (pid == 0) { permanently_drop_suid(getuid()); close(p[0]); if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); - execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *) 0); + execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *)NULL); fatal("ssh_askpass: exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno)); } close(p[1]); len = 0; do { ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len); if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; if (r <= 0) break; len += r; } while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0); buf[len] = '\0'; close(p[0]); while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) < 0) if (errno != EINTR) break; signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); return NULL; } buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; pass = xstrdup(buf); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); return pass; } /* * Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the * passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If * RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no * tty is available */ char * read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags) { char *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024]; int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd; rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF; if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) use_askpass = 1; else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) { if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty"); use_askpass = 1; } } else { rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY; ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR); if (ttyfd >= 0) close(ttyfd); else { debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY, strerror(errno)); use_askpass = 1; } } if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL) return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup(""); if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) { if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV)) askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV); else askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT; if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt)) == NULL) if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)) return xstrdup(""); return ret; } if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) { if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) return NULL; return xstrdup(""); } ret = xstrdup(buf); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); return ret; } int ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; char *p, prompt[1024]; int allowed = 0; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args); va_end(args); p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF); if (p != NULL) { /* * Accept empty responses and responses consisting * of the word "yes" as affirmative. */ if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' || strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0) allowed = 1; free(p); } return (allowed); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,221 +1,222 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.81 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.82 2015/09/24 06:16:53 djm Exp $ REGRESS_TARGETS= unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t-exec tests: prep $(REGRESS_TARGETS) # Interop tests are not run by default interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop prep: test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out clean: for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done test -z "${SUDO}" || ${SUDO} rm -f ${SUDO_CLEAN} rm -rf $(OBJ).putty distclean: clean LTESTS= connect \ proxy-connect \ connect-privsep \ proto-version \ proto-mismatch \ exit-status \ envpass \ transfer \ banner \ rekey \ stderr-data \ stderr-after-eof \ broken-pipe \ try-ciphers \ yes-head \ login-timeout \ agent \ agent-getpeereid \ agent-timeout \ agent-ptrace \ keyscan \ keygen-change \ keygen-convert \ key-options \ scp \ sftp \ sftp-chroot \ sftp-cmds \ sftp-badcmds \ sftp-batch \ sftp-glob \ sftp-perm \ reconfigure \ dynamic-forward \ forwarding \ multiplex \ reexec \ brokenkeys \ cfgparse \ cfgmatch \ addrmatch \ localcommand \ forcecommand \ portnum \ keytype \ kextype \ cert-hostkey \ cert-userkey \ host-expand \ keys-command \ forward-control \ integrity \ krl \ multipubkey \ limit-keytype \ hostkey-agent \ keygen-knownhosts \ hostkey-rotate \ - principals-command + principals-command \ + cert-file # dhgex \ INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp #LTESTS= cipher-speed USER!= id -un CLEANFILES= t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \ t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub t10.out t10.out.pub \ t12.out t12.out.pub \ authorized_keys_${USER} known_hosts pidfile testdata \ ssh_config sshd_config.orig ssh_proxy sshd_config sshd_proxy \ rsa.pub rsa rsa1.pub rsa1 host.rsa host.rsa1 \ rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub \ ls.copy banner.in banner.out empty.in \ scp-ssh-wrapper.scp ssh_proxy_envpass remote_pid \ sshd_proxy_bak rsa_ssh2_cr.prv rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv \ known_hosts-cert host_ca_key* cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \ putty.rsa2 sshd_proxy_orig ssh_proxy_bak \ key.rsa-* key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* \ authorized_principals_${USER} expect actual ready \ sshd_proxy.* authorized_keys_${USER}.* modpipe revoked-* krl-* \ ssh.log failed-ssh.log sshd.log failed-sshd.log \ regress.log failed-regress.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh \ sftp-server.sh sftp-server.log sftp.log setuid-allowed \ data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent.pub key.ed25519-512 \ key.ed25519-512.pub netcat host_krl_* host_revoked_* \ kh.* user_*key* agent-key.* known_hosts.* hkr.* SUDO_CLEAN+= /var/run/testdata_${USER} /var/run/keycommand_${USER} # Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX" TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen CPPFLAGS=-I.. t1: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv t2: cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t3: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t4: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok t5: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok t6: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2 chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2 $(OBJ)/t7.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@ t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t8.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@ t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t9.out: test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@ t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t10.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@ t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null t11: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok $(OBJ)/t12.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@ t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done # Not run by default interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS} # Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile unit: set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \ V="" ; \ test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \ V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \ fi Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,61 +1,66 @@ # $OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.2 2014/02/27 21:21:25 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="disallow agent ptrace attach" if have_prog uname ; then case `uname` in AIX|CYGWIN*|OSF1) echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)" exit 0 ;; esac fi +if [ "x$USER" = "xroot" ]; then + echo "Skipped: running as root" + exit 0 +fi + if have_prog gdb ; then : ok else echo "skipped (gdb not found)" exit 0 fi if $OBJ/setuid-allowed ${SSHAGENT} ; then : ok else echo "skipped (${SSHAGENT} is mounted on a no-setuid filesystem)" exit 0 fi if test -z "$SUDO" ; then echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" exit 0 else $SUDO chown 0 ${SSHAGENT} $SUDO chgrp 0 ${SSHAGENT} $SUDO chmod 2755 ${SSHAGENT} fi trace "start agent" eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" else # ls -l ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK} gdb ${SSHAGENT} ${SSH_AGENT_PID} > ${OBJ}/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF quit EOF r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "gdb failed: exit code $r" fi egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null ${OBJ}/gdb.out r=$? rm -f ${OBJ}/gdb.out if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ptrace succeeded?: exit code $r" fi trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null fi Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh (nonexistent) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh (revision 296853) @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.2 2015/09/24 07:15:39 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="ssh with certificates" + +rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* +rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key* + +# Create a CA key +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key1 ||\ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key2 ||\ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" + +# Make some keys and certificates. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +# Move the certificate to a different address to better control +# when it is offered. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 || + fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1" +mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 || + fail "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2" +mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub + +trace 'try with identity files' +opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes" +opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2" +echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + +for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do + # Just keys should fail + ${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 5$p + r=$? + if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then + fail "ssh succeeded with no certs in protocol $p" + fi + + # Keys with untrusted cert should fail. + opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" + ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p + r=$? + if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then + fail "ssh succeeded with bad cert in protocol $p" + fi + + # Good cert with bad key should fail. + opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2" + opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" + ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p + r=$? + if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then + fail "ssh succeeded with no matching key in protocol $p" + fi + + # Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed. + opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" + ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then + fail "ssh failed with trusted cert and key in protocol $p" + fi + + # Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed. + opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" + opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" + ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then + fail "ssh failed with multiple certs in protocol $p" + fi + + #Keys with trusted certificate specified in config options, should succeed. + opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" + ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then + fail "ssh failed with trusted cert in config in protocol $p" + fi +done + +#next, using an agent in combination with the keys +SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then + fatal "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2" +fi + +trace "start agent" +eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" +fi + +# add private keys to agent +${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key2 > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0" +fi +${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key1 > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0" +fi + +# try ssh with the agent and certificates +# note: ssh agent only uses certificates in protocol 2 +opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" +# with no certificates, shoud fail +${SSH} -2 $opts somehost exit 52 +if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with agent in protocol 2 succeeded with no cert" +fi + +#with an untrusted certificate, should fail +opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" +${SSH} -2 $opts somehost exit 52 +if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with agent in protocol 2 succeeded with bad cert" +fi + +#with an additional trusted certificate, should succeed +opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" +${SSH} -2 $opts somehost exit 52 +if [ $? -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with agent in protocol 2 failed with good cert" +fi + +trace "kill agent" +${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null + +#cleanup +rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* +rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key* Property changes on: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:executable ## -0,0 +1 ## +* \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/check-perm.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/check-perm.c (nonexistent) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/check-perm.c (revision 296853) @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +/* + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H +#include +#endif + +static void +fatal(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); + fputc('\n', stderr); + va_end(args); + exit(1); +} +/* Based on session.c. NB. keep tests in sync */ +static void +safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid) +{ + const char *cp; + char component[PATH_MAX]; + struct stat st; + + if (*path != '/') + fatal("chroot path does not begin at root"); + if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component)) + fatal("chroot path too long"); + + /* + * Descend the path, checking that each component is a + * root-owned directory with strict permissions. + */ + for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) { + if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL) + strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component)); + else { + cp++; + memcpy(component, path, cp - path); + component[cp - path] = '\0'; + } + + /* debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); */ + + if (stat(component, &st) != 0) + fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, + component, strerror(errno)); + if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) + fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot " + "directory %s\"%s\"", + cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); + if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) + fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory", + cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); + + } + + if (chdir(path) == -1) + fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": " + "%s", path, strerror(errno)); +} + +/* from platform.c */ +int +platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid) +{ + if (uid == 0) + return 1; +#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID + if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID) + return 1; +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* from auth.c */ +int +auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, + uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) +{ + char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; + char *cp; + int comparehome = 0; + struct stat st; + + if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) + comparehome = 1; + + if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); + return -1; + } + if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || + (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", + buf); + return -1; + } + + /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ + for (;;) { + if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); + return -1; + } + strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); + + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || + (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, + "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); + return -1; + } + + /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ + if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) + break; + + /* + * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, + * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too + */ + if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "check-perm -m [chroot | keys-command] [path]\n"); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const char *path = "."; + char errmsg[256]; + int ch, mode = -1; + extern char *optarg; + extern int optind; + struct stat st; + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hm:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'm': + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "chroot") == 0) + mode = 1; + else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "keys-command") == 0) + mode = 2; + else { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid -m option\n"), + usage(); + } + break; + default: + usage(); + } + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc > 1) + usage(); + else if (argc == 1) + path = argv[0]; + + if (mode == 1) + safely_chroot(path, getuid()); + else if (mode == 2) { + if (stat(path, &st) < 0) + fatal("Could not stat %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); + if (auth_secure_path(path, &st, NULL, 0, + errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) + fatal("Unsafe %s: %s", path, errmsg); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mode\n"); + usage(); + } + return 0; +} Property changes on: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/check-perm.c ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,58 +1,60 @@ -# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.2 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.3 2015/10/23 02:22:01 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="dhgex" LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} rm -f ${LOG} cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange` ssh_test_dhgex() { bits="$1"; shift cipher="$1"; shift kex="$1"; shift cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "KexAlgorithms=$kex" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Ciphers=$cipher" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy rm -f ${LOG} opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher" - groupsz="1024<$bits<8192" + min=2048 + max=8192 + groupsz="$min<$bits<$max" verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher" ${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed ($@)" fi # check what we request grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null if [ $? != 0 ]; then got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}` fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got" fi # check what we got (depends on contents of system moduli file) gotbits="`awk '/bits set:/{print $4}' ${LOG} | head -1 | cut -f2 -d/`" if [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits" fi } check() { bits="$1"; shift for c in $@; do for k in $kexs; do ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k done done } #check 2048 3des-cbc check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128` check 3072 arcfour blowfish-cbc check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192` check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256` check 8192 rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,128 +1,110 @@ -# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.4 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.5 2015/09/04 04:23:10 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="hostkey rotate" # Need full names here since they are used in HostKeyAlgorithms HOSTKEY_TYPES="ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ssh-ed25519 ssh-rsa ssh-dss" rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy rm $OBJ/known_hosts trace "prepare hostkeys" nkeys=0 all_algs="" for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1` test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs}," all_algs="${all_algs}$k" done dossh() { # All ssh should succeed in this test ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed" } expect_nkeys() { _expected=$1 _message=$2 _n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed" [ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)" } check_key_present() { _type=$1 _kfile=$2 test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub" _kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \ fatal "awk failed" fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null } cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no" >$OBJ/known_hosts dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-ed25519 -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no # Verify no additional keys learned expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys" check_key_present ssh-ed25519 || fail "unstrict didn't learn key" # Connect to sshd as usual verbose "learn additional hostkeys" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs # Check that other keys learned expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn keys" # Check each key type for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k" check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k" done # Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey" mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old rm -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs # Check that the key was replaced expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" # Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect verbose "learn new primary hostkey" ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new ) \ > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Check new hostkey added dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "current key missing" check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub || fail "new key missing" # Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd verbose "rotate primary hostkey" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa # Check old hostkey removed dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" # Connect again, forcing rotated key verbose "check rotate primary hostkey" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" - -# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.4 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $ -# Placed in the Public Domain. - -tid="hostkey rotate" - -# Prepare hostkeys file with one key - -# Connect to sshd - -# Check that other keys learned - -# Change one hostkey (non primary) - -# Connect to sshd - -# Check that the key was replaced - Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,76 +1,82 @@ # $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/21 06:40:02 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="authorized keys from command" if test -z "$SUDO" ; then echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" exit 0 fi rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args touch $OBJ/keys-command-args chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/rsa.pub` expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/rsa.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` # Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have # acceptable directory permissions. KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}" cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'" #!/bin/sh echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7 test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 if test $# -eq 6 ; then test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2 test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3 test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4 test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5 test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6 fi exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}" _EOF $SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND" +if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $KEY_COMMAND ; then + echo "skipping: $KEY_COMMAND is unsuitable as AuthorizedKeysCommand" + $SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND + exit 0 +fi + if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments" ( grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak echo AuthorizedKeysFile none echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "connect failed" fi verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments" # Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed. ( grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak echo AuthorizedKeysFile none echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "connect failed" fi else echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)" fi $SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/keyscan.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/keyscan.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/keyscan.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,24 +1,24 @@ -# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.5 2015/09/11 03:44:21 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="keyscan" # remove DSA hostkey rm -f ${OBJ}/host.dsa start_sshd -KEYTYPES="rsa dsa" +KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain` if ssh_version 1; then KEYTYPES="${KEYTYPES} rsa1" fi for t in $KEYTYPES; do trace "keyscan type $t" ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \ > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh-keyscan -t $t failed with: $r" fi done Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/limit-keytype.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/limit-keytype.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/limit-keytype.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,80 +1,97 @@ -# $OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.1 2015/01/13 07:49:49 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.4 2015/10/29 08:05:17 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="restrict pubkey type" rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key* mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig # Create a CA key ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" # Make some keys and a certificate. ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \ fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \ -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key3 || fatal "couldn't sign user_key1" # Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when # it is offered. mv $OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub -cp -p $OBJ/user_key3 $OBJ/cert_user_key3 grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes" -fullopts="$opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2" +certopts="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub" echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER prepare_config() { ( grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo "Protocol 2" echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey" echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" for x in "$@" ; do echo "$x" done ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy } prepare_config # Check we can log in with all key types. -${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 proxy true || fatal "cert failed" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed" # Allow plain Ed25519 and RSA. The certificate should fail. -verbose "privsep=$privsep allow rsa,ed25519" +verbose "allow rsa,ed25519" prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-rsa,ssh-ed25519" -${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed" # Allow Ed25519 only. -verbose "privsep=$privsep allow ed25519" +verbose "allow ed25519" prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-ed25519" -${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded" # Allow all certs. Plain keys should fail. -verbose "privsep=$privsep allow cert only" +verbose "allow cert only" prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-*-cert-v01@openssh.com" -${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key3 proxy true || fatal "cert failed" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded" ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded" + +# Allow RSA in main config, Ed25519 for non-existent user. +verbose "match w/ no match" +prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-rsa" \ + "Match user x$USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-ed25519" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed" + +# Allow only DSA in main config, Ed25519 for user. +verbose "match w/ matching" +prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-dss" \ + "Match user $USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-ed25519" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key4 proxy true && fatal "key4 succeeded" Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,145 +1,152 @@ # $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.1 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="authorized principals command" rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak if test -z "$SUDO" ; then echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" exit 0 fi # Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have # acceptable directory permissions. PRINCIPALS_CMD="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}" cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_CMD'" #!/bin/sh test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" && exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" _EOF test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command" $SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_CMD" +if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $PRINCIPALS_CMD ; then + echo "skipping: $PRINCIPALS_CMD is unsuitable as " \ + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand" + $SUDO rm -f $PRINCIPALS_CMD + exit 0 +fi + # Create a CA key and a user certificate. ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \ fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed" ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \ -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key" if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_CMD ]; then # Test explicitly-specified principals for privsep in yes no ; do _prefix="privsep $privsep" # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none" echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_CMD %u" echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}" echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # XXX test missing command # XXX test failing command # Empty authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals" echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Wrong authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals" echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Correct authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals" echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi # authorized_principals with bad key option verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt" echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # authorized_principals with command=false verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false" echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # authorized_principals with command=true verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true" echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi # Setup for principals= key option rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Wrong principals list verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option" ( printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" fi # Correct principals list verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option" ( printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" fi done else echo "SKIPPED: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND not executable " \ "(/var/run mounted noexec?)" fi Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/proxy-connect.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/proxy-connect.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/proxy-connect.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,31 +1,32 @@ -# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.8 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.9 2016/02/17 02:24:17 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="proxy connect" mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig for ps in no yes; do cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do for c in no yes; do verbose "plain username protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c" opts="-$p -oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c failed" fi if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then - fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c" + fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c: " \ + "$SSH_CONNECTION" fi done done done for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do verbose "username with style protocol $p" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \ fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed" done Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/rekey.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/rekey.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/rekey.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,170 +1,172 @@ -# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.16 2015/02/14 12:43:16 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.17 2016/01/29 05:18:15 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="rekey" LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} rm -f ${LOG} cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak # Test rekeying based on data volume only. # Arguments will be passed to ssh. ssh_data_rekeying() { _kexopt=$1 ; shift _opts="$@" if ! test -z "$_kexopts" ; then cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "$_kexopt" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy _opts="$_opts -o$_kexopt" fi rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} _opts="$_opts -oCompression=no" ${SSH} <${DATA} $_opts -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed ($@)" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy ($@)" n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occured ($@)" fi } increase_datafile_size 300 opts="" for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i" done for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do opts="$opts Ciphers=$i" done for i in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do opts="$opts MACs=$i" done for opt in $opts; do verbose "client rekey $opt" ssh_data_rekeying "$opt" -oRekeyLimit=256k done # AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do verbose "client rekey $c $kex" ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c done done fi for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}" ssh_data_rekeying "" -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s done for s in 5 10; do verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s}" rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} < ${DATA} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 3" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occured" fi done for s in 5 10; do verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s} no data" rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occured" fi done for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do verbose "server rekeylimit ${s}" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "rekeylimit ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat ${DATA}" \ > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occured" fi done for s in 5 10; do verbose "server rekeylimit default ${s} no data" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "rekeylimit default ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occured" fi done verbose "rekeylimit parsing" -for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G; do +for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G 4G 8G; do for time in 1 1m 1M 1h 1H 1d 1D 1w 1W; do case $size in 16) bytes=16 ;; 1k|1K) bytes=1024 ;; 1m|1M) bytes=1048576 ;; 1g|1G) bytes=1073741824 ;; + 4g|4G) bytes=4294967296 ;; + 8g|8G) bytes=8589934592 ;; esac case $time in 1) seconds=1 ;; 1m|1M) seconds=60 ;; 1h|1H) seconds=3600 ;; 1d|1D) seconds=86400 ;; 1w|1W) seconds=604800 ;; esac b=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \ awk '/rekeylimit/{print $2}'` s=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \ awk '/rekeylimit/{print $3}'` if [ "$bytes" != "$b" ]; then fatal "rekeylimit size: expected $bytes bytes got $b" fi if [ "$seconds" != "$s" ]; then fatal "rekeylimit time: expected $time seconds got $s" fi done done rm -f ${COPY} ${DATA} Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/setuid-allowed.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/setuid-allowed.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/setuid-allowed.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,57 +1,57 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* $OpenBSD$ */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H # include #endif #include #include #include -void +static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "check-setuid [path]\n"); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { const char *path = "."; struct statvfs sb; if (argc > 2) usage(); else if (argc == 2) path = argv[1]; if (statvfs(path, &sb) != 0) { /* Don't return an error if the host doesn't support statvfs */ if (errno == ENOSYS) return 0; fprintf(stderr, "statvfs for \"%s\" failed: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); } return (sb.f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? 1 : 0; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh (revision 296853) @@ -1,26 +1,31 @@ # $OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.4 2014/01/20 00:00:30 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sftp in chroot" CHROOT=/var/run FILENAME=testdata_${USER} PRIVDATA=${CHROOT}/${FILENAME} if [ -z "$SUDO" ]; then echo "skipped: need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" exit 0 fi +if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m chroot "$CHROOT" ; then + echo "skipped: $CHROOT is unsuitable as ChrootDirectory" + exit 0 +fi + $SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \ fatal "create $PRIVDATA failed" start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /" verbose "test $tid: get" ${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \ fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed" cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ" $SUDO rm $PRIVDATA Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,460 +1,452 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.4 2015/07/07 14:53:30 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.5 2015/10/06 01:20:59 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 # include #endif #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "common.h" void sshkey_file_tests(void); void sshkey_file_tests(void) { struct sshkey *k1, *k2; struct sshbuf *buf, *pw; BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; char *cp; TEST_START("load passphrase"); pw = load_text_file("pw"); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 TEST_START("parse RSA1 from private"); buf = load_file("rsa1_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "rsa1_1", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); a = load_bignum("rsa1_1.param.n"); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a); BN_free(a); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse RSA1 from private w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("rsa1_1_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "rsa1_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load RSA1 from public"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa1_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("RSA1 key hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("rsa1_1.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("RSA1 key bubblebabble fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("rsa1_1.fp.bb"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(k1); #endif TEST_START("parse RSA from private"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "rsa_1", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n"); b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p"); c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q"); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->p, b); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->q, c); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse RSA from private w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("rsa_1_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "rsa_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format"); buf = load_file("rsa_n"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - "", "rsa_n", &k2, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("rsa_n_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "rsa_n_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load RSA from public"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load RSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("RSA key hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("RSA cert hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("rsa_1-cert.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("RSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp.bb"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_START("parse DSA from private"); buf = load_file("dsa_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "dsa_1", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g"); b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv"); c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub"); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->g, a); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, b); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->pub_key, c); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse DSA from private w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("dsa_1_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "dsa_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format"); buf = load_file("dsa_n"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - "", "dsa_n", &k2, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("dsa_n_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "dsa_n_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load DSA from public"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load DSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_DSA_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("DSA key hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("DSA cert hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("dsa_1-cert.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("DSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp.bb"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(k1); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "ecdsa_1", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.param.curve"); ASSERT_STRING_EQ((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf), OBJ_nid2sn(k1->ecdsa_nid)); sshbuf_free(buf); a = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.priv"); b = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.pub"); c = EC_POINT_point2bn(EC_KEY_get0_group(k1->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k1->ecdsa), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(c, NULL); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), a); ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(b, c); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "ecdsa_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_n"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - "", "ecdsa_n", &k2, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_n_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "ecdsa_n_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load ECDSA from public"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load ECDSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ECDSA key hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ECDSA cert hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1-cert.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("ECDSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp.bb"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(k1); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "ed25519_1", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519); /* XXX check key contents */ TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private w/ passphrase"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1_pw"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "ed25519_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load Ed25519 from public"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("load Ed25519 cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k2), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_CERT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("Ed25519 key hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("Ed25519 cert hex fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1-cert.fp"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("Ed25519 key bubblebabble fingerprint"); buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp.bb"); cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); sshbuf_free(buf); free(cp); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(pw); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,411 +1,403 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.4 2015/03/04 23:22:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.6 2015/12/07 02:20:46 djm Exp $ */ /* * Fuzz tests for key parsing * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 # include #endif #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "common.h" void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void); static void onerror(void *fuzz) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n"); fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz); } static void public_fuzz(struct sshkey *k) { struct sshkey *k1; struct sshbuf *buf; struct fuzz *fuzz; ASSERT_PTR_NE(buf = sshbuf_new(), NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k, buf), 0); /* XXX need a way to run the tests in "slow, but complete" mode */ fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */ FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | */ FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), &k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { if (sshkey_from_blob(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), &k1) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); } fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); } static void -sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k) +sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k, const char *sig_alg) { struct fuzz *fuzz; u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed"; size_t l; - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), sig_alg, 0), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */ FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, sig, l); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), 0), 0); free(sig); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { /* Ensure 1-bit difference at least */ if (fuzz_matches_original(fuzz)) continue; ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), c, sizeof(c), 0), 0); } fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); } void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void) { struct sshkey *k1; struct sshbuf *buf, *fuzzed; struct fuzz *fuzz; int r; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 TEST_START("fuzz RSA1 private"); buf = load_file("rsa1_1"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", - &k1, NULL) == 0) + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz RSA1 public"); buf = load_file("rsa1_1_pw"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buf, &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); if (sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(fuzzed, &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("fuzz RSA private"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", - &k1, NULL) == 0) + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz RSA new-format private"); buf = load_file("rsa_n"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", - &k1, NULL) == 0) + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz DSA private"); buf = load_file("dsa_1"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", - &k1, NULL) == 0) + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz DSA new-format private"); buf = load_file("dsa_n"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", - &k1, NULL) == 0) + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA private"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", - &k1, NULL) == 0) + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA new-format private"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_n"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", - &k1, NULL) == 0) + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 private"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_free(buf); ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", - &k1, NULL) == 0) + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) sshkey_free(k1); sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); } sshbuf_free(fuzzed); fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz RSA public"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz RSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz DSA public"); buf = load_file("dsa_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz DSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k1), 0); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA public"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k1), 0); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 public"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 cert"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k1), 0); public_fuzz(k1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); - sig_fuzz(k1); + sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa"); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); + TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-256"); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA512 sig"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-512"); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig"); buf = load_file("dsa_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); - sig_fuzz(k1); + sig_fuzz(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig"); buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); - sig_fuzz(k1); + sig_fuzz(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 sig"); buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", - &k1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(buf); - sig_fuzz(k1); + sig_fuzz(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); /* XXX fuzz decoded new-format blobs too */ } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,521 +1,541 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.7 2015/08/05 05:27:33 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.9 2015/12/07 02:20:46 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) # include #endif #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "common.h" #include "ssh2.h" void sshkey_tests(void); static void put_opt(struct sshbuf *b, const char *name, const char *value) { struct sshbuf *sect; sect = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sect, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, name), 0); if (value != NULL) ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, value), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, sect), 0); sshbuf_free(sect); } static void build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, const struct sshkey *k, const char *type, - const struct sshkey *sign_key, const struct sshkey *ca_key) + const struct sshkey *sign_key, const struct sshkey *ca_key, + const char *sig_alg) { struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts; u_char *sigblob; size_t siglen; ca_buf = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0); /* * Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping * the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/ */ pk = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(pk, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb_plain(k, pk), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0); principals = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(principals, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0); critopts = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(critopts, NULL); put_opt(critopts, "force-command", "/usr/local/bin/nethack"); put_opt(critopts, "source-address", "192.168.0.0/24,127.0.0.1,::1"); exts = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(exts, NULL); put_opt(critopts, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen, - sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 0), 0); + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */ free(sigblob); sshbuf_free(ca_buf); sshbuf_free(exts); sshbuf_free(critopts); sshbuf_free(principals); sshbuf_free(pk); } static void -signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const u_char *d, size_t l) +signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg, + const u_char *d, size_t l) { size_t len; u_char *sig; - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, 0), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0); /* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */ sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10; ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0); free(sig); } static void banana(u_char *s, size_t l) { size_t o; const u_char the_banana[] = { 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a' }; for (o = 0; o < l; o += sizeof(the_banana)) { if (l - o < sizeof(the_banana)) { memcpy(s + o, "nanananana", l - o); break; } memcpy(s + o, banana, sizeof(the_banana)); } } static void -signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad) +signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg) { u_char i, buf[2049]; size_t lens[] = { 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 127, 128, 129, 255, 256, 257, 1023, 1024, 1025, 2047, 2048, 2049 }; for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(lens)/sizeof(lens[0])); i++) { test_subtest_info("%s key, banana length %zu", sshkey_type(k), lens[i]); banana(buf, lens[i]); - signature_test(k, bad, buf, lens[i]); + signature_test(k, bad, sig_alg, buf, lens[i]); } } static struct sshkey * get_private(const char *n) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *ret; b = load_file(n); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", n, &ret, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &ret, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } void sshkey_tests(void) { struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *k4, *kr, *kd, *kf; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC struct sshkey *ke; #endif struct sshbuf *b; TEST_START("new invalid"); k1 = sshkey_new(-42); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA1"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL); /* Can't allocate without NID */ sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); /* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new_private KEY_RSA"); k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->p, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new_private KEY_DSA"); k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_DSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 767, &kr), SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->p, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(kr->rsa->n), 1024); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->g, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->priv_key, NULL); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kr, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kd, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(ke, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid); ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kf, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal mismatched key types"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0); #endif ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal different keys"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); #endif ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(kr); sshkey_free(kd); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sshkey_free(ke); #endif sshkey_free(kf); TEST_START("certify key"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k1, NULL), 0); k2 = get_private("ed25519_2"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_certified(k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert, NULL); k1->cert->type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; k1->cert->serial = 1234; k1->cert->key_id = strdup("estragon"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->key_id, NULL); k1->cert->principals = calloc(4, sizeof(*k1->cert->principals)); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals, NULL); k1->cert->principals[0] = strdup("estragon"); k1->cert->principals[1] = strdup("vladimir"); k1->cert->principals[2] = strdup("pozzo"); k1->cert->principals[3] = strdup("lucky"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[0], NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[1], NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[2], NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[3], NULL); k1->cert->valid_after = 0; k1->cert->valid_before = (u_int64_t)-1; k1->cert->critical = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->critical, NULL); k1->cert->extensions = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->extensions, NULL); put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "force-command", "/usr/bin/true"); put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "source-address", "127.0.0.1"); put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL); put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-agent-forwarding", NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(k2, &k1->cert->signature_key), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2), 0); b = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k1, b), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k3), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); sshkey_free(k3); sshbuf_reset(b); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sign and verify RSA"); k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); - signature_tests(k1, k2); + signature_tests(k1, k2, "ssh-rsa"); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); + TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA256"); + k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-256"); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA512"); + k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-512"); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + TEST_START("sign and verify DSA"); k1 = get_private("dsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); - signature_tests(k1, k2); + signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("sign and verify ECDSA"); k1 = get_private("ecdsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); - signature_tests(k1, k2); + signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("sign and verify ED25519"); k1 = get_private("ed25519_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); - signature_tests(k1, k2); + signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("nested certificate"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); k3 = get_private("rsa_1"); - build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1); + build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4), SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); sshkey_free(k3); sshbuf_free(b); TEST_DONE(); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/roaming.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: roaming.h,v 1.6 2011/12/07 05:44:38 djm Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR - * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN - * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF - * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#ifndef ROAMING_H -#define ROAMING_H - -#define DEFAULT_ROAMBUF 65536 -#define MAX_ROAMBUF (2*1024*1024) /* XXX arbitrary */ -#define ROAMING_REQUEST "roaming@appgate.com" - -extern int roaming_enabled; -extern int resume_in_progress; - -void request_roaming(void); -int get_snd_buf_size(void); -int get_recv_buf_size(void); -void add_recv_bytes(u_int64_t); -int wait_for_roaming_reconnect(void); -void roaming_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *); -void set_out_buffer_size(size_t); -ssize_t roaming_write(int, const void *, size_t, int *); -ssize_t roaming_read(int, void *, size_t, int *); -size_t roaming_atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t); -u_int64_t get_recv_bytes(void); -u_int64_t get_sent_bytes(void); -void roam_set_bytes(u_int64_t, u_int64_t); -void resend_bytes(int, u_int64_t *); -void calculate_new_key(u_int64_t *, u_int64_t, u_int64_t); -int resume_kex(void); - -#endif /* ROAMING */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-pledge.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-pledge.c (nonexistent) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-pledge.c (revision 296853) @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-pledge.c,v 1.1 2015/10/09 01:37:08 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Theo de Raadt + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_PLEDGE + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +struct ssh_sandbox { + pid_t child_pid; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *m) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + debug3("%s: preparing pledge sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + box->child_pid = 0; + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s: pledge()", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + box->child_pid = child_pid; + /* Nothing to do here */ +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_PLEDGE */ Property changes on: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-pledge.c ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,318 +1,321 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production, * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context. * * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures. * E.g. * auditctl -a task,always -F uid= */ /* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */ /* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG /* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */ # include # define __have_siginfo_t 1 # define __have_sigval_t 1 # define __have_sigevent_t 1 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* for offsetof */ #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */ #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)) #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \ /* load first syscall argument */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */ #ifdef __NR_fstat SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_fstat64 SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_open SC_DENY(open, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_openat SC_DENY(openat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_newfstatat SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_stat SC_DENY(stat, EACCES), #endif #ifdef __NR_stat64 SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES), #endif /* Syscalls to permit */ #ifdef __NR_brk SC_ALLOW(brk), #endif #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime), #endif #ifdef __NR_close SC_ALLOW(close), #endif #ifdef __NR_exit SC_ALLOW(exit), #endif #ifdef __NR_exit_group SC_ALLOW(exit_group), #endif #ifdef __NR_getpgid SC_ALLOW(getpgid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getpid SC_ALLOW(getpid), #endif +#ifdef __NR_getrandom + SC_ALLOW(getrandom), +#endif #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday), #endif #ifdef __NR_madvise SC_ALLOW(madvise), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap SC_ALLOW(mmap), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap2 SC_ALLOW(mmap2), #endif #ifdef __NR_mremap SC_ALLOW(mremap), #endif #ifdef __NR_munmap SC_ALLOW(munmap), #endif #ifdef __NR__newselect SC_ALLOW(_newselect), #endif #ifdef __NR_poll SC_ALLOW(poll), #endif #ifdef __NR_pselect6 SC_ALLOW(pselect6), #endif #ifdef __NR_read SC_ALLOW(read), #endif #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask), #endif #ifdef __NR_select SC_ALLOW(select), #endif #ifdef __NR_shutdown SC_ALLOW(shutdown), #endif #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask), #endif #ifdef __NR_time SC_ALLOW(time), #endif #ifdef __NR_write SC_ALLOW(write), #endif #ifdef __NR_socketcall SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), #endif /* Default deny */ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), }; static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = { .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])), .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns, }; struct ssh_sandbox { pid_t child_pid; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; /* * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. */ debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->child_pid = 0; return box; } #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG extern struct monitor *pmonitor; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx); static void ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) { char msg[256]; snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)", __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr); mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor); _exit(1); } static void ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void) { struct sigaction act; sigset_t mask; debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__); memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); sigemptyset(&mask); sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation; act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { struct rlimit rl_zero; int nnp_failed = 0; /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(); #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) { debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); nnp_failed = 1; } debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1) debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); else if (nnp_failed) fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but " "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { box->child_pid = child_pid; } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-solaris.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-solaris.c (nonexistent) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-solaris.c (revision 296853) @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc + * Author: Alex Wilson + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SOLARIS +#ifndef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS +# error "--with-solaris-privs must be used with the Solaris sandbox" +#endif + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H +# include +#endif + +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +struct ssh_sandbox { + priv_set_t *pset; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; + + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + + /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */ + box->pset = solaris_basic_privset(); + + if (box->pset == NULL) { + free(box); + return NULL; + } + + /* Drop everything except the ability to use already-opened files */ + if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || +#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 || + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) { + free(box); + return NULL; + } + + /* These may not be available on older Solaris-es */ +# if defined(PRIV_FILE_READ) && defined(PRIV_FILE_WRITE) + if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_READ) != 0 || + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_WRITE) != 0) { + free(box); + return NULL; + } +# endif + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, box->pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, box->pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, box->pset) != 0) + fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + priv_freeset(box->pset); + box->pset = NULL; + free(box); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + /* Nothing to do here */ +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_SOLARIS */ Property changes on: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-solaris.c ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,212 +1,218 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.17 2015/07/27 16:29:23 guenther Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.18 2015/10/02 01:39:26 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct sandbox_policy { int syscall; int action; }; /* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */ static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = { - { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#ifdef SYS_kbind + { SYS_kbind, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#endif + + { SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + #ifdef SYS_getentropy /* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */ { SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #else /* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */ { SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #endif - { SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, -#ifdef SYS_kbind - { SYS_kbind, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog + { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #endif + { SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER }, + { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, -#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog - { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, -#endif - { SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + + { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER }, + { -1, -1 } }; struct ssh_sandbox { int systrace_fd; pid_t child_pid; void (*osigchld)(int); }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->systrace_fd = -1; box->child_pid = 0; box->osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { debug3("%s: ready", __func__); signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0) fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid()); debug3("%s: started", __func__); } static void ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid, const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls) { int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status; pid_t pid; struct systrace_policy policy; /* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */ debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); do { pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED); } while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR); signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) { if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d", __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); if (WIFEXITED(status)) fatal("%s: child exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__); } debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid); box->child_pid = child_pid; /* Set up systracing of child */ if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__, dev_systrace, strerror(errno)); close(dev_systrace); debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd); if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno)); /* Allocate and assign policy */ memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy)); policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW; policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL; if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN; policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid; if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); /* Set per-syscall policy */ for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) { found = 0; for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) { if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) { found = 1; break; } } policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY; policy.strp_code = i; policy.strp_policy = found ? allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL; if (found) debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i); if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); } /* Signal the child to start running */ debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0) fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { /* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */ close(box->systrace_fd); free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy); } #endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/scp.1 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/scp.1 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/scp.1 (revision 296853) @@ -1,242 +1,243 @@ .\" .\" scp.1 .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.67 2015/07/10 06:21:53 markus Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.68 2015/09/25 18:19:54 jmc Exp $ .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: July 10 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 25 2015 $ .Dt SCP 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm scp .Nd secure copy (remote file copy program) .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm scp .Bk -words .Op Fl 12346BCpqrv .Op Fl c Ar cipher .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl l Ar limit .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option .Op Fl P Ar port .Op Fl S Ar program .Sm off .Oo .Op Ar user No @ .Ar host1 : .Oc Ar file1 .Sm on .Ar ... .Sm off .Oo .Op Ar user No @ .Ar host2 : .Oc Ar file2 .Sm on .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm copies files between hosts on a network. It uses .Xr ssh 1 for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security as .Xr ssh 1 . .Nm will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for authentication. .Pp File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate that the file is to be copied to/from that host. Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid .Nm treating file names containing .Sq :\& as host specifiers. Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 1 Forces .Nm to use protocol 1. .It Fl 2 Forces .Nm to use protocol 2. .It Fl 3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host. Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the progress meter. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases). .It Fl C Compression enable. Passes the .Fl C flag to .Xr ssh 1 to enable compression. .It Fl c Ar cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl F Ar ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for .Nm ssh . This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl l Ar limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. .It Fl o Ar ssh_option Can be used to pass options to .Nm ssh in the format used in .Xr ssh_config 5 . This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate .Nm scp command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs +.It CertificateFile .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Cipher .It Ciphers .It Compression .It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It HostName .It IdentityFile .It IdentitiesOnly .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LogLevel .It MACs .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It RhostsRSAAuthentication .It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It UpdateHostKeys .It UsePrivilegedPort .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .El .It Fl P Ar port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that this option is written with a capital .Sq P , because .Fl p is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file. .It Fl p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original file. .It Fl q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that .Nm follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. .It Fl S Ar program Name of .Ar program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand .Xr ssh 1 options. .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm and .Xr ssh 1 to print debugging messages about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. .El .Sh EXIT STATUS .Ex -std scp .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh HISTORY .Nm is based on the rcp program in .Bx source code from the Regents of the University of California. .Sh AUTHORS .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/scp.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/scp.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/scp.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1351 +1,1361 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.182 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.184 2015/11/27 00:49:31 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). * * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.) * * 1995 Timo Rinne , Tatu Ylonen * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Parts from: * * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "progressmeter.h" extern char *__progname; #define COPY_BUFLEN 16384 int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout); int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout); /* Struct for addargs */ arglist args; arglist remote_remote_args; /* Bandwidth limit */ long long limit_kbps = 0; struct bwlimit bwlimit; /* Name of current file being transferred. */ char *curfile; /* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */ int verbose_mode = 0; /* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped * through this process. */ int throughlocal = 0; /* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */ pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1; static void killchild(int signo) { if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); } if (signo) _exit(1); exit(1); } static void suspchild(int signo) { int status; if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo); while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); } } static int do_local_cmd(arglist *a) { u_int i; int status; pid_t pid; if (a->num == 0) fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments"); if (verbose_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "Executing:"); for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { execvp(a->list[0], a->list); perror(a->list[0]); exit(1); } do_cmd_pid = pid; signal(SIGTERM, killchild); signal(SIGINT, killchild); signal(SIGHUP, killchild); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); do_cmd_pid = -1; if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) return (-1); return (0); } /* * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success. */ int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) { int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2]; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); /* * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below. */ if (pipe(reserved) < 0) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pipe(pout) < 0) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Free the reserved descriptors. */ close(reserved[0]); close(reserved[1]); signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ do_cmd_pid = fork(); if (do_cmd_pid == 0) { /* Child. */ close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); dup2(pin[0], 0); dup2(pout[1], 1); close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ close(pin[0]); *fdout = pin[1]; close(pout[1]); *fdin = pout[0]; signal(SIGTERM, killchild); signal(SIGINT, killchild); signal(SIGHUP, killchild); return 0; } /* * This functions executes a command simlar to do_cmd(), but expects the * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd(). * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected. */ int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout) { pid_t pid; int status; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { dup2(fdin, 0); dup2(fdout, 1); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } typedef struct { size_t cnt; char *buf; } BUF; BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int); void lostconn(int); int okname(char *); void run_err(const char *,...); void verifydir(char *); struct passwd *pwd; uid_t userid; int errs, remin, remout; int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; #define CMDNEEDS 64 char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ int response(void); void rsource(char *, struct stat *); void sink(int, char *[]); void source(int, char *[]); void tolocal(int, char *[]); void toremote(char *, int, char *[]); void usage(void); int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n; char *targ, **newargv; const char *errstr; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* Copy argv, because we modify it */ newargv = xcalloc(MAX(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv)); for (n = 0; n < argc; n++) newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]); argv = newargv; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args)); args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-x"); addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); fflag = tflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) switch (ch) { /* User-visible flags. */ case '1': case '2': case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); break; case '3': throughlocal = 1; break; case 'o': case 'c': case 'i': case 'F': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'P': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-p"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); addargs(&args, "-p"); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'B': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN); break; case 'p': pflag = 1; break; case 'r': iamrecursive = 1; break; case 'S': ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'v': addargs(&args, "-v"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v"); verbose_mode = 1; break; case 'q': addargs(&args, "-q"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q"); showprogress = 0; break; /* Server options. */ case 'd': targetshouldbedirectory = 1; break; case 'f': /* "from" */ iamremote = 1; fflag = 1; break; case 't': /* "to" */ iamremote = 1; tflag = 1; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(0, O_BINARY); #endif break; default: usage(); } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid); if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; + if (pflag) { + /* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */ + } else { + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec", + NULL) == -1) { + perror("pledge"); + exit(1); + } + } + remin = STDIN_FILENO; remout = STDOUT_FILENO; if (fflag) { /* Follow "protocol", send data. */ (void) response(); source(argc, argv); exit(errs != 0); } if (tflag) { /* Receive data. */ sink(argc, argv); exit(errs != 0); } if (argc < 2) usage(); if (argc > 2) targetshouldbedirectory = 1; remin = remout = -1; do_cmd_pid = -1; /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); if ((targ = colon(argv[argc - 1]))) /* Dest is remote host. */ toremote(targ, argc, argv); else { if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(argv[argc - 1]); tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */ } /* * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked * and no error has occurred yet */ if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) { if (remin != -1) (void) close(remin); if (remout != -1) (void) close(remout); if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1) errs = 1; else { if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) errs = 1; } } exit(errs != 0); } /* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */ static int scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s) { off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt; *cnt += s; if (limit_kbps > 0) bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s); return 0; } static int do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb) { /* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */ char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2]; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n", (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime), (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime)); if (verb) { fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n", (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime); fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf); } (void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf)); return (response()); } void toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv) { char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser, *arg; arglist alist; int i; u_int j; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; *targ++ = 0; if (*targ == 0) targ = "."; arg = xstrdup(argv[argc - 1]); if ((thost = strrchr(arg, '@'))) { /* user@host */ *thost++ = 0; tuser = arg; if (*tuser == '\0') tuser = NULL; } else { thost = arg; tuser = NULL; } if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) { free(arg); return; } for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { src = colon(argv[i]); if (src && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */ *src++ = 0; if (*src == 0) src = "."; host = strrchr(argv[i], '@'); if (host) { *host++ = 0; host = cleanhostname(host); suser = argv[i]; if (*suser == '\0') suser = pwd->pw_name; else if (!okname(suser)) continue; } else { host = cleanhostname(argv[i]); suser = NULL; } xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); host = cleanhostname(thost); xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); if (do_cmd2(host, tuser, bp, remin, remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); (void) close(remin); (void) close(remout); remin = remout = -1; } else if (src) { /* standard remote to remote */ freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&alist, "-x"); addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); addargs(&alist, "-n"); for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { addargs(&alist, "%s", remote_remote_args.list[j]); } *src++ = 0; if (*src == 0) src = "."; host = strrchr(argv[i], '@'); if (host) { *host++ = 0; host = cleanhostname(host); suser = argv[i]; if (*suser == '\0') suser = pwd->pw_name; else if (!okname(suser)) continue; addargs(&alist, "-l"); addargs(&alist, "%s", suser); } else { host = cleanhostname(argv[i]); } addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", host); addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd); addargs(&alist, "%s", src); addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s", tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", thost, targ); if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0) errs = 1; } else { /* local to remote */ if (remin == -1) { xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); host = cleanhostname(thost); if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) exit(1); if (response() < 0) exit(1); free(bp); } source(1, argv + i); } } free(arg); } void tolocal(int argc, char **argv) { char *bp, *host, *src, *suser; arglist alist; int i; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) { /* Local to local. */ freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP); if (iamrecursive) addargs(&alist, "-r"); if (pflag) addargs(&alist, "-p"); addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]); if (do_local_cmd(&alist)) ++errs; continue; } *src++ = 0; if (*src == 0) src = "."; if ((host = strrchr(argv[i], '@')) == NULL) { host = argv[i]; suser = NULL; } else { *host++ = 0; suser = argv[i]; if (*suser == '\0') suser = pwd->pw_name; } host = cleanhostname(host); xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) { free(bp); ++errs; continue; } free(bp); sink(1, argv + argc - 1); (void) close(remin); remin = remout = -1; } } void source(int argc, char **argv) { struct stat stb; static BUF buffer; BUF *bp; off_t i, statbytes; size_t amt, nr; int fd = -1, haderr, indx; char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX]; int len; for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { name = argv[indx]; statbytes = 0; len = strlen(name); while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/') name[--len] = '\0'; if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0) goto syserr; if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) { strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL); name = encname; } if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); goto next; } if (stb.st_size < 0) { run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size"); goto next; } unset_nonblock(fd); switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFREG: break; case S_IFDIR: if (iamrecursive) { rsource(name, &stb); goto next; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: run_err("%s: not a regular file", name); goto next; } if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL) last = name; else ++last; curfile = last; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0) goto next; } #define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), (long long)stb.st_size, last); if (verbose_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf); } (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); if (response() < 0) goto next; if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { next: if (fd != -1) { (void) close(fd); fd = -1; } continue; } if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remout); for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size) amt = stb.st_size - i; if (!haderr) { if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt)) != amt) { haderr = errno; memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr); } } /* Keep writing after error to retain sync */ if (haderr) { (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt); memset(bp->buf, 0, amt); continue; } if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio, &statbytes) != amt) haderr = errno; } unset_nonblock(remout); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); if (fd != -1) { if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr) haderr = errno; fd = -1; } if (!haderr) (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); else run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr)); (void) response(); } } void rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX]; if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) { run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return; } last = strrchr(name, '/'); - if (last == 0) + if (last == NULL) last = name; else last++; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n", (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last); if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path)); if (response() < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, "..")) continue; if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) { run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name); continue; } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name); vect[0] = path; source(1, vect); } (void) closedir(dirp); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2); (void) response(); } void sink(int argc, char **argv) { static BUF buffer; struct stat stb; enum { YES, NO, DISPLAYED } wrerr; BUF *bp; off_t i; size_t j, count; int amt, exists, first, ofd; mode_t mode, omode, mask; off_t size, statbytes; unsigned long long ull; int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048]; struct timeval tv[2]; #define atime tv[0] #define mtime tv[1] #define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } setimes = targisdir = 0; mask = umask(0); if (!pflag) (void) umask(mask); if (argc != 1) { run_err("ambiguous target"); exit(1); } targ = *argv; if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(targ); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) targisdir = 1; for (first = 1;; first = 0) { cp = buf; if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) return; if (*cp++ == '\n') SCREWUP("unexpected "); do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) SCREWUP("lost connection"); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); *cp = 0; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf); if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') { if (iamremote == 0) (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf + 1, strlen(buf + 1)); if (buf[0] == '\02') exit(1); ++errs; continue; } if (buf[0] == 'E') { (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); return; } if (ch == '\n') *--cp = 0; cp = buf; if (*cp == 'T') { setimes++; cp++; if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); if ((time_t)ull < 0 || (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ mtime.tv_sec = ull; mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 || mtime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited"); if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("atime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); if ((time_t)ull < 0 || (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ atime.tv_sec = ull; atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 || atime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); continue; } if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { /* * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't * followed. */ if (first) { run_err("%s", cp); exit(1); } SCREWUP("expected control record"); } mode = 0; for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') SCREWUP("bad mode"); mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0'); } if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); for (size = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)*cp);) size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0'); if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("size not delimited"); if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) { run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); exit(1); } if (targisdir) { static char *namebuf; static size_t cursize; size_t need; need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250; if (need > cursize) { free(namebuf); namebuf = xmalloc(need); cursize = need; } (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ, strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp); np = namebuf; } else np = targ; curfile = cp; exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0; if (buf[0] == 'D') { int mod_flag = pflag; if (!iamrecursive) SCREWUP("received directory without -r"); if (exists) { if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) { errno = ENOTDIR; goto bad; } if (pflag) (void) chmod(np, mode); } else { /* Handle copying from a read-only directory */ mod_flag = 1; if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0) goto bad; } vect[0] = xstrdup(np); sink(1, vect); if (setimes) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0) run_err("%s: set times: %s", vect[0], strerror(errno)); } if (mod_flag) (void) chmod(vect[0], mode); free(vect[0]); continue; } omode = mode; mode |= S_IWUSR; if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) { bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); continue; } (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { (void) close(ofd); continue; } cp = bp->buf; wrerr = NO; statbytes = 0; if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remin); for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + amt > size) amt = size - i; count += amt; do { j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt, scpio, &statbytes); if (j == 0) { run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ? strerror(errno) : "dropped connection"); exit(1); } amt -= j; cp += j; } while (amt > 0); if (count == bp->cnt) { /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */ if (wrerr == NO) { if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } } count = 0; cp = bp->buf; } } unset_nonblock(remin); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO && atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) && ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) { run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } if (pflag) { if (exists || omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ run_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } else { if (!exists && omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ run_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } if (close(ofd) == -1) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } (void) response(); if (setimes && wrerr == NO) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) { run_err("%s: set times: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } switch (wrerr) { case YES: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno)); break; case NO: (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); break; case DISPLAYED: break; } } screwup: run_err("protocol error: %s", why); exit(1); } int response(void) { char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048]; if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp)) lostconn(0); cp = rbuf; switch (resp) { case 0: /* ok */ return (0); default: *cp++ = resp; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */ case 2: /* fatal error, "" */ do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) lostconn(0); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); if (!iamremote) (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf); ++errs; if (resp == 1) return (-1); exit(1); } /* NOTREACHED */ } void usage(void) { (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n" " [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n"); exit(1); } void run_err(const char *fmt,...) { static FILE *fp; va_list ap; ++errs; if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) { (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01); (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: "); va_start(ap, fmt); (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); (void) fprintf(fp, "\n"); (void) fflush(fp); } if (!iamremote) { va_start(ap, fmt); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } } void verifydir(char *cp) { struct stat stb; if (!stat(cp, &stb)) { if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) return; errno = ENOTDIR; } run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno)); killchild(0); } int okname(char *cp0) { int c; char *cp; cp = cp0; do { c = (int)*cp; if (c & 0200) goto bad; if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) { switch (c) { case '\'': case '"': case '`': case ' ': case '#': goto bad; default: break; } } } while (*++cp); return (1); bad: fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0); return (0); } BUF * allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize) { size_t size; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE struct stat stb; if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno)); return (0); } size = roundup(stb.st_blksize, blksize); if (size == 0) size = blksize; #else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ size = blksize; #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ if (bp->cnt >= size) return (bp); if (bp->buf == NULL) bp->buf = xmalloc(size); else bp->buf = xreallocarray(bp->buf, 1, size); memset(bp->buf, 0, size); bp->cnt = size; return (bp); } void lostconn(int signo) { if (!iamremote) (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16); if (signo) _exit(1); else exit(1); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/servconf.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/servconf.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/servconf.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2353 +1,2374 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.280 2015/08/06 14:53:21 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.285 2016/02/17 05:29:04 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "channels.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "packet.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "version.h" static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int); static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int); /* Use of privilege separation or not */ extern int use_privsep; extern Buffer cfg; /* Initializes the server options to their default values. */ void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options)); /* Portable-specific options */ options->use_pam = -1; /* Standard Options */ options->num_ports = 0; options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_queued_listens = 0; options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->address_family = -1; options->num_host_key_files = 0; options->num_host_cert_files = 0; options->host_key_agent = NULL; options->pid_file = NULL; options->server_key_bits = -1; options->login_grace_time = -1; options->key_regeneration_time = -1; options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET; options->ignore_rhosts = -1; options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1; options->print_motd = -1; options->print_lastlog = -1; options->x11_forwarding = -1; options->x11_display_offset = -1; options->x11_use_localhost = -1; options->permit_tty = -1; options->permit_user_rc = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->strict_modes = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1; options->hostbased_key_types = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->rsa_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_key_types = NULL; options->kerberos_authentication = -1; options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; options->permit_user_env = -1; options->use_login = -1; options->compression = -1; options->rekey_limit = -1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1; options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1; options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1; options->num_allow_users = 0; options->num_deny_users = 0; options->num_allow_groups = 0; options->num_deny_groups = 0; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->num_subsystems = 0; options->max_startups_begin = -1; options->max_startups_rate = -1; options->max_startups = -1; options->max_authtries = -1; options->max_sessions = -1; options->banner = NULL; options->use_dns = -1; options->client_alive_interval = -1; options->client_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_authkeys_files = 0; options->num_accept_env = 0; options->permit_tun = -1; options->num_permitted_opens = -1; options->adm_forced_command = NULL; options->chroot_directory = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL; options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->version_addendum = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ static int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } +static void +assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o) +{ + if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, &o->ciphers) != 0 || + kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_MAC, &o->macs) != 0 || + kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_KEX, &o->kex_algorithms) != 0 || + kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, + &o->hostkeyalgorithms) != 0 || + kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, + &o->hostbased_key_types) != 0 || + kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &o->pubkey_key_types) != 0) + fatal("kex_assemble_names failed"); +} + void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { int i; /* Portable-specific options */ if (options->use_pam == -1) options->use_pam = 1; /* Standard Options */ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) error("WARNING: SSH protocol version 1 enabled"); if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE; if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE; options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE; #endif options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE; } } /* No certificates by default */ if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0); if (options->pid_file == NULL) options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE); if (options->server_key_bits == -1) options->server_key_bits = 1024; if (options->login_grace_time == -1) options->login_grace_time = 120; if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1) options->key_regeneration_time = 3600; if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO; if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) options->ignore_rhosts = 1; if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0; if (options->print_motd == -1) options->print_motd = 1; if (options->print_lastlog == -1) options->print_lastlog = 1; if (options->x11_forwarding == -1) options->x11_forwarding = 1; if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) options->x11_display_offset = 10; if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1) options->x11_use_localhost = 1; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH); if (options->permit_tty == -1) options->permit_tty = 1; if (options->permit_user_rc == -1) options->permit_user_rc = 1; if (options->strict_modes == -1) options->strict_modes = 1; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1) options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0; - if (options->hostkeyalgorithms == NULL) - options->hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) options->rsa_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1) options->kerberos_authentication = 0; if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1) options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1; if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1) options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 0; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; if (options->permit_user_env == -1) options->permit_user_env = 0; if (options->use_login == -1) options->use_login = 0; if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = COMP_DELAYED; if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1) options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1) options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1) options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1; if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->max_startups == -1) options->max_startups = 100; if (options->max_startups_rate == -1) options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */ if (options->max_startups_begin == -1) options->max_startups_begin = 10; if (options->max_authtries == -1) options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX; if (options->max_sessions == -1) options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX; if (options->use_dns == -1) options->use_dns = 1; if (options->client_alive_interval == -1) options->client_alive_interval = 0; if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1) options->client_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS); options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2); } if (options->permit_tun == -1) options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD); if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; - if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 || - kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_MAC, &options->macs) != 0 || - kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_KEX, &options->kex_algorithms) != 0 || - kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, - &options->hostbased_key_types) != 0 || - kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, - &options->pubkey_key_types) != 0) - fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__); + assemble_algorithms(options); - /* Turn privilege separation on by default */ + /* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */ if (use_privsep == -1) use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON; #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]); #undef CLEAR_ON_NONE #ifndef HAVE_MMAP if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) { error("This platform does not support both privilege " "separation and compression"); error("Compression disabled"); options->compression = 0; } #endif } /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ /* Portable-specific options */ sUsePAM, /* Standard Options */ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile, sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, sHostKeyAlgorithms, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sHostCertificate, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDeprecated, sUnsupported } ServerOpCodes; #define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */ #define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */ #define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH) /* Textual representation of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int flags; } keywords[] = { /* Portable-specific options */ #ifdef USE_PAM { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* Standard Options */ { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ #ifdef KRB5 { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef USE_AFS { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif #else { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG + { "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#else { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#endif { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */ { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "protocol", sProtocol, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "noneenabled", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hpndisabled", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hpnbuffersize", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcprcvbufpoll", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } }; static struct { int val; char *text; } tunmode_desc[] = { { SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" }, { -1, NULL } }; /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption. */ static ServerOpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, u_int *flags) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) { *flags = keywords[i].flags; return keywords[i].opcode; } error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return sBadOption; } char * derelativise_path(const char *path) { char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX]; if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0) return xstrdup("none"); expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid()); if (*expanded == '/') return expanded; if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded); free(expanded); return ret; } static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) { u_int i; if (port == 0) for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]); else add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, port); } static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options->address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)", addr ? addr : "", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next) ; ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs; options->listen_addrs = aitop; } /* * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports * and AddressFamily options. */ static void queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) { options->queued_listen_addrs = xreallocarray( options->queued_listen_addrs, options->num_queued_listens + 1, sizeof(addr)); options->queued_listen_ports = xreallocarray( options->queued_listen_ports, options->num_queued_listens + 1, sizeof(port)); options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens] = xstrdup(addr); options->queued_listen_ports[options->num_queued_listens] = port; options->num_queued_listens++; } /* * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries. */ static void process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options) { u_int i; if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) { add_listen_addr(options, options->queued_listen_addrs[i], options->queued_listen_ports[i]); free(options->queued_listen_addrs[i]); options->queued_listen_addrs[i] = NULL; } free(options->queued_listen_addrs); options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; free(options->queued_listen_ports); options->queued_listen_ports = NULL; options->num_queued_listens = 0; } struct connection_info * get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns) { static struct connection_info ci; if (!populate) return &ci; ci.host = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns); ci.address = get_remote_ipaddr(); ci.laddress = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); ci.lport = get_local_port(); return &ci; } /* * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice. * * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are * checked for syntax only. * * The second time is after a connection has been established but before * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any * options set are copied into the main server config. * * Potential additions/improvements: * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg Protocol, Ciphers. * * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg: * Match Address 192.168.0.* * Tag trusted * Match Group wheel * Tag trusted * Match Tag trusted * AllowTcpForwarding yes * GatewayPorts clientspecified * [...] * * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive * Match Group shell * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip */ static int match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user) { int result = 0; struct passwd *pw; if (user == NULL) goto out; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does " "not exist", line, user); } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group " "at line %d", user, line); } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) { debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); } else { debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); result = 1; } out: ga_free(); return result; } /* * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does * not match. */ static int match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) { int result = 1, attributes = 0, port; char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition; if (ci == NULL) debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp); else debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s " "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)", ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)", ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)", ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport); while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { attributes++; if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes != 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { error("'all' cannot be combined with other " "Match attributes"); return -1; } *condition = cp; return 1; } if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); return -1; } if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, 0) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at " "line %d", ci->user, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) { case -1: return -1; case 0: result = 0; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->host == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1) result = 0; else debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->address == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){ if (ci == NULL || ci->laddress == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d", ci->laddress, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) { if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) { error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line", arg); return -1; } if (ci == NULL || ci->lport == 0) { result = 0; continue; } /* TODO support port lists */ if (port == ci->lport) debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalPort %d' at line %d", ci->laddress, port, line); else result = 0; } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); return -1; } } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); return -1; } if (ci != NULL) debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; return result; } #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = { { "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "prohibit-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY }, { "yes", PERMIT_YES }, { "no", PERMIT_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { { "delayed", COMP_DELAYED }, { "yes", COMP_ZLIB }, { "no", COMP_NONE }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = { { "clientspecified", 2 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_privsep[] = { { "yes", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX }, { "sandbox", PRIVSEP_ON }, { "nosandbox", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX }, { "no", PRIVSEP_OFF }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = { { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "no", FORWARD_DENY }, { "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE }, { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL }, { NULL, -1 } }; int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p; int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int i, flags = 0; size_t len; long long val64; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; cp = line; if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace */ if (*arg == '\0') arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') return 0; intptr = NULL; charptr = NULL; opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags); if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } if (*activep && opcode != sMatch) debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp); if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) { if (connectinfo == NULL) { fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed " "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg); } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */ while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); return 0; } } switch (opcode) { /* Portable-specific options */ case sUsePAM: intptr = &options->use_pam; goto parse_flag; /* Standard Options */ case sBadOption: return -1; case sPort: /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ if (options->ports_from_cmdline) return 0; if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.", filename, linenum); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.", filename, linenum); options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg); if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.", filename, linenum); break; case sServerKeyBits: intptr = &options->server_key_bits; parse_int: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.", filename, linenum); value = atoi(arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sLoginGraceTime: intptr = &options->login_grace_time; parse_time: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sKeyRegenerationTime: intptr = &options->key_regeneration_time; goto parse_time; case sListenAddress: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing address", filename, linenum); /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */ if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) { queue_listen_addr(options, arg, 0); break; } p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage", filename, linenum); p = cleanhostname(p); if (arg == NULL) port = 0; else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum); queue_listen_addr(options, p, port); break; case sAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; parse_multistate: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sHostKeyFile: intptr = &options->num_host_key_files; if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) fatal("%s line %d: too many host keys specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTKEYS); charptr = &options->host_key_files[*intptr]; parse_filename: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = derelativise_path(arg); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sHostKeyAgent: charptr = &options->host_key_agent; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ? xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); break; case sHostCertificate: intptr = &options->num_host_cert_files; if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) fatal("%s line %d: too many host certificates " "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTCERTS); charptr = &options->host_cert_files[*intptr]; goto parse_filename; break; case sPidFile: charptr = &options->pid_file; goto parse_filename; case sPermitRootLogin: intptr = &options->permit_root_login; multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin; goto parse_multistate; case sIgnoreRhosts: intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts; parse_flag: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); value = 0; /* silence compiler */ if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0) value = 1; else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0) value = 0; else fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts: intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case sRhostsRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly: intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types; parse_keytypes: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sHostKeyAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; goto parse_keytypes; case sRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types; goto parse_keytypes; case sKerberosAuthentication: intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd: intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosTicketCleanup: intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosGetAFSToken: intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; goto parse_flag; case sGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sGssCleanupCreds: intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; case sGssStrictAcceptor: intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; goto parse_flag; case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sChallengeResponseAuthentication: intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPrintMotd: intptr = &options->print_motd; goto parse_flag; case sPrintLastLog: intptr = &options->print_lastlog; goto parse_flag; case sX11Forwarding: intptr = &options->x11_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sX11DisplayOffset: intptr = &options->x11_display_offset; goto parse_int; case sX11UseLocalhost: intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost; goto parse_flag; case sXAuthLocation: charptr = &options->xauth_location; goto parse_filename; case sPermitTTY: intptr = &options->permit_tty; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserRC: intptr = &options->permit_user_rc; goto parse_flag; case sStrictModes: intptr = &options->strict_modes; goto parse_flag; case sTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case sEmptyPasswd: intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserEnvironment: intptr = &options->permit_user_env; goto parse_flag; case sUseLogin: intptr = &options->use_login; goto parse_flag; case sCompression: intptr = &options->compression; multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; goto parse_multistate; case sRekeyLimit: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); - /* check for too-large or too-small limits */ - if (val64 > UINT_MAX) - fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large", - filename, linenum); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) - options->rekey_limit = (u_int32_t)val64; + options->rekey_limit = val64; if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) { (void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case sGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports; goto parse_multistate; case sUseDNS: intptr = &options->use_dns; goto parse_flag; case sLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = strdelim(&cp); value = log_facility_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; break; case sLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = strdelim(&cp); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_level_ptr == -1) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case sAllowTcpForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowAgentForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sUsePrivilegeSeparation: intptr = &use_privsep; multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowUsers: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS) fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sDenyUsers: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS) fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sAllowGroups: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS) fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sDenyGroups: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_deny_groups >= MAX_DENY_GROUPS) fatal("%s line %d: too many deny groups.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->deny_groups[options->num_deny_groups++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sCiphers: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case sMacs: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case sKexAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case sProtocol: intptr = &options->protocol; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = proto_spec(arg); if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) *intptr = value; break; case sSubsystem: if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) { fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.", filename, linenum); } arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) { arg = strdelim(&cp); break; } for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.", filename, linenum, arg); options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.", filename, linenum); options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */ p = xstrdup(arg); len = strlen(p) + 1; while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { len += 1 + strlen(arg); p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len); strlcat(p, " ", len); strlcat(p, arg, len); } options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p; options->num_subsystems++; break; case sMaxStartups: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d", &options->max_startups_begin, &options->max_startups_rate, &options->max_startups)) == 3) { if (options->max_startups_begin > options->max_startups || options->max_startups_rate > 100 || options->max_startups_rate < 1) fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); } else if (n != 1) fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); else options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin; break; case sMaxAuthTries: intptr = &options->max_authtries; goto parse_int; case sMaxSessions: intptr = &options->max_sessions; goto parse_int; case sBanner: charptr = &options->banner; goto parse_filename; /* * These options can contain %X options expanded at * connect time, so that you can specify paths like: * * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u */ case sAuthorizedKeysFile: if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_authkeys_files >= MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authorized keys files.", filename, linenum); options->authorized_keys_files[ options->num_authkeys_files++] = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); } } return 0; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sClientAliveInterval: intptr = &options->client_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case sClientAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case sAcceptEnv: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (options->num_accept_env >= MAX_ACCEPT_ENV) fatal("%s line %d: too many allow env.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->accept_env[options->num_accept_env++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sPermitTunnel: intptr = &options->permit_tun; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/" "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) { value = tunmode_desc[i].val; break; } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/" "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo); if (value < 0) fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = value; break; case sPermitOpen: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification", filename, linenum); n = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) { if (*activep && n == -1) { channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); options->num_permitted_opens = 0; } break; } if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (*activep && n == -1) { options->num_permitted_opens = 1; channel_disable_adm_local_opens(); } break; } if (*activep && n == -1) channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) { p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen", filename, linenum); p = cleanhostname(p); if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in " "PermitOpen", filename, linenum); if (*activep && n == -1) options->num_permitted_opens = channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port); } break; case sForceCommand: if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL) options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len); return 0; case sChrootDirectory: charptr = &options->chroot_directory; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sTrustedUserCAKeys: charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys; goto parse_filename; case sRevokedKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file; goto parse_filename; case sIPQoS: arg = strdelim(&cp); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case sVersionAddendum: if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument", filename, linenum); else options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedKeysCommand: if (cp == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) { if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand " "must be an absolute path", filename, linenum); options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing AuthorizedKeysCommandUser " "argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand: if (cp == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) { if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: " "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be " "an absolute path", filename, linenum); options->authorized_principals_command = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing " "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sAuthenticationMethods: if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_auth_methods >= MAX_AUTH_METHODS) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authentication methods.", filename, linenum); if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) fatal("%s line %d: invalid " "authentication method list.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->auth_methods[ options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg); } } return 0; case sStreamLocalBindMask: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask " "argument.", filename, linenum); /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &p, 8); if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777) fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case sStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case sFingerprintHash: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) options->fingerprint_hash = value; break; case sDeprecated: logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s", filename, linenum, arg); while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); break; case sUnsupported: logit("%s line %d: Unsupported option %s", filename, linenum, arg); while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); break; default: fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)", filename, linenum, arg, opcode); } if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", filename, linenum, arg); return 0; } /* Reads the server configuration file. */ void load_server_config(const char *filename, Buffer *conf) { char line[4096], *cp; FILE *f; int lineno = 0; debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename); if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) { perror(filename); exit(1); } buffer_clear(conf); while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { lineno++; if (strlen(line) == sizeof(line) - 1) fatal("%s line %d too long", filename, lineno); /* * Trim out comments and strip whitespace * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce * line numbers later for error messages */ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL) memcpy(cp, "\n", 2); cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r"); buffer_append(conf, cp, strlen(cp)); } buffer_append(conf, "\0", 1); fclose(f); debug2("%s: done config len = %d", __func__, buffer_len(conf)); } void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { ServerOptions mo; initialize_server_options(&mo); parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", &cfg, connectinfo); copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0); } int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec) { char *p; while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') { if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) { ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) { ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) { ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) { ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6); } else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) { ci->lport = a2port(p + 6); if (ci->lport == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode" " specification %s\n", p+6, p); return -1; } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n", p); return -1; } } return 0; } /* * returns 1 for a complete spec, 0 for partial spec and -1 for an * empty spec. */ int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *ci) { if (ci->user && ci->host && ci->address) return 1; /* complete */ if (!ci->user && !ci->host && !ci->address) return -1; /* empty */ return 0; /* partial */ } /* * Copy any supported values that are set. * * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we * do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow(). */ void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) { #define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != -1) \ dst->n = src->n; \ } while (0) M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc); M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions); M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */ #define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \ free(dst->n); \ dst->n = src->n; \ } \ } while(0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(n, num_n) do {\ if (src->num_n != 0) { \ for (dst->num_n = 0; dst->num_n < src->num_n; dst->num_n++) \ dst->n[dst->num_n] = xstrdup(src->n[dst->num_n]); \ } \ } while(0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); + /* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */ + assemble_algorithms(dst); + /* * The only things that should be below this point are string options * which are only used after authentication. */ if (preauth) return; + /* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */ M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command); + if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) { + free(dst->adm_forced_command); + dst->adm_forced_command = NULL; + } M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory); + if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) { + free(dst->chroot_directory); + dst->chroot_directory = NULL; + } } #undef M_CP_INTOPT #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { int active, linenum, bad_options = 0; char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf; debug2("%s: config %s len %d", __func__, filename, buffer_len(conf)); obuf = cbuf = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(conf)); active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1; linenum = 1; while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) { if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename, linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0) bad_options++; } free(obuf); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); process_queued_listen_addrs(options); } static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case sAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case sPermitRootLogin: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin); case sGatewayPorts: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports); case sCompression: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression); case sUsePrivilegeSeparation: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep); case sAllowTcpForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); case sProtocol: switch (val) { case SSH_PROTO_1: return "1"; case SSH_PROTO_2: return "2"; case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2): return "2,1"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static const char * lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } static void dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val) { if (val == NULL) return; printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val == NULL ? "none" : val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; if (count <= 0) return; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); printf("\n"); } void dump_config(ServerOptions *o) { u_int i; int ret; struct addrinfo *ai; char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV], *s = NULL; char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL; /* these are usually at the top of the config */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++) printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]); dump_cfg_fmtint(sProtocol, o->protocol); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family); /* * ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to * print these in reverse order. */ for (ai = o->listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) : strerror(errno)); } else { laddr2 = laddr1; if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s\n%s", addr, port, laddr2); else xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s\n%s", addr, port, laddr2); free(laddr2); } } printf("%s", laddr1); free(laddr1); /* integer arguments */ #ifdef USE_PAM dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); #endif dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits); dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time); dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); /* formatted integer arguments */ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(sRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); #ifdef KRB5 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup); # ifdef USE_AFS dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); # endif #endif #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd); +#ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog); +#endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes); dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep); dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); /* string arguments */ dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT); dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC); dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, o->authorized_principals_file); dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0' ? "none" : o->version_addendum); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent); dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX); dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types ? o->hostbased_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms ? o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ? o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); /* string array arguments */ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files, o->authorized_keys_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files, o->host_key_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files, o->host_cert_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods, o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods); /* other arguments */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++) printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i], o->subsystem_args[i]); printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin, o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups); for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) { s = tunmode_desc[i].text; break; } dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s); printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); - printf("rekeylimit %lld %d\n", (long long)o->rekey_limit, + printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1418 +1,1409 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.178 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.182 2016/02/08 10:57:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Server main loop for handling the interactive session. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "session.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "serverloop.h" -#include "roaming.h" #include "ssherr.h" extern ServerOptions options; /* XXX */ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; extern int use_privsep; static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */ static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */ static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */ static int fdin; /* Descriptor for stdin (for writing) */ static int fdout; /* Descriptor for stdout (for reading); May be same number as fdin. */ static int fderr; /* Descriptor for stderr. May be -1. */ static long stdin_bytes = 0; /* Number of bytes written to stdin. */ static long stdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes sent to client. */ static long stderr_bytes = 0; /* Number of stderr bytes sent to client. */ static long fdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes read from program. */ static int stdin_eof = 0; /* EOF message received from client. */ static int fdout_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered reading from fdout. */ static int fderr_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered readung from fderr. */ static int fdin_is_tty = 0; /* fdin points to a tty. */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to client (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to client (output). */ static int connection_closed = 0; /* Connection to client closed. */ static u_int buffer_high; /* "Soft" max buffer size. */ static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */ /* * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */ /* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* prototypes */ static void server_init_dispatch(void); /* * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid * the race between select() and child_terminated */ static int notify_pipe[2]; static void notify_setup(void) { if (pipe(notify_pipe) < 0) { error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno)); } else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) || (fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) { error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno)); close(notify_pipe[0]); close(notify_pipe[1]); } else { set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]); set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]); return; } notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */ notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */ } static void notify_parent(void) { if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); } static void notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) { if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); } static void notify_done(fd_set *readset) { char c; if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) debug2("notify_done: reading"); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; child_terminated = 1; #ifndef _UNICOS mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); #endif notify_parent(); errno = save_errno; } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } /* * Make packets from buffered stderr data, and buffer it for sending * to the client. */ static void make_packets_from_stderr_data(void) { u_int len; /* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */ while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { len = buffer_len(&stderr_buffer); if (packet_is_interactive()) { if (len > 512) len = 512; } else { /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) len = packet_get_maxsize(); } packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); stderr_bytes += len; } } /* * Make packets from buffered stdout data, and buffer it for sending to the * client. */ static void make_packets_from_stdout_data(void) { u_int len; /* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */ while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { len = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); if (packet_is_interactive()) { if (len > 512) len = 512; } else { /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) len = packet_get_maxsize(); } packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); stdout_bytes += len; } } static void client_alive_check(void) { int channel_id; /* timeout, check to see how many we have had */ if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.client_alive_count_max) { logit("Timeout, client not responding."); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply", * we should get back a failure */ if ((channel_id = channel_find_open()) == -1) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ } else { channel_request_start(channel_id, "keepalive@openssh.com", 1); } packet_send(); } /* * Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the * select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors * have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite). */ static void wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_milliseconds) { struct timeval tv, *tvp; int ret; time_t minwait_secs = 0; int client_alive_scheduled = 0; int program_alive_scheduled = 0; /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */ channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, &minwait_secs, 0); if (minwait_secs != 0) max_time_milliseconds = MIN(max_time_milliseconds, (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000); /* * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly, * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag. * * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet. */ if (compat20 && max_time_milliseconds == 0 && options.client_alive_interval) { client_alive_scheduled = 1; max_time_milliseconds = (u_int64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000; } if (compat20) { #if 0 /* wrong: bad condition XXX */ if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) #endif FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); } else { /* * Read packets from the client unless we have too much * buffered stdin or channel data. */ if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) < buffer_high && channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); /* * If there is not too much data already buffered going to * the client, try to get some more data from the program. */ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { program_alive_scheduled = child_terminated; if (!fdout_eof) FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp); if (!fderr_eof) FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp); } /* * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data * to the program. */ if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0) FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp); } notify_prepare(*readsetp); /* * If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that * descriptor. */ if (packet_have_data_to_write()) FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); /* * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read * from it, then read as much as is available and exit. */ if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) if (max_time_milliseconds == 0 || client_alive_scheduled) max_time_milliseconds = 100; if (max_time_milliseconds == 0) tvp = NULL; else { tv.tv_sec = max_time_milliseconds / 1000; tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_milliseconds % 1000); tvp = &tv; } /* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */ ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); if (ret == -1) { memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); if (errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } else { if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled) client_alive_check(); if (!compat20 && program_alive_scheduled && fdin_is_tty) { if (!fdout_eof) FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp); if (!fderr_eof) FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp); } } notify_done(*readsetp); } /* * Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored * in buffers and processed later. */ static void process_input(fd_set *readset) { int len; char buf[16384]; /* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { - int cont = 0; - len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont); + len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == 0) { - if (cont) - return; verbose("Connection closed by %.100s", get_remote_ipaddr()); connection_closed = 1; if (compat20) return; cleanup_exit(255); } else if (len < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { verbose("Read error from remote host " "%.100s: %.100s", get_remote_ipaddr(), strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } else { /* Buffer any received data. */ packet_process_incoming(buf, len); } } if (compat20) return; /* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */ if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) { errno = 0; len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) { /* do nothing */ #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD } else if (len <= 0) { #else } else if ((!isatty(fdout) && len <= 0) || (isatty(fdout) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif fdout_eof = 1; } else { buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len); fdout_bytes += len; } } /* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */ if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) { errno = 0; len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) { /* do nothing */ #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD } else if (len <= 0) { #else } else if ((!isatty(fderr) && len <= 0) || (isatty(fderr) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif fderr_eof = 1; } else { buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len); } } } /* * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin. */ static void process_output(fd_set *writeset) { struct termios tio; u_char *data; u_int dlen; int len; /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */ if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) { data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer); dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); len = write(fdin, data, dlen); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) { /* do nothing */ } else if (len <= 0) { if (fdin != fdout) close(fdin); else shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */ fdin = -1; } else { /* Successful write. */ if (fdin_is_tty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r' && tcgetattr(fdin, &tio) == 0 && !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { /* * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of * traffic analysis */ packet_send_ignore(len); packet_send(); } /* Consume the data from the buffer. */ buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len); /* Update the count of bytes written to the program. */ stdin_bytes += len; } } /* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) packet_write_poll(); } /* * Wait until all buffered output has been sent to the client. * This is used when the program terminates. */ static void drain_output(void) { /* Send any buffered stdout data to the client. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); packet_send(); /* Update the count of sent bytes. */ stdout_bytes += buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); } /* Send any buffered stderr data to the client. */ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); packet_send(); /* Update the count of sent bytes. */ stderr_bytes += buffer_len(&stderr_buffer); } /* Wait until all buffered data has been written to the client. */ packet_write_wait(); } static void process_buffered_input_packets(void) { dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, active_state); } /* * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to * stdin (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the * child program). */ void server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; int max_fd = 0; u_int nalloc = 0; int wait_status; /* Status returned by wait(). */ pid_t wait_pid; /* pid returned by wait(). */ int waiting_termination = 0; /* Have displayed waiting close message. */ u_int64_t max_time_milliseconds; u_int previous_stdout_buffer_bytes; u_int stdout_buffer_bytes; int type; debug("Entering interactive session."); /* Initialize the SIGCHLD kludge. */ child_terminated = 0; mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); if (!use_privsep) { signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); } /* Initialize our global variables. */ fdin = fdin_arg; fdout = fdout_arg; fderr = fderr_arg; /* nonblocking IO */ set_nonblock(fdin); set_nonblock(fdout); /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */ if (fderr != -1) set_nonblock(fderr); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin)) fdin_is_tty = 1; connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); notify_setup(); previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = 0; /* Set approximate I/O buffer size. */ if (packet_is_interactive()) buffer_high = 4096; else buffer_high = 64 * 1024; #if 0 /* Initialize max_fd to the maximum of the known file descriptors. */ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout); if (fderr != -1) max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr); #endif /* Initialize Initialize buffers. */ buffer_init(&stdin_buffer); buffer_init(&stdout_buffer); buffer_init(&stderr_buffer); /* * If we have no separate fderr (which is the case when we have a pty * - there we cannot make difference between data sent to stdout and * stderr), indicate that we have seen an EOF from stderr. This way * we don't need to check the descriptor everywhere. */ if (fderr == -1) fderr_eof = 1; server_init_dispatch(); /* Main loop of the server for the interactive session mode. */ for (;;) { /* Process buffered packets from the client. */ process_buffered_input_packets(); /* * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin. */ if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { if (fdin != fdout) close(fdin); else shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */ fdin = -1; } /* Make packets from buffered stderr data to send to the client. */ make_packets_from_stderr_data(); /* * Make packets from buffered stdout data to send to the * client. If there is very little to send, this arranges to * not send them now, but to wait a short while to see if we * are getting more data. This is necessary, as some systems * wake up readers from a pty after each separate character. */ max_time_milliseconds = 0; stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); if (stdout_buffer_bytes != 0 && stdout_buffer_bytes < 256 && stdout_buffer_bytes != previous_stdout_buffer_bytes) { /* try again after a while */ max_time_milliseconds = 10; } else { /* Send it now. */ make_packets_from_stdout_data(); } previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); /* Send channel data to the client. */ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) channel_output_poll(); /* * Bail out of the loop if the program has closed its output * descriptors, and we have no more data to send to the * client, and there is no pending buffered data. */ if (fdout_eof && fderr_eof && !packet_have_data_to_write() && buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) == 0 && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) == 0) { if (!channel_still_open()) break; if (!waiting_termination) { const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n"; char *cp; waiting_termination = 1; buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s)); /* Display list of open channels. */ cp = channel_open_message(); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, cp, strlen(cp)); free(cp); } } max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]); /* Sleep in select() until we can do something. */ wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm); /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */ cleanup_exit(255); } /* Process any channel events. */ channel_after_select(readset, writeset); /* Process input from the client and from program stdout/stderr. */ process_input(readset); /* Process output to the client and to program stdin. */ process_output(writeset); } free(readset); free(writeset); /* Cleanup and termination code. */ /* Wait until all output has been sent to the client. */ drain_output(); debug("End of interactive session; stdin %ld, stdout (read %ld, sent %ld), stderr %ld bytes.", stdin_bytes, fdout_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes); /* Free and clear the buffers. */ buffer_free(&stdin_buffer); buffer_free(&stdout_buffer); buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); /* Close the file descriptors. */ if (fdout != -1) close(fdout); fdout = -1; fdout_eof = 1; if (fderr != -1) close(fderr); fderr = -1; fderr_eof = 1; if (fdin != -1) close(fdin); fdin = -1; channel_free_all(); /* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */ mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); while ((wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, 0)) < 0) if (errno != EINTR) packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (wait_pid != pid) error("Strange, wait returned pid %ld, expected %ld", (long)wait_pid, (long)pid); /* Check if it exited normally. */ if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) { /* Yes, normal exit. Get exit status and send it to the client. */ debug("Command exited with status %d.", WEXITSTATUS(wait_status)); packet_start(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS); packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(wait_status)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* * Wait for exit confirmation. Note that there might be * other packets coming before it; however, the program has * already died so we just ignore them. The client is * supposed to respond with the confirmation when it receives * the exit status. */ do { type = packet_read(); } while (type != SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION); debug("Received exit confirmation."); return; } /* Check if the program terminated due to a signal. */ if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status)) packet_disconnect("Command terminated on signal %d.", WTERMSIG(wait_status)); /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", wait_status); /* NOTREACHED */ } static void collect_children(void) { pid_t pid; sigset_t oset, nset; int status; /* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */ sigemptyset(&nset); sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD); sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset); if (child_terminated) { debug("Received SIGCHLD."); while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) if (pid > 0) session_close_by_pid(pid, status); child_terminated = 0; } sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); } void server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; - int rekeying = 0, max_fd; + int max_fd; u_int nalloc = 0; u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0; debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2."); mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); child_terminated = 0; connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); if (!use_privsep) { signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); } notify_setup(); max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]); server_init_dispatch(); for (;;) { process_buffered_input_packets(); - rekeying = (active_state->kex != NULL && !active_state->kex->done); - - if (!rekeying && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state) && + packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) channel_output_poll(); - if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && !rekeying) + if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && + !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) rekey_timeout_ms = packet_get_rekey_timeout() * 1000; else rekey_timeout_ms = 0; wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm); /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */ cleanup_exit(255); } collect_children(); - if (!rekeying) { + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) channel_after_select(readset, writeset); - if (packet_need_rekeying()) { - debug("need rekeying"); - active_state->kex->done = 0; - kex_send_kexinit(active_state); - } - } process_input(readset); if (connection_closed) break; process_output(writeset); } collect_children(); free(readset); free(writeset); /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */ channel_free_all(); /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */ session_destroy_all(NULL); } static int server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq); /* * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client. * even if this was generated by something other than * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives. */ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); return 0; } static int server_input_stdin_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *data; u_int data_len; /* Stdin data from the client. Append it to the buffer. */ /* Ignore any data if the client has closed stdin. */ if (fdin == -1) return 0; data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len); explicit_bzero(data, data_len); free(data); return 0; } static int server_input_eof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { /* * Eof from the client. The stdin descriptor to the * program will be closed when all buffered data has * drained. */ debug("EOF received for stdin."); packet_check_eom(); stdin_eof = 1; return 0; } static int server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { u_int row = packet_get_int(); u_int col = packet_get_int(); u_int xpixel = packet_get_int(); u_int ypixel = packet_get_int(); debug("Window change received."); packet_check_eom(); if (fdin != -1) pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel); return 0; } static Channel * server_request_direct_tcpip(void) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target, *originator; u_short target_port, originator_port; target = packet_get_string(NULL); target_port = packet_get_int(); originator = packet_get_string(NULL); originator_port = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s " "port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port); /* XXX fine grained permissions */ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && !no_port_forwarding_flag) { c = channel_connect_to_port(target, target_port, "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip"); } else { logit("refused local port forward: " "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port); } free(originator); free(target); return c; } static Channel * server_request_direct_streamlocal(void) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target, *originator; u_short originator_port; target = packet_get_string(NULL); originator = packet_get_string(NULL); originator_port = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s", originator, originator_port, target); /* XXX fine grained permissions */ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && !no_port_forwarding_flag) { c = channel_connect_to_path(target, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal"); } else { logit("refused streamlocal port forward: " "originator %s port %d, target %s", originator, originator_port, target); } free(originator); free(target); return c; } static Channel * server_request_tun(void) { Channel *c = NULL; int mode, tun; int sock; mode = packet_get_int(); switch (mode) { case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT: case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET: break; default: packet_send_debug("Unsupported tunnel device mode."); return NULL; } if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) { packet_send_debug("Server has rejected tunnel device " "forwarding"); return NULL; } tun = packet_get_int(); if (forced_tun_device != -1) { if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun) goto done; tun = forced_tun_device; } sock = tun_open(tun, mode); if (sock < 0) goto done; c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif done: if (c == NULL) packet_send_debug("Failed to open the tunnel device."); return c; } static Channel * server_request_session(void) { Channel *c; debug("input_session_request"); packet_check_eom(); if (no_more_sessions) { packet_disconnect("Possible attack: attempt to open a session " "after additional sessions disabled"); } /* * A server session has no fd to read or write until a * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered. */ c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "server-session", 1); if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) { debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self); channel_free(c); return NULL; } channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0); return c; } static int server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype; int rchan; u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len; ctype = packet_get_string(&len); rchan = packet_get_int(); rwindow = packet_get_int(); rmaxpack = packet_get_int(); debug("server_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) { c = server_request_session(); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { c = server_request_direct_tcpip(); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) { c = server_request_tun(); } if (c != NULL) { debug("server_input_channel_open: confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_send(); } } else { debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(rchan); packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { packet_put_cstring("open failed"); packet_put_cstring(""); } packet_send(); } free(ctype); return 0; } static int server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct sshbuf **respp) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL; int r, ndx, success = 0; const u_char *blob; u_char *sig = 0; size_t blen, slen; if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* * Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys * before attempting to sign anything with it. */ if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) { error("%s: unknown host %s key", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto out; } /* * XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather * than passing in public and private keys */ if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL && (key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) { error("%s: can't retrieve hostkey %d", __func__, ndx); goto out; } sshbuf_reset(sigbuf); free(sig); sig = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 || (r = ssh->kex->sign(key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen, - sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), 0)) != 0 || + sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), NULL, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } } /* Success */ *respp = resp; resp = NULL; /* don't free it */ success = 1; out: free(sig); sshbuf_free(resp); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshkey_free(key); return success; } static int server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *rtype; int want_reply; int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0; struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); want_reply = packet_get_char(); debug("server_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); /* -R style forwarding */ if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) { struct passwd *pw; struct Forward fwd; pw = the_authctxt->pw; if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user"); memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL); fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d", fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port); /* check permissions */ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 || no_port_forwarding_flag || (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT || (fwd.listen_port != 0 && fwd.listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && pw->pw_uid != 0) #endif ) { success = 0; packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the port */ success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(&fwd, &allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts); } free(fwd.listen_host); if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0) + if (allocated_listen_port != 0 && + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u32: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) { struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL); fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__, fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port); success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd); free(fwd.listen_host); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); debug("server_input_global_request: streamlocal-forward listen path %s", fwd.listen_path); /* check permissions */ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 || no_port_forwarding_flag) { success = 0; packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the socket */ success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener( &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts); } free(fwd.listen_path); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__, fwd.listen_path); success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd); free(fwd.listen_path); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) { no_more_sessions = 1; success = 1; } else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) { success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(&resp); } if (want_reply) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); if (success && resp != NULL) ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, sshbuf_ptr(resp), sshbuf_len(resp)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } free(rtype); sshbuf_free(resp); return 0; } static int server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c; int id, reply, success = 0; char *rtype; id = packet_get_int(); rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); reply = packet_get_char(); debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %d request %s reply %d", id, rtype, reply); if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) packet_disconnect("server_input_channel_req: " "unknown channel %d", id); if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) { packet_check_eom(); chan_rcvd_eow(c); } else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0) success = session_input_channel_req(c, rtype); if (reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); } free(rtype); return 0; } static void server_init_dispatch_20(void) { debug("server_init_dispatch_20"); dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request); /* client_alive */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); /* rekeying */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); } static void server_init_dispatch_13(void) { debug("server_init_dispatch_13"); dispatch_init(NULL); dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_EOF, &server_input_eof); dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, &server_input_stdin_data); dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE, &server_input_window_size); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open); } static void server_init_dispatch_15(void) { server_init_dispatch_13(); debug("server_init_dispatch_15"); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_oclose); } static void server_init_dispatch(void) { if (compat20) server_init_dispatch_20(); else if (compat13) server_init_dispatch_13(); else server_init_dispatch_15(); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/session.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/session.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/session.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2784 +1,2814 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.278 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.280 2016/02/16 03:37:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "serverloop.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "session.h" #include "kex.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "sftp.h" #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) #include #endif #ifdef WITH_SELINUX #include #endif #define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \ (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \ (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t')) /* func */ Session *session_new(void); void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int, int, int); void session_pty_cleanup(Session *); void session_proctitle(Session *); int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *); int do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *); int do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *); int do_exec(Session *, const char *); void do_login(Session *, const char *); #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX static void do_pre_login(Session *s); #endif void do_child(Session *, const char *); void do_motd(void); int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *); static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *); static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *); static int session_pty_req(Session *); /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern char *__progname; extern int log_stderr; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); extern Buffer loginmsg; /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; /* data */ static int sessions_first_unused = -1; static int sessions_nalloc = 0; static Session *sessions = NULL; #define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0 #define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP login_cap_t *lc; #endif static int is_child = 0; +static int in_chroot = 0; /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; /* removes the agent forwarding socket */ static void auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw) { if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { temporarily_use_uid(pw); unlink(auth_sock_name); rmdir(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_name = NULL; restore_uid(); } } static int auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw) { Channel *nc; int sock = -1; if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { error("authentication forwarding requested twice."); return 0; } /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */ auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX"); /* Create private directory for socket */ if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) { packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: " "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); free(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_dir = NULL; goto authsock_err; } xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld", auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid()); /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */ sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */ if (sock < 0) goto authsock_err; /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ nc = channel_new("auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "auth socket", 1); nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name); return 1; authsock_err: free(auth_sock_name); if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) { rmdir(auth_sock_dir); free(auth_sock_dir); } if (sock != -1) close(sock); auth_sock_name = NULL; auth_sock_dir = NULL; return 0; } static void display_loginmsg(void) { if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) { buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1); printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg)); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); } } void do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt) { setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name); /* setup the channel layer */ /* XXX - streamlocal? */ if (no_port_forwarding_flag || (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0) channel_disable_adm_local_opens(); else channel_permit_all_opens(); auth_debug_send(); if (compat20) do_authenticated2(authctxt); else do_authenticated1(authctxt); do_cleanup(authctxt); } +/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */ +static int +xauth_valid_string(const char *s) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) && + s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' && + s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_') + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + /* * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings * are requested, etc. */ static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt) { Session *s; char *command; int success, type, screen_flag; int enable_compression_after_reply = 0; u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0; s = session_new(); if (s == NULL) { error("no more sessions"); return; } s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; /* * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell * or a command. */ for (;;) { success = 0; /* Get a packet from the client. */ type = packet_read(); /* Process the packet. */ switch (type) { case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION: compression_level = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) { packet_send_debug("Received invalid compression level %d.", compression_level); break; } if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { debug2("compression disabled"); break; } /* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */ enable_compression_after_reply = 1; success = 1; break; case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY: success = session_pty_req(s); break; case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING: s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len); s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len); screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER; debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag); if (packet_remaining() == 4) { if (!screen_flag) debug2("Buggy client: " "X11 screen flag missing"); s->screen = packet_get_int(); } else { s->screen = 0; } packet_check_eom(); - success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) && + xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data)) + success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + else { + success = 0; + error("Invalid X11 forwarding data"); + } if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); s->auth_proto = NULL; s->auth_data = NULL; } break; case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING: if (!options.allow_agent_forwarding || no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) { debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication."); break; } debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request."); success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); break; case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST: if (no_port_forwarding_flag) { debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication."); break; } if (!(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE)) { debug("Port forwarding not permitted."); break; } debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request."); if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0, &options.fwd_opts) < 0) { debug("Port forwarding failed."); break; } success = 1; break; case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE: if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0) success = 1; break; case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL: case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD: if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) { command = packet_get_string(&dlen); debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command); if (do_exec(s, command) != 0) packet_disconnect( "command execution failed"); free(command); } else { if (do_exec(s, NULL) != 0) packet_disconnect( "shell execution failed"); } packet_check_eom(); session_close(s); return; default: /* * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored, * and a failure message is returned. */ logit("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type); } packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */ if (enable_compression_after_reply) { enable_compression_after_reply = 0; packet_start_compression(compression_level); } } } #define USE_PIPES 1 /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors and such. */ int do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) { pid_t pid; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0) { error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(pout) < 0) { error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); return -1; } if (pipe(perr) < 0) { error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); return -1; } #else int inout[2], err[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) { error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) { error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); return -1; } #endif session_proctitle(s); /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[0]); close(perr[1]); #else close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); close(err[0]); close(err[1]); #endif return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. */ if (setsid() < 0) error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket * pair, and make the child side the standard input. */ close(pin[1]); if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); /* Redirect stdout. */ close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); close(pout[1]); /* Redirect stderr. */ close(perr[0]); if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0) perror("dup2 stderr"); close(perr[1]); #else /* * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist) * seem to depend on it. */ close(inout[1]); close(err[1]); if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */ perror("dup2 stdin"); if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout (same as stdin) */ perror("dup2 stdout"); close(inout[0]); if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */ perror("dup2 stderr"); close(err[0]); #endif #ifdef _UNICOS cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */ #endif /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ do_child(s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef _UNICOS signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); #endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */ packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); /* * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ buffer_clear(&loginmsg); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[1]); if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], s->is_subsystem, 0); } else { /* Enter the interactive session. */ server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]); /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */ } #else /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */ close(inout[0]); close(err[0]); /* * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same. */ if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1], s->is_subsystem, 0); } else { server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]); /* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */ } #endif return 0; } /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp, * lastlog, and other such operations. */ int do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) { int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; pid_t pid; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_pty: no session"); ptyfd = s->ptyfd; ttyfd = s->ttyfd; /* * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional. * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions. */ if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) { error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; } /* we keep a reference to the pty master */ if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) { error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); close(fdout); return -1; } /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(fdout); close(ptymaster); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; close(fdout); close(ptymaster); /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ptyfd); /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */ pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty); /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0) error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0) error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0) error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) { #ifdef _UNICOS cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */ #endif /* _UNICOS */ do_login(s, command); } # ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX else do_pre_login(s); # endif #endif /* * Do common processing for the child, such as execing * the command. */ do_child(s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef _UNICOS signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); #endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* Enter interactive session. */ s->ptymaster = ptymaster; packet_set_interactive(1, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); } else { server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1); /* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */ } return 0; } #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX static void do_pre_login(Session *s) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; pid_t pid = getpid(); /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } #endif /* * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is * to be forced, execute that instead. */ int do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) { int ret; - const char *forced = NULL; - char session_type[1024], *tty = NULL; + const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL; + char session_type[1024]; if (options.adm_forced_command) { original_command = command; command = options.adm_forced_command; forced = "(config)"; } else if (forced_command) { original_command = command; command = forced_command; forced = "(key-option)"; } if (forced != NULL) { if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) { s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ? SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR; } else if (s->is_subsystem) s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command); } else if (s->is_subsystem) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys); } else if (command == NULL) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell"); } else { /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command"); } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { tty = s->tty; if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) tty += 5; } - verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d", + verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d", session_type, tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", tty == NULL ? "" : tty, s->pw->pw_name, get_remote_ipaddr(), - get_remote_port()); + get_remote_port(), + s->self); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (command != NULL) PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ shell =_PATH_BSHELL; PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); } #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); else ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command); original_command = NULL; /* * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ buffer_clear(&loginmsg); return ret; } /* administrative, login(1)-like work */ void do_login(Session *s, const char *command) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; struct passwd * pw = s->pw; pid_t pid = getpid(); /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ if (!use_privsep) record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); #ifdef USE_PAM /* * If password change is needed, do it now. * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check. */ if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { display_loginmsg(); do_pam_chauthtok(); s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0; /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */ } #endif if (check_quietlogin(s, command)) return; display_loginmsg(); do_motd(); } /* * Display the message of the day. */ void do_motd(void) { FILE *f; char buf[256]; if (options.print_motd) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd", "/etc/motd"), "r"); #else f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"); #endif if (f) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stdout); fclose(f); } } } /* * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given. */ int check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command) { char buf[256]; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; struct stat st; /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */ if (command != NULL) return 1; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #else if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #endif return 0; } /* * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable * already exists, its value is overridden. */ void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, const char *value) { char **env; u_int envsize; u_int i, namelen; if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) { error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name); return; } /* * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null * entry before continuing. */ if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) { *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); *envp[0] = NULL; *envsizep = 1; } /* * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. */ env = *envp; namelen = strlen(name); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=') break; if (env[i]) { /* Reuse the slot. */ free(env[i]); } else { /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */ envsize = *envsizep; if (i >= envsize - 1) { if (envsize >= 1000) fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); envsize += 50; env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); *envsizep = envsize; } /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ env[i + 1] = NULL; } /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */ env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value); } /* * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing. * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#') * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed. */ static void read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize, const char *filename) { FILE *f; char buf[4096]; char *cp, *value; u_int lineno = 0; f = fopen(filename, "r"); if (!f) return; while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { if (++lineno > 1000) fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename); for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') continue; cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; value = strchr(cp, '='); if (value == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno, filename); continue; } /* * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to * the value string. */ *value = '\0'; value++; child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value); } fclose(f); } #ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN /* * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present. */ static char * child_get_env(char **env, const char *name) { int i; size_t len; len = strlen(name); for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++) if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=') return(env[i] + len + 1); return NULL; } /* * Read /etc/default/login. * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK. */ static void read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid) { char **tmpenv = NULL, *var; u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0; u_long mask; /* * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment, * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're * interested in. */ read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login"); if (tmpenv == NULL) return; if (uid == 0) var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH"); else var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH"); if (var != NULL) child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var); if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL) if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1) umask((mode_t)mask); for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++) free(tmpenv[i]); free(tmpenv); } #endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ void copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) { char *var_name, *var_val; int i; if (source == NULL) return; for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) { var_name = xstrdup(source[i]); if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) { free(var_name); continue; } *var_val++ = '\0'; debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); free(var_name); } } static char ** do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) { char buf[256]; u_int i, envsize; char **env, *laddr; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN) char *path = NULL; #else extern char **environ; char **senv, **var; #endif /* Initialize the environment. */ envsize = 100; env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *)); env[0] = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * The Windows environment contains some setting which are * important for a running system. They must not be dropped. */ { char **p; p = fetch_windows_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_windows_environment(p); } #endif if (getenv("TZ")) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); #ifdef GSSAPI /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter * the childs environment as they see fit */ ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); #endif if (!options.use_login) { /* Set basic environment. */ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); #ifdef _AIX child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name); #endif child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", "su"); senv = environ; environ = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); *environ = NULL; (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH); copy_environment(environ, &env, &envsize); for (var = environ; *var != NULL; ++var) free(*var); free(environ); environ = senv; #else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ # ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains * important components pointing to the system directories, * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better * remains intact here. */ # ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid); path = child_get_env(env, "PATH"); # endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH); } # endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell); } /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */ if (!options.use_login) { while (custom_environment) { struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; char *str = ce->s; for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++) ; if (str[i] == '=') { str[i] = 0; child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1); } custom_environment = ce->next; free(ce->s); free(ce); } } /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port()); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf); laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), laddr, get_local_port()); free(laddr); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf); if (s->ttyfd != -1) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); if (s->term) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term); if (s->display) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display); if (original_command) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", original_command); #ifdef _UNICOS if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0') child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir); #endif /* _UNICOS */ /* * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or * SIA), so copy it to the child. */ { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp); } #ifdef _AIX { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment"); } #endif #ifdef KRB5 if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", s->authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif #ifdef USE_PAM /* * Pull in any environment variables that may have * been set by PAM. */ if (options.use_pam) { char **p; p = fetch_pam_child_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_pam_environment(p); p = fetch_pam_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_pam_environment(p); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ if (auth_sock_name != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, auth_sock_name); /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */ if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment", strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : ""); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf); } if (debug_flag) { /* dump the environment */ fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n"); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]); } return env; } /* * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found * first in this order). */ static void do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell) { FILE *f = NULL; char cmd[1024]; int do_xauth; struct stat st; do_xauth = s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL; /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */ if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL && !no_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc && stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) { snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) { if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) { /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */ if (debug_flag) { fprintf(stderr, "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display); fprintf(stderr, "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); } snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display); fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", cmd); } } } static void do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f = NULL; char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN; struct stat sb; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl); #else if (pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = def_nl; #endif if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) { if (nl != def_nl) free(nl); return; } /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */ logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl); if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stderr); fclose(f); } exit(254); } /* * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions. */ static void safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid) { const char *cp; char component[PATH_MAX]; struct stat st; if (*path != '/') fatal("chroot path does not begin at root"); if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component)) fatal("chroot path too long"); /* * Descend the path, checking that each component is a * root-owned directory with strict permissions. */ for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) { if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL) strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component)); else { cp++; memcpy(component, path, cp - path); component[cp - path] = '\0'; } debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); if (stat(component, &st) != 0) fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, component, strerror(errno)); if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot " "directory %s\"%s\"", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); } if (chdir(path) == -1) fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": " "%s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chroot(path) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chdir("/") == -1) fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path); } /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { char *chroot_path, *tmp; -#ifdef USE_LIBIAF - int doing_chroot = 0; -#endif platform_setusercontext(pw); if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context"); exit(1); } #else if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("setgid"); exit(1); } /* Initialize the group list. */ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("initgroups"); exit(1); } endgrent(); #endif platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw); - if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && + if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory, pw->pw_uid); chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); free(tmp); free(chroot_path); /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */ free(options.chroot_directory); options.chroot_directory = NULL; -#ifdef USE_LIBIAF - doing_chroot = 1; -#endif + in_chroot = 1; } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context (setuser)"); exit(1); } /* * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID. */ (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK); #else # ifdef USE_LIBIAF -/* In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail; typically - * because of the lack of necessary authentication services and runtime - * such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so, ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd - * We skip it in the internal sftp chroot case. - * We'll lose auditing and ACLs but permanently_set_uid will - * take care of the rest. - */ - if ((doing_chroot == 0) && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) { - fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name); - } + /* + * In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail; + * typically because of the lack of necessary authentication + * services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so, + * ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the + * internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but + * permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest. + */ + if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) + fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name); # endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ permanently_set_uid(pw); #endif } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); } if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid); } static void do_pwchange(Session *s) { fflush(NULL); fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n"); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { fprintf(stderr, "You must change your password now and login again!\n"); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX setexeccon(NULL); #endif #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #else execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL); #endif perror("passwd"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Password change required but no TTY available.\n"); } exit(1); } static void launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname) { /* Launch login(1). */ execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname, #ifdef xxxLOGIN_NEEDS_TERM (s->term ? s->term : "unknown"), #endif /* LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */ #ifdef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT "-p", "-f", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #else "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #endif /* Login couldn't be executed, die. */ perror("login"); exit(1); } static void child_close_fds(void) { extern int auth_sock; if (auth_sock != -1) { close(auth_sock); auth_sock = -1; } if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out()) close(packet_get_connection_in()); else { close(packet_get_connection_in()); close(packet_get_connection_out()); } /* * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain * open in the parent. */ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */ channel_close_all(); /* * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later. */ endpwent(); /* * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file * descriptors open. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); } /* * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group * ids, and executing the command or shell. */ #define ARGV_MAX 10 void do_child(Session *s, const char *command) { extern char **environ; char **env; char *argv[ARGV_MAX]; const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; int r = 0; /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ destroy_sensitive_data(); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { do_setusercontext(pw); child_close_fds(); do_pwchange(s); exit(1); } /* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */ if (options.use_login && command != NULL) options.use_login = 0; #ifdef _UNICOS cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command); #endif /* _UNICOS */ /* * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */ if (!options.use_login) { #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty); if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) do_motd(); #else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */ if (!options.use_pam) do_nologin(pw); do_setusercontext(pw); /* * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have * generated messages, so if this in an interactive * login then display them too. */ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) display_loginmsg(); #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login && !is_pam_session_open()) { debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting"); display_loginmsg(); exit(254); } #endif /* * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is * legal, and means /bin/sh. */ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; /* * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, * even if shell is overridden from login.conf */ env = do_setup_env(s, shell); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); #endif /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */ if (options.use_login) hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns); /* * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be * closed before building the environment, as we call * get_remote_ipaddr there. */ child_close_fds(); /* * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment. */ environ = env; #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) /* * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable. */ if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() && (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) { char cell[64]; debug("Getting AFS token"); k_setpag(); if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL); krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir); } #endif /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) { /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0); #endif - if (r || options.chroot_directory == NULL || - strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) + if (r || !in_chroot) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home " "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno)); + } if (r) exit(1); } closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); if (!options.use_login) do_rc_files(s, shell); /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) { printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n"); fflush(NULL); exit(1); } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) { extern int optind, optreset; int i; char *p, *args; setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME); args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server"); for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " "))) if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1) argv[i++] = p; argv[i] = NULL; optind = optreset = 1; __progname = argv[0]; #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); #endif exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); } fflush(NULL); if (options.use_login) { launch_login(pw, hostname); /* NEVERREACHED */ } /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL) shell0++; else shell0 = shell; /* * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that * this is a login shell. */ if (!command) { char argv0[256]; /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */ argv0[0] = '-'; if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1) >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) { errno = EINVAL; perror(shell); exit(1); } /* Execute the shell. */ argv[0] = argv0; argv[1] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); /* Executing the shell failed. */ perror(shell); exit(1); } /* * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c * option to execute the command. */ argv[0] = (char *) shell0; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = (char *) command; argv[3] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); perror(shell); exit(1); } void session_unused(int id) { debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id); if (id >= options.max_sessions || id >= sessions_nalloc) { fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)", __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions)); sessions[id].self = id; sessions[id].used = 0; sessions[id].chanid = -1; sessions[id].ptyfd = -1; sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; sessions_first_unused = id; } Session * session_new(void) { Session *s, *tmp; if (sessions_first_unused == -1) { if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions) return NULL; debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)", __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions); tmp = xreallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions)); if (tmp == NULL) { error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions", __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1); return NULL; } sessions = tmp; session_unused(sessions_nalloc++); } if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc || sessions_first_unused < 0) { fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d", __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused]; if (s->used) { fatal("%s: session %d already used", __func__, sessions_first_unused); } sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused; s->used = 1; s->next_unused = -1; debug("session_new: session %d", s->self); return s; } static void session_dump(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p " "channel %d pid %ld", s->used, s->next_unused, s->self, s, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); } } int session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) { Session *s = session_new(); debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid); if (s == NULL) { error("no more sessions"); return 0; } s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid) fatal("no user for session %d", s->self); debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid); s->chanid = chanid; return 1; } Session * session_by_tty(char *tty) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) { debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty); return s; } } debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_channel(int id) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->chanid == id) { debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d", i, id); return s; } } debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_x11_channel(int id) { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used) continue; for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) { if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) { debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d " "channel %d", s->self, id); return s; } } } debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_pid(pid_t pid) { int i; debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid); for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->pid == pid) return s; } error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid); session_dump(); return NULL; } static int session_window_change_req(Session *s) { s->col = packet_get_int(); s->row = packet_get_int(); s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); return 1; } static int session_pty_req(Session *s) { u_int len; int n_bytes; if (no_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) { debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication."); return 0; } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty."); return 0; } s->term = packet_get_string(&len); if (compat20) { s->col = packet_get_int(); s->row = packet_get_int(); } else { s->row = packet_get_int(); s->col = packet_get_int(); } s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; } /* Allocate a pty and open it. */ debug("Allocating pty."); if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)))) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; s->ptyfd = -1; s->ttyfd = -1; error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self); return 0; } debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty); /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */ if (!compat20) n_bytes = packet_remaining(); tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes); if (!use_privsep) pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty); /* Set window size from the packet. */ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); packet_check_eom(); session_proctitle(s); return 1; } static int session_subsystem_req(Session *s) { struct stat st; u_int len; int success = 0; char *prog, *cmd; u_int i; s->subsys = packet_get_string(&len); packet_check_eom(); debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) { if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) { prog = options.subsystem_command[i]; cmd = options.subsystem_args[i]; if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) { s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP; debug("subsystem: %s", prog); } else { if (stat(prog, &st) < 0) debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", prog, strerror(errno)); s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); } success = do_exec(s, cmd) == 0; break; } } if (!success) logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, " "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); return success; } static int session_x11_req(Session *s) { int success; if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) { error("session_x11_req: session %d: " "x11 forwarding already active", s->self); return 0; } s->single_connection = packet_get_char(); s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL); s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL); s->screen = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); - success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) && + xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data)) + success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + else { + success = 0; + error("Invalid X11 forwarding data"); + } if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); s->auth_proto = NULL; s->auth_data = NULL; } return success; } static int session_shell_req(Session *s) { packet_check_eom(); return do_exec(s, NULL) == 0; } static int session_exec_req(Session *s) { u_int len, success; char *command = packet_get_string(&len); packet_check_eom(); success = do_exec(s, command) == 0; free(command); return success; } static int session_break_req(Session *s) { packet_get_int(); /* ignored */ packet_check_eom(); if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) < 0) return 0; return 1; } static int session_env_req(Session *s) { char *name, *val; u_int name_len, val_len, i; name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len); val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len); packet_check_eom(); /* Don't set too many environment variables */ if (s->num_env > 128) { debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name); goto fail; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) { debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val); s->env = xreallocarray(s->env, s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env)); s->env[s->num_env].name = name; s->env[s->num_env].val = val; s->num_env++; return (1); } } debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name); fail: free(name); free(val); return (0); } static int session_auth_agent_req(Session *s) { static int called = 0; packet_check_eom(); if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) { debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag"); return 0; } if (called) { return 0; } else { called = 1; return auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); } } int session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype) { int success = 0; Session *s; if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) { logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s", c->self, rtype); return 0; } debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d req %s", s->self, rtype); /* * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command * or a subsystem is executed */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) { success = session_shell_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) { success = session_exec_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) { success = session_pty_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) { success = session_x11_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) { success = session_auth_agent_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { success = session_subsystem_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) { success = session_env_req(s); } } if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) { success = session_window_change_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) { success = session_break_req(s); } return success; } void session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty) { if (!compat20) fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0"); /* * now that have a child and a pipe to the child, * we can activate our channel and register the fd's */ if (s->chanid == -1) fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); channel_set_fds(s->chanid, fdout, fdin, fderr, ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT); } /* * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally * (e.g., due to a dropped connection). */ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) { if (s == NULL) { error("session_pty_cleanup: no session"); return; } if (s->ttyfd == -1) return; debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty); /* Record that the user has logged out. */ if (s->pid != 0) record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name); /* Release the pseudo-tty. */ if (getuid() == 0) pty_release(s->tty); /* * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty * while we're still cleaning up. */ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0) error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); /* unlink pty from session */ s->ttyfd = -1; } void session_pty_cleanup(Session *s) { PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s)); } static char * sig2name(int sig) { #define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x SSH_SIG(ABRT); SSH_SIG(ALRM); SSH_SIG(FPE); SSH_SIG(HUP); SSH_SIG(ILL); SSH_SIG(INT); SSH_SIG(KILL); SSH_SIG(PIPE); SSH_SIG(QUIT); SSH_SIG(SEGV); SSH_SIG(TERM); SSH_SIG(USR1); SSH_SIG(USR2); #undef SSH_SIG return "SIG@openssh.com"; } static void session_close_x11(int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) { debug("session_close_x11: x11 channel %d missing", id); } else { /* Detach X11 listener */ debug("session_close_x11: detach x11 channel %d", id); channel_cancel_cleanup(id); if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_mark_dead(c); } } static void session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg) { Session *s; u_int i; debug3("session_close_single_x11: channel %d", id); channel_cancel_cleanup(id); if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL) fatal("session_close_single_x11: no x11 channel %d", id); for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { debug("session_close_single_x11: session %d: " "closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]); /* * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we * close all of its siblings. */ if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id) session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]); } free(s->x11_chanids); s->x11_chanids = NULL; free(s->display); s->display = NULL; free(s->auth_proto); s->auth_proto = NULL; free(s->auth_data); s->auth_data = NULL; free(s->auth_display); s->auth_display = NULL; } static void session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL) fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d", s->self, s->chanid); debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %ld", s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); if (WIFEXITED(status)) { channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-status", 0); packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status)); packet_send(); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status))); #ifdef WCOREDUMP packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0); #else /* WCOREDUMP */ packet_put_char(0); #endif /* WCOREDUMP */ packet_put_cstring(""); packet_put_cstring(""); packet_send(); } else { /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status); } /* disconnect channel */ debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid); /* * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds. */ channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1); /* * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be * interested in data we write. * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could * be some more data waiting in the pipe. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_write_failed(c); } void session_close(Session *s) { u_int i; - debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); + verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d", + s->pw->pw_name, + get_remote_ipaddr(), + get_remote_port(), + s->self); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); free(s->auth_display); free(s->auth_data); free(s->auth_proto); free(s->subsys); if (s->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) { free(s->env[i].name); free(s->env[i].val); } free(s->env); } session_proctitle(s); session_unused(s->self); } void session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status) { Session *s = session_by_pid(pid); if (s == NULL) { debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %ld", (long)pid); return; } if (s->chanid != -1) session_exit_message(s, status); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); s->pid = 0; } /* * this is called when a channel dies before * the session 'child' itself dies */ void session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg) { Session *s = session_by_channel(id); u_int i; if (s == NULL) { debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id); return; } debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %ld", id, (long)s->pid); if (s->pid != 0) { debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id); /* * delay detach of session, but release pty, since * the fd's to the child are already closed */ if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); return; } /* detach by removing callback */ channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid); /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */ if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) { for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]); s->x11_chanids[i] = -1; } } s->chanid = -1; session_close(s); } void session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *)) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used) { if (closefunc != NULL) closefunc(s); else session_close(s); } } } static char * session_tty_list(void) { static char buf[1024]; int i; char *cp; buf[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) { if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) { cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/'); cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1; } else cp = s->tty + 5; if (buf[0] != '\0') strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf); } } if (buf[0] == '\0') strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf); return buf; } void session_proctitle(Session *s) { if (s->pw == NULL) error("no user for session %d", s->self); else setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list()); } int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) { struct stat st; char display[512], auth_display[512]; char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; u_int i; if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) { packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file."); return 0; } if (!options.x11_forwarding) { debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file."); return 0; } if (options.xauth_location == NULL || (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) { packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing."); return 0; } if (options.use_login) { packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; " "not compatible with UseLogin=yes."); return 0; } if (s->display != NULL) { debug("X11 display already set."); return 0; } if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset, options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); return 0; } for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { channel_register_cleanup(s->x11_chanids[i], session_close_single_x11, 0); } /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays. */ if (options.x11_use_localhost) { snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display); } else { #ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY struct hostent *he; struct in_addr my_addr; he = gethostbyname(hostname); if (he == NULL) { error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); return 0; } memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)); snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr), s->display_number, s->screen); #else snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname, s->display_number, s->screen); #endif s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(display); } return 1; } static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) { server_loop2(authctxt); } void do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int called = 0; debug("do_cleanup"); /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */ if (is_child) return; /* avoid double cleanup */ if (called) return; called = 1; if (authctxt == NULL) return; #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { sshpam_cleanup(); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); } #endif if (!authctxt->authenticated) return; #ifdef KRB5 if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && authctxt->krb5_ctx) krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (compat20 && options.gss_cleanup_creds) ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(); #endif /* remove agent socket */ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); /* * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled, * or if running in monitor. */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1898 +1,1898 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.120 2015/05/28 04:50:53 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.121 2016/02/11 02:21:34 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* XXX: memleaks */ /* XXX: signed vs unsigned */ /* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */ /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "progressmeter.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted; extern int showprogress; /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */ #define MIN_READ_SIZE 512 /* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */ #define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64 struct sftp_conn { int fd_in; int fd_out; u_int transfer_buflen; u_int num_requests; u_int version; u_int msg_id; #define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001 #define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002 #define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004 #define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008 #define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010 u_int exts; u_int64_t limit_kbps; struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out; }; static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5))); /* ARGSUSED */ static int sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount) { struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit; bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount); return 0; } static void send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { u_char mlen[4]; struct iovec iov[2]; if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m)); /* Send length first */ put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m)); iov[0].iov_base = mlen; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen); iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m); iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m); if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_out) != sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen)) fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); } static void get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { u_int msg_len; u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) { if (errno == EPIPE) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) fatal("Received message too long %u", msg_len); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != msg_len) { if (errno == EPIPE) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } } static void send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s, u_int len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); sshbuf_free(msg); } static u_int get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id, status; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); return status; } static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id, status; u_char type; u_char *handle; char errmsg[256]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, errfmt); if (errfmt != NULL) vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args); va_end(args); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (errfmt != NULL) error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE) fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); return handle; } static Attrib * get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; u_char type; int r; static Attrib a; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type); } if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } sshbuf_free(msg); return &a; } static int get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id; u_int64_t flag; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); } memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0; st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0; sshbuf_free(msg); return 0; } struct sftp_conn * do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests, u_int64_t limit_kbps) { u_char type; struct sshbuf *msg; struct sftp_conn *ret; int r; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->msg_id = 1; ret->fd_in = fd_in; ret->fd_out = fd_out; ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen; ret->num_requests = num_requests; ret->exts = 0; ret->limit_kbps = 0; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(ret, msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(ret, msg); /* Expecting a VERSION reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) { error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)", type); sshbuf_free(msg); free(ret); return(NULL); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version); /* Check for extensions */ while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) { char *name; u_char *value; size_t vlen; int known = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC; known = 1; } if (known) { debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s", name, value); } else { debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name); } free(name); free(value); } sshbuf_free(msg); /* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */ if (ret->version == 0) ret->transfer_buflen = MIN(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480); ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps; if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) { bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps, ret->transfer_buflen); bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps, ret->transfer_buflen); } return ret; } u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn) { return conn->version; } int do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { u_int id, status; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0; size_t handle_len; u_char type; char *handle; int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; int r; if (dir) *dir = NULL; id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path); if (handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } if (dir) { ents = 0; *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[0] = NULL; } for (; !interrupted;) { id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++; debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int rstatus; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus); if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF) break; error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus)); goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (count == 0) break; debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(filename); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } if (print_flag) printf("%s\n", longname); /* * Directory entries should never contain '/' * These can be used to attack recursive ops * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd') */ if (strchr(filename, '/') != NULL) { error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" " "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path); } else if (dir) { *dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir)); (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename); (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname); memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a)); (*dir)[++ents] = NULL; } free(filename); free(longname); } } status = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); free(handle); if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) { /* Don't return results on error */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = NULL; } else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) { /* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); **dir = NULL; } return status; } int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); } void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) { free(s[i]->filename); free(s[i]->longname); free(s[i]); } free(s); } int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag) error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } Attrib * do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } Attrib * do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; if (conn->version == 0) { if (quiet) debug("Server version does not support lstat operation"); else logit("Server version does not support lstat operation"); return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet)); } id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #ifdef notyet Attrib * do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle, handle_len); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #endif int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle, handle_len, a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } char * do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path, strlen(path)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s size %lu", path, filename, (unsigned long)a.size); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return(filename); } int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath, int force_legacy) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send rename request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if (use_ext) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" : "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) { error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send link request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if (conn->version < 3) { error("This server does not support the symlink operation"); return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send symlink request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; /* Silently return if the extension is not supported */ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0) return -1; /* Send fsync request */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status; } #ifdef notyet char * do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return filename; } #endif int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #ifdef notyet int do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #endif static void send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } int do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { Attrib junk; struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *handle; int local_fd = -1, write_error; int read_error, write_errno, reordered = 0, r; u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater; u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK; off_t progress_counter; size_t handle_len; struct stat st; struct request { u_int id; size_t len; u_int64_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests; struct request *req; u_char type; TAILQ_INIT(&requests); if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = a->perm & 0777; else mode = 0666; if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) { error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path); return(-1); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) size = a->size; else size = 0; buflen = conn->transfer_buflen; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */ /* Send open request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_READ)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &junk)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); if (handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); return(-1); } local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR); if (local_fd == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } offset = highwater = 0; if (resume_flag) { if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) { error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (st.st_size < 0) { error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path); goto fail; } if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "local file is larger than remote", local_path); fail: do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); sshbuf_free(msg); free(handle); if (local_fd != -1) close(local_fd); return -1; } offset = highwater = st.st_size; } /* Read from remote and write to local */ write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0; max_req = 1; progress_counter = offset; if (showprogress && size != 0) start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter); while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) { u_char *data; size_t len; /* * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully */ if (interrupted) { if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */ break; max_req = 0; } /* Send some more requests */ while (num_req < max_req) { debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)", (unsigned long long)offset, (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1, num_req, max_req); req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req)); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len = buflen; req->offset = offset; offset += buflen; num_req++; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq); send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); } sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req); /* Find the request in our queue */ for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests); req != NULL && req->id != id; req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq)) ; if (req == NULL) fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_STATUS: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF) read_error = 1; max_req = 0; TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; break; case SSH2_FXP_DATA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu", (unsigned long long)req->offset, (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1); if (len > req->len) fatal("Received more data than asked for " "%zu > %zu", len, req->len); if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 || atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) && !write_error) { write_errno = errno; write_error = 1; max_req = 0; } else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater) highwater = req->offset + len; else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater) reordered = 1; progress_counter += len; free(data); if (len == req->len) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; } else { /* Resend the request for the missing data */ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting " "%llu -> %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)req->offset + len, (unsigned long long)req->offset + req->len - 1, num_req); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len -= len; req->offset += len; send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); /* Reduce the request size */ if (len < buflen) buflen = MAX(MIN_READ_SIZE, len); } if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */ if (size > 0 && offset > size) { /* Only one request at a time * after the expected EOF */ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)offset, num_req); max_req = 1; } else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) { ++max_req; } } break; default: fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); } } if (showprogress && size) stop_progress_meter(); /* Sanity check */ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL) fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue"); /* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */ if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) { if (reordered && resume_flag) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "server reordered requests", local_path); } debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater); if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1) error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (read_error) { error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = -1; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else if (write_error) { error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(write_errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else { if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else status = SSH2_FX_OK; /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1) #else if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1) #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (preserve_flag && (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (fsync_flag) { debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path); if (fsync(local_fd) == -1) error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } } close(local_fd); sshbuf_free(msg); free(handle); return(status); } static int download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { int i, ret = 0; SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries; char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst; mode_t mode = 0777; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (dirattrib == NULL && (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) { error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag) printf("Retrieving %s\n", src); if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777; else { debug("Server did not send permissions for " "directory \"%s\"", dst); } if (mkdir(dst, mode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) { error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) { error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src); return -1; } for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) { filename = dir_entries[i]->filename; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ) { if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Download of file %s to %s failed", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src); free(new_dst); free(new_src); } if (preserve_flag) { if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); } else debug("Server did not send times for directory " "\"%s\"", dst); } free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries); return ret; } int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { char *src_canon; int ret; if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src); return -1; } ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0, dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag); free(src_canon); return ret; } int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { int r, local_fd; u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK; u_int id; u_char type; off_t offset, progress_counter; u_char *handle, *data; struct sshbuf *msg; struct stat sb; Attrib a, *c = NULL; u_int32_t startid; u_int32_t ackid; struct outstanding_ack { u_int id; u_int len; off_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks; struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL; size_t handle_len; TAILQ_INIT(&acks); if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); return(-1); } if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); close(local_fd); return(-1); } if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { error("%s is not a regular file", local_path); close(local_fd); return(-1); } stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 0777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; if (resume) { /* Get remote file size if it exists */ if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) { close(local_fd); return -1; } if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) { error("destination file bigger or same size as " "source file"); close(local_fd); return -1; } if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) { close(local_fd); return -1; } } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send open request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT| (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC))) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); sshbuf_reset(msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); if (handle == NULL) { close(local_fd); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } startid = ackid = id + 1; data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen); /* Read from local and write to remote */ offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0); if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size, &progress_counter); for (;;) { int len; /* * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF, * thus losing the last block of the file. * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the * server to drain. */ if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK) len = 0; else do len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen); while ((len == -1) && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); if (len == -1) fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (len != 0) { ack = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ack)); ack->id = ++id; ack->offset = offset; ack->len = len; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u", id, (unsigned long long)offset, len); } else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL) break; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id); if (id == startid || len == 0 || id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) { u_int rid; sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, " "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); /* Find the request in our queue */ for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks); ack != NULL && ack->id != rid; ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq)) ; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid); TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq); debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld", ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset); ++ackid; progress_counter += ack->len; free(ack); } offset += len; if (offset < 0) fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__); } sshbuf_free(msg); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); free(data); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } if (close(local_fd) == -1) { error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ if (preserve_flag) do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a); if (fsync_flag) (void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len); - if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != SSH2_FX_OK) + if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; free(handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { int ret = 0; - u_int status; DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst; struct stat sb; - Attrib a; + Attrib a, *dirattrib; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag) printf("Entering %s\n", src); attrib_clear(&a); stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 01777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; - status = do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0); /* - * we lack a portable status for errno EEXIST, - * so if we get a SSH2_FX_FAILURE back we must check - * if it was created successfully. + * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST, + * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether + * the path already existed and is a directory. */ - if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { - if (status != SSH2_FX_FAILURE) + if (do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0) != 0) { + if ((dirattrib = do_stat(conn, dst, 0)) == NULL) return -1; - if (do_stat(conn, dst, 0) == NULL) + if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { + error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", dst); return -1; + } } if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) { error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; filename = dp->d_name; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) { logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ret = -1; } else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst, preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename); free(new_dst); free(new_src); } do_setstat(conn, dst, &a); (void) closedir(dirp); return ret; } int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { char *dst_canon; int ret; if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst); return -1; } ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag); free(dst_canon); return ret; } char * path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2) { char *ret; size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; ret = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(ret, p1, len); if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/') strlcat(ret, "/", len); strlcat(ret, p2, len); return(ret); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,136 +1,142 @@ /* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.27 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */ #ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H #define _SFTP_CLIENT_H +#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB +# include +#else +# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" +#endif + typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT; struct SFTP_DIRENT { char *filename; char *longname; Attrib a; }; /* * Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the * server's native format may be larger than the client's. */ struct sftp_statvfs { u_int64_t f_bsize; u_int64_t f_frsize; u_int64_t f_blocks; u_int64_t f_bfree; u_int64_t f_bavail; u_int64_t f_files; u_int64_t f_ffree; u_int64_t f_favail; u_int64_t f_fsid; u_int64_t f_flag; u_int64_t f_namemax; }; /* * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success. */ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t); u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *); /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int); /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **); /* Delete file 'path' */ int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); /* Create directory 'path' */ int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int); /* Remove directory 'path' */ int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */ Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */ Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); /* Set file attributes of 'path' */ int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *); /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */ int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *); /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */ int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int); /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int force_legacy); /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */ int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int); /* * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times * if 'pflag' is set */ int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); /* * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int, int); /* * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times * if 'pflag' is set */ int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int); /* * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int, int); /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */ char *path_append(const char *, const char *); #endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,51 +1,53 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.4 2009/02/21 19:32:04 tobias Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.5 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "misc.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" void cleanup_exit(int i) { sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct passwd *user_pw; + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n", (u_long)getuid()); return 1; } return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw)); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1711 +1,1715 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.107 2015/08/20 22:32:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.109 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN */ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" /* Our verbosity */ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; /* Our client */ static struct passwd *pw = NULL; static char *client_addr = NULL; /* input and output queue */ struct sshbuf *iqueue; struct sshbuf *oqueue; /* Version of client */ static u_int version; /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */ static int init_done; /* Disable writes */ static int readonly; /* Requests that are allowed/denied */ static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist; /* portable attributes, etc. */ typedef struct Stat Stat; struct Stat { char *name; char *long_name; Attrib attrib; }; /* Packet handlers */ static void process_open(u_int32_t id); static void process_close(u_int32_t id); static void process_read(u_int32_t id); static void process_write(u_int32_t id); static void process_stat(u_int32_t id); static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id); static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_remove(u_int32_t id); static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id); static void process_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended(u_int32_t id); struct sftp_handler { const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */ const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */ u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */ void (*handler)(u_int32_t); int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */ }; struct sftp_handler handlers[] = { /* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */ { "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 }, { "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 }, { "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 }, { "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 }, { "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 }, { "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 }, { "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 }, { "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 }, { "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 }, { "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 }, { "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 }, { "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 }, { "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 }, { "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 }, { "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 }, { "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 }, { "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 }, { "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; /* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */ struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = { { "posix-rename", "posix-rename@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_posix_rename, 1 }, { "statvfs", "statvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 }, { "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 }, { "hardlink", "hardlink@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 }, { "fsync", "fsync@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; static int request_permitted(struct sftp_handler *h) { char *result; if (readonly && h->does_write) { verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name); return 0; } if (request_blacklist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_blacklist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); verbose("Refusing blacklisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } if (request_whitelist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_whitelist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); debug2("Permitting whitelisted %s request", h->name); return 1; } if (request_whitelist != NULL) { verbose("Refusing non-whitelisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } return 1; } static int errno_to_portable(int unixerrno) { int ret = 0; switch (unixerrno) { case 0: ret = SSH2_FX_OK; break; case ENOENT: case ENOTDIR: case EBADF: case ELOOP: ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; break; case EPERM: case EACCES: case EFAULT: ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; break; case ENAMETOOLONG: case EINVAL: ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE; break; case ENOSYS: ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; break; default: ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; break; } return ret; } static int flags_from_portable(int pflags) { int flags = 0; if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) && (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) { flags = O_RDWR; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) { flags = O_RDONLY; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) { flags = O_WRONLY; } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) flags |= O_APPEND; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) flags |= O_CREAT; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) flags |= O_TRUNC; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) flags |= O_EXCL; return flags; } static const char * string_from_portable(int pflags) { static char ret[128]; *ret = '\0'; #define PAPPEND(str) { \ if (*ret != '\0') \ strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \ strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \ } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) PAPPEND("READ") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) PAPPEND("WRITE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) PAPPEND("APPEND") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) PAPPEND("CREATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) PAPPEND("TRUNCATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) PAPPEND("EXCL") return ret; } /* handle handles */ typedef struct Handle Handle; struct Handle { int use; DIR *dirp; int fd; int flags; char *name; u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write; int next_unused; }; enum { HANDLE_UNUSED, HANDLE_DIR, HANDLE_FILE }; Handle *handles = NULL; u_int num_handles = 0; int first_unused_handle = -1; static void handle_unused(int i) { handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED; handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = i; } static int handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp) { int i; if (first_unused_handle == -1) { if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles) return -1; num_handles++; handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle)); handle_unused(num_handles - 1); } i = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused; handles[i].use = use; handles[i].dirp = dirp; handles[i].fd = fd; handles[i].flags = flags; handles[i].name = xstrdup(name); handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0; return i; } static int handle_is_ok(int i, int type) { return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type; } static int handle_to_string(int handle, u_char **stringp, int *hlenp) { if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL) return -1; *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t)); put_u32(*stringp, handle); *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t); return 0; } static int handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen) { int val; if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t)) return -1; val = get_u32(handle); if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) || handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR)) return val; return -1; } static char * handle_to_name(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)|| handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].name; return NULL; } static DIR * handle_to_dir(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) return handles[handle].dirp; return NULL; } static int handle_to_fd(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].fd; return -1; } static int handle_to_flags(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].flags; return 0; } static void handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes; } static void handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_read(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_read); return 0; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_write(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_write); return 0; } static int handle_close(int handle) { int ret = -1; if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { ret = close(handles[handle].fd); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) { ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else { errno = ENOENT; } return ret; } static void handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle)); } else { logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle)); } } static void handle_log_exit(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++) if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED) handle_log_close(i, "forced"); } static int get_handle(struct sshbuf *queue, int *hp) { u_char *handle; int r; size_t hlen; *hp = -1; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(queue, &handle, &hlen)) != 0) return r; if (hlen < 256) *hp = handle_from_string(handle, hlen); free(handle); return 0; } /* send replies */ static void send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_reset(m); } static const char * status_to_message(u_int32_t status) { const char *status_messages[] = { "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */ "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */ "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */ "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */ "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */ "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */ "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */ "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */ "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */ "Unknown error" /* Others */ }; return (status_messages[MIN(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]); } static void send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status); if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE || (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF)) logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (version >= 3) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, status_to_message(status))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, dlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) { debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen); } static void send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle) { u_char *string; int hlen; handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen); debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen); free(string); } static void send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats) { struct sshbuf *msg; int i, r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].long_name)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &stats[i].attrib)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int64_t flag; int r; flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0; flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_frsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bfree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bavail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_files)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_ffree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_favail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_namemax)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } /* parse incoming */ static void process_init(void) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &version)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); verbose("received client version %u", version); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0 || /* POSIX rename extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */ /* statvfs extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */ /* fstatvfs extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */ /* hardlink extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */ /* fsync extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0) /* version */ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void process_open(u_int32_t id) { u_int32_t pflags; Attrib a; char *name; int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags); flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666; logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); if (readonly && ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY || (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) { verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode"); status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; } else { fd = open(name, flags, mode); if (fd < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL); if (handle < 0) { close(fd); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_close(u_int32_t id) { int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle); handle_log_close(handle, NULL); ret = handle_close(handle); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); } static void process_read(u_int32_t id) { u_char buf[64*1024]; u_int32_t len; int r, handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; u_int64_t off; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); if (len > sizeof buf) { len = sizeof buf; debug2("read change len %d", len); } fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd >= 0) { if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { error("process_read: seek failed"); status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { ret = read(fd, buf, len); if (ret < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else if (ret == 0) { status = SSH2_FX_EOF; } else { send_data(id, buf, ret); status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle_update_read(handle, ret); } } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static void process_write(u_int32_t id) { u_int64_t off; size_t len; int r, handle, fd, ret, status; u_char *data; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %zu", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) && lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error("process_write: seek failed"); } else { /* XXX ATOMICIO ? */ ret = write(fd, data, len); if (ret < 0) { error("process_write: write failed"); status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else if ((size_t)ret == len) { status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle_update_write(handle, ret); } else { debug2("nothing at all written"); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } } } send_status(id, status); free(data); } static void process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat) { Attrib a; struct stat st; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : ""); verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name); r = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st); if (r < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_stat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 0); } static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 1); } static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; struct stat st; int fd, r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd >= 0) { r = fstat(fd, &st); if (r < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static struct timeval * attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a) { static struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[0].tv_usec = 0; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[1].tv_usec = 0; return tv; } static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a.size); r = truncate(name, a.size); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; int handle, fd, r; int status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { char *name = handle_to_name(handle); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a.size); r = ftruncate(fd, a.size); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD r = fchmod(fd, a.perm & 07777); #else r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); #ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES r = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(&a)); #else r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); #ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN r = fchown(fd, a.uid, a.gid); #else r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } send_status(id, status); } static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp = NULL; char *path; int r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: opendir", id); logit("opendir \"%s\"", path); dirp = opendir(path); if (dirp == NULL) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp); if (handle < 0) { closedir(dirp); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(path); } static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *path; int r, handle; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); dirp = handle_to_dir(handle); path = handle_to_name(handle); if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); } else { struct stat st; char pathname[PATH_MAX]; Stat *stats; int nstats = 10, count = 0, i; stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat)); while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (count >= nstats) { nstats *= 2; stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat)); } /* XXX OVERFLOW ? */ snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path, strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name); if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0) continue; stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib)); stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name); stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0); count++; /* send up to 100 entries in one message */ /* XXX check packet size instead */ if (count == 100) break; } if (count > 0) { send_names(id, count, stats); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { free(stats[i].name); free(stats[i].long_name); } } else { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF); } free(stats); } } static void process_remove(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: remove", id); logit("remove name \"%s\"", name); r = unlink(name); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm & 07777 : 0777; debug3("request %u: mkdir", id); logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode); r = mkdir(name, mode); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: rmdir", id); logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name); r = rmdir(name); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id) { char resolvedname[PATH_MAX]; char *path; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (path[0] == '\0') { free(path); path = xstrdup("."); } debug3("request %u: realpath", id); verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path); if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) { send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); } else { Stat s; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; struct stat sb; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: rename", id); logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { /* Race-free rename of regular files */ if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) { if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS #ifdef EXDEV || errno == EXDEV #endif #ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO #endif ) { struct stat st; /* * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to * stat+rename. This is racy. */ if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } else { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); /* clean spare link */ unlink(newpath); } else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id) { int r, len; char buf[PATH_MAX]; char *path; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: readlink", id); verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path); if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else { Stat s; buf[len] = '\0'; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = buf; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: symlink", id); logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); /* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */ r = symlink(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id); logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); r = rename(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id) { char *path; struct statvfs st; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: statvfs", id); logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path); if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); free(path); } static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id) { int r, handle, fd; struct statvfs st; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); return; } if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); } static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: hardlink", id); logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); r = link(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id) { int handle, fd, r, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle); verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle)); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { r = fsync(fd); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); } static void process_extended(u_int32_t id) { char *request; int i, r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) { if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i])) send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); else extended_handlers[i].handler(id); break; } } if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request); send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */ } free(request); } /* stolen from ssh-agent */ static void process(void) { u_int msg_len; u_int buf_len; u_int consumed; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int i, r; u_int32_t id; buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (buf_len < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue); msg_len = get_u32(cp); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { error("bad message from %s local user %s", client_addr, pw->pw_name); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11); } if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) return; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); buf_len -= 4; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_INIT: process_init(); init_done = 1; break; case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED: if (!init_done) fatal("Received extended request before init"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); process_extended(id); break; default: if (!init_done) fatal("Received %u request before init", type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == handlers[i].type) { if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); } else { handlers[i].handler(id); } break; } } if (handlers[i].handler == NULL) error("Unknown message %u", type); } /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) { error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (msg_len < consumed) { error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } if (msg_len > consumed && (r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */ void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i) { if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) { handle_log_exit(); logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); } _exit(i); } static void sftp_server_usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] " "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] " "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n" " %s -Q protocol_feature\n", __progname, __progname); exit(1); } int sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) { fd_set *rset, *wset; int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; ssize_t len, olen, set_size; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; char *cp, *homedir = NULL, buf[4*4096]; long mask; extern char *optarg; extern char *__progname; + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); pw = pwcopy(user_pw); while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'Q': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n"); exit(1); } for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name); for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name); exit(0); break; case 'R': readonly = 1; break; case 'c': /* * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a * shell using "sftp-server -c command" */ skipargs = 1; break; case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'l': log_level = log_level_number(optarg); if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'f': log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg); if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'd': cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid); homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); free(cp); break; case 'p': if (request_whitelist != NULL) fatal("Permitted requests already set"); request_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'P': if (request_blacklist != NULL) fatal("Refused requests already set"); request_blacklist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'u': errno = 0; mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8); if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' || cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0)) fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); (void)umask((mode_t)mask); break; case 'h': default: sftp_server_usage(); } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) /* * On Linux, we should try to avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps} * available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically * imply arbitrary code execution access that will break * restricted configurations. */ if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) != 0) fatal("unable to make the process undumpable"); #endif /* defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) */ + /* Drop any fine-grained privileges we don't need */ + platform_pledge_sftp_server(); + if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) { client_addr = xstrdup(cp); if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) { error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"", getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } *cp = '\0'; } else client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); in = STDIN_FILENO; out = STDOUT_FILENO; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(in, O_BINARY); setmode(out, O_BINARY); #endif max = 0; if (in > max) max = in; if (out > max) max = out; if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); - rset = xmalloc(set_size); - wset = xmalloc(set_size); + rset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); + wset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); if (homedir != NULL) { if (chdir(homedir) != 0) { error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir, strerror(errno)); } } + set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); for (;;) { memset(rset, 0, set_size); memset(wset, 0, set_size); /* * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle * the worst-case length packet it can generate, * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. */ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 && (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) FD_SET(in, rset); else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue); if (olen > 0) FD_SET(out, wset); if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; error("select: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2); } /* copy stdin to iqueue */ if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); if (len == 0) { debug("read eof"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0); } else if (len < 0) { error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } /* send oqueue to stdout */ if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen); if (len < 0) { error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } /* * Process requests from client if we can fit the results * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input * and let the output queue drain. */ r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH); if (r == 0) process(); else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp.1 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp.1 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp.1 (revision 296853) @@ -1,625 +1,626 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.101 2015/01/30 11:43:14 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.102 2015/09/25 18:19:54 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 30 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 25 2015 $ .Dt SFTP 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sftp .Nd secure file transfer program .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sftp .Bk -words .Op Fl 1246aCfpqrv .Op Fl B Ar buffer_size .Op Fl b Ar batchfile .Op Fl c Ar cipher .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl l Ar limit .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option .Op Fl P Ar port .Op Fl R Ar num_requests .Op Fl S Ar program .Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server .Ar host .Ek .Nm sftp .Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns .Ar host Ns Op : Ns Ar .Nm sftp .Oo .Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns .Ar host Ns Oo : Ns Ar dir Ns .Op Ar / .Oc .Nm sftp .Fl b Ar batchfile .Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar host .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is an interactive file transfer program, similar to .Xr ftp 1 , which performs all operations over an encrypted .Xr ssh 1 transport. It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compression. .Nm connects and logs into the specified .Ar host , then enters an interactive command mode. .Pp The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after successful interactive authentication. .Pp The third usage format allows .Nm to start in a remote directory. .Pp The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the .Fl b option. In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see .Xr sshd 8 and .Xr ssh-keygen 1 for details). .Pp Since some usage formats use colon characters to delimit host names from path names, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 1 Specify the use of protocol version 1. .It Fl 2 Specify the use of protocol version 2. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl a Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting existing partial or complete copies of files. If the partial contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. .It Fl B Ar buffer_size Specify the size of the buffer that .Nm uses when transferring files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes. .It Fl b Ar batchfile Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input .Ar batchfile instead of .Em stdin . Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication. A .Ar batchfile of .Sq \- may be used to indicate standard input. .Nm will abort if any of the following commands fail: .Ic get , put , reget , reput, rename , ln , .Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls , .Ic lchdir , chmod , chown , .Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink , and .Ic lmkdir . Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by prefixing the command with a .Sq \- character (for example, .Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) . .It Fl C Enables compression (via ssh's .Fl C flag). .It Fl c Ar cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via .Xr ssh 1 ) . This option may be useful in debugging the client and server. .It Fl F Ar ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for .Xr ssh 1 . This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl l Ar limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. .It Fl o Ar ssh_option Can be used to pass options to .Nm ssh in the format used in .Xr ssh_config 5 . This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate .Nm sftp command-line flag. For example, to specify an alternate port use: .Ic sftp -oPort=24 . For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs +.It CertificateFile .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Cipher .It Ciphers .It Compression .It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It HostName .It IdentityFile .It IdentitiesOnly .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LogLevel .It MACs .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It RhostsRSAAuthentication .It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It UpdateHostKeys .It UsePrivilegedPort .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .El .It Fl P Ar port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. .It Fl p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original files transferred. .It Fl q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl R Ar num_requests Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time. Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests. .It Fl r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading. Note that .Nm does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. .It Fl S Ar program Name of the .Ar program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand .Xr ssh 1 options. .It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on the remote host. A path is useful for using .Nm over protocol version 1, or when the remote .Xr sshd 8 does not have an sftp subsystem configured. .It Fl v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh. .El .Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS Once in interactive mode, .Nm understands a set of commands similar to those of .Xr ftp 1 . Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by .Xr glob 3 must be escaped with backslashes .Pq Sq \e . .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ic bye Quit .Nm sftp . .It Ic cd Ar path Change remote directory to .Ar path . .It Ic chgrp Ar grp Ar path Change group of file .Ar path to .Ar grp . .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .Ar grp must be a numeric GID. .It Ic chmod Ar mode Ar path Change permissions of file .Ar path to .Ar mode . .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .It Ic chown Ar own Ar path Change owner of file .Ar path to .Ar own . .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .Ar own must be a numeric UID. .It Xo Ic df .Op Fl hi .Op Ar path .Xc Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory (or .Ar path if specified). If the .Fl h flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable" suffixes. The .Fl i flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information. This command is only supported on servers that implement the .Dq statvfs@openssh.com extension. .It Ic exit Quit .Nm sftp . .It Xo Ic get .Op Fl afPpr .Ar remote-path .Op Ar local-path .Xc Retrieve the .Ar remote-path and store it on the local machine. If the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the remote machine. .Ar remote-path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. If it does and .Ar local-path is specified, then .Ar local-path must specify a directory. .Pp If the .Fl a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. .Pp If the .Fl f flag is specified, then .Xr fsync 2 will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk. .Pp If either the .Fl P or .Fl p flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. .Pp If the .Fl r flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that .Nm does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. .It Ic help Display help text. .It Ic lcd Ar path Change local directory to .Ar path . .It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path Display local directory listing of either .Ar path or current directory if .Ar path is not specified. .Ar ls-options may contain any flags supported by the local system's .Xr ls 1 command. .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .It Ic lmkdir Ar path Create local directory specified by .Ar path . .It Xo Ic ln .Op Fl s .Ar oldpath .Ar newpath .Xc Create a link from .Ar oldpath to .Ar newpath . If the .Fl s flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a hard link. .It Ic lpwd Print local working directory. .It Xo Ic ls .Op Fl 1afhlnrSt .Op Ar path .Xc Display a remote directory listing of either .Ar path or the current directory if .Ar path is not specified. .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .Pp The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of .Ic ls accordingly: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 1 Produce single columnar output. .It Fl a List files beginning with a dot .Pq Sq \&. . .It Fl f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is lexicographical. .It Fl h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024, M=1048576, etc.). .It Fl l Display additional details including permissions and ownership information. .It Fl n Produce a long listing with user and group information presented numerically. .It Fl r Reverse the sort order of the listing. .It Fl S Sort the listing by file size. .It Fl t Sort the listing by last modification time. .El .It Ic lumask Ar umask Set local umask to .Ar umask . .It Ic mkdir Ar path Create remote directory specified by .Ar path . .It Ic progress Toggle display of progress meter. .It Xo Ic put .Op Fl afPpr .Ar local-path .Op Ar remote-path .Xc Upload .Ar local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the local machine. .Ar local-path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. If it does and .Ar remote-path is specified, then .Ar remote-path must specify a directory. .Pp If the .Fl a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy. If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. .Pp If the .Fl f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call .Xr fsync 2 after the file has been transferred. Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. .Pp If either the .Fl P or .Fl p flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. .Pp If the .Fl r flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that .Nm does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. .It Ic pwd Display remote working directory. .It Ic quit Quit .Nm sftp . .It Xo Ic reget .Op Fl Ppr .Ar remote-path .Op Ar local-path .Xc Resume download of .Ar remote-path . Equivalent to .Ic get with the .Fl a flag set. .It Xo Ic reput .Op Fl Ppr .Op Ar local-path .Ar remote-path .Xc Resume upload of .Op Ar local-path . Equivalent to .Ic put with the .Fl a flag set. .It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath Rename remote file from .Ar oldpath to .Ar newpath . .It Ic rm Ar path Delete remote file specified by .Ar path . .It Ic rmdir Ar path Remove remote directory specified by .Ar path . .It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath Create a symbolic link from .Ar oldpath to .Ar newpath . .It Ic version Display the .Nm protocol version. .It Ic \&! Ns Ar command Execute .Ar command in local shell. .It Ic \&! Escape to local shell. .It Ic \&? Synonym for help. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ftp 1 , .Xr ls 1 , .Xr scp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr glob 3 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sftp-server 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A S. Lehtinen .%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol" .%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt .%D January 2001 .%O work in progress material .Re Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sftp.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2450 +1,2451 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.171 2015/08/20 22:32:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.172 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H # include #endif #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT #include #else typedef void EditLine; #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */ #define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */ /* File to read commands from */ FILE* infile; /* Are we in batchfile mode? */ int batchmode = 0; /* PID of ssh transport process */ static pid_t sshpid = -1; /* Suppress diagnositic messages */ int quiet = 0; /* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */ int global_rflag = 0; /* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */ int global_aflag = 0; /* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */ int global_pflag = 0; /* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */ int global_fflag = 0; /* SIGINT received during command processing */ volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0; /* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/ int sort_flag; /* Context used for commandline completion */ struct complete_ctx { struct sftp_conn *conn; char **remote_pathp; }; int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */ extern char *__progname; /* Separators for interactive commands */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* ls flags */ #define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */ #define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */ #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */ #define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */ #define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */ #define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */ #define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */ #define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */ #define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */ #define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS) #define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT) /* Commands for interactive mode */ enum sftp_command { I_CHDIR = 1, I_CHGRP, I_CHMOD, I_CHOWN, I_DF, I_GET, I_HELP, I_LCHDIR, I_LINK, I_LLS, I_LMKDIR, I_LPWD, I_LS, I_LUMASK, I_MKDIR, I_PUT, I_PWD, I_QUIT, I_REGET, I_RENAME, I_REPUT, I_RM, I_RMDIR, I_SHELL, I_SYMLINK, I_VERSION, I_PROGRESS, }; struct CMD { const char *c; const int n; const int t; }; /* Type of completion */ #define NOARGS 0 #define REMOTE 1 #define LOCAL 2 static const struct CMD cmds[] = { { "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, { "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, { "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE }, { "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE }, { "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE }, { "df", I_DF, REMOTE }, { "dir", I_LS, REMOTE }, { "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "get", I_GET, REMOTE }, { "help", I_HELP, NOARGS }, { "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, { "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL }, { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL }, { "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE }, { "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL }, { "ls", I_LS, REMOTE }, { "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS }, { "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE }, { "mget", I_GET, REMOTE }, { "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL }, { "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS }, { "put", I_PUT, LOCAL }, { "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE }, { "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE }, { "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE }, { "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL }, { "rm", I_RM, REMOTE }, { "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE }, { "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE }, { "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS }, { "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS }, { "?", I_HELP, NOARGS }, { NULL, -1, -1 } }; int interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *, char *file1, char *file2); /* ARGSUSED */ static void killchild(int signo) { if (sshpid > 1) { kill(sshpid, SIGTERM); waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); } _exit(1); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void cmd_interrupt(int signo) { const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n"; int olderrno = errno; (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); interrupted = 1; errno = olderrno; } static void help(void) { printf("Available commands:\n" "bye Quit sftp\n" "cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n" "chgrp grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n" "chmod mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n" "chown own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n" "df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n" " filesystem containing 'path'\n" "exit Quit sftp\n" "get [-afPpRr] remote [local] Download file\n" "reget [-fPpRr] remote [local] Resume download file\n" "reput [-fPpRr] [local] remote Resume upload file\n" "help Display this help text\n" "lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n" "lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n" "lmkdir path Create local directory\n" "ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n" "lpwd Print local working directory\n" "ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n" "lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n" "mkdir path Create remote directory\n" "progress Toggle display of progress meter\n" "put [-afPpRr] local [remote] Upload file\n" "pwd Display remote working directory\n" "quit Quit sftp\n" "rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n" "rm path Delete remote file\n" "rmdir path Remove remote directory\n" "symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n" "version Show SFTP version\n" "!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n" "! Escape to local shell\n" "? Synonym for help\n"); } static void local_do_shell(const char *args) { int status; char *shell; pid_t pid; if (!*args) args = NULL; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */ if (args) { debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); } else { debug3("Executing %s", shell); execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL); } fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) error("Shell exited abnormally"); else if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } static void local_do_ls(const char *args) { if (!args || !*args) local_do_shell(_PATH_LS); else { int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1; char *buf = xmalloc(len); /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */ snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args); local_do_shell(buf); free(buf); } } /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ static char * path_strip(char *path, char *strip) { size_t len; if (strip == NULL) return (xstrdup(path)); len = strlen(strip); if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) { if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/') len++; return (xstrdup(path + len)); } return (xstrdup(path)); } static char * make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd) { char *abs_str; /* Derelativise */ if (p && p[0] != '/') { abs_str = path_append(pwd, p); free(p); return(abs_str); } else return(p); } static int parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'a': *aflag = 1; break; case 'f': *fflag = 1; break; case 'p': case 'P': *pflag = 1; break; case 'r': case 'R': *rflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *sflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 's': *sflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'l': *lflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = LS_NAME_SORT; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case '1': *lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW; break; case 'S': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT; break; case 'a': *lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL; break; case 'f': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; break; case 'h': *lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS; break; case 'l': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'n': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'r': *lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT; break; case 't': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT; break; default: error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *hflag = *iflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'h': *hflag = 1; break; case 'i': *iflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) { switch (ch) { default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int is_dir(char *path) { struct stat sb; /* XXX: report errors? */ if (stat(path, &sb) == -1) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)); } static int remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) { Attrib *a; /* XXX: report errors? */ if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL) return(0); if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(a->perm)); } /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */ static int pathname_is_dir(char *pathname) { size_t l = strlen(pathname); return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/'; } static int process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *abs_src = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; glob_t g; char *filename, *tmp=NULL; int i, r, err = 0; abs_src = xstrdup(src); abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src); } else { error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); } err = -1; goto out; } /* * If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or * unspecified. */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !is_dir(dst)) { error("Multiple source paths, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) { if (is_dir(dst)) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(dst); } } else if (dst) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(filename); } free(tmp); resume |= global_aflag; if (!quiet && resume) printf("Resuming %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); else if (!quiet && !resume) printf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } free(abs_dst); abs_dst = NULL; } out: free(abs_src); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *tmp_dst = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL; glob_t g; int err = 0; int i, dst_is_dir = 1; struct stat sb; if (dst) { tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst); tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd); } memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", src); if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) { error("File \"%s\" not found.", src); err = -1; goto out; } /* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */ if (tmp_dst != NULL) dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst); /* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) { error("Multiple paths match, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) { err = -1; error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno)); continue; } tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) { /* If directory specified, append filename */ if (dst_is_dir) abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); else abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst); } else if (tmp_dst) { abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd); } free(tmp); resume |= global_aflag; if (!quiet && resume) printf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); else if (!quiet && !resume) printf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } } out: free(abs_dst); free(tmp_dst); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) { SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa; SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb; int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; #define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename)); else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime)); else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size)); fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ static int do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag) { int n; u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1; SFTP_DIRENT **d; if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0) return (n); if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { u_int m = 0, width = 80; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) { if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) m = MAX(m, strlen(d[n]->filename)); } /* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */ tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path); m += strlen(tmp); free(tmp); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAX(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MIN(colspace, width); } if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) ; /* count entries */ sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp); } for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) { char *tmp, *fname; if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) continue; tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename); fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path); free(tmp); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) { char *lname; struct stat sb; memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb); lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); printf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else printf("%s\n", d[n]->longname); } else { printf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); free_sftp_dirents(d); return (0); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ static int do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag) { char *fname, *lname; glob_t g; int err, r; struct winsize ws; u_int i, c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path, GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT, NULL, &g)) != 0 || (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) { if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path); } else { error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path); } return -1; } if (interrupted) goto out; /* * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory, * then just list its contents. */ if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL && S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) { err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag); globfree(&g); return err; } if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) m = MAX(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i])); columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAX(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) { error("no stat information for %s", fname); continue; } lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); printf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else { printf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); out: if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); return 0; } static int do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag) { struct sftp_statvfs st; char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; unsigned long long ffree; if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1) return -1; if (iflag) { ffree = st.f_files ? (100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files) : 0; printf(" Inodes Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %3llu%%\n", (unsigned long long)st.f_files, (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree), (unsigned long long)st.f_favail, (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, ffree); } else if (hflag) { strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used)); strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail)); strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root)); strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total)); fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used); fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail); fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root); fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total); printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %3llu%%\n", s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / st.f_blocks)); } else { printf(" Size Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %3llu%%\n", (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024), (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / st.f_blocks)); } return 0; } /* * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that * does not glob it. */ static void undo_glob_escape(char *s) { size_t i, j; for (i = j = 0;;) { if (s[i] == '\0') { s[j] = '\0'; return; } if (s[i] != '\\') { s[j++] = s[i++]; continue; } /* s[i] == '\\' */ ++i; switch (s[i]) { case '?': case '[': case '*': case '\\': s[j++] = s[i++]; break; case '\0': s[j++] = '\\'; s[j] = '\0'; return; default: s[j++] = '\\'; s[j++] = s[i++]; break; } } } /* * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting, * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3) * wildcards. * The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for * use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion. * * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments. * * If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last * argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\""). * * If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the * last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise. * This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set. */ #define MAXARGS 128 #define MAXARGLEN 8192 static char ** makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote, u_int *terminated) { int argc, quot; size_t i, j; static char argvs[MAXARGLEN]; static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1]; enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q; *argcp = argc = 0; if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) { args_too_longs: error("string too long"); return NULL; } if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 1; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; state = MA_START; i = j = 0; for (;;) { if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){ error("Too many arguments."); return NULL; } if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) { if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { /* Terminate current argument */ argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; state = MA_START; } else if (state != MA_START) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') { q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE; if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = q; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = arg[i]; } else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) state = q; else if (state == q) state = MA_UNQUOTED; else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '\\') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"'; /* Unescape quote we are in */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ if (arg[i + 1] == quot) { i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * double-escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. NB. string can grow here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. */ argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { /* Unescape everything */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } } else if (arg[i] == '#') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; else goto string_done; } else if (arg[i] == '\0') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { if (sloppy) { state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 0; goto string_done; } error("Unterminated quoted argument"); return NULL; } string_done: if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; } break; } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) && (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) { /* * Special case for sftp: escape quoted * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow * here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } i++; } *argcp = argc; return argv; } static int parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *aflag, int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag, int *rflag, int *sflag, unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2) { const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp; char *cp2, **argv; int base = 0; long l; int i, cmdnum, optidx, argc; /* Skip leading whitespace */ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); /* Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) */ *ignore_errors = 0; if (*cp == '-') { *ignore_errors = 1; cp++; cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); } /* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */ if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#') return (0); if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) return -1; /* Figure out which command we have */ for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) { if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0) break; } cmdnum = cmds[i].n; cmd = cmds[i].c; /* Special case */ if (*cp == '!') { cp++; cmdnum = I_SHELL; } else if (cmdnum == -1) { error("Invalid command."); return -1; } /* Get arguments and parse flags */ *aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0; *rflag = *sflag = 0; *path1 = *path2 = NULL; optidx = 1; switch (cmdnum) { case I_GET: case I_REGET: case I_REPUT: case I_PUT: if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc, aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { error("You must specify at least one path after a " "%s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Get second pathname (optional) */ if (argc - optidx > 1) { *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Destination is not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path2); } break; case I_LINK: if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_RENAME: if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_SYMLINK: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; parse_two_paths: if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify two paths after a %s " "command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Paths are not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path1); undo_glob_escape(*path2); break; case I_RM: case I_MKDIR: case I_RMDIR: case I_CHDIR: case I_LCHDIR: case I_LMKDIR: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Only "rm" globs */ if (cmdnum != I_RM) undo_glob_escape(*path1); break; case I_DF: if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag, iflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (argc - optidx < 1) *path1 = NULL; else { *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); undo_glob_escape(*path1); } break; case I_LS: if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return(-1); /* Path is optional */ if (argc - optidx > 0) *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); break; case I_LLS: /* Skip ls command and following whitespace */ cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); case I_SHELL: /* Uses the rest of the line */ break; case I_LUMASK: case I_CHMOD: base = 8; case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) goto need_num_arg; errno = 0; l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base); if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' || ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) || l < 0) { need_num_arg: error("You must supply a numeric argument " "to the %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *n_arg = l; if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK) break; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); break; case I_QUIT: case I_PWD: case I_LPWD: case I_HELP: case I_VERSION: case I_PROGRESS: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; break; default: fatal("Command not implemented"); } *cpp = cp; return(cmdnum); } static int parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd, int err_abort) { char *path1, *path2, *tmp; int ignore_errors = 0, aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0; int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0; int cmdnum, i; unsigned long n_arg = 0; Attrib a, *aa; char path_buf[PATH_MAX]; int err = 0; glob_t g; path1 = path2 = NULL; cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &aflag, &fflag, &hflag, &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2); if (ignore_errors != 0) err_abort = 0; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); /* Perform command */ switch (cmdnum) { case 0: /* Blank line */ break; case -1: /* Unrecognized command */ err = -1; break; case I_REGET: aflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_GET: err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, rflag, aflag, fflag); break; case I_REPUT: aflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_PUT: err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, rflag, aflag, fflag); break; case I_RENAME: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag); break; case I_SYMLINK: sflag = 1; case I_LINK: if (!sflag) path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2); break; case I_RM: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) printf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_MKDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = 0777; err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1); break; case I_RMDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_rmdir(conn, path1); break; case I_CHDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) { err = 1; break; } if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) { free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) { error("Can't change directory: Can't check target"); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) { error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not " "a directory", tmp); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } free(*pwd); *pwd = tmp; break; case I_LS: if (!path1) { do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag); break; } /* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */ tmp = NULL; if (*path1 != '/') tmp = *pwd; path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag); break; case I_DF: /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (path1 == NULL) path1 = xstrdup(*pwd); path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag); break; case I_LCHDIR: tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid()); free(path1); path1 = tmp; if (chdir(path1) == -1) { error("Couldn't change local directory to " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LMKDIR: if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) { error("Couldn't create local directory " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LLS: local_do_ls(cmd); break; case I_SHELL: local_do_shell(cmd); break; case I_LUMASK: umask(n_arg); printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg); break; case I_CHMOD: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = n_arg; remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) printf("Changing mode on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!(aa = do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) { if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) { error("Can't get current ownership of " "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) { if (!quiet) printf("Changing owner on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->uid = n_arg; } else { if (!quiet) printf("Changing group on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->gid = n_arg; } err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_PWD: printf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd); break; case I_LPWD: if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) { error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno)); err = -1; break; } printf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf); break; case I_QUIT: /* Processed below */ break; case I_HELP: help(); break; case I_VERSION: printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn)); break; case I_PROGRESS: showprogress = !showprogress; if (showprogress) printf("Progress meter enabled\n"); else printf("Progress meter disabled\n"); break; default: fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum); } if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); free(path1); free(path2); /* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */ if (err_abort && err != 0) return (-1); else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT) return (1); return (0); } #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT static char * prompt(EditLine *el) { return ("sftp> "); } /* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */ static void complete_display(char **list, u_int len) { u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest */ for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) m = MAX(m, strlen(list[y])); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; m = m > len ? m - len : 0; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAX(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MIN(colspace, width); printf("\n"); m = 1; for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) { llen = strlen(list[y]); tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : ""; printf("%-*s", colspace, tmp); if (m >= columns) { printf("\n"); m = 1; } else m++; } printf("\n"); } /* * Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word", * attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next * characters common to all entries in "list". */ static char * complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count) { if (word == NULL) return NULL; if (count > 0) { u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]); /* Find length of common stem */ for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) { u_int x; for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++) if (list[0][x] != list[y][x]) break; matchlen = x; } if (matchlen > strlen(word)) { char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]); tmp[matchlen] = '\0'; return tmp; } } return xstrdup(word); } /* Autocomplete a sftp command */ static int complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen; char *tmp, **list, argterm[3]; const LineInfo *lf; list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *)); /* No command specified: display all available commands */ if (cmd == NULL) { for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); list[count] = NULL; complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); return count; } /* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */ cmdlen = strlen(cmd); for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen)) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); } list[count] = NULL; if (count == 0) { free(list); return 0; } /* Complete ambigious command */ tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count); if (count > 1) complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); if (tmp != NULL) { tmplen = strlen(tmp); cmdlen = strlen(cmd); /* If cmd may be extended then do so */ if (tmplen > cmdlen) if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); lf = el_line(el); /* Terminate argument cleanly */ if (count == 1) { y = 0; if (!terminated) argterm[y++] = quote; if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ') argterm[y++] = ' '; argterm[y] = '\0'; if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); } return count; } /* * Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any) * represent local or remote files. */ static int complete_is_remote(char *cmd) { int i; if (cmd == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c))) return cmds[i].t; } return -1; } /* Autocomplete a filename "file" */ static int complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { glob_t g; char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8]; u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs; int clen; const LineInfo *lf; /* Glob from "file" location */ if (file == NULL) tmp = xstrdup("*"); else xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file); /* Check if the path is absolute. */ isabs = tmp[0] == '/'; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); if (remote != LOCAL) { tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path); remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); } else glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); /* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */ for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) { /* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */ if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') { if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') hadglob = 1; break; } if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') tmplen++; if (tmp[tmplen] == '/') pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */ } free(tmp); tmp = NULL; if (g.gl_matchc == 0) goto out; if (g.gl_matchc > 1) complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen); /* Don't try to extend globs */ if (file == NULL || hadglob) goto out; tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc); tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path); free(tmp2); if (tmp == NULL) goto out; tmplen = strlen(tmp); filelen = strlen(file); /* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */ cesc = isesc = 0; for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) { if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){ isesc = 1; cesc++; } else isesc = 0; } if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) { tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc; len = strlen(tmp2); /* quote argument on way out */ for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) { if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 || (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2) fatal("invalid multibyte character"); ins[0] = '\\'; memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen); ins[clen + 1] = '\0'; switch (tmp2[i]) { case '\'': case '"': case '\\': case '\t': case '[': case ' ': case '#': case '*': if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) { if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr " "failed."); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); break; } } } lf = el_line(el); if (g.gl_matchc == 1) { i = 0; if (!terminated && quote != '\0') ins[i++] = quote; if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' && (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')) ins[i++] = ' '; ins[i] = '\0'; if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); out: globfree(&g); return g.gl_matchc; } /* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */ static unsigned char complete(EditLine *el, int ch) { char **argv, *line, quote; int argc, carg; u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR; const LineInfo *lf; struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx; lf = el_line(el); if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0) fatal("%s: el_get failed", __func__); /* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */ cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer; line = xmalloc(cursor + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor); line[cursor] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, "e, &terminated); free(line); /* Get all the arguments on the line */ len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer; line = xmalloc(len + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len); line[len] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL); /* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */ if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' && line[cursor] != '\n') { free(line); return ret; } if (carg == 0) { /* Show all available commands */ complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1); ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') { /* Handle the command parsing */ if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg >= 1) { /* Handle file parsing */ int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]); char *filematch = NULL; if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ') filematch = argv[carg - 1]; if (remote != 0 && complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn, *complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch, remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } free(line); return ret; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ int interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2) { char *remote_path; char *dir = NULL; char cmd[2048]; int err, interactive; EditLine *el = NULL; #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT History *hl = NULL; HistEvent hev; extern char *__progname; struct complete_ctx complete_ctx; if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline"); if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history"); history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100); el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl); el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt); el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs"); el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL); el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1); el_source(el, NULL); /* Tab Completion */ el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete", "Context sensitive argument completion", complete); complete_ctx.conn = conn; complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path; el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL); /* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[5C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); /* make ^w match ksh behaviour */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL); } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ remote_path = do_realpath(conn, "."); if (remote_path == NULL) fatal("Need cwd"); if (file1 != NULL) { dir = xstrdup(file1); dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path); if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) { if (!quiet) printf("Changing to: %s\n", dir); snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir); if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, 1) != 0) { free(dir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (-1); } } else { /* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s", global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir, file2 == NULL ? "" : " ", file2 == NULL ? "" : file2); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, 1); free(dir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (err); } free(dir); } setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO); err = 0; for (;;) { char *cp; signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); if (el == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("sftp> "); if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("\n"); break; } if (!interactive) { /* Echo command */ printf("sftp> %s", cmd); if (strlen(cmd) > 0 && cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] != '\n') printf("\n"); } } else { #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT const char *line; int count = 0; if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL || count <= 0) { printf("\n"); break; } history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line); if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n"); continue; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ } cp = strrchr(cmd, '\n'); if (cp) *cp = '\0'; /* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */ interrupted = 0; signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, batchmode); if (err != 0) break; } free(remote_path); free(conn); #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT if (el != NULL) el_end(el); #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ /* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */ return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1); } static void connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out) { int c_in, c_out; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2]; if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1)) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = pin[0]; *out = pout[1]; c_in = pout[0]; c_out = pin[1]; #else /* USE_PIPES */ int inout[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = *out = inout[0]; c_in = c_out = inout[1]; #endif /* USE_PIPES */ if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1) fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); else if (sshpid == 0) { if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(*in); close(*out); close(c_in); close(c_out); /* * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands, * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and * kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the * underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal. */ signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); execvp(path, args); fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } signal(SIGTERM, killchild); signal(SIGINT, killchild); signal(SIGHUP, killchild); close(c_in); close(c_out); } static void usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n" " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] " "[-i identity_file] [-l limit]\n" " [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] " "[-S program]\n" " [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host\n" " %s [user@]host[:file ...]\n" " %s [user@]host[:dir[/]]\n" " %s -b batchfile [user@]host\n", __progname, __progname, __progname, __progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int in, out, ch, err; char *host = NULL, *userhost, *cp, *file2 = NULL; int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2; char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL; char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL; const char *errstr; LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; arglist args; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; struct sftp_conn *conn; size_t copy_buffer_len = DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN; size_t num_requests = DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS; long long limit_kbps = 0; + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); setlocale(LC_CTYPE, ""); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no"); addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; infile = stdin; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* Passed through to ssh(1) */ case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; /* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */ case 'F': case 'c': case 'i': case 'o': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'q': ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; quiet = 1; showprogress = 0; addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; case 'P': addargs(&args, "-oPort %s", optarg); break; case 'v': if (debug_level < 3) { addargs(&args, "-v"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level; } debug_level++; break; case '1': sshver = 1; if (sftp_server == NULL) sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER; break; case '2': sshver = 2; break; case 'a': global_aflag = 1; break; case 'B': copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'b': if (batchmode) fatal("Batch file already specified."); /* Allow "-" as stdin */ if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 && (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg); showprogress = 0; quiet = batchmode = 1; addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes"); break; case 'f': global_fflag = 1; break; case 'p': global_pflag = 1; break; case 'D': sftp_direct = optarg; break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ break; case 'r': global_rflag = 1; break; case 'R': num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 's': sftp_server = optarg; break; case 'S': ssh_program = optarg; replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); break; case 'h': default: usage(); } } if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); if (sftp_direct == NULL) { if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2)) usage(); userhost = xstrdup(argv[optind]); file2 = argv[optind+1]; if ((host = strrchr(userhost, '@')) == NULL) host = userhost; else { *host++ = '\0'; if (!userhost[0]) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing username\n"); usage(); } addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", userhost); } if ((cp = colon(host)) != NULL) { *cp++ = '\0'; file1 = cp; } host = cleanhostname(host); if (!*host) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n"); usage(); } addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver); /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */ if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL) addargs(&args, "-s"); addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ? sftp_server : "sftp")); connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out); } else { args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "sftp-server"); connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out); } freeargs(&args); conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps); if (conn == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server"); if (!quiet) { if (sftp_direct == NULL) fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host); else fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct); } err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2); #if !defined(USE_PIPES) shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR); shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR); #endif close(in); close(out); if (batchmode) fclose(infile); while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,625 +1,622 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.123 2015/07/03 03:43:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.128 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; /* Default files to add */ static char *default_files[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, #endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, #ifdef WITH_SSH1 _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, #endif NULL }; static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */ static int lifetime = 0; /* User has to confirm key use */ static int confirm = 0; -/* we keep a cache of one passphrases */ +/* we keep a cache of one passphrase */ static char *pass = NULL; static void clear_pass(void) { if (pass) { explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); free(pass); pass = NULL; } } static int delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only) { struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL; char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL; int r, ret = -1; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) { printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */ free(comment); comment = NULL; xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s", certpath, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public)) fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", certpath, comment); ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", certpath, ssh_err(r)); out: - if (cert != NULL) - sshkey_free(cert); - if (public != NULL) - sshkey_free(public); + sshkey_free(cert); + sshkey_free(public); free(certpath); free(comment); return ret; } /* Send a request to remove all identities. */ static int delete_all(int agent_fd) { int ret = -1; if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0) ret = 0; /* ignore error-code for ssh1 */ ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1); if (ret == 0) fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n"); return ret; } static int add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only) { struct sshkey *private, *cert; char *comment = NULL; char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL; int r, fd, ret = -1; struct sshbuf *keyblob; if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) { fd = STDIN_FILENO; filename = "(stdin)"; } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { perror(filename); return -1; } /* * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong. */ if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) { if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { close(fd); return -1; } } if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, keyblob)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(keyblob); close(fd); return -1; } close(fd); /* At first, try empty passphrase */ - if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", filename, - &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", &private, + &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto fail_load; } /* try last */ if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) { - if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, filename, - &private, &comment)) != 0 && - r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private, + &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto fail_load; } } - if (comment == NULL) - comment = xstrdup(filename); if (private == NULL) { /* clear passphrase since it did not work */ clear_pass(); - snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %.200s%s: ", - comment, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); + snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %s%s: ", + filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); for (;;) { pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) goto fail_load; if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, - filename, &private, NULL)) == 0) + &private, &comment)) == 0) break; else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); fail_load: clear_pass(); - free(comment); sshbuf_free(keyblob); return -1; } clear_pass(); snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, - "Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s%s: ", comment, + "Bad passphrase, try again for %s%s: ", filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); } } + if (comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') + comment = xstrdup(filename); sshbuf_free(keyblob); if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, lifetime, confirm)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); ret = 0; if (lifetime != 0) fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); if (confirm != 0) fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); } /* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */ if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */ xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s", certpath, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) { error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } /* Graft with private bits */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) { error("%s: key_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } sshkey_free(cert); if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, lifetime, confirm)) != 0) { error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed: %s", certpath, private->cert->key_id, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath, private->cert->key_id); if (lifetime != 0) fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); if (confirm != 0) fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n"); out: free(certpath); free(comment); sshkey_free(private); return ret; } static int update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id) { char *pin = NULL; int r, ret = -1; if (add) { if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) return -1; } if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin, lifetime, confirm)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n", add ? "added" : "removed", id); ret = 0; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n", add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r)); ret = -1; } free(pin); return ret; } static int list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp) { char *fp; int r, had_identities = 0; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; size_t i; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int version = 1; #else int version = 2; #endif for (; version <= 2; version++) { if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, version, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for " "protocol %d: %s\n", version, ssh_err(r)); continue; } for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { had_identities = 1; if (do_fp) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); - printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n", + printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i], sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i])); free(fp); } else { if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); continue; } fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", idlist->comments[i]); } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); } if (!had_identities) { printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); return -1; } return 0; } static int lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock) { char prompt[100], *p1, *p2; int r, passok = 1, ret = -1; strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt)); p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (lock) { strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt); p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n"); passok = 0; } explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2)); free(p2); } if (passok) { if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un"); ret = 0; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n", lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r)); } } explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1)); free(p1); return (ret); } static int do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file) { if (deleting) { if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1) return -1; } else { if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1) return -1; } return 0; } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname); fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -E hash Specify hash algorithm used for fingerprints.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -k Load only keys and not certificates.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -c Require confirmation to sign using identities\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n"); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int agent_fd; char *pkcs11provider = NULL; int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0; int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0; + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); /* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */ switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT: fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your " "authentication agent.\n"); exit(2); default: fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); exit(2); } while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXE:e:s:t:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'k': key_only = 1; break; case 'l': case 'L': if (lflag != 0) fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag); lflag = ch; break; case 'x': case 'X': if (xflag != 0) fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag); xflag = ch; break; case 'c': confirm = 1; break; case 'd': deleting = 1; break; case 'D': Dflag = 1; break; case 's': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'e': deleting = 1; pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); ret = 1; goto done; } break; default: usage(); ret = 1; goto done; } } if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1) fatal("Invalid combination of actions"); else if (xflag) { if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } else if (lflag) { if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } else if (Dflag) { if (delete_all(agent_fd) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } if (argc == 0) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int count = 0; if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n", (u_int)getuid()); ret = 1; goto done; } for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) { snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, default_files[i]); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0) continue; if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1) ret = 1; else count++; } if (count == 0) ret = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, argv[i]) == -1) ret = 1; } } clear_pass(); done: ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd); return ret; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 (revision 296853) @@ -1,213 +1,220 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.59 2015/04/24 06:26:49 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.62 2015/11/15 23:54:15 jmc Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: April 24 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: November 15 2015 $ .Dt SSH-AGENT 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-agent .Nd authentication agent .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-agent .Op Fl c | s -.Op Fl Ddx +.Op Fl \&Ddx .Op Fl a Ar bind_address .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl t Ar life .Op Ar command Op Ar arg ... .Nm ssh-agent .Op Fl c | s .Fl k .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519). .Nm is usually started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program. Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines using .Xr ssh 1 . .Pp The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using +.Xr ssh 1 +(see +.Cm AddKeysToAgent +in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for details) +or .Xr ssh-add 1 . Multiple identities may be stored in .Nm concurrently and .Xr ssh 1 will automatically use them if present. .Xr ssh-add 1 is also used to remove keys from .Nm and to query the keys that are held in one. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl a Ar bind_address Bind the agent to the .Ux Ns -domain socket .Ar bind_address . The default is .Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt . .It Fl c Generate C-shell commands on .Dv stdout . This is the default if .Ev SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. .It Fl D Foreground mode. When this option is specified .Nm will not fork. .It Fl d Debug mode. When this option is specified .Nm will not fork and will write debug information to standard error. .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Fl k Kill the current agent (given by the .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable). .It Fl s Generate Bourne shell commands on .Dv stdout . This is the default if .Ev SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell. .It Fl t Ar life Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in .Xr sshd_config 5 . A lifetime specified for an identity with .Xr ssh-add 1 overrides this value. Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever. .It Fl x Exit after the last client has disconnected. .El .Pp -If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. +If a command line is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. When the command dies, so does the agent. .Pp The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the network in a secure way. .Pp There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are exported, eg .Cm ssh-agent xterm & . The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either .Xr sh 1 or .Xr csh 1 syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg .Cm eval `ssh-agent -s` for Bourne-type shells such as .Xr sh 1 or .Xr ksh 1 and .Cm eval `ssh-agent -c` for .Xr csh 1 and derivatives. .Pp Later .Xr ssh 1 looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent. .Pp The agent will never send a private key over its request channel. Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent. .Pp A .Ux Ns -domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user. .Pp The .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID. .Pp The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line terminates. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .Ux Ns -domain sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1449 +1,1467 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.204 2015/07/08 20:24:02 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.212 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The authentication agent program. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) #include /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */ #endif typedef enum { AUTH_UNUSED, AUTH_SOCKET, AUTH_CONNECTION } sock_type; typedef struct { int fd; sock_type type; struct sshbuf *input; struct sshbuf *output; struct sshbuf *request; } SocketEntry; u_int sockets_alloc = 0; SocketEntry *sockets = NULL; typedef struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; struct sshkey *key; char *comment; char *provider; time_t death; u_int confirm; } Identity; typedef struct { int nentries; TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist; } Idtab; /* private key table, one per protocol version */ Idtab idtable[3]; int max_fd = 0; /* pid of shell == parent of agent */ pid_t parent_pid = -1; time_t parent_alive_interval = 0; /* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */ pid_t cleanup_pid = 0; /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */ char socket_name[PATH_MAX]; char socket_dir[PATH_MAX]; /* locking */ #define LOCK_SIZE 32 #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16 #define LOCK_ROUNDS 1 int locked = 0; char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE]; char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE]; extern char *__progname; /* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */ static long lifetime = 0; static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* * Client connection count; incremented in new_socket() and decremented in * close_socket(). When it reaches 0, ssh-agent will exit. Since it is * normally initialized to 1, it will never reach 0. However, if the -x * option is specified, it is initialized to 0 in main(); in that case, * ssh-agent will exit as soon as it has had at least one client but no * longer has any. */ static int xcount = 1; static void close_socket(SocketEntry *e) { int last = 0; if (e->type == AUTH_CONNECTION) { debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount - 1); if (--xcount == 0) last = 1; } close(e->fd); e->fd = -1; e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; sshbuf_free(e->input); sshbuf_free(e->output); sshbuf_free(e->request); if (last) cleanup_exit(0); } static void idtab_init(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i <=2; i++) { TAILQ_INIT(&idtable[i].idlist); idtable[i].nentries = 0; } } /* return private key table for requested protocol version */ static Idtab * idtab_lookup(int version) { if (version < 1 || version > 2) fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version); return &idtable[version]; } static void free_identity(Identity *id) { sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->provider); free(id->comment); free(id); } /* return matching private key for given public key */ static Identity * lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key, int version) { Identity *id; Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) { if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) return (id); } return (NULL); } /* Check confirmation of keysign request */ static int confirm_key(Identity *id) { char *p; int ret = -1; p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (p != NULL && ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", id->comment, p)) ret = 0; free(p); return (ret); } static void send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */ static void process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) { Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, (version == 1) ? SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, tab->nentries)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) { if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, id->key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, id->key->rsa->n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #endif } else { u_char *blob; size_t blen; if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(blob); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* ssh1 only */ static void process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e) { u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16]; u_int response_type; BIGNUM *challenge; Identity *id; int r, len; struct sshbuf *msg; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; struct sshkey *key; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge))) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */ if (sshbuf_len(e->request) == 0) goto failure; if ((r = sshbuf_get(e->request, session_id, sizeof(session_id))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &response_type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (response_type != 1) goto failure; id = lookup_identity(key, 1); if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) { struct sshkey *private = id->key; /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ if ((r = rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) != 0)) { fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto failure; /* XXX ? */ } /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id */ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); if (len <= 0 || len > 32) { logit("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len); goto failure; } memset(buf, 0, 32); BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); /* Send the response. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(msg, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } failure: /* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send: if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(key); BN_clear_free(challenge); sshbuf_free(msg); } #endif +static char * +agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags) +{ + if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { + if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256) + return "rsa-sha2-256"; + else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512) + return "rsa-sha2-512"; + } + return NULL; +} + /* ssh2 only */ static void process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) { u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; size_t blen, dlen, slen = 0; u_int compat = 0, flags; int r, ok = -1; struct sshbuf *msg; struct sshkey *key; struct identity *id; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE) compat = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB; if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { - error("%s: cannot parse key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ok)); + error("%s: cannot parse key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } if ((id = lookup_identity(key, 2)) == NULL) { verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto send; } if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) { verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__); goto send; } if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, - data, dlen, compat)) != 0) { - error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ok)); + data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags), compat)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } /* Success */ ok = 0; send: sshkey_free(key); if (ok == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); free(data); free(blob); free(signature); } /* shared */ static void process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) { size_t blen; int r, success = 0; struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_char *blob; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 u_int bits; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ switch (version) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case 1: if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); return; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (bits != sshkey_size(key)) logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: " "actual %u, announced %u", sshkey_size(key), bits); break; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ case 2: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &blob, &blen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) error("%s: sshkey_from_blob failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(blob); break; } if (key != NULL) { Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, version); if (id != NULL) { /* * We have this key. Free the old key. Since we * don't want to leave empty slots in the middle of * the array, we actually free the key there and move * all the entries between the empty slot and the end * of the array. */ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); if (tab->nentries < 1) fatal("process_remove_identity: " "internal error: tab->nentries %d", tab->nentries); TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); tab->nentries--; success = 1; } sshkey_free(key); } send_status(e, success); } static void process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) { Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); } /* Mark that there are no identities. */ tab->nentries = 0; /* Send success. */ send_status(e, 1); } /* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */ static time_t reaper(void) { time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime(); Identity *id, *nxt; int version; Idtab *tab; for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) { tab = idtab_lookup(version); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); if (id->death == 0) continue; if (now >= id->death) { debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment); TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); tab->nentries--; } else deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death : MIN(deadline, id->death); } } if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now) return 0; else return (deadline - now); } /* * XXX this and the corresponding serialisation function probably belongs * in key.c */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static int agent_decode_rsa1(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey **kp) { struct sshkey *k = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *kp = NULL; if ((k = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || /* SSH1 and SSL have p and q swapped */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || /* p */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->p)) != 0) /* q */ goto out; /* Generate additional parameters */ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) goto out; /* enable blinding */ if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } r = 0; /* success */ out: if (r == 0) *kp = k; else sshkey_free(k); return r; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ static void process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) { Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; int success = 0, confirm = 0; u_int seconds; char *comment = NULL; time_t death = 0; struct sshkey *k = NULL; u_char ctype; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; switch (version) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case 1: r = agent_decode_rsa1(e->request, &k); break; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ case 2: r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k); break; } if (r != 0 || k == NULL || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: decode private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &ctype)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } switch (ctype) { case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) { error("%s: bad lifetime constraint: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } death = monotime() + seconds; break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: confirm = 1; break; default: error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype); err: sshbuf_reset(e->request); free(comment); sshkey_free(k); goto send; } } success = 1; if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); /* Increment the number of identities. */ tab->nentries++; } else { sshkey_free(k); free(id->comment); } id->comment = comment; id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; send: send_status(e, success); } /* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */ static void process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) { int r, success = 0, delay; char *passwd, passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE]; static u_int fail_count = 0; size_t pwlen; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (pwlen == 0) { debug("empty password not supported"); } else if (locked && !lock) { if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_passwd, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) { debug("agent unlocked"); locked = 0; fail_count = 0; explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd)); success = 1; } else { /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */ if (fail_count < 100) fail_count++; delay = 100000 * fail_count; debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds", (double)delay/1000000); usleep(delay); } explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash)); } else if (!locked && lock) { debug("agent locked"); locked = 1; arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt)); if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); success = 1; } explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen); free(passwd); send_status(e, success); } static void no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, (type == SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES) ? SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 static void process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin; int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; u_int seconds; time_t death = 0; u_char type; struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k; Identity *id; Idtab *tab; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); death = monotime() + seconds; break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: confirm = 1; break; default: error("process_add_smartcard_key: " "Unknown constraint type %d", type); goto send; } } if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { k = keys[i]; version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; tab = idtab_lookup(version); if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; id->provider = xstrdup(provider); id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */ id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); tab->nentries++; success = 1; } else { sshkey_free(k); } keys[i] = NULL; } send: free(pin); free(provider); free(keys); send_status(e, success); } static void process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL; int r, version, success = 0; Identity *id, *nxt; Idtab *tab; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(pin); for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) { tab = idtab_lookup(version); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); /* Skip file--based keys */ if (id->provider == NULL) continue; if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); tab->nentries--; } } } if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0) success = 1; else error("process_remove_smartcard_key:" " pkcs11_del_provider failed"); free(provider); send_status(e, success); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ /* dispatch incoming messages */ static void process_message(SocketEntry *e) { u_int msg_len; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int r; if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input); msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) { close_socket(e); return; } if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4) return; /* move the current input to e->request */ sshbuf_reset(e->request); if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* check wheter agent is locked */ if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) { sshbuf_reset(e->request); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: /* send empty lists */ no_identities(e, type); break; default: /* send a fail message for all other request types */ send_status(e, 0); } return; } debug("type %d", type); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK: case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK: process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK); break; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* ssh1 */ case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE: process_authentication_challenge1(e); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: process_request_identities(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY: case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED: process_add_identity(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY: process_remove_identity(e, 1); break; #endif case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e, 1); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */ break; /* ssh2 */ case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: process_sign_request2(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: process_request_identities(e, 2); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY: case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED: process_add_identity(e, 2); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY: process_remove_identity(e, 2); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e, 2); break; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED: process_add_smartcard_key(e); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: process_remove_smartcard_key(e); break; #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ default: /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ error("Unknown message %d", type); sshbuf_reset(e->request); send_status(e, 0); break; } } static void new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) { u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc; if (type == AUTH_CONNECTION) { debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount + 1); ++xcount; } set_nonblock(fd); if (fd > max_fd) max_fd = fd; for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) { sockets[i].fd = fd; if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sockets[i].type = type; return; } old_alloc = sockets_alloc; new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10; sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++) sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; sockets_alloc = new_alloc; sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd; if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sockets[old_alloc].type = type; } static int prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp, struct timeval **tvpp) { u_int i, sz; int n = 0; static struct timeval tv; time_t deadline; for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: n = MAX(n, sockets[i].fd); break; case AUTH_UNUSED: break; default: fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type); break; } } sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); if (*fdrp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { free(*fdrp); free(*fdwp); *fdrp = xmalloc(sz); *fdwp = xmalloc(sz); *nallocp = sz; } if (n < *fdl) debug("XXX shrink: %d < %d", n, *fdl); *fdl = n; memset(*fdrp, 0, sz); memset(*fdwp, 0, sz); for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdrp); if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0) FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdwp); break; default: break; } } deadline = reaper(); if (parent_alive_interval != 0) deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval : MIN(deadline, parent_alive_interval); if (deadline == 0) { *tvpp = NULL; } else { tv.tv_sec = deadline; tv.tv_usec = 0; *tvpp = &tv; } return (1); } static void after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; socklen_t slen; char buf[1024]; int len, sock, r; u_int i, orig_alloc; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; for (i = 0, orig_alloc = sockets_alloc; i < orig_alloc; i++) switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_UNUSED: break; case AUTH_SOCKET: if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { slen = sizeof(sunaddr); sock = accept(sockets[i].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen); if (sock < 0) { error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno)); break; } if (getpeereid(sock, &euid, &egid) < 0) { error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", sock, strerror(errno)); close(sock); break; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("uid mismatch: " "peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid()); close(sock); break; } new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock); } break; case AUTH_CONNECTION: if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0 && FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) { len = write(sockets[i].fd, sshbuf_ptr(sockets[i].output), sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)) continue; if (len <= 0) { close_socket(&sockets[i]); break; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[i].output, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)) continue; if (len <= 0) { close_socket(&sockets[i]); break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[i].input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); process_message(&sockets[i]); } break; default: fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type); } } static void cleanup_socket(void) { if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid) return; debug("%s: cleanup", __func__); if (socket_name[0]) unlink(socket_name); if (socket_dir[0]) rmdir(socket_dir); } void cleanup_exit(int i) { cleanup_socket(); _exit(i); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void cleanup_handler(int sig) { cleanup_socket(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif _exit(2); } static void check_parent_exists(void) { /* * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1, * so testing for that should be safe. */ if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) { /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */ cleanup_socket(); _exit(2); } } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n" " [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n" " ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -x Exit when the last client disconnects.\n"); exit(1); } int main(int ac, char **av) { int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno; u_int nalloc; char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL; fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT struct rlimit rlim; #endif extern int optind; extern char *optarg; pid_t pid; char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; struct timeval *tvp = NULL; size_t len; mode_t prev_mask; + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* drop */ setegid(getgid()); setgid(getgid()); setuid(geteuid()); #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */ prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0); #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); seed_rng(); while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:x")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'c': if (s_flag) usage(); c_flag++; break; case 'k': k_flag++; break; case 's': if (c_flag) usage(); s_flag++; break; case 'd': if (d_flag || D_flag) usage(); d_flag++; break; case 'D': if (d_flag || D_flag) usage(); D_flag++; break; case 'a': agentsocket = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); usage(); } break; case 'x': xcount = 0; break; default: usage(); } } ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag)) usage(); if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) { shell = getenv("SHELL"); if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 && strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0) c_flag = 1; } if (k_flag) { const char *errstr = NULL; pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); if (pidstr == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); exit(1); } pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr); exit(1); } if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) { perror("kill"); exit(1); } format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } parent_pid = getpid(); if (agentsocket == NULL) { /* Create private directory for agent socket */ mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir)); if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) { perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir"); exit(1); } snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir, (long)parent_pid); } else { /* Try to use specified agent socket */ socket_dir[0] = '\0'; strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name); } /* * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from * the parent. */ prev_mask = umask(0177); sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); if (sock < 0) { /* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */ *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */ cleanup_exit(1); } umask(prev_mask); /* * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent. */ if (D_flag || d_flag) { log_init(__progname, d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid); + fflush(stdout); goto skip; } pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { perror("fork"); cleanup_exit(1); } if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */ close(sock); snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid); if (ac == 0) { format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 || setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) { perror("setenv"); exit(1); } execvp(av[0], av); perror(av[0]); exit(1); } /* child */ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); if (setsid() == -1) { error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } (void)chdir("/"); if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { /* XXX might close listen socket */ (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); if (fd > 2) close(fd); } #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) { error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } #endif skip: cleanup_pid = getpid(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(0); #endif new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock); if (ac > 0) parent_alive_interval = 10; idtab_init(); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler); signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler); nalloc = 0; + + if (pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); + platform_pledge_agent(); while (1) { prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp); result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp); saved_errno = errno; if (parent_alive_interval != 0) check_parent_exists(); (void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */ if (result < 0) { if (saved_errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("select: %s", strerror(saved_errno)); } else if (result > 0) after_select(readsetp, writesetp); } /* NOTREACHED */ } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,222 +1,219 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.32 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.34 2015/12/11 04:21:12 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #define INTBLOB_LEN 20 #define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r); slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s); if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(SIGBLOB_LEN)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN; ret = 0; } else { /* ietf-drafts */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-dss")) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; } out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); if (sig != NULL) DSA_SIG_free(sig); - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); + sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL; size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* fetch signature */ if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { if ((sigblob = malloc(signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; memcpy(sigblob, signature, signaturelen); len = signaturelen; } else { /* ietf-drafts */ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } } if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* parse signature */ if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || (sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL || (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) || (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } /* sha1 the data */ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) { case 1: ret = 0; break; case 0: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; default: ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); if (sig != NULL) DSA_SIG_free(sig); - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); - if (ktype != NULL) - free(ktype); + sshbuf_free(b); + free(ktype); if (sigblob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); free(sigblob); } return ret; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,192 +1,188 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.11 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.12 2015/12/11 04:21:12 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" /* ARGSUSED */ int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; int hash_alg; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t len, dlen; struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->r)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->s)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); - if (bb != NULL) - sshbuf_free(bb); + sshbuf_free(b); + sshbuf_free(bb); if (sig != NULL) ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); return ret; } /* ARGSUSED */ int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; int hash_alg; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t dlen; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; char *ktype = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* fetch signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* parse signature */ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->r) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->s) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) { case 1: ret = 0; break; case 0: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; default: ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); - if (sigbuf != NULL) - sshbuf_free(sigbuf); - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + sshbuf_free(b); if (sig != NULL) ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); free(ktype); return ret; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 (revision 296853) @@ -1,864 +1,868 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.127 2015/08/20 19:20:06 naddy Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.130 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 20 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $ .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keygen .Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion .Sh SYNOPSIS .Bk -words .Nm ssh-keygen .Op Fl q .Op Fl b Ar bits .Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1 .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase .Op Fl C Ar comment .Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl p .Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase .Op Fl f Ar keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl i .Op Fl m Ar key_format .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl e .Op Fl m Ar key_format .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl y .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl c .Op Fl P Ar passphrase .Op Fl C Ar comment .Op Fl f Ar keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl l .Op Fl v .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl B .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl D Ar pkcs11 .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl F Ar hostname .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Op Fl l .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl H .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl R Ar hostname .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl r Ar hostname .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Op Fl g .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl G Ar output_file .Op Fl v .Op Fl b Ar bits .Op Fl M Ar memory .Op Fl S Ar start_point .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl T Ar output_file .Fl f Ar input_file .Op Fl v .Op Fl a Ar rounds .Op Fl J Ar num_lines .Op Fl j Ar start_line .Op Fl K Ar checkpt .Op Fl W Ar generator .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl s Ar ca_key .Fl I Ar certificate_identity .Op Fl h .Op Fl n Ar principals .Op Fl O Ar option .Op Fl V Ar validity_interval .Op Fl z Ar serial_number .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl L .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl A .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl k .Fl f Ar krl_file .Op Fl u .Op Fl s Ar ca_public .Op Fl z Ar version_number .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Q .Fl f Ar krl_file .Ar .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm generates, manages and converts authentication keys for .Xr ssh 1 . .Nm -can create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1 and -DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. +can create keys for use by SSH protocol versions 1 and 2. +Protocol 1 should not be used +and is only offered to support legacy devices. +It suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses +and doesn't support many of the advanced features available for protocol 2. +.Pp The type of key to be generated is specified with the .Fl t option. If invoked without any arguments, .Nm will generate an RSA key for use in SSH protocol 2 connections. .Pp .Nm is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group exchange (DH-GEX). See the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section for details. .Pp Finally, .Nm can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. .Pp Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication key in .Pa ~/.ssh/identity , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in .Pa /etc/rc . .Pp Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same name but .Dq .pub appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using the .Fl p option. .Pp There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public key copied to other machines. .Pp For RSA1 keys, there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for convenience to the user to help identify the key. The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful. The comment is initialized to .Dq user@host when the key is created, but can be changed using the .Fl c option. .Pp After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should be placed to be activated. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl A For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment. This is used by .Pa /etc/rc to generate new host keys. .It Fl a Ar rounds When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol 2 key when the .Fl o flag is set), this option specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). .Pp When screening DH-GEX candidates ( using the .Fl T command). This option specifies the number of primality tests to perform. .It Fl B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file. .It Fl b Ar bits Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 2048 bits. Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys, the .Fl b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will fail. Ed25519 keys have a fixed length and the .Fl b flag will be ignored. .It Fl C Ar comment Provides a new comment. .It Fl c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys. The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. .It Fl D Ar pkcs11 Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library .Ar pkcs11 . When used in combination with .Fl s , this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details). .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Fl e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the .Fl m option. The default export format is .Dq RFC4716 . This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including several commercial SSH implementations. .It Fl F Ar hostname Search for the specified .Ar hostname in a .Pa known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found. This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the .Fl H option to print found keys in a hashed format. .It Fl f Ar filename Specifies the filename of the key file. .It Fl G Ar output_file Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX. These primes must be screened for safety (using the .Fl T option) before use. .It Fl g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the .Fl r command. .It Fl H Hash a .Pa known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix. These hashes may be used normally by .Nm ssh and .Nm sshd , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names. .It Fl h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user certificate. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl I Ar certificate_identity Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file in the format specified by the .Fl m option and print an OpenSSH compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows importing keys from other software, including several commercial SSH implementations. The default import format is .Dq RFC4716 . .It Fl J Ar num_lines Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH candidate screening using the .Fl T option. .It Fl j Ar start_line Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate screening using the .Fl T option. .It Fl K Ar checkpt Write the last line processed to the file .Ar checkpt while performing DH candidate screening using the .Fl T option. This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been processed if the job is restarted. .It Fl k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, .Nm will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the .Fl f flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line. Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or using the format described in the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section. .It Fl L -Prints the contents of a certificate. +Prints the contents of one or more certificates. .It Fl l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. Private RSA1 keys are also supported. For RSA and DSA keys .Nm tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If combined with .Fl v , an ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint. .It Fl M Ar memory Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Fl m Ar key_format Specify a key format for the .Fl i (import) or .Fl e (export) conversion options. The supported key formats are: .Dq RFC4716 (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), .Dq PKCS8 (PEM PKCS8 public key) or .Dq PEM (PEM public key). The default conversion format is .Dq RFC4716 . .It Fl N Ar new_passphrase Provides the new passphrase. .It Fl n Ar principals Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl O Ar option Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may be specified multiple times. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. The options that are valid for user certificates are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ic clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may be added individually. .It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command Forces the execution of .Ar command instead of any shell or command specified by the user when the certificate is used for authentication. .It Ic no-agent-forwarding Disable .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding (permitted by default). .It Ic no-port-forwarding Disable port forwarding (permitted by default). .It Ic no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default). .It Ic no-user-rc Disable execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 (permitted by default). .It Ic no-x11-forwarding Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default). .It Ic permit-agent-forwarding Allows .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding. .It Ic permit-port-forwarding Allows port forwarding. .It Ic permit-pty Allows PTY allocation. .It Ic permit-user-rc Allows execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 . .It Ic permit-x11-forwarding Allows X11 forwarding. .It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid. The .Ar address_list is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format. .El .Pp At present, no options are valid for host keys. .It Fl o Causes .Nm -to save SSH protocol 2 private keys using the new OpenSSH format rather than +to save private keys using the new OpenSSH format rather than the more compatible PEM format. The new format has increased resistance to brute-force password cracking but is not supported by versions of OpenSSH prior to 6.5. Ed25519 keys always use the new private key format. .It Fl P Ar passphrase Provides the (old) passphrase. .It Fl p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the new passphrase. .It Fl Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. .It Fl q Silence .Nm ssh-keygen . .It Fl R Ar hostname Removes all keys belonging to .Ar hostname from a .Pa known_hosts file. This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the .Fl H option above). .It Fl r Ar hostname Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named .Ar hostname for the specified public key file. .It Fl S Ar start Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Fl s Ar ca_key Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .Pp When generating a KRL, .Fl s specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial number. See the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. .It Fl T Ar output_file Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the .Fl G option) for safety. .It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1 Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are .Dq rsa1 for protocol version 1 and .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 , or .Dq rsa for protocol version 2. .It Fl u Update a KRL. When specified with .Fl k , keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL being created. .It Fl V Ar validity_interval Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval. The start time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by a relative time in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or a relative time starting with a plus character. .Pp For example: .Dq +52w1d (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now), .Dq -4w:+4w (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now), .Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000 (valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), .Dq -1d:20110101 (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011). .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli generation. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .It Fl W Ar generator Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Fl y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout. .It Fl z Ar serial_number Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. The default serial number is zero. .Pp When generating a KRL, the .Fl z flag is used to specify a KRL version number. .El .Sh MODULI GENERATION .Nm may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive process). .Pp Generation of primes is performed using the .Fl G option. The desired length of the primes may be specified by the .Fl b option. For example: .Pp .Dl # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048 .Pp By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired length range. This may be overridden using the .Fl S option, which specifies a different start point (in hex). .Pp Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for suitability. This may be performed using the .Fl T option. In this mode .Nm will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the .Fl f option). For example: .Pp .Dl # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates .Pp By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests. This may be overridden using the .Fl a option. The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the .Fl W option. Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5. .Pp Screened DH groups may be installed in .Pa /etc/moduli . It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of a connection share common moduli. .Sh CERTIFICATES .Nm supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys. Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to the X.509 certificates used in .Xr ssl 8 . .Pp .Nm supports two types of certificates: user and host. User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub .Pp The resultant certificate will be placed in .Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub . A host certificate requires the .Fl h option: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub .Pp The host certificate will be output to .Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub . .Pp It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by providing the token library using .Fl D and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument to .Fl s : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub .Pp In all cases, .Ar key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate is used for authentication. .Pp Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub .Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub" .Pp Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific command. For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the .Fl O option above. .Pp Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The .Fl V option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from .Ux Epoch to the distant future. .Pp For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA public key must be trusted by .Xr sshd 8 or .Xr ssh 1 . Please refer to those manual pages for details. .Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS .Nm is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being revoked by serial number. .Pp KRLs may be generated using the .Fl k flag. This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or not available). .Pp Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some directive-specific information. .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been specified on the .Nm command line using the .Fl s option. .It Cm id : Ar key_id Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA key must have been specified on the .Nm command line using the .Fl s option. .It Cm key : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key. .It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash. .El .Pp KRLs may be updated using the .Fl u flag in addition to .Fl k . When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the KRL, adding to those already there. .Pp It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key (or keys). The .Fl Q -flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the commandline. +flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line. If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered) then .Nm will exit with a non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES. This file is not automatically accessed by .Nm but it is offered as the default file for the private key. .Xr ssh 1 will read this file when a login attempt is made. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically accessed by .Nm but it is offered as the default file for the private key. .Xr ssh 1 will read this file when a login attempt is made. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%R RFC 4716 .%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format" .%D 2006 .Re .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2688 +1,2742 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.277 2015/08/19 23:17:51 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.288 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Identity and host key generation and maintenance. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "uuencode.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "dns.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "krl.h" #include "digest.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" #else # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" #endif /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */ #define DEFAULT_BITS 2048 #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 #define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256 u_int32_t bits = 0; /* * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase. This can be * set on the command line. */ int change_passphrase = 0; /* * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment. This can be set * on the command line. */ int change_comment = 0; int quiet = 0; int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; /* Flag indicating that we want to hash a known_hosts file */ int hash_hosts = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want lookup a host in known_hosts file */ int find_host = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want to delete a host from a known_hosts file */ int delete_host = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want to show the contents of a certificate */ int show_cert = 0; /* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ int print_fingerprint = 0; int print_bubblebabble = 0; /* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */ int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */ char identity_file[1024]; int have_identity = 0; /* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */ char *identity_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */ char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */ char *identity_comment = NULL; /* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */ char *ca_key_path = NULL; /* Certificate serial number */ unsigned long long cert_serial = 0; /* Key type when certifying */ u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; /* "key ID" of signed key */ char *cert_key_id = NULL; /* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */ char *cert_principals = NULL; /* Validity period for certificates */ u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0; u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL; /* Certificate options */ #define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1) #define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1) #define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2) #define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3) #define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4) #define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \ CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC) u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT; char *certflags_command = NULL; char *certflags_src_addr = NULL; /* Conversion to/from various formats */ int convert_to = 0; int convert_from = 0; enum { FMT_RFC4716, FMT_PKCS8, FMT_PEM } convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; int print_public = 0; int print_generic = 0; char *key_type_name = NULL; /* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */ char *pkcs11provider = NULL; /* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */ int use_new_format = 0; /* Cipher for new-format private keys */ char *new_format_cipher = NULL; /* * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys / * number of primality trials when screening moduli. */ int rounds = 0; /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* moduli.c */ int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, unsigned long); #endif static void type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL u_int maxbits, nid; #endif if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); if (*bitsp == 0) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (type == KEY_DSA) *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA; else if (type == KEY_ECDSA) { if (name != NULL && (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0) *bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); if (*bitsp == 0) *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA; } else #endif *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ? OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS; if (*bitsp > maxbits) fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits); if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024) fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits"); else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 1024) fatal("Key must at least be 1024 bits"); else if (type == KEY_ECDSA && sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length - valid lengths are " "256, 384 or 521 bits"); #endif } static void ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) { char buf[1024]; char *name = NULL; if (key_type_name == NULL) name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; else { switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { case KEY_RSA1: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY; break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA; break; #endif case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; break; default: fatal("bad key type"); } } snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0) strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file)); have_identity = 1; } static struct sshkey * load_identity(char *filename) { char *pass; struct sshkey *prv; int r; if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, NULL)) == 0) return prv; if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); if (identity_passphrase) pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, NULL); explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); free(pass); if (r != 0) fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); return prv; } #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static void do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k) { size_t len; u_char *blob; char comment[61]; int r; if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) fatal("version 1 keys are not supported"); if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0) fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k), pw->pw_name, hostname); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n", comment); dump_base64(stdout, blob, len); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); sshkey_free(k); free(blob); exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed"); break; #if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */ case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSAPublicKey(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSAPublicKey failed"); break; #endif /* XXX ECDSA? */ default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k; struct stat st; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0) k = load_identity(identity_file); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_to_pkcs8(k); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_to_pem(k); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); } exit(0); } /* * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length * instead of 16. */ static void buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value) { u_int bytes, bignum_bits; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8; if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes) fatal("%s: input buffer too small: need %d have %zu", __func__, bytes, sshbuf_len(b)); if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static struct sshkey * do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *type, *cipher; u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345"; int r, rlen, ktype; u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4; size_t slen; u_long e; if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) { error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC); sshbuf_free(b); return NULL; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4); if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) { error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher); free(cipher); sshbuf_free(b); free(type); return NULL; } free(cipher); if (strstr(type, "dsa")) { ktype = KEY_DSA; } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) { ktype = KEY_RSA; } else { sshbuf_free(b); free(type); return NULL; } if ((key = sshkey_new_private(ktype)) == NULL) fatal("key_new_private failed"); free(type); switch (key->type) { case KEY_DSA: buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->p); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->g); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->pub_key); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->priv_key); break; case KEY_RSA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0)) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); e = e1; debug("e %lx", e); if (e < 30) { e <<= 8; e += e2; debug("e %lx", e); e <<= 8; e += e3; debug("e %lx", e); } if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) { sshbuf_free(b); sshkey_free(key); return NULL; } buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->d); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->n); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->p); if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa)) != 0) fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); break; } rlen = sshbuf_len(b); if (rlen != 0) error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: " "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); sshbuf_free(b); /* try the key */ - if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), 0) != 0 || + if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0) != 0 || sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), 0) != 0) { sshkey_free(key); free(sig); return NULL; } free(sig); return key; } static int get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len) { int c; size_t pos = 0; line[0] = '\0'; while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) { if (pos >= len - 1) fatal("input line too long."); switch (c) { case '\r': c = fgetc(fp); if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno)); return pos; case '\n': return pos; } line[pos++] = c; line[pos] = '\0'; } /* We reached EOF */ return -1; } static void do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private) { int r, blen, escaped = 0; u_int len; char line[1024]; u_char blob[8096]; char encoded[8096]; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); encoded[0] = '\0'; while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) { if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\') escaped++; if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 || strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) { if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL) *private = 1; if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) { break; } /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */ continue; } if (escaped) { escaped--; /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */ continue; } strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded)); } len = strlen(encoded); if (((len % 4) == 3) && (encoded[len-1] == '=') && (encoded[len-2] == '=') && (encoded[len-3] == '=')) encoded[len-3] = '\0'; blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob)); if (blen < 0) fatal("uudecode failed."); if (*private) *k = do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen); else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0) fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fclose(fp); } static void do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { EVP_PKEY *pubkey; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__, identity_file); } fclose(fp); switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey); break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case EVP_PKEY_EC: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA; (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey); (*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa); break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__, EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)); } EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); return; } static void do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { FILE *fp; RSA *rsa; #ifdef notyet DSA *dsa; #endif if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = rsa; fclose(fp); return; } #if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */ rewind(fp); if ((dsa = PEM_read_DSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; (*k)->dsa = dsa; fclose(fp); return; } /* XXX ECDSA */ #endif fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__); } static void do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k = NULL; int r, private = 0, ok = 0; struct stat st; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); } if (!private) { if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0) ok = 1; if (ok) fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } else { switch (k->type) { case KEY_DSA: ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #endif case KEY_RSA: ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); } } if (!ok) fatal("key write failed"); sshkey_free(k); exit(0); } #endif static void do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *prv; struct stat st; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); prv = load_identity(identity_file); if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0) error("key_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(prv); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); exit(0); } static void do_download(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL; int i, nkeys; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; char *fp, *ra; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; pkcs11_init(0); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (print_fingerprint) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]), fp, sshkey_type(keys[i])); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else { (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); pkcs11_terminate(); exit(0); #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } +static struct sshkey * +try_read_key(char **cpp) +{ + struct sshkey *ret; + int r; + + if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + /* Try RSA1 */ + if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0) + return ret; + /* Try modern */ + sshkey_free(ret); + if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0) + return ret; + /* Not a key */ + sshkey_free(ret); + return NULL; +} + static void -do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) +fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment) { - FILE *f; - struct sshkey *public; - char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra; - int r, i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1; + char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; - struct stat st; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; - if (!have_identity) - ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, + comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public)); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); +} + +static void +fingerprint_private(const char *path) +{ + struct stat st; + char *comment = NULL; + struct sshkey *public = NULL; + int r; + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) - fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); - if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &public, &comment)) != 0) - debug2("Error loading public key \"%s\": %s", - identity_file, ssh_err(r)); - else { - fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); - ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, - SSH_FP_RANDOMART); - if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); - printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, comment, - sshkey_type(public)); - if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) - printf("%s\n", ra); - sshkey_free(public); - free(comment); - free(ra); - free(fp); - exit(0); + fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, &comment)) != 0) { + debug("load public \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL, + &public, &comment)) != 0) { + debug("load private \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s is not a key file.", path); + } } - if (comment) { - free(comment); - comment = NULL; - } - if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) - fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + fingerprint_one_key(public, comment); + sshkey_free(public); + free(comment); +} - while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { - if ((cp = strchr(line, '\n')) == NULL) { - error("line %d too long: %.40s...", - num + 1, line); - skip = 1; +static void +do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) +{ + FILE *f; + struct sshkey *public = NULL; + char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; + int i, invalid = 1; + const char *path; + long int lnum = 0; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + path = identity_file; + + if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) { + f = stdin; + path = "(stdin)"; + } else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno)); + + while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &lnum) == 0) { + cp = line; + cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; + /* Trim leading space and comments */ + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') continue; + + /* + * Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys + * or known_hosts. + */ + + /* + * Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if + * "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're + * not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin). + */ + if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && + strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) { + fclose(f); + fingerprint_private(path); + exit(0); } - num++; - if (skip) { - skip = 0; + + /* + * If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to + * accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options. + * Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff. + */ + if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { + i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); + if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || + (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { + int quoted = 0; + + comment = cp; + for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && + *cp != '\t')); cp++) { + if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') + cp++; /* Skip both */ + else if (*cp == '"') + quoted = !quoted; + } + if (!*cp) + continue; + *cp++ = '\0'; + } + } + /* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */ + if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { + debug("%s:%ld: not a public key", path, lnum); continue; } - *cp = '\0'; - /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ - for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + /* Find trailing comment, if any */ + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; - if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') - continue; - i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); - if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { - int quoted = 0; + if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#') comment = cp; - for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && - *cp != '\t')); cp++) { - if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') - cp++; /* Skip both */ - else if (*cp == '"') - quoted = !quoted; - } - if (!*cp) - continue; - *cp++ = '\0'; - } - ep = cp; - if ((public = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) - fatal("sshkey_new failed"); - if ((r = sshkey_read(public, &cp)) != 0) { - cp = ep; - sshkey_free(public); - if ((public = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) - fatal("sshkey_new failed"); - if ((r = sshkey_read(public, &cp)) != 0) { - sshkey_free(public); - continue; - } - } - comment = *cp ? cp : comment; - fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); - ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, - SSH_FP_RANDOMART); - if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); - printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, - comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public)); - if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) - printf("%s\n", ra); - free(ra); - free(fp); + + fingerprint_one_key(public, comment); sshkey_free(public); - invalid = 0; + invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */ } fclose(f); if (invalid) - fatal("%s is not a public key file.", identity_file); + fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path); exit(0); } static void do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) { struct { char *key_type; char *key_type_display; char *path; } key_types[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "rsa1", "RSA1", _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; int first = 0; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private, *public; char comment[1024]; int i, type, fd, r; FILE *f; for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { if (stat(key_types[i].path, &st) == 0) continue; if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); first = 0; continue; } if (first == 0) { first = 1; printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); } printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); fflush(stdout); type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); strlcpy(identity_file, key_types[i].path, sizeof(identity_file)); bits = 0; type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { error("key_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); first = 0; continue; } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, "", comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(private); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; continue; } sshkey_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd == -1) { error("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; continue; } f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) { error("fdopen %s failed", identity_file); close(fd); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; continue; } if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) { error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fclose(f); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; continue; } fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); sshkey_free(public); } if (first != 0) printf("\n"); } struct known_hosts_ctx { const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */ FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */ int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */ int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */ int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */ }; static int known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts; int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts); switch (l->status) { case HKF_STATUS_OK: case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED: /* * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard * characters or a CA/revocation marker. */ if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED) != 0 || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) { fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); if (has_wild && !find_host) { logit("%s:%ld: ignoring host name " "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path, l->linenum, l->hosts); } return 0; } /* * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list, * hash and store separately. */ ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts); while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') { if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("hash_host failed"); fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey); ctx->has_unhashed = 1; } free(ohosts); return 0; case HKF_STATUS_INVALID: /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */ ctx->invalid = 1; logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } /* NOTREACHED */ return -1; } static int known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; char *fp; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { if (delete_host) { if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } else { /* * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke * marker, delete it by *not* writing the * line to ctx->out. */ ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) printf("# Host %s found: line %ld\n", ctx->host, l->linenum); } return 0; } else if (find_host) { ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) { printf("# Host %s found: line %ld %s\n", ctx->host, l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" : (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : "")); } if (hash_hosts) known_hosts_hash(l, ctx); else if (print_fingerprint) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep); printf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host, sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment); free(fp); } else fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } } else if (delete_host) { /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { ctx->invalid = 1; logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); } fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } return 0; } static void do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) { char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX]; int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0; struct known_hosts_ctx ctx; u_int foreach_options; if (!have_identity) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Specified known hosts path too long"); free(cp); have_identity = 1; } memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.out = stdout; ctx.host = name; /* * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout */ if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) { if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) || strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old)) fatal("known_hosts path too long"); umask(077); if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; unlink(tmp); fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno)); } inplace = 1; } /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */ foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0; foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0; if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, hash_hosts ? known_hosts_hash : known_hosts_find_delete, &ctx, - name, NULL, foreach_options)) != 0) + name, NULL, foreach_options)) != 0) { + if (inplace) + unlink(tmp); fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } if (inplace) fclose(ctx.out); if (ctx.invalid) { error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file); if (inplace) { error("Not replacing existing known_hosts " "file because of errors"); unlink(tmp); } exit(1); } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) { logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file); if (inplace) unlink(tmp); } else if (inplace) { /* Backup existing file */ if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno)); if (link(identity_file, old) == -1) fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old, strerror(errno)); /* Move new one into place */ if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) { error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file, strerror(errno)); unlink(tmp); unlink(old); exit(1); } printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file); printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old); if (ctx.has_unhashed) { logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old); logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy " "of hostnames"); } } exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key); } /* * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure * for the current user. */ static void do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) { char *comment; char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment); if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { if (identity_passphrase) old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else old_passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase, &private, &comment); explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase)); free(old_passphrase); if (r != 0) goto badkey; } else if (r != 0) { badkey: fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); } if (comment) printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_new_passphrase) { passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); passphrase2 = NULL; } else { passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Verify that they are the same. */ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase1); free(passphrase2); printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n"); exit(1); } /* Destroy the other copy. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase2); } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */ free(comment); printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n"); exit(0); } /* * Print the SSHFP RR. */ static int do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname) { struct sshkey *public; char *comment = NULL; struct stat st; int r; if (fname == NULL) fatal("%s: no filename", __func__); if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.", fname, ssh_err(r)); export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); return 1; } /* * Change the comment of a private key file. */ static void do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) { char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase; struct sshkey *private; struct sshkey *public; struct stat st; FILE *f; int r, fd; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment)) == 0) passphrase = xstrdup(""); else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); else { if (identity_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Try to load using the passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &private, &comment)) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); } } - /* XXX what about new-format keys? */ - if (private->type != KEY_RSA1) { - error("Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys."); + + if (private->type != KEY_RSA1 && private->type != KEY_ED25519 && + !use_new_format) { + error("Comments are only supported for RSA1 or keys stored in " + "the new format (-o)."); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment); if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment)); } else { printf("Enter new comment: "); fflush(stdout); if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0'; } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal("key_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd == -1) fatal("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file); f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) fatal("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(public); fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment); fclose(f); free(comment); printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n"); exit(0); } -static const char * -fmt_validity(u_int64_t valid_from, u_int64_t valid_to) -{ - char from[32], to[32]; - static char ret[64]; - time_t tt; - struct tm *tm; - - *from = *to = '\0'; - if (valid_from == 0 && valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) - return "forever"; - - if (valid_from != 0) { - /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ - tt = valid_from > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_from; - tm = localtime(&tt); - strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); - } - if (valid_to != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { - /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ - tt = valid_to > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_to; - tm = localtime(&tt); - strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); - } - - if (valid_from == 0) { - snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to); - return ret; - } - if (valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { - snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from); - return ret; - } - - snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to); - return ret; -} - static void add_flag_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name) { int r; debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static void add_string_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name, const char *value) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, value)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(b); } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static void prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which) { sshbuf_reset(c); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_command != NULL) add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc"); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_src_addr != NULL) add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr); } static struct sshkey * load_pkcs11_key(char *path) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL; int r, i, nkeys; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0) fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r)); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys); debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) { private = keys[i]; continue; } sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); sshkey_free(public); return private; #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } static void do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) { int r, i, fd; u_int n; struct sshkey *ca, *public; - char *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL; + char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL; FILE *f; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(1); #endif tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL) fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path); } else ca = load_identity(tmp); free(tmp); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { /* Split list of principals */ n = 0; if (cert_principals != NULL) { otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); plist = NULL; for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') fatal("Empty principal name"); } free(otmp); } tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0) fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\": %s", __func__, tmp, ssh_err(r)); if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA && public->type != KEY_ECDSA && public->type != KEY_ED25519) fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified", __func__, tmp, sshkey_type(public)); /* Prepare certificate to sign */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0) fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); public->cert->type = cert_key_type; public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial; public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id); public->cert->nprincipals = n; public->cert->principals = plist; public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from; public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to; prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL); prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions, OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca, &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0) fatal("key_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r)); if (sshkey_certify(public, ca) != 0) fatal("Couldn't not certify key %s", tmp); if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) *cp = '\0'; xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp); free(tmp); if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out, strerror(errno)); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) fatal("Could not write certified key to %s: %s", out, ssh_err(r)); fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); if (!quiet) { + sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert, + valid, sizeof(valid)); logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s " - "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public), + "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public), out, public->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial, cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", - fmt_validity(cert_valid_from, cert_valid_to)); + valid); } sshkey_free(public); free(out); } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif exit(0); } static u_int64_t parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now) { int64_t mul, secs; mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1; if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s); if (mul == -1 && secs > now) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul); } static u_int64_t parse_absolute_time(const char *s) { struct tm tm; time_t tt; char buf[32], *fmt; /* - * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there + * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way. */ switch (strlen(s)) { case 8: fmt = "%Y-%m-%d"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6); break; case 14: fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12); break; default: fatal("Invalid certificate time format %s", s); } memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm)); if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL) fatal("Invalid certificate time %s", s); if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); return (u_int64_t)tt; } static void parse_cert_times(char *timespec) { char *from, *to; time_t now = time(NULL); int64_t secs; /* +timespec relative to now */ if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) { if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec); cert_valid_to = now + secs; /* * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts * with poorly-synchronised clocks. */ cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60; return; } /* * from:to, where * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */ from = xstrdup(timespec); to = strchr(from, ':'); if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec); *to++ = '\0'; if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now); else cert_valid_from = parse_absolute_time(from); if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now); else cert_valid_to = parse_absolute_time(to); if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from) fatal("Empty certificate validity interval"); free(from); } static void add_cert_option(char *opt) { char *val; if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0) certflags_flags = 0; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) { val = opt + 14; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty force-command option"); if (certflags_command != NULL) fatal("force-command already specified"); certflags_command = xstrdup(val); } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) { val = opt + 15; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty source-address option"); if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) fatal("source-address already specified"); if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) fatal("Invalid source-address list"); certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val); } else fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt); } static void show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical) { char *name, *arg; struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL; int r; if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__); while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) { sshbuf_free(option); option = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); printf(" %s", name); if (!in_critical && (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0)) printf("\n"); else if (in_critical && (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 || strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); printf(" %s\n", arg); free(arg); } else { printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %zu)\n", sshbuf_len(option)); sshbuf_reset(option); } free(name); if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0) fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end"); } sshbuf_free(option); sshbuf_free(options); } static void -do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) +print_cert(struct sshkey *key) { - struct sshkey *key; - struct stat st; - char *key_fp, *ca_fp; + char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp; u_int i; - int r; - if (!have_identity) - ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) - fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); - if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &key, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("Cannot load public key \"%s\": %s", - identity_file, ssh_err(r)); - if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) - fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file); - key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); + sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); - printf("%s:\n", identity_file); printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key), sshkey_cert_type(key)); printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp); printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp); printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial); - printf(" Valid: %s\n", - fmt_validity(key->cert->valid_after, key->cert->valid_before)); + printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid); printf(" Principals: "); if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++) printf("\n %s", key->cert->principals[i]); printf("\n"); } printf(" Critical Options: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->critical, 1); } printf(" Extensions: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0); } - exit(0); } static void +do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + struct stat st; + int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0; + FILE *f; + char *cp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; + const char *path; + long int lnum = 0; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + + path = identity_file; + if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { + f = stdin; + path = "(stdin)"; + is_stdin = 1; + } else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + + while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &lnum) == 0) { + sshkey_free(key); + key = NULL; + /* Trim leading space and comments */ + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') + continue; + if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("key_new"); + if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) { + error("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path, + lnum, ssh_err(r)); + continue; + } + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum); + continue; + } + ok = 1; + if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1) + printf("%s:\n", path); + else + printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum); + print_cert(key); + } + sshkey_free(key); + fclose(f); + exit(ok ? 0 : 1); +} + +static void load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp) { struct sshbuf *krlbuf; int r, fd; if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) fatal("Unable to load KRL: %s", ssh_err(r)); close(fd); /* XXX check sigs */ if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 || *krlp == NULL) fatal("Invalid KRL file: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(krlbuf); } static void update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca, const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_long lnum = 0; char *path, *cp, *ep, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; unsigned long long serial, serial2; int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, r; FILE *krl_spec; path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid); if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { krl_spec = stdin; free(path); path = xstrdup("(standard input)"); } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (!quiet) printf("Revoking from %s\n", path); while (read_keyfile_line(krl_spec, path, line, sizeof(line), &lnum) == 0) { was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = 0; cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */ for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') { cp[i] = '\0'; break; } if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') { /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */ if (r == -1) r = i; } else r = -1; } if (r != -1) cp[r] = '\0'; if (*cp == '\0') continue; if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by serial number " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 7; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); errno = 0; serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-')) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); serial2 = serial; if (*ep == '-') { cp = ep + 1; errno = 0; serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0') fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); if (serial2 <= serial) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range " "%llu:%llu", path, lnum, (unsigned long long)serial, (unsigned long long)serial2); } if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca, serial, serial2) != 0) { fatal("%s: revoke serial failed", __func__); } } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by key ID " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 3; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0) fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__); } else { if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { cp += 4; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_explicit_key = 1; } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) { cp += 5; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_sha1 = 1; } else { /* * Just try to process the line as a key. * Parsing will fail if it isn't. */ } if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("key_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path, lnum, ssh_err(r)); if (was_explicit_key) r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); else if (was_sha1) r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key); else r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key); if (r != 0) fatal("%s: revoke key failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(key); } } if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0) fclose(krl_spec); free(path); } static void do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, int argc, char **argv) { struct ssh_krl *krl; struct stat sb; struct sshkey *ca = NULL; int fd, i, r, wild_ca = 0; char *tmp; struct sshbuf *kbuf; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL generation requires an output file"); if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if (updating) fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0) wild_ca = 1; else { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); free(tmp); } } if (updating) load_krl(identity_file, &krl); else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) fatal("couldn't create KRL"); if (cert_serial != 0) ssh_krl_set_version(krl, cert_serial); if (identity_comment != NULL) ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, identity_comment); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl); if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0) fatal("Couldn't generate KRL"); if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) fatal("open %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, (void *)sshbuf_ptr(kbuf), sshbuf_len(kbuf)) != sshbuf_len(kbuf)) fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); close(fd); sshbuf_free(kbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); - if (ca != NULL) - sshkey_free(ca); + sshkey_free(ca); } static void do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) { int i, r, ret = 0; char *comment; struct ssh_krl *krl; struct sshkey *k; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL checking requires an input file"); load_krl(identity_file, &krl); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0) fatal("Cannot load public key %s: %s", argv[i], ssh_err(r)); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k); printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i], *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "", r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED"); if (r != 0) ret = 1; sshkey_free(k); free(comment); } ssh_krl_free(krl); exit(ret); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]\n" " [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n"); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n"); #endif fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]\n" " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]\n" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL " ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]\n" " ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n" " [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n" #endif " ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]\n" " [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -A\n" " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n" " file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...\n"); exit(1); } /* * Main program for key management. */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2; char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; struct sshkey *private, *public; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int r, opt, type, fd; int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; FILE *f; const char *errstr; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* Moduli generation/screening */ char out_file[PATH_MAX], *checkpoint = NULL; u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0; int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0; unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0; BIGNUM *start = NULL; #endif extern int optind; extern char *optarg; + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); seed_rng(); /* we need this for the home * directory. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); if (!pw) fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Remaining characters: UYdw */ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQXceghiklopquvxy" "C:D:E:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:Z:" "a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'A': gen_all_hostkeys = 1; break; case 'b': bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 256, 32768, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'F': find_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'I': cert_key_id = optarg; break; case 'R': delete_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'L': show_cert = 1; break; case 'l': print_fingerprint = 1; break; case 'B': print_bubblebabble = 1; break; case 'm': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PKCS8; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PEM; break; } fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg); case 'n': cert_principals = optarg; break; case 'o': use_new_format = 1; break; case 'p': change_passphrase = 1; break; case 'c': change_comment = 1; break; case 'f': if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Identity filename too long"); have_identity = 1; break; case 'g': print_generic = 1; break; case 'P': identity_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'N': identity_new_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'Q': check_krl = 1; break; case 'O': add_cert_option(optarg); break; case 'Z': new_format_cipher = optarg; break; case 'C': identity_comment = optarg; break; case 'q': quiet = 1; break; case 'e': case 'x': /* export key */ convert_to = 1; break; case 'h': cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST; certflags_flags = 0; break; case 'k': gen_krl = 1; break; case 'i': case 'X': /* import key */ convert_from = 1; break; case 'y': print_public = 1; break; case 's': ca_key_path = optarg; break; case 't': key_type_name = optarg; break; case 'D': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'u': update_krl = 1; break; case 'v': if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else { if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 && log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; } break; case 'r': rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'a': rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'V': parse_cert_times(optarg); break; case 'z': errno = 0; cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); break; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* Moduli generation/screening */ case 'W': generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'M': memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; case 'G': do_gen_candidates = 1; if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >= sizeof(out_file)) fatal("Output filename too long"); break; case 'T': do_screen_candidates = 1; if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >= sizeof(out_file)) fatal("Output filename too long"); break; case 'K': if (strlen(optarg) >= PATH_MAX) fatal("Checkpoint filename too long"); checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'S': /* XXX - also compare length against bits */ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0) fatal("Invalid start point."); break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case '?': default: usage(); } } /* reinit */ log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); argv += optind; argc -= optind; if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) { error("Too few arguments."); usage(); } } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) { error("Too many arguments."); usage(); } if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { error("Can only have one of -p and -c."); usage(); } if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) { error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R."); usage(); } if (gen_krl) { do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, argc, argv); return (0); } if (check_krl) { do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv); return (0); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (cert_key_id == NULL) fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); do_ca_sign(pw, argc, argv); } if (show_cert) do_show_cert(pw); if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) do_download(pw); if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) do_fingerprint(pw); if (change_passphrase) do_change_passphrase(pw); if (change_comment) do_change_comment(pw); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (convert_to) do_convert_to(pw); if (convert_from) do_convert_from(pw); #endif if (print_public) do_print_public(pw); if (rr_hostname != NULL) { unsigned int n = 0; if (have_identity) { n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file, rr_hostname); if (n == 0) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); exit(0); } else { n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); if (n == 0) fatal("no keys found."); exit(0); } } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (do_gen_candidates) { FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w"); if (out == NULL) { error("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); return (1); } if (bits == 0) bits = DEFAULT_BITS; if (gen_candidates(out, memory, bits, start) != 0) fatal("modulus candidate generation failed"); return (0); } if (do_screen_candidates) { FILE *in; FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "a"); if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) { if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate " "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); } } else in = stdin; if (out == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); } if (prime_test(in, out, rounds == 0 ? 100 : rounds, generator_wanted, checkpoint, start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0) fatal("modulus screening failed"); return (0); } #endif if (gen_all_hostkeys) { do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); return (0); } if (key_type_name == NULL) key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); if (!quiet) printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) fatal("key_generate failed"); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal("key_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */ snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) { if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) { if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); } else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0) { error("Could not create directory '%s': %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); } else if (!quiet) printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir); } } /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) { char yesno[3]; printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file); printf("Overwrite (y/n)? "); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') exit(1); } /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else { passphrase_again: passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { /* * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and * retry. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase1); free(passphrase2); printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n"); goto passphrase_again; } /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase2); } if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment)); } else { /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); } /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); exit(1); } /* Clear the passphrase. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */ sshkey_free(private); if (!quiet) printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); if (!quiet) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file); printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } sshkey_free(public); exit(0); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 (revision 296853) @@ -1,178 +1,180 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.36 2014/08/30 15:33:50 sobrado Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.38 2015/11/08 23:24:03 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . .\" .\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is .\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the .\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 30 2014 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: November 8 2015 $ .Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keyscan .Nd gather ssh public keys .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-keyscan .Bk -words -.Op Fl 46Hv +.Op Fl 46cHv .Op Fl f Ar file .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl T Ar timeout .Op Fl t Ar type .Op Ar host | addrlist namelist .Ar ... .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying .Pa ssh_known_hosts files. .Nm provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl scripts. .Pp .Nm uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of 1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those hosts are down or do not run ssh. For scanning, one does not need login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning process involve any encryption. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. +.It Fl c +Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys. .It Fl f Ar file Read hosts or .Dq addrlist namelist pairs from .Ar file , one per line. If .Pa - is supplied instead of a filename, .Nm will read hosts or .Dq addrlist namelist pairs from the standard input. .It Fl H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may be used normally by .Nm ssh and .Nm sshd , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. .It Fl p Ar port Port to connect to on the remote host. .It Fl T Ar timeout Set the timeout for connection attempts. If .Ar timeout seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the last time anything was read from that host, then the connection is closed and the host in question considered unavailable. Default is 5 seconds. .It Fl t Ar type Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The possible values are .Dq rsa1 for protocol version 1 and .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 , or .Dq rsa for protocol version 2. Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. The default is to fetch .Dq rsa , .Dq ecdsa , and .Dq ed25519 keys. .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. .El .Sh SECURITY If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using .Nm without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to .Em man in the middle attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, .Nm can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created. .Sh FILES Input format: .Bd -literal 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 .Ed .Pp Output format for RSA1 keys: .Bd -literal host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus .Ed .Pp Output format for RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 keys: .Bd -literal host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key .Ed .Pp Where .Ar keytype is either .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 , .Dq ssh-ed25519 , .Dq ssh-dss or .Dq ssh-rsa . .Pp .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts .Sh EXAMPLES Print the rsa host key for machine .Ar hostname : .Bd -literal $ ssh-keyscan hostname .Ed .Pp Find all hosts from the file .Pa ssh_hosts which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file .Pa ssh_known_hosts : .Bd -literal $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \e sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts - .Ed .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit .An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm@lcs.mit.edu wrote the initial version, and .An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned@users.sourceforge.net added support for protocol version 2. .Sh BUGS It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9. This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key. Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,804 +1,847 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.101 2015/04/10 00:08:55 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.105 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "compat.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh_api.h" /* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */ int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; #define KT_RSA1 1 #define KT_DSA 2 #define KT_RSA 4 #define KT_ECDSA 8 #define KT_ED25519 16 +int get_cert = 0; int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519; int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */ #define MAXMAXFD 256 /* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */ int timeout = 5; int maxfd; #define MAXCON (maxfd - 10) extern char *__progname; fd_set *read_wait; size_t read_wait_nfdset; int ncon; struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */ /* * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n]. */ typedef struct Connection { u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */ #define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */ #define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */ #define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */ #define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */ int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */ int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */ int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */ int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */ int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */ sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */ char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */ char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */ char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */ char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */ char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */ struct ssh *c_ssh; /* SSH-connection */ struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */ TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */ } con; TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */ con *fdcon; static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key); static int fdlim_get(int hard) { #if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) return (-1); if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY) return SSH_SYSFDMAX; else return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur; #else return SSH_SYSFDMAX; #endif } static int fdlim_set(int lim) { #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; #endif if (lim <= 0) return (-1); #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) return (-1); rlfd.rlim_cur = lim; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) return (-1); #elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE) setdtablesize(lim); #endif return (0); } /* * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the * one in the GNU libc. */ static char * xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim) { char *s, *e; if (!**str) return (NULL); s = *str; e = s + strcspn(s, delim); if (*e != '\0') *e++ = '\0'; *str = e; return (s); } /* * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop. */ static char * strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim) { char *tok; do { tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim); } while (tok && *tok == '\0'); return (tok); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static struct sshkey * keygrab_ssh1(con *c) { static struct sshkey *rsa; static struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_char type; if (rsa == NULL) { if ((rsa = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); return NULL; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); } if ((r = sshbuf_put(msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7))) != 0 || /* padding */ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto buf_err; if (type != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) { error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name); sshbuf_reset(msg); return NULL; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */ /* server key */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 || /* host key */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->n)) != 0) { buf_err: error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_reset(msg); return NULL; } sshbuf_reset(msg); return (rsa); } #endif static int key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { con *c; if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL) keyprint(c, hostkey); /* always abort key exchange */ return -1; } static int ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor) { switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99) return 1; break; case 2: return 1; default: break; } return 0; } static void keygrab_ssh2(con *c) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; int r; enable_compat20(); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = - c->c_keytype == KT_DSA ? "ssh-dss" : - (c->c_keytype == KT_RSA ? "ssh-rsa" : - (c->c_keytype == KT_ED25519 ? "ssh-ed25519" : - "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521")); + switch (c->c_keytype) { + case KT_DSA: + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? + "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-dss"; + break; + case KT_RSA: + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? + "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-rsa"; + break; + case KT_ED25519: + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? + "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-ed25519"; + break; + case KT_ECDSA: + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" : + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"; + break; + default: + fatal("unknown key type %d", c->c_keytype); + break; + } if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) { free(c->c_ssh); fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); exit(1); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; # endif #endif c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper); /* * do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until * the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done. */ ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done, c->c_ssh); } static void -keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key) +keyprint_one(char *host, struct sshkey *key) { - char *host = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name; - char *hostport = NULL; + char *hostport; - if (!key) - return; if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("host_hash failed"); hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port); - fprintf(stdout, "%s ", hostport); + if (!get_cert) + fprintf(stdout, "%s ", hostport); sshkey_write(key, stdout); fputs("\n", stdout); free(hostport); } +static void +keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key) +{ + char *hosts = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name; + char *host, *ohosts; + + if (key == NULL) + return; + if (get_cert || (!hash_hosts && ssh_port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)) { + keyprint_one(hosts, key); + return; + } + ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(hosts); + while ((host = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL) + keyprint_one(host, key); + free(ohosts); +} + static int tcpconnect(char *host) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, s = -1; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (s < 0) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(s) == -1) fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s); if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 && errno != EINPROGRESS) error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno)); else break; close(s); s = -1; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); return s; } static int conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype) { char *namebase, *name, *namelist; int s; namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname); do { name = xstrsep(&namelist, ","); if (!name) { free(namebase); return (-1); } } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0); if (s >= maxfd) fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s); if (fdcon[s].c_status) fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s); + debug3("%s: oname %s kt %d", __func__, oname, keytype); fdcon[s].c_fd = s; fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON; fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase; fdcon[s].c_name = name; fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist; fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname); fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen; fdcon[s].c_len = 4; fdcon[s].c_off = 0; fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype; gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL); fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); FD_SET(s, read_wait); ncon++; return (s); } static void confree(int s) { if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED) fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s); close(s); free(fdcon[s].c_namebase); free(fdcon[s].c_output_name); if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS) free(fdcon[s].c_data); fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED; fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0; if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) { ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh); free(fdcon[s].c_ssh); fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL; } TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); FD_CLR(s, read_wait); ncon--; } static void contouch(int s) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL); fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); } static int conrecycle(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; int ret; ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype); confree(s); return (ret); } static void congreet(int s) { int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0; char buf[256], *cp; char remote_version[sizeof buf]; size_t bufsiz; con *c = &fdcon[s]; for (;;) { memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); bufsiz = sizeof(buf); cp = buf; while (bufsiz-- && (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') { if (*cp == '\r') *cp = '\n'; cp++; } if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; } if (n == 0) { switch (errno) { case EPIPE: error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name); break; case ECONNREFUSED: break; default: error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); break; } conrecycle(s); return; } if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } *cp = '\0'; if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL) fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed"); ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1); ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c); /* back link */ if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3) c->c_ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); else c->c_ssh->compat = 0; if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) { debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } } else if (remote_major != 1) { debug("%s doesn't support ssh1", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } fprintf(stderr, "# %s:%d %s\n", c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf)); n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) { error("snprintf: buffer too small"); confree(s); return; } if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) { error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { keygrab_ssh2(c); confree(s); return; } c->c_status = CS_SIZE; contouch(s); } static void conread(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; size_t n; if (c->c_status == CS_CON) { congreet(s); return; } n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off); if (n == 0) { error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } c->c_off += n; if (c->c_off == c->c_len) switch (c->c_status) { case CS_SIZE: c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen); c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7); c->c_off = 0; c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len); c->c_status = CS_KEYS; break; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case CS_KEYS: keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c)); confree(s); return; #endif default: fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status); break; } contouch(s); } static void conloop(void) { struct timeval seltime, now; fd_set *r, *e; con *c; int i; gettimeofday(&now, NULL); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec || (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) { seltime = c->c_tv; seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec; seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec; if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) { seltime.tv_usec += 1000000; seltime.tv_sec--; } } else timerclear(&seltime); r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) ; for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) { if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) { error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name); confree(i); } else if (FD_ISSET(i, r)) conread(i); } free(r); free(e); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec || (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) { int s = c->c_fd; c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link); conrecycle(s); } } static void do_host(char *host) { char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n"); int j; if (name == NULL) return; for (j = KT_RSA1; j <= KT_ED25519; j *= 2) { if (get_keytypes & j) { while (ncon >= MAXCON) conloop(); conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j); } } } void fatal(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); va_end(args); exit(255); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, - "usage: %s [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n" + "usage: %s [-46cHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n" "\t\t [host | addrlist namelist] ...\n", __progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; int opt, fopt_count = 0, j; char *tname, *cp, line[NI_MAXHOST]; FILE *fp; u_long linenum; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); TAILQ_INIT(&tq); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); if (argc <= 1) usage(); - while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "Hv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) { + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cHv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; + break; + case 'c': + get_cert = 1; break; case 'p': ssh_port = a2port(optarg); if (ssh_port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(1); } break; case 'T': timeout = convtime(optarg); if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg); usage(); } break; case 'v': if (!debug_flag) { debug_flag = 1; log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; else fatal("Too high debugging level."); break; case 'f': if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0) optarg = NULL; argv[fopt_count++] = optarg; break; case 't': get_keytypes = 0; tname = strtok(optarg, ","); while (tname) { int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); switch (type) { case KEY_RSA1: get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1; break; case KEY_DSA: get_keytypes |= KT_DSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA: get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA; break; case KEY_RSA: get_keytypes |= KT_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: fatal("unknown key type %s", tname); } tname = strtok(NULL, ","); } break; case '4': IPv4or6 = AF_INET; break; case '6': IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; break; case '?': default: usage(); } } if (optind == argc && !fopt_count) usage(); log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); maxfd = fdlim_get(1); if (maxfd < 0) fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname); if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD) maxfd = MAXMAXFD; if (MAXCON <= 0) fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname); if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0)) fdlim_set(maxfd); fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS); read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) { if (argv[j] == NULL) fp = stdin; else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); linenum = 0; while (read_keyfile_line(fp, argv[j] == NULL ? "(stdin)" : argv[j], line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { /* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL) cp = line + strlen(line) - 1; while (cp >= line) { if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') *cp-- = '\0'; else break; } /* Skip empty lines */ if (*line == '\0') continue; do_host(line); } if (ferror(fp)) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); fclose(fp); } while (optind < argc) do_host(argv[optind++]); while (ncon > 0) conloop(); return (0); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 (revision 296853) @@ -1,93 +1,93 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.14 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.15 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: December 7 2013 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $ .Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keysign .Nd ssh helper program for host-based authentication .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is used by .Xr ssh 1 to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature -required during host-based authentication with SSH protocol version 2. +required during host-based authentication. .Pp .Nm is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global client configuration file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting .Cm EnableSSHKeysign to .Dq yes . .Pp .Nm is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from .Xr ssh 1 . See .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 for more information about host-based authentication. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Controls whether .Nm is enabled. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to generate the digital signature. They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Since they are readable only by root, .Nm must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate information corresponding with the private keys above. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh HISTORY .Nm first appeared in .Ox 3.2 . .Sh AUTHORS .An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,297 +1,308 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.49 2015/07/03 03:56:25 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.52 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include +#include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "msg.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */ +extern char *__progname; + /* XXX readconf.c needs these */ uid_t original_real_uid; extern char *__progname; static int valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, u_char *data, size_t datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_char type, *pkblob; char *p; size_t blen, len; char *pkalg, *luser; int r, pktype, fail; if (ret != NULL) *ret = NULL; fail = 0; if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (len != 20 && len != 32) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; /* server user */ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* service */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* method */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* pubkey */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) fail++; else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: bad key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fail++; } else if (key->type != pktype) fail++; free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* client host name, handle trailing dot */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug2("%s: check expect chost %s got %s", __func__, host, p); if (strlen(host) != len - 1) fail++; else if (p[len - 1] != '.') fail++; else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* local user */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &luser, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, luser) != 0) fail++; free(luser); /* end of message */ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) fail++; sshbuf_free(b); debug3("%s: fail %d", __func__, fail); if (fail && key != NULL) sshkey_free(key); else if (ret != NULL) *ret = key; return (fail ? -1 : 0); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct sshbuf *b; Options options; #define NUM_KEYTYPES 4 struct sshkey *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL; struct passwd *pw; int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd; u_char *signature, *data, rver; char *host, *fp; size_t slen, dlen; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL u_int32_t rnd[256]; #endif + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0) + fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); + /* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2) exit(1); /* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */ if (fd > 2) close(fd); i = 0; /* XXX This really needs to read sshd_config for the paths */ key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); original_real_uid = getuid(); /* XXX readconf.c needs this */ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) fatal("getpwuid failed"); pw = pwcopy(pw); permanently_set_uid(pw); seed_rng(); #ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); #endif /* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */ initialize_options(&options); (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "", &options, 0); fill_default_options(&options); if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1) fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s", _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE); for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { if (key_fd[i] != -1) found = 1; } if (found == 0) fatal("could not open any host key"); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #endif found = 0; for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { keys[i] = NULL; if (key_fd[i] == -1) continue; r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, &key, NULL); close(key_fd[i]); if (r != 0) debug("parse key %d: %s", i, ssh_err(r)); else if (key != NULL) { keys[i] = key; found = 1; } } if (!found) fatal("no hostkey found"); + if (pledge("stdio dns", NULL) != 0) + fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, b) < 0) fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rver)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (rver != version) fatal("bad version: received %d, expected %d", rver, version); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&fd)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (fd < 0 || fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO) fatal("bad fd"); if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL) fatal("cannot get local name for fd"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0) fatal("not a valid request"); free(host); found = 0; for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { if (keys[i] != NULL && sshkey_equal_public(key, keys[i])) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname); fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp ? fp : ""); } - if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen, 0)) != 0) + if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen, NULL, 0)) + != 0) fatal("sshkey_sign failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); free(data); /* send reply */ sshbuf_reset(b); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, b) == -1) fatal("ssh_msg_send failed"); return (0); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,242 +1,242 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.5 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.6 2015/12/11 00:20:04 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "pathnames.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ int fd = -1; pid_t pid = -1; static void send_msg(Buffer *m) { u_char buf[4]; int mlen = buffer_len(m); put_u32(buf, mlen); if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 || atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m)) != buffer_len(m)) error("write to helper failed"); buffer_consume(m, mlen); } static int recv_msg(Buffer *m) { u_int l, len; u_char buf[1024]; if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) { error("read from helper failed: %u", len); return (0); /* XXX */ } len = get_u32(buf); if (len > 256 * 1024) fatal("response too long: %u", len); /* read len bytes into m */ buffer_clear(m); while (len > 0) { l = len; if (l > sizeof(buf)) l = sizeof(buf); if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) { error("response from helper failed."); return (0); /* XXX */ } buffer_append(m, buf, l); len -= l; } return (buffer_get_char(m)); } int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { return (0); } void pkcs11_terminate(void) { close(fd); } static int pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { Key key; u_char *blob, *signature = NULL; u_int blen, slen = 0; int ret = -1; Buffer msg; if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) return (-1); key.type = KEY_RSA; key.rsa = rsa; if (key_to_blob(&key, &blob, &blen) == 0) return -1; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST); buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); buffer_put_string(&msg, from, flen); buffer_put_int(&msg, 0); free(blob); send_msg(&msg); buffer_clear(&msg); if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { signature = buffer_get_string(&msg, &slen); if (slen <= (u_int)RSA_size(rsa)) { memcpy(to, signature, slen); ret = slen; } free(signature); } buffer_free(&msg); return (ret); } /* redirect the private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ static int wrap_key(RSA *rsa) { static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa; memcpy(&helper_rsa, RSA_get_default_method(), sizeof(helper_rsa)); helper_rsa.name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper"; helper_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt; RSA_set_method(rsa, &helper_rsa); return (0); } static int pkcs11_start_helper(void) { int pair[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) { error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { error("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } else if (pid == 0) { if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(pair[0]); close(pair[1]); execlp(_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, - (char *) 0); + (char *)NULL); fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(pair[1]); fd = pair[0]; return (0); } int pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, Key ***keysp) { Key *k; int i, nkeys; u_char *blob; u_int blen; Buffer msg; if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0) return (-1); buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin); send_msg(&msg); buffer_clear(&msg); if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { nkeys = buffer_get_int(&msg); *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(Key *)); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { blob = buffer_get_string(&msg, &blen); free(buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL)); k = key_from_blob(blob, blen); wrap_key(k->rsa); (*keysp)[i] = k; free(blob); } } else { nkeys = -1; } buffer_free(&msg); return (nkeys); } int pkcs11_del_provider(char *name) { int ret = -1; Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, ""); send_msg(&msg); buffer_clear(&msg); if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) ret = 0; buffer_free(&msg); return (ret); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,374 +1,375 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.11 2015/08/20 22:32:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.12 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ struct pkcs11_keyinfo { Key *key; char *providername; TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next; }; TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist; #define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 10240 /*XXX*/ /* helper */ #define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue); #define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp); /* input and output queue */ Buffer iqueue; Buffer oqueue; static void add_key(Key *k, char *name) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki)); ki->providername = xstrdup(name); ki->key = k; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); } static void del_keys_by_name(char *name) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt; for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next); if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); free(ki->providername); key_free(ki->key); free(ki); } } } /* lookup matching 'private' key */ static Key * lookup_key(Key *k) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) { debug("check %p %s", ki, ki->providername); if (key_equal(k, ki->key)) return (ki->key); } return (NULL); } static void send_msg(Buffer *m) { int mlen = buffer_len(m); buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen); buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen); buffer_consume(m, mlen); } static void process_add(void) { char *name, *pin; Key **keys; int i, nkeys; u_char *blob; u_int blen; Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); name = get_string(NULL); pin = get_string(NULL); if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys)) > 0) { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER); buffer_put_int(&msg, nkeys); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (key_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen) == 0) continue; buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name); free(blob); add_key(keys[i], name); } free(keys); } else { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } free(pin); free(name); send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void process_del(void) { char *name, *pin; Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); name = get_string(NULL); pin = get_string(NULL); del_keys_by_name(name); if (pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0) buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS); else buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); free(pin); free(name); send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void process_sign(void) { u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0; int ok = -1; Key *key, *found; Buffer msg; blob = get_string(&blen); data = get_string(&dlen); (void)get_int(); /* XXX ignore flags */ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) != NULL) { if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int ret; slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); signature = xmalloc(slen); if ((ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature, found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) != -1) { slen = ret; ok = 0; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } key_free(key); } buffer_init(&msg); if (ok == 0) { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE); buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen); } else { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } free(data); free(blob); free(signature); send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void process(void) { u_int msg_len; u_int buf_len; u_int consumed; u_int type; u_char *cp; buf_len = buffer_len(&iqueue); if (buf_len < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = buffer_ptr(&iqueue); msg_len = get_u32(cp); if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { error("bad message len %d", msg_len); cleanup_exit(11); } if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) return; buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4); buf_len -= 4; type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: debug("process_add"); process_add(); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: debug("process_del"); process_del(); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: debug("process_sign"); process_sign(); break; default: error("Unknown message %d", type); break; } /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ if (buf_len < buffer_len(&iqueue)) { error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); cleanup_exit(255); } consumed = buf_len - buffer_len(&iqueue); if (msg_len < consumed) { error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed); cleanup_exit(255); } if (msg_len > consumed) buffer_consume(&iqueue, msg_len - consumed); } void cleanup_exit(int i) { /* XXX */ _exit(i); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { fd_set *rset, *wset; int in, out, max, log_stderr = 0; ssize_t len, olen, set_size; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; char buf[4*4096]; extern char *__progname; + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist); pkcs11_init(0); seed_rng(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); in = STDIN_FILENO; out = STDOUT_FILENO; max = 0; if (in > max) max = in; if (out > max) max = out; buffer_init(&iqueue); buffer_init(&oqueue); set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); rset = xmalloc(set_size); wset = xmalloc(set_size); for (;;) { memset(rset, 0, set_size); memset(wset, 0, set_size); /* * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle * the worst-case length packet it can generate, * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. */ if (buffer_check_alloc(&iqueue, sizeof(buf)) && buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) FD_SET(in, rset); olen = buffer_len(&oqueue); if (olen > 0) FD_SET(out, wset); if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; error("select: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(2); } /* copy stdin to iqueue */ if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); if (len == 0) { debug("read eof"); cleanup_exit(0); } else if (len < 0) { error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } else { buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len); } } /* send oqueue to stdout */ if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen); if (len < 0) { error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } else { buffer_consume(&oqueue, len); } } /* * Process requests from client if we can fit the results * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input * and let the output queue drain. */ if (buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) process(); } } #else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern char *__progname; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); fatal("PKCS#11 support disabled at compile time"); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,693 +1,695 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.21 2015/07/18 08:02:17 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.22 2016/02/12 00:20:30 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT #include "pkcs11.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct pkcs11_slotinfo { CK_TOKEN_INFO token; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int logged_in; }; struct pkcs11_provider { char *name; void *handle; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; CK_INFO info; CK_ULONG nslots; CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; int valid; int refcount; TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; }; TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers; struct pkcs11_key { struct pkcs11_provider *provider; CK_ULONG slotidx; int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa); RSA_METHOD rsa_method; char *keyid; int keyid_len; }; int pkcs11_interactive = 0; int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { pkcs11_interactive = interactive; TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers); return (0); } /* * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable. * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { CK_RV rv; CK_ULONG i; debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid); if (!p->valid) return; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { if (p->slotinfo[i].session && (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); } if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); p->valid = 0; p->function_list = NULL; dlclose(p->handle); } /* * remove a reference to the provider. * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount); if (--p->refcount <= 0) { if (p->valid) error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p); free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } } /* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */ void pkcs11_terminate(void) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); } } /* lookup provider by name */ static struct pkcs11_provider * pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { debug("check %p %s", p, p->name); if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name)) return (p); } return (NULL); } /* unregister provider by name */ int pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); return (0); } return (-1); } /* openssl callback for freeing an RSA key */ static int pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; int rv = -1; if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) != NULL) { if (k11->orig_finish) rv = k11->orig_finish(rsa); if (k11->provider) pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); free(k11->keyid); free(k11); } return (rv); } /* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */ static int pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) { CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_ULONG nfound = 0; CK_RV rv; int ret = -1; f = p->function_list; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv); return (-1); } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || nfound != 1) { debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu", nfound, nattr, rv); } else ret = 0; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); return (ret); } /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ static int pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG tlen = 0; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE; CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 }; CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[] = { {CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(private_key_class) }, {CKA_ID, NULL, 0}, {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) } }; char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024]; int rval = -1; key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class; key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val; if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) == NULL) { error("RSA_get_app_data failed for rsa %p", rsa); return (-1); } if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for rsa %p", rsa); return (-1); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { if (!pkcs11_interactive) { error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ? " on reader keypad" : ""); return (-1); } if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad."); else { snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label); pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); if (pin == NULL) return (-1); /* bail out */ } rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); if (pin != NULL) { explicit_bzero(pin, strlen(pin)); free(pin); } if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } si->logged_in = 1; } key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len; /* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */ if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 && pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) { error("cannot find private key"); } else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv); } else { /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ tlen = RSA_size(rsa); rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen); if (rv == CKR_OK) rval = tlen; else error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); } return (rval); } static int pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return (-1); } /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ static int pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method(); k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); k11->provider = provider; provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */ k11->slotidx = slotidx; /* identify key object on smartcard */ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; - k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); - memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); + if (k11->keyid_len > 0) { + k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); + memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); + } k11->orig_finish = def->finish; memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method)); k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11"; k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt; k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt; k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish; RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method); RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11); return (0); } /* remove trailing spaces */ static void rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len) { size_t i; if (!len) return; for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--) if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ') buf[i] = '\0'; else break; } /* * open a pkcs11 session and login if required. * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use */ static int pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin) { CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int login_required; f = p->function_list; login_required = p->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; if (pin && login_required && !strlen(pin)) { error("pin required"); return (-1); } if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } if (login_required && pin) { rv = f->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin)); if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } p->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1; } p->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session; return (0); } /* * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx, * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys. * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. */ static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *, CK_ULONG, CK_ATTRIBUTE [], CK_ATTRIBUTE [3], struct sshkey ***, int *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,4, 3 * sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)))); static int pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys) { CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; CK_OBJECT_CLASS cert_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE; CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = { { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) } }; CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_filter[] = { { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(cert_class) } }; CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_attribs[] = { { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 } }; CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attribs[] = { { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 } }; pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class; cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class; if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, pubkey_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0 || pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, cert_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0) return (-1); return (0); } static int pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key) { int i; for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++) if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i])) return (1); return (0); } static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE filter[], CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[3], struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys) { struct sshkey *key; RSA *rsa; X509 *x509; EVP_PKEY *evp; int i; const u_char *cp; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG nfound; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; f = p->function_list; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; /* setup a filter the looks for public keys */ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, filter, 1)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } while (1) { /* XXX 3 attributes in attribs[] */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { attribs[i].pValue = NULL; attribs[i].ulValueLen = 0; } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || nfound == 0) break; /* found a key, so figure out size of the attributes */ if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); continue; } /* * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but * ensure that none of the others are zero length. * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. */ if (attribs[1].ulValueLen == 0 || attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0) { continue; } /* allocate buffers for attributes */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if (attribs[i].ulValueLen > 0) { attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc( attribs[i].ulValueLen); } } /* * retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key, * or ID, subject and value for certificates. */ rsa = NULL; if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); } else if (attribs[1].type == CKA_MODULUS ) { if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { error("RSA_new failed"); } else { rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue, attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL); rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue, attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL); } } else { cp = attribs[2].pValue; if ((x509 = X509_new()) == NULL) { error("X509_new failed"); } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[2].ulValueLen) == NULL) { error("d2i_X509 failed"); } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL || evp->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) { debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa"); } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(evp->pkey.rsa)) == NULL) { error("RSAPublicKey_dup"); } if (x509) X509_free(x509); } if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e && pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) { key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); key->rsa = rsa; key->type = KEY_RSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) { sshkey_free(key); } else { /* expand key array and add key */ *keysp = xreallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); } } else if (rsa) { RSA_free(rsa); } for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) free(attribs[i].pValue); } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); return (0); } /* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists */ int pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp) { int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; void *handle = NULL; CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **); CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; CK_ULONG i; *keyp = NULL; if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { error("provider already registered: %s", provider_id); goto fail; } /* open shared pkcs11-libarary */ if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); goto fail; } if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); goto fail; } p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); p->handle = handle; /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetFunctionList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } p->function_list = f; if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_Initialize failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } need_finalize = 1; if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetInfo failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID)); rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription)); debug("manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d", p->info.manufacturerID, p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, p->info.libraryDescription, p->info.libraryVersion.major, p->info.libraryVersion.minor); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } if (p->nslots == 0) { error("no slots"); goto fail; } p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); p->valid = 1; nkeys = 0; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetTokenInfo failed: %lu", rv); continue; } if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in slot %lu", __func__, (unsigned long)i); continue; } rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label)); rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID)); rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model)); rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber)); debug("label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> model <%s> serial <%s>" " flags 0x%lx", token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, token->serialNumber, token->flags); /* open session, login with pin and retrieve public keys */ if (pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0) pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys); } if (nkeys > 0) { TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ return (nkeys); } error("no keys"); /* don't add the provider, since it does not have any keys */ fail: if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); if (p) { free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } if (handle) dlclose(handle); return (-1); } #else int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { return (0); } void pkcs11_terminate(void) { return; } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,268 +1,355 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 01:32:50 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.58 2015/12/11 04:21:12 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "digest.h" static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *); +static const char * +rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg) +{ + switch (hash_alg) { + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: + return "ssh-rsa"; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: + return "rsa-sha2-256"; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: + return "rsa-sha2-512"; + } + return NULL; +} + +static int +rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(const char *ident) +{ + if (strcmp(ident, "ssh-rsa") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; + return -1; +} + +static int +rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: + return NID_sha1; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: + return NID_sha256; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: + return NID_sha512; + default: + return -1; + } +} + /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident) { - int hash_alg; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL; size_t slen; u_int dlen, len; - int nid, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; - if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) + if (alg_ident == NULL || strlen(alg_ident) == 0 || + strncmp(alg_ident, "ssh-rsa-cert", strlen("ssh-rsa-cert")) == 0) + hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + else + hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(alg_ident); + if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || + BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* hash the data */ - hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; - nid = NID_sha1; + nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg); if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (len < slen) { size_t diff = slen - len; memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); explicit_bzero(sig, diff); } else if (len > slen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* encode signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } - if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-rsa")) != 0 || + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, rsa_hash_alg_ident(hash_alg))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, slen)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); if (sig != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sig, slen); free(sig); } - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); + sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, - const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen) { char *ktype = NULL; int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t len, diff, modlen, dlen; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) + if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } - if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) { + if ((hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(ktype)) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */ modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (len > modlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; goto out; } else if (len < modlen) { diff = modlen - len; osigblob = sigblob; if ((sigblob = realloc(sigblob, modlen)) == NULL) { sigblob = osigblob; /* put it back for clear/free */ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len); explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff); len = modlen; } - hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa); out: if (sigblob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); free(sigblob); } - if (ktype != NULL) - free(ktype); - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); + free(ktype); + sshbuf_free(b); explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); return ret; } /* * See: * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn */ + /* * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ static const u_char id_sha1[] = { 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */ 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */ }; +/* + * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html + * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) + * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) + * id-sha256(1) } + */ +static const u_char id_sha256[] = { + 0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */ + 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ + 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ + 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */ + 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ + 0x04, 0x20 /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */ +}; + +/* + * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html + * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) + * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) + * id-sha256(3) } + */ +static const u_char id_sha512[] = { + 0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */ + 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ + 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ + 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */ + 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ + 0x04, 0x40 /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */ +}; + static int +rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp) +{ + switch (hash_alg) { + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: + *oidp = id_sha1; + *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1); + break; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: + *oidp = id_sha256; + *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256); + break; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: + *oidp = id_sha512; + *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512); + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + return 0; +} + +static int openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen, u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) { - size_t ret, rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; - int len, oidmatch, hashmatch; + size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; + int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch; const u_char *oid = NULL; u_char *decrypted = NULL; + if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0) + return ret; ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - switch (hash_alg) { - case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: - oid = id_sha1; - oidlen = sizeof(id_sha1); - hlen = 20; - break; - default: - goto done; - } + hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); if (hashlen != hlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } rsasize = RSA_size(rsa); if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM || siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto done; } if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto done; } oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0; hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0; if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) { ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto done; } ret = 0; done: if (decrypted) { explicit_bzero(decrypted, rsasize); free(decrypted); } return ret; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 (revision 296853) @@ -1,1700 +1,1687 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.361 2015/07/20 18:44:12 millert Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.369 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: July 20 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh .Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program) .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh .Bk -words .Op Fl 1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy .Op Fl b Ar bind_address .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec .Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl e Ar escape_char .Op Fl F Ar configfile .Op Fl I Ar pkcs11 .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl L Ar address .Op Fl l Ar login_name .Op Fl m Ar mac_spec .Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port -.Op Fl Q Cm cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key | protocol-version +.Op Fl Q Ar query_option .Op Fl R Ar address .Op Fl S Ar ctl_path .Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port .Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar hostname .Op Ar command .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. -It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, -and provide secure encrypted communications between +It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and .Ux Ns -domain sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel. .Pp .Nm connects and logs into the specified .Ar hostname (with optional .Ar user name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods -depending on the protocol version used (see below). +(see below). .Pp If .Ar command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. .Pp The options are as follows: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Fl 1 Forces .Nm to try protocol version 1 only. .Pp .It Fl 2 Forces .Nm to try protocol version 2 only. .Pp .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .Pp .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .Pp .It Fl A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's .Ux Ns -domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .Pp .It Fl a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. .Pp .It Fl b Ar bind_address Use .Ar bind_address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. .Pp .It Fl C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and .Ux Ns -domain connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by .Xr gzip 1 , and the .Dq level can be controlled by the .Cm CompressionLevel option for protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the .Cm Compression option. .Pp .It Fl c Ar cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. .Pp Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The supported values are .Dq 3des , .Dq blowfish , and .Dq des . For protocol version 2, .Ar cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order of preference. See the .Cm Ciphers keyword in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp .It Fl D Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port .Sm on .Xc Specifies a local .Dq dynamic application-level port forwarding. This works by allocating a socket to listen to .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address . Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Nm will act as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of standard error. .Pp .It Fl e Ar escape_char Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a dot .Pq Ql \&. closes the connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the character to .Dq none disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. .Pp .It Fl F Ar configfile Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config will be ignored. The default for the per-user configuration file is .Pa ~/.ssh/config . .Pp .It Fl f Requests .Nm to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if .Nm is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies .Fl n . The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like .Ic ssh -f host xterm . .Pp If the .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to .Dq yes , then a client started with .Fl f will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. .Pp .It Fl G Causes .Nm to print its configuration after evaluating .Cm Host and .Cm Match blocks and exit. .Pp .It Fl g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified on the master process. .Pp .It Fl I Ar pkcs11 Specify the PKCS#11 shared library .Nm should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. .Pp .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple .Fl i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). +If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the +.Cm CertificateFile +directive, .Nm will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to identity filenames. .Pp .It Fl K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .Pp .It Fl k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .Pp .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : remote_socket .Sm on .Xc .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Ar local_socket : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Ar local_socket : remote_socket .Sm on .Xc Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address , or to a Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to either .Ar host port .Ar hostport , or the Unix socket .Ar remote_socket , from the remote machine. .Pp Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. .Pp By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp .It Fl l Ar login_name Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .Pp .It Fl M Places the .Nm client into .Dq master mode for connection sharing. Multiple .Fl M options places .Nm into .Dq master mode with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted. Refer to the description of .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl m Ar mac_spec -Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC -(message authentication code) algorithms can -be specified in order of preference. +A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms, +specified in order of preference. See the .Cm MACs keyword for more information. .Pp .It Fl N Do not execute a remote command. -This is useful for just forwarding ports -(protocol version 2 only). +This is useful for just forwarding ports. .Pp .It Fl n Redirects stdin from .Pa /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). This must be used when .Nm is run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For example, .Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The .Nm program will be put in the background. (This does not work if .Nm needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the .Fl f option.) .Pp .It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When the .Fl O option is specified, the .Ar ctl_cmd argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: .Dq check (check that the master process is running), .Dq forward (request forwardings without command execution), .Dq cancel (cancel forwardings), .Dq exit (request the master to exit), and .Dq stop (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). .Pp .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact +.It AddKeysToAgent .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs +.It CertificateFile .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Cipher .It Ciphers .It ClearAllForwardings .It Compression .It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It DynamicForward .It EscapeChar .It ExitOnForwardFailure .It FingerprintHash .It ForwardAgent .It ForwardX11 .It ForwardX11Timeout .It ForwardX11Trusted .It GatewayPorts .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It HostName .It IdentityFile .It IdentitiesOnly .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LocalCommand .It LocalForward .It LogLevel .It MACs .It Match .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PermitLocalCommand .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyUseFdpass .It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It RemoteForward .It RequestTTY .It RhostsRSAAuthentication .It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It StreamLocalBindMask .It StreamLocalBindUnlink .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It Tunnel .It TunnelDevice .It UpdateHostKeys .It UsePrivilegedPort .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .It VersionAddendum .It VisualHostKey .It XAuthLocation .El .Pp .It Fl p Ar port Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .Pp -.It Fl Q Cm cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key | protocol-version +.It Fl Q Ar query_option Queries .Nm for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2. The available features are: .Ar cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), .Ar cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), .Ar mac (supported message integrity codes), .Ar kex (key exchange algorithms), .Ar key -(key types) and +(key types), +.Ar key-cert +(certificate key types), +.Ar key-plain +(non-certificate key types), and .Ar protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions). .Pp .It Fl q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. .Pp .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : local_socket .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Ar remote_socket : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Ar remote_socket : local_socket .Sm on .Xc Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket, on the local side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP .Ar port or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to either .Ar host port .Ar hostport , or .Ar local_socket , from the local machine. .Pp Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. .Pp By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specifying a .Ar bind_address . An empty .Ar bind_address , or the address .Ql * , indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .Pp If the .Ar port argument is .Ql 0 , the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. When used together with .Ic -O forward the allocated port will be printed to the standard output. .Pp .It Fl S Ar ctl_path Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing, or the string .Dq none to disable connection sharing. Refer to the description of .Cm ControlPath and .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. -Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use -of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg.\& +Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH +as a secure transport for other applications (e.g.\& .Xr sftp 1 ) . The subsystem is specified as the remote command. .Pp .It Fl T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. .Pp .It Fl t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple .Fl t options force tty allocation, even if .Nm has no local tty. .Pp .It Fl V Display the version number and exit. .Pp .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .Pp .It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to .Ar host on .Ar port over the secure channel. Implies .Fl N , .Fl T , .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure and .Cm ClearAllForwardings . -Works with Protocol version 2 only. .Pp .It Fl w Xo .Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Xc Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified .Xr tun 4 devices between the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Dq any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Dq any . See also the .Cm Tunnel and .Cm TunnelDevice directives in .Xr ssh_config 5 . If the .Cm Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is .Dq point-to-point . .Pp .It Fl X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. .Pp For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the .Nm .Fl Y option and the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted directive in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp .It Fl x Disables X11 forwarding. .Pp .It Fl Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. .Pp .It Fl y Send log information using the .Xr syslog 3 system module. By default this information is sent to stderr. .El .Pp .Nm may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the .Cm Protocol option in .Xr ssh_config 5 or the .Fl 1 and .Fl 2 options (see above). -Both protocols support similar authentication methods, -but protocol 2 is the default since -it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality -(the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) -and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, -hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, -umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160). -Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the -integrity of the connection. +Protocol 1 should not be used +and is only offered to support legacy devices. +It suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses +and doesn't support many of the advanced features available for protocol 2. .Pp The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, and password authentication. Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, -though protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order: -.Cm PreferredAuthentications . +though +.Cm PreferredAuthentications +can be used to change the default order. .Pp Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs in from is listed in .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv or .Pa /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files .Pa ~/.rhosts or .Pa ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login. Additionally, the server .Em must be able to verify the client's host key (see the description of .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.] .Pp Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. .Nm implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. -Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys, -but protocol 2 may use any. The HISTORY section of .Xr ssl 8 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. .Pp The file .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the .Nm program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. .Pp The user creates his/her key pair by running .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . This stores the private key in .Pa ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa -(protocol 2 DSA), +(DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa -(protocol 2 ECDSA), +(ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -(protocol 2 Ed25519), +(Ed25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa -(protocol 2 RSA) +(RSA) and stores the public key in .Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub -(protocol 2 DSA), +(DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub -(protocol 2 ECDSA), +(ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub -(protocol 2 Ed25519), +(Ed25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub -(protocol 2 RSA) +(RSA) in the user's home directory. The user should then copy the public key to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine. The .Pa authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional .Pa ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in without giving the password. .Pp A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority can be used in place of many public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of .Xr ssh-keygen 1 for more information. .Pp The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication may be with an authentication agent. See .Xr ssh-agent 1 +and (optionally) the +.Cm AddKeysToAgent +directive in +.Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an arbitrary .Qq challenge text, and prompts for a response. -Protocol 2 allows multiple challenges and responses; -protocol 1 is restricted to just one challenge/response. Examples of challenge-response authentication include .Bx Authentication (see .Xr login.conf 5 ) and PAM (some .Pf non- Ox systems). .Pp Finally, if other authentication methods fail, .Nm prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. .Pp .Nm automatically maintains and checks a database containing identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's identification ever changes, .Nm warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed. .Pp When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. .Pp If an interactive session is requested .Nm by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one. The flags .Fl T and .Fl t can be used to override this behaviour. .Pp If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape characters noted below. .Pp If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to .Dq none will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used. .Pp The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. .Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, .Nm supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character. .Pp A single tilde character can be sent as .Ic ~~ or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the .Cm EscapeChar configuration directive or on the command line by the .Fl e option. .Pp The supported escapes (assuming the default .Ql ~ ) are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm ~. Disconnect. .It Cm ~^Z Background .Nm . .It Cm ~# List forwarded connections. .It Cm ~& Background .Nm at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate. .It Cm ~? Display a list of escape characters. .It Cm ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system -(only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). +(only useful if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the .Fl L , .Fl R and .Fl D options (see above). It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with .Sm off .Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for local, .Sm off .Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for remote and .Sm off .Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for dynamic port-forwardings. .Ic !\& Ns Ar command allows the user to execute a local command if the .Ic PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Basic help is available, using the .Fl h option. .It Cm ~R Request rekeying of the connection -(only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). +(only useful if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~V Decrease the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .It Cm ~v Increase the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .El .Sh TCP FORWARDING Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail server; another is going through firewalls. .Pp In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support encrypted communications. This works as follows: the user connects to the remote host using .Nm , specifying a port to be used to forward connections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the same local port, and .Nm will encrypt and forward the connection. .Pp The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine .Dq 127.0.0.1 (localhost) to remote server .Dq server.example.com : .Bd -literal -offset 4n $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1 .Ed .Pp This tunnels a connection to IRC server .Dq server.example.com , joining channel .Dq #users , nickname .Dq pinky , using port 1234. It doesn't matter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services. .Pp The .Fl f option backgrounds .Nm and the remote command .Dq sleep 10 is specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the service which is to be tunnelled. If no connections are made within the time specified, .Nm will exit. .Sh X11 FORWARDING If the .Cm ForwardX11 variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl X , .Fl x , and .Fl Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not manually set .Ev DISPLAY . Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration files. .Pp The .Ev DISPLAY value set by .Nm will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because .Nm creates a .Dq proxy X server on the server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted channel. .Pp .Nm will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). .Pp If the .Cm ForwardAgent variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl A and .Fl a options above) and the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side. .Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .Pp If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .Fl E option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match. .Pp Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, using .Em random art . By setting the .Cm VisualHostKey option to .Dq yes , a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. .Pp To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all known hosts, the following command line can be used: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts .Pp If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. .Pp In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, .Dq host.example.com . The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for host.example.com: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. .Ed .Pp The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: .Pp .Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com .Pp Finally the client connects: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com [...] Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? .Ed .Pp See the .Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS option in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS .Nm contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using the .Xr tun 4 network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined securely. The .Xr sshd_config 5 configuration option .Cm PermitTunnel controls whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic). .Pp The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. .Pp On the client: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 .Ed .Pp On the server: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 .Ed .Pp Client access may be more finely tuned via the .Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file (see below) and the .Cm PermitRootLogin server option. The following entry would permit connections on .Xr tun 4 device 1 from user .Dq jane and on tun device 2 from user .Dq john , if .Cm PermitRootLogin is set to .Dq forced-commands-only : .Bd -literal -offset 2n tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john .Ed .Pp Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as .Xr ipsecctl 8 and .Xr isakmpd 8 . .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Nm will normally set the following environment variables: .Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" .It Ev DISPLAY The .Ev DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server. It is automatically set by .Nm to point to a value of the form .Dq hostname:n , where .Dq hostname indicates the host where the shell runs, and .Sq n is an integer \*(Ge 1. .Nm uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set .Ev DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually copy any required authorization cookies). .It Ev HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. .It Ev LOGNAME Synonym for .Ev USER ; set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. .It Ev MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. .It Ev PATH Set to the default .Ev PATH , as specified when compiling .Nm . .It Ev SSH_ASKPASS If .Nm needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If .Nm does not have a terminal associated with it but .Ev DISPLAY and .Ev SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by .Ev SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling .Nm from a .Pa .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from .Pa /dev/null to make this work.) .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the agent. .It Ev SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number, server IP address, and server port number. .It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. It can be used to extract the original arguments. .It Ev SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated with the current shell or command. If the current session has no tty, this variable is not set. .It Ev TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connections). .It Ev USER Set to the name of the user logging in. .El .Pp Additionally, .Nm reads .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , and adds lines of the format .Dq VARNAME=value to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Xr sshd 8 reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described in the .Xr sshd 8 manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see .Sx ENVIRONMENT , above. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). .Nm will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are used for host-based authentication. -If protocol version 1 is used, -.Nm -must be setuid root, since the host key is readable only by root. -For protocol version 2, -.Nm -uses -.Xr ssh-keysign 8 -to access the host keys, -eliminating the requirement that -.Nm -be setuid root when host-based authentication is used. -By default -.Nm -is not setuid root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .El .Sh EXIT STATUS .Nm exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr tun 4 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr ssh-keysign 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh STANDARDS .Rs .%A S. Lehtinen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4250 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4251 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4252 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4253 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4254 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Schlyter .%A W. Griffin .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4255 .%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints .Re .Pp .Rs .%A F. Cusack .%A M. Forssen .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4256 .%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A P. Remaker .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4335 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Bellare .%A T. Kohno .%A C. Namprempre .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4344 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes .Re .Pp .Rs .%A B. Harris .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4345 .%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Friedl .%A N. Provos .%A W. Simpson .%D March 2006 .%R RFC 4419 .%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A R. Thayer .%D November 2006 .%R RFC 4716 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format .Re .Pp .Rs .%A D. Stebila .%A J. Green .%D December 2009 .%R RFC 5656 .%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer .Re .Pp .Rs .%A A. Perrig .%A D. Song .%D 1999 .%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) .%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security .Re .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2064 +1,2128 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.420 2015/07/30 00:01:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.436 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine. * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos * in Canada (German citizen). * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "uidswap.h" -#include "roaming.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "myproposal.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif extern char *__progname; /* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE static char **saved_av; #endif /* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */ int tty_flag = 0; /* don't exec a shell */ int no_shell_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set * on the command line. */ int stdin_null_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and * a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist. */ int need_controlpersist_detach = 0; /* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */ int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty; /* * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the * background. */ int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; /* forward stdio to remote host and port */ char *stdio_forward_host = NULL; int stdio_forward_port = 0; /* * General data structure for command line options and options configurable * in configuration files. See readconf.h. */ Options options; /* optional user configfile */ char *config = NULL; /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ char *host; /* socket address the host resolves to */ struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* Private host keys. */ Sensitive sensitive_data; /* Original real UID. */ uid_t original_real_uid; uid_t original_effective_uid; /* command to be executed */ Buffer command; /* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */ int subsystem_flag = 0; /* # of replies received for global requests */ static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0; /* mux.c */ extern int muxserver_sock; extern u_int muxclient_command; /* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */ static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n" " [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]\n" -" [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]\n" -" [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]\n" -" [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n" -" [-Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key]\n" -" [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n" +" [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file] [-L address]\n" +" [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n" +" [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n" " [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command]\n" ); exit(255); } static int ssh_session(void); static int ssh_session2(void); static void load_public_identity_files(void); static void main_sigchld_handler(int); /* from muxclient.c */ void muxclient(const char *); void muxserver_listen(void); /* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */ static void tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths) { u_int i; char *cp; for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], original_real_uid); free(paths[i]); paths[i] = cp; } } /* * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen) { char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr, loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); - snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (cname != NULL) hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA)) loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) { if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) { error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", __func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *cname = '\0'; } } return res; } /* * Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address. * Returns a canonical address string. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen) { char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { debug2("%s: could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s", __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (res == NULL) { debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses", __func__, name); return NULL; } if (res->ai_next != NULL) { debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses", __func__, name); goto fail; } if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { debug("%s: Could not format address for name %.100s: %s", __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); goto fail; } if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) { error("%s: host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", __func__, name, addr, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *caddr = '\0'; fail: freeaddrinfo(res); return NULL; } return res; } /* * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname * and perform the replacement if it is. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static int check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname) { int i; struct allowed_cname *rule; if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 || strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0) return 0; if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return 0; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. */ if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return 0; debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname); for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) { rule = options.permitted_cnames + i; if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 || match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1) continue; verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname " "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname); free(*namep); *namep = xstrdup(cname); return 1; } return 0; } /* * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL * if no name was found after canonicalization. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port) { int i, ndots; char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST]; struct addrinfo *addrs; if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return NULL; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. */ if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return NULL; /* Try numeric hostnames first */ if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port, newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) { debug2("%s: hostname %.100s is address", __func__, *hostp); if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) { debug2("%s: canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__, *hostp, newname); free(*hostp); *hostp = xstrdup(newname); } return addrs; } + /* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */ + if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') { + debug3("%s: name is fully qualified", __func__); + fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp); + if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, + newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) + goto found; + free(fullhost); + goto notfound; + } + /* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */ ndots = 0; for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (*cp == '.') ndots++; } if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) { debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)", __func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots); return NULL; } /* Attempt each supplied suffix */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) { *newname = '\0'; xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp, options.canonical_domains[i]); debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__, *hostp, fullhost); if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) { free(fullhost); continue; } + found: /* Remove trailing '.' */ fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0'; /* Follow CNAME if requested */ if (!check_follow_cname(&fullhost, newname)) { debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost); } free(*hostp); *hostp = fullhost; return addrs; } + notfound: if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local) fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp); debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp); return NULL; } /* * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line. */ static void process_config_files(const char *host_arg, struct passwd *pw, int post_canon) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; int r; if (config != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 && !read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_arg, &options, SSHCONF_USERCONF | (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0))) fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: " "%.100s", config, strerror(errno)); } else { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_arg, &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF | (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0)); /* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, host, host_arg, &options, post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0); } } /* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */ static void set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port) { struct addrinfo *addr; for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) { switch (addr->ai_family) { case AF_INET: ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin_port = htons(port); break; case AF_INET6: ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin6_port = htons(port); break; } } } /* * Main program for the ssh client. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, config_test = 0; char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *host_arg, *logfile; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; - char cname[NI_MAXHOST]; + char cname[NI_MAXHOST], uidstr[32], *conn_hash_hex; struct stat st; struct passwd *pw; int timeout_ms; extern int optind, optreset; extern char *optarg; struct Forward fwd; struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; - char *conn_hash_hex; + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ /* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */ saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av)); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_av[i] = NULL; compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_av; #endif /* * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); /* * Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping * may clobber the real uid). */ original_real_uid = getuid(); original_effective_uid = geteuid(); /* * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times). */ PRIV_END; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */ if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) { struct rlimit rlim; rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } #endif /* Get user data. */ pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid); if (!pw) { logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)original_real_uid); exit(255); } /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */ pw = pwcopy(pw); /* * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we * don't set the modes explicitly. */ umask(022); /* * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been * set. */ initialize_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ host = NULL; use_syslog = 0; logfile = NULL; argv0 = av[0]; again: while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" "ACD:E:F:GI:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '1': options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; break; case '2': options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; break; case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'n': stdin_null_flag = 1; break; case 'f': fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; stdin_null_flag = 1; break; case 'x': options.forward_x11 = 0; break; case 'X': options.forward_x11 = 1; break; case 'y': use_syslog = 1; break; case 'E': - logfile = xstrdup(optarg); + logfile = optarg; break; case 'G': config_test = 1; break; case 'Y': options.forward_x11 = 1; options.forward_x11_trusted = 1; break; case 'g': options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1; break; case 'O': if (stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing " "command with -W"); else if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Multiplexing command already specified"); if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD; else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE; else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP; else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD; else fatal("Invalid multiplex command."); break; case 'P': /* deprecated */ options.use_privileged_port = 0; break; case 'Q': cp = NULL; if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1); else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0) cp = mac_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0) cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) cp = key_alg_list(0, 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) cp = key_alg_list(1, 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0) cp = key_alg_list(0, 1); else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 cp = xstrdup("1\n2"); #else cp = xstrdup("2"); #endif } if (cp == NULL) fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); printf("%s\n", cp); free(cp); exit(0); break; case 'a': options.forward_agent = 0; break; case 'A': options.forward_agent = 1; break; case 'k': options.gss_deleg_creds = 0; break; case 'K': options.gss_authentication = 1; options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; break; case 'i': - if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) { + p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, original_real_uid); + if (stat(p, &st) < 0) fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " - "not accessible: %s.\n", optarg, + "not accessible: %s.\n", p, strerror(errno)); - break; - } - add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1); + else + add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1); + free(p); break; case 'I': #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + free(options.pkcs11_provider); options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg); #else fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n"); #endif break; case 't': if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES) options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE; else options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES; break; case 'v': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else { if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) options.log_level++; } break; case 'V': if (options.version_addendum && *options.version_addendum != '\0') fprintf(stderr, "%s %s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, options.version_addendum, OPENSSL_VERSION); else fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION); if (opt == 'V') exit(0); break; case 'w': if (options.tun_open == -1) options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT; options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote); if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'W': if (stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("stdio forward already specified"); if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O"); if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host; stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port; free(fwd.connect_host); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; no_shell_flag = 1; options.clear_forwardings = 1; options.exit_on_forward_failure = 1; break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'e': if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 && (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) optarg[1] < 128) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31; else if (strlen(optarg) == 1) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0]; else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0) options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'c': if (ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' ? optarg + 1 : optarg)) { /* SSH2 only */ + free(options.ciphers); options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_INVALID; break; } /* SSH1 only */ options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg); if (options.cipher == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES) options.ciphers = xstrdup("3des-cbc"); else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH) options.ciphers = xstrdup("blowfish-cbc"); else options.ciphers = xstrdup(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT); break; case 'm': - if (mac_valid(optarg)) + if (mac_valid(optarg)) { + free(options.macs); options.macs = xstrdup(optarg); - else { + } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'M': if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES) options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK; else options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES; break; case 'p': options.port = a2port(optarg); if (options.port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'l': options.user = optarg; break; case 'L': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0)) add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'R': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1)) { add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad remote forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'D': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'C': options.compression = 1; break; case 'N': no_shell_flag = 1; options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'T': options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_config_line(&options, pw, host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line, "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0) exit(255); free(line); break; case 's': subsystem_flag = 1; break; case 'S': - if (options.control_path != NULL) - free(options.control_path); + free(options.control_path); options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'b': options.bind_address = optarg; break; case 'F': config = optarg; break; default: usage(); } } ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && !host) { if (strrchr(*av, '@')) { p = xstrdup(*av); cp = strrchr(p, '@'); if (cp == NULL || cp == p) usage(); options.user = p; *cp = '\0'; host = xstrdup(++cp); } else host = xstrdup(*av); if (ac > 1) { optind = optreset = 1; goto again; } ac--, av++; } /* Check that we got a host name. */ if (!host) usage(); host_arg = xstrdup(host); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); #endif /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ buffer_init(&command); /* * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command. */ if (!ac) { /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */ if (subsystem_flag) { fprintf(stderr, "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n"); usage(); } } else { /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) { if (i) buffer_append(&command, " ", 1); buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i])); } } /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 && !no_shell_flag) fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command " "to execute."); /* * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E. */ if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL) fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E"); - if (logfile != NULL) { + if (logfile != NULL) log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); - free(logfile); - } log_init(argv0, options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog); if (debug_flag) /* version_addendum is always NULL at this point */ logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION); /* Parse the configuration files */ process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0); /* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */ fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options); /* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */ if (options.hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */ cp = percent_expand(options.hostname, "h", host, (char *)NULL); free(host); host = cp; free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); } /* If canonicalization requested then try to apply it */ lowercase(host); if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port); /* * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed * as a result of CNAME following. * * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules. * * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via * CanonicalizeHostname=always */ if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) || options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) { if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command), cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) { /* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */ if (option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command)) cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */ } else check_follow_cname(&host, cname); } /* * If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration * files as new stanzas may match. */ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0) { debug("Re-reading configuration after hostname " "canonicalisation"); free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1); /* * Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation * enabled and the port number may have changed since, so * reset it in address list */ if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0) set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port); } /* Fill configuration defaults. */ fill_default_options(&options); if (options.port == 0) options.port = default_ssh_port(); channel_set_af(options.address_family); /* Tidy and check options */ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) lowercase(options.host_key_alias); if (options.proxy_command != NULL && strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 && options.proxy_use_fdpass) fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible"); if (options.control_persist && options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist; " "disabling"); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } + if (options.connection_attempts <= 0) + fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts"); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (original_effective_uid != 0) options.use_privileged_port = 0; #endif /* reinit */ log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog); if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) tty_flag = 1; /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */ if (buffer_len(&command) == 0) tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO; /* Force no tty */ if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO || muxclient_command != 0) tty_flag = 0; /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */ if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) { if (tty_flag) logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because " "stdin is not a terminal."); tty_flag = 0; } seed_rng(); if (options.user == NULL) options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port); + snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%d", pw->pw_uid); /* Find canonic host name. */ if (strchr(host, '.') == 0) { struct addrinfo hints; struct addrinfo *ai = NULL; int errgai; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family; hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai); if (errgai == 0) { if (ai->ai_canonname != NULL) host = xstrdup(ai->ai_canonname); freeaddrinfo(ai); } } if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, options.user, strlen(options.user)) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0) fatal("%s: mux digest failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); conn_hash_hex = tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); if (options.local_command != NULL) { debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); cp = options.local_command; options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, "C", conn_hash_hex, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "p", portstr, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); free(cp); } if (options.control_path != NULL) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, original_real_uid); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "C", conn_hash_hex, "L", shorthost, "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "p", portstr, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, + "i", uidstr, (char *)NULL); free(cp); } free(conn_hash_hex); if (config_test) { dump_client_config(&options, host); exit(0); } if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL) fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command"); if (options.control_path != NULL) muxclient(options.control_path); /* * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now. */ if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) { + debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port); if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */ } timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive, options.use_privileged_port) != 0) exit(255); if (addrs != NULL) freeaddrinfo(addrs); packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval, options.server_alive_count_max); if (timeout_ms > 0) debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms); /* * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra * privileges, because the file is only readable by root. * If we cannot access the private keys, load the public keys * instead and try to execute the ssh-keysign helper instead. */ sensitive_data.nkeys = 0; sensitive_data.keys = NULL; sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0; if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication || options.hostbased_authentication) { sensitive_data.nkeys = 9; sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys, sizeof(Key)); for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; PRIV_START; +#if WITH_SSH1 sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); +#endif #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ECDSA, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); #endif sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ED25519, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_RSA, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_DSA, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ECDSA, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); #endif sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ED25519, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); PRIV_END; if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 && sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[5] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[6] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[7] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[8] == NULL) { #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE); #endif sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE); sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE); sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, NULL); #endif sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL); sensitive_data.external_keysign = 1; } } /* * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no * longer need them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard * to read identity files and other non-world-readable files from the * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where * root is mapped to nobody. */ if (original_effective_uid == 0) { PRIV_START; permanently_set_uid(pw); } /* * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh * directory if it doesn't already exist. */ if (config == NULL) { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0) { #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf); #endif if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0) error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL); #endif } } /* load options.identity_files */ load_public_identity_files(); /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */ tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */ ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, options.port, pw, timeout_ms); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port()); } else { verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host); } /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) { if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) { /* Destroys contents safely */ debug3("clear hostkey %d", i); key_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]); sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; } } free(sensitive_data.keys); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { free(options.identity_files[i]); options.identity_files[i] = NULL; if (options.identity_keys[i]) { key_free(options.identity_keys[i]); options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; } } + for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { + free(options.certificate_files[i]); + options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; + } exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session(); packet_close(); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */ ssh_kill_proxy_command(); return exit_status; } static void control_persist_detach(void) { pid_t pid; int devnull; debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__); /* * master (current process) into the background, and make the * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); case 0: /* Child: master process continues mainloop */ break; default: /* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */ debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid); stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag; options.request_tty = orequest_tty; tty_flag = otty_flag; close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; muxclient(options.control_path); /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */ fatal("Failed to connect to new control master"); } if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } else { if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } daemon(1, 1); setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path); } /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */ static void fork_postauth(void) { if (need_controlpersist_detach) control_persist_detach(); debug("forking to background"); fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; if (daemon(1, 1) < 0) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); } /* Callback for remote forward global requests */ static void ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt; /* XXX verbose() on failure? */ debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d", type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path : rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "", (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) { if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int(); logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1); } } if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } else { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } } if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) { debug("All remote forwarding requests processed"); if (fork_after_authentication_flag) fork_postauth(); } } static void client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(int id, void *arg) { debug("stdio forwarding: done"); cleanup_exit(0); } static void ssh_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) { if (!success) fatal("stdio forwarding failed"); } static void ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(void) { Channel *c; int in, out; if (stdio_forward_host == NULL) return; if (!compat20) fatal("stdio forwarding require Protocol 2"); debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, stdio_forward_host, stdio_forward_port); if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) < 0 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0) fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed"); if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(stdio_forward_host, stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__); channel_register_cleanup(c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); } static void ssh_init_forwarding(void) { int success = 0; int i; /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote " "address %.200s:%d", (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : options.local_forwards[i].listen_host, options.local_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].connect_path : options.local_forwards[i].connect_host, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port); success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener( &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts); } if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request local forwarding."); if (i > 0 && success == 0) error("Could not request local forwarding."); /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to " "local address %.200s:%d", (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host, options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path : options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host, options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port); options.remote_forwards[i].handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding( &options.remote_forwards[i]); if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request remote forwarding."); else logit("Warning: Could not request remote " "forwarding."); } else { client_register_global_confirm(ssh_confirm_remote_forward, &options.remote_forwards[i]); } } /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { if (client_request_tun_fwd(options.tun_open, options.tun_local, options.tun_remote) == -1) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); else error("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); } } } static void check_agent_present(void) { int r; if (options.forward_agent) { /* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) { options.forward_agent = 0; if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); } } } static int ssh_session(void) { int type; int interactive = 0; int have_tty = 0; struct winsize ws; char *cp; const char *display; + char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; /* Enable compression if requested. */ if (options.compression) { debug("Requesting compression at level %d.", options.compression_level); if (options.compression_level < 1 || options.compression_level > 9) fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to " "9 (slow, best)."); /* Send the request. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION); packet_put_int(options.compression_level); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) packet_start_compression(options.compression_level); else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) logit("Warning: Remote host refused compression."); else packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for " "compression response."); } /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */ if (tty_flag) { debug("Requesting pty."); /* Start the packet. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY); /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the length of the string. */ cp = getenv("TERM"); if (!cp) cp = ""; packet_put_cstring(cp); /* Store window size in the packet. */ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); /* Store tty modes in the packet. */ tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL); /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Read response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { interactive = 1; have_tty = 1; } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) logit("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to " "allocate a pseudo tty."); else packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty " "request response."); } /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); - if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { - char *proto, *data; - /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ - client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, - options.forward_x11_trusted, - options.forward_x11_timeout, - &proto, &data); + if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display, + options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, + options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto, data, 0); /* Read response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { interactive = 1; } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { logit("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding."); } else { packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 " "forwarding"); } } /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */ check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); auth_request_forwarding(); /* Read response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); packet_check_eom(); if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) logit("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding."); } /* Initiate port forwardings. */ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); ssh_init_forwarding(); /* Execute a local command */ if (options.local_command != NULL && options.permit_local_command) ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); /* * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " "confirmation received"); } else fork_postauth(); } /* * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell. */ if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) { int len = buffer_len(&command); if (len > 900) len = 900; debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command)); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } else { debug("Requesting shell."); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } /* Enter the interactive session. */ return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0); } /* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */ static void ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg) { extern char **environ; const char *display; int interactive = tty_flag; + char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; if (!success) return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); - if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { - char *proto, *data; - /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ - client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, - options.forward_x11_trusted, - options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data); + if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display, + options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, + options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data, 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ interactive = 1; } check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); packet_send(); } /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); client_session2_setup(id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"), NULL, fileno(stdin), &command, environ); } /* open new channel for a session */ static int ssh_session2_open(void) { Channel *c; int window, packetmax, in, out, err; if (stdin_null_flag) { in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); } else { in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); } out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0) fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(in)) set_nonblock(in); if (!isatty(out)) set_nonblock(out); if (!isatty(err)) set_nonblock(err); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (tty_flag) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } c = channel_new( "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self); channel_send_open(c->self); if (!no_shell_flag) channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, ssh_session2_setup, NULL); return c->self; } static int ssh_session2(void) { int id = -1; /* XXX should be pre-session */ if (!options.control_persist) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); ssh_init_forwarding(); /* Start listening for multiplex clients */ muxserver_listen(); /* * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground * client attach as a control slave. * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until * after the connection is fully established (in particular, * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure). */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) { ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag; ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag; orequest_tty = options.request_tty; otty_flag = tty_flag; stdin_null_flag = 1; no_shell_flag = 1; tty_flag = 0; if (!fork_after_authentication_flag) need_controlpersist_detach = 1; fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; } /* * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier. */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN)) id = ssh_session2_open(); else { packet_set_interactive( options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); } /* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO && (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) { debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(0); packet_send(); } /* Execute a local command */ if (options.local_command != NULL && options.permit_local_command) ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); /* * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " "confirmation received"); } else fork_postauth(); } return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); } +/* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */ static void load_public_identity_files(void) { char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST]; char *pwdir = NULL, *pwname = NULL; - int i = 0; Key *public; struct passwd *pw; - u_int n_ids; + int i; + u_int n_ids, n_certs; char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 Key **keys; int nkeys; #endif /* PKCS11 */ - n_ids = 0; + n_ids = n_certs = 0; memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys)); + memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files)); + memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates)); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, &keys)) > 0) { for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { key_free(keys[i]); continue; } identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */ n_ids++; } free(keys); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed"); pwname = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); pwdir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("load_public_identity_files: gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { free(options.identity_files[i]); + options.identity_files[i] = NULL; continue; } cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], original_real_uid); filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pwdir, "u", pwname, "l", thishost, "h", host, "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); free(cp); public = key_load_public(filename, NULL); debug("identity file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); free(options.identity_files[i]); identity_files[n_ids] = filename; identity_keys[n_ids] = public; if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) continue; - /* Try to add the certificate variant too */ + /* + * If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try + * to add the default certificate variant too. + */ + if (options.num_certificate_files != 0) + continue; xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename); public = key_load_public(cp, NULL); debug("identity file %s type %d", cp, public ? public->type : -1); if (public == NULL) { free(cp); continue; } if (!key_is_cert(public)) { debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate", __func__, cp, key_type(public)); key_free(public); free(cp); continue; } identity_keys[n_ids] = public; - /* point to the original path, most likely the private key */ - identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename); + identity_files[n_ids] = cp; n_ids++; } + + if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) + fatal("%s: too many certificates", __func__); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { + cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i], + original_real_uid); + filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pwdir, + "u", pwname, "l", thishost, "h", host, + "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); + free(cp); + + public = key_load_public(filename, NULL); + debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename, + public ? public->type : -1); + free(options.certificate_files[i]); + options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; + if (public == NULL) { + free(filename); + continue; + } + if (!key_is_cert(public)) { + debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate", + __func__, filename, key_type(public)); + key_free(public); + free(filename); + continue; + } + certificate_files[n_certs] = filename; + certificates[n_certs] = public; + ++n_certs; + } + options.num_identity_files = n_ids; memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files)); memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys)); + + options.num_certificate_files = n_certs; + memcpy(options.certificate_files, + certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files)); + memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates)); explicit_bzero(pwname, strlen(pwname)); free(pwname); explicit_bzero(pwdir, strlen(pwdir)); free(pwdir); } static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) ; signal(sig, main_sigchld_handler); errno = save_errno; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,99 +1,105 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.81 2015/08/04 05:23:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.83 2015/12/11 03:19:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */ #define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER SSH_CIPHER_3DES /* Default port number. */ #define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22 /* + * Maximum number of certificate files that can be specified + * in configuration files or on the command line. + */ +#define SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES 100 + +/* * Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified * in configuration files or on the command line. */ #define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100 /* * Maximum length of lines in authorized_keys file. * Current value permits 16kbit RSA and RSA1 keys and 8kbit DSA keys, with * some room for options and comments. */ -#define SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES 8192 +#define SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES 16384 /* * Major protocol version. Different version indicates major incompatibility * that prevents communication. * * Minor protocol version. Different version indicates minor incompatibility * that does not prevent interoperation. */ #define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1 #define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5 /* We support both SSH1 and SSH2 */ #define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2 #define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0 /* * Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the * default port if present. */ #define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh" /* * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the * authentication agent. */ #define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME "SSH_AGENT_PID" /* * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the * authentication socket. */ #define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" /* * Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass */ #define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS" /* * Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this * many bits. This is to make double encryption with rsaref work. */ #define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED 128 /* * Length of the session key in bytes. (Specified as 256 bits in the * protocol.) */ #define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32 /* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */ #define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE -2 /* * unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes; * sshd will change its privileges to this user and its * primary group. */ #ifndef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER #define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd" #endif /* Minimum modulus size (n) for RSA keys. */ #define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 768 /* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */ #define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG 128 Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,176 +1,170 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.15 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.17 2016/01/14 16:17:40 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt * * Transport layer protocol: * * 1-19 Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug, * etc) * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for * different authentication methods) * * User authentication protocol: * * 50-59 User authentication generic * 60-79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused * for different authentication methods) * * Connection protocol: * * 80-89 Connection protocol generic * 90-127 Channel related messages * * Reserved for client protocols: * * 128-191 Reserved * * Local extensions: * * 192-255 Local extensions */ /* ranges */ #define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN 1 #define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX 49 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN 50 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX 79 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN 60 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX #define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN 80 #define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX 127 #define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MIN 128 #define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MAX 191 #define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN 192 #define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MAX 255 #define SSH2_MSG_MIN 1 #define SSH2_MSG_MAX 255 /* transport layer: generic */ #define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 #define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 #define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 #define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 #define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 +#define SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO 7 /* transport layer: alg negotiation */ #define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 #define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */ #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 #define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* dh-group-exchange */ #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD 30 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 34 /* ecdh */ #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT 30 #define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY 31 /* user authentication: generic */ #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */ #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 #define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* connection protocol: generic */ #define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 #define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* channel related messages */ #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 #define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* disconnect reason code */ #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 #define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* misc */ #define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 #define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 #define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 #define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 #define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 - -/* kex messages for resume@appgate.com */ -#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_RESUME 30 -#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_REQUIRED 31 -#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH 32 -#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_OK 33 -#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_FAIL 34 /* Certificate types for OpenSSH certificate keys extension */ #define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER 1 #define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2 Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_api.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_api.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_api.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,537 +1,537 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.4 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.5 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include "ssh1.h" /* For SSH_MSG_NONE */ #include "ssh_api.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "version.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include int _ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *); int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *, char **); int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *, char **); int _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *); int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *_ssh_host_public_key(int, int, struct ssh *); struct sshkey *_ssh_host_private_key(int, int, struct ssh *); -int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, - size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, u_int); +int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, + u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); /* * stubs for the server side implementation of kex. * disable privsep so our stubs will never be called. */ int use_privsep = 0; int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *, - u_char *, u_int, u_int); + u_char *, u_int, char *, u_int); DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); /* Define these two variables here so that they are part of the library */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, - u_char *data, u_int datalen, u_int compat) + u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *alg, u_int compat) { return (-1); } DH * mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) { return (NULL); } /* API */ int ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; struct ssh *ssh; char **proposal; static int called; int r; if (!called) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ called = 1; } if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (is_server) ssh_packet_set_server(ssh); /* Initialize key exchange */ proposal = kex_params ? kex_params->proposal : myproposal; if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0) { ssh_free(ssh); return r; } ssh->kex->server = is_server; if (is_server) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key; ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key; ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign; } else { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key; } *sshp = ssh; return 0; } void ssh_free(struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; ssh_packet_close(ssh); /* * we've only created the public keys variants in case we * are a acting as a server. */ while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->public_keys)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->public_keys, k, next); if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->server) sshkey_free(k->key); free(k); } while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->private_keys)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->private_keys, k, next); free(k); } if (ssh->kex) kex_free(ssh->kex); free(ssh); } void ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *ssh, void *app_data) { ssh->app_data = app_data; } void * ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->app_data; } /* Returns < 0 on error, 0 otherwise */ int ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key) { struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL; struct key_entry *k = NULL, *k_prv = NULL; int r; if (ssh->kex->server) { if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0) return r; if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL || (k_prv = malloc(sizeof(*k_prv))) == NULL) { free(k); sshkey_free(pubkey); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } k_prv->key = key; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->private_keys, k_prv, next); /* add the public key, too */ k->key = pubkey; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next); r = 0; } else { if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; k->key = key; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next); r = 0; } return r; } int ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh, int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *)) { if (cb == NULL || ssh->kex == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ssh->kex->verify_host_key = cb; return 0; } int ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), data, len); } int ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep) { int r; u_int32_t seqnr; u_char type; /* * Try to read a packet. Return SSH_MSG_NONE if no packet or not * enough data. */ *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; if (ssh->kex->client_version_string == NULL || ssh->kex->server_version_string == NULL) return _ssh_exchange_banner(ssh); /* * If we enough data and a dispatch function then * call the function and get the next packet. * Otherwise return the packet type to the caller so it * can decide how to go on. * * We will only call the dispatch function for: * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for * different authentication methods) */ for (;;) { if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, &type, &seqnr)) != 0) return r; if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && type >= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX && ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) { if ((r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh)) != 0) return r; } else { *typep = type; return 0; } } } const u_char * ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp) { return sshpkt_ptr(ssh, lenp); } int ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, size_t len) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, data, len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; return 0; } const u_char * ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len) { struct sshbuf *output = ssh_packet_get_output(ssh); *len = sshbuf_len(output); return sshbuf_ptr(output); } int ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len) { return sshbuf_consume(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len); } int ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len) { return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len)); } int ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len) { return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), len)); } /* Read other side's version identification. */ int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, char **bannerp) { struct sshbuf *input; const char *s; char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ const char *mismatch = "Protocol mismatch.\r\n"; int r, remote_major, remote_minor; size_t i, n, j, len; *bannerp = NULL; input = ssh_packet_get_input(ssh); len = sshbuf_len(input); s = (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(input); for (j = n = 0;;) { for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (j >= len) return (0); buf[i] = s[j++]; if (buf[i] == '\r') { buf[i] = '\n'; buf[i + 1] = 0; continue; /**XXX wait for \n */ } if (buf[i] == '\n') { buf[i + 1] = 0; break; } } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf); if (ssh->kex->server || ++n > 65536) { if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), mismatch, strlen(mismatch))) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION; } } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, j)) != 0) return r; /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99) { remote_major = 2; remote_minor = 0; } if (remote_major != 2) return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH; enable_compat20(); chop(buf); debug("Remote version string %.100s", buf); if ((*bannerp = strdup(buf)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, char **bannerp) { char buf[256]; int r; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION); if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), buf, strlen(buf))) != 0) return r; chop(buf); debug("Local version string %.100s", buf); if ((*bannerp = strdup(buf)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } int _ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; /* * if _ssh_read_banner() cannot parse a full version string * it will return NULL and we end up calling it again. */ r = 0; if (kex->server) { if (kex->server_version_string == NULL) r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, &kex->server_version_string); if (r == 0 && kex->server_version_string != NULL && kex->client_version_string == NULL) r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, &kex->client_version_string); } else { if (kex->server_version_string == NULL) r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, &kex->server_version_string); if (r == 0 && kex->server_version_string != NULL && kex->client_version_string == NULL) r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, &kex->client_version_string); } if (r != 0) return r; /* start initial kex as soon as we have exchanged the banners */ if (kex->server_version_string != NULL && kex->client_version_string != NULL) { if ((r = _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(ssh)) != 0 || (r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } struct sshkey * _ssh_host_public_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type); TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) { debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key)); if (k->key->type == type && (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid)) return (k->key); } return (NULL); } struct sshkey * _ssh_host_private_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type); TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->private_keys, next) { debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key)); if (k->key->type == type && (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid)) return (k->key); } return (NULL); } int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; debug3("%s: need %s", __func__, sshkey_type(hostkey)); TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) { debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key)); if (sshkey_equal_public(hostkey, k->key)) return (0); /* ok */ } return (-1); /* failed */ } /* offer hostkey algorithms in kexinit depending on registered keys */ int _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *ssh) { struct key_entry *k; char *orig, *avail, *oavail = NULL, *alg, *replace = NULL; char **proposal; size_t maxlen; int ktype, r; /* XXX we de-serialize ssh->kex->my, modify it, and change it */ if ((r = kex_buf2prop(ssh->kex->my, NULL, &proposal)) != 0) return r; orig = proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; if ((oavail = avail = strdup(orig)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; if ((replace = calloc(1, maxlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } *replace = '\0'; while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') { if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) continue; TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) { if (k->key->type == ktype || (sshkey_is_cert(k->key) && k->key->type == sshkey_type_plain(ktype))) { if (*replace != '\0') strlcat(replace, ",", maxlen); strlcat(replace, alg, maxlen); break; } } } if (*replace != '\0') { debug2("%s: orig/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, orig); debug2("%s: replace/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, replace); free(orig); proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = replace; replace = NULL; /* owned by proposal */ r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal); } out: free(oavail); free(replace); kex_prop_free(proposal); return r; } int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey, - u_char **signature, size_t *slen, - const u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int compat) + u_char **signature, size_t *slen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, + const char *alg, u_int compat) { - return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen, compat); + return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen, alg, compat); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_config =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_config (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_config (revision 296853) @@ -1,51 +1,53 @@ -# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.28 2013/09/16 11:35:43 sthen Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.30 2016/02/20 23:06:23 sobrado Exp $ # $FreeBSD$ # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See # ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for # users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files # or on the command line. # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the # ssh_config(5) man page. # Host * # ForwardAgent no # ForwardX11 no # RhostsRSAAuthentication no # RSAAuthentication yes # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no # BatchMode no # CheckHostIP no # AddressFamily any # ConnectTimeout 0 # StrictHostKeyChecking ask # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 # Port 22 -# Protocol 2,1 +# Protocol 2 # Cipher 3des # Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc # MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160 # EscapeChar ~ # Tunnel no # TunnelDevice any:any # PermitLocalCommand no # VisualHostKey no # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com # RekeyLimit 1G 1h # VerifyHostKeyDNS yes -# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20160125 +# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20160310 Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 (revision 296853) @@ -1,1744 +1,1819 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.215 2015/08/14 15:32:41 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.228 2016/02/20 23:01:46 sobrado Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 14 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 20 2016 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh_config .Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ~/.ssh/config .Nm /etc/ssh/ssh_config .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr ssh 1 obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: .Pp .Bl -enum -offset indent -compact .It command-line options .It user's configuration file .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config .It system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config .El .Pp For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections separated by .Dq Host specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions.) .Pp Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. .Pp The configuration file has the following format: .Pp Empty lines and lines starting with .Ql # are comments. Otherwise a line is of the format .Dq keyword arguments . Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one .Ql = ; the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying configuration options using the .Nm ssh , .Nm scp , and .Nm sftp .Fl o option. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single .Ql * as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is usually the .Ar hostname argument given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions.) .Pp A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . If a negated entry is matched, then the .Cm Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard matches. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .It Cm Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the .Cm Match keyword are satisfied. -Match conditions are specified using one or more critera +Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria or the single token .Cm all which always matches. The available criteria keywords are: .Cm canonical , .Cm exec , .Cm host , .Cm originalhost , .Cm user , and .Cm localuser . The .Cm all criteria must appear alone or immediately after .Cm canonical . Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but .Cm all and .Cm canonical require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . .Pp The .Cm canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option.) This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host names only. The .Cm exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. The following character sequences in the command will be expanded prior to execution: .Ql %L will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, .Ql %l will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), .Ql %h will be substituted by the target host name, .Ql %n will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command-line, .Ql %p the destination port, .Ql %r by the remote login username, and .Ql %u by the username of the user running .Xr ssh 1 . .Pp The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the .Sx PATTERNS section. The criteria for the .Cm host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the .Cm Hostname or .Cm CanonicalizeHostname options. The .Cm originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line. The .Cm user keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. The .Cm localuser keyword matches against the name of the local user running .Xr ssh 1 (this keyword may be useful in system-wide .Nm files). +.It Cm AddKeysToAgent +Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +If this option is set to +.Dq yes +and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to +the agent with the default lifetime, as if by +.Xr ssh-add 1 . +If this option is set to +.Dq ask , +.Nm ssh +will require confirmation using the +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +program before adding a key (see +.Xr ssh-add 1 +for details). +If this option is set to +.Dq confirm , +each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the +.Fl c +option was specified to +.Xr ssh-add 1 . +If this option is set to +.Dq no , +no keys are added to the agent. +The argument must be +.Dq yes , +.Dq confirm , +.Dq ask , +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid arguments are .Dq any , .Dq inet (use IPv4 only), or .Dq inet6 (use IPv6 only). +The default is +.Dq any . .It Cm BatchMode If set to .Dq yes , passphrase/password querying will be disabled. This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present to supply the password. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm BindAddress Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. Note that this option does not work if .Cm UsePrivilegedPort is set to .Dq yes . .It Cm CanonicalDomains When .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified destination host. .It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. The default, .Dq yes , will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search rules. A value of .Dq no will cause .Xr ssh 1 to fail instantly if .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by .Cm CanonicalDomains . .It Cm CanonicalizeHostname Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. The default, .Dq no , is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to .Dq yes then, for connections that do not use a .Cm ProxyCommand , .Xr ssh 1 will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line using the .Cm CanonicalDomains suffixes and .Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is set to .Dq always , then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. .Pp If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching .Cm Host and .Cm Match stanzas. .It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before canonicalization is disabled. The default, .Dq 1 , allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). .It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more arguments of .Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list , where .Ar source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, and .Ar target_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to. .Pp For example, .Dq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com will allow hostnames matching .Dq *.a.example.com to be canonicalized to names in the .Dq *.b.example.com or .Dq *.c.example.com domains. +.It Cm CertificateFile +Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. +A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order +to use this certificate either +from an +.Cm IdentityFile +directive or +.Fl i +flag to +.Xr ssh 1 , +via +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +or via a +.Cm PKCS11Provider . +.Pp +The file name may use the tilde +syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following +escape characters: +.Ql %d +(local user's home directory), +.Ql %u +(local user name), +.Ql %l +(local host name), +.Ql %h +(remote host name) or +.Ql %r +(remote user name). +.Pp +It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in +configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence. +Multiple +.Cm CertificateFile +directives will add to the list of certificates used for +authentication. .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm CheckHostIP If this flag is set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 will additionally check the host IP address in the .Pa known_hosts file. This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add addresses of destination hosts to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the process, regardless of the setting of .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking . If the option is set to .Dq no , the check will not be executed. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in protocol version 1. Currently, .Dq blowfish , .Dq 3des , and .Dq des are supported. .Ar des is only supported in the .Xr ssh 1 client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do not support the .Ar 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is .Dq 3des . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It 3des-cbc .It aes128-cbc .It aes192-cbc .It aes256-cbc .It aes128-ctr .It aes192-ctr .It aes256-ctr .It aes128-gcm@openssh.com .It aes256-gcm@openssh.com .It arcfour .It arcfour128 .It arcfour256 .It blowfish-cbc .It cast128-cbc .It chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, -arcfour256,arcfour128, -aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc, -aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour +aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,3des-cbc .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq cipher . .It Cm ClearAllForwardings Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings specified in the configuration files or on the command line be cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the .Xr ssh 1 command line to clear port forwardings set in configuration files, and is automatically set by .Xr scp 1 and .Xr sftp 1 . The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm Compression Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm CompressionLevel Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled. The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best). The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. The meaning of the values is the same as in .Xr gzip 1 . Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. .It Cm ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable, not when it refuses the connection. .It Cm ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the .Cm ControlPath argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same .Cm ControlPath with .Cm ControlMaster set to .Dq no (the default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. .Pp Setting this to .Dq ask will cause ssh to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using .Xr ssh-askpass 1 . If the .Cm ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance. .Pp X11 and .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. .Pp Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already exist. These options are: .Dq auto and .Dq autoask . The latter requires confirmation like the .Dq ask option. .It Cm ControlPath Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described in the .Cm ControlMaster section above or the string .Dq none to disable connection sharing. In the path, .Ql %L will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, .Ql %l will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), .Ql %h will be substituted by the target host name, .Ql %n will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command line, .Ql %p the destination port, .Ql %r by the remote login username, .Ql %u -by the username of the user running -.Xr ssh 1 , and +by the username and +.Ql %i +by the numeric user ID (uid) of the user running +.Xr ssh 1 , +and .Ql \&%C by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r. It is recommended that any .Cm ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. .It Cm ControlPersist When used in conjunction with .Cm ControlMaster , specifies that the master connection should remain open in the background (waiting for future client connections) after the initial client connection has been closed. If set to .Dq no , then the master connection will not be placed into the background, and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to .Dq yes or .Dq 0 , then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the .Xr ssh 1 .Dq Fl O No exit option). If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in .Xr sshd_config 5 , then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the specified time. .It Cm DynamicForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port . .Sm on IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Xr ssh 1 will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. .It Cm EnableSSHKeysign Setting this option to .Dq yes in the global client configuration file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program .Xr ssh-keysign 8 during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See .Xr ssh-keysign 8 for more information. .It Cm EscapeChar Sets the escape character (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character, .Ql ^ followed by a letter, or .Dq none to disable the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary data). .It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested -dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings. +dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\& +if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port). +Note that +.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure +does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not, +for example, cause +.Xr ssh 1 +to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Cm ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Cm ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and .Ev DISPLAY set. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. .It Cm ForwardX11Timeout Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . X11 connections received by .Xr ssh 1 after this time will be refused. The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has elapsed. .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to .Dq yes , remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq no , remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the .Xr xauth 1 token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time. .Pp The default is .Dq no . .Pp See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. By default, .Xr ssh 1 binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Dq no . -Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is .Dq no . -Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 should hash host names and addresses when they are added to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts . These hashed names may be used normally by .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. The default is .Dq no . Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . -This option applies to protocol version 2 only and -is similar to -.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication . .It Cm HostbasedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ssh-ed25519, ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .Ed .Pp The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported key types. .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms -Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms +Specifies the host key algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ssh-ed25519, ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .Ed .Pp If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified to prefer their algorithms. .Pp The list of available key types may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq key . .It Cm HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. .It Cm HostName Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. If the hostname contains the character sequence .Ql %h , then this will be replaced with the host name specified on the command line (this is useful for manipulating unqualified names). The character sequence .Ql %% will be replaced by a single .Ql % character, which may be used when specifying IPv6 link-local addresses. .Pp The default is the name given on the command line. Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in .Cm HostName specifications). .It Cm IdentitiesOnly Specifies that .Xr ssh 1 -should only use the authentication identity files configured in the +should only use the authentication identity and certificate files explicitly +configured in the .Nm -files, +files +or passed on the +.Xr ssh 1 +command-line, even if .Xr ssh-agent 1 or a .Cm PKCS11Provider offers more identities. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless .Cm IdentitiesOnly is set. +If no certificates have been explicitly specified by +.Cm CertificateFile , .Xr ssh 1 will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to the path of a specified .Cm IdentityFile . .Pp The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following escape characters: .Ql %d (local user's home directory), .Ql %u (local user name), .Ql %l (local host name), .Ql %h (remote host name) or .Ql %r (remote user name). .Pp It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence. Multiple .Cm IdentityFile directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other configuration directives). .Pp .Cm IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with .Cm IdentitiesOnly to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. +.Cm IdentityFile +may also be used in conjunction with +.Cm CertificateFile +in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with +the identity. .It Cm IgnoreUnknown Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to suppress errors if .Nm contains options that are unrecognised by .Xr ssh 1 . It is recommended that .Cm IgnoreUnknown be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied to unknown options that appear before it. .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are .Dq af11 , .Dq af12 , .Dq af13 , .Dq af21 , .Dq af22 , .Dq af23 , .Dq af31 , .Dq af32 , .Dq af33 , .Dq af41 , .Dq af42 , .Dq af43 , .Dq cs0 , .Dq cs1 , .Dq cs2 , .Dq cs3 , .Dq cs4 , .Dq cs5 , .Dq cs6 , .Dq cs7 , .Dq ef , .Dq lowdelay , .Dq throughput , .Dq reliability , or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Dq lowdelay for interactive sessions and .Dq throughput for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. The default is to use the server specified list. The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. For an OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: .Dq bsdauth , .Dq pam , and .Dq skey . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq kex . .It Cm LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. The following escape character substitutions will be performed: .Ql %d (local user's home directory), .Ql %h (remote host name), .Ql %l (local host name), .Ql %n (host name as provided on the command line), .Ql %p (remote port), .Ql %r (remote user name) or .Ql %u (local user name) or .Ql \&%C by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r. .Pp The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the session of the .Xr ssh 1 that spawned it. It should not be used for interactive commands. .Pp This directive is ignored unless .Cm PermitLocalCommand has been enabled. .It Cm LocalForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. The first argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on and the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport . IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr ssh 1 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. .It Cm MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. -The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 -for data integrity protection. +The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Dq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, +hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, -hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512, -hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, -hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com, -hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com, -hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160, -hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 +hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq mac . .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines. In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys. However, this option disables host authentication for localhost. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is to check the host key for localhost. .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PermitLocalCommand Allow local command execution via the .Ic LocalCommand option or using the .Ic !\& Ns Ar command escape sequence in .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PKCS11Provider Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library .Xr ssh 1 should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. .It Cm Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. .It Cm PreferredAuthentications -Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2 -authentication methods. +Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\& .Cm keyboard-interactive ) over another method (e.g.\& .Cm password ) . The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password .Ed .It Cm Protocol Specifies the protocol versions .Xr ssh 1 should support in order of preference. The possible values are .Sq 1 and .Sq 2 . Multiple versions must be comma-separated. When this option is set to .Dq 2,1 .Nm ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if version 2 is not available. The default is .Sq 2 . +Protocol 1 suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and should +not be used. +It is only offered to support legacy devices. .It Cm ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed using the user's shell .Ql exec directive to avoid a lingering shell process. .Pp In the command string, any occurrence of .Ql %h will be substituted by the host name to connect, .Ql %p by the port, and .Ql %r by the remote user name. The command can be basically anything, and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an .Xr sshd 8 server running on some machine, or execute .Ic sshd -i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting the command to .Dq none disables this option entirely. Note that .Cm CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. .Pp This directive is useful in conjunction with .Xr nc 1 and its proxy support. For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p .Ed .It Cm ProxyUseFdpass Specifies that .Cm ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor back to .Xr ssh 1 instead of continuing to execute and pass data. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ssh-ed25519, ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .Ed .Pp The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported key types. .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . -This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Dq default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. -This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine. The first argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on and the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport . IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. .Pp If the .Ar port argument is .Ql 0 , the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. .Pp If the .Ar bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. If the .Ar bind_address is .Ql * or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .It Cm RequestTTY Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The argument may be one of: .Dq no (never request a TTY), .Dq yes (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), .Dq force (always request a TTY) or .Dq auto (request a TTY when opening a login session). This option mirrors the .Fl t and .Fl T flags for .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm RevokedHostKeys Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host authentication. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires .Xr ssh 1 to be setuid root. .It Cm RSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . RSA authentication will only be attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is running. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local .Xr environ 7 should be sent to the server. -Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note that the .Ev TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. Refer to .Cm AcceptEnv in .Xr sshd_config 5 for how to configure the server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm SendEnv directives. The default is not to send any environment variables. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .It Cm ServerAliveCountMax Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be sent without .Xr ssh 1 receiving any messages back from the server. If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive (below). The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. .Pp The default value is 3. If, for example, .Cm ServerAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15 and .Cm ServerAliveCountMax is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. -This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm ServerAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the server, .Xr ssh 1 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. -This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 will never automatically add host keys to the .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be annoying when the .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If this flag is set to .Dq no , ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files. If this flag is set to .Dq ask , new host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq no , or .Dq ask . The default is .Dq ask . .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. .Pp The default is .Dq yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Dq no . .It Cm Tunnel Request .Xr tun 4 device forwarding between the client and the server. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq point-to-point (layer 3), .Dq ethernet (layer 2), or .Dq no . Specifying .Dq yes requests the default tunnel mode, which is .Dq point-to-point . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm TunnelDevice Specifies the .Xr tun 4 devices to open on the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun . .Sm on The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Dq any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Dq any . The default is .Dq any:any . .It Cm UpdateHostKeys Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has completed and add them to .Cm UserKnownHostsFile . The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq no (the default) or .Dq ask . Enabling this option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones are removed. Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the -host was already trusted or explicity accepted by the user. +host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user. If .Cm UpdateHostKeys is set to .Dq ask , then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is currently incompatible with .Cm ControlPersist , and will be disabled if it is enabled. .Pp Presently, only .Xr sshd 8 from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the .Dq hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys. .It Cm UsePrivilegedPort Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . If set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 must be setuid root. Note that this option must be set to .Dq yes for .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication with older servers. .It Cm User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the command line. .It Cm UserKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 . .It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource records. If this option is set to .Dq yes , the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to .Dq ask . If this option is set to .Dq ask , information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm new host keys according to the .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq no , or .Dq ask . The default is .Dq yes if compiled with LDNS and .Dq no otherwise. -Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .Pp See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm VersionAddendum Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify OS- or site-specific modifications. The default is -.Dq FreeBSD-20160125 . +.Dq FreeBSD-20160310 . The value .Dq none may be used to disable this. .It Cm VisualHostKey If this flag is set to .Dq yes , an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this flag is set to .Dq no , no fingerprint strings are printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program. The default is .Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth . .El .Sh PATTERNS A .Em pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, .Sq * (a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or .Sq ?\& (a wildcard that matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the .Dq .co.uk set of domains, the following pattern could be used: .Pp .Dl Host *.co.uk .Pp The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: .Pp .Dl Host 192.168.0.? .Pp A .Em pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization except from the .Dq dialup pool, the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&" .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. This file must be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,925 +1,931 @@ /* * Namespace munging inspired by an equivalent hack in NetBSD's tree: add * the "Fssh_" prefix to every symbol in libssh which doesn't already have * it. This prevents collisions between symbols in libssh and symbols in * other libraries or applications which link with libssh, either directly * or indirectly (e.g. through PAM loading pam_ssh). * * A list of symbols which need munging is obtained as follows: * - # nm libprivatessh.a | LC_ALL=C awk ' + # nm libssh.a | LC_ALL=C awk ' /^[0-9a-z]+ [Tt] [A-Za-z_][0-9A-Za-z_]*$/ && $3 !~ /^Fssh_/ { printf("#define %-39s Fssh_%s\n", $3, $3) }' | unexpand -a | LC_ALL=C sort -u * * $FreeBSD$ */ #define Blowfish_decipher Fssh_Blowfish_decipher #define Blowfish_encipher Fssh_Blowfish_encipher #define Blowfish_expand0state Fssh_Blowfish_expand0state #define Blowfish_expandstate Fssh_Blowfish_expandstate #define Blowfish_initstate Fssh_Blowfish_initstate #define Blowfish_stream2word Fssh_Blowfish_stream2word +#define _ssh__compat_glob Fssh__ssh__compat_glob +#define _ssh__compat_globfree Fssh__ssh__compat_globfree #define _ssh_compat_realpath Fssh__ssh_compat_realpath #define _ssh_exchange_banner Fssh__ssh_exchange_banner #define _ssh_host_key_sign Fssh__ssh_host_key_sign #define _ssh_host_private_key Fssh__ssh_host_private_key #define _ssh_host_public_key Fssh__ssh_host_public_key #define _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs Fssh__ssh_order_hostkeyalgs #define _ssh_read_banner Fssh__ssh_read_banner #define _ssh_send_banner Fssh__ssh_send_banner #define _ssh_verify_host_key Fssh__ssh_verify_host_key #define a2port Fssh_a2port #define a2tun Fssh_a2tun #define add_host_to_hostfile Fssh_add_host_to_hostfile #define add_p1p1 Fssh_add_p1p1 #define addargs Fssh_addargs #define addr_match_cidr_list Fssh_addr_match_cidr_list #define addr_match_list Fssh_addr_match_list #define addr_netmatch Fssh_addr_netmatch #define addr_pton Fssh_addr_pton #define addr_pton_cidr Fssh_addr_pton_cidr #define ask_permission Fssh_ask_permission #define atomicio Fssh_atomicio #define atomicio6 Fssh_atomicio6 #define atomiciov Fssh_atomiciov #define atomiciov6 Fssh_atomiciov6 #define auth_request_forwarding Fssh_auth_request_forwarding #define bandwidth_limit Fssh_bandwidth_limit #define bandwidth_limit_init Fssh_bandwidth_limit_init #define barrett_reduce Fssh_barrett_reduce #define bcrypt_hash Fssh_bcrypt_hash #define bcrypt_pbkdf Fssh_bcrypt_pbkdf #define bf_ssh1_cipher Fssh_bf_ssh1_cipher #define bitmap_clear_bit Fssh_bitmap_clear_bit #define bitmap_free Fssh_bitmap_free #define bitmap_from_string Fssh_bitmap_from_string #define bitmap_nbits Fssh_bitmap_nbits #define bitmap_nbytes Fssh_bitmap_nbytes #define bitmap_new Fssh_bitmap_new #define bitmap_set_bit Fssh_bitmap_set_bit #define bitmap_test_bit Fssh_bitmap_test_bit #define bitmap_to_string Fssh_bitmap_to_string #define bitmap_zero Fssh_bitmap_zero #define blf_cbc_decrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_decrypt #define blf_cbc_encrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_encrypt #define blf_dec Fssh_blf_dec #define blf_ecb_decrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_decrypt #define blf_ecb_encrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_encrypt #define blf_enc Fssh_blf_enc #define blf_key Fssh_blf_key #define buffer_append Fssh_buffer_append #define buffer_append_space Fssh_buffer_append_space #define buffer_check_alloc Fssh_buffer_check_alloc #define buffer_consume Fssh_buffer_consume #define buffer_consume_end Fssh_buffer_consume_end #define buffer_consume_end_ret Fssh_buffer_consume_end_ret #define buffer_consume_ret Fssh_buffer_consume_ret #define buffer_get Fssh_buffer_get #define buffer_get_bignum Fssh_buffer_get_bignum #define buffer_get_bignum2 Fssh_buffer_get_bignum2 #define buffer_get_bignum2_ret Fssh_buffer_get_bignum2_ret #define buffer_get_bignum_ret Fssh_buffer_get_bignum_ret #define buffer_get_char Fssh_buffer_get_char #define buffer_get_char_ret Fssh_buffer_get_char_ret #define buffer_get_cstring Fssh_buffer_get_cstring #define buffer_get_cstring_ret Fssh_buffer_get_cstring_ret #define buffer_get_ecpoint Fssh_buffer_get_ecpoint #define buffer_get_ecpoint_ret Fssh_buffer_get_ecpoint_ret #define buffer_get_int Fssh_buffer_get_int #define buffer_get_int64 Fssh_buffer_get_int64 #define buffer_get_int64_ret Fssh_buffer_get_int64_ret #define buffer_get_int_ret Fssh_buffer_get_int_ret #define buffer_get_ret Fssh_buffer_get_ret #define buffer_get_short Fssh_buffer_get_short #define buffer_get_short_ret Fssh_buffer_get_short_ret #define buffer_get_string Fssh_buffer_get_string #define buffer_get_string_ptr Fssh_buffer_get_string_ptr #define buffer_get_string_ptr_ret Fssh_buffer_get_string_ptr_ret #define buffer_get_string_ret Fssh_buffer_get_string_ret #define buffer_put_bignum Fssh_buffer_put_bignum #define buffer_put_bignum2 Fssh_buffer_put_bignum2 #define buffer_put_bignum2_from_string Fssh_buffer_put_bignum2_from_string #define buffer_put_bignum2_ret Fssh_buffer_put_bignum2_ret #define buffer_put_bignum_ret Fssh_buffer_put_bignum_ret #define buffer_put_char Fssh_buffer_put_char #define buffer_put_cstring Fssh_buffer_put_cstring #define buffer_put_ecpoint Fssh_buffer_put_ecpoint #define buffer_put_ecpoint_ret Fssh_buffer_put_ecpoint_ret #define buffer_put_int Fssh_buffer_put_int #define buffer_put_int64 Fssh_buffer_put_int64 #define buffer_put_short Fssh_buffer_put_short #define buffer_put_string Fssh_buffer_put_string #define cert_free Fssh_cert_free #define cert_new Fssh_cert_new #define chacha_encrypt_bytes Fssh_chacha_encrypt_bytes #define chacha_ivsetup Fssh_chacha_ivsetup #define chacha_keysetup Fssh_chacha_keysetup #define chachapoly_crypt Fssh_chachapoly_crypt #define chachapoly_get_length Fssh_chachapoly_get_length #define chachapoly_init Fssh_chachapoly_init #define chan_ibuf_empty Fssh_chan_ibuf_empty #define chan_is_dead Fssh_chan_is_dead #define chan_mark_dead Fssh_chan_mark_dead #define chan_obuf_empty Fssh_chan_obuf_empty #define chan_rcvd_eow Fssh_chan_rcvd_eow #define chan_rcvd_ieof Fssh_chan_rcvd_ieof #define chan_rcvd_oclose Fssh_chan_rcvd_oclose #define chan_read_failed Fssh_chan_read_failed #define chan_send_eof2 Fssh_chan_send_eof2 #define chan_send_ieof1 Fssh_chan_send_ieof1 #define chan_send_oclose1 Fssh_chan_send_oclose1 #define chan_shutdown_read Fssh_chan_shutdown_read #define chan_shutdown_write Fssh_chan_shutdown_write #define chan_write_failed Fssh_chan_write_failed #define channel_add_adm_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_add_adm_permitted_opens #define channel_add_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_add_permitted_opens #define channel_after_select Fssh_channel_after_select #define channel_by_id Fssh_channel_by_id #define channel_cancel_cleanup Fssh_channel_cancel_cleanup #define channel_cancel_lport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_lport_listener #define channel_cancel_rport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_rport_listener #define channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens #define channel_clear_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_clear_permitted_opens #define channel_close_all Fssh_channel_close_all #define channel_close_fd Fssh_channel_close_fd #define channel_close_fds Fssh_channel_close_fds #define channel_connect_by_listen_address Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_address #define channel_connect_by_listen_path Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_path #define channel_connect_stdio_fwd Fssh_channel_connect_stdio_fwd #define channel_connect_to_path Fssh_channel_connect_to_path #define channel_connect_to_port Fssh_channel_connect_to_port #define channel_disable_adm_local_opens Fssh_channel_disable_adm_local_opens #define channel_find_open Fssh_channel_find_open #define channel_free Fssh_channel_free #define channel_free_all Fssh_channel_free_all #define channel_fwd_bind_addr Fssh_channel_fwd_bind_addr #define channel_handler Fssh_channel_handler #define channel_input_close Fssh_channel_input_close #define channel_input_close_confirmation Fssh_channel_input_close_confirmation #define channel_input_data Fssh_channel_input_data #define channel_input_extended_data Fssh_channel_input_extended_data #define channel_input_ieof Fssh_channel_input_ieof #define channel_input_oclose Fssh_channel_input_oclose #define channel_input_open_confirmation Fssh_channel_input_open_confirmation #define channel_input_open_failure Fssh_channel_input_open_failure #define channel_input_port_forward_request Fssh_channel_input_port_forward_request #define channel_input_port_open Fssh_channel_input_port_open #define channel_input_status_confirm Fssh_channel_input_status_confirm #define channel_input_window_adjust Fssh_channel_input_window_adjust #define channel_lookup Fssh_channel_lookup #define channel_new Fssh_channel_new #define channel_not_very_much_buffered_data Fssh_channel_not_very_much_buffered_data #define channel_open_message Fssh_channel_open_message #define channel_output_poll Fssh_channel_output_poll #define channel_permit_all_opens Fssh_channel_permit_all_opens #define channel_post_auth_listener Fssh_channel_post_auth_listener #define channel_post_connecting Fssh_channel_post_connecting #define channel_post_mux_client Fssh_channel_post_mux_client #define channel_post_mux_listener Fssh_channel_post_mux_listener #define channel_post_open Fssh_channel_post_open #define channel_post_output_drain_13 Fssh_channel_post_output_drain_13 #define channel_post_port_listener Fssh_channel_post_port_listener #define channel_post_x11_listener Fssh_channel_post_x11_listener #define channel_pre_connecting Fssh_channel_pre_connecting #define channel_pre_dynamic Fssh_channel_pre_dynamic #define channel_pre_input_draining Fssh_channel_pre_input_draining #define channel_pre_listener Fssh_channel_pre_listener #define channel_pre_mux_client Fssh_channel_pre_mux_client #define channel_pre_open Fssh_channel_pre_open #define channel_pre_open_13 Fssh_channel_pre_open_13 #define channel_pre_output_draining Fssh_channel_pre_output_draining #define channel_pre_x11_open Fssh_channel_pre_x11_open #define channel_pre_x11_open_13 Fssh_channel_pre_x11_open_13 #define channel_prepare_select Fssh_channel_prepare_select #define channel_print_adm_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_print_adm_permitted_opens #define channel_register_cleanup Fssh_channel_register_cleanup #define channel_register_fds Fssh_channel_register_fds #define channel_register_filter Fssh_channel_register_filter #define channel_register_open_confirm Fssh_channel_register_open_confirm #define channel_register_status_confirm Fssh_channel_register_status_confirm #define channel_request_remote_forwarding Fssh_channel_request_remote_forwarding #define channel_request_rforward_cancel Fssh_channel_request_rforward_cancel #define channel_request_start Fssh_channel_request_start #define channel_send_open Fssh_channel_send_open #define channel_send_window_changes Fssh_channel_send_window_changes #define channel_set_af Fssh_channel_set_af #define channel_set_fds Fssh_channel_set_fds #define channel_set_x11_refuse_time Fssh_channel_set_x11_refuse_time #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip #define channel_setup_local_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_local_fwd_listener #define channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener #define channel_still_open Fssh_channel_still_open #define channel_stop_listening Fssh_channel_stop_listening #define channel_update_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_update_permitted_opens #define check_crc Fssh_check_crc #define check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type Fssh_check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type #define check_key_in_hostkeys Fssh_check_key_in_hostkeys #define choose_dh Fssh_choose_dh #define choose_t Fssh_choose_t #define chop Fssh_chop #define cipher_alg_list Fssh_cipher_alg_list #define cipher_authlen Fssh_cipher_authlen #define cipher_blocksize Fssh_cipher_blocksize #define cipher_by_name Fssh_cipher_by_name #define cipher_by_number Fssh_cipher_by_number #define cipher_cleanup Fssh_cipher_cleanup #define cipher_crypt Fssh_cipher_crypt #define cipher_get_keycontext Fssh_cipher_get_keycontext #define cipher_get_keyiv Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv #define cipher_get_keyiv_len Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv_len #define cipher_get_length Fssh_cipher_get_length #define cipher_get_number Fssh_cipher_get_number #define cipher_init Fssh_cipher_init #define cipher_is_cbc Fssh_cipher_is_cbc #define cipher_ivlen Fssh_cipher_ivlen #define cipher_keylen Fssh_cipher_keylen #define cipher_mask_ssh1 Fssh_cipher_mask_ssh1 #define cipher_name Fssh_cipher_name #define cipher_number Fssh_cipher_number #define cipher_seclen Fssh_cipher_seclen #define cipher_set_key_string Fssh_cipher_set_key_string #define cipher_set_keycontext Fssh_cipher_set_keycontext #define cipher_set_keyiv Fssh_cipher_set_keyiv #define cipher_warning_message Fssh_cipher_warning_message #define ciphers_valid Fssh_ciphers_valid #define cleanhostname Fssh_cleanhostname #define cleanup_exit Fssh_cleanup_exit #define clear_cached_addr Fssh_clear_cached_addr #define colon Fssh_colon #define compare Fssh_compare #define compare_gps Fssh_compare_gps #define compat_cipher_proposal Fssh_compat_cipher_proposal #define compat_datafellows Fssh_compat_datafellows #define compat_kex_proposal Fssh_compat_kex_proposal #define compat_pkalg_proposal Fssh_compat_pkalg_proposal #define compress_buffer Fssh_compress_buffer #define connect_next Fssh_connect_next #define connect_to Fssh_connect_to #define convtime Fssh_convtime #define crypto_hash_sha512 Fssh_crypto_hash_sha512 #define crypto_hashblocks_sha512 Fssh_crypto_hashblocks_sha512 #define crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 Fssh_crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 #define crypto_sign_ed25519 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair #define crypto_sign_ed25519_open Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_open #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime #define crypto_verify_32 Fssh_crypto_verify_32 #define dbl_p1p1 Fssh_dbl_p1p1 #define deattack_init Fssh_deattack_init #define debug Fssh_debug #define debug2 Fssh_debug2 #define debug3 Fssh_debug3 #define deny_input_open Fssh_deny_input_open #define derive_ssh1_session_id Fssh_derive_ssh1_session_id #define detect_attack Fssh_detect_attack #define dh_estimate Fssh_dh_estimate #define dh_gen_key Fssh_dh_gen_key #define dh_new_group Fssh_dh_new_group #define dh_new_group1 Fssh_dh_new_group1 #define dh_new_group14 Fssh_dh_new_group14 #define dh_new_group_asc Fssh_dh_new_group_asc #define dh_new_group_fallback Fssh_dh_new_group_fallback #define dh_pub_is_valid Fssh_dh_pub_is_valid #define dispatch_protocol_error Fssh_dispatch_protocol_error #define dispatch_protocol_ignore Fssh_dispatch_protocol_ignore #define dns_read_key Fssh_dns_read_key #define do_log Fssh_do_log #define do_log2 Fssh_do_log2 #define dump_base64 Fssh_dump_base64 #define enable_compat13 Fssh_enable_compat13 #define enable_compat20 Fssh_enable_compat20 #define error Fssh_error #define evp_ssh1_3des Fssh_evp_ssh1_3des #define evp_ssh1_bf Fssh_evp_ssh1_bf #define explicit_bzero Fssh_explicit_bzero #define export_dns_rr Fssh_export_dns_rr #define fatal Fssh_fatal #define filter_proposal Fssh_filter_proposal #define fingerprint_b64 Fssh_fingerprint_b64 #define fingerprint_hex Fssh_fingerprint_hex #define fmt_scaled Fssh_fmt_scaled #define free_hostkeys Fssh_free_hostkeys #define freeargs Fssh_freeargs #define freerrset Fssh_freerrset #define gen_candidates Fssh_gen_candidates #define get_canonical_hostname Fssh_get_canonical_hostname #define get_local_ipaddr Fssh_get_local_ipaddr #define get_local_name Fssh_get_local_name #define get_local_port Fssh_get_local_port #define get_peer_ipaddr Fssh_get_peer_ipaddr #define get_peer_port Fssh_get_peer_port #define get_remote_ipaddr Fssh_get_remote_ipaddr #define get_remote_name_or_ip Fssh_get_remote_name_or_ip #define get_remote_port Fssh_get_remote_port #define get_sock_port Fssh_get_sock_port #define get_socket_address Fssh_get_socket_address #define get_u16 Fssh_get_u16 #define get_u32 Fssh_get_u32 #define get_u32_le Fssh_get_u32_le #define get_u64 Fssh_get_u64 #define getrrsetbyname Fssh_getrrsetbyname -#define glob Fssh_glob #define glob0 Fssh_glob0 #define glob2 Fssh_glob2 #define globexp1 Fssh_globexp1 #define globextend Fssh_globextend -#define globfree Fssh_globfree #define host_delete Fssh_host_delete #define host_hash Fssh_host_hash #define hostfile_read_key Fssh_hostfile_read_key #define hostfile_replace_entries Fssh_hostfile_replace_entries #define hostkeys_foreach Fssh_hostkeys_foreach #define hpdelim Fssh_hpdelim #define init_hostkeys Fssh_init_hostkeys #define input_kex_c25519_init Fssh_input_kex_c25519_init #define input_kex_c25519_reply Fssh_input_kex_c25519_reply #define input_kex_dh Fssh_input_kex_dh #define input_kex_dh_gex_group Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_group #define input_kex_dh_gex_init Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_init #define input_kex_dh_gex_reply Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_reply #define input_kex_dh_gex_request Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_request #define input_kex_dh_init Fssh_input_kex_dh_init #define input_kex_ecdh_init Fssh_input_kex_ecdh_init #define input_kex_ecdh_reply Fssh_input_kex_ecdh_reply #define iptos2str Fssh_iptos2str #define ipv64_normalise_mapped Fssh_ipv64_normalise_mapped #define is_key_revoked Fssh_is_key_revoked #define kex_alg_list Fssh_kex_alg_list #define kex_assemble_names Fssh_kex_assemble_names #define kex_buf2prop Fssh_kex_buf2prop #define kex_c25519_hash Fssh_kex_c25519_hash #define kex_derive_keys Fssh_kex_derive_keys #define kex_derive_keys_bn Fssh_kex_derive_keys_bn #define kex_dh_hash Fssh_kex_dh_hash #define kex_ecdh_hash Fssh_kex_ecdh_hash #define kex_free Fssh_kex_free #define kex_free_newkeys Fssh_kex_free_newkeys +#define kex_input_ext_info Fssh_kex_input_ext_info #define kex_input_kexinit Fssh_kex_input_kexinit #define kex_input_newkeys Fssh_kex_input_newkeys #define kex_names_cat Fssh_kex_names_cat #define kex_names_valid Fssh_kex_names_valid #define kex_new Fssh_kex_new #define kex_prop2buf Fssh_kex_prop2buf #define kex_prop_free Fssh_kex_prop_free #define kex_protocol_error Fssh_kex_protocol_error #define kex_send_kexinit Fssh_kex_send_kexinit #define kex_send_newkeys Fssh_kex_send_newkeys #define kex_setup Fssh_kex_setup +#define kex_start_rekex Fssh_kex_start_rekex #define kexc25519_client Fssh_kexc25519_client #define kexc25519_keygen Fssh_kexc25519_keygen #define kexc25519_server Fssh_kexc25519_server #define kexc25519_shared_key Fssh_kexc25519_shared_key #define kexdh_client Fssh_kexdh_client #define kexdh_server Fssh_kexdh_server #define kexecdh_client Fssh_kexecdh_client #define kexecdh_server Fssh_kexecdh_server #define kexgex_client Fssh_kexgex_client #define kexgex_hash Fssh_kexgex_hash #define kexgex_server Fssh_kexgex_server #define key_add_private Fssh_key_add_private #define key_alg_list Fssh_key_alg_list #define key_cert_check_authority Fssh_key_cert_check_authority #define key_cert_copy Fssh_key_cert_copy #define key_certify Fssh_key_certify #define key_demote Fssh_key_demote #define key_drop_cert Fssh_key_drop_cert #define key_ec_validate_private Fssh_key_ec_validate_private #define key_ec_validate_public Fssh_key_ec_validate_public #define key_from_blob Fssh_key_from_blob #define key_from_private Fssh_key_from_private #define key_generate Fssh_key_generate #define key_load_cert Fssh_key_load_cert #define key_load_file Fssh_key_load_file #define key_load_private Fssh_key_load_private #define key_load_private_cert Fssh_key_load_private_cert #define key_load_private_type Fssh_key_load_private_type #define key_load_public Fssh_key_load_public #define key_new_private Fssh_key_new_private #define key_perm_ok Fssh_key_perm_ok #define key_private_deserialize Fssh_key_private_deserialize #define key_private_serialize Fssh_key_private_serialize #define key_read Fssh_key_read #define key_save_private Fssh_key_save_private #define key_sign Fssh_key_sign #define key_to_blob Fssh_key_to_blob #define key_to_certified Fssh_key_to_certified #define key_verify Fssh_key_verify #define key_write Fssh_key_write #define load_hostkeys Fssh_load_hostkeys #define log_change_level Fssh_log_change_level #define log_facility_name Fssh_log_facility_name #define log_facility_number Fssh_log_facility_number #define log_init Fssh_log_init #define log_is_on_stderr Fssh_log_is_on_stderr #define log_level_name Fssh_log_level_name #define log_level_number Fssh_log_level_number #define log_redirect_stderr_to Fssh_log_redirect_stderr_to #define logit Fssh_logit #define lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type Fssh_lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type #define lowercase Fssh_lowercase #define mac_alg_list Fssh_mac_alg_list #define mac_clear Fssh_mac_clear #define mac_compute Fssh_mac_compute #define mac_init Fssh_mac_init #define mac_setup Fssh_mac_setup #define mac_valid Fssh_mac_valid #define match Fssh_match #define match_host_and_ip Fssh_match_host_and_ip #define match_hostname Fssh_match_hostname #define match_list Fssh_match_list #define match_maybe_hashed Fssh_match_maybe_hashed #define match_pattern Fssh_match_pattern #define match_pattern_list Fssh_match_pattern_list #define match_user Fssh_match_user #define mktemp_proto Fssh_mktemp_proto #define mm_choose_dh Fssh_mm_choose_dh #define mm_receive_fd Fssh_mm_receive_fd #define mm_send_fd Fssh_mm_send_fd #define mm_sshkey_sign Fssh_mm_sshkey_sign #define monotime Fssh_monotime #define ms_subtract_diff Fssh_ms_subtract_diff #define ms_to_timeval Fssh_ms_to_timeval #define mult Fssh_mult #define mysignal Fssh_mysignal #define newkeys_from_blob Fssh_newkeys_from_blob #define newkeys_to_blob Fssh_newkeys_to_blob #define nh_aux Fssh_nh_aux #define nh_final Fssh_nh_final #define nh_update Fssh_nh_update -#define packet_backup_state Fssh_packet_backup_state #define packet_close Fssh_packet_close #define packet_disconnect Fssh_packet_disconnect #define packet_get_char Fssh_packet_get_char #define packet_get_int Fssh_packet_get_int #define packet_process_incoming Fssh_packet_process_incoming #define packet_read_expect Fssh_packet_read_expect #define packet_read_poll_seqnr Fssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr #define packet_read_seqnr Fssh_packet_read_seqnr -#define packet_restore_state Fssh_packet_restore_state #define packet_send_debug Fssh_packet_send_debug #define packet_set_connection Fssh_packet_set_connection #define packet_write_poll Fssh_packet_write_poll #define packet_write_wait Fssh_packet_write_wait #define parse_ipqos Fssh_parse_ipqos #define parse_prime Fssh_parse_prime #define percent_expand Fssh_percent_expand #define permanently_drop_suid Fssh_permanently_drop_suid #define permanently_set_uid Fssh_permanently_set_uid #define permitopen_port Fssh_permitopen_port #define pkcs11_add_provider Fssh_pkcs11_add_provider #define pkcs11_del_provider Fssh_pkcs11_del_provider #define pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter Fssh_pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter #define pkcs11_find Fssh_pkcs11_find #define pkcs11_init Fssh_pkcs11_init #define pkcs11_provider_finalize Fssh_pkcs11_provider_finalize #define pkcs11_provider_unref Fssh_pkcs11_provider_unref #define pkcs11_rsa_finish Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_finish #define pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt #define pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt #define pkcs11_terminate Fssh_pkcs11_terminate #define plain_key_blob Fssh_plain_key_blob +#define platform_pledge_agent Fssh_platform_pledge_agent +#define platform_pledge_mux Fssh_platform_pledge_mux +#define platform_pledge_sftp_server Fssh_platform_pledge_sftp_server +#define pledge Fssh_pledge #define poly1305_auth Fssh_poly1305_auth #define poly64 Fssh_poly64 #define poly_hash Fssh_poly_hash #define port_open_helper Fssh_port_open_helper #define prime_test Fssh_prime_test #define proto_spec Fssh_proto_spec #define put_bitmap Fssh_put_bitmap #define put_host_port Fssh_put_host_port #define put_u16 Fssh_put_u16 #define put_u32 Fssh_put_u32 #define put_u32_le Fssh_put_u32_le #define put_u64 Fssh_put_u64 #define pwcopy Fssh_pwcopy #define qfileout Fssh_qfileout #define read_keyfile_line Fssh_read_keyfile_line #define read_mux Fssh_read_mux #define read_passphrase Fssh_read_passphrase #define reallocarray Fssh_reallocarray #define record_hostkey Fssh_record_hostkey #define reduce_add_sub Fssh_reduce_add_sub #define refresh_progress_meter Fssh_refresh_progress_meter #define replacearg Fssh_replacearg #define restore_uid Fssh_restore_uid #define revoke_blob Fssh_revoke_blob #define revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE #define revoked_certs_for_ca_key Fssh_revoked_certs_for_ca_key #define revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE #define rijndaelEncrypt Fssh_rijndaelEncrypt #define rijndaelKeySetupEnc Fssh_rijndaelKeySetupEnc #define rsa_generate_additional_parameters Fssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters #define rsa_private_decrypt Fssh_rsa_private_decrypt #define rsa_public_encrypt Fssh_rsa_public_encrypt #define sanitise_stdfd Fssh_sanitise_stdfd #define scan_scaled Fssh_scan_scaled #define seed_rng Fssh_seed_rng #define set_log_handler Fssh_set_log_handler #define set_nodelay Fssh_set_nodelay #define set_nonblock Fssh_set_nonblock #define shadow_pw Fssh_shadow_pw #define sieve_large Fssh_sieve_large #define sig_winch Fssh_sig_winch #define sigdie Fssh_sigdie #define sock_set_v6only Fssh_sock_set_v6only #define square Fssh_square #define ssh1_3des_cbc Fssh_ssh1_3des_cbc #define ssh1_3des_cleanup Fssh_ssh1_3des_cleanup #define ssh1_3des_init Fssh_ssh1_3des_init #define ssh1_3des_iv Fssh_ssh1_3des_iv #define ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms Fssh_ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms #define ssh_add_hostkey Fssh_ssh_add_hostkey #define ssh_add_identity_constrained Fssh_ssh_add_identity_constrained #define ssh_agent_sign Fssh_ssh_agent_sign #define ssh_alloc_session_state Fssh_ssh_alloc_session_state #define ssh_close_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_close_authentication_socket #define ssh_compatible_openssl Fssh_ssh_compatible_openssl #define ssh_crc32 Fssh_ssh_crc32 #define ssh_decrypt_challenge Fssh_ssh_decrypt_challenge #define ssh_digest_alg_by_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_by_name #define ssh_digest_alg_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_name #define ssh_digest_blocksize Fssh_ssh_digest_blocksize #define ssh_digest_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_buffer #define ssh_digest_bytes Fssh_ssh_digest_bytes #define ssh_digest_copy_state Fssh_ssh_digest_copy_state #define ssh_digest_final Fssh_ssh_digest_final #define ssh_digest_free Fssh_ssh_digest_free #define ssh_digest_memory Fssh_ssh_digest_memory #define ssh_digest_start Fssh_ssh_digest_start #define ssh_digest_update Fssh_ssh_digest_update #define ssh_digest_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_update_buffer #define ssh_dispatch_init Fssh_ssh_dispatch_init #define ssh_dispatch_range Fssh_ssh_dispatch_range #define ssh_dispatch_run Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run #define ssh_dispatch_run_fatal Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run_fatal #define ssh_dispatch_set Fssh_ssh_dispatch_set #define ssh_dss_sign Fssh_ssh_dss_sign #define ssh_dss_verify Fssh_ssh_dss_verify #define ssh_ecdsa_sign Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sign #define ssh_ecdsa_verify Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_verify #define ssh_ed25519_sign Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sign #define ssh_ed25519_verify Fssh_ssh_ed25519_verify #define ssh_err Fssh_ssh_err #define ssh_fetch_identitylist Fssh_ssh_fetch_identitylist #define ssh_free Fssh_ssh_free #define ssh_free_identitylist Fssh_ssh_free_identitylist #define ssh_gai_strerror Fssh_ssh_gai_strerror #define ssh_get_app_data Fssh_ssh_get_app_data #define ssh_get_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_get_authentication_socket #define ssh_get_progname Fssh_ssh_get_progname #define ssh_hmac_bytes Fssh_ssh_hmac_bytes #define ssh_hmac_final Fssh_ssh_hmac_final #define ssh_hmac_free Fssh_ssh_hmac_free #define ssh_hmac_init Fssh_ssh_hmac_init #define ssh_hmac_start Fssh_ssh_hmac_start #define ssh_hmac_update Fssh_ssh_hmac_update #define ssh_hmac_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_hmac_update_buffer #define ssh_init Fssh_ssh_init #define ssh_input_append Fssh_ssh_input_append #define ssh_input_space Fssh_ssh_input_space #define ssh_krl_check_key Fssh_ssh_krl_check_key #define ssh_krl_file_contains_key Fssh_ssh_krl_file_contains_key #define ssh_krl_free Fssh_ssh_krl_free #define ssh_krl_from_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_from_blob #define ssh_krl_init Fssh_ssh_krl_init #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range #define ssh_krl_revoke_key Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1 Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1 #define ssh_krl_set_comment Fssh_ssh_krl_set_comment #define ssh_krl_set_version Fssh_ssh_krl_set_version #define ssh_krl_to_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_to_blob #define ssh_lock_agent Fssh_ssh_lock_agent +#define ssh_malloc_init Fssh_ssh_malloc_init #define ssh_msg_recv Fssh_ssh_msg_recv #define ssh_msg_send Fssh_ssh_msg_send #define ssh_output_consume Fssh_ssh_output_consume #define ssh_output_ptr Fssh_ssh_output_ptr #define ssh_output_space Fssh_ssh_output_space -#define ssh_packet_backup_state Fssh_ssh_packet_backup_state #define ssh_packet_close Fssh_ssh_packet_close #define ssh_packet_connection_af Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_af #define ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket #define ssh_packet_disconnect Fssh_ssh_packet_disconnect #define ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress Fssh_ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress #define ssh_packet_get_bignum Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bignum #define ssh_packet_get_bignum2 Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bignum2 #define ssh_packet_get_bytes Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bytes #define ssh_packet_get_char Fssh_ssh_packet_get_char #define ssh_packet_get_connection_in Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_in #define ssh_packet_get_connection_out Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_out #define ssh_packet_get_cstring Fssh_ssh_packet_get_cstring #define ssh_packet_get_ecpoint Fssh_ssh_packet_get_ecpoint #define ssh_packet_get_input Fssh_ssh_packet_get_input #define ssh_packet_get_int Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int #define ssh_packet_get_int64 Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int64 #define ssh_packet_get_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_get_maxsize #define ssh_packet_get_output Fssh_ssh_packet_get_output #define ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags #define ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout #define ssh_packet_get_state Fssh_ssh_packet_get_state #define ssh_packet_get_string Fssh_ssh_packet_get_string #define ssh_packet_get_string_ptr Fssh_ssh_packet_get_string_ptr #define ssh_packet_have_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_have_data_to_write #define ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts #define ssh_packet_is_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_is_interactive +#define ssh_packet_is_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_is_rekeying #define ssh_packet_need_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_need_rekeying #define ssh_packet_next Fssh_ssh_packet_next #define ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write #define ssh_packet_payload Fssh_ssh_packet_payload #define ssh_packet_process_incoming Fssh_ssh_packet_process_incoming #define ssh_packet_put Fssh_ssh_packet_put #define ssh_packet_put_bignum Fssh_ssh_packet_put_bignum #define ssh_packet_put_bignum2 Fssh_ssh_packet_put_bignum2 #define ssh_packet_put_char Fssh_ssh_packet_put_char #define ssh_packet_put_cstring Fssh_ssh_packet_put_cstring #define ssh_packet_put_ecpoint Fssh_ssh_packet_put_ecpoint #define ssh_packet_put_int Fssh_ssh_packet_put_int #define ssh_packet_put_int64 Fssh_ssh_packet_put_int64 #define ssh_packet_put_raw Fssh_ssh_packet_put_raw #define ssh_packet_put_string Fssh_ssh_packet_put_string #define ssh_packet_read Fssh_ssh_packet_read #define ssh_packet_read_expect Fssh_ssh_packet_read_expect #define ssh_packet_read_poll1 Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll1 #define ssh_packet_read_poll2 Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll2 #define ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr #define ssh_packet_read_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_seqnr #define ssh_packet_remaining Fssh_ssh_packet_remaining -#define ssh_packet_restore_state Fssh_ssh_packet_restore_state #define ssh_packet_send Fssh_ssh_packet_send #define ssh_packet_send1 Fssh_ssh_packet_send1 #define ssh_packet_send2 Fssh_ssh_packet_send2 #define ssh_packet_send2_wrapped Fssh_ssh_packet_send2_wrapped #define ssh_packet_send_debug Fssh_ssh_packet_send_debug #define ssh_packet_send_ignore Fssh_ssh_packet_send_ignore #define ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts #define ssh_packet_set_authenticated Fssh_ssh_packet_set_authenticated #define ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks Fssh_ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks #define ssh_packet_set_connection Fssh_ssh_packet_set_connection #define ssh_packet_set_encryption_key Fssh_ssh_packet_set_encryption_key #define ssh_packet_set_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_set_interactive #define ssh_packet_set_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_set_maxsize #define ssh_packet_set_nonblocking Fssh_ssh_packet_set_nonblocking #define ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags #define ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits Fssh_ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits #define ssh_packet_set_server Fssh_ssh_packet_set_server #define ssh_packet_set_state Fssh_ssh_packet_set_state #define ssh_packet_set_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_set_timeout #define ssh_packet_set_tos Fssh_ssh_packet_set_tos #define ssh_packet_start Fssh_ssh_packet_start #define ssh_packet_start_compression Fssh_ssh_packet_start_compression #define ssh_packet_start_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_start_discard #define ssh_packet_stop_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_stop_discard #define ssh_packet_write_poll Fssh_ssh_packet_write_poll #define ssh_packet_write_wait Fssh_ssh_packet_write_wait #define ssh_remote_ipaddr Fssh_ssh_remote_ipaddr +#define ssh_remote_port Fssh_ssh_remote_port #define ssh_remove_all_identities Fssh_ssh_remove_all_identities #define ssh_remove_identity Fssh_ssh_remove_identity #define ssh_request_reply Fssh_ssh_request_reply #define ssh_rsa_sign Fssh_ssh_rsa_sign #define ssh_rsa_verify Fssh_ssh_rsa_verify #define ssh_set_app_data Fssh_ssh_set_app_data #define ssh_set_newkeys Fssh_ssh_set_newkeys #define ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback Fssh_ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback #define ssh_update_card Fssh_ssh_update_card #define sshbuf_alloc Fssh_sshbuf_alloc #define sshbuf_avail Fssh_sshbuf_avail #define sshbuf_b64tod Fssh_sshbuf_b64tod #define sshbuf_check_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_check_reserve #define sshbuf_consume Fssh_sshbuf_consume #define sshbuf_consume_end Fssh_sshbuf_consume_end #define sshbuf_dtob16 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob16 #define sshbuf_dtob64 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob64 #define sshbuf_dump Fssh_sshbuf_dump #define sshbuf_dump_data Fssh_sshbuf_dump_data #define sshbuf_free Fssh_sshbuf_free #define sshbuf_from Fssh_sshbuf_from #define sshbuf_fromb Fssh_sshbuf_fromb #define sshbuf_froms Fssh_sshbuf_froms #define sshbuf_get Fssh_sshbuf_get #define sshbuf_get_bignum1 Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum1 #define sshbuf_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2 #define sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct #define sshbuf_get_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_get_cstring #define sshbuf_get_ec Fssh_sshbuf_get_ec #define sshbuf_get_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_get_eckey #define sshbuf_get_string Fssh_sshbuf_get_string #define sshbuf_get_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_string_direct #define sshbuf_get_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_get_stringb #define sshbuf_get_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u16 #define sshbuf_get_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u32 #define sshbuf_get_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u64 #define sshbuf_get_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u8 #define sshbuf_init Fssh_sshbuf_init #define sshbuf_len Fssh_sshbuf_len #define sshbuf_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_max_size #define sshbuf_mutable_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_mutable_ptr #define sshbuf_new Fssh_sshbuf_new #define sshbuf_parent Fssh_sshbuf_parent #define sshbuf_peek_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_peek_string_direct #define sshbuf_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_ptr #define sshbuf_put Fssh_sshbuf_put #define sshbuf_put_bignum1 Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum1 #define sshbuf_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2 #define sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes #define sshbuf_put_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_put_cstring #define sshbuf_put_ec Fssh_sshbuf_put_ec #define sshbuf_put_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_put_eckey #define sshbuf_put_string Fssh_sshbuf_put_string #define sshbuf_put_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_put_stringb #define sshbuf_put_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u16 #define sshbuf_put_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u32 #define sshbuf_put_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u64 #define sshbuf_put_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u8 #define sshbuf_putb Fssh_sshbuf_putb #define sshbuf_putf Fssh_sshbuf_putf #define sshbuf_putfv Fssh_sshbuf_putfv #define sshbuf_refcount Fssh_sshbuf_refcount #define sshbuf_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_reserve #define sshbuf_reset Fssh_sshbuf_reset #define sshbuf_set_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_set_max_size #define sshbuf_set_parent Fssh_sshbuf_set_parent #define sshkey_add_private Fssh_sshkey_add_private #define sshkey_cert_check_authority Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority #define sshkey_cert_copy Fssh_sshkey_cert_copy #define sshkey_cert_type Fssh_sshkey_cert_type #define sshkey_certify Fssh_sshkey_certify #define sshkey_check_revoked Fssh_sshkey_check_revoked #define sshkey_curve_name_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_curve_name_to_nid #define sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits #define sshkey_curve_nid_to_name Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_name #define sshkey_demote Fssh_sshkey_demote #define sshkey_drop_cert Fssh_sshkey_drop_cert #define sshkey_dump_ec_key Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_key #define sshkey_dump_ec_point Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_point #define sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg Fssh_sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg #define sshkey_ec_validate_private Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_private #define sshkey_ec_validate_public Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_public #define sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid #define sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid #define sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name #define sshkey_equal Fssh_sshkey_equal #define sshkey_equal_public Fssh_sshkey_equal_public #define sshkey_fingerprint Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint #define sshkey_fingerprint_raw Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint_raw +#define sshkey_format_cert_validity Fssh_sshkey_format_cert_validity #define sshkey_free Fssh_sshkey_free #define sshkey_from_blob Fssh_sshkey_from_blob #define sshkey_from_blob_internal Fssh_sshkey_from_blob_internal #define sshkey_from_private Fssh_sshkey_from_private #define sshkey_fromb Fssh_sshkey_fromb #define sshkey_froms Fssh_sshkey_froms #define sshkey_generate Fssh_sshkey_generate #define sshkey_in_file Fssh_sshkey_in_file #define sshkey_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_is_cert #define sshkey_load_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_cert #define sshkey_load_file Fssh_sshkey_load_file #define sshkey_load_private Fssh_sshkey_load_private #define sshkey_load_private_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_private_cert #define sshkey_load_private_type Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type #define sshkey_load_private_type_fd Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type_fd #define sshkey_load_public Fssh_sshkey_load_public #define sshkey_names_valid2 Fssh_sshkey_names_valid2 #define sshkey_new Fssh_sshkey_new #define sshkey_new_private Fssh_sshkey_new_private #define sshkey_parse_private2 Fssh_sshkey_parse_private2 #define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob #define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type #define sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob #define sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob #define sshkey_perm_ok Fssh_sshkey_perm_ok #define sshkey_plain_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_plain_to_blob #define sshkey_private_deserialize Fssh_sshkey_private_deserialize #define sshkey_private_serialize Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize #define sshkey_private_to_blob2 Fssh_sshkey_private_to_blob2 #define sshkey_private_to_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_private_to_fileblob #define sshkey_putb Fssh_sshkey_putb #define sshkey_putb_plain Fssh_sshkey_putb_plain #define sshkey_puts Fssh_sshkey_puts #define sshkey_read Fssh_sshkey_read #define sshkey_save_private Fssh_sshkey_save_private #define sshkey_sign Fssh_sshkey_sign #define sshkey_size Fssh_sshkey_size #define sshkey_ssh_name Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name #define sshkey_ssh_name_plain Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name_plain #define sshkey_to_base64 Fssh_sshkey_to_base64 #define sshkey_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_to_blob #define sshkey_to_certified Fssh_sshkey_to_certified #define sshkey_try_load_public Fssh_sshkey_try_load_public #define sshkey_type Fssh_sshkey_type #define sshkey_type_from_name Fssh_sshkey_type_from_name #define sshkey_type_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_type_is_cert #define sshkey_type_plain Fssh_sshkey_type_plain #define sshkey_verify Fssh_sshkey_verify #define sshkey_write Fssh_sshkey_write #define sshpkt_add_padding Fssh_sshpkt_add_padding #define sshpkt_disconnect Fssh_sshpkt_disconnect #define sshpkt_fatal Fssh_sshpkt_fatal #define sshpkt_get Fssh_sshpkt_get #define sshpkt_get_bignum1 Fssh_sshpkt_get_bignum1 #define sshpkt_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_get_bignum2 #define sshpkt_get_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_get_cstring #define sshpkt_get_ec Fssh_sshpkt_get_ec #define sshpkt_get_end Fssh_sshpkt_get_end #define sshpkt_get_string Fssh_sshpkt_get_string #define sshpkt_get_string_direct Fssh_sshpkt_get_string_direct #define sshpkt_get_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u32 #define sshpkt_get_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u64 #define sshpkt_get_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u8 #define sshpkt_ptr Fssh_sshpkt_ptr #define sshpkt_put Fssh_sshpkt_put #define sshpkt_put_bignum1 Fssh_sshpkt_put_bignum1 #define sshpkt_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_put_bignum2 #define sshpkt_put_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_put_cstring #define sshpkt_put_ec Fssh_sshpkt_put_ec #define sshpkt_put_string Fssh_sshpkt_put_string #define sshpkt_put_stringb Fssh_sshpkt_put_stringb #define sshpkt_put_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u32 #define sshpkt_put_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u64 #define sshpkt_put_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u8 #define sshpkt_putb Fssh_sshpkt_putb #define sshpkt_send Fssh_sshpkt_send #define sshpkt_start Fssh_sshpkt_start #define start_progress_meter Fssh_start_progress_meter #define stop_progress_meter Fssh_stop_progress_meter #define strdelim Fssh_strdelim #define strnvis Fssh_strnvis #define strvis Fssh_strvis #define strvisx Fssh_strvisx #define sys_tun_open Fssh_sys_tun_open #define temporarily_use_uid Fssh_temporarily_use_uid #define tilde_expand_filename Fssh_tilde_expand_filename #define timingsafe_bcmp Fssh_timingsafe_bcmp #define to_blob Fssh_to_blob #define to_blob_buf Fssh_to_blob_buf #define tohex Fssh_tohex #define tty_make_modes Fssh_tty_make_modes #define tty_parse_modes Fssh_tty_parse_modes #define tun_open Fssh_tun_open #define umac128_delete Fssh_umac128_delete #define umac128_final Fssh_umac128_final #define umac128_new Fssh_umac128_new #define umac128_update Fssh_umac128_update #define umac_delete Fssh_umac_delete #define umac_final Fssh_umac_final #define umac_new Fssh_umac_new #define umac_update Fssh_umac_update #define uncompress_buffer Fssh_uncompress_buffer #define unix_listener Fssh_unix_listener #define unset_nonblock Fssh_unset_nonblock #define update_progress_meter Fssh_update_progress_meter #define uudecode Fssh_uudecode #define uuencode Fssh_uuencode #define verbose Fssh_verbose #define verify_host_key_dns Fssh_verify_host_key_dns #define vis Fssh_vis #define write_host_entry Fssh_write_host_entry #define x11_connect_display Fssh_x11_connect_display #define x11_create_display_inet Fssh_x11_create_display_inet #define x11_input_open Fssh_x11_input_open #define x11_open_helper Fssh_x11_open_helper #define x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing Fssh_x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing #define xasprintf Fssh_xasprintf #define xcalloc Fssh_xcalloc #define xcrypt Fssh_xcrypt #define xmalloc Fssh_xmalloc #define xmmap Fssh_xmmap #define xreallocarray Fssh_xreallocarray #define xstrdup Fssh_xstrdup Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-basic.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-basic.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-basic.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,462 +1,462 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.4 2015/01/14 15:02:39 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.5 2015/10/20 23:24:25 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0) return r; if (v != NULL && len != 0) memcpy(v, p, len); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = PEEK_U64(p); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = PEEK_U32(p); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = PEEK_U16(p); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp) { const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); int r; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = (u_int8_t)*p; return 0; } int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { const u_char *val; size_t len; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0) return r; if (valp != NULL) { if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if (len != 0) memcpy(*valp, val, len); (*valp)[len] = '\0'; } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; return 0; } int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { size_t len; const u_char *p; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0) return r; - if (valp != 0) + if (valp != NULL) *valp = p; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); SSHBUF_ABORT(); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { u_int32_t len; const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); if (valp != NULL) *valp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE")); return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; } len = PEEK_U32(p); if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE")); return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE; } if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE")); return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; } - if (valp != 0) + if (valp != NULL) *valp = p + 4; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; return 0; } int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp) { size_t len; const u_char *p, *z; int r; if (valp != NULL) *valp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0) return r; /* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */ if (len > 0 && (z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT")); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) return -1; if (valp != NULL) { if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if (len != 0) memcpy(*valp, p, len); (*valp)[len] = '\0'; } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = (size_t)len; return 0; } int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v) { u_int32_t len; u_char *p; int r; /* * Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is * a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly * into 'v'. */ if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0) return r; return 0; } int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0) return r; if (len != 0) memcpy(p, v, len); return 0; } int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v) { return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v)); } int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return r; } int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap) { va_list ap2; int r, len; u_char *p; va_copy(ap2, ap); if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (len == 0) { r = 0; goto out; /* Nothing to do */ } va_end(ap2); va_copy(ap2, ap); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0) goto out; if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */ } /* Consume terminating \0 */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: va_end(ap2); return r; } int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0) return r; POKE_U64(p, val); return 0; } int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0) return r; POKE_U32(p, val); return 0; } int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0) return r; POKE_U16(p, val); return 0; } int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val) { u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0) return r; p[0] = val; return 0; } int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) { u_char *d; int r; if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE")); return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0) return r; POKE_U32(d, len); if (len != 0) memcpy(d + 4, v, len); return 0; } int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v) { return sshbuf_put_string(buf, (u_char *)v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v)); } int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v) { return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v)); } int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp) { const u_char *p; size_t len; struct sshbuf *ret; int r; if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *bufp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0) return r; if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 || /* Shouldn't happen */ (r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(ret); return r; } *bufp = ret; return 0; } int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) { u_char *d; const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v; int r, prepend; if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) { SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE")); return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; } /* Skip leading zero bytes */ for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++) ; /* * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to * avoid interpretation as a negative number. */ prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0) return r; POKE_U32(d, len + prepend); if (prepend) d[4] = 0; if (len != 0) memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len); return 0; } int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { const u_char *d; size_t len, olen; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &olen)) < 0) return r; len = olen; /* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */ if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0)) return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE; /* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */ if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 || (len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0)) return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; /* Trim leading zeros */ while (len > 0 && *d == 0x00) { d++; len--; } - if (valp != 0) + if (valp != NULL) *valp = d; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; if (sshbuf_consume(buf, olen + 4) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); SSHBUF_ABORT(); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,406 +1,404 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.4 2015/10/05 17:11:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.6 2016/01/12 23:42:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL #include "includes.h" #include /* roundup */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" static inline int sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf) { SSHBUF_TELL("sanity"); if (__predict_false(buf == NULL || (!buf->readonly && buf->d != buf->cd) || buf->refcount < 1 || buf->refcount > SSHBUF_REFS_MAX || buf->cd == NULL || (buf->dont_free && (buf->readonly || buf->parent != NULL)) || buf->max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || buf->alloc > buf->max_size || buf->size > buf->alloc || buf->off > buf->size)) { /* Do not try to recover from corrupted buffer internals */ SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL); raise(SIGSEGV); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } static void sshbuf_maybe_pack(struct sshbuf *buf, int force) { SSHBUF_DBG(("force %d", force)); SSHBUF_TELL("pre-pack"); if (buf->off == 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return; if (force || (buf->off >= SSHBUF_PACK_MIN && buf->off >= buf->size / 2)) { memmove(buf->d, buf->d + buf->off, buf->size - buf->off); buf->size -= buf->off; buf->off = 0; SSHBUF_TELL("packed"); } } struct sshbuf * sshbuf_new(void) { struct sshbuf *ret; if ((ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL) return NULL; ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; ret->readonly = 0; ret->refcount = 1; ret->parent = NULL; if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } struct sshbuf * sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len) { struct sshbuf *ret; if (blob == NULL || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || (ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL) return NULL; ret->alloc = ret->size = ret->max_size = len; ret->readonly = 1; ret->refcount = 1; ret->parent = NULL; ret->cd = blob; ret->d = NULL; return ret; } int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(child)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_check_sanity(parent)) != 0) return r; child->parent = parent; child->parent->refcount++; return 0; } struct sshbuf * sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf) { struct sshbuf *ret; if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) return NULL; if ((ret = sshbuf_from(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf))) == NULL) return NULL; if (sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf) != 0) { sshbuf_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void sshbuf_init(struct sshbuf *ret) { explicit_bzero(ret, sizeof(*ret)); ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; ret->readonly = 0; ret->dont_free = 1; ret->refcount = 1; if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) ret->alloc = 0; } void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf) { int dont_free = 0; if (buf == NULL) return; /* * The following will leak on insane buffers, but this is the safest * course of action - an invalid pointer or already-freed pointer may * have been passed to us and continuing to scribble over memory would * be bad. */ if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) return; /* * If we are a child, the free our parent to decrement its reference * count and possibly free it. */ - if (buf->parent != NULL) { - sshbuf_free(buf->parent); - buf->parent = NULL; - } + sshbuf_free(buf->parent); + buf->parent = NULL; /* * If we are a parent with still-extant children, then don't free just * yet. The last child's call to sshbuf_free should decrement our * refcount to 0 and trigger the actual free. */ buf->refcount--; if (buf->refcount > 0) return; dont_free = buf->dont_free; if (!buf->readonly) { explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc); free(buf->d); } explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(*buf)); if (!dont_free) free(buf); } void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf) { u_char *d; if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) { /* Nonsensical. Just make buffer appear empty */ buf->off = buf->size; return; } if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) == 0) explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc); buf->off = buf->size = 0; if (buf->alloc != SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) { if ((d = realloc(buf->d, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT)) != NULL) { buf->cd = buf->d = d; buf->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; } } } size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf) { return buf->max_size; } size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf) { return buf->alloc; } const struct sshbuf * sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf) { return buf->parent; } u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf) { return buf->refcount; } int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size) { size_t rlen; u_char *dp; int r; SSHBUF_DBG(("set max buf = %p len = %zu", buf, max_size)); if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) return r; if (max_size == buf->max_size) return 0; if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY; if (max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; /* pack and realloc if necessary */ sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, max_size < buf->size); if (max_size < buf->alloc && max_size > buf->size) { if (buf->size < SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) rlen = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; else rlen = roundup(buf->size, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); if (rlen > max_size) rlen = max_size; explicit_bzero(buf->d + buf->size, buf->alloc - buf->size); SSHBUF_DBG(("new alloc = %zu", rlen)); if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; buf->cd = buf->d = dp; buf->alloc = rlen; } SSHBUF_TELL("new-max"); if (max_size < buf->alloc) return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; buf->max_size = max_size; return 0; } size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf) { if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) return 0; return buf->size - buf->off; } size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf) { if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return 0; return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off); } const u_char * sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf) { if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) return NULL; return buf->cd + buf->off; } u_char * sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf) { if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return NULL; return buf->d + buf->off; } int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) return r; if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY; SSHBUF_TELL("check"); /* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */ if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off) return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; return 0; } int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp) { size_t rlen, need; u_char *dp; int r; if (dpp != NULL) *dpp = NULL; SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len)); if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0) return r; /* * If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size * then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off. */ sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size); SSHBUF_TELL("reserve"); if (len + buf->size > buf->alloc) { /* * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size. */ need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc; rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen)); if (rlen > buf->max_size) rlen = buf->alloc + need; SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen)); if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) { SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail")); if (dpp != NULL) *dpp = NULL; return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } buf->alloc = rlen; buf->cd = buf->d = dp; if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) { /* shouldn't fail */ if (dpp != NULL) *dpp = NULL; return r; } } dp = buf->d + buf->size; buf->size += len; SSHBUF_TELL("done"); if (dpp != NULL) *dpp = dp; return 0; } int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) { int r; SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len)); if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) return r; if (len == 0) return 0; if (len > sshbuf_len(buf)) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; buf->off += len; SSHBUF_TELL("done"); return 0; } int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) { int r; SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len)); if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) return r; if (len == 0) return 0; if (len > sshbuf_len(buf)) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; buf->size -= len; SSHBUF_TELL("done"); return 0; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,338 +1,341 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.4 2015/01/14 15:02:39 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.6 2015/12/10 07:01:35 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _SSHBUF_H #define _SSHBUF_H #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */ #define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */ #define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */ #define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */ /* * NB. do not depend on the internals of this. It will be made opaque * one day. */ struct sshbuf { u_char *d; /* Data */ const u_char *cd; /* Const data */ size_t off; /* First available byte is buf->d + buf->off */ size_t size; /* Last byte is buf->d + buf->size - 1 */ size_t max_size; /* Maximum size of buffer */ size_t alloc; /* Total bytes allocated to buf->d */ int readonly; /* Refers to external, const data */ int dont_free; /* Kludge to support sshbuf_init */ u_int refcount; /* Tracks self and number of child buffers */ struct sshbuf *parent; /* If child, pointer to parent */ }; #ifndef SSHBUF_NO_DEPREACTED /* * NB. Please do not use sshbuf_init() in new code. Please use sshbuf_new() * instead. sshbuf_init() is deprectated and will go away soon (it is * only included to allow compat with buffer_* in OpenSSH) */ void sshbuf_init(struct sshbuf *buf); #endif /* * Create a new sshbuf buffer. * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. */ struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void); /* * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data. * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. */ struct sshbuf *sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len); /* * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of an existing * buffer. The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the * resultant buffer. * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. */ struct sshbuf *sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of a string in * an existing buffer (the string is consumed in the process). * The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the resultant * buffer. * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. */ int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp); /* * Clear and free buf */ void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Reset buf, clearing its contents. NB. max_size is preserved. */ void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Return the maximum size of buf */ size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Set the maximum size of buf * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size); /* * Returns the length of data in buf */ size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Returns number of bytes left in buffer before hitting max_size. */ size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* - * Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the the data in buf + * Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the data in buf */ const u_char *sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* - * Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the the data in buf, or + * Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the data in buf, or * NULL if the buffer is read-only. */ u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf * Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes * with unsigned overflows correctly. * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); /* * Reserve len bytes in buf. * Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the * optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp); /* * Consume len bytes from the start of buf * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); /* * Consume len bytes from the end of buf * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. */ int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); /* Extract or deposit some bytes */ int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len); int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v); /* Append using a printf(3) format */ int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap); /* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */ int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp); int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp); int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp); int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp); int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val); int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val); int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val); int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val); /* * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded strings (u32 len || data) * The "cstring" variants admit no \0 characters in the string contents. * Caller must free *valp. */ int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v); int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v); int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v); /* * "Direct" variant of sshbuf_get_string, returns pointer into the sshbuf to * avoid an malloc+memcpy. The pointer is guaranteed to be valid until the * next sshbuf-modifying function call. Caller does not free. */ int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); /* Skip past a string */ #define sshbuf_skip_string(buf) sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) /* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */ int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); /* * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic * curve points. */ int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v); int sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v); int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v); int sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v); # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); int sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v); int sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); int sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v); # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* Dump the contents of the buffer in a human-readable format */ void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f); /* Dump specified memory in a human-readable format */ void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f); /* Return the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the buffer */ char *sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf); /* Encode the contents of the buffer as base64 */ char *sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf); /* Decode base64 data and append it to the buffer */ int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64); /* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */ #define PEEK_U64(p) \ - (((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \ - ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \ - ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \ - ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \ - ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \ - ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \ - ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \ - (u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[7])) + (((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \ + (u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[7])) #define PEEK_U32(p) \ - (((u_int32_t)(((u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \ - ((u_int32_t)(((u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \ - ((u_int32_t)(((u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \ - (u_int32_t)(((u_char *)(p))[3])) + (((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \ + ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \ + ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \ + (u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3])) #define PEEK_U16(p) \ - (((u_int16_t)(((u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \ - (u_int16_t)(((u_char *)(p))[1])) + (((u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \ + (u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1])) #define POKE_U64(p, v) \ do { \ - ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 56) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 48) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 40) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[3] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 32) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[4] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 24) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[5] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 16) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[6] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 8) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[7] = ((u_int64_t)(v)) & 0xff; \ + const u_int64_t __v = (v); \ + ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 56) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 48) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 40) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[3] = (__v >> 32) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[4] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[5] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[6] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[7] = __v & 0xff; \ } while (0) #define POKE_U32(p, v) \ do { \ - ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 24) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 16) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 8) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[3] = ((u_int64_t)(v)) & 0xff; \ + const u_int32_t __v = (v); \ + ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[3] = __v & 0xff; \ } while (0) #define POKE_U16(p, v) \ do { \ - ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 8) & 0xff; \ - ((u_char *)(p))[1] = ((u_int64_t)(v)) & 0xff; \ + const u_int16_t __v = (v); \ + ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \ } while (0) /* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */ #ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL /* * Return the allocation size of buf */ size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Increment the reference count of buf. */ int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent); /* * Return the parent buffer of buf, or NULL if it has no parent. */ const struct sshbuf *sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf); /* * Return the reference count of buf */ u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf); # define SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT 256 /* Initial allocation */ # define SSHBUF_SIZE_INC 256 /* Preferred increment length */ # define SSHBUF_PACK_MIN 8192 /* Minimim packable offset */ /* # define SSHBUF_ABORT abort */ /* # define SSHBUF_DEBUG */ # ifndef SSHBUF_ABORT # define SSHBUF_ABORT() # endif # ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG # define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \ printf("%s:%d %s: %s size %zu alloc %zu off %zu max %zu\n", \ __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, what, \ buf->size, buf->alloc, buf->off, buf->max_size); \ fflush(stdout); \ } while (0) # define SSHBUF_DBG(x) do { \ printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \ printf x; \ printf("\n"); \ fflush(stdout); \ } while (0) # else # define SSHBUF_TELL(what) # define SSHBUF_DBG(x) # endif #endif /* SSHBUF_INTERNAL */ #endif /* _SSHBUF_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1490 +1,1545 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.263 2015/08/20 22:32:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.271 2016/01/14 22:56:56 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the * login (authentication) dialog. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include /* roundup */ #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "dns.h" -#include "roaming.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "version.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" +#include "authfd.h" char *client_version_string = NULL; char *server_version_string = NULL; Key *previous_host_key = NULL; static int matching_host_key_dns = 0; static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0; /* import */ extern Options options; extern char *__progname; extern uid_t original_real_uid; extern uid_t original_effective_uid; static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, Key *); static void warn_changed_key(Key *); /* Expand a proxy command */ static char * expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, const char *host, int port) { char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV]; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command); ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport, "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); free(tmp); return ret; } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a * a connected fd back to us. */ static int ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int sp[2], sock; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) < 0) fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with " "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, port); debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid); close(sp[1]); /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ if (sp[0] != 0) { if (dup2(sp[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); } if (sp[0] != 1) { if (dup2(sp[0], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); } if (sp[0] >= 2) close(sp[0]); /* * Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get * printed on the user's terminal. */ argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* * Execute the proxy command. * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sp[0]); free(command_string); if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1) fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection"); + close(sp[1]); while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ packet_set_connection(sock, sock); return 0; } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. */ static int ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int pin[2], pout[2]; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0) fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, port); debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid); /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ close(pin[1]); if (pin[0] != 0) { if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); } close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ close(pout[1]); /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get printed on the user's terminal. */ argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */ /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); /* Free the command name. */ free(command_string); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]); /* Indicate OK return */ return 0; } void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void) { /* * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child */ if (proxy_command_pid > 1) kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP); } /* * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection. */ static int ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai) { int sock, r, gaierr; struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */ if (options.bind_address == NULL && !privileged) return sock; if (options.bind_address) { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family; hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype; hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res); if (gaierr) { error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); close(sock); return -1; } } /* * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port. */ if (privileged) { PRIV_START; r = bindresvport_sa(sock, res ? res->ai_addr : NULL); PRIV_END; if (r < 0) { error("bindresvport_sa: af=%d %s", ai->ai_family, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } } else { if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) { error("bind: %s: %s", options.bind_address, strerror(errno)); fail: close(sock); freeaddrinfo(res); return -1; } } if (res != NULL) freeaddrinfo(res); return sock; } static int timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp) { fd_set *fdset; struct timeval tv, t_start; socklen_t optlen; int optval, rc, result = -1; gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL); if (*timeoutp <= 0) { result = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); goto done; } set_nonblock(sockfd); rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); if (rc == 0) { unset_nonblock(sockfd); result = 0; goto done; } if (errno != EINPROGRESS) { result = -1; goto done; } fdset = xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(sockfd, fdset); ms_to_timeval(&tv, *timeoutp); for (;;) { rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv); if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR) break; } switch (rc) { case 0: /* Timed out */ errno = ETIMEDOUT; break; case -1: /* Select error */ debug("select: %s", strerror(errno)); break; case 1: /* Completed or failed */ optval = 0; optlen = sizeof(optval); if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); break; } if (optval != 0) { errno = optval; break; } result = 0; unset_nonblock(sockfd); break; default: /* Should not occur */ fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc); } free(fdset); done: if (result == 0 && *timeoutp > 0) { ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp); if (*timeoutp <= 0) { errno = ETIMEDOUT; result = -1; } } return (result); } /* * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr. * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If needpriv is true, * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection. * This requires super-user privileges if needpriv is true. * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact * the daemon. */ static int ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv) { int on = 1; int sock = -1, attempt; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo *ai; - debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv); + debug2("%s: needpriv %d", __func__, needpriv); + memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop)); + memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport)); for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) { if (attempt > 0) { /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ sleep(1); debug("Trying again..."); } /* * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in * sequence until the connection succeeds. */ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { - error("ssh_connect: getnameinfo failed"); + error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); continue; } debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.", host, ntop, strport); /* Create a socket for connecting. */ sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai); if (sock < 0) /* Any error is already output */ continue; if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, timeout_ms) >= 0) { /* Successful connection. */ memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); break; } else { debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); sock = -1; } } if (sock != -1) break; /* Successful connection. */ } /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ if (sock == -1) { error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s", host, strport, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } debug("Connection established."); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (want_keepalive && setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection. */ packet_set_connection(sock, sock); return 0; } int ssh_connect(const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv) { if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { return ssh_connect_direct(host, addrs, hostaddr, port, family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive, needpriv); } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) { packet_set_connection(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); return 0; /* Always succeeds */ } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) { return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command); } return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command); } static void send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1) { /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s", compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1, SSH_VERSION, *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", options.version_addendum, compat20 ? "\r\n" : "\n"); - if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string, + if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string, strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string)) fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); chop(client_version_string); debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string); } /* * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own * identification string. */ void ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms) { char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch; int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1, client_banner_sent = 0; u_int i, n; size_t len; int fdsetsz, remaining, rc; struct timeval t_start, t_remaining; fd_set *fdset; fdsetsz = howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); fdset = xcalloc(1, fdsetsz); /* * If we are SSH2-only then we can send the banner immediately and * save a round-trip. */ if (options.protocol == SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); send_client_banner(connection_out, 0); client_banner_sent = 1; } /* Read other side's version identification. */ remaining = timeout_ms; for (n = 0;;) { for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (timeout_ms > 0) { gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL); ms_to_timeval(&t_remaining, remaining); FD_SET(connection_in, fdset); rc = select(connection_in + 1, fdset, NULL, fdset, &t_remaining); ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, &remaining); if (rc == 0 || remaining <= 0) fatal("Connection timed out during " "banner exchange"); if (rc == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "select: %s", strerror(errno)); } } - len = roaming_atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1); + len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1); if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "Connection closed by remote host"); else if (len != 1) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "read: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (buf[i] == '\r') { buf[i] = '\n'; buf[i + 1] = 0; continue; /**XXX wait for \n */ } if (buf[i] == '\n') { buf[i + 1] = 0; break; } if (++n > 65536) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "No banner received"); } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf); } server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); free(fdset); /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf); debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99 && (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) { enable_compat20(); break; } if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { mismatch = 1; break; } if (remote_minor < 3) { fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version."); } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) { /* We speak 1.3, too. */ enable_compat13(); minor1 = 3; if (options.forward_agent) { logit("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3"); options.forward_agent = 0; } } break; case 2: if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: mismatch = 1; break; } if (mismatch) fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, remote_major); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) fatal("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; " "refusing connection", remote_version); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) logit("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); if (!client_banner_sent) send_client_banner(connection_out, minor1); chop(server_version_string); } /* defaults to 'no' */ static int confirm(const char *prompt) { const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': "; char *p; int ret = -1; if (options.batch_mode) return 0; for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) { p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO); if (p == NULL || (p[0] == '\0') || (p[0] == '\n') || strncasecmp(p, "no", 2) == 0) ret = 0; if (p && strncasecmp(p, "yes", 3) == 0) ret = 1; free(p); if (ret != -1) return ret; } } static int check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key) { const char *reason; if (key_cert_check_authority(host_key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) { error("%s", reason); return 0; } if (buffer_len(host_key->cert->critical) != 0) { error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported " "critical options(s)", host); return 0; } return 1; } static int sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr) { switch (hostaddr->sa_family) { case AF_INET: return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)-> sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; case AF_INET6: return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK( &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr)); default: return 0; } } /* * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended. */ void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr) { char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; socklen_t addrlen; switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) { case -1: addrlen = 0; break; case AF_INET: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr); break; } /* * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections * using a proxy command */ if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) { if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); *hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port); } else { *hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup(""); } } /* * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple * sshd's on different ports on the same machine. */ if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) { if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) { *hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias); debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname); } else { *hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port); } } } /* * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true. */ #define RDRW 0 #define RDONLY 1 #define ROQUIET 2 static int check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, Key *host_key, int readonly, char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles) { HostStatus host_status; HostStatus ip_status; Key *raw_key = NULL; char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL; char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra; char msg[1024]; const char *type; const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found; int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0; int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr); int r, want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0; int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */ struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys; u_int i; /* * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, * this is probably not a real problem. */ if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local && options.host_key_alias == NULL) { debug("Forcing accepting of host key for " "loopback/localhost."); return 0; } /* * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup. * In some cases, these will have a port number appended. */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip); /* * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with */ if (options.check_host_ip && (local || strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL)) options.check_host_ip = 0; host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]); ip_hostkeys = NULL; if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) { ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]); } retry: /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */ want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key); type = key_type(host_key); /* * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known * hosts or in the systemwide list. */ host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key, &host_found); /* * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip * address to begin with. */ if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) { ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key, &ip_found); if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || (ip_found != NULL && !key_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key)))) host_ip_differ = 1; } else ip_status = host_status; switch (host_status) { case HOST_OK: /* The host is known and the key matches. */ debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.", host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key"); debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", host_found->file, host_found->line); if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(hostname, host_key)) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { if (readonly || want_cert) logit("%s host key for IP address " "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.", type, ip); else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts)) logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP " "address '%.128s' to the list of known " "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip, user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host " "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " "of known hosts.", type, ip); } else if (options.visual_host_key) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); - logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra); + logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra); free(ra); free(fp); } hostkey_trusted = 1; break; case HOST_NEW: if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 && port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { debug("checking without port identifier"); if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key, ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles, system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) { debug("found matching key w/out port"); break; } } if (readonly || want_cert) goto fail; /* The host is new. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { /* * User has requested strict host key checking. We * will not add the host key automatically. The only * alternative left is to abort. */ error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you " "have requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "\nbut keys of different type are already" " known for this host."); else snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); /* The default */ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); msg2[0] = '\0'; if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { if (matching_host_key_dns) snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), "Matching host key fingerprint" " found in DNS.\n"); else snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), "No matching host key fingerprint" " found in DNS.\n"); } snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " "established%s\n" "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " "(yes/no)? ", host, ip, msg1, type, fp, options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", msg2); free(ra); free(fp); if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */ } /* * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the * local known_hosts file. */ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); hostp = hostline; if (options.hash_known_hosts) { /* Add hash of host and IP separately */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) && add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } else { /* Add unhashed "host,ip" */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], hostline, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } } else { r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); hostp = host; } if (!r) logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known " "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the " "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); break; case HOST_REVOKED: error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host); error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to"); error("impersonate this host."); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } goto continue_unsafe; case HOST_CHANGED: if (want_cert) { /* * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match * all hosts that one might visit. */ debug("Host certificate authority does not " "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER, host_found->file, host_found->line); goto fail; } if (readonly == ROQUIET) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { char *key_msg; if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) key_msg = "is unknown"; else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) key_msg = "is unchanged"; else key_msg = "has a different value"; error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host); error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip); error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg); error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); error("and its host key have changed at the same time."); if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu", ip_found->file, ip_found->line); } /* The host key has changed. */ warn_changed_key(host_key); error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", user_hostfiles[0]); error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key), host_found->file, host_found->line); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } continue_unsafe: /* * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or * forwarding. */ if (options.password_authentication) { error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.password_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) { error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled" " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.challenge_response_authentication) { error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled" " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_agent) { error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_agent = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_x11) { error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_x11 = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 || options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.num_local_forwards = options.num_remote_forwards = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding) fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key " "check failure"); /* * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. * This could be done by converting the host key to an * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to * accept the authentication. */ break; case HOST_FOUND: fatal("internal error"); break; } if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) { snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' " "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'" "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu", type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line); if (host_status == HOST_OK) { len = strlen(msg); snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len, "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu", host_found->file, host_found->line); } if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { logit("%s", msg); error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want " "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg)); if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; } else { logit("%s", msg); } } if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) { debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: " "disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return 0; fail: if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) { /* * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and * search normally. */ debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key"); raw_key = key_from_private(host_key); if (key_drop_cert(raw_key) != 0) fatal("Couldn't drop certificate"); host_key = raw_key; goto retry; } if (raw_key != NULL) key_free(raw_key); free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return -1; } /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ int verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) { + u_int i; int r = -1, flags = 0; - char *fp = NULL; + char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL; struct sshkey *plain = NULL; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); r = -1; goto out; } - debug("Server host key: %s %s", - compat20 ? sshkey_ssh_name(host_key) : sshkey_type(host_key), fp); + if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) { + if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + r = -1; + goto out; + } + sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert, + valid, sizeof(valid)); + debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu " + "ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s", + sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp, + (unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial, + host_key->cert->key_id, + sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp, + valid); + for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) { + debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s", + host_key->cert->principals[i]); + } + } else { + debug("Server host key: %s %s", compat20 ? + sshkey_ssh_name(host_key) : sshkey_type(host_key), fp); + } if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) { debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key", __func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp); r = 0; goto out; } /* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */ if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) { r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys); switch (r) { case 0: break; /* not revoked */ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s", sshkey_type(host_key), fp, options.revoked_host_keys); r = -1; goto out; default: error("Error checking host key %s %s in " "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key), fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r)); r = -1; goto out; } } if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { /* * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade * them and try the plain key. */ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0) goto out; if (sshkey_is_cert(plain)) sshkey_drop_cert(plain); if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) { if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { r = 0; goto out; } if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { matching_host_key_dns = 1; } else { warn_changed_key(plain); error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS " "with the new host key to get rid " "of this message."); } } } } r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles, options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); out: sshkey_free(plain); free(fp); + free(cafp); if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) { key_free(previous_host_key); previous_host_key = key_from_private(host_key); } return r; } /* * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection * to the server must already have been established before this is called. * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. * This function does not require super-user privileges. */ void ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms) { char *host; char *server_user, *local_user; local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ host = xstrdup(orighost); lowercase(host); /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms); /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ packet_set_nonblocking(); /* key exchange */ /* authenticate user */ debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user); if (compat20) { ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port); ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); } else { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 ssh_kex(host, hostaddr); ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); #else fatal("ssh1 is not supported"); #endif } free(local_user); } void ssh_put_password(char *password) { int size; char *padded; if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) { packet_put_cstring(password); return; } size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32); padded = xcalloc(1, size); strlcpy(padded, password, size); packet_put_string(padded, size); explicit_bzero(padded, size); free(padded); } /* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */ static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key) { int type[] = { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, -1 }; int i, ret = 0; char *fp, *ra; const struct hostkey_entry *found; for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) { if (type[i] == key->type) continue; if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found)) continue; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" "in %s:%lu\n" "%s key fingerprint %s.", key_type(found->key), found->host, found->file, found->line, key_type(found->key), fp); if (options.visual_host_key) logit("%s", ra); free(ra); free(fp); ret = 1; } return ret; } static void warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) { char *fp; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (fp == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", key_type(host_key), fp); error("Please contact your system administrator."); free(fp); } /* * Execute a local command */ int ssh_local_cmd(const char *args) { char *shell; pid_t pid; int status; void (*osighand)(int); if (!options.permit_local_command || args == NULL || !*args) return (1); if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s", shell, args, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); signal(SIGCHLD, osighand); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) return (1); return (WEXITSTATUS(status)); +} + +void +maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment, + char *passphrase) +{ + int auth_sock = -1, r; + + if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0) + return; + + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { + debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key"); + return; + } + + if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 && + !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) { + debug3("user denied adding this key"); + return; + } + + if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private, comment, 0, + (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3))) == 0) + debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile); + else + debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,75 +1,77 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.28 2013/10/16 02:31:47 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.29 2015/11/15 22:26:49 jcs Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive; struct Sensitive { Key **keys; int nkeys; int external_keysign; }; struct addrinfo; int ssh_connect(const char *, struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int, int *, int, int); void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void); void ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int); void ssh_exchange_identification(int); int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *); void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, char **, char **); void ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *); void ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short); void ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *); void ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *); void ssh_put_password(char *); int ssh_local_cmd(const char *); + +void maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *, Key *, char *, char *); /* * Macros to raise/lower permissions. */ #define PRIV_START do { \ int save_errno = errno; \ if (seteuid(original_effective_uid) != 0) \ fatal("PRIV_START: seteuid: %s", \ strerror(errno)); \ errno = save_errno; \ } while (0) #define PRIV_END do { \ int save_errno = errno; \ if (seteuid(original_real_uid) != 0) \ fatal("PRIV_END: seteuid: %s", \ strerror(errno)); \ errno = save_errno; \ } while (0) Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,771 +1,778 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.77 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.78 2015/11/15 22:26:49 jcs Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the * login (authentication) dialog. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_SSH1 #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* Session id for the current session. */ u_char session_id[16]; u_int supported_authentications = 0; extern Options options; extern char *__progname; /* * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to * authenticate using the agent. */ static int try_agent_authentication(void) { int r, type, agent_fd, ret = 0; u_char response[16]; size_t i; BIGNUM *challenge; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL; /* Get connection to the agent. */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("try_agent_authentication: BN_new failed"); /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 1, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { /* Try this identity. */ debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", idlist->comments[i]); /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); packet_put_bignum(idlist->keys[i]->rsa->n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for server's response. */ type = packet_read(); /* The server sends failure if it doesn't like our key or does not support RSA authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our key."); continue; } /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); packet_get_bignum(challenge); packet_check_eom(); debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */ if ((r = ssh_decrypt_challenge(agent_fd, idlist->keys[i], challenge, session_id, response)) != 0) { /* * The agent failed to authenticate this identifier * although it advertised it supports this. Just * return a wrong value. */ logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt " "challenge: %s", ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response)); } debug("Sending response to RSA challenge."); /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) packet_put_char(response[i]); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); /* * The server returns success if it accepted the * authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); ret = 1; break; } else if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth " "response: %d", type); } if (ret != 1) debug("RSA authentication using agent refused."); out: ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd); BN_clear_free(challenge); return ret; } /* * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to * the server. */ static void respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv) { u_char buf[32], response[16]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; int i, len; /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ /* XXX think about Bleichenbacher, too */ if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) != 0) packet_disconnect( "respond_to_rsa_challenge: rsa_private_decrypt failed"); /* Compute the response. */ /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); if (len <= 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(buf)) packet_disconnect( "respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len); if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, response, sizeof(response)) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge."); /* Send the response back to the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) packet_put_char(response[i]); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response)); explicit_bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); } /* * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate * the user using it. */ static int try_rsa_authentication(int idx) { BIGNUM *challenge; Key *public, *private; - char buf[300], *passphrase, *comment, *authfile; + char buf[300], *passphrase = NULL, *comment, *authfile; int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit; public = options.identity_keys[idx]; authfile = options.identity_files[idx]; comment = xstrdup(authfile); debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment); /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for server's response. */ type = packet_read(); /* * The server responds with failure if it doesn't like our key or * doesn't support RSA authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our key."); free(comment); return 0; } /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("try_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(challenge); packet_check_eom(); debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); /* * If the key is not stored in external hardware, we have to * load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it * fails, ask for a passphrase. */ if (public->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) private = public; else private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL, &perm_ok); if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode && perm_ok) { snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment); for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0); if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) { private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL); quit = 0; } else { debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); quit = 1; } - explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); - free(passphrase); if (private != NULL || quit) break; debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); } } + + if (private != NULL) + maybe_add_key_to_agent(authfile, private, comment, passphrase); + + if (passphrase != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + free(passphrase); + } + /* We no longer need the comment. */ free(comment); if (private == NULL) { if (!options.batch_mode && perm_ok) error("Bad passphrase."); /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) packet_put_char(0); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Expect the server to reject it... */ packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); BN_clear_free(challenge); return 0; } /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private->rsa); /* Destroy the private key unless it in external hardware. */ if (!(private->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) key_free(private); /* We no longer need the challenge. */ BN_clear_free(challenge); /* Wait for response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); return 1; } if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); debug("RSA authentication refused."); return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv * authentication and RSA host authentication. */ static int try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key) { int type; BIGNUM *challenge; debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication."); /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA); packet_put_cstring(local_user); packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for server's response. */ type = packet_read(); /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key."); return 0; } /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("try_rhosts_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(challenge); packet_check_eom(); debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server."); /* Compute a response to the challenge. */ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key->rsa); /* We no longer need the challenge. */ BN_clear_free(challenge); /* Wait for response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server."); return 1; } if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused."); return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system. * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS. */ static int try_challenge_response_authentication(void) { int type, i; u_int clen; char prompt[1024]; char *challenge, *response; debug("Doing challenge response authentication."); for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { /* request a challenge */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE && type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS", type); } if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { debug("No challenge."); return 0; } challenge = packet_get_string(&clen); packet_check_eom(); snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "%s%s", challenge, strchr(challenge, '\n') ? "" : "\nResponse: "); free(challenge); if (i != 0) error("Permission denied, please try again."); if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! " "Response will be transmitted in clear text."); response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) { free(response); break; } packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE); ssh_put_password(response); explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response)); free(response); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) return 1; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE", type); } /* failure */ return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication. */ static int try_password_authentication(char *prompt) { int type, i; char *password; debug("Doing password authentication."); if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text."); for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { if (i != 0) error("Permission denied, please try again."); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD); ssh_put_password(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) return 1; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type); } /* failure */ return 0; } /* * SSH1 key exchange */ void ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr) { int i; BIGNUM *key; Key *host_key, *server_key; int bits, rbits; int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES; u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_char cookie[8]; u_int supported_ciphers; u_int server_flags, client_flags; u_int32_t rnd = 0; debug("Waiting for server public key."); /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */ packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); /* Get cookie from the packet. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) cookie[i] = packet_get_char(); /* Get the public key. */ server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); bits = packet_get_int(); packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e); packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n); rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n); if (bits != rbits) { logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: " "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); } /* Get the host key. */ host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); bits = packet_get_int(); packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e); packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n); rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n); if (bits != rbits) { logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: " "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); } /* Get protocol flags. */ server_flags = packet_get_int(); packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags); supported_ciphers = packet_get_int(); supported_authentications = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).", BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n)); if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key) == -1) fatal("Host key verification failed."); client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN; derive_ssh1_session_id(host_key->rsa->n, server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id); /* * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key. */ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); session_key[i] = rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; } /* * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with * the first 16 bytes of the session id. */ if ((key = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_new failed"); if (BN_set_word(key, 0) == 0) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_set_word failed"); for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { if (BN_lshift(key, key, 8) == 0) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_lshift failed"); if (i < 16) { if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i]) == 0) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed"); } else { if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]) == 0) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed"); } } /* * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the * server (key with smaller modulus first). */ if (BN_cmp(server_key->rsa->n, host_key->rsa->n) < 0) { /* Public key has smaller modulus. */ if (BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < server_key %d + " "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0 || rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0) fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__); } else { /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */ if (BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: server_key %d < host_key %d + " "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0 || rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0) fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__); } /* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */ key_free(server_key); key_free(host_key); if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) { if (cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default)) options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; } else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_INVALID || !(cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & (1 << options.cipher))) { logit("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.", cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default)); options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; } /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */ if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher))) fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.", cipher_name(options.cipher)); debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher)); /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); packet_put_char(options.cipher); /* Send the cookie back to the server. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) packet_put_char(cookie[i]); /* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */ packet_put_bignum(key); BN_clear_free(key); /* Send protocol flags. */ packet_put_int(client_flags); /* Send the packet now. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); debug("Sent encrypted session key."); /* Set the encryption key. */ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher); /* * We will no longer need the session key here. * Destroy any extra copies. */ explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); /* * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message * will be received in encrypted form. */ packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); debug("Received encrypted confirmation."); } /* * Authenticate user */ void ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive) { int i, type; if (supported_authentications == 0) fatal("ssh_userauth1: server supports no auth methods"); /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER); packet_put_cstring(server_user); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* * The server should respond with success if no authentication is * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds * with failure. */ type = packet_read(); /* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) goto success; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type); /* * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host * authentication. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) && options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) { for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) { if (sensitive->keys[i] != NULL && sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 && try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, sensitive->keys[i])) goto success; } } /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) && options.rsa_authentication) { /* * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases. */ if (try_agent_authentication()) goto success; /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) if (options.identity_keys[i] != NULL && options.identity_keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 && try_rsa_authentication(i)) goto success; } /* Try challenge response authentication if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) && options.challenge_response_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { if (try_challenge_response_authentication()) goto success; } /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) && options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { char prompt[80]; snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", server_user, host); if (try_password_authentication(prompt)) goto success; } /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */ fatal("Permission denied."); /* NOTREACHED */ success: return; /* need statement after label */ } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,1827 +1,1934 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.226 2015/07/30 00:01:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.239 2016/02/23 01:34:14 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "dh.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "msg.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif /* import */ extern char *client_version_string; extern char *server_version_string; extern Options options; /* * SSH2 key exchange */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; char *xxx_host; struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; static int verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1) fatal("Host key verification failed."); return 0; } static char * order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret; size_t maxlen; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; int ktype; u_int i; /* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL); hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; first = xmalloc(maxlen); last = xmalloc(maxlen); *first = *last = '\0'; #define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \ do { \ if (*to != '\0') \ strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \ strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \ } while (0) while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') { if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg); if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) ALG_APPEND(first, alg); else ALG_APPEND(last, alg); } #undef ALG_APPEND xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first, (*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last); if (*first != '\0') debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first); free(first); free(last); free(hostname); free(oavail); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); return ret; } void ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; + char *s; struct kex *kex; int r; xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( - options.kex_algorithms); + if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers); if (options.compression) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none"; } else { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"; } myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) { if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, &options.hostkeyalgorithms) != 0) fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms); } else { /* Enforce default */ options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port)); } if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, (time_t)options.rekey_interval); /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); kex = active_state->kex; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; # endif #endif kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state); - if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) { - debug("Roaming not allowed by server"); - options.use_roaming = 0; - } + /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = + compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms); + if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r)); session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); packet_put_cstring("markus"); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif } /* * Authenticate user */ typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt; typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod; typedef struct identity Identity; typedef struct idlist Idlist; struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */ struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */ char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */ int tried; int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */ int userprovided; }; TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity); struct cauthctxt { const char *server_user; const char *local_user; const char *host; const char *service; struct cauthmethod *method; sig_atomic_t success; char *authlist; int attempt; /* pubkey */ struct idlist keys; int agent_fd; /* hostbased */ Sensitive *sensitive; char *oktypes, *ktypes; const char *active_ktype; /* kbd-interactive */ int info_req_seen; /* generic */ void *methoddata; }; struct cauthmethod { char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */ int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt); int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */ int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */ }; +int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, void *); +int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *); int userauth_none(Authctxt *); int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *); int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *); int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *); int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *); #ifdef GSSAPI int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt); int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *); int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *); int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); #endif void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *); static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *); static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *); -static Key *load_identity_file(char *, int); +static Key *load_identity_file(Identity *); static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); static char *authmethods_get(void); Authmethod authmethods[] = { #ifdef GSSAPI {"gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, NULL, &options.gss_authentication, NULL}, #endif {"hostbased", userauth_hostbased, NULL, &options.hostbased_authentication, NULL}, {"publickey", userauth_pubkey, NULL, &options.pubkey_authentication, NULL}, {"keyboard-interactive", userauth_kbdint, NULL, &options.kbd_interactive_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"password", userauth_passwd, NULL, &options.password_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"none", userauth_none, NULL, NULL, NULL}, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL} }; void ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; Authctxt authctxt; - int type; + int r; if (options.challenge_response_authentication) options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; - - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth"); - packet_send(); - debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST sent"); - packet_write_wait(); - type = packet_read(); - if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) - fatal("Server denied authentication request: %d", type); - if (packet_remaining() > 0) { - char *reply = packet_get_string(NULL); - debug2("service_accept: %s", reply); - free(reply); - } else { - debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); - } - packet_check_eom(); - debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received"); - if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL) options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get(); /* setup authentication context */ memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt)); pubkey_prepare(&authctxt); authctxt.server_user = server_user; authctxt.local_user = local_user; authctxt.host = host; authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */ authctxt.success = 0; authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none"); authctxt.authlist = NULL; authctxt.methoddata = NULL; authctxt.sensitive = sensitive; authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL; authctxt.info_req_seen = 0; authctxt.agent_fd = -1; if (authctxt.method == NULL) fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request"); - /* initial userauth request */ - userauth_none(&authctxt); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - dispatch_init(&input_userauth_error); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */ + ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); + ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */ pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt); - dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name); } +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; + int r; + + if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { + char *reply; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + debug2("service_accept: %s", reply); + free(reply); + } else { + debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received"); + + /* initial userauth request */ + userauth_none(authctxt); + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) +{ + return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, active_state); +} + void userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) { if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; if (authlist == NULL) { authlist = authctxt->authlist; } else { free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = authlist; } for (;;) { Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist); if (method == NULL) fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist); authctxt->method = method; /* reset the per method handler */ dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL); /* and try new method */ if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) { debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name); break; } else { debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method"); method->enabled = NULL; } } } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: " "type %d", type); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *msg, *raw, *lang; u_int len; debug3("input_userauth_banner"); raw = packet_get_string(&len); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) { if (len > 65536) len = 65536; msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */ strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH); fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); free(msg); } free(raw); free(lang); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context"); free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = NULL; if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ return 0; } int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__); fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.", authctxt->method->name); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *authlist = NULL; int partial; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context"); authlist = packet_get_string(NULL); partial = packet_get_char(); packet_check_eom(); if (partial != 0) { logit("Authenticated with partial success."); /* reset state */ pubkey_cleanup(authctxt); pubkey_prepare(authctxt); } debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist); userauth(authctxt, authlist); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Key *key = NULL; Identity *id = NULL; Buffer b; int pktype, sent = 0; u_int alen, blen; char *pkalg, *fp; u_char *pkblob; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context"); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKOK) { /* this is similar to SSH_BUG_PKAUTH */ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SSH_BUG_PKOK"); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); buffer_free(&b); } else { pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); } packet_check_eom(); debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u", pkalg, blen); if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) { debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg); goto done; } if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) { debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch " "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) goto done; debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); free(fp); /* * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been * moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by * duplicate keys */ TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) { if (key_equal(key, id->key)) { sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id); break; } } done: if (key != NULL) key_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* try another method if we did not send a packet */ if (sent == 0) userauth(authctxt, NULL); return 0; } #ifdef GSSAPI int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) { Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL; static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL; static u_int mech = 0; OM_uint32 min; int ok = 0; /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at * once. */ if (gss_supported == NULL) gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ } else { mech++; } } if (!ok) return 0; authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_int(1); packet_put_int((gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2); packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE); packet_put_char(gss_supported->elements[mech].length); packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements, gss_supported->elements[mech].length); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */ return 1; } static OM_uint32 process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; OM_uint32 status, ms, flags; Buffer b; status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags); if (send_tok.length > 0) { if (GSS_ERROR(status)) packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK); else packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN); packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); packet_send(); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); } if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */ if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE); packet_send(); } else { ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic"); gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic); if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC); packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); packet_send(); } buffer_free(&b); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); } } return status; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; int oidlen; char *oidv; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; /* Setup our OID */ oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen); if (oidlen <= 2 || oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE || oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) { free(oidv); debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received"); userauth(authctxt, NULL); return 0; } if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2)) fatal("Server returned different OID than expected"); packet_check_eom(); free(oidv); if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { /* Start again with next method on list */ debug("Trying to start again"); userauth(authctxt, NULL); return 0; } return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 status; u_int slen; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); recv_tok.length = slen; /* safe typecast */ packet_check_eom(); status = process_gssapi_token(ctxt, &recv_tok); free(recv_tok.value); if (GSS_ERROR(status)) { /* Start again with the next method in the list */ userauth(authctxt, NULL); return 0; } return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 ms; u_int len; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len); recv_tok.length = len; packet_check_eom(); /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */ (void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL); free(recv_tok.value); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */ return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { char *msg; char *lang; /* maj */(void)packet_get_int(); /* min */(void)packet_get_int(); msg=packet_get_string(NULL); lang=packet_get_string(NULL); packet_check_eom(); debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg); free(msg); free(lang); return 0; } #endif /* GSSAPI */ int userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) { /* initial userauth request */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_send(); return 1; } int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int attempt = 0; char prompt[150]; char *password; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; if (attempt != 1) error("Permission denied, please try again."); snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_char(0); packet_put_cstring(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); packet_add_padding(64); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); return 1; } /* * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; char prompt[150]; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: " "no authentication context"); info = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); if (strlen(info) > 0) logit("%s", info); free(info); free(lang); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_char(1); /* additional info */ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); packet_put_cstring(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); password = NULL; while (password == NULL) { snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); if (password == NULL) { /* bail out */ return 0; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) { explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit."); password = NULL; } explicit_bzero(retype, strlen(retype)); free(retype); } packet_put_cstring(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); packet_add_padding(64); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); return 0; } +static const char * +identity_sign_encode(struct identity *id) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; + + if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA) { + switch (ssh->kex->rsa_sha2) { + case 256: + return "rsa-sha2-256"; + case 512: + return "rsa-sha2-512"; + } + } + return key_ssh_name(id->key); +} + static int identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { Key *prv; int ret; + const char *alg; + alg = identity_sign_encode(id); + /* the agent supports this key */ - if (id->agent_fd) + if (id->agent_fd != -1) return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp, - data, datalen, compat); + data, datalen, alg, compat); /* * we have already loaded the private key or * the private key is stored in external hardware */ if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) - return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, + return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat)); /* load the private key from the file */ - if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename, id->userprovided)) == NULL) - return (-1); /* XXX return decent error code */ - ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); + if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); sshkey_free(prv); return (ret); } static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) { Buffer b; + Identity *private_id; u_char *blob, *signature; - u_int bloblen; size_t slen; - u_int skip = 0; - int ret = -1; - int have_sig = 1; + u_int bloblen, skip = 0; + int matched, ret = -1, have_sig = 1; char *fp; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; - debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp); + debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, key_type(id->key), fp); free(fp); if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { /* we cannot handle this key */ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key"); return 0; } /* data to be signed */ buffer_init(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); skip = session_id2_len; } else { buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); skip = buffer_len(&b); } buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key)); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, identity_sign_encode(id)); } buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); + /* + * If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key + * and use it to complete the signature. + * If no such private key exists, return failure and continue with + * other methods of authentication. + */ + if (key_is_cert(id->key)) { + matched = 0; + TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) && + id->key->type != private_id->key->type) { + id = private_id; + matched = 1; + break; + } + } + if (matched) { + debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for " + "certificate", __func__, id->filename, + id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : ""); + } else { + /* XXX maybe verbose/error? */ + debug("%s: no private key for certificate " + "\"%s\"", __func__, id->filename); + free(blob); + buffer_free(&b); + return 0; + } + } + /* generate signature */ ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), datafellows); if (ret != 0) { + if (ret != SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) + error("%s: signing failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); free(blob); buffer_free(&b); return 0; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE) { buffer_clear(&b); buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); skip = session_id2_len; buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key)); buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); } free(blob); /* append signature */ buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen); free(signature); /* skip session id and packet type */ if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1) fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error"); buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1); /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); buffer_free(&b); packet_send(); return 1; } static int send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) { u_char *blob; u_int bloblen, have_sig = 0; debug3("send_pubkey_test"); if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { /* we cannot handle this key */ debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key"); return 0; } /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_char(have_sig); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) - packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(id->key)); + packet_put_cstring(identity_sign_encode(id)); packet_put_string(blob, bloblen); free(blob); packet_send(); return 1; } static Key * -load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided) +load_identity_file(Identity *id) { - Key *private; - char prompt[300], *passphrase; + Key *private = NULL; + char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment; int r, perm_ok = 0, quit = 0, i; struct stat st; - if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) { - (userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s", - filename, strerror(errno)); + if (stat(id->filename, &st) < 0) { + (id->userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s", + id->filename, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, - "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename); + "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename); for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { if (i == 0) passphrase = ""; else { passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (*passphrase == '\0') { debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); free(passphrase); break; } } - switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, - passphrase, &private, NULL, &perm_ok))) { + switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename, + passphrase, &private, &comment, &perm_ok))) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: if (options.batch_mode) { quit = 1; break; } if (i != 0) debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); break; case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: if (errno == ENOENT) { debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s", - filename, ssh_err(r)); + id->filename, ssh_err(r)); quit = 1; break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: - error("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); + error("Load key \"%s\": %s", id->filename, ssh_err(r)); quit = 1; break; } + if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 && + !(id->key && id->isprivate)) + maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment, + passphrase); if (i > 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); } + free(comment); if (private != NULL || quit) break; } return private; } /* * try keys in the following order: - * 1. agent keys that are found in the config file - * 2. other agent keys - * 3. keys that are only listed in the config file + * 1. certificates listed in the config file + * 2. other input certificates + * 3. agent keys that are found in the config file + * 4. other agent keys + * 5. keys that are only listed in the config file */ static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp; struct idlist agent, files, *preferred; struct sshkey *key; - int agent_fd, i, r, found; + int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found; size_t j; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */ TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */ preferred = &authctxt->keys; TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */ /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { key = options.identity_keys[i]; if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) continue; options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); + id->agent_fd = -1; id->key = key; id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]); id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next); } /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) { if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) continue; found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) { if (id2->key == NULL || (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) continue; if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); found = 1; break; } } /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */ if (!found && options.identities_only) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); explicit_bzero(id, sizeof(*id)); free(id); } } + /* list of certificates specified by user */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { + key = options.certificates[i]; + if (!key_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL || + key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) + continue; + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); + id->agent_fd = -1; + id->key = key; + id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]); + id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i]; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); + } /* list of keys supported by the agent */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 2, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + close(agent_fd); } else { for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) { found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) { /* * agent keys from the config file are * preferred */ if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); id->agent_fd = agent_fd; found = 1; break; } } if (!found && !options.identities_only) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); /* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */ id->key = idlist->keys[j]; id->filename = idlist->comments[j]; idlist->keys[j] = NULL; idlist->comments[j] = NULL; id->agent_fd = agent_fd; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next); } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); /* append remaining agent keys */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd; } /* append remaining keys from the config file */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } - TAILQ_FOREACH(id, preferred, next) { - debug2("key: %s (%p),%s", id->filename, id->key, - id->userprovided ? " explicit" : ""); + /* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes */ + TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) { + if (id->key != NULL && + match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { + debug("Skipping %s key %s - " + "not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", + sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename); + TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next); + sshkey_free(id->key); + free(id->filename); + memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id)); + continue; + } + debug2("key: %s (%p)%s%s", id->filename, id->key, + id->userprovided ? ", explicit" : "", + id->agent_fd != -1 ? ", agent" : ""); } } static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); - if (id->key) - sshkey_free(id->key); + sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->filename); free(id); } } static int try_identity(Identity *id) { if (!id->key) return (0); - if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), - options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { - debug("Skipping %s key %s for not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", - sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename); - return (0); - } if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server", key_type(id->key), id->filename); return (0); } return (id->key->type != KEY_RSA1); } int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; int sent = 0; while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) { if (id->tried++) return (0); /* move key to the end of the queue */ TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next); /* * send a test message if we have the public key. for * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the * private key instead */ if (id->key != NULL) { if (try_identity(id)) { debug("Offering %s public key: %s", key_type(id->key), id->filename); sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id); } } else { debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename); - id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename, - id->userprovided); + id->key = load_identity_file(id); if (id->key != NULL) { if (try_identity(id)) { id->isprivate = 1; sent = sign_and_send_pubkey( authctxt, id); } key_free(id->key); id->key = NULL; } } if (sent) return (sent); } return (0); } /* * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method. */ int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int attempt = 0; if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */ if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) { debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen"); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL); return 0; } debug2("userauth_kbdint"); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_cstring(""); /* lang */ packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ? options.kbd_interactive_devices : ""); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req); return 1; } /* * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE */ int input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response; u_int num_prompts, i; int echo = 0; debug2("input_userauth_info_req"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context"); authctxt->info_req_seen = 1; name = packet_get_string(NULL); inst = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); if (strlen(name) > 0) logit("%s", name); if (strlen(inst) > 0) logit("%s", inst); free(name); free(inst); free(lang); num_prompts = packet_get_int(); /* * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested. * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response. */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE); packet_put_int(num_prompts); debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts); for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) { prompt = packet_get_string(NULL); echo = packet_get_char(); response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0); packet_put_cstring(response); explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response)); free(response); free(prompt); } packet_check_eom(); /* done with parsing incoming message. */ packet_add_padding(64); packet_send(); return 0; } static int ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct stat st; pid_t pid; int i, r, to[2], from[2], status, sock = packet_get_connection_in(); u_char rversion = 0, version = 2; void (*osigchld)(int); *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) { error("%s: not installed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (fflush(stdout) != 0) { error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(to) < 0) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(from) < 0) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (pid == 0) { /* keep the socket on exec */ fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); permanently_drop_suid(getuid()); close(from[0]); if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(to[1]); if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(from[1]); close(to[0]); /* Close everything but stdio and the socket */ for (i = STDERR_FILENO + 1; i < sock; i++) close(i); closefrom(sock + 1); debug3("%s: [child] pid=%ld, exec %s", __func__, (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN); - execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *) 0); + execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL); fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, strerror(errno)); } close(from[1]); close(to[0]); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* send # of sock, data to be signed */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1) fatal("%s: couldn't send request", __func__); sshbuf_reset(b); r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b); close(from[0]); close(to[1]); if (r < 0) { error("%s: no reply", __func__); goto fail; } errno = 0; while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { if (errno != EINTR) { error("%s: waitpid %ld: %s", __func__, (long)pid, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("%s: exited abnormally", __func__); goto fail; } if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { error("%s: exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); goto fail; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto fail; } if (rversion != version) { error("%s: bad version", __func__); goto fail; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fail: signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return -1; } signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return 0; } int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; struct sshkey *private = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; const char *service; u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL; char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL; size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0; int i, r, success = 0; if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) { authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_key_types); authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes; } /* * Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedKeyTypes, * trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn. */ for (;;) { if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL) authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ","); if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL || *authctxt->active_ktype == '\0') break; debug3("%s: trying key type %s", __func__, authctxt->active_ktype); /* check for a useful key */ private = NULL; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) { if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL || authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 || authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC) continue; if (match_pattern_list( sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]), authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1) continue; /* we take and free the key */ private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]; authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL; break; } /* Found one */ if (private != NULL) break; /* No more keys of this type; advance */ authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; } if (private == NULL) { free(authctxt->oktypes); authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL; authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication."); goto out; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); goto out; } debug("%s: trying hostkey %s %s", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); /* figure out a name for the client host */ if ((lname = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in())) == NULL) { error("%s: cannot get local ipaddr/name", __func__); goto out; } /* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */ xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname); debug2("%s: chost %s", __func__, chost); service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service; /* construct data */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif if (authctxt->sensitive->external_keysign) r = ssh_keysign(private, &sig, &siglen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); else if ((r = sshkey_sign(private, &sig, &siglen, - sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows)) != 0) + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, datafellows)) != 0) debug("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (r != 0) { error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, key_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } success = 1; out: if (sig != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sig, siglen); free(sig); } free(keyblob); free(lname); free(fp); free(chost); sshkey_free(private); sshbuf_free(b); return success; } /* find auth method */ /* * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false. */ static int authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method) { if (method == NULL) return 0; /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */ if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0) return 0; /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */ if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0) return 0; return 1; } static Authmethod * authmethod_lookup(const char *name) { Authmethod *method = NULL; if (name != NULL) for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0) return method; debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); return NULL; } /* XXX internal state */ static Authmethod *current = NULL; static char *supported = NULL; static char *preferred = NULL; /* * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list, * use a built-in default list. */ static Authmethod * authmethod_get(char *authlist) { char *name = NULL; u_int next; /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */ if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0) authlist = options.preferred_authentications; if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) { debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist); free(supported); supported = xstrdup(authlist); preferred = options.preferred_authentications; debug3("preferred %s", preferred); current = NULL; } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) return current; for (;;) { if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) { debug("No more authentication methods to try."); current = NULL; return NULL; } preferred += next; debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name); debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred); if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) { debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name); debug("Next authentication method: %s", name); free(name); return current; } free(name); } } static char * authmethods_get(void) { Authmethod *method = NULL; Buffer b; char *list; buffer_init(&b); for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) { if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); buffer_append(&b, method->name, strlen(method->name)); } } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); return list; } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 (revision 296853) @@ -1,981 +1,1014 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.280 2015/07/03 03:49:45 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.284 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: July 3 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd .Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sshd .Bk -words .Op Fl 46DdeiqTt .Op Fl b Ar bits .Op Fl C Ar connection_spec .Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl f Ar config_file .Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time .Op Fl h Ar host_key_file .Op Fl k Ar key_gen_time .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl u Ar len .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for .Xr ssh 1 . Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. .Pp .Nm listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from .Pa /etc/rc.d/sshd . It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange. .Pp .Nm can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ; command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. .Nm rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, .Dv SIGHUP , by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\& .Pa /usr/sbin/sshd . .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl b Ar bits Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key (default 1024). .It Fl C Ar connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the .Fl T extended test mode. If provided, any .Cm Match directives in the configuration file that would apply to the specified user, host, and address will be set before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs. The keywords are .Dq user , .Dq host , .Dq laddr , .Dq lport , and .Dq addr . All are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple .Fl C options or as a comma-separated list. .It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify .Nm during key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the .Fl h option or the .Cm HostKey configuration directive. .It Fl D When this option is specified, .Nm will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of .Nm sshd . .It Fl d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple .Fl d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of the system log. .It Fl e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. .It Fl f Ar config_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config . .Nm refuses to start if there is no configuration file. .It Fl g Ar login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. .It Fl h Ar host_key_file Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if .Nm is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key . .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different protocol versions and host key algorithms. .It Fl i Specifies that .Nm is being run from .Xr inetd 8 . If SSH protocol 1 is enabled, .Nm should not normally be run from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can respond to the client, and this may take some time. Clients may have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time. .It Fl k Ar key_gen_time Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The motivation for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically seized. A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated. .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Fl p Ar port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the .Cm Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the .Cm ListenAddress option override command-line ports. .It Fl q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. .It Fl T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, .Cm Match rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more .Fl C options. .It Fl t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating .Nm reliably as configuration options may change. .It Fl u Ar len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the .Li utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than .Ar len , the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying .Fl u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the .Pa utmp file. .Fl u0 may also be used to prevent .Nm from making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , and using a .Cm from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in .Cm AllowUsers or .Cm DenyUsers . .El .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the .Cm Protocol option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . -Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 and RSA keys; -protocol 1 only supports RSA keys. -For both protocols, -each host has a host-specific key, -normally 2048 bits, -used to identify the host. +Protocol 1 should not be used +and is only offered to support legacy devices. .Pp -Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through +Each host has a host-specific key, +used to identify the host. +Partial forward security for protocol 1 is provided through an additional server key, normally 1024 bits, generated when the server starts. This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and is never stored on disk. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public host and server keys. The client compares the RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then generates a 256-bit random number. It encrypts this random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to the server. Both sides then use this random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. .Pp For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). .Pp Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. .Pp Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in .Cm DenyUsers or its group is listed in .Cm DenyGroups \&. The definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( .Ql \&*LK\&* on Solaris and UnixWare, .Ql \&* on HP-UX, containing .Ql Nologin on Tru64, a leading .Ql \&*LOCKED\&* on FreeBSD and a leading .Ql \&! on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg .Ql NP or .Ql \&*NP\&* ). .Pp If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel. .Pp After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. .Pp When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit. .Sh LOGIN PROCESS When a user successfully logs in, .Nm does the following: .Bl -enum -offset indent .It If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, prints last login time and .Pa /etc/motd (unless prevented in the configuration file or by .Pa ~/.hushlogin ; see the .Sx FILES section). .It If the login is on a tty, records login time. .It Checks .Pa /etc/nologin and .Pa /var/run/nologin ; if one exists, it prints the contents and quits (unless root). .It Changes to run with normal user privileges. .It Sets up basic environment. .It Reads the file .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. See the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Changes to user's home directory. .It If .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists and the .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm PermitUserRC option is set, runs it; else if .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; otherwise runs .Xr xauth 1 . The .Dq rc files are given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See .Sx SSHRC , below. .It Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the system password database. .El .Sh SSHRC If the file .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists, .Xr sh 1 runs it after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard input (and .Ev DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call .Xr xauth 1 because .Nm will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. .Pp The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. .Pp This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: .Bd -literal -offset 3n if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi .Ed .Pp If this file does not exist, .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. .Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public key authentication; -if none is specified, the default is +if this option is not specified, the default is .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 . Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a .Ql # are ignored as comments). Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. Protocol 2 public key consist of: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number). The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for protocol version 1; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key). For protocol version 2 the keytype is .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 , .Dq ssh-ed25519 , .Dq ssh-dss or .Dq ssh-rsa . .Pp Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the .Pa identity.pub , .Pa id_dsa.pub , .Pa id_ecdsa.pub , .Pa id_ed25519.pub , or the .Pa id_rsa.pub file and edit it. .Pp .Nm enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys of 768 bits. .Pp The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm agent-forwarding +Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict +option. .It Cm cert-authority Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. .Pp Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. .It Cm command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify .Cm no-pty . A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by either a .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm ForceCommand directive or a command embedded in a certificate. .It Cm environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. This option is automatically disabled if .Cm UseLogin is enabled. .It Cm from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .Pp In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a .Cm from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. .Pp The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). .It Cm no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. .It Cm no-port-forwarding Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the .Cm command option. .It Cm no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). .It Cm no-user-rc Disables execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc . .It Cm no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. .It Cm permitopen="host:port" Limit local port forwarding with .Xr ssh 1 .Fl L such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple .Cm permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal domains or addresses. A port specification of .Cm * matches any port. +.It Cm port-forwarding +Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict .It Cm principals="principals" On a .Cm cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the .Cm cert-authority option. +.It Cm pty +Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict +option. +.It Cm restrict +Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding, +as well as disabling PTY allocation +and execution of +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc . +If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files +they will be included in this set. .It Cm tunnel="n" Force a .Xr tun 4 device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. +.It Cm user-rc +Enables execution of +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict +option. +.It Cm X11-forwarding +Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict +option. .El .Pp An example authorized_keys file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss AAAAC3...51R== example.net permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss AAAAB5...21S== tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== jane@example.net +restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv== +user@example.net +restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5== +user@example.net .Ed .Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. .Pp Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields are separated by spaces. .Pp The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of .Dq @cert-authority , to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or .Dq @revoked , to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line. .Pp Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns .Pf ( Ql * and .Ql \&? act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by .Ql \&! to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within .Ql \&[ and .Ql \&] brackets then followed by .Ql \&: and a non-standard port number. .Pp Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a .Ql | character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied. .Pp Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they can be obtained, for example, from .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub . The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. .Pp Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are ignored as comments. .Pp When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the .Dq @cert-authority marker described above. .Pp The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the .Dq @revoked marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from .Xr ssh 1 when they are encountered. .Pp It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. .Pp Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 or by taking .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. .Xr ssh-keygen 1 also offers some basic automated editing for .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations. .Pp An example ssh_known_hosts file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... .Ed .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.hushlogin This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and .Pa /etc/motd , if .Cm PrintLastLog and .Cm PrintMotd , respectively, are enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by .Cm Banner . .Pp .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 for more information). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Nm reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described above. The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp If this file, the .Pa ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, .Nm will not allow it to be used unless the .Cm StrictModes option has been set to .Dq no . .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with .Ql # ) , and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not be, world-readable. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.allow .It Pa /etc/hosts.deny Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here. Further details are described in .Xr hosts_access 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 ) . It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli -Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange". +Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange" +key exchange method. The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . +If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will +be used. .Pp .It Pa /etc/motd See .Xr motd 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/nologin If this file exists, .Nm refuses to let anyone except root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Note that .Nm does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Nm sshd . The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Similar to .Pa ~/.ssh/rc , it can be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /var/empty .Xr chroot 2 directory used by .Nm during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-writable. .Pp .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the .Nm listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr chroot 2 , .Xr hosts_access 5 , .Xr login.conf 5 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd_config 5 , .Xr inetd 8 , .Xr sftp-server 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,2698 +1,2700 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.458 2015/08/20 22:32:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.465 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and * authentication agent connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation: * Privilege Separation: * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE #include #include #endif #ifdef __FreeBSD__ #include #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) #include #elif defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H) #include #endif #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "msg.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "monitor_mm.h" #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" -#include "roaming.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef LIBWRAP #include #include int allow_severity; int deny_severity; #endif /* LIBWRAP */ #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif /* Re-exec fds */ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2) #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3) #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4) extern char *__progname; /* Server configuration options. */ ServerOptions options; /* Name of the server configuration file. */ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; /* * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing * the first connection. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */ int test_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ int inetd_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ int no_daemon_flag = 0; /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ int log_stderr = 0; /* Saved arguments to main(). */ char **saved_argv; int saved_argc; /* re-exec */ int rexeced_flag = 0; int rexec_flag = 1; int rexec_argc = 0; char **rexec_argv; /* * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP * signal handler. */ #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; int num_listen_socks = 0; /* * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, * sshd will skip the version-number exchange */ char *client_version_string = NULL; char *server_version_string = NULL; /* Daemon's agent connection */ int auth_sock = -1; int have_agent = 0; /* * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. */ struct { Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */ Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */ Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ int have_ssh1_key; int have_ssh2_key; u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; } sensitive_data; /* * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated. * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0; /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ u_char session_id[16]; /* same for ssh2 */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; /* record remote hostname or ip */ u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1; /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ int *startup_pipes = NULL; int startup_pipe; /* in child */ /* variables used for privilege separation */ int use_privsep = -1; struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL; int privsep_is_preauth = 1; /* global authentication context */ Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL; /* sshd_config buffer */ Buffer cfg; /* message to be displayed after login */ Buffer loginmsg; /* Unprivileged user */ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void); void demote_sensitive_data(void); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static void do_ssh1_kex(void); #endif static void do_ssh2_kex(void); /* * Close all listening sockets */ static void close_listen_socks(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) close(listen_socks[i]); num_listen_socks = -1; } static void close_startup_pipes(void) { int i; if (startup_pipes) for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) close(startup_pipes[i]); } /* * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate * the server key). */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sighup_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; received_sighup = 1; signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); errno = save_errno; } /* * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. * Restarts the server. */ static void sighup_restart(void) { logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); platform_pre_restart(); close_listen_socks(); close_startup_pipes(); alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */ execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(1); } /* * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } /* * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then * reap any zombies left by exited children. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) ; signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); errno = save_errno; } /* * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void grace_alarm_handler(int sig) { if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0) kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM); /* * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized * keys command helpers. */ if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) { signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN); kill(0, SIGTERM); } /* Log error and exit. */ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); } /* * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution * problems. */ static void generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) { verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, options.server_key_bits); verbose("RSA key generation complete."); arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void key_regeneration_alarm(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); errno = save_errno; key_do_regen = 1; } static void sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) { u_int i; int mismatch; int remote_major, remote_minor; int major, minor; char *s, *newline = "\n"; char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; minor = 99; } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; newline = "\r\n"; } else { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; } xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s", major, minor, SSH_VERSION, *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", options.version_addendum, newline); /* Send our protocol version identification. */ - if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string, + if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) != strlen(server_version_string)) { logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } /* Read other sides version identification. */ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { - if (roaming_atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { + if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { logit("Did not receive identification string from %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } if (buf[i] == '\r') { buf[i] = 0; /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ if (i == 12 && strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) break; continue; } if (buf[i] == '\n') { buf[i] = 0; break; } } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' " "from %s port %d", client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port()); close(sock_in); close(sock_out); cleanup_exit(255); } debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) { logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.", get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) { logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.", get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) { fatal("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; " "refusing connection", remote_version); } mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99) { if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) enable_compat20(); else mismatch = 1; break; } if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { mismatch = 1; break; } if (remote_minor < 3) { packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version."); } else if (remote_minor == 3) { /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ enable_compat13(); } break; case 2: if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: mismatch = 1; break; } chop(server_version_string); debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); if (mismatch) { s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); close(sock_in); close(sock_out); logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr(), server_version_string, client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void) { int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; } if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; } } sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); } /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ void demote_sensitive_data(void) { Key *tmp; int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key); key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; } /* Certs do not need demotion */ } /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */ } static void privsep_preauth_child(void) { u_int32_t rnd[256]; gid_t gidset[1]; /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ privsep_challenge_enable(); #ifdef GSSAPI /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */ if (options.gss_authentication) ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); #endif arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); - /* Change our root directory */ - if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) - fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, - strerror(errno)); - if (chdir("/") == -1) - fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); + /* Demote the child */ + if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { + /* Change our root directory */ + if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) + fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, + strerror(errno)); + if (chdir("/") == -1) + fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); - /* Drop our privileges */ - debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid, - (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid); -#if 0 - /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */ - do_setusercontext(privsep_pw); -#else - gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid; - if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0) - fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw); -#endif + /* Drop our privileges */ + debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid, + (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid); + gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid; + if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0) + fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw); + } } static int privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { int status, r; pid_t pid; struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ pmonitor = monitor_init(); /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ pmonitor->m_pkex = &active_state->kex; if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); } else if (pid != 0) { debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); pmonitor->m_pid = pid; if (have_agent) { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock); if (r != 0) { error("Could not get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); have_agent = 0; } } if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid); monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor); /* Sync memory */ monitor_sync(pmonitor); /* Wait for the child's exit status */ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } privsep_is_preauth = 0; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; if (WIFEXITED(status)) { if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d", __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box); return 1; } else { /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); - /* Demote the child */ - if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) - privsep_preauth_child(); + privsep_preauth_child(); setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_child(box); return 0; } } static void privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { u_int32_t rnd[256]; #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING if (1) { #else if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) { #endif /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ use_privsep = 0; goto skip; } /* New socket pair */ monitor_reinit(pmonitor); pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ exit(0); } /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* Drop privileges */ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); skip: /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); /* * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since * this information is not part of the key state. */ packet_set_authenticated(); } static char * list_hostkey_types(void) { Buffer b; const char *p; char *ret; int i; Key *key; buffer_init(&b); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; /* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */ if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) { debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); p = key_ssh_name(key); buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); + + /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */ + if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { + p = ",rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"; + buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); + } break; } /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */ key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); p = key_ssh_name(key); buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); break; } } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret); return ret; } static Key * get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh) { int i; Key *key; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; break; default: key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL && !need_private) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; break; } if (key != NULL && key->type == type && (key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa_nid == nid)) return need_private ? sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key; } return NULL; } Key * get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh); } Key * get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh); } Key * get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) { if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); } Key * get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh) { if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]); } int get_hostkey_index(Key *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (key_is_cert(key)) { if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]))) return (i); } else { if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))) return (i); if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]))) return (i); } } return (-1); } /* Inform the client of all hostkeys */ static void notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *buf; struct sshkey *key; int i, nkeys, r; char *fp; /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS) return; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh); if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC || key->type == KEY_RSA1 || sshkey_is_cert(key)) continue; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp); free(fp); if (nkeys == 0) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("hostkeys-00@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(0); /* want-reply */ } sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s", __func__, i, ssh_err(r)); packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); nkeys++; } debug3("%s: sent %d hostkeys", __func__, nkeys); if (nkeys == 0) fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__); packet_send(); sshbuf_free(buf); } /* * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups */ static int drop_connection(int startups) { int p, r; if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) return 0; if (startups >= options.max_startups) return 1; if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) return 1; p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; p += options.max_startups_rate; r = arc4random_uniform(100); debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r); return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; } static void usage(void) { if (options.version_addendum && *options.version_addendum != '\0') fprintf(stderr, "%s %s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, options.version_addendum, OPENSSL_VERSION); else fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION); fprintf(stderr, "usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n" " [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n" " [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port]\n" " [-u len]\n" ); exit(1); } static void send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf) { Buffer m; debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd, buffer_len(conf)); /* * Protocol from reexec master to child: * string configuration * u_int ephemeral_key_follows * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1) * bignum n " * bignum d " * bignum iqmp " * bignum p " * bignum q " * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded) */ buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf)); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL && sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) { buffer_put_int(&m, 1); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q); } else #endif buffer_put_int(&m, 0); #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY) rexec_send_rng_seed(&m); #endif if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1) fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } static void recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf) { Buffer m; char *cp; u_int len; debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd); buffer_init(&m); if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1) fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__); if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0) fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__); cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); if (conf != NULL) buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1); free(cp); if (buffer_get_int(&m)) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q); if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters( sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters " "error", __func__); #endif } #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY) rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m); #endif buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } /* Accept a connection from inetd */ static void server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out) { int fd; startup_pipe = -1; if (rexeced_flag) { close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO); if (!debug_flag) { startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); } } else { *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); } /* * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if * ttyfd happens to be one of those. */ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); if (!log_stderr) dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO)) close(fd); } debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out); } /* * Listen for TCP connections */ static void server_listen(void) { int ret, listen_sock, on = 1; struct addrinfo *ai; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int socksize; socklen_t len; for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) fatal("Too many listen sockets. " "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(ret)); continue; } /* Create socket for listening. */ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (listen_sock < 0) { /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) { close(listen_sock); continue; } /* * Set socket options. * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. */ if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(listen_sock); debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); len = sizeof(socksize); getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &socksize, &len); debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize); /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); close(listen_sock); continue; } listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; num_listen_socks++; /* Start listening on the port. */ if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); } freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); if (!num_listen_socks) fatal("Cannot bind any address."); } /* * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns * from this function are in a forked subprocess. */ static void server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) { fd_set *fdset; int i, j, ret, maxfd; int key_used = 0, startups = 0; int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }; struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; pid_t pid; u_char rnd[256]; /* setup fd set for accept */ fdset = NULL; maxfd = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) maxfd = listen_socks[i]; /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) startup_pipes[i] = -1; /* * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or * the daemon is killed with a signal. */ for (;;) { if (received_sighup) sighup_restart(); - if (fdset != NULL) - free(fdset); + free(fdset); fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", (int) received_sigterm); close_listen_socks(); if (options.pid_file != NULL) unlink(options.pid_file); exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); } if (key_used && key_do_regen) { generate_ephemeral_server_key(); key_used = 0; key_do_regen = 0; } if (ret < 0) continue; for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { /* * the read end of the pipe is ready * if the child has closed the pipe * after successful authentication * or if the child has died */ close(startup_pipes[i]); startup_pipes[i] = -1; startups--; } for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) continue; fromlen = sizeof(from); *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); if (*newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) usleep(100 * 1000); continue; } if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) { close(*newsock); continue; } if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { debug("drop connection #%d", startups); close(*newsock); continue; } if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { close(*newsock); continue; } if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) { error("reexec socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); close(*newsock); close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); continue; } for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) maxfd = startup_p[0]; startups++; break; } /* * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless * we are in debugging mode. */ if (debug_flag) { /* * In debugging mode. Close the listening * socket, and start processing the * connection without forking. */ debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); startup_pipe = -1; pid = getpid(); if (rexec_flag) { send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg); close(config_s[0]); } break; } /* * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have * the child process the connection. The * parent continues listening. */ platform_pre_fork(); if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* * Child. Close the listening and * max_startup sockets. Start using * the accepted socket. Reinitialize * logging (since our pid has changed). * We break out of the loop to handle * the connection. */ platform_post_fork_child(); startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; close_startup_pipes(); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); if (rexec_flag) close(config_s[0]); break; } /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ platform_post_fork_parent(pid); if (pid < 0) error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid); close(startup_p[1]); if (rexec_flag) { send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg); close(config_s[0]); close(config_s[1]); } /* * Mark that the key has been used (it * was "given" to the child). */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && key_used == 0) { /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */ signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); key_used = 1; } close(*newsock); /* * Ensure that our random state differs * from that of the child */ arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } /* child process check (or debug mode) */ if (num_listen_socks < 0) break; } } /* * Main program for the daemon. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int r, opt, i, j, on = 1; int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; const char *remote_ip; int remote_port; char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL; int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; u_int n; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; mode_t new_umask; Key *key; Key *pubkey; int keytype; Authctxt *authctxt; struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0); + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); #endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ saved_argc = ac; rexec_argc = ac; saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv)); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_argv[i] = NULL; #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_argv; #endif if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1) debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ initialize_server_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'f': config_file_name = optarg; break; case 'c': if (options.num_host_cert_files >= MAX_HOSTCERTS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many host certificates.\n"); exit(1); } options.host_cert_files[options.num_host_cert_files++] = derelativise_path(optarg); break; case 'd': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) options.log_level++; break; case 'D': no_daemon_flag = 1; break; case 'E': - logfile = xstrdup(optarg); + logfile = optarg; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'i': inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'r': rexec_flag = 0; break; case 'R': rexeced_flag = 1; inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'Q': /* ignored */ break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'b': options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256, 32768, NULL); break; case 'p': options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); exit(1); } options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'g': if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'k': if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'h': if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n"); exit(1); } options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = derelativise_path(optarg); break; case 't': test_flag = 1; break; case 'T': test_flag = 2; break; case 'C': if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info, optarg) == -1) exit(1); break; case 'u': utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL); if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_server_config_line(&options, line, "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0) exit(1); free(line); break; case '?': default: usage(); break; } } if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) rexec_flag = 0; if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))) fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); if (rexeced_flag) closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); else closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ - if (logfile != NULL) { + if (logfile != NULL) log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); - free(logfile); - } /* * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host * key (unless started from inetd) */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, log_stderr || !inetd_flag); /* * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from * root's environment */ if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL) (void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME"); #ifdef _UNICOS /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now! * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! */ drop_cray_privs(); #endif sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; /* * If we're doing an extended config test, make sure we have all of * the parameters we need. If we're not doing an extended test, * do not silently ignore connection test params. */ if (test_flag >= 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 0) fatal("user, host and addr are all required when testing " "Match configs"); if (test_flag < 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) >= 0) fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without " "test mode (-T)"); /* Fetch our configuration */ buffer_init(&cfg); if (rexeced_flag) recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg); else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0) load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg); parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, &cfg, NULL); seed_rng(); /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ fill_default_server_options(&options); /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */ if (options.challenge_response_authentication) options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; /* Check that options are sensible */ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL && (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL && strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0)) fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without " "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser"); if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL && (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL && strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0)) fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without " "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser"); /* * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods. * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login. */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with " "SSH protocol 1"); for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) { if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n], 1) == 0) break; } if (n >= options.num_auth_methods) fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by " "enabled authentication methods"); } /* set default channel AF */ channel_set_af(options.address_family); /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ if (optind < ac) { fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); exit(1); } debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) #else "without OpenSSL" #endif ); /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) { if (use_privsep || options.kerberos_authentication) fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); } else { explicit_bzero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd)); privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw); free(privsep_pw->pw_passwd); privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*"); } endpwent(); /* load host keys */ sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(Key *)); sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(Key *)); if (options.host_key_agent) { if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, options.host_key_agent, 1); if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0) have_agent = 1; else error("Could not connect to agent \"%s\": %s", options.host_key_agent, ssh_err(r)); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL) continue; key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL); pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL); if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) pubkey = key_demote(key); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey; if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type != KEY_RSA1 && have_agent) { debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s", options.host_key_files[i]); keytype = pubkey->type; } else if (key != NULL) { keytype = key->type; } else { error("Could not load host key: %s", options.host_key_files[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL; continue; } switch (keytype) { case KEY_RSA1: sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key; sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1; break; case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: if (have_agent || key != NULL) sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; break; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s", key ? "private" : "agent", i, keytype == KEY_RSA1 ? sshkey_type(pubkey) : sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp); free(fp); } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; } if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); } /* * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical * indices to the public keys that they relate to. */ sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(Key *)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) { if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL) continue; key = key_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], NULL); if (key == NULL) { error("Could not load host certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); continue; } if (!key_is_cert(key)) { error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); key_free(key); continue; } /* Find matching private key */ for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) { if (key_equal_public(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) { sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; break; } } if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) { error("No matching private key for certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); key_free(key); continue; } sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; debug("host certificate: #%d type %d %s", j, key->type, key_type(key)); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* Check certain values for sanity. */ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { if (options.server_key_bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || options.server_key_bits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n"); exit(1); } /* * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels */ if (options.server_key_bits > BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { options.server_key_bits = BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.", options.server_key_bits); } } #endif if (use_privsep) { struct stat st; if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) || (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0)) fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) && (st.st_uid != getuid () || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)) #else if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0) #endif fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or " "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); } if (test_flag > 1) { if (server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 1) parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info); dump_config(&options); } /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ if (test_flag) exit(0); /* * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every * module which might be used). */ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); if (rexec_flag) { rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) { debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]); rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i]; } rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R"; rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; } /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; (void) umask(new_umask); /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) log_stderr = 1; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process * exits. */ if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) { #ifdef TIOCNOTTY int fd; #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCNOTTY fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); close(fd); } #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ } /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Avoid killing the process in high-pressure swapping environments. */ if (!inetd_flag && madvise(NULL, 0, MADV_PROTECT) != 0) debug("madvise(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be unmounted if desired. */ if (chdir("/") == -1) error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); /* ignore SIGPIPE */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ if (inetd_flag) { server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); } else { platform_pre_listen(); server_listen(); if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) generate_ephemeral_server_key(); signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); /* * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler * is setup and the listen sockets are bound */ if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) { FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w"); if (f == NULL) { error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); } else { fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); fclose(f); } } /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, &newsock, config_s); } /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]"); /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't * want the child to be able to affect the parent. */ #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY) /* * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set * controlling tty" errors. */ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif if (rexec_flag) { int fd; debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); if (startup_pipe == -1) close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) { dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD; } dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); close(config_s[1]); execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv); /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */ error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno)); recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL); log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Clean up fds */ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); if (fd > STDERR_FILENO) close(fd); } debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); } /* Executed child processes don't need these. */ fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */ alarm(0); signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); #ifdef __FreeBSD__ /* * Initialize the resolver. This may not happen automatically * before privsep chroot(). */ if ((_res.options & RES_INIT) == 0) { debug("res_init()"); res_init(); } #ifdef GSSAPI /* * Force GSS-API to parse its configuration and load any * mechanism plugins. */ { gss_OID_set mechs; OM_uint32 minor_status; gss_indicate_mechs(&minor_status, &mechs); gss_release_oid_set(&minor_status, &mechs); } #endif #endif /* * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do * not have a key. */ packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); packet_set_server(); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() && setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) { debug("get_remote_port failed"); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked. */ (void) get_canonical_hostname(0); /* * The rest of the code depends on the fact that * get_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if * the socket goes away. */ remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); #endif #ifdef LIBWRAP allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO; deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING; /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { struct request_info req; request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0); fromhost(&req); if (!hosts_access(&req)) { debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); refuse(&req); /* NOTREACHED */ fatal("libwrap refuse returns"); } } #endif /* LIBWRAP */ /* Log the connection. */ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in); verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, get_local_port()); free(laddr); /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you * are about to discover the bug. */ signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); if (!debug_flag) alarm(options.login_grace_time); sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); /* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */ if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL) generate_ephemeral_server_key(); packet_set_nonblocking(); /* allocate authentication context */ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt)); authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg; /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */ the_authctxt = authctxt; /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */ buffer_init(&loginmsg); auth_debug_reset(); if (use_privsep) { if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1) goto authenticated; } else if (compat20 && have_agent) { if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); have_agent = 0; } } /* perform the key exchange */ /* authenticate user and start session */ if (compat20) { do_ssh2_kex(); do_authentication2(authctxt); } else { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 do_ssh1_kex(); do_authentication(authctxt); #else fatal("ssh1 not supported"); #endif } /* * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers * the current keystate and exits */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); exit(0); } authenticated: /* * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for * authentication. */ alarm(0); signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); authctxt->authenticated = 1; if (startup_pipe != -1) { close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = -1; } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_authentication) { temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); restore_uid(); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { do_pam_setcred(1); do_pam_session(); } #endif /* * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare * file descriptor passing. */ if (use_privsep) { privsep_postauth(authctxt); /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ if (!compat20) destroy_sensitive_data(); } packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, options.client_alive_count_max); /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */ if (compat20) notify_hostkeys(active_state); /* Start session. */ do_authenticated(authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) finish_pam(); #endif /* USE_PAM */ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE)); #endif packet_close(); if (use_privsep) mm_terminate(); exit(0); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key * (key with larger modulus first). */ int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int) { int rsafail = 0; if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) { /* Server key has bigger modulus. */ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("do_connection: %s: " "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; } else { /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("do_connection: %s: " "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; } return (rsafail); } /* * SSH1 key exchange */ static void do_ssh1_kex(void) { int i, len; int rsafail = 0; BIGNUM *session_key_int, *fake_key_int, *real_key_int; u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_char fake_key_bytes[4096 / 8]; size_t fake_key_len; u_char cookie[8]; u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; /* * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. */ arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie)); /* * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP * spoofing. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) packet_put_char(cookie[i]); /* Store our public server RSA key. */ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); /* Store our public host RSA key. */ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); /* Put protocol flags. */ packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0)); /* Declare supported authentication types. */ auth_mask = 0; if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; if (options.rsa_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; if (options.password_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; packet_put_int(auth_mask); /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.", BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ cipher_type = packet_get_char(); if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type))) packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we sent earlier with the public key packet. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); /* Get the encrypted integer. */ if ((real_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(real_key_int); protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); packet_check_eom(); /* Setup a fake key in case RSA decryption fails */ if ((fake_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); fake_key_len = BN_num_bytes(real_key_int); if (fake_key_len > sizeof(fake_key_bytes)) fake_key_len = sizeof(fake_key_bytes); arc4random_buf(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len); if (BN_bin2bn(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len, fake_key_int) == NULL) fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_bin2bn failed"); /* Decrypt real_key_int using host/server keys */ rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(real_key_int)); /* If decryption failed, use the fake key. Else, the real key. */ if (rsafail) session_key_int = fake_key_int; else session_key_int = real_key_int; /* * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the * key is in the highest bits. */ (void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) { error("do_ssh1_kex: bad session key len from %s: " "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key)); rsafail++; } else { explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); derive_ssh1_session_id( sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id); /* * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the * session id. */ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; } /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ destroy_sensitive_data(); if (use_privsep) mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ BN_clear_free(real_key_int); BN_clear_free(fake_key_int); /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type); /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */ explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } #endif int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen, - const u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int flag) + const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int flag) { int r; u_int xxx_slen, xxx_dlen = dlen; if (privkey) { - if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(privkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen) < 0)) + if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(privkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen, + alg) < 0)) fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__); if (slen) *slen = xxx_slen; } else if (use_privsep) { - if (mm_key_sign(pubkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen) < 0) + if (mm_key_sign(pubkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen, + alg) < 0) fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__); if (slen) *slen = xxx_slen; } else { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slen, - data, dlen, datafellows)) != 0) + data, dlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } return 0; } /* SSH2 key exchange */ static void do_ssh2_kex(void) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; struct kex *kex; int r; myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( options.kex_algorithms); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal( options.ciphers); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal( options.ciphers); myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com"; } if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) - packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, + packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit, (time_t)options.rekey_interval); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( list_hostkey_types()); /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); kex = active_state->kex; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; # endif #endif kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; kex->server = 1; kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state); session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); packet_put_cstring("markus"); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif debug("KEX done"); } /* server specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { if (the_authctxt) { do_cleanup(the_authctxt); if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 && errno != ESRCH) error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__, pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); } } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif _exit(i); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd_config =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd_config (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd_config (revision 296853) @@ -1,136 +1,136 @@ -# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.97 2015/08/06 14:53:21 deraadt Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.98 2016/02/17 05:29:04 djm Exp $ # $FreeBSD$ # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See # sshd_config(5) for more information. # This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin # The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with # OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the # default value. # Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and # FreeBSD has a few additional options. #Port 22 #AddressFamily any #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 #ListenAddress :: # The default requires explicit activation of protocol 1 #Protocol 2 # HostKey for protocol version 1 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key # HostKeys for protocol version 2 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key #KeyRegenerationInterval 1h #ServerKeyBits 1024 # Ciphers and keying #RekeyLimit default none # Logging # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging #SyslogFacility AUTH #LogLevel INFO # Authentication: #LoginGraceTime 2m #PermitRootLogin no #StrictModes yes #MaxAuthTries 6 #MaxSessions 10 #RSAAuthentication yes #PubkeyAuthentication yes # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2 #AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none #AuthorizedKeysCommand none #AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts #RhostsRSAAuthentication no # similar for protocol version 2 #HostbasedAuthentication no # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for # RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files #IgnoreRhosts yes # Change to yes to enable built-in password authentication. #PasswordAuthentication no #PermitEmptyPasswords no # Change to no to disable PAM authentication #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes # Kerberos options #KerberosAuthentication no #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes #KerberosTicketCleanup yes #KerberosGetAFSToken no # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes # Set this to 'no' to disable PAM authentication, account processing, # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and # PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password". # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. #UsePAM yes #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no #X11Forwarding yes #X11DisplayOffset 10 #X11UseLocalhost yes #PermitTTY yes #PrintMotd yes #PrintLastLog yes #TCPKeepAlive yes #UseLogin no #UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox #PermitUserEnvironment no #Compression delayed #ClientAliveInterval 0 #ClientAliveCountMax 3 #UseDNS yes #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid #MaxStartups 10:30:100 #PermitTunnel no #ChrootDirectory none -#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20160125 +#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20160310 # no default banner path #Banner none # override default of no subsystems Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis #Match User anoncvs # X11Forwarding no # AllowTcpForwarding no # PermitTTY no # ForceCommand cvs server Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 (revision 296853) @@ -1,1758 +1,1773 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.211 2015/08/14 15:32:41 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.220 2016/02/17 08:57:34 djm Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 14 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd_config .Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm /etc/ssh/sshd_config .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr sshd 8 reads configuration data from .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with .Fl f on the command line). The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm AcceptEnv Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's .Xr environ 7 . See .Cm SendEnv in .Xr ssh_config 5 for how to configure the client. -Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2, and -that the +The .Ev TERM environment variable is always sent whenever the client requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters .Ql * and .Ql \&? . Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm AcceptEnv directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept any environment variables. .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by .Xr sshd 8 . Valid arguments are .Dq any , .Dq inet (use IPv4 only), or .Dq inet6 (use IPv6 only). The default is .Dq any . .It Cm AllowAgentForwarding Specifies whether .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is permitted. The default is .Dq yes . Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Dq yes or .Dq all to allow TCP forwarding, .Dq no to prevent all TCP forwarding, .Dq local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Dq remote to allow remote forwarding only. The default is .Dq yes . Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Dq yes or .Dq all to allow StreamLocal forwarding, .Dq no to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding, .Dq local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Dq remote to allow remote forwarding only. The default is .Dq yes . Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AuthenticationMethods Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of authentication method names. Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least one of these lists. .Pp For example, an argument of .Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by either password or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. .Pp For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon followed by the device identifier .Dq bsdauth , .Dq pam , or .Dq skey , depending on the server configuration. For example, .Dq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the .Dq bsdauth device. .Pp If the .Dq publickey method is listed more than once, .Xr sshd 8 verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for subsequent authentications. For example, an .Cm AuthenticationMethods of .Dq publickey,publickey will require successful authentication using two different public keys. .Pp -This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal +This option will yield a fatal error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled. Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion of a single authentication method is sufficient. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. .Pp Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the username being authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type offered for authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of the key, and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication. If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user will be supplied. .Pp The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in .Xr sshd 8 ) . If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not, then .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used for user authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of .Xr sshd 8 . .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. +Alternately this option may be set to +.Dq none +to skip checking for user keys in files. The default is .Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 . .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed certificate principals as per .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile . The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. .Pp Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the username being authenticated and %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated. .Pp The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized principals commands. If .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified but .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a key listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in .Xr sshd 8 ) . Empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are ignored. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. .Pp The default is .Dq none , i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. Note that .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys , though the .Cm principals= key option offers a similar facility (see .Xr sshd 8 for details). .It Cm Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. If the argument is .Dq none then no banner is displayed. -This option is only available for protocol version 2. By default, no banner is displayed. .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in .Xr login.conf 5 ) The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm ChrootDirectory Specifies the pathname of a directory to .Xr chroot 2 to after authentication. At session startup .Xr sshd 8 checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, .Xr sshd 8 changes the working directory to the user's home directory. .Pp The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. .Pp The .Cm ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directories to support the user's session. For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically .Xr sh 1 , and basic .Pa /dev nodes such as .Xr null 4 , .Xr zero 4 , .Xr stdin 4 , .Xr stdout 4 , .Xr stderr 4 , and .Xr tty 4 devices. For file transfer sessions using .Dq sftp , no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used, though sessions which use logging may require .Pa /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see .Xr sftp-server 8 for details). .Pp For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which .Xr sshd 8 cannot detect. .Pp -The default is not to +The default is +.Dq none , +indicating not to .Xr chroot 2 . .It Cm Ciphers -Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2. +Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It 3des-cbc .It aes128-cbc .It aes192-cbc .It aes256-cbc .It aes128-ctr .It aes192-ctr .It aes256-ctr .It aes128-gcm@openssh.com .It aes256-gcm@openssh.com .It arcfour .It arcfour128 .It arcfour256 .It blowfish-cbc .It cast128-cbc .It chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, -aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com +aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, +aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq cipher . .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be sent without .Xr sshd 8 receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive (below). The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. .Pp The default value is 3. If .Cm ClientAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15, and .Cm ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. -This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, .Xr sshd 8 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. -This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm Compression Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until the user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq delayed , or .Dq no . The default is .Dq delayed . .It Cm DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm DenyUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Cm ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by .Cm ForceCommand , ignoring any command supplied by the client and .Pa ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a .Cm Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command of .Dq internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process sftp server that requires no support files when used with .Cm ChrootDirectory . +The default is +.Dq none . .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports forwarded for the client. By default, .Xr sshd 8 binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to connect. The argument may be .Dq no to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, .Dq yes to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or .Dq clientspecified to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Dq no . -Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is .Dq yes . -Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to .Dq yes then the client must authenticate against the .Pa host service on the current hostname. If set to .Dq no then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ssh-ed25519, ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .Ed .Pp The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported key types. .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). -This option is similar to -.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication -and applies to protocol version 2 only. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse name lookup when matching the name in the .Pa ~/.shosts , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv files during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . A setting of .Dq yes means that .Xr sshd 8 uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm HostCertificate Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified by .Cm HostKey . The default behaviour of .Xr sshd 8 is not to load any certificates. .It Cm HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. .Pp Note that .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible and that the .Cm HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which of the keys are actually used by .Xr sshd 8 . .Pp It is possible to have multiple host key files. .Dq rsa1 keys are used for version 1 and .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 or .Dq rsa are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol. It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case operations on the private key will be delegated to an .Xr ssh-agent 1 . .It Cm HostKeyAgent Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an agent that has access to the private host keys. If .Dq SSH_AUTH_SOCK is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms -Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms +Specifies the host key algorithms that the server offers. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ssh-ed25519, ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .Ed .Pp The list of available key types may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq key . .It Cm IgnoreRhosts Specifies that .Pa .rhosts and .Pa .shosts files will not be used in .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication or .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . .Pp .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv and .Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv are still used. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should ignore the user's .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts during .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication or .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are .Dq af11 , .Dq af12 , .Dq af13 , .Dq af21 , .Dq af22 , .Dq af23 , .Dq af31 , .Dq af32 , .Dq af33 , .Dq af41 , .Dq af42 , .Dq af43 , .Dq cs0 , .Dq cs1 , .Dq cs2 , .Dq cs3 , .Dq cs4 , .Dq cs5 , .Dq cs6 , .Dq cs7 , .Dq ef , .Dq lowdelay , .Dq throughput , .Dq reliability , or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Dq lowdelay for interactive sessions and .Dq throughput for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is to use whatever value .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to (by default .Dq yes ) . .It Cm KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether the password provided by the user for .Cm PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as .Pa /etc/passwd . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. The supported algorithms are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It curve25519-sha256@libssh.org .It diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp384 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp521 .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq kex . .It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds). .It Cm ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses .Xr sshd 8 should listen on. The following forms may be used: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar host | Ar IPv4_addr | Ar IPv6_addr .Sm on .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar host | Ar IPv4_addr : Ar port .Sm on .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Oo .Ar host | Ar IPv6_addr Oc : Ar port .Sm on .El .Pp If .Ar port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all .Cm Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local addresses. Multiple .Cm ListenAddress options are permitted. .It Cm LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 120 seconds. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. .It Cm MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. -The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 -for data integrity protection. +The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Dq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The supported MACs are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It hmac-md5 .It hmac-md5-96 .It hmac-ripemd160 .It hmac-sha1 .It hmac-sha1-96 .It hmac-sha2-256 .It hmac-sha2-512 .It umac-64@openssh.com .It umac-128@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com .It umac-64-etm@openssh.com .It umac-128-etm@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, +hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, -hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512 +hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq mac . .It Cm Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the .Cm Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the global section of the config file, until either another .Cm Match line or the end of the file. If a keyword appears in multiple .Cm Match blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is applied. .Pp The arguments to .Cm Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token .Cm All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are .Cm User , .Cm Group , .Cm Host , .Cm LocalAddress , .Cm LocalPort , and .Cm Address . The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the PATTERNS section of .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp The patterns in an .Cm Address criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, e.g.\& .Dq 192.0.2.0/24 or .Dq 3ffe:ffff::/32 . Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, .Dq 192.0.2.0/33 and .Dq 192.0.2.0/8 respectively. .Pp Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a .Cm Match keyword. Available keywords are .Cm AcceptEnv , .Cm AllowAgentForwarding , .Cm AllowGroups , .Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding , .Cm AllowTcpForwarding , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm AuthenticationMethods , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile , +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand , +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile , .Cm Banner , .Cm ChrootDirectory , .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm ForceCommand , .Cm GatewayPorts , .Cm GSSAPIAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes , .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , .Cm IPQoS , .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , .Cm KerberosAuthentication , .Cm MaxAuthTries , .Cm MaxSessions , .Cm PasswordAuthentication , .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , .Cm PermitOpen , .Cm PermitRootLogin , .Cm PermitTTY , .Cm PermitTunnel , .Cm PermitUserRC , .Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes , .Cm PubkeyAuthentication , .Cm RekeyLimit , .Cm RevokedKeys , .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication , .Cm RSAAuthentication , .Cm StreamLocalBindMask , .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink , .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , .Cm X11DisplayOffset , .Cm X11Forwarding and .Cm X11UseLocalHost . .It Cm MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. .It Cm MaxSessions -Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per network connection. +Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp) +sessions permitted per network connection. +Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection +multiplexing. +Setting +.Cm MaxSessions +to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 +will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting +forwarding. The default is 10. .It Cm MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the .Cm LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. .Pp Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the three colon separated values .Dq start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60"). .Xr sshd 8 will refuse connection attempts with a probability of .Dq rate/100 (30%) if there are currently .Dq start (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches .Dq full (60). .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. See also .Cm UsePAM . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PermitOpen Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar IPv4_addr : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Dq any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of .Dq none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. .It Cm PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq prohibit-password , .Dq without-password , .Dq forced-commands-only , or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . Note that if .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is .Dq yes , the root user may be allowed in with its password even if .Cm PermitRootLogin is set to .Dq without-password . .Pp If this option is set to .Dq prohibit-password or .Dq without-password , password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq forced-commands-only , root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the .Ar command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq no , root is not allowed to log in. .It Cm PermitTunnel Specifies whether .Xr tun 4 device forwarding is allowed. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq point-to-point (layer 3), .Dq ethernet (layer 2), or .Dq no . Specifying .Dq yes permits both .Dq point-to-point and .Dq ethernet . The default is .Dq no . .Pp Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected .Xr tun 4 device must allow access to the user. .It Cm PermitTTY Specifies whether .Xr pty 4 allocation is permitted. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PermitUserEnvironment Specifies whether .Pa ~/.ssh/environment and .Cm environment= options in .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by .Xr sshd 8 . The default is .Dq no . Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as .Ev LD_PRELOAD . .It Cm PermitUserRC Specifies whether any .Pa ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH daemon, or .Dq none to not write one. The default is .Pa /var/run/sshd.pid . .It Cm Port Specifies the port number that .Xr sshd 8 listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also .Cm ListenAddress . .It Cm PrintLastLog Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PrintMotd Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print .Pa /etc/motd when a user logs in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, .Pa /etc/profile , or equivalent.) The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm Protocol Specifies the protocol versions .Xr sshd 8 supports. The possible values are .Sq 1 and .Sq 2 . Multiple versions must be comma-separated. The default is .Sq 2 . +Protocol 1 suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and should +not be used. +It is only offered to support legacy devices. +.Pp Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate preference, because the client selects among multiple protocol versions offered by the server. Specifying .Dq 2,1 is identical to .Dq 1,2 . .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ssh-ed25519, ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .Ed .Pp The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported key types. .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq yes . -Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section. The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Dq default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. -This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RevokedKeys Specifies revoked public keys file, or .Dq none to not use one. Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq no . This option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm RSAAuthentication Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq yes . This option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm ServerKeyBits Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key. The default and minimum value is 1024. .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm StrictModes Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should check file modes and ownership of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this does not apply to .Cm ChrootDirectory , whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. .It Cm Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. .Pp The command .Xr sftp-server 8 implements the .Dq sftp file transfer subsystem. .Pp Alternately the name .Dq internal-sftp implements an in-process .Dq sftp server. This may simplify configurations using .Cm ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients. .Pp By default no subsystems are defined. -Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving .Dq ghost users and consuming server resources. .Pp The default is .Dq yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Dq no . .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or .Dq none to not use one. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are allowed. If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted for authentication using .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys . For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm UseDNS Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should look up the remote host name, and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq no , then only addresses and not host names may be used in .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .Cm from and .Nm .Cm Match .Cm Host directives. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm UseLogin Specifies whether .Xr login 1 is used for interactive login sessions. The default is .Dq no . Note that .Xr login 1 is never used for remote command execution. Note also, that if this is enabled, .Cm X11Forwarding will be disabled because .Xr login 1 does not know how to handle .Xr xauth 1 cookies. If .Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation is specified, it will be disabled after authentication. .It Cm UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to .Dq yes this will enable PAM authentication using .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication and .Cm PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. .Pp Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable either .Cm PasswordAuthentication or .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication. .Pp If .Cm UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run .Xr sshd 8 as a non-root user. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic. After successful authentication, another process will be created that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. -The default is +The argument must be +.Dq yes , +.Dq no , +or .Dq sandbox . If .Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to .Dq sandbox then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional restrictions. +The default is +.Dq sandbox . .It Cm VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default is -.Dq FreeBSD-20160125 . +.Dq FreeBSD-20160310 . The value .Dq none may be used to disable this. .It Cm X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. .It Cm X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .Pp When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and to client displays if the .Xr sshd 8 proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see .Cm X11UseLocalhost below), though this is not the default. Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see the warnings for .Cm ForwardX11 in .Xr ssh_config 5 ) . A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a .Dq no setting. .Pp Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if .Cm UseLogin is enabled. .It Cm X11UseLocalhost Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable to .Dq localhost . This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. .Cm X11UseLocalhost may be set to .Dq no to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard address. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program, or .Dq none to not use one. The default is .Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth . .El .Sh TIME FORMATS .Xr sshd 8 command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: .Sm off .Ar time Op Ar qualifier , .Sm on where .Ar time is a positive integer value and .Ar qualifier is one of the following: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It Aq Cm none seconds .It Cm s | Cm S seconds .It Cm m | Cm M minutes .It Cm h | Cm H hours .It Cm d | Cm D days .It Cm w | Cm W weeks .El .Pp Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time value. .Pp Time format examples: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) .It 10m 10 minutes .It 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Xr sshd 8 . This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not necessary) that it be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssherr.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssherr.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/ssherr.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,141 +1,141 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.4 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.5 2015/09/13 14:39:16 tim Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include #include "ssherr.h" const char * ssh_err(int n) { switch (n) { case SSH_ERR_SUCCESS: return "success"; case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: return "unexpected internal error"; case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: return "memory allocation failed"; case SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE: return "incomplete message"; case SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT: return "invalid format"; case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE: return "bignum is negative"; case SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE: return "string is too large"; case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE: return "bignum is too large"; case SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE: return "elliptic curve point is too large"; case SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE: return "insufficient buffer space"; case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: return "invalid argument"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH: return "key bits do not match"; case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID: return "invalid elliptic curve"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH: return "key type does not match"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN: return "unknown or unsupported key type"; case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH: return "elliptic curve does not match"; case SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT: return "plain key provided where certificate required"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB: return "key lacks certificate data"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE: return "unknown/unsupported certificate type"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY: return "invalid certificate signing key"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE: return "invalid elliptic curve value"; case SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID: return "incorrect signature"; case SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR: return "error in libcrypto"; /* XXX fetch and return */ case SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA: return "unexpected bytes remain after decoding"; case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: return strerror(errno); case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID: return "invalid certificate"; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION: return "communication with agent failed"; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE: return "agent refused operation"; case SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE: return "DH GEX group out of range"; case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: return "disconnected"; case SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID: return "message authentication code incorrect"; case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching cipher found"; case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching MAC found"; case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching compression method found"; case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching key exchange method found"; case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: return "no matching host key type found"; case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH: return "protocol version mismatch"; case SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return "could not read protocol version"; case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED: return "could not load host key"; case SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY: return "rekeying not supported by peer"; case SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT: - return "passphrase is too short (minimum four characters)"; + return "passphrase is too short (minimum five characters)"; case SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED: return "file changed while reading"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER: return "key encrypted using unsupported cipher"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: return "incorrect passphrase supplied to decrypt private key"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS: return "bad permissions"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH: return "certificate does not match key"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: return "key not found"; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT: return "agent not present"; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES: return "agent contains no identities"; case SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY: return "internal error: buffer is read-only"; case SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC: return "KRL file has invalid magic number"; case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: return "Key is revoked"; case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: return "Connection closed"; case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: return "Connection timed out"; case SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT: return "Connection corrupted"; case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR: return "Protocol error"; default: return "unknown error"; } } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,3895 +1,3909 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.21 2015/08/19 23:19:01 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.31 2015/12/11 04:21:12 mmcc Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #endif #include "crypto_api.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */ #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "match.h" /* openssh private key file format */ #define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" #define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" #define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1) #define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1) #define KDFNAME "bcrypt" #define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1" #define SALT_LEN 16 #define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-cbc" #define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16 /* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */ #define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n" static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert); /* Supported key types */ struct keytype { const char *name; const char *shortname; int type; int nid; int cert; + int sigonly; }; static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { - { "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", KEY_ED25519, 0, 0 }, + { "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", KEY_ED25519, 0, 0, 0 }, { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", - KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1 }, + KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - { NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0 }, - { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0 }, - { "ssh-dss", "DSA", KEY_DSA, 0, 0 }, + { NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 }, + { "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 }, + { "ssh-dss", "DSA", KEY_DSA, 0, 0, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0 }, - { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0 }, + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 }, + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 - { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0 }, + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0, 0 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - { "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1 }, - { "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1 }, + { "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, + { "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", - KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1 }, + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 }, { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", - KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1 }, + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", - KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 }, + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1, 0 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 } + { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 } }; const char * sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == k->type) return kt->shortname; } return "unknown"; } static const char * sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid)) return kt->name; } return "ssh-unknown"; } int sshkey_type_is_cert(int type) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == type) return kt->cert; } return 0; } const char * sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k) { return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid); } const char * sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k) { return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type), k->ecdsa_nid); } int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { /* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */ if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) || (!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0)) return kt->type; } return KEY_UNSPEC; } int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type != KEY_ECDSA && kt->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT) continue; if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) return kt->nid; } return -1; } char * key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only) { char *tmp, *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - if (kt->name == NULL) + if (kt->name == NULL || kt->sigonly) continue; if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert)) continue; if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = '\n'; nlen = strlen(kt->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard) { char *s, *cp, *p; const struct keytype *kt; int type; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { type = sshkey_type_from_name(p); if (type == KEY_RSA1) { free(s); return 0; } if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { if (allow_wildcard) { /* * Try matching key types against the string. * If any has a positive or negative match then * the component is accepted. */ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; if (match_pattern_list(kt->name, p, 0) != 0) break; } if (kt->type != -1) continue; } free(s); return 0; } } free(s); return 1; } u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n); case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p); case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return 256; /* XXX */ } return 0; } static int sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: return 1; default: return 0; } } int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) return 0; return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type); } /* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */ int sshkey_type_plain(int type) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT: return KEY_RSA; case KEY_DSA_CERT: return KEY_DSA; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: return KEY_ECDSA; case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return KEY_ED25519; default: return type; } } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */ int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name) { if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0) return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0) return NID_secp384r1; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0) return NID_secp521r1; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ else return -1; } u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: return 256; case NID_secp384r1: return 384; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case NID_secp521r1: return 521; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ default: return 0; } } int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits) { switch (bits) { case 256: return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; case 384: return NID_secp384r1; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case 521: return NID_secp521r1; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ default: return -1; } } const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: return "nistp256"; case NID_secp384r1: return "nistp384"; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case NID_secp521r1: return "nistp521"; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ default: return NULL; } } int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid) { int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); if (kbits <= 0) return -1; /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */ if (kbits <= 256) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; else if (kbits <= 384) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384; else return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ static void cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert) { u_int i; if (cert == NULL) return; - if (cert->certblob != NULL) - sshbuf_free(cert->certblob); - if (cert->critical != NULL) - sshbuf_free(cert->critical); - if (cert->extensions != NULL) - sshbuf_free(cert->extensions); - if (cert->key_id != NULL) - free(cert->key_id); + sshbuf_free(cert->certblob); + sshbuf_free(cert->critical); + sshbuf_free(cert->extensions); + free(cert->key_id); for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) free(cert->principals[i]); - if (cert->principals != NULL) - free(cert->principals); - if (cert->signature_key != NULL) - sshkey_free(cert->signature_key); + free(cert->principals); + sshkey_free(cert->signature_key); explicit_bzero(cert, sizeof(*cert)); free(cert); } static struct sshkey_cert * cert_new(void) { struct sshkey_cert *cert; if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { cert_free(cert); return NULL; } cert->key_id = NULL; cert->principals = NULL; cert->signature_key = NULL; return cert; } struct sshkey * sshkey_new(int type) { struct sshkey *k; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RSA *rsa; DSA *dsa; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL) return NULL; k->type = type; k->ecdsa = NULL; k->ecdsa_nid = -1; k->dsa = NULL; k->rsa = NULL; k->cert = NULL; k->ed25519_sk = NULL; k->ed25519_pk = NULL; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || (rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL) { if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa); free(k); return NULL; } k->rsa = rsa; break; case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL || (dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) { if (dsa != NULL) DSA_free(dsa); free(k); return NULL; } k->dsa = dsa; break; case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: /* no need to prealloc */ break; case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: free(k); return NULL; break; } if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) { if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) { sshkey_free(k); return NULL; } } return k; } int sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: #define bn_maybe_alloc_failed(p) (p == NULL && (p = BN_new()) == NULL) if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->d) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->iqmp) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->q) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->p) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmq1) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmp1)) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->dsa->priv_key)) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; #undef bn_maybe_alloc_failed case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: /* no need to prealloc */ break; case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } return 0; } struct sshkey * sshkey_new_private(int type) { struct sshkey *k = sshkey_new(type); if (k == NULL) return NULL; if (sshkey_add_private(k) != 0) { sshkey_free(k); return NULL; } return k; } void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) return; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (k->rsa != NULL) RSA_free(k->rsa); k->rsa = NULL; break; case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if (k->dsa != NULL) DSA_free(k->dsa); k->dsa = NULL; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if (k->ecdsa != NULL) EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa); k->ecdsa = NULL; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if (k->ed25519_pk) { explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); free(k->ed25519_pk); k->ed25519_pk = NULL; } if (k->ed25519_sk) { explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ); free(k->ed25519_sk); k->ed25519_sk = NULL; } break; case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: break; } if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) cert_free(k->cert); explicit_bzero(k, sizeof(*k)); free(k); } static int cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b) { if (a == NULL && b == NULL) return 1; if (a == NULL || b == NULL) return 0; if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob)) return 0; if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob), sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between * certificates and plain keys too. */ int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) BN_CTX *bnctx; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ if (a == NULL || b == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type)) return 0; switch (a->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL && BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 && BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0; case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL && BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 && BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 && BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 && BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL) return 0; if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 || EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) { BN_CTX_free(bnctx); return 0; } BN_CTX_free(bnctx); return 1; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL && memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0; default: return 0; } /* NOTREACHED */ } int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type) return 0; if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) { if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert)) return 0; } return sshkey_equal_public(a, b); } static int to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain) { int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; const char *typename; if (key == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if (key->cert == NULL) return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB; } type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type; typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid); switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT: #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: /* Use the existing blob */ /* XXX modified flag? */ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0) return ret; break; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: if (key->dsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0) return ret; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (key->ecdsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0) return ret; break; # endif case KEY_RSA: if (key->rsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0) return ret; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) return ret; break; default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } return 0; } int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0); } int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { struct sshbuf *tmp; int r; if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0); if (r == 0) r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp); sshbuf_free(tmp); return r; } int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1); } static int to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain) { int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t len; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (blobp != NULL) *blobp = NULL; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; if (blobp != NULL) { if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } ret = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) { return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0); } int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) { return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1); } int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp) { u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL; size_t blob_len = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (retp != NULL) *retp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n); int elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e); blob_len = nlen + elen; if (nlen >= INT_MAX - elen || (blob = malloc(blob_len)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob); BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } else if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len, ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ if (retp != NULL) { *retp = ret; ret = NULL; } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg); r = 0; out: free(ret); if (blob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(blob, blob_len); free(blob); } return r; } static char * fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) { char *ret; size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1; size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1; int r; if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL) return NULL; strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen); strlcat(ret, ":", rlen); if (dgst_raw_len == 0) return ret; if ((r = b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, ret + plen, rlen - plen)) == -1) { explicit_bzero(ret, rlen); free(ret); return NULL; } /* Trim padding characters from end */ ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0'; return ret; } static char * fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) { char *retval, hex[5]; size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2; if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL) return NULL; strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen); strlcat(retval, ":", rlen); for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x", i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]); strlcat(retval, hex, rlen); } return retval; } static char * fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) { char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' }; char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm', 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' }; u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1; char *retval; rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1; if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL) return NULL; retval[j++] = 'x'; for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4; if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) { idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) + seed) % 6; idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15; idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) + (seed / 6)) % 6; retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; if ((i + 1) < rounds) { idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15; idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15; retval[j++] = consonants[idx3]; retval[j++] = '-'; retval[j++] = consonants[idx4]; seed = ((seed * 5) + ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) + ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36; } } else { idx0 = seed % 6; idx1 = 16; idx2 = seed / 6; retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; } } retval[j++] = 'x'; retval[j++] = '\0'; return retval; } /* * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability. * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some * scientific publications like this original paper: * * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security", * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf * * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too. * * If you see the picture is different, the key is different. * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing. * * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane, * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes. * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn. * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be * walked in either direction. */ /* * Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 . * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore. */ #define FLDBASE 8 #define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1) #define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1) static char * fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len, const struct sshkey *k) { /* * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm * intersects with itself. Matter of taste. */ char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE"; char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X]; u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y]; size_t i, tlen, hlen; u_int b; int x, y, r; size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1; if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL) return NULL; /* initialize field */ memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char)); x = FLDSIZE_X / 2; y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2; /* process raw key */ for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { int input; /* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */ input = dgst_raw[i]; for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) { /* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */ x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1; y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1; /* assure we are still in bounds */ x = MAX(x, 0); y = MAX(y, 0); x = MIN(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1); y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1); /* augment the field */ if (field[x][y] < len - 2) field[x][y]++; input = input >> 2; } } /* mark starting point and end point*/ field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1; field[x][y] = len; /* assemble title */ r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]", sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k)); /* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */ if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title)) r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k)); tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title); /* assemble hash ID. */ r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg); hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash); /* output upper border */ p = retval; *p++ = '+'; for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++) *p++ = '-'; memcpy(p, title, tlen); p += tlen; for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) *p++ = '-'; *p++ = '+'; *p++ = '\n'; /* output content */ for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) { *p++ = '|'; for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++) *p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)]; *p++ = '|'; *p++ = '\n'; } /* output lower border */ *p++ = '+'; for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++) *p++ = '-'; memcpy(p, hash, hlen); p += hlen; for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) *p++ = '-'; *p++ = '+'; return retval; } char * sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep) { char *retval = NULL; u_char *dgst_raw; size_t dgst_raw_len; if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0) return NULL; switch (dgst_rep) { case SSH_FP_DEFAULT: if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) { retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); } else { retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); } break; case SSH_FP_HEX: retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); break; case SSH_FP_BASE64: retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); break; case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE: retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); break; case SSH_FP_RANDOMART: retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k); break; default: explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); free(dgst_raw); return NULL; } explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); free(dgst_raw); return retval; } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is * permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the * last processed character. */ static int read_decimal_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM *v) { char *cp; size_t e; int skip = 1; /* skip white space */ cp = *cpp; while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') cp++; e = strspn(cp, "0123456789"); if (e == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (e > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 3) return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; if (cp[e] == '\0') skip = 0; - else if (index(" \t\r\n", cp[e]) == NULL) + else if (strchr(" \t\r\n", cp[e]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; cp[e] = '\0'; if (BN_dec2bn(&v, cp) <= 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; *cpp = cp + e + skip; return 0; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ /* returns 0 ok, and < 0 error */ int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp) { struct sshkey *k; int retval = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - char *cp, *space; + char *ep, *cp, *space; int r, type, curve_nid = -1; struct sshbuf *blob; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 - char *ep; u_long bits; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ cp = *cpp; switch (ret->type) { case KEY_RSA1: #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* Get number of bits. */ bits = strtoul(cp, &ep, 10); - if (*cp == '\0' || index(" \t\r\n", *ep) == NULL || + if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(" \t\r\n", *ep) == NULL || bits == 0 || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Bad bit count... */ /* Get public exponent, public modulus. */ if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->e)) < 0) return r; if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->n)) < 0) return r; - *cpp = ep; /* validate the claimed number of bits */ if (BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n) != (int)bits) return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; + *cpp = ep; retval = 0; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ break; case KEY_UNSPEC: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: space = strchr(cp, ' '); if (space == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; *space = '\0'; type = sshkey_type_from_name(cp); if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && (curve_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(cp)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID; *space = ' '; if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; cp = space+1; if (*cp == '\0') return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* trim comment */ space = strchr(cp, ' '); if (space) { /* advance 'space': skip whitespace */ *space++ = '\0'; while (*space == ' ' || *space == '\t') space++; - *cpp = space; + ep = space; } else - *cpp = cp + strlen(cp); + ep = cp + strlen(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, cp)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(blob); return r; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob), &k)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(blob); return r; } sshbuf_free(blob); if (k->type != type) { sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; } if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) { sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; } ret->type = type; if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) { if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) { sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; } if (ret->cert != NULL) cert_free(ret->cert); ret->cert = k->cert; k->cert = NULL; } + switch (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type)) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_RSA) { + case KEY_RSA: if (ret->rsa != NULL) RSA_free(ret->rsa); ret->rsa = k->rsa; k->rsa = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8); #endif - } - if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_DSA) { + break; + case KEY_DSA: if (ret->dsa != NULL) DSA_free(ret->dsa); ret->dsa = k->dsa; k->dsa = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8); #endif - } + break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ECDSA) { + case KEY_ECDSA: if (ret->ecdsa != NULL) EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa); ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa; ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; k->ecdsa = NULL; k->ecdsa_nid = -1; #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa); #endif - } + break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ED25519) { + case KEY_ED25519: free(ret->ed25519_pk); ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk; k->ed25519_pk = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */ #endif + break; } + *cpp = ep; retval = 0; /*XXXX*/ sshkey_free(k); if (retval != 0) break; break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } return retval; } int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *uu = NULL; if (b64p != NULL) *b64p = NULL; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0) goto out; if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(b)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* Success */ if (b64p != NULL) { *b64p = uu; uu = NULL; } r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); free(uu); return r; } static int sshkey_format_rsa1(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 u_int bits = 0; char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL; if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL || key->rsa->n == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL || (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* size of modulus 'n' */ if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0) goto out; /* Success */ r = 0; out: if (dec_e != NULL) OPENSSL_free(dec_e); if (dec_n != NULL) OPENSSL_free(dec_n); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ return r; } static int sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; char *uu = NULL; if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) { if ((r = sshkey_format_rsa1(key, b)) != 0) goto out; } else { /* Unsupported key types handled in sshkey_to_base64() */ if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: free(uu); return r; } int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0) goto out; if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) { if (feof(f)) errno = EPIPE; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } /* Success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } const char * sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->cert->type) { case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER: return "user"; case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST: return "host"; default: return "unknown"; } } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap) { RSA *private = NULL; BIGNUM *f4 = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (rsap == NULL || bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *rsap = NULL; if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } *rsap = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: if (private != NULL) RSA_free(private); if (f4 != NULL) BN_free(f4); return ret; } static int dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap) { DSA *private; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (dsap == NULL || bits != 1024) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } *dsap = NULL; if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } *dsap = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: if (private != NULL) DSA_free(private); return ret; } # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k) { EC_GROUP *eg; int nids[] = { NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 NID_secp521r1, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ -1 }; int nid; u_int i; BN_CTX *bnctx; const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k); /* * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that * are supported. */ if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0) return nid; if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) { if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL) { BN_CTX_free(bnctx); return -1; } if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0) break; EC_GROUP_free(eg); } BN_CTX_free(bnctx); if (nids[i] != -1) { /* Use the group with the NID attached */ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) { EC_GROUP_free(eg); return -1; } } return nids[i]; } static int ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap) { EC_KEY *private; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL || (*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *ecdsap = NULL; if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); *ecdsap = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: if (private != NULL) EC_KEY_free(private); return ret; } # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *k; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (keyp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *keyp = NULL; if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (type) { case KEY_ED25519: if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL || (k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; } crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk); ret = 0; break; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: ret = dsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->dsa); break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: ret = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid, &k->ecdsa); break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA1: ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa); break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ default: ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if (ret == 0) { k->type = type; *keyp = k; } else sshkey_free(k); return ret; } int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key) { u_int i; const struct sshkey_cert *from; struct sshkey_cert *to; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (to_key->cert != NULL) { cert_free(to_key->cert); to_key->cert = NULL; } if ((from = from_key->cert) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((to = to_key->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 || - (ret = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions) != 0)) + (ret = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions)) != 0) return ret; to->serial = from->serial; to->type = from->type; if (from->key_id == NULL) to->key_id = NULL; else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; to->valid_after = from->valid_after; to->valid_before = from->valid_before; if (from->signature_key == NULL) to->signature_key = NULL; else if ((ret = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key, &to->signature_key)) != 0) return ret; if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (from->nprincipals > 0) { if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals, sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) { to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]); if (to->principals[i] == NULL) { to->nprincipals = i; return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } } } to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals; return 0; } int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp) { struct sshkey *n = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (pkp != NULL) - *pkp = NULL; - + *pkp = NULL; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); if (n->ecdsa == NULL) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL)) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { if ((n->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); } break; default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) { if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0) { sshkey_free(n); return ret; } } *pkp = n; return 0; } static int cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf) { struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL; struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL; u_char *sig = NULL; size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0) return ret; /* Parse body of certificate up to signature */ if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) { /* XXX debug print error for ret */ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */ signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b); if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE; goto out; } /* Parse principals section */ while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) { char *principal = NULL; char **oprincipals = NULL; if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal, NULL)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } oprincipals = key->cert->principals; key->cert->principals = reallocarray(key->cert->principals, key->cert->nprincipals + 1, sizeof(*key->cert->principals)); if (key->cert->principals == NULL) { free(principal); key->cert->principals = oprincipals; ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal; } /* * Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections * for later use. */ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 || (exts != NULL && (ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0)) goto out; /* * Validate critical options and extensions sections format. */ while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) { if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical); ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) { if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions); ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Parse CA key and check signature */ if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; goto out; } if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; goto out; } if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Success */ ret = 0; out: sshbuf_free(ca); sshbuf_free(crit); sshbuf_free(exts); sshbuf_free(principals); free(sig); return ret; } static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert) { int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; size_t len; u_char *pk = NULL; struct sshbuf *copy; #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) EC_POINT *q = NULL; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif *keyp = NULL; if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; goto out; } switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_RSA: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8); #endif break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) != 0 || sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); #endif break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype); if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (key->ecdsa != NULL) EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa); if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID; goto out; } if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) { /* XXX assume it is a allocation error */ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q); #endif break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ED25519: if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0) goto out; if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } key->ed25519_pk = pk; pk = NULL; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } break; default: ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; goto out; } /* Parse certificate potion */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0) goto out; if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } ret = 0; *keyp = key; key = NULL; out: sshbuf_free(copy); sshkey_free(key); free(ktype); free(curve); free(pk); #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) if (q != NULL) EC_POINT_free(q); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ return ret; } int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp) { return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); } int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0) return r; r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } int sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat) { if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: return ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: - return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); + return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } /* * ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error. */ int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int compat) { if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return ssh_dss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: - return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); + return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } /* Converts a private to a public key */ int sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **dkp) { struct sshkey *pk; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (dkp != NULL) - *dkp = NULL; - + *dkp = NULL; if ((pk = calloc(1, sizeof(*pk))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; pk->type = k->type; pk->flags = k->flags; pk->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; pk->dsa = NULL; pk->ecdsa = NULL; pk->rsa = NULL; pk->ed25519_pk = NULL; pk->ed25519_sk = NULL; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) goto fail; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || (pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL || (pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) goto fail; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA: if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL || (pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL || (pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL || (pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL || (pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) goto fail; /* FALLTHROUGH */ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: pk->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(pk->ecdsa_nid); if (pk->ecdsa == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(pk->ecdsa, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto fail; } break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) goto fail; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ED25519: if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { if ((pk->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } memcpy(pk->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); } break; default: ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; fail: sshkey_free(pk); return ret; } *dkp = pk; return 0; } /* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */ int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k) { int newtype; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: newtype = KEY_RSA_CERT; break; case KEY_DSA: newtype = KEY_DSA_CERT; break; case KEY_ECDSA: newtype = KEY_ECDSA_CERT; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: newtype = KEY_ED25519_CERT; break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; k->type = newtype; return 0; } /* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */ int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k) { if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; cert_free(k->cert); k->cert = NULL; k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type); return 0; } /* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */ int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca) { struct sshbuf *principals = NULL; u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32]; size_t i, ca_len, sig_len; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *cert; if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL || k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0) return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */ sshbuf_reset(cert); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0) goto out; /* -v01 certs put nonce first */ arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0) goto out; /* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */ switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->p)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->q)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->g)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0) goto out; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_ec(cert, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->n)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) goto out; break; default: ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0) goto out; if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, k->cert->principals[i])) != 0) goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0) goto out; /* Sign the whole mess */ if ((ret = sshkey_sign(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert), - sshbuf_len(cert), 0)) != 0) + sshbuf_len(cert), NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Append signature and we are done */ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0) goto out; ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0) sshbuf_reset(cert); - if (sig_blob != NULL) - free(sig_blob); - if (ca_blob != NULL) - free(ca_blob); - if (principals != NULL) - sshbuf_free(principals); + free(sig_blob); + free(ca_blob); + sshbuf_free(principals); return ret; } int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k, int want_host, int require_principal, const char *name, const char **reason) { u_int i, principal_matches; time_t now = time(NULL); if (reason != NULL) *reason = NULL; if (want_host) { if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } else { if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } if (now < 0) { /* yikes - system clock before epoch! */ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) { if (require_principal) { *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } else if (name != NULL) { principal_matches = 0; for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) { principal_matches = 1; break; } } if (!principal_matches) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed " "principal"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } return 0; } +size_t +sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l) +{ + char from[32], to[32], ret[64]; + time_t tt; + struct tm *tm; + + *from = *to = '\0'; + if (cert->valid_after == 0 && + cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) + return strlcpy(s, "forever", l); + + if (cert->valid_after != 0) { + /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ + tt = cert->valid_after > INT_MAX ? + INT_MAX : cert->valid_after; + tm = localtime(&tt); + strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); + } + if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { + /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ + tt = cert->valid_before > INT_MAX ? + INT_MAX : cert->valid_before; + tm = localtime(&tt); + strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); + } + + if (cert->valid_after == 0) + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to); + else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from); + else + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to); + + return strlcpy(s, ret, l); +} + int sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0) goto out; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_DSA: if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) goto out; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: return r; } int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp) { char *tname = NULL, *curve = NULL; struct sshkey *k = NULL; size_t pklen = 0, sklen = 0; int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_char *ed25519_pk = NULL, *ed25519_sk = NULL; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL BIGNUM *exponent = NULL; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (kp != NULL) *kp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0) goto out; type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->g)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; goto out; } k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); if (k->ecdsa == NULL || (exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent))) goto out; if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0) || + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 || (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent)) != 0) goto out; if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0) || + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 || (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) goto out; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d) != 0) || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp) != 0) || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p) != 0) || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) goto out; if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; break; case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) goto out; if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; goto out; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* enable blinding */ switch (k->type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA1: if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } break; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* success */ r = 0; if (kp != NULL) { *kp = k; k = NULL; } out: free(tname); free(curve); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (exponent != NULL) BN_clear_free(exponent); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ sshkey_free(k); if (ed25519_pk != NULL) { explicit_bzero(ed25519_pk, pklen); free(ed25519_pk); } if (ed25519_sk != NULL) { explicit_bzero(ed25519_sk, sklen); free(ed25519_sk); } return r; } #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public) { BN_CTX *bnctx; EC_POINT *nq = NULL; BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp; int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; BN_CTX_start(bnctx); /* * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint() * refuses to load GF2m points. */ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_prime_field) goto out; /* Q != infinity */ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public)) goto out; if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1 || EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public, x, y, bnctx) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 || BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) goto out; /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */ if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1) goto out; /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0) goto out; ret = 0; out: BN_CTX_free(bnctx); if (nq != NULL) EC_POINT_free(nq); return ret; } int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key) { BN_CTX *bnctx; BIGNUM *order, *tmp; int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; BN_CTX_start(bnctx); if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) goto out; /* private < order - 1 */ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0) goto out; ret = 0; out: BN_CTX_free(bnctx); return ret; } void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { BIGNUM *x, *y; BN_CTX *bnctx; if (point == NULL) { fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr); return; } if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_new failed\n", __func__); return; } BN_CTX_start(bnctx); if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_get failed\n", __func__); return; } if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_prime_field) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__); return; } if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, bnctx) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n", __func__); return; } fputs("x=", stderr); BN_print_fp(stderr, x); fputs("\ny=", stderr); BN_print_fp(stderr, y); fputs("\n", stderr); BN_CTX_free(bnctx); } void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key) { const BIGNUM *exponent; sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)); fputs("exponent=", stderr); if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) fputs("(NULL)", stderr); else BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)); fputs("\n", stderr); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ static int sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername, int rounds) { u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL; u_char salt[SALT_LEN]; char *b64 = NULL; size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen; u_int check; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; const struct sshcipher *cipher; const char *kdfname = KDFNAME; struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL; memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext)); if (rounds <= 0) rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS; if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) { ciphername = "none"; kdfname = "none"; } else if (ciphername == NULL) ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME; else if (cipher_number(ciphername) != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN); if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0) goto out; } else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) { /* Unsupported KDF type */ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */ (r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0) goto out; /* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */ /* Random check bytes */ check = arc4random(); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0) goto out; /* append private key and comment*/ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(prv, encrypted)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0) goto out; /* padding */ i = 0; while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0) goto out; } /* length in destination buffer */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0) goto out; /* encrypt */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* uuencode */ if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } sshbuf_reset(blob); if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0) goto out; for (i = 0; i < strlen(b64); i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, b64[i])) != 0) goto out; /* insert line breaks */ if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0) goto out; } if (i % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(kdf); sshbuf_free(encoded); sshbuf_free(encrypted); cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt)); if (key != NULL) { explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); free(key); } if (pubkeyblob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen); free(pubkeyblob); } if (b64 != NULL) { explicit_bzero(b64, strlen(b64)); free(b64); } return r; } static int sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL; const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL; const u_char *cp; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t encoded_len; size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0; struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL; struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL; struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; struct sshkey *k = NULL; u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last; u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2; memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext)); if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* check preamble */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob); encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob); if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) || memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN; encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN; /* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */ while (encoded_len > 0) { if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0) goto out; } last = *cp; encoded_len--; cp++; if (last == '\n') { if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN && memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) { /* \0 terminate */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0) goto out; break; } } } if (encoded_len == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* decode base64 */ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0) goto out; /* check magic */ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) || memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* parse public portion of key */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* pubkey */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0) goto out; if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { /* passphrase required */ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (nkeys != 1) { /* XXX only one key supported */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* check size of encrypted key blob */ blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* setup key */ keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0) goto out; if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* decrypt private portion of key */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded), encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) { /* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */ if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* there should be no trailing data */ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* check check bytes */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0) goto out; if (check1 != check2) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } /* Load the private key and comment */ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* Check deterministic padding */ i = 0; while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0) goto out; if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */ /* success */ r = 0; if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = k; k = NULL; } if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } out: pad = 0; cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); free(ciphername); free(kdfname); free(comment); if (salt != NULL) { explicit_bzero(salt, slen); free(salt); } if (key != NULL) { explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); free(key); } sshbuf_free(encoded); sshbuf_free(decoded); sshbuf_free(kdf); sshbuf_free(decrypted); sshkey_free(k); return r; } #if WITH_SSH1 /* * Serialises the authentication (private) key to a blob, encrypting it with * passphrase. The identification of the blob (lowest 64 bits of n) will * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a * passphrase. */ static int sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL, *encrypted = NULL; u_char buf[8]; int r, cipher_num; struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; const struct sshcipher *cipher; u_char *cp; /* * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER. */ cipher_num = (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0) ? SSH_CIPHER_NONE : SSH_CIPHER_3DES; if ((cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_num)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* This buffer is used to build the secret part of the private key. */ if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buffer, 4, &cp)) != 0) goto out; arc4random_buf(cp, 2); memcpy(cp + 2, cp, 2); /* * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted * format would just give known plaintext). * Note: q and p are stored in reverse order to SSL. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->p)) != 0) goto out; /* Pad the part to be encrypted to a size that is a multiple of 8. */ explicit_bzero(buf, 8); if ((r = sshbuf_put(buffer, buf, 8 - (sshbuf_len(buffer) % 8))) != 0) goto out; /* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */ if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* First store keyfile id string. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(encrypted, LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) goto out; /* Store cipher type and "reserved" field. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, cipher_num)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->n) != 0) || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->e) != 0) || - (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment) != 0)) + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0) goto out; /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted, sshbuf_len(buffer), &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(buffer), sshbuf_len(buffer), 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0) goto out; r = sshbuf_putb(blob, encrypted); out: explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); - if (buffer != NULL) - sshbuf_free(buffer); - if (encrypted != NULL) - sshbuf_free(encrypted); + sshbuf_free(buffer); + sshbuf_free(encrypted); return r; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */ static int sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment) { int success, r; int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase); u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL; #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L) const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL; #else const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL; #endif const u_char *bptr; BIO *bio = NULL; if (len > 0 && len <= 4) return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT; if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (key->type) { case KEY_DSA: success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); break; #endif case KEY_RSA: success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); break; default: success = 0; break; } if (success == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: BIO_free(bio); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */ int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) { switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case KEY_RSA1: return sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(key, blob, passphrase, comment); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_RSA: if (force_new_format) { return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); } return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob, passphrase, comment); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Parse the public, unencrypted portion of a RSA1 key. */ int sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; struct sshkey *pub = NULL; struct sshbuf *copy = NULL; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string * from the buffer. */ if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Make a working copy of the keyblob and skip past the magic */ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) goto out; /* Skip cipher type, reserved data and key bits. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* cipher type */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* key bits */ goto out; /* Read the public key from the buffer. */ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->e)) != 0) goto out; /* Finally, the comment */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(copy, (u_char**)commentp, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */ r = 0; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = pub; else sshkey_free(pub); pub = NULL; out: - if (copy != NULL) - sshbuf_free(copy); - if (pub != NULL) - sshkey_free(pub); + sshbuf_free(copy); + sshkey_free(pub); return r; } static int sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; u_int16_t check1, check2; u_int8_t cipher_type; struct sshbuf *decrypted = NULL, *copy = NULL; u_char *cp; char *comment = NULL; struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; const struct sshcipher *cipher; struct sshkey *prv = NULL; *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string * from the buffer. */ if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if ((prv = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL || (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) goto out; /* Read cipher type. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &cipher_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* reserved */ goto out; /* Read the public key and comment from the buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* key bits */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* Check that it is a supported cipher. */ cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type); if (cipher == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } /* Initialize space for decrypted data. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, sshbuf_len(copy), &cp)) != 0) goto out; /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(copy), sshbuf_len(copy), 0, 0)) != 0) { cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); goto out; } if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check2)) != 0) goto out; if (check1 != check2) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } /* Read the rest of the private key. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->p)) != 0) goto out; /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa)) != 0) goto out; /* enable blinding */ if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } r = 0; *keyp = prv; prv = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } out: explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext)); - if (comment != NULL) - free(comment); - if (prv != NULL) - sshkey_free(prv); - if (copy != NULL) - sshbuf_free(copy); - if (decrypted != NULL) - sshbuf_free(decrypted); + free(comment); + sshkey_free(prv); + sshbuf_free(copy); + sshbuf_free(decrypted); return r; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp) { EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; struct sshkey *prv = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; int r; *keyp = NULL; if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) != (int)sshbuf_len(blob)) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk); prv->type = KEY_RSA; #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8); #endif if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk); prv->type = KEY_DSA; #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk); prv->type = KEY_ECDSA; prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa); if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 || sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL || sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 || sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } # ifdef DEBUG_PK if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL) sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa); # endif #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ } else { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } r = 0; *keyp = prv; prv = NULL; out: BIO_free(bio); if (pk != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pk); - if (prv != NULL) - sshkey_free(prv); + sshkey_free(prv); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { - int r; - *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case KEY_RSA1: return sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, keyp, commentp); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_RSA: return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, passphrase, keyp); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp); case KEY_UNSPEC: - if ((r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp, - commentp)) == 0) + if (sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp, + commentp) == 0) return 0; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, passphrase, keyp); #else return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase, - const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { - int r; - if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */ - if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buffer, NULL, NULL)) == 0) { + if (sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buffer, NULL, NULL) == 0) { return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase, keyp, commentp); } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC, - passphrase, keyp, commentp)) == 0) - return 0; - return r; + return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC, + passphrase, keyp, commentp); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,229 +1,230 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.9 2015/08/04 05:23:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.12 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef SSHKEY_H #define SSHKEY_H #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ # define RSA void # define DSA void # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 768 #define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20) struct sshbuf; /* Key types */ enum sshkey_types { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, KEY_RSA_CERT, KEY_DSA_CERT, KEY_ECDSA_CERT, KEY_ED25519_CERT, KEY_UNSPEC }; /* Default fingerprint hash */ #define SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 /* Fingerprint representation formats */ enum sshkey_fp_rep { SSH_FP_DEFAULT = 0, SSH_FP_HEX, SSH_FP_BASE64, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE, SSH_FP_RANDOMART }; /* key is stored in external hardware */ #define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 #define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256 /* XXX opaquify? */ struct sshkey_cert { struct sshbuf *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */ u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */ u_int64_t serial; char *key_id; u_int nprincipals; char **principals; u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before; struct sshbuf *critical; struct sshbuf *extensions; struct sshkey *signature_key; }; /* XXX opaquify? */ struct sshkey { int type; int flags; RSA *rsa; DSA *dsa; int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */ EC_KEY *ecdsa; u_char *ed25519_sk; u_char *ed25519_pk; struct sshkey_cert *cert; }; #define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES #define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES struct sshkey *sshkey_new(int); int sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *); struct sshkey *sshkey_new_private(int); void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *); char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *, int, enum sshkey_fp_rep); int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp); const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *); const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **); u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); int sshkey_type_plain(int); int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int, const char *, const char **); +size_t sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *, + char *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__, 2, 3))); int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *); int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *); const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int); u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int); int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int); int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *); int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid); int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *); const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *); const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int); char *key_alg_list(int, int); int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **); int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, - const u_char *, size_t, u_int); + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, u_int); /* for debug */ void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *); /* private key parsing and serialisation */ int sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf); int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp); /* private key file format parsing and serialisation */ int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds); int sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, - const char *passphrase, const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, - char **commentp); + const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); #ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL -int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, + u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *ident); int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, - const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); + const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen); int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); #endif #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) # undef RSA # undef DSA # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #endif #endif /* SSHKEY_H */ Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,164 +1,164 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.31 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.32 2015/12/26 20:51:35 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does. We cannot * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of * login the current system has. Also, we want to be able to execute commands * on a tty. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "loginrec.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" extern Buffer loginmsg; extern ServerOptions options; /* * Returns the time when the user last logged in. Returns 0 if the * information is not available. This must be called before record_login. * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf. */ time_t get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname, char *buf, size_t bufsize) { struct logininfo li; login_get_lastlog(&li, uid); strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize); return (time_t)li.tv_sec; } /* * Generate and store last login message. This must be done before * login_login() is called and lastlog is updated. */ static void store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid) { #ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG char *time_string, hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX+1] = "", buf[512]; time_t last_login_time; if (!options.print_lastlog) return; # ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid); if (time_string != NULL) { buffer_append(&loginmsg, time_string, strlen(time_string)); free(time_string); } # else last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname, sizeof(hostname)); if (last_login_time != 0) { time_string = ctime(&last_login_time); time_string[strcspn(time_string, "\n")] = '\0'; if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0) snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s\r\n", time_string); else snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, hostname); buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf)); } # endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */ #endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */ } /* * Records that the user has logged in. I wish these parts of operating * systems were more standardized. */ void record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid, const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) { struct logininfo *li; /* save previous login details before writing new */ store_lastlog_message(user, uid); li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty); login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen); login_login(li); login_free_entry(li); } #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX void record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) { struct logininfo *li; li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname); login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen); login_utmp_only(li); login_free_entry(li); } #endif /* Records that the user has logged out. */ void record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user) { struct logininfo *li; li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty); login_logout(li); login_free_entry(li); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,257 +1,263 @@ /* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.39 2015/06/24 01:49:19 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code for uid-swapping. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases: * 1. euid=0, ruid=0 * 2. euid=0, ruid!=0 * 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0 * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has * POSIX saved uids or not. */ #if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) /* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that is not part of the posix specification. */ #define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID /* Saved effective uid. */ static uid_t saved_euid = 0; static gid_t saved_egid = 0; #endif /* Saved effective uid. */ static int privileged = 0; static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; static gid_t *saved_egroups = NULL, *user_groups = NULL; static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1; /* * Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user * id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested. */ void temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) { /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */ #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID saved_euid = geteuid(); saved_egid = getegid(); debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (saved_euid != 0) { privileged = 0; return; } #endif #else if (geteuid() != 0) { privileged = 0; return; } #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ privileged = 1; temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1; saved_egroupslen = getgroups(0, NULL); if (saved_egroupslen < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (saved_egroupslen > 0) { saved_egroups = xreallocarray(saved_egroups, saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */ free(saved_egroups); } /* set and save the user's groups */ if (user_groupslen == -1) { if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); user_groupslen = getgroups(0, NULL); if (user_groupslen < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (user_groupslen > 0) { user_groups = xreallocarray(user_groups, user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */ free(user_groups); } } /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */ if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */ if (setgid(getegid()) < 0) debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno)); /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */ if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno)); #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); } void permanently_drop_suid(uid_t uid) { -#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN +#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST uid_t old_uid = getuid(); #endif debug("permanently_drop_suid: %u", (u_int)uid); if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno)); -#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN - /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */ +#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST + /* + * Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid). + * + * Note that we don't do this on Cygwin, or on Solaris-based platforms + * where fine-grained privileges are available (the user might be + * deliberately allowed the right to setuid back to root). + */ if (old_uid != uid && (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1)) fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__); #endif /* Verify UID drop was successful */ if (getuid() != uid || geteuid() != uid) { fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)", __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), (u_int)uid); } } /* * Restores to the original (privileged) uid. */ void restore_uid(void) { /* it's a no-op unless privileged */ if (!privileged) { debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)"); return; } if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective"); #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */ if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0) fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno)); if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0) fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno)); #else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ /* * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value. * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid * as well. */ setuid(getuid()); setgid(getgid()); #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; } /* * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective. */ void permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw) { -#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN +#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST uid_t old_uid = getuid(); gid_t old_gid = getgid(); #endif if (pw == NULL) fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given"); if (temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective"); debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid); if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); #ifdef __APPLE__ /* * OS X requires initgroups after setgid to opt back into * memberd support for >16 supplemental groups. */ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("initgroups %.100s %u: %.100s", pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); #endif if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0) fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); -#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN +#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST /* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */ if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 && (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1)) fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__); #endif /* Verify GID drop was successful */ if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) { fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)", __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(), (u_int)pw->pw_gid); } -#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN +#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */ if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid && (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1)) fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__); #endif /* Verify UID drop was successful */ if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) { fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)", __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), (u_int)pw->pw_uid); } } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/version.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/version.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/version.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.75 2015/08/21 03:45:26 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.76 2016/02/23 09:14:34 djm Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ -#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.1" +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.2" #define SSH_PORTABLE "p2" #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE -#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20160125" +#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20160310" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) #else #define OPENSSL_VERSION "without OpenSSL" #endif Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,96 +1,106 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.32 2015/04/24 01:36:01 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.33 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" + +void +ssh_malloc_init(void) +{ +#if defined(__OpenBSD__) + extern char *malloc_options; + + malloc_options = "S"; +#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */ +} void * xmalloc(size_t size) { void *ptr; if (size == 0) fatal("xmalloc: zero size"); ptr = malloc(size); if (ptr == NULL) fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size); return ptr; } void * xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *ptr; if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0) fatal("xcalloc: zero size"); if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX"); ptr = calloc(nmemb, size); if (ptr == NULL) fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size * nmemb); return ptr; } void * xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *new_ptr; new_ptr = reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size); if (new_ptr == NULL) fatal("xreallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)", nmemb, size); return new_ptr; } char * xstrdup(const char *str) { size_t len; char *cp; len = strlen(str) + 1; cp = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(cp, str, len); return cp; } int xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int i; va_start(ap, fmt); i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL) fatal("xasprintf: could not allocate memory"); return (i); } Index: releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h (revision 296853) @@ -1,25 +1,26 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.15 2015/04/24 01:36:01 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.16 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo * * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ +void ssh_malloc_init(void); void *xmalloc(size_t); void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t); void *xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); char *xstrdup(const char *); int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); Index: releng/10.3/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,23 +1,20 @@ # PAM module for SSH # $FreeBSD$ SSHDIR= ${.CURDIR}/../../../../crypto/openssh LIB= pam_ssh MAN= pam_ssh.8 SRCS= pam_ssh.c -# required when linking with a dynamic libssh -SRCS+= roaming_dummy.c - -WARNS?= 3 +WARNS?= 5 CFLAGS+= -I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h DPADD= ${LIBSSH} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBCRYPT} LDADD= -lssh -lcrypto -lcrypt USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c (revision 296853) @@ -1,441 +1,444 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the * DARPA CHATS research program. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote * products derived from this software without specific prior written * permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define PAM_SM_AUTH #define PAM_SM_SESSION #include #include #include #include +#define __bounded__(x, y, z) #include "key.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #define ssh_add_identity(auth, key, comment) \ ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0, 0) extern char **environ; struct pam_ssh_key { Key *key; char *comment; }; static const char *pam_ssh_prompt = "SSH passphrase: "; static const char *pam_ssh_have_keys = "pam_ssh_have_keys"; static const char *pam_ssh_keyfiles[] = { ".ssh/identity", /* SSH1 RSA key */ ".ssh/id_rsa", /* SSH2 RSA key */ ".ssh/id_dsa", /* SSH2 DSA key */ ".ssh/id_ecdsa", /* SSH2 ECDSA key */ NULL }; static const char *pam_ssh_agent = "/usr/bin/ssh-agent"; -static char *const pam_ssh_agent_argv[] = { "ssh_agent", "-s", NULL }; +static char str_ssh_agent[] = "ssh-agent"; +static char str_dash_s[] = "-s"; +static char *const pam_ssh_agent_argv[] = { str_ssh_agent, str_dash_s, NULL }; static char *const pam_ssh_agent_envp[] = { NULL }; /* * Attempts to load a private key from the specified file in the specified * directory, using the specified passphrase. If successful, returns a * struct pam_ssh_key containing the key and its comment. */ static struct pam_ssh_key * pam_ssh_load_key(const char *dir, const char *kfn, const char *passphrase, int nullok) { struct pam_ssh_key *psk; char fn[PATH_MAX]; char *comment; Key *key; if (snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s/%s", dir, kfn) > (int)sizeof(fn)) return (NULL); comment = NULL; /* * If the key is unencrypted, OpenSSL ignores the passphrase, so * it will seem like the user typed in the right one. This allows * a user to circumvent nullok by providing a dummy passphrase. * Verify that the key really *is* encrypted by trying to load it * with an empty passphrase, and if the key is not encrypted, * accept only an empty passphrase. */ key = key_load_private(fn, "", &comment); if (key != NULL && !(*passphrase == '\0' && nullok)) { key_free(key); return (NULL); } if (key == NULL) key = key_load_private(fn, passphrase, &comment); if (key == NULL) { openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "failed to load key from %s", fn); return (NULL); } openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "loaded '%s' from %s", comment, fn); if ((psk = malloc(sizeof(*psk))) == NULL) { key_free(key); free(comment); return (NULL); } psk->key = key; psk->comment = comment; return (psk); } /* * Wipes a private key and frees the associated resources. */ static void pam_ssh_free_key(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, void *data, int pam_err __unused) { struct pam_ssh_key *psk; psk = data; key_free(psk->key); free(psk->comment); free(psk); } PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused, int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused) { const char **kfn, *passphrase, *user; const void *item; struct passwd *pwd; struct pam_ssh_key *psk; int nkeys, nullok, pam_err, pass; nullok = (openpam_get_option(pamh, "nullok") != NULL); /* PEM is not loaded by default */ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* get user name and home directory */ pam_err = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL); if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) return (pam_err); pwd = getpwnam(user); if (pwd == NULL) return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN); if (pwd->pw_dir == NULL) return (PAM_AUTH_ERR); nkeys = 0; pass = (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, &item) == PAM_SUCCESS && item != NULL); load_keys: /* get passphrase */ pam_err = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, &passphrase, pam_ssh_prompt); if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) return (pam_err); /* switch to user credentials */ pam_err = openpam_borrow_cred(pamh, pwd); if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) return (pam_err); /* try to load keys from all keyfiles we know of */ for (kfn = pam_ssh_keyfiles; *kfn != NULL; ++kfn) { psk = pam_ssh_load_key(pwd->pw_dir, *kfn, passphrase, nullok); if (psk != NULL) { pam_set_data(pamh, *kfn, psk, pam_ssh_free_key); ++nkeys; } } /* switch back to arbitrator credentials */ openpam_restore_cred(pamh); /* * If we tried an old token and didn't get anything, and * try_first_pass was specified, try again after prompting the * user for a new passphrase. */ if (nkeys == 0 && pass == 1 && openpam_get_option(pamh, "try_first_pass") != NULL) { pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, NULL); pass = 0; goto load_keys; } /* no keys? */ if (nkeys == 0) return (PAM_AUTH_ERR); pam_set_data(pamh, pam_ssh_have_keys, NULL, NULL); return (PAM_SUCCESS); } PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, int flags __unused, int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused) { return (PAM_SUCCESS); } /* * Parses a line from ssh-agent's output. */ static void pam_ssh_process_agent_output(pam_handle_t *pamh, FILE *f) { char *line, *p, *key, *val; size_t len; while ((line = fgetln(f, &len)) != NULL) { if (len < 4 || strncmp(line, "SSH_", 4) != 0) continue; /* find equal sign at end of key */ for (p = key = line; p < line + len; ++p) if (*p == '=') break; if (p == line + len || *p != '=') continue; *p = '\0'; /* find semicolon at end of value */ for (val = ++p; p < line + len; ++p) if (*p == ';') break; if (p == line + len || *p != ';') continue; *p = '\0'; /* store key-value pair in environment */ openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "got %s: %s", key, val); pam_setenv(pamh, key, val, 1); } } /* * Starts an ssh agent and stores the environment variables derived from * its output. */ static int pam_ssh_start_agent(pam_handle_t *pamh) { int agent_pipe[2]; pid_t pid; FILE *f; /* get a pipe which we will use to read the agent's output */ if (pipe(agent_pipe) == -1) return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); /* start the agent */ openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "starting an ssh agent"); pid = fork(); if (pid == (pid_t)-1) { /* failed */ close(agent_pipe[0]); close(agent_pipe[1]); return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); } if (pid == 0) { int fd; /* child: drop privs, close fds and start agent */ setgid(getegid()); setuid(geteuid()); close(STDIN_FILENO); open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); dup2(agent_pipe[1], STDOUT_FILENO); dup2(agent_pipe[1], STDERR_FILENO); for (fd = 3; fd < getdtablesize(); ++fd) close(fd); execve(pam_ssh_agent, pam_ssh_agent_argv, pam_ssh_agent_envp); _exit(127); } /* parent */ close(agent_pipe[1]); if ((f = fdopen(agent_pipe[0], "r")) == NULL) return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); pam_ssh_process_agent_output(pamh, f); fclose(f); return (PAM_SUCCESS); } /* * Adds previously stored keys to a running agent. */ static int pam_ssh_add_keys_to_agent(pam_handle_t *pamh) { const struct pam_ssh_key *psk; const char **kfn; const void *item; char **envlist, **env; int fd, pam_err; /* switch to PAM environment */ envlist = environ; if ((environ = pam_getenvlist(pamh)) == NULL) { environ = envlist; return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); } /* get a connection to the agent */ if (ssh_get_authentication_socket(&fd) != 0) { openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "failed to connect to the agent"); pam_err = PAM_SYSTEM_ERR; goto end; } /* look for keys to add to it */ for (kfn = pam_ssh_keyfiles; *kfn != NULL; ++kfn) { pam_err = pam_get_data(pamh, *kfn, &item); if (pam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && item != NULL) { psk = item; if (ssh_add_identity(fd, psk->key, psk->comment) == 0) openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "added %s to ssh agent", psk->comment); else openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "failed " "to add %s to ssh agent", psk->comment); /* we won't need the key again, so wipe it */ pam_set_data(pamh, *kfn, NULL, NULL); } } pam_err = PAM_SUCCESS; /* disconnect from agent */ ssh_close_authentication_socket(fd); end: /* switch back to original environment */ for (env = environ; *env != NULL; ++env) free(*env); free(environ); environ = envlist; return (pam_err); } PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused, int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused) { struct passwd *pwd; const char *user; const void *data; int pam_err; /* no keys, no work */ if (pam_get_data(pamh, pam_ssh_have_keys, &data) != PAM_SUCCESS && openpam_get_option(pamh, "want_agent") == NULL) return (PAM_SUCCESS); /* switch to user credentials */ pam_err = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL); if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) return (pam_err); pwd = getpwnam(user); if (pwd == NULL) return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN); pam_err = openpam_borrow_cred(pamh, pwd); if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) return (pam_err); /* start the agent */ pam_err = pam_ssh_start_agent(pamh); if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { openpam_restore_cred(pamh); return (pam_err); } /* we have an agent, see if we can add any keys to it */ pam_err = pam_ssh_add_keys_to_agent(pamh); if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { /* XXX ignore failures */ } openpam_restore_cred(pamh); return (PAM_SUCCESS); } PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused, int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused) { const char *ssh_agent_pid; char *end; int status; pid_t pid; if ((ssh_agent_pid = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AGENT_PID")) == NULL) { openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "no ssh agent"); return (PAM_SUCCESS); } pid = (pid_t)strtol(ssh_agent_pid, &end, 10); if (*ssh_agent_pid == '\0' || *end != '\0') { openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "invalid ssh agent pid"); return (PAM_SESSION_ERR); } openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "killing ssh agent %d", (int)pid); if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1 || (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1 && errno != ECHILD)) return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR); return (PAM_SUCCESS); } PAM_MODULE_ENTRY("pam_ssh"); Index: releng/10.3/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,63 +1,64 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include LIB= ssh PRIVATELIB= true SHLIB_MAJOR= 5 SRCS= ssh_api.c ssherr.c sshbuf.c sshkey.c sshbuf-getput-basic.c \ sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c krl.c bitmap.c SRCS+= authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c \ canohost.c channels.c cipher.c cipher-aes.c cipher-aesctr.c \ cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher-3des1.c cleanup.c \ compat.c crc32.c deattack.c fatal.c hostfile.c \ log.c match.c md-sha256.c moduli.c nchan.c packet.c opacket.c \ readpass.c rsa.c ttymodes.c xmalloc.c addrmatch.c \ atomicio.c key.c dispatch.c mac.c uidswap.c uuencode.c misc.c \ monitor_fdpass.c rijndael.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c dh.c \ msg.c progressmeter.c dns.c entropy.c umac.c umac128.c \ ssh-pkcs11.c smult_curve25519_ref.c \ poly1305.c chacha.c cipher-chachapoly.c \ ssh-ed25519.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c hmac.c \ sc25519.c ge25519.c fe25519.c ed25519.c verify.c hash.c blocks.c \ kex.c kexdh.c kexgex.c kexecdh.c kexc25519.c \ kexdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhc.c kexc25519c.c \ - kexdhs.c kexgexs.c kexecdhs.c kexc25519s.c + kexdhs.c kexgexs.c kexecdhs.c kexc25519s.c \ + platform-pledge.c # gss-genr.c should be in $SRCS but causes linking problems, so it is # compiled directly into sshd instead. # Portability layer SRCS+= bcrypt_pbkdf.c blowfish.c bsd-misc.c explicit_bzero.c fmt_scaled.c \ glob.c openssl-compat.c port-tun.c reallocarray.c realpath.c strtonum.c \ timingsafe_bcmp.c vis.c xcrypt.c xmmap.c .if ${MK_LDNS} == "no" SRCS+= getrrsetbyname.c .else LDNSDIR= ${.CURDIR}/../../../contrib/ldns CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 -I${LDNSDIR} SRCS+= getrrsetbyname-ldns.c DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} LDADD+= -lldns USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif CFLAGS+= -I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h .if ${MK_KERBEROS_SUPPORT} != "no" CFLAGS+= -include krb5_config.h SRCS+= krb5_config.h DPADD+= ${LIBGSSAPI} ${LIBKRB5} ${LIBHX509} ${LIBASN1} ${LIBCOM_ERR} ${LIBMD} ${LIBROKEN} LDADD+= -lgssapi -lkrb5 -lhx509 -lasn1 -lcom_err -lmd -lroken .endif NO_LINT= DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypto -lcrypt -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} ${SSHDIR}/openbsd-compat Index: releng/10.3/secure/libexec/sftp-server/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/libexec/sftp-server/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/libexec/sftp-server/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,32 +1,27 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= sftp-server SRCS= sftp-server.c sftp-common.c sftp-server-main.c MAN= sftp-server.8 CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h -.if !defined(NO_SHARED) -# required when linking with a dynamic libssh -SRCS+= roaming_dummy.c -.endif - DPADD= ${LIBSSH} LDADD= -lssh USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 #DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} #LDADD+= -lldns #USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/libexec/ssh-keysign/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/libexec/ssh-keysign/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/libexec/ssh-keysign/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,28 +1,28 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= ssh-keysign -SRCS= ssh-keysign.c roaming_dummy.c readconf.c +SRCS= ssh-keysign.c readconf.c MAN= ssh-keysign.8 CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h BINMODE=4555 DPADD= ${LIBSSH} LDADD= -lssh USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 #DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} #LDADD+= -lldns #USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,32 +1,27 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= ssh-pkcs11-helper SRCS= ssh-pkcs11.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c MAN= ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h -.if !defined(NO_SHARED) -# required when linking with a dynamic libssh -SRCS+= roaming_dummy.c -.endif - DPADD= ${LIBSSH} LDADD= -lssh USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 #DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} #LDADD+= -lldns #USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/scp/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/scp/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/scp/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,31 +1,26 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= scp SRCS= scp.c CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h -.if !defined(NO_SHARED) -# required when linking with a dynamic libssh -SRCS+= roaming_dummy.c -.endif - DPADD= ${LIBSSH} LDADD= -lssh USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 #DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} #LDADD+= -lldns #USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/sftp/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/sftp/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/sftp/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,31 +1,26 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= sftp SRCS= sftp.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c progressmeter.c CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h -.if !defined(NO_SHARED) -# required when linking with a dynamic libssh -SRCS+= roaming_dummy.c -.endif - DPADD= ${LIBSSH} ${LIBEDIT} ${LIBNCURSES} LDADD= -lssh -ledit -lncurses USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 #DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} #LDADD+= -lldns #USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,47 +1,46 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= ssh LINKS= ${BINDIR}/ssh ${BINDIR}/slogin MAN= ssh.1 ssh_config.5 MLINKS= ssh.1 slogin.1 SRCS= ssh.c readconf.c clientloop.c sshtty.c \ - sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c mux.c \ - roaming_common.c roaming_client.c + sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c mux.c # gss-genr.c really belongs in libssh; see src/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile SRCS+= gss-genr.c CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h DPADD= ${LIBSSH} ${LIBUTIL} LDADD= -lssh -lutil USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} LDADD+= -lldns USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif .if ${MK_KERBEROS_SUPPORT} != "no" CFLAGS+= -include krb5_config.h SRCS+= krb5_config.h DPADD+= ${LIBGSSAPI} LDADD+= -lgssapi .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .if defined(LOCALBASE) CFLAGS+= -DXAUTH_PATH=\"${LOCALBASE}/bin/xauth\" .endif .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-add/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-add/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-add/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,31 +1,26 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= ssh-add SRCS+= ssh-add.c CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h -.if !defined(NO_SHARED) -# required when linking with a dynamic libssh -SRCS+= roaming_dummy.c -.endif - DPADD= ${LIBSSH} LDADD= -lssh USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 #DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} #LDADD+= -lldns #USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-agent/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-agent/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-agent/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,31 +1,26 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= ssh-agent SRCS= ssh-agent.c CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h -.if !defined(NO_SHARED) -# required when linking with a dynamic libssh -SRCS+= roaming_dummy.c -.endif - DPADD= ${LIBSSH} LDADD= -lssh USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 #DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} #LDADD+= -lldns #USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keygen/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keygen/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keygen/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,31 +1,26 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= ssh-keygen SRCS= ssh-keygen.c CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h -.if !defined(NO_SHARED) -# required when linking with a dynamic libssh -SRCS+= roaming_dummy.c -.endif - DPADD= ${LIBSSH} LDADD= -lssh USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} LDADD+= -lldns USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keyscan/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keyscan/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keyscan/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,26 +1,26 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= ssh-keyscan -SRCS= ssh-keyscan.c roaming_dummy.c +SRCS= ssh-keyscan.c CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h DPADD= ${LIBSSH} LDADD= -lssh USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 #DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} #LDADD+= -lldns #USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile =================================================================== --- releng/10.3/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile (revision 296853) @@ -1,73 +1,73 @@ # $FreeBSD$ .include PROG= sshd SRCS= sshd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-passwd.c auth-rsa.c auth-rh-rsa.c \ audit.c audit-bsm.c audit-linux.c platform.c \ sshpty.c sshlogin.c servconf.c serverloop.c \ auth.c auth1.c auth2.c auth-options.c session.c \ auth-chall.c auth2-chall.c groupaccess.c \ auth-skey.c auth-bsdauth.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c \ auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c \ monitor_mm.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c auth-krb5.c \ auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c gss-serv-krb5.c \ loginrec.c auth-pam.c auth-shadow.c auth-sia.c md5crypt.c \ sftp-server.c sftp-common.c \ - roaming_common.c roaming_serv.c \ sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-systrace.c sandbox-darwin.c \ - sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-capsicum.c + sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-pledge.c \ + sandbox-solaris.c # gss-genr.c really belongs in libssh; see src/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile SRCS+= gss-genr.c MAN= sshd.8 sshd_config.5 CFLAGS+=-I${SSHDIR} -include ssh_namespace.h SRCS+= ssh_namespace.h DPADD= ${LIBSSH} ${LIBUTIL} ${LIBWRAP} ${LIBPAM} LDADD= -lssh -lutil -lwrap ${MINUSLPAM} USEPRIVATELIB= ssh .if ${MK_LDNS} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 #DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS} #LDADD+= -lldns #USEPRIVATELIB+= ldns .endif .if ${MK_AUDIT} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DUSE_BSM_AUDIT -DHAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR DPADD+= ${LIBBSM} LDADD+= -lbsm .endif .if ${MK_KERBEROS_SUPPORT} != "no" CFLAGS+= -include krb5_config.h SRCS+= krb5_config.h DPADD+= ${LIBGSSAPI_KRB5} ${LIBGSSAPI} ${LIBKRB5} ${LIBHX509} ${LIBASN1} \ ${LIBCOM_ERR} ${LIBROKEN} ${LIBWIND} ${LIBHEIMBASE} ${LIBHEIMIPCC} LDADD+= -lgssapi_krb5 -lgssapi -lkrb5 -lhx509 -lasn1 \ -lcom_err -lroken -lwind -lheimbase -lheimipcc .endif DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ} LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz # Fix the order of NEEDED entries for libthr and libc. The libthr # needs to interpose libc symbols, leaving the libthr loading as # dependency of krb causes reversed order and broken interposing. Put # the threading library last on the linker command line, just before # the -lc added by a compiler driver. .if ${MK_KERBEROS_SUPPORT} != "no" DPADD+= ${LIBPTHREAD} LDADD+= -lpthread .endif .if defined(LOCALBASE) CFLAGS+= -DXAUTH_PATH=\"${LOCALBASE}/bin/xauth\" .endif .include .PATH: ${SSHDIR} Index: releng/10.3 =================================================================== --- releng/10.3 (revision 296852) +++ releng/10.3 (revision 296853) Property changes on: releng/10.3 ___________________________________________________________________ Modified: svn:mergeinfo ## -0,0 +0,2 ## Merged /head:r296633-296634,296651,296657 Merged /stable/10:r296781